NAVAL

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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM: RISK

OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT ON THE NILE

by

Timothy E. Petrov

December 2018

Thesis Advisor: Rachel L. Sigman

Second Reader: Emily L. Meierding
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Since 2011, Ethiopia has forged ahead with plans to complete the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
(GERD), a massive infrastructure project meant to bring much-needed electricity to the nation and to the
region. Egypt opposes the initiative due to the perceived negative impacts associated with altering the flow
of the Nile. Ethiopia has—up until now—acquiesced to Egyptian claims on the Nile, showcasing an
inclination toward cooperation. With the GERD, however, Ethiopia is challenging Egypt’s historic
supremacy over affairs along the Nile. Despite frameworks for cooperation, binding agreements have
remained elusive and, in their absence, Ethiopia has unilaterally moved forward with the project. With
construction over 65% complete, Ethiopia’s developmental ambitions have collided with Egypt’s access to
natural resources, prompting fears of conflict between the sovereign states. Why has Ethiopia continued to
press on with this initiative at the risk of interstate conflict? This thesis examines internal and external
conditions affecting Ethiopia’s drive toward construction and completion of the GERD. It highlights internal
political and economic dynamics factoring into Ethiopia’s decision-making process and showcases external
considerations that have afforded Ethiopia the maneuver space to move forward with regional ambitions.
Ultimately, internal and external conditions set the stage for initial construction and continue to incentivize
Ethiopia toward completion.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF

Ethiopia, Egypt, Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam, GERD PAGES
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THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM: RISK OF INTERSTATE

CONFLICT ON THE NILE

Timothy E. Petrov
Major, United States Air Force
BA, American Military University, 2007
BA, University of Minnesota, 2008

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

(MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 2018

Approved by: Rachel L. Sigman

Advisor

Emily L. Meierding
Second Reader

Afshon P. Ostovar
Associate Chair for Research
Department of National Security Affairs

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 ABSTRACT

Since 2011, Ethiopia has forged ahead with plans to complete the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a massive infrastructure project meant to bring
much-needed electricity to the nation and to the region. Egypt opposes the initiative due
to the perceived negative impacts associated with altering the flow of the Nile. Ethiopia
has—up until now—acquiesced to Egyptian claims on the Nile, showcasing an
inclination toward cooperation. With the GERD, however, Ethiopia is challenging
Egypt’s historic supremacy over affairs along the Nile. Despite frameworks for
cooperation, binding agreements have remained elusive and, in their absence, Ethiopia
has unilaterally moved forward with the project. With construction over 65% complete,
Ethiopia’s developmental ambitions have collided with Egypt’s access to natural
resources, prompting fears of conflict between the sovereign states. Why has Ethiopia
continued to press on with this initiative at the risk of interstate conflict? This thesis
examines internal and external conditions affecting Ethiopia’s drive toward construction
and completion of the GERD. It highlights internal political and economic dynamics
factoring into Ethiopia’s decision-making process and showcases external considerations
that have afforded Ethiopia the maneuver space to move forward with regional ambitions.
Ultimately, internal and external conditions set the stage for initial construction and
continue to incentivize Ethiopia toward completion.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION...........................1
B. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3
1. Overview: Resource Wars and Interstate Conflict .....................3
2. Water Wars: The Alarmists’ Perspective ....................................5
3. Water Wars: The Empiricists’ Take ............................................7
4. Cooperation and Conflict: The Ethiopia–Egypt Dynamic .........8
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .....................12
1. Internal Conditions ......................................................................12
2. External Conditions .....................................................................14
D. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................15
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE .............16

II. INTERNAL CONDITIONS................................................................................17

A. RELEVANT THEORY AND CONCEPTS...........................................18
B. INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS—
DEVELOPMENT AND ELITE DOMINATION .................................21
1. The Derg .......................................................................................23
2. The Meles Era ..............................................................................25
C. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS—THE GERD AS STATE
TRANSFORMATION.............................................................................31
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................38

III. EXTERNAL CONDITIONS ..............................................................................41

A. EGYPT’S WANING POWER ................................................................42
1. Egypt’s Position of Power ...........................................................43
2. Nile Treaties and Undermined Supremacy ...............................45
3. Egypt’s Weakened State: An Opportunity ................................50
B. ETHIOPIA’S INCREASED REGIONAL SIGNIFICANCE ..............54
1. Rising Economic and Political Power ........................................55
2. Ethiopia—Central to Regional Peacekeeping and
Security Operations .....................................................................58
3. Ethiopia—Critical U.S. Partner in East Africa.........................60
C. NO FEAR OF RETRIBUTION..............................................................63
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................68

IV. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................71

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 A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................71
1. Internal Conditions ......................................................................71
2. External Conditions .....................................................................72
3. The Confluence.............................................................................74
B. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS.......................................................74
C. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS.........................................................................76
D. GAPS IN RESEARCH AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY .......80

LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................83

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................99

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 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Ethiopian Power Demand and Supply by 2030 .........................................37

Figure 2. Chinese Support to Projects along the Nile ...............................................50

Figure 3. Interstate versus Intrastate conflict, 1946–2016 ........................................65

Figure 4. Internal Conditions Argument Map ...........................................................72

Figure 5. External Conditions Argument Map ..........................................................73

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 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AU African Union
BCM Billon-Cubic Meters
CAR Central African Republic
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CFA Cooperative Framework Agreement
COMSEA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Derg Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia
DoP Declaration of Principles
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC East African Community
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GERD Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GTP Growth and Transformation Plan
HAD High Aswan Dam
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
MW Megawatts
NBI Nile Basin Initiative
NRBC Nile River Basin Commission
PIDA African Union’s Programme for Infrastructure Development in
Africa
PKO Peacekeeping Operation
SOF Special Operations Forces
TLPF Tigray People’s Liberation Front
UIC Union of Islamic Courts
UN United Nations

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UNAMID African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP United Nations Development Program
USD U.S. Dollars
WEF World Economic Forum

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my wife and children for all the love and support they provided
throughout my time in the military and especially during this period of graduate study.
They have endured a great many stresses being part of a military family. Throughout
countless moves and times apart, and with a general lack of understanding as to what the
future might bring, they stood by me. For this, I am eternally grateful. Thank you to my
advisors, who made this project possible—your dedication to duty and professionalism is
unmatched. Above all else, I thank God, who gave me the strength to persevere.

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 I. INTRODUCTION

Since 2011, Ethiopia has forged ahead with plans to complete the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD), a massive undertaking meant to bring much-needed electricity
to the nation and to the region. Given the immense opposition from Egypt, which stems
from the perceived negative externalities associated with altering the waterflow of the Nile,
why has Ethiopia decided to risk interstate conflict by unilaterally moving forward with
the initiative? Has Ethiopia’s perception of relative power changed, and what exigencies
are driving the decision to challenge Egypt’s “hydro-hegemony?” 1 Why now? This
research adds to literature on water wars and the risk of international conflict due to large-
scale developmental projects.

The argument found herein suggests internal and external dynamics have fostered
an environment suitable for Ethiopia to announce and move forward with the GERD
project. From an internal perspective, Ethiopia—an inherently developmental state—has
focused squarely on the economic advancement from and large-scale projects like the dam
have served to further political and economic aspirations. Externally, regional dynamics
have altogether changed. Egypt is weaker, Ethiopia is more significant in East Africa, and
while the prospect of interstate conflict seems high, based on belligerent sentiments
expressed by leaders, evidence suggests actual behaviors in the international arena are
highly cooperative. With such internal and external conditions at play, Ethiopia has not
only had the internal resolve to commence and push forward with the project, it has
maintained the maneuver space to continue with progress unimpeded.

A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

This study adds to research on the potential for conflict over water and energy
resources. As population growth pushes the total number of inhabitants on Earth past seven
and a half billion, increased water use and competition have heightened concerns over

1 Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony – A Framework for Analysis of Trans-
Boundary Water Conflicts,” Water Policy 8 no. 5 (October 2006): 435–460, http://doi.org/10.2166/
wp.2006.054.
1
“environmental scarcity” and the “depletion and degradation of aquifers, rivers, and other
water resources.” 2 Writing in 1984, Cooley maintained “long after oil runs out, water is
likely to cause wars, cement peace, and make [or] break empires and alliances.” 3 With the
potential to spur increased conflict or cooperation between international and subnational
groups, it is important to identify links between natural resources, development and the
potential for international dispute.

Ethiopia’s commitment to completing the GERD has certainly increased

interactions with regional, riparian states. Contention and cooperation have been part of
the dialogue. As such, this study is nested in larger academic debates surrounding the
contemporary relevance of realism and liberalism. Realists suggest the international system
is inherently anarchic, producing a perpetual struggle between self-interested, unitary
actors attempting to bolster material power. 4 Liberals contend institutions within the
international regime provide a “binding and constraining” effect, reducing ambiguity and
conflict and forging greater agreement between states. 5 Given these perspectives,
analyzing the dispute over the GERD provides the opportunity to investigate unilateral
actions of contemporary states in the international order. It likewise provides indications
of how international institutions may affect conflict or cooperation in contending states.
The GERD represents a crucial juncture in the relations between Ethiopia and Egypt.
Despite the potential for increased acrimony, Ethiopia has pressed forward with the
initiative. As Ethiopia continues to act unilaterally, questions emerge about regional power

2 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from

Cases,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 5, http://doi.org/10.2307/2539147.
3 John K. Cooley, “The War Over Water,” Foreign Policy, no. 54 (1984): 3http://doi.org/10.2307/
1148352.
4 Kenneth M. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 69, 66, 64,
105.
5 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” International Organization 36, no. 2
(Spring 1982): 325–355; G. John Ikenberry, “Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint,” in
America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry, 213–238 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2002).
2
dynamics, “hydro-hegemony,” “water diplomacy,” and the water-energy-food nexus. 6
These issues will affect future security and political dynamics in the region. For this reason,
it is important to understand what factors are driving Ethiopia to push forward with the
GERD.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section draws on theories of resource conflict and water wars to investigate
how large-scale energy projects affect the onset of conflict. While scholarship does not
directly answer the question of why Ethiopia has unilaterally moved forward with the
GERD initiative, evaluation of resource conflict and water wars informs overall
understandings of resources, development, water, and the potential for conflict or
cooperation. A great deal of research has been dedicated to evaluating conflict, as it relates
to natural resources. Investigation of the GERD dispute adds to this body of knowledge by
providing a contemporary perspective, one centered on development and regional
dynamics in Africa. Greater study on the GERD has the potential to contribute to the
conflict versus cooperation debate by illuminating the circumstances behind why states to
adopt a more conflictual approach to interstate interaction. Understanding this necessarily
requires an in-depth review of the literature on resource conflict and cooperative versus
conflictual approaches.

1. Overview: Resource Wars and Interstate Conflict

Scholars debate the extent to which natural resources drive conflict. Those arguing
that resource wars exist point to the convergence of population expansion, scarcity, and
competition increasing tension between actors. This junction between resources and
conflict is by no means a novel concept. It harkens back to what Hobbes described in
Leviathan as the inevitability of conflict due to contending interests: “two men [desiring]

6 Zeitoun and Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony”; Hala Nasr and Andreas Neef, “Ethiopia’s Challenge to
Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile River Basin: The Case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,”
Geopolitics 21, no. 4 (2016): 972, http://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1209740; Ibrahim Ismail and A.
Refaat, “Water Food and Energy Sustainability Nexus” (paper presented at International Conference on
Sustainable Futures (ICSF), Applied Science University, Bahrain), October 2017,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321579870_Water_Food_and_Energy_Sustainability_Nexus.
3
the same thing, which nevertheless they both cannot enjoy, [ultimately leading them to]
become enemies.” 7 While this is but a micro-level expression of resource conflict, the
underlying principle holds true at the macro level. As Sprout and Sprout showcased in
1968, resource availability rarely proved adequate enough to satiate desires of sovereigns,
especially when coupled with increased demands from subjugated populations. 8
International discord is noted as a product of “domestic growth and the external expansion
of interest; competition for resources, markets, superiority in arms, and strategic advantage;
and the dynamics of crisis.” 9 As such, modernization and developmental efforts throughout
history reflect a continuance of the struggle to subsist in a world of finite—sometimes
scarce—resources.

This study provides a contemporary take because Ethiopia is in a unique stage of

industrialization and development, seeking to maximize use of all available resources. 10
While Ethiopia persistently exhibited characteristics of a developmental state throughout
history, the GERD represents the first instance of an internal developmental agenda in
Ethiopia crossing a threshold into the realm of international contest. As energy is the most
fundamental driver of global economic prosperity, and as Ethiopia continues to exploit the
Nile as a source of hydropower, contending interests with Egypt may once again promote
Hobbesian divisiveness. 11

In the debate surrounding “resource conflict,” there are two camps. The first group
represents a school of thought which sees resources, the acquisition thereof, and subsequent

7Arash Abizadeh, “Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory,” The American Political
Science Review 105, no. 2 (2011): 300, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41495067.
8 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, “The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources,”
World Politics 20, no. 4 (1968): 661, http://doi.org/10.2307/2009688.
9 Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International
Violence, (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1975): 14.
10 Alex Gray, “Ethiopia is Africa’s Fastest-Growing Economy,” World Economic Forum, May 4,
2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/ethiopia-africa-fastest-growing-economy/.
11 Huiyi Chen and Ashok Swain, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Evaluating Its
Sustainability Standard and Geopolitical Significance,” Energy Development Frontier 3, no. 1 (March
2014): 11–12; Bekele Bayissa, “A Review of the Ethiopian Energy Policy and Biofuels Strategy,” in Digest
of Ethiopia’s National Policies, Strategies and Programs, ed. Taye Assefa, 209–238 (Addis Ababa: Forum
for Social Studies (FSS), 2008), 209.
4
development efforts as fundamental drivers of conflict. 12 Water is identified as a subset of
overall resources, and as such, a point of contention. The counter to the “conflict” narrative
is the “cooperation” perspective. This camp notes that transboundary water resources have
assuredly increased interactions between states, but that overall, such exchanges have
produced markedly more agreement than disagreement. 13 Though expansion, scarcity, and
competition have the potential to increase tension, the incentive to cooperate and engage
in water diplomacy consistently prevailed. 14 Both camps are explored in greater detail
below.

2. Water Wars: The Alarmists’ Perspective

There are a number of authors who have emphasized the potential for water
conflict. Starr discussed water conflict in the Middle East and Africa. 15 She highlighted
upticks in population, increased water use, and the depletion of overall supplies as
aggravators of conflict. 16 Starr noted that throughout the Middle East, water disputes
fostered heighted levels of aggression. Iraq, Syria, and Turkey proved to be particularly
aggressive actors. Exchanges included proposals to attack the Ataturk Dam and Turkish
aircraft being shot down by Syrian forces. 17 Such belligerent confrontations prompted

12 See Sprout and Sprout, “The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources”; Cooley,
“The War Over Water.”; Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict.”; Peter H. Gleick,
“Environment and Security: The Clear Connections,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47, no. 3 (1991): 19–
20, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1991.11459956; Joyce R. Starr, “Water Wars,” Foreign Policy, no.
82 (1991): 17–36, http://doi.org/10.2307/1148639; Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of
Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001).
13 See Aaron T. Wolf, “‘Water Wars’ and Water Reality: Conflict and Cooperation Along
International Waterways,” in Environmental Change, Adaptation and Security, ed. S. C. Lonergan, 251–
265 (Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1999); Juha I. Uitto and Aaron T. Wolf, “Water Wars?
Geographical Perspectives: Introduction,” The Geographical Journal 168, no. 4 (2002): 289–292,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3451472; Shim Yoffe, Aaron T. Wolf, and Mark Giordano, “Conflict and
Cooperation Over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators of Basins At RISR,” Journal of the
American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 39, no. 5 (October 2003): 1109–1126, https://doi.org/
10.1111/j.1752-1688.2003.tb03696.x.
14 Hala Nasr & Andreas Neef, “Ethiopia’s Challenge to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile River Basin:
The Case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Geopolitics 21, no 4 (July 2016): 973, http://doi.org/
10.1080/14650045.2016.1209740.
15 Starr, “Water Wars.”
16 Ibid., 17–18.
17 Ibid., 31.

5
Starr to conclude: “Water security will soon rank with military security in the war rooms
of defense ministries.” 18

Gleick was similarly adamant about the connection between water, as a contested
resource, and conflict. He saw a definitive cause for concern, as structural forces continued
to guide nations towards increased competition and dispute. It was not just incongruence
in the distribution of natural resources between countries, but rather, scarcity was a product
of increased demand due to population growth, rises in the standard of living, and negative
implications associated with climate change. 19 According to Gleick, changed conditions
warranted a reevaluation of contemporary understandings of security and threat, to address
“resource and environmental problems that reduce the quality of life and result in increased
competition and tensions among sub national or national groups.” 20

Klare likewise believed competition over resources provoked conflict. He noted

fresh water is a particularly divisive issue, because sources are unevenly distributed
throughout the planet and disproportionately appropriated to stronger states through
multilateral arrangements. 21 Transnational watercourses remain “a chronic source of
tension” between actors because when flow is altered or subsides, “the political
environment deteriorates, [and] tensions often reach a breaking point.” 22 Competition
ultimately drives “econocentric security policy…[with] increased emphasis on resource
protection” by those with the capacity to do so. 23

There have certainly been a number of incidents involving water disputes and the
mobilization of military forces. Hostilities between Israel, Syria, and Jordan showcased
“attempts by each side to divert water from the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers,” while
altercations “between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq [occurred] over the construction of dams on

18 Ibid., 19.
19 Peter H. Gleick, “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International
Security,” International Security 18, no. 1 (1993): 79, http://doi.org/10.2307/2539033.
20 Gleick, “Water and Conflict,” 82.
21 Klare, Resource Wars,144–145.
22 Ibid., 146–147.
23 Ibid., 14.

6
the Euphrates River.” 24 An altogether separate contest occurred over the Ussuri River,
prompting “armed confrontation between China and the Soviet Union in 1969.” 25 This
suggests, at a minimum, the potential for conflict over water. There are, however, concerns
about the aforementioned perspectives because they overstate the frequency of water wars
and ignore historic levels of cooperation between riparian states. Both of these factors are
discussed below.

3. Water Wars: The Empiricists’ Take

The counter to the conflict narrative is a cooperation perspective. Simply put, it

revolves around the reality that water has historically not prompted armed conflict, and at
times, inspires cooperation over conflict. 26 Indeed, the onset of conflict has never been
associated with contestation of water rights. 27 Throughout the literature on wars between
nations, even stretching back hundreds of years, there have been no large-scale examples
of material conflict or mobilization of forces occurring on the basis of water disputes. 28

Contrary to the conflict view, history is rife with examples of increased

cooperation, even when dealing with the most belligerent of rivals. This may be tied to
international intervention. Tir and Stinnet (2011) provide evidence of cooperation fostered
by institutions, whereby the contentious issue of water has been managed by international
agencies, ultimately leading states to interact and “stop short of full-scale war.” 29

24 Paul R. Hensel, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Thomas E. Sowers, “Conflict Management of
Riparian Disputes,” Political Geography 25, no 4 (2006): 384, https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.polgeo.2005.11.001.
25 Hans Petter Wollebæk Toset, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Håvard Hegre, “Shared Rivers and Interstate
Conflict,” Political Geography 19, 8 (2000): 980, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298(00)00038-X.
26 Nils Petter, Gleditsch, Kathryn Furlong, Håvard Hegre, Bethany Lacina, and Taylor Owen,
“Conflicts Over Shared Rivers: Resource Scarcity or Fuzzy Boundaries?” Political Geography 25, no. 4
(May 2006): 379, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.02.004.
27 Wolf, “‘Water Wars’ and Water Reality.”
28 Wolf, “‘Water Wars’ and Water Reality”; Uitto and Wolf, “Water Wars? Geographical
Perspectives.”; Fiona Fintan and Imeru Tamrat, “Spilling Blood over Water? The Case of Ethiopia,” in
Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts, ed. Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman, 243–319
(Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2002).
29 Jaroslav Tir,and Douglas M. Stinnett, “The Institutional Design of Riparian Treaties: The Role of
River Issues,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no. 4 (2011): 608, https://doi.org/
10.1177%2F0022002710393917.
7
Following the logic of conflict over cooperation, countries like India and Pakistan should
have fought numerous wars over the Indus River. 30 Instead, these actors found a route to
an agreement—that is, with the help of organizations like the World Bank. 31 Throughout
the globe, some three thousand-plus water treaties highlight extensive cooperation between
nations, as well as the role of international intervention, in assuring fresh water sources
were not endangered by the outbreak of violence. 32

Even when cooperation between actors has been absent, states have seemed to
avoid war over water. Downplaying concerns about international conflict due to increased
water use, Allan (2002) documented the how riparian states along the Jordan Basin
managed the stress of limited water supplies. One state simply shifted to importing
agricultural necessities, effectively offsetting those enterprises which consumed the most
water resources. 33 Rather than choosing conflict or even cooperation, unilateral options
existed outside of these constraints. This, at a minimum, suggests states seek alternative
means of resolving water concerns.

