Art.

159 - Other cases of evasion of service of sentence

People vs Pontillas

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Facts:

The appellee accused Remigio Pontillas of violating a conditional pardon, which he had been granted on
December 24, 1935, in Manila, Philippines. Pontillas had been granted a pardon remitting the
unexecuted portion of his six-year prision correccional sentence for illegal marriage. He agreed to not
violate any penal laws of the Philippine Islands, which was accepted on September 8, 1922. Pontillas was
released from Bilibid Prisons on that date. However, he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously violated the
conditions of the pardon by committing the crime of damage to property through reckless driving.
Pontillas was sentenced to thirty days' subsidiary imprisonment in lieu of a fine and P60.30 indemnity in
criminal case No. H-47583, which has become final and executory.

The court ruled that a person who was conditionally pardoned by the Chief Executive for illegal marriage
or bigamy after serving nineteen months of the six-year and one-day penalty of prision correccional
could be criminally prosecuted for violation of a conditional pardon on the sole ground that, contrary to
the condition that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippine Islands", he has
committed the crime of damage to another's property through reckless imprudence.

The lower court held that the first penalty had already been prescribed when the accused committed his
second offense, and therefore, he could no longer be prosecuted for violation of conditional pardon.
However, the fiscal disagreed and now questions whether a person can be criminally prosecuted for
violation of a conditional pardon on the sole ground that, contrary to the condition that "he shall not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippine Islands", he has committed the crime of damage to
another's property through reckless imprudence.

Issue:

The appellee's penalty for bigamy, which was imposed on him in 1921, was only six years and one day
after he committed the crime on December 24, 1935. The period between the two occasions is 14 years,
ten months, and ten days. The penalties of prision mayor are prescribed in fifteen years under the old
Penal Code and the Revised Penal Code, which have different provisions for penalties. Therefore, the
question is whether the penalty had been prescribed at the time of the crime.

Ruling:

The appellee's conditional pardon, which was granted and accepted, had already reduced his six-year
penalty by 19 months. This was due to his acceptance of the pardon, which allowed him to enjoy liberty
without being obligated to serve the remainder of his sentence, as long as he did not violate any penal
laws. The Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled that a conditional pardon is a contract between the
Chief Executive and the convict, and the pardoned convict must fulfill its strict terms or face the same
situation as before the pardon, which could result in serving the remaining sentence.

In the appealed resolution, it was stated that the crime of damage to property committed by the
appellee is not one that shows moral perversity on his party, meaning that, strictly speaking, he did not
infringe any condition of his pardon. However, the reason for this is irrelevant because the condition of
the pardon did not consist in that he would not commit any crime, more or less grave, which might
denote perversity, but in any violation of any penal law of the Philippines. The crime of damage to
property of another, through reckless imprudence, is a crime expressly punished and considered as such
by article 356 in relation to article 3 of the Revised Penal Code.

Since the question and facts before us are different, it is not necessary for us to decide whether an
action may be brought for the purpose of enforcing the service of a part of a sentence, which was not
extinguished on account of conditional pardon, after the usual period of prescription of the penalty.

The appealed resolution stated that the appellee's crime of damage to property was not a moral
perversity crime, as he did not violate any condition of his pardon. However, this is irrelevant as the
condition of the pardon did not involve committing any grave crime but violating any penal law in the
Philippines. The crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence is punishable by article 356
in relation to article 3 of the Revised Penal Code. The court does not need to decide whether an action
can be brought to enforce a part of a sentence that was not extinguished due to the conditional pardon.

People vs. Sanares

Isidoro Sanares y Caerne was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila under the following
information.

That on or about March 1, 1927, the said accused having been granted by His Excellency, the
Governor-General, a conditional pardon remitting the unexecuted portion of the sentence of
imprisonment of six years and one imposed upon him in criminal case No. 4508 of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite, for the crime of theft, which he began to serve on July 9, 1924, and
having been released from Bilibid Prison on March 1, 1927, upon accepting the condition of such
pardon, to wit: that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippine Islands; on
or about February 5, 1935, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously violated the condition of such pardon by then and there committing
the crime of estafa for which he was finally sentenced to suffer three months and eleven days of
 imprisonment, and to pay P50 indemnify, imposed upon him by the municipal court of the City
of Manila in Criminal case No. H-26727.

