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Artificial Intelligence?
Jack Watson
When this article was being composed, a machine called Deep Blue had just won, a chess match
against the best chess grandmaster in the world, Garry Kasparov. This was a rematch, following
Deep Blue's initial defeat in 1996 - in one corner, an intense, brilliant and charismatic 33 year
old man with a laser-like gaze, and in the other, a 3,000 pound box of metal and plastic capable
of tens of millions of calculations per second. In a flash of humanity, Kasparov gambled in the
last game, moving in a decisive and perhaps reckless manner with a novel approach, to take all
or nothing from his stolid, silent opponent who, his creators proudly said, seemed to be thinking
strategically. He lost that day. But did we?
There were a fair number of people rooting for the device over the human. This could not be
because of unpopularity of Kasparov, whose repute was solid and respectable. The enticement
for those who favoured the instrument over the brain seems, in part, attributable to the
enthusiasm in some of the scientific community for achieving artificial intelligence and, so the
reasoning seems to go, finally curing society of its wildness. If a calculator can tell us how much
the square root of 3672 multiplied by 15 plus 73 is in a split second, why can it not tell us how
many people we can feed?
The desire for an artificial intelligence is hardly new. It is grounded in the longstanding human
desire for a common wisdom, leading us in particular to a set of standards that we can share as
decent and humane and as the sort we can live by. Deep Blue, for all its technical achievement,
left the stage an inferior thing still, a mere collection point for the sophistication of numerous
grandmasters. Artificial intelligence is not computer intelligence and neither holds a candle to the
knowledge and sensitivity that we call human wisdom.
Deep Blue could not be disappointed with losing nor enthusiastic about winning. Much more
important: Deep Blue did not, and could not, have the capacity to recognize tragedy, nor aspire
to the betterment of others, nor respect the rights of humankind, nor talk lovingly to a child. For
as long as humans have been thinking, we have been thinking of something greater than each of
us.
This issue of LawNow looks at religion and the law which Deep Blue does not understand. The
aspirations of both religion and law are similar, secular and mundane as the law may be. Both
commend that harmony, understanding, generosity, wisdom, and peace are essential for both
stability and progress. Although wise societies endeavour to keep church in the official sense
separate from state, religion and law have been inseparable throughout history. Moreover, the
thrill of technology has only been a consequence of making things easier, not making them
better.
We have been striving for a law as an expression of common values for at least 5,000 years, and,
in light of the apparent age of the Sphinx and of the caverns in France, and of the monuments of
China, a lot longer than that. Around 2,350 B.C.E., Mesopotamian Kings, who claimed
appointment by gods, consolidated their directives and ordinances into something called
Urukagina's Code. The Code provided for stoning of thieves and adulteresses, amongst other
things. Around the same era we find records of early technology.
August / September 1997
This article is copyright @ 1997 by LawNow, Legal Studies Program, Faculty of Extension,
University of Alberta. Permission to reproduce material from LawNow may be granted on request.
By 2050 B.C.E., evidenced by the five articles deciphered of Ur-Nammu's Code, an advanced
legal system existed with specialized judges, the taking of testimony under oath, an established
form for judicial decisions, and the ability of judges to award damages to a victim from a guilty
party. In 1850 B.C.E., according to a clay tablet discovered, a trial was held respecting the
murder of a temple employee by three men. The deceased's widow knew of the murder but
remained silent. The crime came to light, however, and nine witnesses testified against all four.
The widow produced two witnesses to say that she had been abused by her husband, was not
party to the murder, and she was even worse off after his death. The men were executed in front
of the victim's house, but the widow was spared.
By 1700 B.C.E., Babylonian King Hammurabi had established a 282 clause Code of laws which
regulated a wide array of obligations, professions and rights, including commerce, slavery,
marriage, theft, and debts. It also provided for a variety of punishments to balance the scales,
such as cutting off a finger or hand for theft, or a lower lip for kissing a married woman, or a
tongue for defamation.