4. Cooperation and Conflict: The Ethiopia–Egypt Dynamic

With regard to the GERD dispute, Ethiopia has, up until now, accepted Egyptian
dominance over affairs along the Nile. Egypt has maintained a position of power since the
early 20th century; the 1929 and 1959 Nile agreements not only guaranteed a set amount of
water each year, but also provided Egypt with a “veto power” against upstream
developmental efforts which jeopardized flow. 34 Ethiopia’s minimal dam construction

30 Undala Alam, “Questioning the Water Wars Rationale: A Case Study of The Indus Waters
Treaty,” The Geographical Journal 168 (2002): 341–353, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0016-
7398.2002.00060.x.
31 Alam, “Questioning the Water Wars Rationale.”
32 Yoffe, Wolf, Giordano, “Conflict and Cooperation Over International Freshwater Resources.”
33 John Anthony Allan, “Hydro-Peace in the Middle East: Why No Water Wars? A Case Study of the
Jordan River Basin,” SAIS Review 22, no. 2 (2002): 255–272, http://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2002.0027.
34 Peter Engelke and Howard Passell, From The Gulf To The Nile: Water Security in an Arid Region
(Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 2017), 11, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03704; Ana Elisa Cascão,
“Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin: Unilateralism Vs. Cooperation?” Water Alternatives
2, No. 2 (2009): 245; Zeitoun and Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony,” 447, 435; Salman M. A. Salman, “The
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: The Road to The Declaration of Principles and The Khartoum
Document,” Water International 41, no. 4 (2016): 513, http://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2016.1170374.
8
indicates an acquiescence and an inclination towards cooperation. With the GERD project,
however, it appears evident that Ethiopia is challenging this norm. As such, leveraging the
conflict versus cooperation debate may provide insight into Ethiopia’s rationale for moving
forward. Interestingly, a look at the historical narrative indicates both conflict and
cooperation have been part of the dispute.

Clashes over the Nile have long captivated the attention of statesmen and scholars
alike. Egypt’s former President Anwar Sadat famously described the Nile waters as “a
matter of life or death.” 35 These sentiments were echoed by Egypt’s former Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, who likewise declared “the next war in our
region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics.” 36 From a more contemporary
perspective, in 2013, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi said that “all options” were being
considered to prevent disruption of water supplies. 37 The Ethiopian government promptly
rebuffed the declaration stating: “Ethiopia is not intimidated by Egypt’s psychological
warfare and won’t halt the dam’s construction, even for seconds.” 38 This was consistent
with past sentiments of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi who stated: “I am not worried that
the Egyptians will suddenly invade Ethiopia….Nobody who has tried that has lived to tell
the story. I don’t think the Egyptians will be any different and I think they know that.”39
On the surface, the statements are clear saber-rattling. Deeper investigation, however,
reveals that recurrent salvos of inflammatory rhetoric have been walked back time and time
again, in an effort to quell belligerence. 40 The question is whether Ethiopia’s language,
coupled with continued unilateral activity, is indicative of substantive change.

35 Gleick, “Environment and Security,” 19–20.

36 Ibid.
37 Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia Dismisses Egypt’s ‘Psychological Warfare’ on Dam,” Reuters, June 11,
2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-egypt-nile-idUSBRE95A0X620130611.
38 Ibid
39 Barry Malone, “Ethiopian PM Warns Egypt of Nile War,” Reuters, November 23, 2010,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-egypt-meles-idUSTRE6AM5V820101123.
40 Ahmed Maher, “Egyptian Politicians Caught in On-Air Ethiopia Dam Gaffe,” BBC News, June 4,
2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22771563.
9
 Some analysts view the construction of the dam as a complete “game changer,” an
event shifting regional hegemony in favor of Ethiopia. 41 The construction of the GERD
represents an inflection point in the relations between the two countries, where Ethiopia’s
developmental agenda now constitutes a distinct “counterhegemonic power play.” 42 It is
clear Ethiopia seeks to exploit the Nile as a source of hydropower. What is less clear is the
extent to which Ethiopia is willing to exert influence, sustain unilateral activities, and upset
regional power dynamics. According to Verhoeven (2013), this is well underway. Indeed
“the technocratic logic underpinning Ethiopia’s unprecedented push to become Africa’s
‘hydro-superpower’ is sound …. [and represents] the regime’s boldest attempt at
transforming” the state and the region. 43 Simply put, Egypt’s historic claim to the Nile is
being contested, and some scholars contend, contestation is a preliminary phase to genuine
conflict over regional hegemony. 44 This however, does not mean violence between states
is imminent. Cooperation can prevail.

Literature indicates that Ethiopia and Egypt have historically maintained a strategic
dialogue on the contentious issue of the GERD. This ultimately led to the Declaration of
Principles (DoP) and the Khartoum Document. 45 The DoP, later reinforced by the
Khartoum Document, codified a new era of cooperation along the Nile, with a gravitation
away from the historical rights of Egypt and a new focus on development efforts benefitting
all riparian states. 46 This shows a continued reliance on cooperation rather than resorting

41 Rawia Tawfik, “Reconsidering Counter-Hegemonic Dam Projects: The Case of The Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” Water Policy 18, no. 5 (October 2016): 1033–1052, http://doi.org/10.2166/
wp.2016.162; Salman, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.”
42 Hala Nasr and Andreas Neef, “Ethiopia’s Challenge to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile River
Basin,” 969.
43 Harry Verhoeven, “The Politics of African Energy Development: Ethiopia’s Hydro-agricultural
State-building Strategy and Clashing Paradigms of Water Security,” Philosophical Transactions:
Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 371, no. 2002 (2013): 6, http://www.jstor.org/stable/
42583071.
44 Hamdy A. Hassan, “Contending Hegemony and The New Security Systems in Africa,” African
Journal of Political Science and International Relations 9 no. 5 (May 2015): 159–169http://doi.org/
10.5897/AJPSIR2015.0772; Ana Elisa Cascão, “Ethiopia–Challenges to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile
Basin,” Water Policy 10 no. 2 (November 2008): 13, http://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2008.206.
45 Salman, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.”
46 Ibid.

10
to conflict. In fact, even at the height of tensions—during the initial diversion of waters in
anticipation of the greater excavation project in 2013—armed conflict between the two
nations was unlikely. 47 Meeting between Egypt and Ethiopia seemingly showcase a low
risk of conflict and an intent to shift from unilateral, antagonistic rhetoric to preserving
stability and regional cooperation. 48 This may be influencing Ethiopia’s overall
calculations of risk.

Some researchers suggest cooperation may have less to do with maintaining cordial
relations than a genuine fear of the deleterious effects of militarized confrontation between
the nations. 49 War risks deterioration and contamination of a river; a mutually assured
destruction by ruining life-sustaining supplies of water. 50 With millions of individuals
dependent on the Nile River, and millions more already lacking sustained access to fresh
water sources, the incentive to cooperate is evident. 51

Despite the aforementioned frameworks for cooperation, binding agreements to set

and guarantee allocations of water remain elusive. 52 In their absence, Ethiopia has pressed
forward with construction. Continued construction suggests the benefits of development
outweigh any perceived costs associated with conflict. The GERD dispute provides an
opportunity to understand the circumstances under which cooperative relationships may
become more conflictual. Investigation fosters greater understanding of how and why

47 Goitom Gebreluel, “Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa’s Oldest Geopolitical
Rivalry?” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 2 (2014): 26http://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.926207
48 Peter Kagwanja, “Calming the Waters: The East African Community and Conflict over the Nile
Resources,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 1, no. 3 (2007): 321–337, http://doi.org/10.1080/
17531050701625565.
49 Seifulaziz Milas, “Egypt/Ethiopia: There Will Be No Water War in the Nile Basin Because No One
Can Afford It,” African Arguments, June 10, 2013, http:// africanarguments.org/2013/06/10/egyptethiopia-
there-will-be-no-water-war-in-the-nilebasin-because-no-one-can-afford-it-by-seifulaziz-milas/.
50 Gebreluel, “Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam,” 33.
51 “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Conflict and Water Diplomacy in the Nile Basin,” in
Water Diplomacy in Action: Contingent Approaches to Managing Complex Water Problems, edited by
Shafiqul Islam and Kaveh Madani, 253–262 (London: Anthem Press, 2017): 253.
52 Dale Whittington, John Waterbury, and Marc Jeuland, “The Grand Renaissance Dam and Prospects
for Cooperation on the Eastern Nile,” Water Policy 16, no. 4 (August 2014): 595–608, http://dx.doi.org/
10.2166/wp.2014.011; Daniel Mumbere, “Ethiopia Unhappy With Egypt’s ‘Unconstructive’ Comments On
Nile Dam Project,” Africa News, 12 May 2018, www.africanews.com/2018/05/12/ethiopia-unhappy-with-
egypt-s-unconstructive-comments-on-nile-dam-project/.
11
states become aggressive, given competition over water. In order to do this, however, there
must be a baseline understanding of the factors driving Ethiopia to behave this way.

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The core issue investigated in this study is the connection between development of
water resources and conflict. Building on the water war debate introduced in the literature
review, the question of why Ethiopia decided to move forward with the GERD generates
two overarching explanations, with a number of nested hypotheses. From a more general
perspective, explanations for Ethiopia’s decisions stem from internal and external sources.
This is obvious, as internal and external pressures drive states to act and respond. As such,
the below hypotheses are separated into internal and external dynamics affecting Ethiopia.

1. Internal Conditions

The first hypothesis is that internal political considerations are driving Ethiopia
towards completion of the GERD. To begin, Ethiopia stands out as an exception to
common conceptions of African statehood and development. While European imperialism
shaped the trajectory of other states in Africa, Ethiopia was neither settled, colonized, nor
exploited as a base of operations for extracting natural resources. This uniqueness helped
to set the state on an altogether different course, one which—through necessity—
strengthened centralized authority and focused government efforts on internal
development. 53 Ethiopia has a legacy of elites dominating economic affairs and has also

53 Christopher Clapham, ”Ethiopian Development: The Politics of Emulation,” Commonwealth &

Comparative Politics, 44, no. 1 (2006): 138, http://doi.org/10.1080/14662040600624536.
12
showcased a willingness to pursue an aggressive, state-led, developmental agenda. 54 As
such, internal political dynamics must be evaluated. 55

The second hypothesis is that improved economic conditions are driving the
government’s decision-making process. Ethiopia is at a stage of economic development
which requires greater amounts of energy. Throughout history, developing nations have
leveraged natural resources—such as wood or coal—to produce energy commensurate
with the corresponding stage of development. 56 Indeed, during industrialization periods,
the demand for energy spikes and growth in energy production is deemed vital to continued
expansion and progress. 57 This is the case, at present, in Ethiopia. With some 90 million
citizens and a burgeoning economy, energy needs are real and pressing. According to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the GERD is a direct response to “Ethiopia’s expanding energy
needs…fast-growing economy, booming urbanization, increasing industrial development
and establishment of industrial parks.” 58 This lends credence to the supposition that
economic considerations are driving the government to act.

A nested theory, under the “improved economic conditions” hypothesis, is that

growth has brought about greater availability of funding for the project. Ethiopia has

54 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have
Failed, (London: Yale University Press, 1998), 22.
55 The original proposal for this thesis included a hypothesis on large-scale infrastructure projects
diverting attention away from core domestic issues. Large-scale development projects are inherently
political and bolster the legitimacy of centralized states by showcasing government provisions to the
citizenry. Such gestures, however, also deflect attention away from domestic issues by refocusing the
narrative on muscle movements made on behalf of the people. The GERD is certainly a massive
undertaking and will eclipse all other development ventures with regard to investment and anticipated
return. As Ethiopia announced the GERD in 2011—at the height of the internal strife between the Oromo
and Somali ethnic groups—this seemed like a plausible hypothesis. After an evaluation of the historical
narrative, it could not be substantiated that Ethiopian leadership purposely leveraged the GERD as a means
of diverting attention away from internal strife. Instead, what came to the fore was a clear indication that
developmentalism was wholly engrained in the Ethiopian conception of legitimacy and rule. As such, focus
shifted to an investigation of developmentalism and the diversionary development hypothesis was removed.
56 William J. Hausman, “Long Term Trends in Energy Prices” in The State of Humanity edited by
Julian L Simon, 280–286, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Inc, 1995), 280.
57 Ibid.
58 “The Reality of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD),” Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed April 16, 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.et/-/the-reality-of-the-
grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd.
13
witnessed a tremendous amount of growth in the recent past. Despite a World Economic
Forum (WEF) ranking of 108 out of 137 countries in terms of competitiveness, the country
boasts five years of consecutive growth and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $72.5
billion.59 According to one WEF analyst, Ethiopia has the potential to maintain 8% growth,
effectively signaling a changed condition from one of the poorest nations in the world. 60
Furthermore, Ethiopia has demonstrated a commitment to securing the funding through
both internal and external sources. 61 Internally, the government has acquired 12 billion
Ethiopian birr ($982.26 million), with another 3.4 billion birr in donations expected in the
coming year. 62 Externally, the GERD initiative has generated international interest, with
China even offering loans to pay for the project. 63 As such, “funding availability” is an
altogether relevant, albeit nested, hypothesis.

2. External Conditions

The third hypothesis moves beyond internal conditions, to external exigencies, and
posits that regional power dynamics have shifted from the historic precedent of Egyptian
hegemony. This “regional power shift” hypothesis intimates that Ethiopia’s timing was
purposeful—during a period of waning Egyptian power and influence. Indeed, Ethiopia
announced initial plans to construct the dam in April of 2011. This was a merely a few
months after the Arab Spring and revolution in Egypt. This suggests a degree of
opportunism, but also feeds into larger questions of changing power dynamics in the
region. Egypt historically exerted influence on riparian states in Africa, dominated affairs
along the Nile, and preserved a position of power “through threat and intimidation.”64

59 Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018 (Davos, Switzerland: World
Economic Forum, 2017), 33, 116–117, https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-
report-2017-2018.
60 Gray “Ethiopia is Africa’s Fastest-Growing Economy.”
61 Shaul Shay, “The ‘Renaissance Dam’ Crisis,” (paper presented at Herzliya Conference, April
2018), https://www.idc.ac.il/en/research/ips/2018/Documents/
ShaulShayRenaissance%20DamEN22.4.2018A.pdf
62 Shay, “The ‘Renaissance Dam’ Crisis” 2–3.
63 Ibid.
64 Klare, Resource Wars, 158.

14
Perhaps something changed in 2011, when Egypt showcased to the world it could no longer
manage the internal affairs of the state.

The final hypothesis is that there is no genuine fear of retribution because interstate
war is infrequent and has never stemmed from disputes over water. A critical, element to
this “no fear” hypothesis is that violent conflict in the post-World War II (WWII) era has
predominantly existed in Third World countries, with outbreaks occurring at the
subnational level. 65 This leads to questions about the likelihood of contemporary interstate
conflict in the post-WWII, liberal, international order, where juridical sovereignty is
enforced without the requisite of empirical sovereignty. 66

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

The dispute surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is an interesting

case because it both conforms to and contradicts the aforementioned theories of resource
conflict and water diplomacy. As the literature suggests, cooperation and conflict have both
been part of the debate. One group necessarily sees the GERD as increasing opportunities
for engagement, with cooperation clearly benefiting all states involved. 67 An opposing
perspective views the construction of the GERD as a direct challenge to Egypt’s regional
hegemony and a legitimate driver of conflict. 68 Understanding the nature of this dispute,

65 Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,” 5; Mohammed Ayoob, “State

Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International
Conflict. ed. Chester A Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. 127–142 (Washington, DC: USIP
Press, 2001): 127.
66 Robert H Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood
in the African Crisis.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 24, no. 1 (1986): 2, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/160511.
67 See Kagwanja, “Calming the Waters,” 321–325; Gebreluel, “Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam,”
27–29; Dale Whittington and Elizabeth McClelland, “Opportunities for Regional and International
Cooperation in the Nile Basin,” Water International 17, no. 3 (2009): 144-154, http://doi.org/10.1080/
02508069208686134.
68 See Klare, Resource Wars, 158; Cascão, “Ethiopia–Challenges to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile
Basin,” 13; Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin.”; Gleick, “Water and Conflict.”;
Harry Verhoeven, “The Politics of African Energy Development: Ethiopia’s Hydro-agricultural State-
building Strategy and Clashing Paradigms of Water Security,” Philosophical Transactions: Mathematical,
Physical and Engineering Sciences 371, no. 2002 (2013): 10, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42583071.
15
as it relates to the larger debate of water conflict versus cooperation, requires greater
inquiry. This thesis seeks to address this.

This case study will be based on qualitative analysis of primary sources like
speeches and statement made by key leaders, as well as secondary sources to include data
from scholarly articles, governmental or agency reports, and newspapers. This is the most
appropriate method of inquiry given time constraints and the overall objective of
understanding why Ethiopia has maintained its current course. Leveraging previous
scholarship will aid in understanding resources and conflict, hydro-hegemony, water
diplomacy, and the water-energy-food nexus. 69 Contemporary intentions and perspectives
derived from government reports and news articles will also provide insight.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis is structured into four chapters. Following the introduction, the second
and third chapters respectively evaluate internal and external considerations affecting
Ethiopia’s drive toward construction and completion of the GERD. Chapter Two discusses
internal dynamics to include the domestic political environment, economic development,
and growth. It evaluates the three hypotheses of internal political considerations, improved
economic conditions, and funding availability. The third chapter focuses on external
conditions and investigates Egypt’s waning influence in Africa, Ethiopia’s rising
significance, and the prospect of violent conflict over water. As such, Chapter Three
analyzes the remaining hypotheses of regional power shift and no fear. The final chapter
provides conclusions which showcases how internal considerations were the impetus
behind initial plans and commencement of the GERD initiative, while external dynamics
fostered an international environment with enough maneuver space for Ethiopia to continue
with progress unimpeded.

69 See Zeitoun and Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony – A Framework for Analysis of Trans-Boundary

Water Conflicts;” Ismail and Refaat, “Water Food and Energy Sustainability Nexus;” Hala Nasr and
Andreas Neef, “Ethiopia’s Challenge to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile River Basin,” 972; “The Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Conflict and Water Diplomacy in the Nile Basin,” 253–262.
16
 II. INTERNAL CONDITIONS

Investigating internal conditions in Ethiopia provides a tremendous amount of

insight into the government’s desire to continue moving forward with construction and
completion of the GERD. In evaluating internal political and economic considerations, it
becomes evident that Ethiopia is a developmental state, that politicians have consistently
relied on economic performance to maintain power, and that Ethiopia’s current economic
planning requires urgent increases to energy supplies. This chapter is dedicated to
exploring these internal dynamics.

