PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY V.

JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY
The Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary are the pillars on which the smooth and
effective functioning of a Government rests. In order to achieve the ultimate goals of public
welfare and the effective functioning of the constitutional machinery a balance is urged as
opposed to conflicts. Over the past few years, the issue of parliamentary sovereignty versus
judicial supremacy has been a subject matter of heated scholarly debate. Not only the Indian
parliamentary system differs from the British parliamentary system, but also, the power of
judicial review of the Supreme Court in India is narrower than that of what exists in the USA.
This article aims to show that India neither has the parliamentary sovereignty nor does it have the
judicial supremacy, but rather it is a synthesis of both. It seeks to explore the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty under the British Constitution and the concept of judicial review under
the Constitution of the USA. Further it will study on how the constitution makers adopted the
middle course between the American system of judicial supremacy and the British principle of
parliamentary sovereignty by incorporating, in the Constitution of India, the power of judicial
review and the provisions for amendments. This article critically analyzes the response of the
Supreme Court to the constitutional amendments made by the Parliament and its impact on the
relationship between the Parliament and the Judiciary. It will also look into how the judicial
activism has created the jurisdictional conflict between the two organs. Also, this article seeks to
suggest reasonable relations between the Parliament and the Supreme Court for maintaining the
constitutional balance between the two organs of the government and the proper functioning of
constitutional democracy in the country.