Citizenship-Q and A
Citizenship-Q and A
A. Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular political
community of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications such as minority. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the
political community.
Q. Who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution?
A. Philippine citizens at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution were those who were citizens under the 1973 Constitution.
Q. Who were citizens of the Philippines at the time of adoption of the 1973 Constitution?
A. They were those who were citizens under Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, namely:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the (1935) Constitution;
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands;
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship;
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Q. Emilio Osmena is a holder of an alien registration certificate. He is also a son of a Filipino father (and a grandson of President Osmena) and the holder
of a valid subsisting Philippine passport, a continuous resident of the Philippines and a registered voter since 1965. It is contended that he is an alien and
therefore disqualified from holding public office. Decide.
A. By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father the presumption is that he is Filipino and remains Filipino until proof is shown that he has renounced or
lost Philippine citizenship. There is no proof that he has been naturalized in a foreign country, or has expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, or has
sworn allegiance to a foreign country. Possession of an alien registration certificate unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts whereby Philippine
citizenship is lost is not adequate proof of loss of citizenship. Aznar v. COMELEC and Osmena,
Q. What is the citizenship of an illegitimate child of a Filipina mother?
A. Filipino. This is true whether the child be born under the 1935 or under the 1973 or 1987 Constitution.
Q. What is the citizenship of an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother?
A. Filipino, if paternity is clear, because of jus sanguinis, which makes no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. This was the case of
Tecson v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004.
Q. If a child was born of a Filipina mother and an alien father before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, do the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions recognize
such child as Filipino?
A. No, unless upon reaching majority the child elects Philippine citizenship pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. In other words, Section 1(2) of the 1973,
which is the same as Section 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution, took effect only with the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973. Hence,
children similarly situated but born prior to January 17,
1973 are governed by Section 1(4) of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
Q. May a child born under the 1973 or the 1987 Constitution of a Filipina mother and an alien father elect Philippine citizenship?
A. No. If the mother was still a Filipina at the time of the birth of the child then the child is already Filipino by birth, and hence need not elect. If the
mother, however, had lost Philippine citizenship by the time of the birth of the child, the child has no right of election and may acquire citizenship only by
naturalization. In other words, the provision on election in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution are transitory provisions intended to take care of those who
under the 1935 Constitution could have elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching majority but had not yet reached majority at the time of the effectivity
of the 1973 or 1987 Constitution.
Q. Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of
election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates
of registration?
A. No. This case involved children who had grown to adult years and for some
reason failed to register their election but had all along acted as citizens. Among the things which the Court noted was that the 1973 Constitution had
already corrected the chauvinistic provision of the 1935 Constitution by making those born of a Filipina mother a citizen without need for election.
Cabiling Ma v. Commissioner,
Q. What is naturalization?
A. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting a foreigner and clothing him with the privileges of a natural-born citizen. A person may be naturalized either
by complying with both the substantive and procedural requirements of a general naturalization law or he may be naturalized by a special act of the
legislature.
Q. What kind of naturalization laws and procedures have been used in the
Philippines?
A. The following have been used:
1. General law of naturalization applied through a judicial process. (Revised Naturalization Law, C.A. 473, June 17,1939. This is still in effect.)
2. Special naturalization law, i.e., an act of the legislature making a named individual a citizen of the Philippines. E.g., the Republic Act which made Father
James Moran, S.J. a citizen or the Presidential Decree which made Mr. Ronnie Nathanielz a citizen.
3. Mass naturalization law. The Philippine Bill of 1902 made Filipino citizens of "all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside in them who
were Spanish subjects" on 11 April 1899 "and then resided in said islands."
4. General law of naturalization applied through a combination of administrative process and presidential legislative process (Letter of Instruction No. 270,
in effect for a limited period from its promulgation by President Marcos on April 11,1975.)
5. Administrative Naturalization Law, R.A. 9139, enacted in 2000.
Q. What kind of requirements must an applicant for naturalization satisfy under the Revised Naturalization Law?
A. Both substantive and procedural requirements.
Q. Applicant for citizenship received a favorable decision after the Fiscal failed to raise any objection. In the hearing after the two year probation, however,
the Fiscal turned around to say that the respondent had no lucrative business, trade, or profession. May such subject be raised for the first time in the final
hearing?
A. Yes. In re petition of Martin Ng to be admitted a Filipino Citizen,
Q. What is the effect ofthe naturalization ofa father on legitimate minor children?
A. In general, the minor children become citizens of the Philippines. (C.A. 473,
Sees. 15,16)
Q. What is the effect on the wife of the naturalized husband?
A. She becomes a Filipino citizen, provided she shows, in an administrative procedure for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration, that she
has none of the disqualifications found in C.A. 473, Sec. 2. Burca v. Republic,).