In an effort to evaluate the internal conditions of the state, this chapter is divided
into three sections. The first section delves into relevant theory. While scholarship does not
directly answer the question of how internal considerations affected Ethiopia’s drive
towards construction and completion of the GERD, theories of developmental states
highlight a confluence between political and economic influences. As such, the section
begins with an introduction of developmental state theory depicted by a number of scholars
but substantively defined in terms of African states by Mkandawire (2001). 70 The theory
speaks to a convergence between political and economic considerations and provides a
fundamental basis for understanding the inclinations of the Ethiopian government.
“Performance legitimacy,” autonomy, and economic transformation are also explored, as
concepts intrinsically tied to the developmental state. 71

The second section moves beyond theory to an investigation of political conditions

in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a developmental state. State-led intervention efforts, coupled with
absolute control over economic planning and management, are conspicuous and persistent

70 For Developmental State Theory, see Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the
Developmental State, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995); For developmental states in Africa,
see Lindsay Whitfield, Ole Therkildsen, Lars Buur, and Anne Mette Kjær, The Politics of African
Industrial Policy: A Comparative Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 6;
Christopher Clapham, “The Ethiopian Developmental State,” Third World Quarterly 39, no. 6 (2018):
1151, http://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1328982; Thandika Mkandawire, “Thinking About
Developmental States in Africa,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25, no. 3, Special Issue on African
Economic Development in A Comparative Perspective (May 2001): 289–313, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
23600389.
71 Clapham, “The Ethiopian Developmental State,” 1154.

17
throughout the historical narrative of the state. Elite domination was central to the state’s
developmental logic early on, and as the state matured, autocratic tendencies of past
regimes—which proved critical in bolstering the economic condition of the state—were
not only maintained but strengthened. From a more contemporary perspective, growth
became an obsession, and this is evident from government policies and official statements
showcasing economic development as the overriding priority of the state. 72 As such, the
historical narrative reflects a unique internal political condition—the strengthening of elite
domination, developmentalism, and state-led intervention. 73

The final section shifts to an analysis of economic factors driving the GERD
forward in Ethiopia. It begins with a discussion of economic performance and highlights
how improvements in the recent past have led to a changed economic condition. The
GERD, central to transforming the state internally and regionally, exists as both the upshot
of policy aimed at improving the socio-economic condition of the state, while also the
antecedent to anticipated growth and productivity. Ultimately, the section reveals how the
GERD, and the economic benefits it is expected to generate, incentivizes Ethiopia to press
forward with the project despite the potential for raised tensions with Egypt.

A. RELEVANT THEORY AND CONCEPTS

Theories of developmental states came from attempts to understand the economic

successes noted in the East Asian countries. 74 In these states, economic policies targeted
key industries for investment and expansion. Government intercession improved
conditions in certain sectors and set the stage for increased growth. The lines between
business interests and government action were blurred considerably, and in the East Asian
context, state-led intervention brought about marked improvements in economic
performance. The developmental state represented a distinct challenge to laissez-faire or

72 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/
15 (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2010), http://www.iea.org/media/
pams/ethiopia/Ethiopia_GTP_2010to2915.pdf.
73 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 22.
74 Johnson, Japan: Who Governs?; Whitfield, Therkildsen, Buur, and Kjær, The Politics of African
Industrial Policy, 6.
18
minimalist perspectives on government intervention in economic affairs, and while much
could be said about the factors involved in success, the end result was still an enhanced
economic condition in the East Asian countries.

Developmental state theory has been applied to Africa, and Ethiopia has even been
noted as the “clearest example” of a developmental state on the continent. 75 To classify
Ethiopia as a developmental state, however, certain conditions must be met. Mkandawire
suggested the developmental state has two core “components: one ideological [and] one
structural.” 76 The first component, ideology, points to the central “mission” of the state—
to direct all governmental action towards bolstering economic growth. 77 The second
component, structure, relates to the ability to enact reforms and implement policies without
being subject to interference. 78 Mkandawire further noted:

Such a capacity is determined by various…institutional, technical,

administrative and political [mechanisms]. Undergirding all these is the
autonomy of the state from social forces so that it can use these capacities
to devise long-term economic policies unencumbered by claims of myopic
private interests. It is usually assumed that such a state should, in some
sense, be “strong” and enjoy “relative autonomy” from key social actors. 79

As such, the developmental state has a strong centralized authority, a definitive

will, and absolute control over economic planning and management. This, however, does
not lead to regime success or continuity. A government could fulfill such requisites yet
institute policies which inordinately reward a select few, ultimately leading to upheaval.
For a government to persist, a measure of legitimacy must exist.

The concept of performance legitimacy, linked to developmental state theory,

likewise stemmed from studying the economic successes of East Asia. It suggests that a
certain level of repression may be acceptable to the citizenry; that is to say, the populace

75 Clapham, “The Ethiopian Developmental State,” 1151.

76 Mkandawire, “Thinking About Developmental States in Africa,” 290.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.

19
might sacrifice political or social freedoms in exchange for quality of life enhancements
brought about by a government’s “developmental agenda.” 80 Citizens view restrictive
measures as a necessary evil—essential to transforming society and reaching a level of
advancement commensurate with a modern state. Performance legitimacy has been
primarily applied to China, where the communist government has enjoyed relative political
stability due to an improved economic condition. 81 As was the case with developmental
state theory, however, scholars posited that performance legitimacy could be applied to
Ethiopia. 82 This is because Ethiopia is markedly repressive yet enjoys relative political
stability. 83 At the same time, economic growth has been noted in the recent past. This
suggests, at a minimum, some linkage.

In addition to the above concepts, elite domination over the economy—that is to

say, uncontested “autonomy” in managing the economy, without subservience to any
particular social or economic group—is critically important to underscore. 84 This is
because construction of the GERD could not have been realized without absolute control
over economic planning and management. As elite domination is featured throughout the
historical narrative of Ethiopia, it represents a necessary condition—one which must be
highlighted from the outset. Indeed, as will be discussed, elite domination led to an
obsession with economic growth. Growth is manifestly a state imperative in Ethiopia, and
with an expectation of continued advancement, energy—or rather, producing ample
supplies commensurate with sustained economic growth—has emerged as the central focus
of Ethiopia’s developmental agenda. Construction of the GERD is thus bound to elite

80 Suisheng Zhao, “The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernization?” Journal
of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 419–436, http://doi.org/10.1080/10670561003666061; Elsje
Fourie, “China’s Example for Meles’ Ethiopia: When Development ‘Models’ Land,” The Journal of
Modern African Studies 53, no. 3 (September 2015): 308, http://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X15000397.
81 Zhao, “The China Model,” 419–436.
82 Fourie “China’s Example for Meles’ Ethiopia,” 308.
83 Mohammad Ademo and Jeffrey Smith, “Ethiopia Is Falling Apart,” Foreign Policy, January 11,
2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/11/ethiopia-is-falling-apart/.
84 The phrase “elite domination” is an adaptation derived from conceptions of state autonomy—
discussed in Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States & Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995).
20
dominance over economic planning and management, and ultimately, to the ruling
regime’s power and legitimacy.

Even a cursory review of the above theories and concepts highlight a certain
applicability to the case of the GERD. Large-scale infrastructural projects in Ethiopia—
like past agricultural investments and reform—are expressions of a distinct ideology of
state-led development and intervention. 85 State-led development, under the guise of
modernization schemes, proved to be a key mechanism through which the central
government centralized authority, garnered increased legitimacy, and assured the
continuity of the regime. 86 This has been an enduring practice from colonial rule—where
Ethiopia was itself an imperial entity—to the present and has occurred regardless of the
regime in power. 87 To fully understand this, a look at the political-economic dynamics of
Ethiopia’s past is required.

B. INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS—DEVELOPMENT AND

ELITE DOMINATION

This section investigates political dynamics in Ethiopia. It reviews the historical

narrative of the state and highlights a legacy of centralization, elite domination over
economic planning and management, and state-led development. It points to elite
domination as a necessary condition for a strong commitment to projects like the GERD,
but also showcases how this condition has strengthened over time. Furthermore, this
section describes an increasing willingness by the Ethiopian government to aggressively
pursue a developmental agenda. Over time, the central state strengthened to such an extent
that large-scale infrastructural projects were immutable, dictated by the all-powerful state.
As such, the GERD can be viewed as the crown jewel in Ethiopia’s developmental legacy,
a contemporary manifestation of elite will, and an infrastructure project meant to serve the
distinct needs of the state.

85 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 22.

86 Ibid.
87 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 413; Emanuele Fantini, Tesfaye Muluneh, Hermen Smit, “Big Projects,
Strong States,” in Water, Technology, and the Nation-State, ed. Fillippo Menga and Erik Swyngedouw, 65–
80 (New York: Routledge, 2018): 66.
21
 To begin, Chinigo (2004) suggested centralization, elite domination, and state-led
development extend as far back as the Imperial Era, when Ethiopia engaged in military
conquests and instituted a quasi-feudal land tenure system to serve the needs of the central
Abyssinian state. 88 As the Abyssinian Empire expanded into the neighboring regions of
Oromo, Afar, Ogaden and Sidama, the emperor took control of all land and allocated it as
he saw fit—generally to elites “in exchange for differing combinations of services and
tribute.” 89 Similar to European feudalism, groups at periphery paid tribute, and this served
as a means of bolstering elite power and developmental discretion. 90 As Crummey (1980)
noted, “the Abyssinian social formation had two fundamental classes: cultivators and
rulers. Relations between these two were intimate and fluid, uncomplicated either by
ethnicity or by legal status…. [and] rulers supported themselves by means of exactions
from the peasants, primarily in the form of tribute rather than rent.” 91 As such, from the
outset, Ethiopia existed as an elite center and a dominated fringe. This affected the
developmental agenda of the state by centering policy on growth.

Throughout the 1950s, Ethiopian leaders recognized that agricultural productivity

was markedly low, so they sought to improve lands under the purview of the state. With
absolute control over the economy, the empire established agencies like the “National
Economic Council…to boost agro-industrial productivity and living standards.” 92 While
early developmental strategies brought some growth, it quickly became evident that the

88 David Chinigo, “Decentralization and Agrarian Transformation in Ethiopia: Extending the Power of
the Federal State,” Critical African Studies 6, no. 1 (2014): 2, http://doi.org/10.1080/
21681392.2014.853986.
89 Lubie Birru, “Abyssinian Colonialism as the Genesis of the Crisis in The Horn: Oromo Resistance
(1855-1913),” Northeast African Studies 2/3, no. 3/1 (1980): 93, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43660058;
John M. Cohen, “Ethiopia After Haile Selassie: The Government Land Factor,” African Affairs 72, no. 289
(1973): 366; Lionel Cliffe, “Capitalism or Feudalism? The Famine in Ethiopia,” Review of African Political
Economy, no. 1 (1974): 35–36; Chinigo, “Decentralization and Agrarian Transformation in Ethiopia,” 5.
90 Donald Crummey, “Abyssinian Feudalism, “Past & Present 89 (1980): 115–138,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/650660.
91 Crummey, “Abyssinian Feudalism,” 138.
92 Sarah Vaughan and Mesfin Gebremichael, Rethinking Business and Politics in Ethiopia: The Role
of EFFORT, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray, Africa Power and Politics, Report 2
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 2011), 17, http://www.institutions-africa.org/filestream/
20110822-appp-rr02-rethinking-business-politics-in-ethiopia-by-sarah-vaughan-mesfin-gebremichael-
august-2011.
22
wealth generated from state ventures was disproportionately funneled to the actors closest
to the regime. The central state—but also the church—maintained the largest tracts of land,
and as such, reaped the greatest reward from planning and management. 93 Land tenure
practices and taxes crushed rural populations, and as discontent grew, peasants rallied
around the mantra of returning “land to the tiller.” 94 The empire was overthrown by a
military committee called “the Derg,” and this early situation shows a striking similarity to
a developmental state without the fulfillment of the performance legitimacy condition.

1. The Derg

The Derg overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1974 and instituted sweeping
changes throughout the country. This era represented a shift from monarchical rule to a
pointedly socialist government. As Abegaz noted:

The Derg intensified the administrative centralization program of the

monarchy under a unitary state and implemented an unprecedented degree
of state ownership and control of the modern sector of the economy. The
country’s 15 regions were reorganized into thirty administrative units.
Imitating the nomenklatura systems of the socialist states, the regime
established parallel networks of government and party organs down to the
level of the kebele (neighborhood)—all controlled by [the Workers’ Party
of Ethiopia (WPE), military officers in the upper echelon of the civil service
core]. 95

While these changes were meant to shift power back to the people, the reality was
that power still resided at the center—this time with the party.

State-led development and elite domination not only continued but intensified
during the Derg years. The government was extraordinarily repressive and “outlawed
private ownership of land holdings over 10 hectares, abolished rural wage labor, set
production quotas and agricultural prices, and empowered state enterprises to control

93 Shahidur Rashid, Meron Assefa and Gezahegn Ayele, “Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in
Ethiopia,” (Working Paper 43, World Bank, December 2007): 1, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/738521468023444566/Main-report.
94 Chinigo, “Decentralization and Agrarian Transformation in Ethiopia,” 42.
95 Berhanu Abegaz, Aid and Reform in Ethiopia, World Bank Project 35725, (August 1999): 24,
www.documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/716401468029717101/pdf/
357250ET0Aid010reform0ethiopia2.pdf.
23
practically all aspects agricultural markets.” 96 The state nationalized all “land, industries
and property” and state-owned enterprises and bureaucracies became the central
mechanism guiding all economic transactions and developmental activities. 97 Anything
that could be taken from the people was coopted by the central government and reallocated
as deemed appropriate. This included homes or other private businesses, and groups that
lost assets or goods and received no compensation from the government. 98

At its worst, the Derg instituted policies to forcibly remove rural populations. The
government placed groups in agricultural communities, or “villages,” with the expectation
of bolstering productivity and output. 99 This developmental policy was a tragic failure.
Such actions, however, showcase elite domination over economic planning and
management, as well as the ability to impose elite will, regardless of the effect on the
citizenry.

As land reforms and resettlement programs continued to negatively affect the

population, and as famine gripped the region, “rural and ethnically-based opposition
movements” began to form. 100 The Derg “violently repressed” groups like the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). 101
This only strengthened the resolve of the opposition. Internal discord, coupled with an
external war with Eritrea proved to be too much, and the Derg was removed from power
in 1991. 102 A second era of failed developmental policy had come to an end.

96 Vaughan and Gebremichael, Rethinking Business and Politics in Ethiopia, 17; Rashid, Assefa and
Ayele, “Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Ethiopia,” 4.
97 Vaughan and Gebremichael, Rethinking Business and Politics in Ethiopia, 18; Alemayehu Geda,
“Macroeconomic Performance in Post-Derg Ethiopia,” Northeast African Studies 8 (2001): 162,
http://doi.org/10.1353/nas.2005.0016.
98 Abegaz, Aid and Reform in Ethiopia, 23.
99 Adrian P. Wood, “Natural Resource Conflicts in South-West Ethiopia: State, Communities, and the
Role of the National Conservation Strategy in the Search for Sustainable Development,” 89; Clapham,
“Ethiopian Development,” 115; Scott, Seeing Like a State, 418–419.
100 Clapham, “Ethiopian Development,” 116.
101 Flintan and Tamrat, “Spilling Blood over Water?” 248.
102 Ibid.

24
 2. The Meles Era

After the exceedingly repressive policies of the Derg era and the fall of the Soviet
Union, the expectation from the international community was to see the Ethiopian
government step away from centralized management and exploitative practices to a more
open, market-oriented, liberal-democratic model of governance and development. 103 This
did not occur. Instead, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF),
led by Meles Zenawi, formulated an altogether new model which fundamentally
contradicted liberal-democratic norms and the Washington Consensus. 104 The idea of
“revolutionary democracy” meant to blend aspects of “Marxist-Maoist ideology” with
markets, institutions, and other democratic practices, ultimately to produce a
developmental state centered on exploiting the state’s most precious natural resource,
land. 105 In delving into the intricacies of the model, it becomes evident land was not the
sole resource of interest. Increasingly, water—for irrigation and energy production—
became part of an aggressive developmental agenda aimed at the end goal of
industrialization.

Shifting to a growth model which incorporated a more diverse set of interests

required a strong, central state to guide and impose change. The leader of the EPRDF was
up for the challenge. Meles Zenawi attacked the failed developmental practices of the West,
and unambiguously asserted that the principles guiding liberal democratic governments
and markets were incongruent with Africa. 106 Likewise, he condemned the predatory
practices of states in Africa, which led to patronage and corruption, noted as altogether
debilitating for a state. 107 He believed what was needed was an authoritarian spin on
democracy, tailored to the immediate needs of the state—a state run and regulated

103 Clapham “Ethiopian Development,” 116.

104 Alex DeWaal, “The Theory and Practice of Meles Zenawi,” African Affairs 112 (2013): 148.
105 Nolawi Melakedingel, “The Oddities of ‘Revolutionary Democracy,’” The Addis Standard, May
10, 2013, addisstandard.com/the-oddities-of-revolutionary-democracy/; Leonardo R. Arriola and Terrence
Lyons, “The 100% Election,” Journal of Democracy 27, 1 (2016): 79.
106 DeWaal, “The Theory and Practice of Meles Zenawi,” 153.
107 Ibid.

25
economic enterprise that could assure continued, meaningful growth. 108 This was the only
safeguard against runaway capitalism and the depravity of neopatrimonialism. Fantini
(2013) captured the distinctive nature of this new model:

[While] the traditional developmental state model, as theorized from the

East Asian experience, relies on an independent state bureaucracy
committed to economic growth and transformation, within the Ethiopian
approach, the ruling party overlaps with state administration at all layers.
This appears in line with Ethiopian political tradition, where a single
Amharic word, menghist, indicates at the same time the state, the
government and the party in power. In particular, in the EPRDF vision, the
government and ruling elite should play the role of “political vanguard,”
interpreting the needs and aspirations of the poor masses and transforming
the country from a precapitalist to a “sustainable” market economy. 109

Simply put, the answer was to cede all power to the state, because only a strong central
government could maintain a “single-minded pursuit of accelerated development.” 110

It is important to recognize that while the government was an ethno-federal system,

Ethiopia was a de facto one-party state which limited influence from other political or
economic interests. 111 The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front initially
implemented the ethnic federalism to battle the “ethno-regionally based conflicts and
inequalities that had marked Ethiopia before 1991.” 112 Although the constitution boasted
that “all sovereign power resides in Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia,”
Ethiopian federalism showcased something entirely different. 113 Ruling-party dominance
was pervasive and authoritarian traditions served to politicize ethnicities and drive a wedge

108 DeWaal, “The Theory and Practice of Meles Zenawi,” 154.

109 Emanuele Fantini, Developmental State, Economic Transformation and Social Diversification in
Ethiopia (Milan, Italy: Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 2013): 4,
https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/analysis_163_2013.pdf.
110 Arriola and Lyons, “The 100% Election,” 79.
111 Asnake Kefale, “The (Un)making of Opposition Coalitions and the Challenge of Democratization
in Ethiopia,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 5, no. 4 (2011): 694.
112 Tobias Hagmann & Jon Abbink, “Twenty Years of Revolutionary Democratic Ethiopia, 1991 to
2011,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 5, no. 4 (2011): 579.
113 Lahra Smith, Making Citizens in Africa: Ethnicity, Gender, & National Identity in Ethiopia (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 79.
26
between disparate groups. 114 Indeed, as Kefale noted: “Twenty years after the adoption of
a multiparty system in Ethiopia, there is little progress towards the building of an open and
democratic space where parties with contradictory agendas can freely compete” 115
Ultimately, the state could execute a centralized vision without interference.

While the government showcased the trappings of a modern democratic state, to

include elections, the EPRDF maintained preeminence over all political affairs. This
dominance bled over into economic realm, as the only viable source of livelihood was
found within the party structures. The center controlled the resources, as well as the
distribution of government investments to local businesses. As Lefort (2013) noted, this
caused increased “wheeling and dealing, patrimonialism, and even predation” in
Ethiopia. 116 It is no wonder why between the years of 2005 and 2010 membership in the
EPRDF increased more than five-fold to four million members. 117 There was, effectively,
nothing but the party-state.