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty and the court forthwith ordered his recommitment for
the unexpired portion of his former sentence. The accused appealed from this judgment and prays that
he be acquitted or that the penalty be reduced. No reason, alleged or extant in the record, appears in
support of the first prayer, for the violation of the new is conceded, and the accused has pleaded guilty
thereto. As to the modification of the judgment and the reduction of the penalty, we believe that the
point is well taken, as the trial court erroneously applied section 4 of Act No. 1524, which has been
expressly repealed by the Revised Penal Code.

The record shows that the conditional pardon whose conditions were violated by the accused referred
to a penalty of six years and one day of prision, of which two years, five months and twenty-two days
had been served by the accused. The penalty remitted by the pardon was, therefore, three years, seven
months and eight days. These facts appear in the information the material allegations of which have
been admitted by the accused by virtue of' his plea of guilty (U.S. vs. Burlado, 42 Phil., 72; U.S vs. Barba,
29 Phil., 206; People vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 39200 [58 Phil., 930]).

Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the Penalty remitted by the
granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of
his original sentence."

The second part of the article just quoted is inapplicable to the case at bar because the unexpired
portion of the penalty remitted by reason of the condition pardon granted the accused does not exceed
six years. The first part thereof, which imposes the penalty or prision correccional in its minimum period
upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon, shall violated any of its conditions, is,
therefore, applicable. The duration of this penalty is from six months and one day to two years and four
months. Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstance of having pleaded guilty should be considered in favor
of the accused, and there being no aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its
minimum period which ranges from six months and one day to one year, one month and ten days
of prision correccional. The benefits afforded by the Indeterminate Sentence Law are not applicable to
the accused, by express provision thereof.

Wherefore, modifying the appealed judgment, we are of the opinion that we should, as we hereby
sentenced the appellant to eight months of prision correccional, with costs.

People vs. Martin

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46432-may-17,-1939-people-of-the-phil-v-teodorico-martin-br-br-068-phil-122&catid=600&Itemid=566

The appellant Teodorico Martin was sentenced in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the crime of
abduction to the penalty of fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, having
commenced to serve this sentence on January 17, 1917. On February 5, 1923, after having served eight
years, one month and seventeen days, leaving still unserved six years, six months and fourteen days, he
was pardoned on condition that he should not again be found guilty of any crime punishable by the laws
of the Philippines. Subsequently the appellant was tried for the crime of attempted robbery in band with
physical injuries and sentenced, by final judgment dated October 27, 1932, to pay a fine of 330 pesetas,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The appellant is charged with a violation of the conditions of his pardon for having committed the crime
for which he was sentenced on October 27, 1932. The Court of First Instance of Rizal, which took
cognizance of this case, found him guilty and sentenced him to suffer the penalty which was remitted in
the pardon, namely, six years, six months and fourteen days of reclusion temporal.

It is alleged that the Court of First Instance of Cavite, and not that of Rizal, had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of this case. We find no merit in this contention. While the Court of First Instance of Cavite
was the one which imposed on the appellant the penalty of which he was subsequently pardoned,
nevertheless the violation of the conditions of that pardon, which is the subject matter of the present
prosecution, took place in the Province of Rizal. The present proceeding is not a continuation or a part of
the former one. It is a new proceeding, complete in itself and independent of the latter. It refers to other
subsequent facts which the law (art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code) punishes as a distinct crime the
penalty for which is not necessarily that remitted by the pardon.

The prescription of the violation is another defense put up by the appellant. He contends that this
violation being punished with prision correccional in its minimum degree which should be imposed in its
medium period, that is, from one year, one month and eleven days to one year, eight months and twenty
days (art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code), it prescribes after four years under section 1 of Act No. 3585.
This Act provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished
by imprisonment for two year s or more, but less than six years; . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

We likewise find no merit in this defense. In the first place, the penalty prescribed for the violation is not
that of prision correccional in its minimum grade, but the penalty remitted by the pardon. Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon the convict, who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the
granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of
his original sentence."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case at bar the penalty remitted was six years, six months and fourteen days, or more than six
years. The appellant’s contention that there should be deducted from this remitted penalty the
allowance of time provided in article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, is unsound. This allowance is given in
consideration of the good conduct of the prisoner while serving his sentence. Not having served this
remitted penalty, there is no reason for the allowance, namely, the good conduct of the appellant while
serving his sentence. The penalty imposable for the violation being more than six years, this does not
prescribe after four years, but after eight, under the aforesaid Act No. 3585 the pertinent portion of
which has been quoted.

