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Critically assess Peter Singer’s view regarding our moral obligations to the global poor

Should we donate our time and money in order to assist the global poor, and if so, to what extent? In Commented [A1]: Excellent start
this essay, I will lay out the view of Peter Singer as expressed in his 1972 work ‘Famine, Affluence and
Morality’. I will then highlight the strengths of Singer’s argument, and also attempt to find weaknesses
which may somewhat discredit the paper. After then demonstrating a typical rebuttal of these counter-
arguments from the view of Peter Singer, I will then come to a conclusion assessing whether this
viewpoint is indeed morally correct, and whether it should be followed by the general public. Commented [A2]: What weakness will you highlight?
Otherwise this is a very good signpost introduction
Peter Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to help the global poor in the most effective way we
can; a way of acting which has been termed ‘effective altruism’. The argument follows that suffering and
death from lack of necessities is a bad thing. Singer also holds the utilitarian view that suffering in the
world should therefore be minimised as far as possible. Therefore, if it is in our power to prevent
something bad from happening without sacrificing anything of ‘similar moral importance’, we ought,
morally, to do it. Due to the effects of globalisation as well, this entails that we should value the lives Commented [A3]: Why is globalisation relevant?
and wellbeing of those people on the other side of the world just as much as one would someone living
in your own neighbourhood, as by donating to charity we can effectively help people regardless of their
location. The principle also makes no distinction between cases where the agent is the only person who
could possibly help, and examples where the agent is just one among millions of people in the same
position. Singer uses the example of a child drowning in a pond in order to illustrate his point, stating
that we have no less of an obligation to help those in extreme poverty than our obligation to rescue a
drowning child from a pond. Following from this, even if there were other people around the pond who
could also help, it is morally unjustifiable not to save the child. Overall, he argues in favour of the
principle of beneficence, in that everyone’s necessity is morally prior to anyone’s luxury, and therefore Commented [A4]: Nice way of putting the point
we are morally required to attend to all necessity before attending to our own luxuries.1

However, some would argue against this, stating that referring to those in absolute poverty as ‘small
children’ is simply a paternalistic insult, rather than an objective judgement.2 Also, if there was a Commented [A5]: Um: this seems like a pretty bad
lifeguard whose job it was to prevent people from drowning, then it would be their job. In this sense, objection – the child in the pond is just an analogy. It is
maybe not the best chosen analogy politically, because it
Singer implies that all people in need of help in developing countries are both as blameless as children, likens the global poor to drowning children, but Singer could
and that their governments (i.e the lifeguards) have no responsibility towards helping their people. It have simply used a different example of someone who we
also casts western philanthropists as heroic saviours of the helpless and those living in dire conditions as could easily have helped to make his point
passive victims of dire circumstances.3 It would arguably be better to think of the child as able to Commented [A6]: Um: not obviously – it’s meant to be an
improve their own circumstances, leading into the bigger point about whether international aid would analogy, not giving an in-depth picture of singer’s view of
global politics. I think I see where you’re coming from here,
actually lead to an overdependence on foreign countries, at the expense of domestic improvement.
and I do worry about the political/rhetorical point, but it
doesn’t to my mind affect the argument in any way.

1
Corbett, Bob, Moral obligations to Distant Others,
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2
Kekes, John, On the supposed obligation to relieve famine (Cambridge University Press, Oct. 2002) pp. 506-507
3
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Phillip Pettit argues that there is a distinction between cases where the agent is the only one available to
save the child, and cases where others are present. For example, he agrees with Singer in that if the
agent is the only person who can save the child in the pond’s life, and at an incomparable moral cost to
themselves, then the moral act must be to save the child. However, if the agent is simply one among
millions of people that could save a life by donating to charity, then the agent shares only a fraction of
the obligation of the previous example, as they only need do their fair share. If the child dies because of
the inaction of others, then the blame must fall on others, and not on the agent.4 Commented [A7]: Good – this is a really nice point,
properly referenced and clearly explained
Singer would reject these arguments, again citing the example of the drowning child in the pond. If
instead of it only being the agent in the park, there were hundreds of other people there, all of whom
had noticed the child but chosen not to pull them out of the water, is the agent less obliged to save the
child? Singer also argues that if everyone did give their fair share to charity, then there would indeed be
no obligation to reduce ones self to marginal utility, as poverty would be solved without resorting to
these drastic meaures. However, if everyone does not give to charity, then by giving more than your fair
share will prevent more suffering than if you just gave the average, and therefore this is the morally
correct act. Singer also rejects the idea of a ‘lifeguard’ having a greater responsibility than the agent Commented [A8]: Good – this is a good response to the
themselves, arguing that private charities do not discourage governments from taking responsibility for second objection, although you haven’t considered the first
objection…
aid, and on the contrary, proves that there is a genuine interest in the provision of aid, leading to further
investment in the area.