This new model of governance and development showcased a convergence

between political ambition and economic transformation. As state-supported enterprises
strengthened, and as the center continued to exercise influence over lands and agriculture,
the interlacing between business interests and government action crystalized. 118 As was
the case in the past, lands were repurposed for what the central government thought was
most important. Land was even appropriated for foreign investment and ventures which
directly competed with indigenous, rural populaces. 119 “Developmental patrimonialism”

114 Smith, Making Citizens in Africa, 84.

115 Kefale, “The (Un)making of Opposition Coalitions and the Challenge of Democratization in
Ethiopia,” 694.
116 Rene Lefort, “The Theory and Practice of Meles Zenawi: A Response to Alex de Waal,” African
Affairs 112, no. 448 (July 2013): 467.
117 Fantini, Developmental State, Economic Transformation and Social Diversification in Ethiopia, 4;
Harry Verhoeven, “Africa’s Next Hegemon: Behind Ethiopia’s Power Plays,” Foreign Affairs, April 12,
2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ethiopia/2015-04-12/africas-next-hegemon.
118 Vaughan and Gebremichael, Rethinking Business and Politics in Ethiopia, 8.
119 Jon Abbink, “Dam Controversies: Contested Governance and Developmental Discourse on the
Ethiopian Omo River Dam,” Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale 20, no. 2 (May 2012): 127,
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8676.2012.00196.x.
27
aided growth in terms of GDP, but fundamentally undermined democratic principles,
ultimately widening the chasm between the ruling center and the dominated periphery. 120
Marginalized groups had no voice, and as such, no recourse. The state exerted absolute
control over economic planning and management, and exercise government will without
contest.

After consolidating political and economic power, the state sought to legitimize its
position by focusing on the “existential threat” of poverty. 121 The Derg era showcased to
the world that Ethiopia was unable to prevent famine. This was a black eye for a proud
Ethiopian government. As such, poverty reduction became the fundamental basis for all
political and economic activity, and the government strengthened “state-directed
development” as the means of stemming poverty. 122

Plans for growth and development were initially centered on raising productivity in
the agricultural sector because land still existed as the core state resource. Interestingly,
agricultural modernization efforts intersected with industrialization initiatives. As
discussed in more detail in the next section, energy came to be understood as a critical
component of continued growth. The government realized dams supported the dual
purpose of irrigation and energy production. This brought about a new period, where the
developmental agenda of the state focused squarely on dams. As Abbink (2012) noted:

Ethiopia is one of the enthusiastic participants in massive dam building.

Poverty, socio-economic ‘backwardness’ and material underdevelopment
can, in the view of the state elite, be decisively pushed back by grand
schemes of energy infrastructure building imposed from above. The
building of dams all over the country is one crucial element in this effort,
next to large-scale agrarian land leases to foreign investors …. In the past
20 years—since the post-Marxist EPRDF party came to power in 1991 after
a civil war—dams and hydropower stations have been built or expanded in
a significant way… 123

120 Ibid.
121 Leonardo R. Arriola and Terrence Lyons, “The 100% Election,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1
(2016): 80, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Arriola-27-1.pdf.
122 Arriola and Lyons, “The 100% Election,” 79.
123 Abbink, “Dam Controversies,” 127.

28
 Elite dominance over economic planning and management drove state-led
developmental efforts, and ultimately fostered increased dam-building. This began with
state-led efforts. Governmental policies targeted growth as an overriding imperative. 124
The massive surge in government spending is a testament to this. As Rodrik (2016) noted,
public investment jumped “from 5% of GDP in the early 1990s to 19% in 2011 – the third
highest rate in the world.” 125 Investment in “roads, schools, health facilities, and, more
recently, railways and energy,” were critical to the state’s agenda. 126 Economic policy
fostered a measure of growth, and as a result, a degree of legitimacy. As Fantini, Muluneh,
and Smit (2018) alluded to, the government came to rely on economic performance to
maintain power and even leveraged “large scale development projects—particularly dams”
to bolster authoritarian rule in Ethiopia. 127 As such, dams served the expressed purpose of
exemplifying legitimate state action on behalf of the people. Not all citizens’ needs,
however, were represented in the state’s planning.

Elite domination and state-led development not only proved to be a persistent theme
in the distant past but were critical functions in modern existence. Returning to
Mkandawire’s definition, the concepts of structure and ideology seem to be fulfilled as the
expressed intent of the government to build dams went forward uncontested despite the
adverse impacts on the population. Indeed, carrying forward the exact practices of past
regimes, the central state paid little heed to the needs of the periphery and did not care
about the negative externalities associated with building dams. “Increased pressure and
competition” over natural resources affected the rural populations during dam construction,

124 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP).
125 Dani Rodrik, “The Return of Public Investment,” Project Syndicate, January 13, 2016,
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/public-infrastructure-investment-sustained-growth-by-dani-
rodrik-2016-01.
126 Yared Seid, Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse, and Seid Nuru Ali, “Ethiopia: An Agrarian Economy in
Transition,” in Africa’s Lions: Growth Traps and Opportunities for Six African Economies, ed. Bhorat
Haroon and Tarp Finn, 37–76 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016): 66,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1hfr23q.5; “Ethiopia Not Ready for Foreign Investment in
Telecoms, Banking: President,” Reuters, 24 April 18, https://af.reuters.com/article/topnews/idafkbn1hv1k1-
ozatp; W. Wolde-Ghiorgis, “Renewable Energy for Rural Development in Ethiopia: The Case For New
Energy Policies and Institutional Reform,” Energy Policy 30 (2002): 1096, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
S0301-4215(02)00061-7.
127 Fantini, Muluneh, and Smit, “Big Projects, Strong States,” 66.

29
and conflict between domestic groups even erupted. 128 This, however, did not stop
government plans or programs. In fact, as was the case during the Derg era, the government
doubled-down on authoritative practices and even saw fit to relocate groups. This occurred
on the Omo River, where tens of thousands of people were resettled or displaced as a result
of the Gilgel Gibe dam complex. 129 The state had the will and the ability to enforce its
ambitions.

Elite dominance was further exemplified in the public discourse surrounding

construction of the dams. Any opinions contesting dam construction were quickly
dismissed or denigrated by the central government. Protests were labelled anti-growth or
contrary to critical poverty reduction initiatives. 130 In the end, state-led development
efforts served elite interests of growth and development, and this outweighed shorter-term
concerns of those that were adversely affected.

Evaluating the historical narrative produces an understanding of distinct political

conditions affecting Ethiopia’s push towards construction and completion of the GERD.
The Ethiopian model of governance represents a unique blend of “revolutionary democracy
and [the] developmental state,” where state officials leverage a narrative of enhancing
economic conditions to legitimize central power and enact elite will. 131 A centralized
vision was persistently imposed throughout history, despite negative repercussions or
protests from the periphery. The core difference was the absolute power of the state—the
ideology (mission), coupled with the structure (ability) to enforce the plans and ambitions
of the state. This is not to say political conditions alone drove initial construction of the
GERD. As discussed in the next section, economic factors were also relevant. They were,
however, subordinate to the absolute political dominance that prompted state action.

128 Flintan and Tamrat, “Spilling Blood over Water?” 268.

129 Terri Hathaway, “What Cost Ethiopia’s Dam Boom? A Look Inside the Expansion of Ethiopia’s
Energy Sector,” International Rivers, February 6, 2008, 5, 21–22, https://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/
default/files/attached-files/ethioreport06feb08.pdf.
130 Abbink, “Dam Controversies,” 134.
131 Jon Harald Sande Lie, Berouk Mesfin, Ethiopia: A Political Economy Analysis, Report
commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs, 2018), xi, https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2496505/
NUPI_rapport_%2BEthiopia_%2BSandeLie_Mesfin.pdf.
30
Political will brought about economic advancement, economic advancement necessitated
increases in energy production, and the expectation of continued growth reinforced
incentives to continue moving forward with the GERD. This becomes clearer after a review
of the economic condition in Ethiopia.

C. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS—THE GERD AS STATE

TRANSFORMATION

In assessing internal conditions in Ethiopia, it becomes difficult to divorce

economic and political considerations. Indeed, state-led intervention and developmental
efforts have been the impetus behind past economic successes. 132 As such, political and
economic conditions must be understood as conjoined. Increased economic growth is
central to the political ambitions of the state, but initial economic performance and growth
was contingent on state-led development, intervention, and investment. 133 The nexus
between economic and political considerations is patently evident and becomes all the
more palpable when considering the case of the GERD.

To begin, Ethiopia’s economy has grown dramatically in the recent past. Though
the World Economic Forum (WEF) ranked Ethiopia as 108 out of 137 countries in terms
of economic competitiveness, the country boasted five years of consecutive growth from
2012 to 2017 and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $72.5 billion. 134 With growth rates
hovering around 10% in the last decade, and with the potential to maintain 8% growth over
the next few years, Ethiopia has demonstrated it is “Africa’s fastest-growing economy.”135
This growth has been accompanied by changing economic conditions. Ethiopia has become
more integrated in the global economy, and with labor costs just under those of Bangladesh,

132 Lars Christian Moller and Konstantin M. Wacker, “Explaining Ethiopia’s Growth Acceleration—
The Role of Infrastructure and Macroeconomic Policy,” World Development, 96 (2017): 199,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.03.007.
133 Kassahun Berhanu and Colin Poulton, “The Political Economy of Agricultural Extension Policy in
Ethiopia: Economic Growth and Political Control,” Development Policy Review 32, no. 2 (2014): s198,
https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12082.
134 Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018, 116–117.
135 Gray, “Ethiopia is Africa’s Fastest-Growing Economy.”

31
Ethiopia has already courted companies like H&M, J. Crew, and Naturalizers. 136 This
changed economic condition, however, cannot be divorced from the aforementioned
political considerations—more specifically, from state-led development efforts.

It is important to recognize the government’s expressed intent has always been to

bolster socio-economic conditions, relieve endemic poverty, and bring the nation to a
middle-income society. 137 The difference now, as it pertains to the GERD, is an overall
understanding that the ability to advance the stage is dependent on an improved energy
situation. 138 Extraordinary levels of development require extraordinary amounts of energy,
and with a newfound burgeoning economy, Ethiopian leaders prioritized energy production
as an absolute must. This is evident from the policies enacted.

In 2010, the government introduced the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP),
an all-encompassing plan overhaul the socio-economic condition of the state. The GTP
articulated goals such as “an economy which has a modern and productive agricultural
sector…an industrial sector that plays a leading role in the economy…and, [increased] per
capita income.” 139 The initiative focused on driving the nation towards a middle-income
status by 2025, a goal which incorporated a distinct shift from agriculture to
manufacturing. 140 Such a transformation necessitated massive increases to energy
supplies. This was not overlooked by policymakers.

The GTP called for a five-fold increase in domestic energy generation capacity—
from 2,000 megawatts (MWs) to 8,000 MWs, with a 10,000 MW capacity by the end
2015. 141 Though the government failed to achieve this goal within the given time

136 Alan Gelb, Christian J. Meyer, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Divyanshi Wadhwa, Can Africa Be a
Manufacturing Destination? Labor Costs in Comparative Perspective, CDG Working Paper 466
(Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2017), 26, https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/
can-africa-be-manufacturing-destination-labor.pdf.
137 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), 7.
138 Bayissa, “A Review of the Ethiopian Energy Policy and Biofuels Strategy,” 211.
139 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), 7.
140 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), 13, 49; Power
Africa in Ethiopia, USAID, accessed 12 June 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
1860/EthiopiaCountryFactSheet__2016.09%20FINAL.pdf.
141 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), 36.

32
constraints, improvements were ongoing. The most significant advancements were linked
to dam construction and utilization. Projects included damming along the Omo River and
the Nile, and with regard to the Omo River, a cascade of five dams was planned and
developed. The Gilgel Gibe I, II, and III were completed in 2004, 2010, and 2016
respectively, and after operations began, the Gibe I fulfilled 30% of Ethiopia’s power
requirements. 142 The Gibe III, with more than 1,870 MWs, effectively doubled the nation’s
total energy supplies. 143 The two remaining projects were set to add another 2,000 MWs
of capacity. 144 While these steps represented extraordinary progress towards increasing
energy supplies, they were not enough. What was needed was a big win—a massive
infrastructural undertaking to boost supplies.

The GERD, situated along the Blue Nile, dwarfs all other energy projects planned
in Ethiopia. It is the largest dam under development on the continent, and with a potential
of over 6,000 MWs of installed power, it boasts a generation capacity of 15,000 GWh of
energy per year. 145 Publicly, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs contends the GERD
is a direct response to “Ethiopia’s expanding energy needs…fast-growing economy,
booming urbanization, increasing industrial development and establishment of industrial
parks.” 146 As such, it is a result of past growth, but also serves the expressed interest of
meeting future needs. The GERD was announced in 2011, and construction began shortly
thereafter. It was deemed 65% complete in June 2018 and is projected to be finished by
2019. 147

142 “Salini Impregilo in Ethiopia: A Story Sixty Years Long,” Salini Impregilo, accessed 12 June
2018, https://ethiopia.salini-impregilo.com/en/projects/main-projects.html.
143 Keshav Rastogi, “An Emerging and Troubled Power: Ethiopia’s (Un)Distributed Renewable
Grid,” Harvard Political Review, April 16, 2018, harvardpolitics.com/columns/an-emerging-and-troubled-
power-ethiopias-undistributed-renewable-grid/.
144 “Two More Dams for Ethiopian Power Generation,” ESI Africa, October 20, 2014,
https://www.esi-africa.com/two-more-dams-for-ethiopian-power-generation/.
145 “Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” Salini Impregilo, accessed 12 June 2018,
https://ethiopia.salini-impregilo.com/en/projects/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam.html.
146 “The Reality of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD),” Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
147 “More Than 65% of GERD’s Construction Completed,” Embassy of Ethiopia in Belgium,
Brussels, June 4, 2018, https://ethiopianembassy.be/en/2018/06/04/more-than-65-of-gerds-construction-
completed/.
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 The GERD has eclipsed all other state-led development efforts with regard to
investment and anticipated return. 148 The overall cost is assessed at $4.7 billion (80 billion
Ethiopian Birr). 149 Ethiopia has demonstrated a commitment to advancing the project by
securing funding through both internal and external sources. 150 Funding for the dam stems
from taxes, bonds, lotteries, and foreign investment and support. 151 Taxes represent a small
portion but aid the overall effort to fund the project. It should be noted that the very ability
to tax internally showcases a changed economic condition in the state.

Support also stems from compulsory contributions. The government extracts

donations from civil servants, equivalent to one-month’s salary, and issues bonds in
return. 152 Though some within the state see this as a patriotic way to support Ethiopian
advancement, most citizens have little choice in the matter and act in submission to the
government’s pressure to buy bonds. 153 This again showcases a changed condition within
the state. There is money among the masses and the government is able to leverage
contributions to help push the project along. Other internal mechanisms include loans and
bond purchases from state-owned banks, investments by state-owned business, and a
lottery, which entices citizens with a jackpot of 10 million Ethiopian Birr (~ $450,000). 154

148 “Paying for Giant Nile Dam Itself, Ethiopia Thwarts Egypt but Takes Risks,” Reuters, April 23,
2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-energy-idUSL6N0N91QM20140423.
149 Michael Asiedu, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD): Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan
Push for Cooperation,” Global Political Trend (February 2018): 1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/
resrep14135.
150 Shay, “The ‘Renaissance Dam’ Crisis.”
151 Kingsley Ighobor and Busani Bafana, “Financing Africa’s Massive Projects,” Africa Renewal
December 1, 2014, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2014/financing-africa’s-
massive-projects.
152 Katrina Manson and Borzou Daragahi, “Water: Battle of the Nile,” Financial Times, June 19,
2013, https://www.ft.com/content/bc79c9ac-d364-11e2-95d4-00144feab7de.
153 Temesgen T. Deressa and John Mukum Mbaku, “While Egypt Struggles, Ethiopia Builds over the
Blue Nile: Controversies and the Way Forward,” Brookings Institute (blog), 25 July 2013,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/07/25/while-egypt-struggles-ethiopia-builds-over-the-blue-
nile-controversies-and-the-way-forward/.
154 Deressa and Mbaku, “While Egypt Struggles, Ethiopia Builds over the Blue Nile.”; Kofi Saa,
“Winning Numbers of Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam Lottery Announced in Addis Ababa,” Zegabi,
June 28, 2016, www.zegabi.com/articles/10480.
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Collectively, these efforts highlight a newfound internal ability to raise money and amass
contributions.

Externally, the GERD initiative has garnered extensive international support. With
more than three million Ethiopians living abroad, the diaspora contributed more than $2
million (USD). 155 The project has also generated interest and support from China.156
China has offered loans and provided foreign investment packages to help pay for the
exorbitant cost of the project. 157 Backing from China aligns with larger initiatives like One
Belt, One Road. China is investing heavily in Ethiopia and the GERD is one of many
interests. Indeed, China recently supported construction of a $4 billon rail system from
Addis Ababa to Djibouti. 158 As such, external sources of funding are available and add to
the newfound ability to sustain the GERD project.

Overall, the government has acquired 12 billion Ethiopian Birr ($982.26 million),
with another 3.4 billion Birr in donations expected in coming years. 159 Despite the high
price tag, construction has moved forward uninterrupted. Internal and external sources of
funding have provided the ability to continue with the project. Ultimately, however,
movement on the GERD continues unabated because the dam is central to the economic
and political aspiration of the state—to become the regional provisioner of hydro-electric
energy.

Once complete, the GERD will transform the state. From a domestic perspective,
it will bring much-needed electricity to Ethiopia’s urban and rural communities. At present,

155 Haftu Gebrezgabiher, “Ethiopia: Diaspora Raises Over U.S. $2 Million for Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam,” Ethiopian Herald, February 21, 2017, https://allafrica.com/stories/201702210172.html.
156 Wossenu Abtew and Shimelis Behailu Dessu, “Financing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,”
in The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, 161–169 (Switzerland: Springer, 2018),
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97094-3_11.
157 Abtew and Dessu, “Financing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.”; Jenny R. Kehl, “Water
Security in Transboundary Systems: Cooperation in Intractable Conflicts and the Nile System,” in Water
Security in the Middle East Essays in Scientific and Social Cooperation, ed. Jean Axelrad Cahan, 39–66,
(London: Anthem Press, 2017), 48.
158 Bashir Ali, “Under the Radar: Ethiopia’s Economic Growth Offers Opportunities and Challenges,”
Global Risk Insights, February 4, 2018, https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/02/ethiopia-economic-growth-
opportunities-challenges/.
159 Shay, “The ‘Renaissance Dam’ Crisis,” 2–3.

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75% of the nation’s residents still live without reliable access to electricity. 160 Without an
assured supply, the population continues to leverage biomass fuel for everyday life. 161
While hydropower is the country’s leading source for the generation of electricity, it is
greatly underutilized. More than 45,000 MWs of potential capacity exists within the state,
but only 2,300 MW has been exploited thus far. 162 The GERD is an essential step in
leveraging the full potential of natural resources to provide for the well-being of the
citizenry and bring Ethiopia out of backwardness. 163

The project also promises increased revenue for Ethiopia through the state-owned
energy enterprise. If economic planning works out as scheduled, by 2030, the GERD will
not only serve the domestic populace, but enable Ethiopia to produce surpluses of
electricity—enough for export throughout the region. 164 As Figure 1 indicates, continued
growth in demand will be met with additional supplies of domestic energy—notably from
increases in hydropower (blue). Construction of the GERD, coupled with efficiencies in
terms of better cabling, infrastructure, and enhanced substations, will lead to a net surplus
of electricity, available for export to neighboring countries. 165 As such, Ethiopia’s current
economic planning is set, and its success is wholly contingent on the increased supplies
brought about by the GERD.