Moreover, the violation in question is penalized by the Revised Penal Code (art. 159 aforesaid), which is
not a special law, and the prescription thereof, as regulated by article 90 of the same Code, is ten years.

Wherefore, the period of eight years not having elapsed from the time the appellant was found guilty of
the crime of attempted robbery in band with injuries by final judgment rendered on October 27, 1932,
nor from the time he committed this crime on October 27, 1930, the violation of the conditions of his
pardon with which he is charged, has not prescribed either under Act No. 3585 or under the Revised
Penal Code.

The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.

Torres vs. Gonzales

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Facts:

1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was was granted conditional pardon by the president
on condition that he "would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines". He accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982, he was charged with 20
counts of estafa (pending trial) while in 1985, he was convicted of sedition (pending appeal). In 1986,
Justice Secretary Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president
cancelled the pardon. Torres was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres thus filed a petition for habeas corpus before the SC
questioning the validity of the arrest order. He claimed that he did not violate his conditional pardon
since he has not been convicted by final judgment of 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition.

Issue:

Is conviction by final judgment necessary before a person may be validly rearrested and recommitted for
violation of the terms of his condition pardon?

Ruling:

The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
Since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict
who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by
final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged
to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed
against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum
period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate
any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's
executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

People vs Ponce De Leon

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This is an appeal taken by the Government, represented by the Attorney-General, from the judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, dismissing the information filed against the
accused Miguel Ponce de Leon y Ballesteros, for the violation of a conditional pardon.

On March 13, 1923 the appellee was found guilty of parricide by the Court of First Instance of Manila,
and sentenced to three years of banishment from within a radius of 25 kilometers from the Roman
Catholic Church in Santa Ana. On February 16, 1924 His Excellency the Governor-General pardoned him
on condition that he should never again be guilty of any misconduct. A few weeks later the appellee was
introduced by Captain Panopio to Godofredo Dancel of the Governor-General's Office, indicating
thereby that he accepted the conditional pardon. On October 6, 1928 the appellee was charged with the
violation of section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code of illegal possession of a number of
cartridges and a chip for an automatic pistol, and having pleaded guilty, was sentenced to pay a fine of
P25.

On June 7, 1930, Assistant Fiscal F.B. Albert, of the City of Manila, revived criminal case No. 40135 of
said court and filed an information against the appellee charging him with the violation, as aforesaid, of
the conditional pardon granted him and by him accepted, praying the after the proper investigation he
be compelled to serve the unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment. After due hearing, the court
dismissed the information on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to order the remedy sought by the
prosecution. The Government, represented by the Attorney-General, appealed.

This appeal raises two question: First, whether the decision is applicable; and second, whether the court
had jurisdiction to order the appellee to serve the unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment
inasmuch as he had violated the condition of his pardon.

Act No. 1524 which provides the manner of enforcing the conditions imposed by the Governor-General
in the exercise of his power to grant conditional pardons, does not establish the right to appeal from the
order or judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance denying or dismissing a petition for the
enforcement of said conditions. For this reason counsel for the appellee contends that the judgment
from which the Attorney-General has appealed is not open to such a recourse. But section 44 of General
Orders, No. 58 as amended by section 4 of Act No. 2886 recognizes the right of the Government to
appeal from others sustaining a demurrer or dismissing a complaint or information. Of course there is no
question that no appeal can be taken from an order dismissing an information, when the accused is
thereby acquitted or set at liberty. Inasmuch as the law cited above is silent with reference to appeals by
the State, we see no good reason why the general provisions of section 44, General Orders, No. 58,
should not also applicable to the order in question. The ground upon which rest the principle prohibiting
an appeal from a judgment or order of acquittal, is that the accused is placed in double jeopardy of
conviction for one and the same offense. This fundamental reason does not exist in the present case:
the appellee was not placed in double jeopardy of conviction for one and the same offense, for what the
prosecution sought was that he be compelled to serve out the unexpired portion of the penalty of
banishment from which he had been relieved by a conditional pardon. In case it is finally decided that he
must serve out the unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment, he is not sentenced to a new
penalty or found guilty of the same crime of which he was convicted, but he is merely restored to the
status in which he was before being pardoned.