The amount of money that Singer implies should be donated goes too far. He argues that we should
donate money until the level of ‘marginal utility’ is reached. This means that donating should only stop
when, by giving more, you are harming yourself and your dependents more than the suffering you
would relieve by indeed donating. This sets too high a moral standard- for example, some forms of
malaria can be cured for as little as $2. The suffering relieved by this donation is potentially high enough
to save a life; therefore, unless donating the money would cause you suffering comparable to dying
from malaria, you should do it. It is simple to see that this is simply too demanding to be practical, as it Commented [A9]: good
would reduce one’s own utility by too much. This principle would also too hold that almost everyone
living in a developed country is guilty of immorality, including Singer himself. John Kekes argues that by
stating that this many people are doing wrong, the very concept of immorality is itself watered down
and made acceptable. Singer appears to be a ‘Loving Saint’, in that he derives much of his own self- Commented [A10]: good- interesting idea
worth and happiness from his helping of others5. While Singer will dismiss expensive items as pointless
frivolity, many people will find intense happiness through them, or even love these objects. Therefore
Singer provides too high a standard for others to follow, as although he himself is able to find all his
needed fulfilment just through helping others, many other people will not. If you are a moral saint, and Commented [A11]: although think about the effective
as Singer states, donate or work for most of your life in service of the needy, you will miss out on key life altruists who look like they in fact are following singer’s
example…
experiences which make our lives richer. Under the principle, there is no possible justification for art,
literature or leisure activities, as time would be better spent working to help the global poor, instead of
on these frivolities. If everyone followed this demanding theory, then the total amount of utility may
actually be reduced, as the happiness derived from these activities would be totally removed from
society. In addition, it could be argued that giving money away to this extent may cause economic Commented [A12]: big may here thought right!

4
Pettit, P., 'The Consequentialist Perspective in Three Methods of Ethics (Blackwell: Oxford, 1997) pp. 163-169
5
Wolf, Susan, Moral Saints, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 8 (August 1982), 419-439
damage to the country as a whole, meaning that in future there is less money available to give away,
and reducing overall utility, as people lose their jobs due to reductions in consumer spending, causing
relative poverty domestically.

In response, Singer would argue a number of things. For one, he is somewhat flexible on the strength of
his principle, mentioning that there is a ‘moderate version’, which simply states that we should prevent
bad things from happening, unless in doing so it sacrifices something of any moral significance; i.e, far
more lenient than the ‘comparable significance’ premise. Singer also argues that by giving away money
to the extent of marginal utility, that the consumer society that exists today would slow down, and
possibly cease to exist, something that Singer regards as certainly desirable. He believes that if this
principle was followed, that absolute poverty would cease to exist, worthy of the end of consumerist
society.

In conclusion, I would argue that Singer’s ideas have a number of problems, especially when applied
practically. Chief among these is the argument that if most people are acting immorally, then immorality
loses all meaning, as many would see not donating to the point of marginal utility as permissible. Commented [A13]: This is really nicely done! Well done!
You’ve focused in on a couple of the arguments, and done in
Word Count: 1498 to considerable detail, and thought carefully about the right
kinds of responses. The referencing is good and you’ve done
Bibliography some good extra reading, and reverenced it well. It would
have been good to have more in the conclusion about all of
Singer, Peter, Famine, affluence and morality, Philosophy and public affairs 1972 the arugments in the paper, so that you could effectively
sum up all of the material. Overall, very well done.
Corbett, Bob, Moral obligations to Distant Others,
One thing which I found less than convincing was the
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/philosophy/moral/others/distant.html material about the political implications of the drowning
child example, for more on this see above.
Kekes, John, On the supposed obligation to relieve famine (Cambridge University Press, Oct. 2002) pp. 506-507
One thing you might want to think about more is the idea of
Pettit, P., 'The Consequentialist Perspective in Three Methods of Ethics (Blackwell: Oxford, 1997) pp. 163-169 acting immorally losing its meaning. What do you mean by
this idea? Is the idea that we can no longer use the threat of
immorality as a way to get people to act better? (Think
about Christian morality, and the idea that we are all Sinners
Wolf, Susan, Moral Saints, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 8 (August 1982), 419-439
– does this mean that the threat of immorality is no longer a
coercive tool?) Or is the idea that we need the idea that
some of us are moral in order for the term to have any
meaning at all. If so, then why?
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