160 Rastogi, “An Emerging and Troubled Power.”

161 Chen and Swain, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” 11.
162 USAID, Ethiopia: Power Africa Fact Sheet, accessed 12 June 18, https://www.usaid.gov/
powerafrica/ethiopia.
163 Abbink, “Dam Controversies,” 127.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy: Green

Economy Strategy, (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2011): 80,
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/ethiopia/docs/Ethiopia%20CRGE.pdf.
165 According to Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and as described in, The Ethiopian Power
Sector: A Renewable Future, infrastructure upgrades constitute some $14 billion in investments, which
include upgrading transmission lines, connectors, and building capacity at more than one hundred
substations throughout the country. Power Africa, a component of USAID, is working in conjunction with
Ethiopia Electric Utility to ensure transmission and distribution losses are minimized. (Sources: Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, The Ethiopian Power Sector: A Renewable Future, 14; “Ethiopia –
Energy,” International Trade Administration (ITA), U.S. Department of Commerce, June 21, 2017,
https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=Ethiopia-Energy.)
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 Figure 1. Ethiopian Power Demand and Supply by 2030 166

It is important to note Ethiopia is already exporting electricity to Djibouti and

Sudan, with connections that support a maximum power flow of 90 MW and 250 MW
respectively. 167 Sales of electricity to Djibouti are garnering $1.3 to $1.5 million per month
for Ethiopia. 168 Further south, the Ethio-Kenya-Tanzania power line is currently under
construction, and once complete, is expected to deliver more than 2,000 MWs of
capacity. 169 As such, there are clear incentives to continuing the GERD. The dam is not
only instrumental to future economic ventures, it is essential to sustaining current economic
relations between Ethiopia and neighboring states.

166 Source: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy:
Green Economy Strategy, 80.
167 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, The Ethiopian Power Sector: A Renewable Future, 11;
Agathe Maupin, Energy Dialogues in Africa: Is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Transforming
Ethiopia’s Regional Role? (Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs,
2016), https://www.africaportal.org/documents/14554/saia_sop_228_maupin_20160223.pdf.
168 “Energy Report - Ethiopia,” Embassy of Sweden, 15 September 2016, https://www.business-
sweden.se/globalassets/energy-report-ethiopia.pdf.
169 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, The Ethiopian Power Sector: A Renewable Future, 11.

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D. CONCLUSION

This chapter evaluated political and economic conditions driving Ethiopia towards
construction and completion of the GERD. From a political perspective, a legacy of
developmentalism and elite dominance over economic affairs has shaped government
action and driven aggressive economic planning. Elite dominance has not only been an
enduring theme in the historical narrative, it has occurred as a strengthening condition over
time. From an economic perspective, state-led development efforts have produced
economic growth but have also necessitated greater intervention and continued investment.
Collectively, internal conditions have fostered advancement on the GERD project.

In returning to the concepts of the developmental state and performance legitimacy,

a few things should be noted. The historical narrative suggests Ethiopia is a developmental
state, where the will of the elite is extended from core to the periphery. 170 Disparate
sources of information show that the core mission of the state has been, and continues to
be, economic growth. Furthermore, the government has maintained the ability to impose
elite will—throughout history and to the present. This elite dominance occurred during the
rule of the empire, was bolstered during the period of the Derg, and became absolute in the
modern era, where the government was easily able to shut down any protest or contention
surrounding dams. As such, the mission and the structure principles found within
Mkandawire’s definition are fulfilled.

So why risk conflict by moving forward with the GERD project? Simply put,
because internal conditions have incentivized the government towards initial construction
and continued progress. Ethiopia’s current economic planning demands urgent increases
to energy supplies, and now that Ethiopia has the political and economic means to improve
conditions, the GERD has morphed into a strategic imperative. The GERD is an integral
part of domestic and regional ambitions, and as there are clear economic benefits for
persisting with the project, Ethiopia is simply willing to assume the risk.

170 Moller and Wacker, “Explaining Ethiopia’s Growth Acceleration,” 198; Jason Mosley and
Elizabeth E. Watson, “Frontier Transformations: Development Visions, Spaces and Processes in Northern
Kenya and Southern Ethiopia,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 10, no. 3 (2016): 453, http://doi.org/
10.1080/17531055.2016.1266199.
38
 The GERD—Africa’s largest infrastructure project to date—represents a
developmental agenda centered on transforming the state and the region. 171 As such, it is
important to recognize the internal, developmental agenda of the state has crossed a
threshold and transcended into the realm of international contest. This necessitates a
discussion of external considerations. While the rationale for the GERD is evident from an
analysis of internal conditions, progress on the dam could not have occurred without
parallel, accommodating external conditions. Ethiopia would need the right mix of external
dynamics to have the maneuver space to move forward with the project unimpeded. An
analysis of these external considerations is what this study now turns to.

171 Verhoeven, “Africa’s Next Hegemon.”; “Ethiopia Not Ready for Foreign Investment in Telecoms,
Banking.”; Wolde-Ghiorgis, “Renewable Energy for Rural Development in Ethiopia,” 1096.
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 III. EXTERNAL CONDITIONS

The current regime cannot be sustained. It’s being sustained because of the
diplomatic clout of Egypt. Now, there will come a time when the people of
East Africa and Ethiopia will become too desperate to care about these
diplomatic niceties. Then, they are going to act. 172

—Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, 2005

The previous chapter reviewed internal considerations and provided key insights
into the motivations of the Ethiopian leadership. The government desired to progress down
the path of advancement, and the GERD became central to realizing internal and regional
aspirations. While internal dynamics proved critical to understanding why Ethiopia chose
to move forward with the GERD, it is equally important to note external conditions, which
have afforded Ethiopia the opportunity to continue with construction of the dam.

This chapter is dedicated to investigating the regional power shift and no fear
hypotheses and showcases how external conditions changed, ultimately aiding initial
announcement and subsequent progression of the GERD project. While a host of influences
or dynamics could be addressed, analysis herein focuses on three overarching themes.
During the period leading up to the announcement of the GERD, Egypt’s regional influence
declined, Ethiopia’s power and standing increased, and the overall prospect of violent
conflict between the two nations—something which was markedly low from the outset—
diminished. With such external conditions at play, Ethiopia had a unique window of
opportunity to both announce the project and move forward with it unilaterally.

The first section of this chapter investigates Egypt from the perspective of its
waning influence in Africa. It highlights how Egypt once held a position of prominence
and exerted great influence on riparian states on the continent. As time passed, however,
Egypt’s ability to compel upstream neighbors lessened considerably. The second section

172 Mike Thomson, “Nile Restrictions Anger Ethiopia,” BBC News, February 3, 2005,
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4232107.stm.
41
evaluates Ethiopia as an emerging power and “anchor of stability” in the region. 173 It
discusses Ethiopia’s economic and political dominance in the region, how Ethiopia became
central to regional stability, and how relations with the U.S. bolstered the significance of
the state. The final section evaluates the prospect of violent conflict between Ethiopia and
Egypt, as a result of the contestation over the Nile waters. Standing in stark contrast to
narratives on impending “water wars,” it showcases how the probability of conflict was
(and continues) to be low. 174 As there was no genuine fear of retribution for constructing
the GERD, the project moved forward unabated.

Collectively, these three considerations showcase an external dynamic apt for a

challenge to Egypt’s historic hegemony over the Nile. 175 Prior to an explanation of the
contest, what is needed is an understanding of power dynamics in Africa.

A. EGYPT’S WANING POWER

Egypt was once a regional leader in Africa. This was apparent and seemingly
unquestioned. Nations throughout the continent looked to Egypt as one of the first states to
break free from the shackles of imperialism. In the post-colonial period, African states saw
Egypt as a model of governance and a source of political and military support. 176 As time
passed, Egypt’s circle of influence contracted considerably. In an effort to understand the
importance of this external consideration, as well as the effect on initial construction of the
GERD, this section showcases Egypt’s initial “position of power,” how successive Nile

173 Paul Omach, “The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of
National Interests,” African Affairs 99, no. 394 (January 2000): 83, 90, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
723548; Gebreluel, “Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa’s Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry?”
29.
174 For more on “water wars” see Starr, “Water Wars,” 17–36; Gleick, “Water and Conflict,” 79,
Klare, Resource Wars, 144–145.
175 Cascão, “Ethiopia–Challenges to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile Basin,” 13; Cascão, “Changing
Power Relations in The Nile River Basin.”; Zeitoun and Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony,” 447, 435.
176 Barak Barfi, Egypt’s New Realism: Challenges Under Sisi (Washington, DC: Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 2018), 68, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/
PolicyFocus156-Barfi.pdf.
42
treaties undermined Egypt’s supremacy, and how Egypt’s weakened state opened a
window of opportunity for Ethiopia to move forward with the GERD. 177

1. Egypt’s Position of Power

In discussing Egypt, it is important to begin with an understanding that Egypt

historically displayed characteristics of a regional hegemon. 178 Throughout the 20th
century—due to political, military, and economic power—Egypt exerted extraordinary
influence in African nations. This influence could be described as benevolent or
malevolent, but ultimately, it should be regarded as extensive. As early as the post-colonial
era, Egypt assumed a leadership role in the region. Then-President Gamal Abdel Nasser
spoke out against the “European overlords” and denounced the vices of apartheid policies
in South Africa. 179 Such actions set the stage for nationalist and independence movements
throughout the continent and showcased how Egypt’s influence was altogether pervasive.

During the same period, Egypt sought to expand its reach. Egypt exported technical
experts to developing states and even allowed African students—those who were denied
opportunities to study abroad in European nations—to attend universities in Egypt. 180
These efforts forged ties with neighboring states and affixed Egypt in a position of
prominence. This unique standing was bolstered as Egypt even became more involved in
the internal affairs of African states. Egypt not only inspired Eritrean separatist movements
in the late 1950s but provided material support for Somali irredentists. 181 Egypt also
provided direct military assistance to African governments. In the case in Nigeria, Egyptian

177 Nasr and Neef, “Ethiopia’s Challenge to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile River Basin,” 971, 976.
178 Dale Whittington, “Visions of Nile Basin Development,” Water Policy 6, no. 1 (2004): 1–24,
quoted in Mohammed Yimer, “The Nile Hydro Politics; A Historic Power Shift,” International Journal of
Political Science and Development 3, no. 2 (2015): 101, http://doi.org/10.14662/IJPSD2015.011; Cascão,
“Ethiopia–Challenges to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile Basin,” 13; Cascão, “Changing Power Relations
in The Nile River Basin: Unilateralism Vs. Cooperation?”: 248; Kehl, “Water Security in Transboundary
Systems,” 42.
179 Barak Barfi, Egypt’s New Realism: Challenges Under Sisi, 68.
180 Ibid.
181 Haggai Erlich, “Identity and Church: Ethiopian–Egyptian Dialogue, 1924 –59,” International
Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (2000): 23–46, https://www.jstor.org/stable/259534; Kagwanja
“Calming the Waters,” 325.
43
pilots were deployed to quell hostilities during the Biafran (civil) War. 182 There are
numerous other examples of Egypt’s influence on the continent but suffice it to say Egypt
held considerable sway in Africa. This was even more true of affairs along the Nile River.

Egypt was the preeminent actor on the Nile. Its authority remained uncontested
because Egypt was the “most powerful riparian,” exercising a “formidable veto power”
over any action on the watercourse. 183 This unique standing was legitimized through
rhetoric and legal precedent. From a rhetorical perspective, Egypt claimed to be absolutely
dependent on the Nile waters; nearly 97% of Egypt’s freshwater stemmed from the
river. 184 From a legal standpoint, Egypt maintained that certain “historic rights” were
spelled out in past treaties, which guaranteed access to set allocations of waters. 185 These
assurances dated back to the colonial period, when Egypt was a part of the British Empire.
During this era, allocation of the Nile’s waters was codified and ensured a position of
privilege for Egypt with regard to the amount of water allocated. 186 Agreements in 1929
and 1959 respectively guaranteed 48 and 55.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) of water each
year. 187 Outside of Sudan—which was under the administration of Egypt and received 4
BCMs per year—other riparian nations were altogether excluded from deliberations. 188 As
such, the status quo from the outset was Egyptian supremacy over the Nile, and in this way,
Egypt acted as a de facto hegemon.

182 Ibid.
183 Zeitoun and Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony,” 447, 435; Salman, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam,” 513.
184 Jack Di Nunzio, Conflict on The Nile: The Future of Transboundary Water Disputes Over the
World’s Longest River, Future Directions International, Strategic Analysis Paper, November 25, 2013, 4,
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/conflict-on-the-nile-the-future-of-transboundary-water-
disputes-over-the-world-s-longest-river/; Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin,”
248.
185 Fred H. Lawson, “Desecuritization, Domestic Struggles, and Egypt’s Conflict with Ethiopia over
the Nile River,” Democracy and Security 12, no. 1 (2016): 129, http://doi.org/10.1080/
17419166.2015.1133305; Swain, “Ethiopia, The Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River,” 677.
186 Salman, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” 513; Kagwanja “Calming the Waters,” 321.
187 Engelke and Passell, From the Gulf to the Nile, 11; Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The
Nile River Basin,” 245.
188 Ibid.

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 Egypt dominated affairs along the Nile and enforced its will through threats of
retribution. 189 As Klare noted in 2001, Egypt maintained its preeminence through
“intimidation… [whenever] neighbors announced plans for a new major water project,
Cairo [was] quick to warn of dire consequences should it proceed with any such plan.” 190
Even as Egypt stymied the plans other states, it moved forward unilaterally with efforts to
leverage the Nile to its fullest potential. In 1960, Egypt began construction of the High
Aswan Dam (HAD) for irrigation and to control waterflow during years of drought and
flooding. The HAD, a hydroelectric facility, served the dual-purpose of generating 15% of
the country’s energy needs. 191 It is important to realize this massive endeavor moved
forward despite protests from upstream states like Ethiopia. 192 This showcases Egypt’s
preeminence. It is equally important to note is that while the HAD improved the quality of
lives for millions of Egyptians, evaporation in the reservoir—which accounted for 12% of
the river flow annually—represented an inherent waste for in country with insufficient
supplies of water. 193 Even so, Egypt continued with this and other unilateral development
efforts, which later came to include land reclamation—the process of converting desert
lands into farmlands. 194 Ultimately, Egyptian unilateralism inspired upstream states to
evaluate the water utilization within their own borders.

2. Nile Treaties and Undermined Supremacy

As African states became more affluent, and as outside organizations like the World
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and United Nations (under the United Nations

189 Swain, “Ethiopia, The Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River,” 685.
190 Klare, Resource Wars, 158.
191 Ismail and Refaat, “Water Food and Energy Sustainability Nexus,” 12.
192 Daniel Kendie, “Egypt and the Hydro-Politics of the Blue Nile River,” Northeast African Studies
6, no. 1–2, (1999): 148, https://doi.org/10.1353/nas.2002.0002.
193 John Waterbury and Dale Whittington, “Playing Chicken on the Nile? The Implications of
Microdam Development in the Ethiopian Highlands and Egypt’s New Valley Project,” Natural Resources
Forum, 22 (1998): 156, http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-8947.1998.tb00725.x; Fred Pearce, “Does Egypt
Own The Nile? A Battle Over Precious Water,” Yale Environment 360, July 19, 2010,
https://e360.yale.edu/features/does_egypt_own_the_nile_a_battle_over_precious_water.
194 Egypt: Egyptian Land Reclamation Efforts, United States Department of Agriculture, Global
Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) Report, May 16, 2016, https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/egypt-
egyptian-land-reclamation-efforts.
45
Development Program – UNDP) looked to improve conditions in the region, African states
began to develop water resources as part of general or internal developmental efforts. This
led to a realization in Egypt that Cairo needed to get out ahead of the problem and set a
regional agenda before upstream development endangered the country’s water supply. As
such, Egypt worked to broker deals along the Nile. These were ultimately in an effort to
protect their vital interests.

Preliminary accords, to include Hydromet (1967), the Undugu (1983), and the
TeccoNile (1992), produced very little change with regard the status quo. This was because
Egypt led the coordination efforts. Not all riparian states were included in the discussions,
and deliberations ultimately focused on “technical issues” versus direct “legal challenges”
to Egypt’s dominance. 195 Hydromet served as an initial coordination effort between Egypt,
Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. It was funded by the UNDP and sought to research
the water flow from Lake Victoria, Lake Kyoga and Lake Albert. 196 Even then, upstream
states were particularly suspicious of the effort, which was predominantly driven by
Egypt. 197 The Undugu Project included more states like Burundi, the Central African
Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan and
Uganda—Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania were passive observers—but failed to produce
meaningful change, as discussions focused on drought versus effective utilization of water
during rainy seasons. 198 Finally, TeccoNILE brought together the DRC, Egypt, Rwanda,
Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, with Burundi, Kenya, Eritrea and Ethiopia as observers once
again. 199 This process included various ministers of water, as well as an international panel
of experts, to discuss “technical assistance and capacity building” efforts, ultimately meant
to drive development along the Nile. 200 Though seemingly innocuous, due to the overall
lack of coordination between states, these early mechanisms for increased coordination

195 Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin,” 246
196 Kagwanja, “Calming the Waters,” 329.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.

46
began the process of eroding Egyptian supremacy along the Nile. 201 A shift was occurring,
away from Egyptian-led efforts and the preeminence of Egyptian interests. This was the
beginnings of a weakened Egypt. Indeed, Ethiopia, for its part, purposefully abstained from
negotiations, bucking Egypt’s attempts to control the dialogue. As one author noted,
“Ethiopians…in accordance with their old strategy of letting the Egyptians sweat, preferred
to participate as observers only.” 202 This overt rebuff marked the beginning of an era of
increased contestation.

In the 1990s, Egypt’s influence began to diminish considerably, as regional

organizations and collective efforts became the norm. The Nile 2002 Conference Series
(1993–2004) was one of the first attempts to bring together disparate states to discuss the
establishment of a “multilateral, cooperative institution” to specifically address concerns
stemming from previous Nile accords. 203 Ethiopia again took the role of passive observer,
but other participants met regularly annually—“in Aswan in 1993, in Khartoum in 1994,
in Arusha in 1995, in Kampala in 1996, and in Addis Ababa in February [of] 1997.”204
With each meeting, the power dynamic shifted further away from the dictates and interests
of Egypt to regional cooperation and region-wide initiatives.

As regional coordination appeared to be rising, Egypt looked for ways to safeguard

water supplies. This is most evident in the bilateral deal signed by Egypt and Ethiopia in
1993. This treaty, outside of the construct of the aforementioned treaties and cooperative
efforts, was the first time Egypt conceded that Ethiopia had an inherent “right” to make use
of available resources within its borders. 205 Buried deeper in the accord was wording
which showcased Egypt’s acknowledgement of being in a weakened position. Egypt
specifically sought assurances from Ethiopia that it would “refrain from engaging in any

201 Kagwanja, “Calming the Waters,” 321–325; Haggai Erlich, The Cross and the River: Ethiopia,
Egypt, and the Nile, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 330.
202 Haggai Erlich, The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Nile, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2001), 11.
203 Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin,” 691.
204 Swain, “Ethiopia, The Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River,” 691.
205 Lawson, “Desecuritization, Domestic Struggles, and Egypt’s Conflict with Ethiopia over the Nile
River,” 1.
47
activity related to the Nile waters…[which] may cause appreciable harm to the interests of
the other party.” 206 This was tantamount to an admission that upstream riparian states held
considerable power. Egypt’s hegemony over the affairs along the Nile had come to an end,
and regional cooperation became the standard.