We trace the Ten Commandments to 1300 B.C.E. and to the story of Moses, contained in
Exodus. These directions combined both religious and legal policy but were fundamentally the
basis of the law. From around the same time the laws of Manu in India emerged to classify
people by social standing and to regulate society in matters from contract to crime. Punishments
were generally less severe than those in other ancient Codes though physical punishment existed,
including amputation.
Draco, a citizen of ancient Athens, also wrote such a severe Code for his people in 621 B.C.E. in
that he contributed his name to history through the expression Draconian referring to harsh laws.
The role of the state as arbiter and punisher was recognized in substitution for private justice.
Ironically, Draco was popular, though his popularity led to his death when he was smothered by
hats and cloaks thrown by Athenians in his honour as he entered an auditorium. Draco's laws
were refined by Solon in 550 B.C.E. It seems likely that the civilizing effect of the laws of
ancient Greece had an impact upon the highly organized and successful Romans, whose Twelve
Tables of 450 B.C.E. survived almost 1,000 years and formed the basis of modern public and
private law. They were improved by Emperor Justinian in 529 B.C.E., and taught as the standard
for laws in the law schools and universities that emerged in the Middle Ages.
In Asia, ancient texts reveal the evolution of organized society under law as well, with severe
physical punishments also recognized in a book printed in China at the time of Solon in Greece.
Chinese Codes followed in 350 B.C.E., and ultimately the T'ang Code in 653 B.C.E. whose 501
articles appeared by Imperial decree, solidifying law as part of the consolidation of China from
feuding kingdoms into a national empire.
The greatest social upheavals and emergence of new institutions can be attributed to differences
of opinion over religion and law or, ironically, the degree to which the one parts company with
the other. The Crusades are a clear example of this, as was the schism between the Roman and
Protestant churches. Cortez and his men no doubt felt their slaughter of Monteczuma's army was
August / September 1997
This article is copyright @ 1997 by LawNow, Legal Studies Program, Faculty of Extension,
University of Alberta. Permission to reproduce material from LawNow may be granted on request.
justified in the spreading of their take on Christianity and not merely on the attractiveness of
Aztec gold.
The history of the world is very much a history of efforts to organize and rationalize human
affairs.
The progenitors of law saw the need for law to have a basis for its claim of right that transcended
the ordinary and the secular without losing sight of it. Law was to be an expression of those ideas
which were civilizing and morally right. The evolution of modem law away from severity has
been, an even greater devotion to those same ideas of civilization.
From Aristotle to Aquinas to John Stuart Mill and Jean Jacques Rousseau, and even into the
realists and critics of our modem times, contributors to law in Europe and the Americas have
striven to maintain the association between law and justice, between law and equity, and between
law and peace. The same can be said for the philosophers and lawmakers of Asia, the Middle
East, and Africa. Coherence, predictability, rationality, and orderliness are key elements of the
law we continue to seek, which might be comprehensible to some kin of Deep Blue yet to be
constructed. However, we also want our law to serve and promote fairness, to help the
downtrodden and unfortunate, to enhance and not discourage personal knowledge and well-
being, and to pass on the world in a better state for our descendants. It is hard to envision Deep
Blue IV learning to care in those ways.
We have great ability to create mechanisms to better deal with aspects of our material world and,
perhaps, a duty to do so. We have an even greater ability to continue to improve ourselves and
our society and, unquestionably, a duty to do so. While we usually have to leave much of
technology to the experts, we can all take part in the fashioning of law and of our society. The
lesson we take from Kasparov's defeat is not that machines are better, but that they can do things
repeatedly and quickly and without thought. Kasparov's loss was attributable to his trying
something new, which is what we call Thought. As with our legal history, we may make
erroneous predictions and plans but, in the end, it is we who will make the computers and not the
computers that will make us.
Jack Watson is Appellate Counsel for the Attorney General at Alberta Justice in
Edmonton, Alberta.
August / September 1997
This article is copyright @ 1997 by LawNow, Legal Studies Program, Faculty of Extension,
University of Alberta. Permission to reproduce material from LawNow may be granted on request.