With reference to the second question, we find that section 4 of Act No. 1524 is applicable. It reads as
follows:

SEC. 4. If the Court shall find from said investigation that one or more of the conditions of such
pardon, heretofore or hereafter grated, has been violated by the person so pardoned, the court
shall order the recommitment and confinement of such person in the proper prison for the
unexpired portion of his original sentence. Such order of the court shall be sufficient authority to
the custodian of any public prison designated therein to receive and safely keep the body of the
person so conditionally pardoned during the unexpired potions of his original sentence.

In dismissing the information presented in this case, the court relied upon the phrase employed in the
law, "shall order the recommitment and confinement of such person." It was argued that since the
appellee could not be reimprisoned because he had been sentenced to banishment, the law was
inapplicable and the court had no jurisdiction to grant the fiscal's petition. We are convinced that the
legal precepts and legislative intention have been misinterpreted. What is meant in that section is that if
the investigation shows the accused be recommitted or confined with a view to serving that portion of
his sentence which has remained unextinguished on account of the conditional pardon. Of course, if the
penalty imposed is not commitment but banishment, for example, he will not be ordered to suffer or
serve imprisonment, but merely that period of banishment from which he was relieved by his
acceptance of the conditional pardon. To place another interpretation upon the law would be to thwart
its purpose which is, as we have said, to enforce the conditions of the pardon, as its very title clearly
declares, and to restore the accused to the same status in which he was before the pardon.lawphil.net

In United States vs. Ignacio (33 Phil., 202), this court said:

The defendant accepted the conditional pardon and thereby secured his release from
imprisonment. Having accepted the conditional pardon, he is bound by its terms. The record
shows that he had been guilty of misconduct after his conditional pardon. By such misconduct,
he forfeit his pardon and his right to liberty thereunder. When a pardoned person violates the
conditions of his pardon, he is left in the exact situation in which he was when the pardon was
granted, and the original sentence may be enforced against him.(Ex parte Wells, 18 Howard
 [U.S.] 307; Ex parte Hawkins, 61 Ark., 321; 30 L.R.A., 736; 54 Am. St. Rep., 209; Kennedy's Case,
135 Mass., 48; Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal., 29.)

If the condition of the pardon upon which the accused secures his release from imprisonment
has been violated by him, after his release, the pardon thereby becomes void and the petitioner
may be arrested and compelled to undergo so much of the original sentence as he had not
suffered at the time of his release. (Ex parte Alvarez vs. State of Florida, 50 Fla., 24; 111 Am. St.
Rep., 102; Fuller vs. State, 122 Ala., 32; 45 L.R.A., 502; Ex parte Marks, supra; State vs. Horne, 7
L.R.A. [N.S.], 719.)

The law is well settled that where the criminal accepts the pardon he accepts it subject to all its
valid conditions and limitations, and will be held bound to compliance therewith. (Ex
parte Alvarez vs. State of Florida, supra.)

If the purpose of the action taken by the prosecution was but to restore the appellee to the status he
was in before receiving and accepting the conditional pardon, and if the principal penalty imposed upon
him in the criminal case for parricide was banishment and not imprisonment, it stands to reason that he
must now extinguish the unexpired portion of the former penalty, and not of any other penalty to which
he has not been sentenced. And to this end, there is no doubt that Courts of First Instance have plenary
power and jurisdiction, under said section 4, Act No. 1524.

Our attention has been called to the fact that the procedure established by Act No. 1524 cannot be
followed in cases where the condition was violated after the period of the defendant's sentence had
expired. In view of the provisions of Act No. 1524, we believe this objection has no legal weight. This law
contains no exception or limitation of the time within which the action provided for may be instituted,
and we do not see how the objection can stand. Of course, we do not mean to apply this decision to a
case where the offense has already prescribed by express provision of the law.

On forfeiture of a pardon by a breach of its conditions, a convict becomes liable to serve the
balance of his unexpired term, although the time for which he was sentenced has expired, the
essential part of the sentenced being the punishment, and not the time when it shall begin and
end. (State vs. Horne, 52 Fla., 125; 42 S., 338; 7 L.R.A. [N. S.], 719; [rehden 52 Fla., 143; 42 S.,
714]; State vs. Yates, 183 N.C., 753; 111 S.E., 337.) (46 C.J., 1203.)

Wherefore the appealed judgment is reversed, and let the accused Miguel Ponce de Leon y Ballesteros
serve the period of banishment to which he was sentenced and which remained unextinguished by
reason of the conditional pardon granted him, with the costs of this instance against said appellee. So
ordered.