Regional organizations like the East African Community (EAC) promoted

integration between African states, solved the collective action problem, and ultimately
produced an overt challenge to “Egyptian and Sudanese monopoly over the Nile
waters.” 207 Egypt could no longer compel states along the Nile, and with each new
collective effort, regional organizations chipped away at Egyptian influence. Later efforts,
most notably the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), shifted the dialogue from general cooperation,
to rectifying the uneven distribution of water resources apparent in previous accords. 208
The NBI defined development in terms of benefits for all riparian states, and emphasized
“equitable utilization” of the Nile waters. 209

In 2006, organizations like the Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC) met
regularly, enhanced levels of cooperation between states, and worked towards the goal of
“sustainable, equitable and peaceful use of water resources.”210 By May of 2010, the Nile
Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) established a new precedent—that
Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania all had the inherent right to use the Nile
waters originating or traversing their territories.211 Egypt rejected the CFA and even
stopped attending cooperative summits. Egypt reluctantly resumed participation in 2016
out of fear of being left out of deliberations altogether.212 This was a major blow to
Egyptian influence. Not only was regional cooperation the default, but states were afforded

206 Barfi, Egypt’s New Realism: Challenges Under Sisi, 66.

207 Kagwanja, “Calming the Waters,” 322.
208 Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin,” 262.
209 Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin,” 262; Ana Elisa Cascão and Alan
Nicol, “GERD: New Norms of Cooperation in The Nile Basin?” Water International 41, no. 4, (2016): 551,
http://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2016.1180763.
210 Kagwanja, “Calming the Waters,” 321.
211 Deressa and Mbaku, “While Egypt Struggles, Ethiopia Builds over the Blue Nile.”
212 Barfi, Egypt’s New Realism: Challenges Under Sisi, 70.

48
the opportunity to exercise “hydro-sovereignty,” the ability to use internal water resources
at the state’s discretion.213 The inequity of colonial agreements was supplanted by
cooperative efforts centered on equitable utilization. Power had shifted away from Egypt.

While efforts to enhance regional cooperation were ongoing, it must be noted that
increased unilateral action was likewise on the rise. 214 States in the Nile River Basin were
rapidly developing and taking advantage of funding stemming from external actors like the
World Bank, IMF, UNDP, and most importantly, China. 215 Indeed, Chinese support
ushered in a number of projects along the Nile and its tributaries. As Figure 2 showcases,
any internal projects that would “bring economic and political benefits at the national level”
were undertaken; many occurred with little regard to the effects on downstream states. 216

213 Patricia Wouters, “The Relevance and Role of Water Law in the Sustainable Development of
Freshwater,” Water International 25, no. 2 (2000): 202-207, http://doi.org/10.1080/02508060008686819,
quoted in Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin,” 246.
214 Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin,” 262.
215 Ibid.
216 Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin,” 263.

49
 Figure 2. Chinese Support to Projects along the Nile 217

As countries became more economically and politically stable, and upstream states
continued to unilaterally advance development projects within their own borders, Egypt’s
historic ability to compel states to adhere to colonial era dictates ceased to exist. 218 Worse
yet, instability was on the rise in Egypt, and as the internal affairs of the state continued to
deteriorate—ultimately leading to the 2011 revolution—this provided an opportune time
for Ethiopia to move forward with the GERD.

3. Egypt’s Weakened State: An Opportunity

The revolution in Egypt provided a unique window of opportunity for Ethiopia.

After Mubarak was removed from power, Egypt was altogether preoccupied with the
internal affairs of the state—especially with efforts to centralize authority and contend with
economic downturn. This was the perfect time for Ethiopia to advance its developmental
ambitions. No one was looking, and by the time Egypt’s affairs were in order, it was too

217 Source: Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin,” 261.
218 Cascão, “Changing Power Relations in The Nile River Basin,” 265.

50
late. The GERD was too far down the path of completion. This becomes clearer after a
review of the historical narrative.

To begin, the timing on the announcement of the GERD was impeccable. Even the
Egyptians noted this:

Hani Raslan, the head Nile Basin studies department at Cairo’s al-Ahram
Center for Political and Strategic Studies, said it is no coincidence that
Ethiopia announced plans to massively expand the dam and forge ahead
with its construction just weeks after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
was ousted in early 2011…. Ethiopia has aspirations to be a regional power
at Egypt’s expense…. It is taking advantage of the instability after the
revolution, especially now that there’s a weak Muslim Brotherhood
president with no experience [and] who is not in sync with the institutions
of the state. 219

After the revolution, Egypt was broken, and the government did not have the
bandwidth to contend with external issues because all “attention and energies were riveted
on the problem of economic recovery” and fixing the state. 220 External issues simply were
not the focus.

Egypt’s clear lack of focus on external affairs was justifiable. Many internal issues
needed to be resolved. Indeed, the first year of interim military rule was understandably
inward-facing, as the government fixated on quelling protests, maintaining stability, and
aiding transition efforts. 221 Even when elections ushered in a new president, however, the
focus remained on internal affairs and centralization efforts. This is evident from the initial
actions taken by then-President Mohmad Morsi. Though the revolution was centered on
expanding the democratic process in Egypt, Morsi took it upon himself to perform a full
“constitutional review,” which ultimately led to all government powers being vested in

219 Griff Witte, “Egypt Frets, Fumes Over Ethiopia’s Nile Plan,” The Washington Post, June 12,
2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypt-frets-fumes-over-ethiopias-nile-plan/
2013/06/12/d3ab3f4a-d1e1-11e2-9577-df9f1c3348f5_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f14dcafa9d02.
220 Lawson, “Desecuritization, Domestic Struggles, and Egypt’s Conflict with Ethiopia over the Nile
River,” 17.
221 Gawdat Bahgat, Egypt in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring What Lies Ahead? (Mt Edgecombe,
South Africa: African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2015), https://accord.org.za/
conflict-trends/egypt-aftermath-arab-spring.
51
him. 222 This effort, clearly meant to strengthen centralized authority, backfired and led to
increased tensions between disparate actors vying for power and influence. Egypt was not
only preoccupied with the internal affairs of the state, it became divided and weak.

Egypt’s internal weakness can be noted in Morsi’s brief tenure, which abruptly
ended in a military coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 223 Later, al-Sisi became
President. Interestingly, the al-Sisi’s government maintained a similar perspective that
“Ethiopia [had] exploited Egypt’s weakness during Mohammed Morsi’s presidency…to
secure the acquiescence of the region’s other states to the GERD project, isolate Egypt,
and violate long-standing agreements on the use of the Nile’s waters that date [back] to
British colonial rule.” 224 Despite understanding this dynamic, little changed with regard to
internal versus external focus because al-Sisi’s primary objective was “regime survival and
avoiding a replay of the uprising that toppled Mubarak.” 225 The government remained
altogether preoccupied with the internal affairs of the state. This is not to say external
affairs like the GERD never came up in the period after the revolution; they did, but they
were intrinsically tied to, and moreover heavily subordinated to, internal issues in Egypt.

It is important to realize that when Egypt discusses external issues, the GERD is a
central consideration. Indeed, as one analyst noted, Egypt “faces only one significant
external threat, the ongoing construction of the Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia.” 226 It must
be noted, the characterization of the GERD as a substantive threat is a clear attempt by

222 Nathaniel D. Danjibo, “The Aftermath of The Arab Spring and Its Implication for Peace and
Development in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa,” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 35, no. 2 (2013):
23, https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/46/1322/05danjibopp1634.pdf.
223 Danjibo, “The Aftermath of The Arab Spring and Its Implication for Peace and Development in
the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa,” 22–23.
224 Payton Knopf, South Sudan’s Civil War and Conflict Dynamics in the Red Sea, Special Report
431, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2018), 3, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
2018-09/sr_431_knopf_south_sudans_civil_war_and_conflict_dynamics_in_the_red_sea2.pdf.
225 Bahgat, “Egypt in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring What Lies Ahead?”
226 Eran Lerman, “The Keystone: Sisi, Egyptian Stability and the Future of the Eastern
Mediterranean,” The Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies, August 16, 2018, https://jiss.org.il/en/
lerman-keystone-sisi-egyptian-stability-future-eastern-mediterranean/.
52
political entrepreneurs to deflect attention away from internal issues in Egypt. 227 There are
genuine and pressing issues in Egypt. These include overpopulation and water scarcity
linked to overusing resources in agricultural enterprises. 228 While the GERD could
complicate issues already present in Egypt, “[the GERD as a] potential flash point can
[genuinely] be mitigated by implementing more progressive water policies” in Egypt.229
As such, while the GERD is regularly discussed in terms of an external threat, the reality
is that the GERD is a scapegoat for failures of policy in Egypt.

The GERD is politicized for internal purposes in Egypt. Interestingly, instead of

being a unifying force—i.e., an existential threat creating a “rally around the flag” effect—
the GERD has actually deepened internal divisions. As Lawson noted in 2016: “radical
Islamist parties and liberal parliamentarians…called attention to the threat [of the GERD]
emanating from the south, but they did so primarily as a way to mobilize public opposition
to President Mursi and the Freedom and Justice Party.” 230 This shows how internal issues
and power struggles remained the core focus of the state, even when discussing the
supposed external issue of the GERD.

Ultimately, in the period after the revolution, Egypt was weak and divided. Ethiopia
capitalized on disarray in Egypt, moved forward with planning and construction, and by
the time Egypt’s affairs were in order, it was simply too late. Ethiopia had advanced too
far with the GERD, and there was no means of stopping progress. As von Lossow and Roll
(2015) highlighted:

[Since] President Sisi took office in June 2014, Cairo has followed a
surprisingly conciliatory line. Three-party talks with Sudan and Ethiopia,
initially abandoned in early 2014, resumed in the autumn…. [discussions
are] no longer about whether or in what form [the] GERD will be built, but

227 Gregory R. Copley, “Egypt’s Instability Triggers a New Proxy War Against Ethiopia and its
Allies,” OilPrice.com, June 7, 2013, https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/Egypts-Instability-Triggers-a-
New-Proxy-War-Against-Ethiopia-and-its-Allies.html.
228 Omer Karasapan and Sajjad Shah, “Egypt’s Population: Boom Then Bust?” Brookings Institute
(blog), May 22, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/05/22/egypts-population-
boom-then-bust/; Di Nunzio, Conflict on The Nile, 4.
229 Lerman, “The Keystone: Sisi, Egyptian Stability and the Future of the Eastern Mediterranean.”
230 Lawson, “Desecuritization, Domestic Struggles, and Egypt’s Conflict with Ethiopia over the Nile
River,” 17.
53
 how the ecological and socioeconomic consequences for each state will be
measured, assessed and addressed. In early 2015, the three countries agreed
to commission an international consulting firm to prepare recommendations
and monitor their implementation. In a historic departure from its previous
stance, Cairo’s consent to this move implies acceptance of the Ethiopian
dam. 231

Ethiopia effectively used this window of opportunity to move forward the GERD.

B. ETHIOPIA’S INCREASED REGIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

In the period leading up to the announcement of the GERD, regional power

dynamics shifted. Egypt lost the ability to compel states and was ultimately unable to
influence regional organizations. At the same time, Ethiopia demonstrated a commitment
to dominating political, economic, and security affairs in East Africa. Ethiopia’s improved
standing in the region even earned the country the reputation of being an “anchor of
stability.” 232 The intent of this section is not to suggest Ethiopian supremacy has replaced
Egypt’s hegemony—though some scholars have alluded to this. 233 Rather, the objective is
to showcase how Ethiopia became increasingly significant in the region throughout the
period leading up to the announcement of the GERD.

This section highlights Ethiopia’s bolstered position in East Africa. Ethiopia’s

regional significance increased as a result of rising economic and political power. Ethiopia
dominated regional collaborative organizations and used positions of leadership to
influence affairs in the region. Ethiopia’s significance also grew as the military became
central to regional peacekeeping and security operations. Finally, Ethiopia’s increasingly
close partnership with the United States served to enhance the state’s capabilities, while

231 Tobias von Lossow and Stephan Roll, Egypt’s Nile Water Policy Under Sisi: Security Interests
Promote Rapprochement with Ethiopia, (Berlin, Germany: German Institute for International and Security
Affairs, 2015), 2, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/143811223.pdf.
232 Omach, “The African Crisis Response Initiative,” 83, 90.
233 Cascão, “Ethiopia–Challenges to Egyptian hegemony in the Nile Basin.”; Verhoeven, “Africa’s
Next Hegemon.”; Abadir M. Ibrahim, “The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement: The Beginning
of the End of Egyptian Hydro-Political Hegemony,” Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law 18,
no. 2 (Spring 2011): 282–313, http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol18/iss2/4.
54
legitimizing Ethiopian action throughout the region. With such a unique standing, Ethiopia
was able to advance strategic imperatives and realize regional aspirations.

1. Rising Economic and Political Power

To begin, Ethiopia stands out as a significant power in East Africa based on area,
population, strategic location, and relative political stability. 234 With regard to being a
legitimate regional power, one scholar noted that states assume such a status when they
acquire “domestic legitimacy (economic and political performances), regional legitimacy
(recognition and compliance by regional states), and international reliability (whether their
international alliances with various global powers support or counteract their regional
leadership).” 235 If this definition qualifies as the litmus test for being a regional power,
Ethiopia may have already attained this status. This becomes clear from a review of
economic and political dynamics.

From an economic and political perspective, Ethiopia’s relative power grew as the
state exerted influence on regional, cooperative organizations—most notably the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD was originally established
as a consortium of states seeking to combat the perils of drought and famine in East
Africa. 236 As time passed, however, the mandate of the organization evolved and expanded
to incorporate peacekeeping and security operations, economic cooperation, and
integration among the eight member-states. 237

IGAD is committed to advancing the socio-economic condition of East African

states through collective developmental efforts and regional projects aimed at benefitting

234 Sonia Le Gouriellec, “Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy: Ethiopia, An ‘Imperfect
Hegemon’ in the Horn of Africa,” International Affairs 94, no. 5 (September 2018): 1059, https://doi.org/
10.1093/ia/iiy117; Kidist Mulugeta, The Role of Regional Powers in the Field of Peace and Security: The
Case of Ethiopia, (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/
bueros/aethiopien/10879.pdf.
235 Belachew Gebrewold, “Legitimate Regional Powers? A Failed Test for Ethiopia, Nigeria, and
South Africa,” African Security 7, no. 1 (2014): 1–23http://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2014.880029.
236 “About Us: The History of IGAD,” Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),
accessed Oct 26, 2018, https://igad.int/about-us.
237 Maupin, Energy Dialogues in Africa, 16–17.

55
all members. 238 While IGAD is not the only organization Ethiopia is a part of, it is the
most significant. As one analyst noted, though Ethiopia is “a founding member of the UN,
the African Union (AU), … and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), Ethiopia pursues its regional interests… through a dominant role in IGAD. 239
It is important to note Egypt is not a participant in IGAD. It is equally important to know
IGAD serves as a complimentary function to the NBI and CFA, encouraging partner states
“to become signatories [of] the CFA,” as well as other cooperative ventures. 240 As such,
IGAD initiatives have consistently undermined Egyptian interests by focusing on
collective, regional efforts.

Ethiopia has historically dominated affairs in the IGAD. Though IGAD is

headquartered in Djibouti, the most critical functions of the IGAD—“[the Conflict Early
Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)] office, IGAD Facilitator’s Office for
Somalia, the IGAD Parliamentary Union, and the Livestock Office”—are located in Addis
Ababa. 241 This level of proximity allows for frequent contact between the government of
Ethiopia and the offices involved in regional efforts. As an example, Ethiopia was able to
acquire the strategic position of leading the “peace and security division” within the IGAD,
and from 2008–2014, Ethiopia even served as the chair of the IGAD. 242 Filling these
unique leadership positions allows the state to influence the region by setting and driving
a developmental agenda based on Ethiopian interests. 243 This is most evident in the three
main projects of IGAD: “the peace process project for Sudan, [the peace process project

238 “About Us: The History of IGAD.”

239 Mehari Taddele Maru, Ethiopia’s Regional Diplomacies: A Dominant Interpretation of the Horn
of Africa, Policy Briefing 112 (Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Foreign Policy and African
Drivers Programme, 2014): 1, www.saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/
saia_112_maru_20141027.pdf.
240 Zeray Yihdego, Alistair Rieu-Clarke, and Ana Elisa Cascão, “How Has the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam Changed the Legal, Political, Economic and Scientific Dynamics in the Nile Basin?”
Water International 41, no. 4 (2016): 507–508, https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2016.1209008.
241 Mulugeta, The Role of Regional Powers in the Field of Peace and Security, 15–16.
242 Mulugeta, The Role of Regional Powers in the Field of Peace and Security, 15.
243 Ibid.

56
for Somalia], and the CEWARN. 244 With a focus on conflict management external to
Ethiopia, these programs afforded Ethiopia the opportunity to expand reach into the affairs
of neighboring states.

Ethiopia’s regional power grew as a result of dominating economic and political

affairs in the region. This was made possible by leveraging IGAD. The significance of
IGAD should not be understated. International institutions look to the IGAD to fulfill the
role of guiding the region towards greater levels of peace and prosperity. This is evidenced
by the overt support IGAD receives from international institutions like the UN, AU, and
even the European Union (EU). Indeed, the EU has worked tirelessly to build capacity in
the IGAD, noting that the organization is critical to enhancing “economic and political
integration in the Horn of Africa.” 245 As a result, IGAD wields considerable influence over
states, enforces a regional agenda on East Africa, and enjoys a measure of legitimacy from
international institutions. This had translated to a unique position of power for the most
influential state in IGAD, Ethiopia.

With specific regard to the GERD project, IGAD has consistently supported the
initiative. 246 In addition to praising the efforts of the Ethiopian government, IGAD has
repeatedly reiterated the GERD’s regional benefits, and made statements reassuring
member-states that the dam will not cause negative consequences. 247 Furthermore, the
IGAD staff directly contributed $250,000 (USD) to the project. 248 This public gesture
showcases alliances and ultimately highlights how the organization serves the expressed
purpose of promoting Ethiopian interests in the region.

244 Ulf Terlinden, IGAD – Paper Tiger facing Gigantic Tasks, (Berlin, Germany: Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, 2004), 3, www.ulf-terlinden.de/docs/Terlinden2004-IGAD-engl.pdf.
245 Harald, Lie, and Mesfin, Ethiopia: A Political Economy Analysis, 35.
246 “IGAD Executive Secretary: The GERD Project Is Regional,” Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), accessed 1 November 2018, https://igad.int/executive-secretary/1529-igad-
executive-secretary-the-gert-project-is-regional.
247 Ibid.
248 “IGAD Executive Secretary Hands Over Staff Contribution to GERD Project,” Intergovernmental
Authority on Development, January 21, 2018, https://igad.int/executive-secretary/1741-igad-executive-
secretary-hands-over-staff-contribution-to-gerd-project.
57
 2. Ethiopia—Central to Regional Peacekeeping and Security Operations

Ethiopia’s increased significance is not only tied to dominance over economic and
political affairs, it is linked to supremacy over security operations in the region. Ethiopia
has maintained one of the largest and most adept fighting forces on the continent—
comprised of nearly 138,000 troops. 249 It has regularly employed its military to wage
conventional warfare, engage in counterinsurgency operations, and participate in
peacekeeping and security operations. 250 This military prowess represents a unique and
critical capability, one which not only enhances the power of the state, but influences the
trajectory of the region. This is best understood by discussing the military’s expanded role
in regional peacekeeping operations (PKOs). 251 By engaging in PKOs, Ethiopia has
become a key player in the region and shifted alliances in its favor.