Q. Jose was born a Chinese and married a natural born Filipina in 1932. Jose was eventuaUy naturalized and took his oath of allegiance in 1955. At that
time Jose, Jr. was 9 years old. In 1987 Jose, Jr. was elected to the House of Representatives.
1. May the citizenship of Jose, Sr., already deceased, be attacked collaterally in this case?
2. Did the minor Jose, Jr. become a Filipino citizen with his father?
3. Did he have to elect Philippine citizenship when he came of age?
4. Is he a natural born citizen?
A. 1. No.
2. Yes, under the Naturalization Law.
3. No, because he already was one. It would be unnatural to expect him to. Election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that you are not one. Moreover,
jurisprudence recognizes both formal and informal election. See e.g., In re Mallare, 59 SCRA 45 (1974).
4. Yes. He benefits from the curative nature of Section 2. He derives his status of being a natural born citizen not from his father, who made election
unnecessary for him, but from his mother who was a natural born Filipina. Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30,1991.
Q. May the law treat natural-born citizens and naturalized citizens differently?
A. No, except in the instances where the Constitution itself makes a distinction. Otherwise there would be a violation of the equal protection clause. Chen
Teck Lao v. Republic
Q. After naturalization proceedings, Cesar Guy took his oath of allegiance on December 22,1959. The government sought the cancellation of his certificate
of naturalization on the ground that (1) during the pendency of his petition for naturalization he filed a sworn
application for a timber license falsely claiming that he was Filipino (for which he was subsequently convicted for perjury), and that (2) on December 12,
1963 he was convicted of rape. On May 28, 1974, the lower court ordered the cancellation of his certificate on the ground that it had been obtained
fraudulently and illegally. On appeal, Guy contended that both convictions were after the two-year probationary period and after the final judgment on his
citizenship and hence could not be used against him. Decide.
A. 1. A decision in a naturalization proceeding is not res judicata as to any of the matters which could support a judgment canceling the certificate for
illegal or fraudulent procurement. In fact, the certificate may be canceled for acts committed after naturalization.
2. Perjury, committed during the pendency of his petition, is evidence of lack of good moral character; hence his having been able to obtain citizenship
despite this misconduct rendered his acquisition thereof fraudulent or illegal. (The Naturalization Law allows cancellation
of a certificate of naturalization if it is found to have been obtained "fraudulently or illegally.") Republic v. Cesar Guy,
Q. Petitioner was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. He was given naturalization as Filipino citizen in 1978. In 1980, however, he still declared his
citizenship as Portuguese in commercial documents and in 1981 he still obtained a Portuguese passport which expired in 1986. Has petitioner renounced
Philippine citizenship?
A. Yes, his actions constitute renunciation. "While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be
heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon insistence of petitioner, had to look into
the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious." In Willie Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, G.R.
No. 83882,
Q. Labo went through a process of naturalization as Australian and thereafter took the oath of allegiance renouncing Philippine citizenship. He claims that
his acquisition of Australian citizenship was invalid and that therefore he was still Filipino citizen qualified to run for
Philippine office.
A. Whether or not he acquired Australian citizenship validly is between him and Australia. The fact is he renounced Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to Australia. And since he has not taken any of the steps for re-acquiring Philippine citizenship, he is
not one now and is not qualified to hold an elective office. Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,
Q. Frivaldo does not deny that he was naturalized an American citizen. He, however, claims that his naturalization was involuntary since it was the only
way he could stay in the United States and thereby protect himself from Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he claims that by participating in the Philippine political
process and filing his certificate of candidacy, he thereby renounced American citizenship and reacquired Philippine citizenship. Decide.
A. He is not Filipino. There were many Filipinos similarly situated in the United States, but they did not find it necessary to abandon Philippine citizenship
nor pledge allegiance to the United States. And by participating in the political process of the Philippines, at best it would have rendered him stateless. As
to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, if he really wanted to he could have easily done so through the process of repatriation. He did not. Frivaldo v.
Comelec,
Q. What is repatriation?
A. Repatriation is the recovery of original citizenship. Thus, if what was lost was
naturalized citizenship, that is what will be reacquired. If what was lost was natural born citizenship, that will be reacquired. Bengzon v. Cruz,
Q. Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?
A. Yes. Altarejos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 163256, November 10,2004.
Q. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. On November 5, 1985, however, he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship. On June 5,
1990, he was naturalized as an American. On March 17,1994, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic
Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,1998 elections. Was he a
natural born Filipino citizen?
A. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally
under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law. Cruz was not naturalized but repatriated. Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of
the United States at any other time; (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation
simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided. Repatriation, as the word connotes, results in the recovery of what had been lost. When what was lost is
natural born citizenship, what is recovered is also natural born citizenship. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. There are only two kinds of citizenship: natural
born and naturalized. Since Cruz did not undergo naturalization, he is natural born. Bengzon v. Cruz,
Q. If a person who has reacquired Philippine citizenship wants to run for office, what must he do?
A. Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired
or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candida<y, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, November 26, 2008.
Q. A natural born Filipino citizen who becomes a green card resident of the United States, or who becomes naturalized citizen of America loses his
domicile of origin in the Philippines. Does reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225 have the effect of restoring his Philippine domicile?
A. No. To reacquire domicile he must provide proof of intent to stay in the Philippines. After he does that, his occasional absence from the recovered
domicile does not have the effect of removing him from the domicile for as long as he manifests animus manendi et revertendi. Japzon v. Ty, G.R. No.
180088, January 19,2009.
NOTE: Where a person is natural born Filipino because of a Filipino mother, and also a natural born American for having been born in the United States,
he has dual citizenship. The INS certification obtained for him by his father did not confer American citizenship on him because he was already one. His
travels under a US passport did not strip him of Philippine citizenship. The fact that he had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for office.
Nor did he have to renounce his American citizenship if he wanted to run for local office. The need for renunciation applies only to those who reacquired
Philippine citizenship through R.A. 9225. Cordora v. Comelec,
Q. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen
and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. This was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect. Was Rosalinda a Filipino citizen?
A. At that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These
were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29,1916, also known as the Jones Law. Under both organic acts, all
inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children were deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent's father, Telesforo
Ybasco, was born on January 5,1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, Telesforo's
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. Valles v. Comelec,,
Q. In the above case, Valles claims that Ybasco Lopez had renounced her Filipino citizenship because she had applied for an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and because she had been issued an Australian passport on
March 3,1988. Decide.
A. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner's contention that the application of private
respondent for an alien certificate
of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar v. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703, and in the more
recent case of Mercado v. Manzano and COMELEC, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999. In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that
respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an
alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado v. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held
that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American
passport on April 22,1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of
his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a
holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not
militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Valles v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 9,2000.
Q. Valles also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao
Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states: "SEC. 40. Disqualifications. —
The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (d) Those with dual citizenship;
A. Again, petitioner's contention is untenable. In the aforecited case of Mercado v. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a
Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of
another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced: . .
the phrase 'dual
citizenship' in R.A. No. 7160,... (d) and in R.A. No. 7854,... must be understood as referring to 'dual allegiance.' Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification." Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine
citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one
declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship. Valles v.
Comelec,
Q. Valles maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 41 SCRA 292, he insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
A. Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e., the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of
citizenship. However, in the case oiBurca v. Republic, 51 SCRA 248, an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in
order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person's citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court. Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the
weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to
make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA.-N0. 95-066 and
EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same
evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions.
However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper. Valles v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000.
Q. Petitioner claims that she was an illegitimate daughter of a Filipina mother; that she was erroneously registered as an alien; that she lost her citizenship
upon marriage to an alien; that her alien husband has died. She petitioned the CFI for "judicial repatriation" and the court declared her ^judicially
repatriated." Was the repatriation proper?
A. No. There is no law authorizing "judicial repatriation." All that is needed is for the woman to take the necessary oath of allegiance and to register the
oath in the proper civil registry. However, the petitioner's claim of Philippine citizenship prior to her marriage may not be established in an action where
the mother or her heirs are not made parties. Philippine citizenship may not be declared in a non-adversary suit where affected persons are not made parties.
Dugcoy Jao v. Republic, G.R. No. 29397, March 29,1983. (NOTE: Compare with People v. Avengonza, G.R!. No. 27976,
December 7,1982.)
Q. Does the repatriation of a mother entitle her minor son to a declaration that
he is entitled to Philippine citizenship?
A. Yes . Republic v. Honorable Judge Tandayag, G.R. No. 32999, October
15,1982 (Reiterating Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52 [19521).
Q. What was Philippine law on the citizenship of the Filipina married to an alien
before the 1973 Constitution?
A. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(7), a Filipino woman loses her Philippine citizenship "upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the
laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality." The 1973 Constitutional provision repeals this statutory rule and the 1987 Constitution
made it applicable not just to female citizens.