Tesoro vs Director of Prisons

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Facts:

Eufemio P. Tesoro was convicted of falsification of a public document in the Court of First Instance of
Manila in 1934 and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two to three years, six months, and 21
days. He was granted parole in November 1935. In December 1937, he was charged with adultery with
Concordia Dairo, wife of his brother-in-law, Jose Nagar. The case was forwarded to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, where the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information, which was dismissed
due to the complainant's nonappearance.

In February 1938, Jose Nagar lodged a complaint with the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, charging
Tesoro with violation of his parole conditions. Tesoro asked for postponement and addressed a letter to
the board denying the charge of illicit relations with the complainant's wife. Simeon Figalang, a parole
officer assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board. The case highlights the
ongoing legal battle between the accused and the parole system in the Philippines.

Issue:

the petitioner was arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Director of Prisons. Thereupon,
petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons and, upon denial thereof by
the trial court,... By virtue of this order, t

Ruling:

The appellant argued that he should serve the unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he
was originally committed to prison after his recommitment. Act No. 1561 and Act No. 4103 both provide
that a convict released on parole who violates its conditions will serve the full sentence of the court, as
though no parole has ever been granted. However, there is no statutory provision governing the duration
of the petitioner's confinement after his recommitment. The court affirmed the judgment, with costs
against the appellant. The sentence imposed will be in full force and effect.

Sales vs. Director of Prisons

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3972-october-13,-1950-flore-ntilde-a-sales-v-director-of-prisons-br-br-087-phil-
492&catid=748&Itemid=566

Facts:

Fidel Ariston had been convicted of the crime of frustrated murder. After serving a little more than two
years of his sentence, he was given a conditional pardon by the President, "the condition being that he
shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines and that, should this condition be violated,
he shall be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Eight years after the grant of his
conditional pardon, Ariston was convicted of estafa. The Executive Secretary ordered the Director of
Prisons to recommit Ariston to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence.

Sales, stepdaughter of Ariston, filed an original petition for habeas corpus on behalf Ariston, who was
then confined in the New Bilibid Prison, raising two principal contentions. Firstly, she argued that Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
She contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in any case repugnant to the due process clause of the
Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed by Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code

2. Whether or not Section 64 (i) is repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution

Ruling:

1. The Revised Penal Code, approved on December 8, 1930, contains a repealing clause (article
367) that repeals sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code, but does not
repeal section 64 (i). The legislative intent is to preserve the President's power to authorize
arrest and reincarceration of individuals violating their pardon conditions, despite the enactment
of article 159. Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, also preserved this authority. The
court ruled that Article 159 and Section 64 (i) could stand together, and proceeding under one
provision did not necessarily preclude action under the other.
2. Since the petitioner was a convict "who had already been seized in a constitutional way, been
confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him, been convicted of crime and been
sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial
determination of whether he had breached the condition of his parole by committing a
subsequent offense.