Ethiopia’s regional significance grew as the state shifted from being a participant
in PKOs to leading regional efforts to promote peace. In the last 50 years, the Ethiopian
military was increasingly called upon to be the central peacekeeping and security force in
Africa. 252 Ethiopia engaged in UN global peacekeeping efforts from the 1950s onwards.
The Ethiopian military fought alongside multinational forces in the Korean War, assisted
in efforts to restore order in the Republic of Congo throughout the 1960s, aided peace and
stability operations in Somalia and Haiti, and provided critical support to the African
Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). 253 In accomplishing these
disparate missions, Ethiopian forces acquired greater technical proficiency and even

249 Mulugeta, The Role of Regional Powers in the Field of Peace and Security, 13.
250 Le Gouriellec, “Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy,” 1064.
251 Jakkie Cilliers, Julia Schünemann and Jonathan D Moyer, Power and Influence in Africa: Algeria,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa, African Futures Paper 14 (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for
Security Studies, 2015), 6, https://issafrica.org/research/papers/power-and-influence-in-africa-algeria-
egypt-ethiopia-nigeria-and-south-africa; Solomon A. Dersso, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Ethiopia,”
Providing for Peacekeeping, accessed October 26, 2018, www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/
contributor-profile-ethiopia/.
252 Ibid.
253 “Ethiopia: A Leading Contributor to UN Peacekeeping Efforts,” United Nations, accessed October
26, 2018, https://news.un.org/en/gallery/529832.
58
achieved a noteworthy level of discipline and professionalism. 254 Only recently, however,
has a distinct shift been noted. The Ethiopian military has become so entrenched in peace
and stability operations, the country has earned the reputation of being the “security
provider” for East Africa. 255

As the Ethiopian government continued to support PKOs, host nations, as well as

international institutions, became increasingly reliant on Ethiopian military power. As a
result, Ethiopia deployed more forces throughout Africa—from Liberia to Rwanda—with
the most expansive operations occurring in war-torn Sudan and Somalia. 256 With regard
to numbers, Ethiopian contributions to PKOs swelled from 2,500 personnel in 2004 to
nearly 8,000 in 2012. 257 Ethiopia, once the fourth-largest contingent of troops executing
UN-mandated missions abroad, came to be the number one contributor of forces to UN
peacekeeping operations. 258 This uptick in support was purposeful, as the Ethiopian
leadership understood that participating in PKOs enhanced “regional and international
influence.” 259 By sending troops to the most troubled spots in the region, Ethiopia assumed
the role of Africa’s peacekeeper and became the most “influential player in the security
problem in the Horn of Africa.” 260

With regard to influencing affairs along the Nile, Ethiopia’s role as the provisioner
of security in the region has aided the state’s ability to shift in regional alliances to their
advantage vis-a-vis the GERD. This dynamic is particularly evident with respect to Sudan,
which previously supported Egyptian interests along the Nile but has recently come to side

254 Cilliers, Schünemann and Moyer, Power and influence in Africa, 6.

255 Le Gouriellec, “Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy,” 1060
256 Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe, “The Ethiopian Post-Transition Security Sector Reform Experience:
Building a National Army from a Revolutionary Democratic Army,” African Security Review 26, no. 2
(2017): 174http://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2017.1297581.
257 Le Gouriellec, “Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy,” 1065; Dersso, “Peacekeeping
Contributor Profile: Ethiopia.”
258 Berhe, “The Ethiopian Post-Transition Security Sector Reform Experience,” 174; “Ethiopia: A
Leading Contributor to UN Peacekeeping Efforts.”
259 Dersso, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Ethiopia.”
260 Cilliers, Schünemann, and Moyer, Power and Influence in Africa, 6; Mulugeta, The Role of
Regional Powers in the Field of Peace and Security, 17.
59
with Ethiopia. Ethiopia makes up more than 95% of the troops supporting peacekeeping
operation on the border of Sudan and South Sudan. 261 Increased levels of interaction have
built trust and strengthened relations between Ethiopia and Sudan. The overall strength of
this partnership is evidenced by statements made by Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir. In
2013, Bashir stated: “[Sudan’s] support for the Renaissance Dam is firm. There are benefits
for the entire region, including Egypt.” 262 This overt gesture of support serves as an
outright denunciation of Egypt, and marks the end of Sudan’s relationship with Egypt—
something which has been on the decline since the 1980s. 263 Indeed, as Knopf (2018)
noted, “Sudan and Ethiopia have forged an increasingly close political and security
partnership rooted in a shared position on the GERD and the use of the Nile.” 264 Ethiopia
is seemingly the partner of choice in the region. This new standing has likewise led the
U.S. to seek out a strategic relationship with Ethiopia.

3. Ethiopia—Critical U.S. Partner in East Africa

Ethiopia’s regional influence grew as it engaged in PKOs, but its international

standing and legitimacy crystallized as it partnered with the U.S. on contingency
operations. This section highlights Ethiopia’s increased significance to the U.S. and to the
international community. While it strays a bit from the core issue of the GERD, Ethiopia’s
ability to maneuver in the international system, as well as influence affairs regionally, is
intrinsically tied to the legitimacy it receives from the U.S and international community.
This legitimacy allows Ethiopia to act with a level of impunity in East Africa. Indeed, past
actions—sanctioned by both the U.S. and the international community—set the precedent
for Ethiopian leadership in the region and have helped to make Ethiopia a regional power.
As such, a digression is warranted because partnering with the U.S. led to increased
latitude, and ultimately, international legitimacy.

261 Gebreluel, “Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa’s Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry?”
29–30.
262 Barfi, Egypt’s New Realism: Challenges Under Sisi, 69.
263 Barfi, Egypt’s New Realism: Challenges Under Sisi, 69; Knopf, South Sudan’s Civil War and
Conflict Dynamics in the Red Sea, 4.
264 Knopf, South Sudan’s Civil War and Conflict Dynamics in the Red Sea, 4.

60
 In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the importance of states in
Africa grew considerably. The Horn of Africa, as well as countries throughout the Sahel,
became “frontline states” in the effort to curb the spread of radical elements. 265 The U.S.
recognized Ethiopia was a consequential actor in the region—one which held considerable
political, economic, and most importantly, military power. As such, the U.S. partnered with
Ethiopia to assure radical ideologies did not take hold or spread throughout less stable
states in East Africa. In the years after the September 11th attacks, U.S aid to Ethiopia rose
from $928,000 (1999-2001) to more than $16.7 million (2002-2004). 266 This was as an
indication of Ethiopia’s increased significance, but also pointed to U.S. confidence in
Ethiopia’s ability to drive regional change.

The U.S. leveraged Ethiopia as an “expert” in the region and relied heavily on the
state’s unique ability to understand political dynamics, language, and culture in East
Africa. 267 The partnership with Ethiopia was critical to advancing U.S. interests in the
region and this was particularly true of operations in Somalia. The U.S. viewed Somalia as
breeding ground for extremists, as well as a potential successor state for Al Qaeda. 268 This
judgement was later reinforced by the presence of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a
radical element which took control of Mogadishu in 2006. 269 As the regional peacekeeping
force, Ethiopia was called upon to take action in Somalia.

Ethiopia engaged in operations to disrupt the activities of the UIC and ultimately
seized control over large swaths of territory, to include the capitol of Somalia. 270 These

265 Africa and the War on Terrorism, ed. John Davis, (London: Routledge, 2007): 1,
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781317184515.
266 Marina Walker Guevara, “Ethiopia Reaps U.S. Aid by Enlisting in War on Terror and Hiring
Influential Lobbyists,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, May 2, 2012,
https://www.icij.org/investigations/collateraldamage/ethiopia-reaps-us-aid-enlisting-war-terror-and-hiring-
influential.
267 Le Gouriellec, “Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy,” 1070.
268 Africa and the War on Terrorism, 2.
269 Ibid., 6, 9.
270 Ibid., 6, 9, 39.

61
activities were encouraged by the United States. 271 The U.S. not only aided the Ethiopians
by sending special operations forces (SOF) “to train Ethiopian troops in anti-terrorism and
counterterrorist tactics,” the U.S. also assisted with intelligence operations and
airstrikes. 272 Increased collaboration with the U.S. bolstered Ethiopian supremacy in the
region. This is evidence by the fact that neither the UN nor the AU condemned the overt
incursion into another sovereign state. 273 In fact, Ethiopia was later rewarded for its
dominance in regional security affairs. The international community invited Ethiopia to be
“a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.” 274 Ultimately, in partnering with
the U.S., Ethiopia attained a new level of prominence, which included uncontested regional
authority and international legitimacy.

In returning to the litmus test of a regional power—which includes “economic and

political performance…regional legitimacy (recognition and compliance by regional
states), and international reliability”—Ethiopia may have achieved regional power
status. 275 Ethiopia dominated political and economic affairs through the IGAD, expanded
influence throughout the region by engaging in peacekeeping and security operations, and
attained an elevated international standing as a reliable partner and regional provisioner of
security. While the intent of this section was not to prove Ethiopia replaced Egypt as the
regional hegemon, one thing is clear: Ethiopia’s power grew. This increased standing
changed regional power dynamics, shifted alliances in favor of Ethiopia, and ultimately
legitimized Ethiopia as acting on behalf of the region. As Le Gouriellec noted: “What [was]
good for Ethiopia [was now] good for the Horn of Africa.” 276

271 Ibid., 9.
272 Ibid., 146, 149, 172.
273 Le Gouriellec, “Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy,” 1067
274 Ibid., 1065.
275 Gebrewold, “Legitimate Regional Powers?” 1.
276 Verhoeven, “Africa’s Next Hegemon,” quoted in Le Gouriellec, “Regional Power and Contested
Hierarchy,” 1059.
62
C. NO FEAR OF RETRIBUTION

The final section of this chapter discusses a core consideration as to how Ethiopia
could move forward, undeterred, with construction and completion of the GERD. Ethiopia
announced the GERD, and continued with the project unabated, because the existential
threat of conflict with an external actor—specifically Egypt—was never a genuine concern.
Indeed, the overall prospect of interstate violence was markedly low from the outset, and
this condition has persisted to the present. While Egypt sees construction of the GERD as
an adverse foreign action diminishing the flow of water in the Nile, and even labeled “water
availability a matter of national security,” Egypt has consistently demonstrated a
commitment to cooperation over conflict. 277 As such, while water scarcity is certainly a
pressing issue in Egypt, war with Ethiopia is not imminent. The importance of this
conclusion cannot be understated because it stands in stark contrast to sensationalized
narratives of states engaging in “water wars.” 278 As analysis herein showcases,
cooperation—not conflict—has been the precedent in international water disputes, and the
case of the GERD is no different. To fully comprehend this, a fundamental understanding
of international water disputes is required.

To begin, Homer-Dixon (1994) was among the first to suggest that water scarcity,
coupled with transboundary river disputes, has the potential to drive increased hostilities
and interstate conflict—especially when the countries involved have the ability to respond
militarily. 279 Other scholars, researchers, and commentators have advanced similar
contentions throughout the years. Klare (2001) notably discussed transnational
watercourses as a “chronic source of tension” between actors; when allocation of water
changes, tensions rise and “reach a breaking point” where cordial diplomatic and political
processes fall to pieces. 280 The eventuality is conflict between opposing sides. The
rationale for thinking stems from a perception that increased consumption is linked to

277 Nasr and Neef, “Ethiopia’s Challenge to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile River Basin,” 969.
278 For more on “water wars” see Starr, “Water Wars,” 17–36; Gleick, “Water and Conflict,” 79,
Klare, Resource Wars, 144–145.
279 Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,” 19.
280 Klare, Resource Wars, 146–147.

63
scarcity and that scarcity drives competition between actors—in this case states. As
consumption and competition persist, finite resources dwindle, and acrimony eventually
provokes conflict. A closer look, however, suggests this may be an altogether inaccurate
presumption.

Both Homer-Dixon and Klare paint extraordinarily gloomy pictures of the

interaction between states when issues of water scarcity emerge. States are presented as
belligerent and unrestrained, and conflict is described as inevitable. The reality, however,
is somewhat different. To begin, it must be noted that in the post-World War II era, violent
conflict has been a phenomenon which has persisted in the “Third World” but
predominantly at the intra- versus interstate levels. 281 As Figure 3 highlights, conflict
between states has lessened considerably over time, with outright wars being mediated by
international organizations like the UN. As such, the backdrop of the discourse on the
GERD, or really any other international dispute, is one of increased interstate cooperation
and dialogue.

281 Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,” 5; Mohammed Ayoob, “State
Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” 127.
64
 Figure 3. Interstate versus Intrastate conflict, 1946–2016 282

In evaluating international contestations over water, it becomes evident disputes

over water rights have not been associated with the onset of violence conflict between
states. 283 In fact, throughout the history of wars between nations, even stretching back
hundreds of years, there have been no substantial examples of conflict or mobilization of
forces occurring on the basis of contending water interests. 284 In 2003, Yoffe, Wolf, and
Giordano even questioned the very legitimacy linking water to international conflict. 285
After an exhaustive review of relevant cases, they concluded such assertions were
altogether unfounded: “dependence on freshwater resources for agricultural or energy

282 Source: Kendra Dupuy, Scott Gates, Håvard M Nygård, Ida Rudolfsen, Siri Aas Rustad, Håvard
Strand and Henrik Urdal, Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2016 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies,
2017), www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/a7992888-34fc-44e6-8176-
2fcb3aada995/pdf.
283 Gleditsch, Furlong, Hegre, Lacina, and Owen, “Conflicts Over Shared Rivers,” 379; Wolf,
“‘Water Wars’ and Water Reality.”
284 Wolf, “‘Water Wars’ and Water Reality.”; Uitto and Wolf, “Water Wars.”
285 Yoffe, Wolf, and Giordano, “Conflict and Cooperation Over International Freshwater Resources,”
1111.
65
needs showed no significant association with conflict.” 286 Gebreluel (2014) likewise noted
how water wars were markedly absent from the historical narrative of interstate
interactions:

Despite the many threats and warnings from both analysts and politicians,
the empirical evidence for inter-state war over water is very clear: several
statistical studies have illustrated the historical anomaly of water wars. The
International Crisis Behaviour dataset, for example, found 412 incidents of
inter-state crises from 1918–1994. In only seven of these cases did it find
water to be a central point of dispute, and all seven were minor skirmishes
rather than large-scale confrontations. 287

As such, claims of impending water wars should be met with some degree of
skepticism. The prospect of violent conflict lessens all the more when considering external
influences on states engaged in a dispute.

From a contemporary perspective, disputes surrounding water have been influenced

and managed by international institutions. As Gleick (1993) noted, “The UN has played an
important role, through the International Law Commission, in developing guidelines and
principles for internationally shared watercourses.” 288 Intervention has facilitated
increased and peaceful interstate dialogue, ultimately heading off any escalation to “full-
scale war.” 289 Ultimately, the historical narrative lacks a precedent of water war and the
current international environment showcases an inclination towards intervention and
cooperation rather than conflict. These dynamics hold true in the case of the GERD as well.

Ethiopia and Egypt have consistently maintained a strategic dialogue on the

contentious issue of the GERD. Negotiations have led to the Declaration of Principles
(DoP) and the Khartoum Agreement. 290 Additionally, continued progress by Egypt to

286 Ibid., 1124.

287 Gebreluel, “Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa’s Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry?”
31.
288 Gleick, “Water and Conflict,” 110.
289 Tir and Stinnett, “The Institutional Design of Riparian Treaties,” 608.
290 Salman, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” 512, 527.

66
utilize water more efficiently indicates an intent to carry on with negotiation efforts. 291
This cooperative behavior follows a larger general pattern of regional cooperation along
the Nile. There is a precedent of Ethiopia and Egypt collaborating with the other nine
countries who share the Nile; the Cooperative Framework for Agreement (CFA), the Nile
Basin Initiative (NBI), and the Nile Basin River Commission all attest to this. 292 In fact,
even though Egypt withdrew from negotiations in the past, it subsequently returned to the
table rather than resorting to war. 293 As such, cooperation, not conflict, has been the
precedent. This was true even during times of increased antipathy.

It is important to note the practice of continuing a strategic dialogue despite the

inflammatory rhetoric of state leaders. As an example, during the tensest period in 2013—
when the Nile waters were initially diverted in anticipation of the larger excavation
project—leaders lobbed accusations and engaged in boisterous saber-rattling. Bellicose
statements, however, served distinct internal political needs and should be understood as
nothing more than political pandering. Indeed, there are noticeable differences in tone at
the international level. In 2013, then-President Mohammed Morsi is quoted as saying:
“We do not want a war, but we are keeping all options open.” 294 News outlets clearly
emphasized the latter half of this statement, and few, if any, focused on the former. While
the statement seems to suggest the potential for conflict, deeper analysis of the GERD
dispute during this critical period reveals that armed conflict was extremely unlikely. 295
Though internally, rhetoric appeared provocative, externally, meetings between the two
states continued to take place, and this ultimately suggests Egypt and Ethiopia valued

291 Yayew Genet Chekol, “Dynamics for Shifting the Ethio-Egyptian Hydro Political Relations,”
International Journal of Social Sciences Studies 6, no. 8 (2018): 69, https://doi.org/10.11114/
ijsss.v6i8.3492.
292 Kagwanja, “Calming the Waters,” 321–325; Gebreluel, “Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam:
Ending Africa’s Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry?” 27–29.
293 Barfi, Egypt’s New Realism: Challenges Under Sisi, 70.
294 Tom Perry and Alastair Macdonald, “Egypt ‘War’ Talk Raises Ethiopia Nile Dam Stakes,”
Reuters, June 10, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-egypt-nile-war/egypt-war-talk-raises-
ethiopia-nile-dam-stakes-idUSBRE95911020130610.
295 Gebreluel, “Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa’s Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry?”
26.
67
dialogue over resorting to conflict. As cooperation was the persistent, legitimate precedent,
it becomes clear the likelihood of violence was (and continues to be) low.

Contrary to the popular contention advanced by alarmists, transboundary water

resources promote increased dialogue based on shared interests, and ultimately lead to
increased cooperation and accord—not conflict. 296 As such, it is clear how Ethiopia could
move forward with the GERD project: because the potential for conflict with Egypt never
truly existed. From the outset, the existential threat of war was negligible, because large-
scale, interstate conflict existed as an aberration in the post-World War II, liberal
international order. The prospect of war further diminished because conflict instigated by
contestation over water rights was (and remains) inconsistent with the historical narrative
of interstate interactions. Ultimately, disputes over transboundary waterways have been
tempered by international influences seeking to promote continued, peaceful cooperation
between riparian states. With such an accommodating external dynamic—an environment
free from the fear of reprisal or retribution—Ethiopia simply has had the maneuver space
to continue with the project undeterred.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter showcased how Egypt’s power waned, how Ethiopian power grew,
and how the prospect of interstate conflict was nonexistent. Collectively, these external
conditions have produced an environment where Ethiopia could move forward with
constructing the GERD. Without Egypt’s weakened state, the status quo would still reflect
Egyptian interests over the rights of upstream riparian states. Without Ethiopia as a distinct
regional power, Ethiopia would not be able to exert influence on states throughout East
Africa. Finally, if a genuine fear of international conflict actually existed, the dynamics
between the two states would be altogether different. What is ultimately observed
throughout the dispute is offensive rhetoric as a tool of internal political mobilization, but
strong signals of cooperation internationally.

296 Ibid., 33.

68
 To offer one final observation, the GERD is noteworthy because it exists at the
intersection between increased unilateralism and regional cooperation—two dynamics
ushered in by a weakened Egypt. From a unilateral vantage, Ethiopia moved forward with
planning when Egypt’s power had waned. From a regional cooperation perspective, the
GERD was central to regional developmental efforts. Indeed, as one analyst noted, prior to
the initial announcement of the GERD in 2011, the dam was already included in the African
Union’s Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), a continent-wide
plan to integrate sources of energy for collective use throughout Africa. 297 This
intersection between unilateralism and regional cooperation is unique, and ultimately
showcases how Egypt’s diminished preeminence, coupled with Ethiopia’s bolstered
standing, allowed for initial announcement and continued progress on the GERD.

297 Maupin, Energy Dialogues in Africa, 12.

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70
 IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

This thesis examined internal and external conditions affecting Ethiopia’s drive
towards construction and completion of the GERD. It highlighted internal political and
economic factors influencing Ethiopia’s decision-making process and showcased external
dynamics which have afforded Ethiopia the opportunity to move forward with the project.
As a result of analysis, two arguments emerged. Both arguments are addressed below.

1. Internal Conditions

The first argument that materialized was that internal political considerations
significantly influenced announcement and initiation of the GERD. The second chapter,
which discussed internal political and economic conditions, repeatedly showcased the
centrality of the state in guiding economic affairs. A developmental focus, coupled with
elite dominance over economic planning and management, prompted extraordinary change
in the state, and ultimately led to construction of the GERD. Early on, the centralized state
assumed the role of developing the economy and instituted sweeping reforms with little
consideration for affected outgroups. The state strengthened over time and implemented
increasingly aggressive developmental agendas, which even came to include resettlement
programs. In the modern era, when state power became absolute under the EPRDF regime,
the incontestable dictates of the government focused squarely on internal development.
While this produced a measure of growth, it also necessitated further intervention to
maintain momentum. Subsequent developmental policies codified growth as the
overriding imperative of the state and the government targeted infrastructure—and
moreover, energy production—for industrialization purposes. As a result, damming
became essential to the developmental logic of the state. Consequently, initial construction
of the GERD was bound to the developmental state, control over economic planning and
management, and, the government’s ambition and capacity to transform the state. Figure
4 illustrates the argument more succinctly.

71
 Figure 4. Internal Conditions Argument Map

It is important to note that improved economic conditions added to the overall

ability of the state to move forward with construction of the dam. Indeed, economic growth
produced greater levels of government investment in infrastructure. Furthermore, an
increased availability of funding bolstered to the government’s capacity to sustain the
project. Improved economic conditions and additional funding, however, did not prompt
the GERD. Internal political considerations were the antecedent to an improved economic
state, and as such, political considerations—not economic conditions—were the initial
drivers of the GERD.

2. External Conditions

The second argument was that external dynamics provided complimentary and
accommodating conditions, which ultimately helped propel the project forward. To begin,
it is difficult to suggest external pressures alone drove construction of the GERD—that is
to say, absent the internal thrust by the Ethiopian government. It is however, relatively
easy to see how external considerations afforded Ethiopia the opportunity to continue with
domestic and regional aspirations. This argument is described in detail below but are also
concisely depicted in Figure 5.

As a core external consideration, Egyptian power, the most preeminent power along
the Nile, weakened considerably in the years leading up to the announcement of the GERD.
Egypt’s historic hydro-hegemony ended, regional cooperation supplanted Egyptian
influence in Africa, and an inability to compel adherence to colonial era treaties fostered
increased use and development by upstream riparian states. By the time internal upheaval
and revolution turned the state’s attention inward, Egypt’s regional power had already
subsided.

72
 At the same time Egypt’s influence waned, Ethiopia became a more prominent
actor in the region. Political and economic affairs were controlled by IGAD, a regional
coordination organization inherently dominated by Ethiopia. Furthermore, as an anchor of
stability, strategic partner of the West, and overall provisioner of security in East Africa,
Ethiopia gained regional prestige, and moreover, international legitimacy. As such,
Ethiopia became more significant in East Africa, and this bolstered standing provided the
latitude necessary to project internal developmental ambitions throughout the region.

Both of these changes—the increase and decrease in power—occurred against a

backdrop of subsiding interstate conflict. In the post-WWII, liberal international order, the
prospect of interstate violence decreased substantially. International institutions, dedicated
to limiting the outbreak of conflict, oversaw and managed transboundary water disputes.
Coupling this accommodating international environment with the precedent of cooperation
in water disputes, there was no legitimate fear of war between Ethiopia and Egypt. This
external condition added to Ethiopia’s expanding maneuver space and ultimately allowed
for greater unilateral action.

Figure 5. External Conditions Argument Map

73
 3. The Confluence

A confluence between internal and external considerations must be noted, as

Ethiopia’s ambition to become a regional provisioner of electricity transcended the realm
of domestic affairs. The internal developmental agenda of the state necessarily met with
complimentary and accommodating external dynamics and momentum on the project was
sustained by shifting regional power dynamics. Had Egypt maintained veto power over
upstream construction—and moreover, been able to resort to violent conflict—Ethiopian
unilateralism would have been restricted. Ultimately, the mission of the Ethiopian
government, to transform the state, initiated from within. The capacity to sustain progress
was inherently buttressed by external conditions.

B. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

From a theoretical perspective, analysis of the GERD dispute lends credence to the
pragmatists’ perspective on water conflict. It also showcases, however, that the literature
on water conflict needs to give more attention to domestic political considerations, which
include state structure and ideology. While the case generally conforms to water
cooperation over conflict, the evaluation of the GERD project highlights how internal
politics have the ability to drive leaders to adopt an aggressive stance on water projects—
even if international cooperation is the dominant behavior noted. As such, the case has
significant theoretical implications.

To begin, the GERD seemingly represents a contemporary manifestation of the

water war arguments presented by Homer-Dixon and Klare. Water scarcity exists is at the
center of the dispute, the contention is over the Nile—a transboundary watercourse—and
both Egypt and Ethiopia maintain capable standing militaries. Furthermore, both countries
have a record of resorting to war to accomplish political ends. Egypt leveraged military
power to counter Israel on several occasions, and Ethiopia deployed forces to contend with
Eritrean and Somali rivals. Add to these conditions with the rhetoric of political
entrepreneurs in Ethiopia and Egypt and it may even seem logical to assume relations are

74
in a “diplomatic downward spiral.” 298 A closer look, however, reveals something quite
different.

In accordance with the pragmatists’ understanding international water disputes, the

case of the GERD conforms to theories of water cooperation, not water war. As suggested
by theorists, the dispute over the Nile waters increased the levels of interactions between
Egypt and Ethiopia, and the states responded with increased diplomacy rather than
resorting to violent conflict. Even when relations were most strained, during the initial
diversion of the Nile waters in 2013, communication persisted. Ultimately, cooperative
frameworks like the Declaration of Principles (DoP) and the Khartoum Document ensued,
and at present, the states continue to showcase an inclination towards cooperation. In a
November 2018 meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Egypt’s Prime Minister
emphasized the desire to “increase the level of cooperation between the two countries…to
ensure the fulfillment of the aspirations of the two brotherly peoples in the development
and preservation of their water interests.” 299 As such, the case of the GERD demonstrates
the pragmatists’ perspective on cooperation over conflict.

The discourse on the GERD also showcases that the literature on water conflict
needs to focus more attention on the internal political condition of states involved.
Ideology (mission) and structure (capability)—introduced in Mkandawire’s definition of
the developmental state—are critical to understanding internal decision-making processes,
as well as external actions. Though international behaviors generally reflect cooperation
over conflict, domestic considerations can push states to adopt a more aggressive stance on
water projects. This is the case, at present, in Ethiopia. Indeed, the GERD is the result of
a decades-long push to consolidate power, institute a developmental ideology, and
strengthen the capacity of the state. With a centralized mission to advance the economic
condition of the state—manifestly evident in the ideology of revolutionary democracy—

298 Daniel Benaim and Michael Wahid Hanna, “Water Wars on the Nile: How Water Scarcity and
Middle Eastern Influence Are Reshaping Northeast Africa,” Foreign Affairs, August 9, 2018,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2018-08-09/water-wars-nile.
299 “We Are Committed to Follow-Up, Continuation of GERD Talks: Ethiopian PM,” Egypt
Independent, November 18, 2018, https://ww.egyptindependent.com/we-are-committed-to-follow-up-
continuation-of-gerd-talks-ethiopian-pm/.
75
and a capability to control all aspects of life—to include economic planning and
management—the thrust towards completion of the dam is altogether internal. As such,
internal political considerations must be noted as central to the theories on water conflict
and cooperation.

C. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis investigated the dispute surrounding the construction of the GERD. In
doing so, it touched on water scarcity as an environmental stress triggering increased
tension between Ethiopia and Egypt. While analysis suggested the likelihood of interstate
violence is low, the dispute should not be minimized. Egypt and Ethiopia have proficient
militaries, are anchors of stability in Africa, and receive exorbitant amounts of U.S. aid;
Egypt alone represents the second-largest recipient of military aid after Israel. 300 Above
all else, there has never been an infrastructure project of this magnitude in Africa. While
there are extraordinary benefits associated with the project, there are also potential hazards.
Indeed, filling the reservoir will take five to fifteen years and could potentially displace
3,700 – 20,000 people during the process. 301 Given these factors, it is critically important
that the U.S. monitor the discourse, and intervene accordingly, as any level of increased
volatility would inevitably distract U.S. attention away from contingency operations in the
Middle East and Africa.

The below sections provide policy recommendations and potential courses of action
for Egypt, Ethiopia, and outside actors. Recommendations focus on mitigating the causes
of water scarcity and bolstering cooperative efforts between the two states. Prior to
reviewing recommendations, what is needed is clarity in understanding the link between
water scarcity and the GERD. As such, the following paragraphs showcase the actual
connection between the two, before moving forward with recommendations.

300 Jared Malsin, “U.S. Releases $195 Million in Military Aid to Egypt,” Wall Street Journal, July 25,
2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-releases-195-million-in-military-aid-to-egypt-1532553758.
301 Asiedu, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), 2; Jacey Fortin, “Dam Rising in
Ethiopia Stirs Hope and Tension,” The New York Times, October 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/
10/12/world/dam-rising-in-ethiopia-stirs-hope-and-tension.html; “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Fact Sheet,” International Rivers, January 24, 2014, https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/the-
grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-fact-sheet-8213.
76
 In analyzing the link between water scarcity and the GERD, it becomes manifestly
evident that the issue of water scarcity is internal to Egypt, preventable, and altogether
manageable. Furthermore, it is separate and distinct from any potential effects stemming
from the GERD. This is because the GERD is not the source of water scarcity, but rather
a potential complicator—adding to insecurities already present in Egypt. The GERD has
the potential to exacerbate water scarcity in Egypt, but it is important to remember the
GERD has not been completed. As such, it cannot be labeled the source. In fact, closer
examination of the situation reveals that population growth and misuse of water resources
are the main contributors to scarcity in Egypt. Consequently, mitigating tensions must start
with management of internal issues in Egypt.

What must first be addressed is the effect of population growth. From 2006 to 2017
Egypt’s population ballooned from 73 million to 104.5 million; it is expected to reach 128
million by 2030. 302 This has important implications for the state. With a growing
population, the math simply works against Egypt. Egypt’s water availability has already
dropped from 2,500 cubic meters per person in 1947 to around 600 cubic meters in
2013. 303 (It is important to note the United Nations Department of Economics and Social
Affairs (UNDESA) defines water scarcity as levels below 1,000 cubic meters per person,
with absolute scarcity defined as less than 500 cubic meters per person. 304) As such, 600
cubic meters per person, subdivided among an ever-growing population, will inevitably
lead to absolute scarcity regardless of any future effects stemming from the GERD.

Simple water scarcity is not the sole issue in Egypt. A growing population
necessarily requires greater foodstuffs for sustainment. While Egypt has historically
imported around 50% of its food supply to contend with increased demand, it has

302 Karasapan and Shah, “Egypt’s Population: Boom Then Bust?”

303 Jonathan Rashad, “The World’s Longest River is in Trouble,” The Washington Post, March 22,
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/03/22/
egypt/?utm_term=.1b91fff9985a; “Egypt’s Per Capita Water Share Falls 60 Pct in 66 Years: CAPMAS,”
Ahram Online, May 21, 2014, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/101910.aspx.
304 “Water Scarcity,” United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UNDESA),
accessed August 9, 2018, http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml.
77
repeatedly showcased the intent to expand agricultural efforts domestically. 305 Land
reclamation in Egypt, the process of converting desert lands into farmlands, was attempted
at various times throughout the past, with a limited degree of success. 306 Despite
negligible returns, the government pledged to continue and even bolster these efforts
through 2016. 307 Land reclamation requires extensive irrigation networks and wastes an
exorbitant amount of water. 308 While population growth has already impacted aggregate
supplies of water, increased use for agricultural purposes imposes an excessive strain on
already limited resources. With 97% of Egypt’s freshwater coming from Nile, and more
than 80% of that water dedicated to agriculture enterprises, little is left for the ever-
expanding population. 309 Ultimately, mitigating tensions must first begin with
adjustments to internal policies in Egypt prior to engaging in a strategic dialogue with
Ethiopia. This is central to the recommendations provided below.

Recommendations
To begin, Egypt, as the state predominantly affected by water scarcity, should shift
internal policies and practices as a gesture of good will and in an effort to maintain positive
relations with Ethiopia. Egypt should import more agricultural necessities, effectively
offsetting those enterprises which consume the majority of water resources in-country. A
“virtual water” mentality—importing rather than growing domestically—is critically
important to maintaining adequate levels of water in Egypt. 310 After internal adjustments,
Egypt should take on the role of initiator in strategic dialogues with Ethiopia. This would
showcase unwavering commitment to the cooperative process and could potentially

305 Ashok Swain, “Challenges for Water Sharing in The Nile Basin: Changing Geo-Politics and
Changing Climate,” Hydrological Sciences Journal 56, no. 4 (2011): 693, http://doi.org/10.1080/
02626667.2011.577037.
306 United States Department of Agriculture, Egypt: Egyptian Land Reclamation Efforts, Global
Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) Report, 16 May 2016, https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/egypt-
egyptian-land-reclamation-efforts.
307 Ibid.
308 Ibid.
309 Di Nunzio, Conflict on The Nile, 4.
310 Allan, “Hydro-Peace in the Middle East,” 255–256.

78
improve upon current levels of engagement. After showing a level of steadfastness, safe-
filling practices should be addressed.

Ethiopia, for its part, should consider reservoir-filling practices that incorporate
periodic releases of water, so the GERD does not greatly harm flow to downstream riparian
neighbors. 311 Additionally, as unilateralism is antithetical to cooperation and also
provokes mistrust, Ethiopia should seek increased engagement with Egypt and remain
holistically transparent in all GERD dealings.

With regard to the U.S., it is in the interest of the U.S. to strengthen the dialogue
between the two states. The U.S. should offer increased incentives for cooperation, or at a
bare minimum, attach conditionality to the support already provided to recipients. Aid to
both countries is considerable and could be used as leverage to provoke greater levels of
cooperation or concession. Ultimately, assuring a peaceful dialogue affords the United
States the opportunity to continue focusing on more pressing operations throughout the
Middle East and Africa.

Finally, it is paramount international agencies provide support to Ethiopia and

Egypt, in an effort to further incentivize cooperation. International institutions should start
by helping Egypt produce sustainable goals on water use and consumption. The United
Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should support
projects like desalinization plants in Egypt and aid efforts to leverage imports over
agricultural expansion. Additionally, international agencies should facilitate exchanges
between the states and promote compromise and coordination during reservoir-filling
years.

Overall, the states involved will continue to pursue cooperation if properly

incentivized. Points of contentions are not insurmountable and can be overcome with
practical compromise and coordination. Indeed, international expectations impose a
responsibility on Ethiopia to not harm downstream riparian neighbors during construction

311 Kevin G. Wheeler, Mohammed Basheer, Zelalem T. Mekonnen, Sami O. Eltoum, Azeb Mersha,
Gamal M. Abdo, Edith A. Zagona, Jim W. Hall & Simon J. Dadson, “Cooperative Filling Approaches for
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” Water International, 41 no. 4, (2016): 611–634, http://doi.org/
10.1080/02508060.2016.1177698.
79
and filling, and this constitutes a mechanism for bringing the two states back to the table
for cooperation. Until Egypt fixes internal issues, however, the GERD will be looked upon
as a potential exacerbator, because the ultimate source of scarcity is internal to Egypt.

D. GAPS IN RESEARCH AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

As is evident from the review of literature and above analysis, there is insufficient
data on Ethiopia’s decisive choice to move forward with construction and completion of
the GERD. There is certainly a host of information on developmental theories, internal
and external dynamics influencing Ethiopia’s decision-making, and water conflict as a
general topic of study. To be sure, this information added credibility to the hypotheses and
arguments presented in this study. What is absent from the research, however, is a causal
link between the dependent variable, construction of the dam, and a definitive independent
variable, something which set the plan into motion—or at the very least, tipped the scales
in favor of construction. Perhaps the best way to interpret this is that the holistic situation
is complex and cannot be boiled down to a simplistic x  y construct. Rather, the “why
now” may be a product of numerous or overlapping influences. This is not to suggest an
independent variable does not exist; rather, that it is altogether difficult to isolate a distinct,
singular driver of the GERD.

Linked to the issue of highlighting an independent variable, there was a great of

difficulty in establishing legitimate government intent. For the most part, this was due to
Ethiopia being a relatively closed society. Information is limited, or biased, under the
inherently authoritarian regime in Ethiopia. Media outlets are influenced by the central
government, and the state not only suppresses information, but harasses journalists, shuts
down news companies, and enacts measures to control messaging on all matters of great
import. 312 As such, there was no smoking gun with regard to rationale. The government
did not openly discuss the timing of the GERD or make overt statements about an intent to
become a regional hegemon. Rather, the arguments presented were constructed based on

312 Mulatu Alemeyehu Moges, “Ethiopian Journalism from Self Censoring to Silence: A Case of
Reporting on Internal Conflict,” Journal for Communications Studies 10, no. 1 (2017): 113,
https://www.essachess.com/index.php/jcs/article/download/374/409.
80
imperfect, available data. Even when discussing the announcement of the GERD, which
seemingly showcased a measure of opportunism, without inside knowledge or first-hand
accounts from Ethiopian leaders confirming this, timing can be relegated to mere
coincidence. As such it is difficult to gauge legitimate intent from the available sources of
information. More information is needed.

With regard to further study, this thesis merely scratched the surface of describing
how internal developmental ambitions influence decision-making, and moreover, offset
concerns over international conflict. More research must be conducted on the
revolutionary democracy, the distinct developmental ideology found in Ethiopia. This
should start with a reevaluation of primary sources—speeches or statements made by key
officials—and secondary sources like scholarly articles, governmental or agency reports,
and newspapers. Additionally, in an effort to add analytic rigor to the process, field
research should be conducted. Researchers should interview government officials in
Ethiopia. While this would present some difficulty, as Ethiopia is a closed society, any
insight that could be gleaned from officials or bureaucrats would add to the overall
understanding internal intent. Interviews and surveys should include questions about the
intent of government, given explicit statements found within core policies like the GTP.
Questions should be posed to bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development in Ethiopia, and if possible, to Abraham Tekeste, the Minister of Finance and
Economic Cooperation. In the end, the intent is to gain an understanding of how internal
developmental ambitions affect decisions with regional implications. Interviews would
provide a critical perspective.

Another concept primed for further study is performance legitimacy. The historical
narrative presented in this thesis showcased a number of regime changes before the EPRDF
came to power. After this, Ethiopia experienced a measure of political stability. Logic
suggests that if the government was deemed illegitimate, regime change—as was
repeatedly noted in the past—would have occurred. Rather than regime change, however,
the EPRDF government has persisted. Furthermore, the government recently transitioned,
and even elected a prime minister from an opposition group. This occurred under the
construct of the existing one-party state. This leaves a number of questions unanswered. Is
81
the government perceived as legitimate, and if so, by whom? These questions must be
answered, as the persistence of the EPRDF governance model is linked to revolutionary
democracy and a developmental agenda which includes completion of the GERD.

As scholarship on governmental legitimacy in Ethiopia is limited, investigation

should go beyond qualitative analysis of existing research. Enquiry should include
evaluation of available data from surveys—those which were previously accomplished by
organizations like Afrobarometer. In doing so, general perceptions on legitimacy can be
unearthed. After this, field research should be conducted to provide supporting evidence
for these suppositions. Again, as interviews and surveys provide the best means of gauging
perceptions, engaging government officials, bureaucrats, and the general populace is
needed.

The same line of questioning should be used for all parties or groups questioned.
By asking similar questions about legitimacy to disparate groups, it is possible to gain an
understanding of each group’s perception. Ultimately, the question of internal conditions
fostering construction of the GERD is linked to the public’s acquiescence to government
action. If groups see the government as legitimate, the government persists, and citizens
continue to forgo rights and privileges in exchange for continued growth. If they do not
view the government as legitimate, this leads to other questions, like the extent to which
the government is willing to repress citizens to achieve developmental goals. Either way,
analysis of performance legitimacy provides an avenue for greater awareness of the internal
decision-making processes in Ethiopia. For this reason, it is a worthwhile venture.

82
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