People vs. Tapel

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On November 10, 1936, the defendant, Tomas Tapel, was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila with the violation of a conditional pardon committed, according to the information, as follows:
"That on or about the 18th day of September, 1936, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
having been granted on September 7, 1934, by his Excellency, the Governor-General, a pardon remitting
the unexecuted portion of the sentence of imprisonment of 12 years, 4. months and 1 day imposed
upon him in criminal case No. 37838 of the Court of First Instance of Manila for the crime of qualified
theft, which sentence he began to serve on December 5, 1929, conditioned upon the fact that he shall
not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippine Islands, which was accepted by the herein
accused on September 8, 1934, as a consequence of which he was released from Bilibid Prisons on the
last mentioned date, did then and there-willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate the conditions of
such pardon by then and there committing the crime of theft, for which he was received again in Bilibid
Prisons to suffer 5 months' imprisonment and 5 days' subsidiary imprisonment in lieu of P14 indemnity
imposed upon him by final judgment in criminal case No. 52232 of the Court of First Instance of Manila."
The accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence of
imprisonment in criminal case No. 37838, and to pay the costs. The defendant has appealed to this
court.
The appellant claims that the trial court erred in imposing upon him a punishment neither specified in
the conditional pardon nor alleged in the information. The pardon imposed the condition that the
appellant shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines, which condition was accepted
by him. It was not necessary to specify in the pardon the penalty for the violation of that condition. The
law has taken care of that in article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon the other hand, the
information charges a particular offense to which the law attaches a particular penalty. A plea of guilty
justifies the imposition of the corresponding penalty.
The appellant also contends that the lower court was in error when it modified its original decision of
November 23, 1936 and reduced the penalty from seven years, six months and twenty-eight days to six
years, six months and two days in accordance with a letter, dated November 25, 1936, from the Bureau
of Prisons. While we do not subscribe to the irregular procedure followed by the trial court in this
regard, its action does not constitute a reversible error. It will be observed that, in conformity with said
letter, the trial court reduced the penalty to be served by the accused by one year and twenty-six days.
The appellant further contends that, in accordance with article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty of prision correctional in its minimum period should have been imposed upon him as the time
during which he was out of prison should have been deducted from the unexecuted portion of his
original sentence which, in such a case, would fall short of six years. We find no merit in this
contention. . When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in which he
was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prison. (See U.
S. vs. Ignacio [1916], 33 Phil, 202, 204; U. S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is well-settled
that, in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as
he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider the time during which the
convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence. (20 RC. L., p. 570;
State vs. Home [1906], 52 Fla., 125; 42 So., 388; 7 L. R. A. [N. S.], 719, 725. Vide, also, Ex parte Bell
[1879], 56 Miss., 282.)
The original sentence imposed upon the appellant by the Court of First Instance of Manila in criminal
case No. 37838 was imprisonment of twelve years, four months and one day. The appellant served his
original sentence from December 5, 1929 until he was pardoned and released on September 8, 1934, or
a total period of four years, nine months and three days. Under article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, the
appellant is entitled to an allowance of one year and twenty-five days for good conduct while in prison.
The appellant, therefore, has garnered to his credit a total of five years, nine months and twenty-eight
days of service, leaving unserved a period of six years, six months and three days, which is one day more
than the penalty imposed by the trial court. The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified,
with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Infante vs Provincial Warden

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Facts:

Infante was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years. After serving 15 years, he was
granted a conditional pardon in 1939, requiring him not to violate Philippine penal laws.
However, in 1949, he was found guilty of driving a jeep without a license, leading to his re-
arrested and re-committed charges.
Issue:

Is INFANTE liable for the crime of Other Cases of Evasion of Service of Sentence under
Article 15 9of the Revised Penal Code?

Ruling:

The Court held that NO. Although the penalty remitted has not, in strict law, prescribed,
reimprisonment of the petitioner for the remainder of his sentence, more than ten years
after he was pardoned, would be repugnant to the weight of reason and the spirit and
genius of our penal laws. As such, the condition of the pardon which the prisoner was
charged with having breached was no longer operative when he committed a violation of
the Motor Vehicle Law

Alvarez vs. Director of Prisons, 80 PHIL 43

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This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner against the Director of Prisons on the
ground that he is being illegally detained in the New Bilibid Prisons, notwithstanding the fact that the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the recommendation of the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence, granted the petitioner on December 23, 1946, absolute pardon of the crime
of murder which he committed and of which he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua on June 5, 1945, by the Court of First Instance of Manila in criminal case no. 70022.

The Director of Prisons, in his return, which according to section 13, Rule 102, is considered prima
facie evidence of the cause of the restraint, alleges that the petitioner, while serving the sentence
of reclusion perpetua for the crime of murder above mentioned, escaped from prison on October 21,
1945, and for said evasion he was prosecuted and sentenced on March 22, 1946, by the Court of
First Instance of Manila in case no. 73820, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of prision correccional; that on April 8, 1946, the petitioner again escaped and evaded the service of
the same sentence, and for the second evasion he was prosecuted and sentenced on August 20,
1946, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in case No. 14862 by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal; and that on May 24, 1946, the petitioner was prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearm, convicted and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
case No. 74312, to six (6) months of imprisonment, and to pay a fine of three hundred pesos (P300),
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Under the commitment orders issued by the respective Courts of First Instance in said cases Nos.
73820, 14862, and 74312, the petitioner is confined in the New Bilibid Prisons to serve a total of six
(6) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of imprisonment, commencing with the date of
his pardon of the crime of murder above mentioned.

The petitioner could have successfully set up the defense of double jeopardy in case No. 14683 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where he was prosecuted again for the first evasion of sentence
of which he had already been convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 73820;
but petitioner did not set up said defense, and was convicted on August 8, 1946, by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in case No. 14683 and sentenced two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional. And petitioner could also have successfully alleged the same defense in case
No. 74311 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, where he was prosecuted for the second time for
the evasion of which the petitioner had already been convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in case No. 14862; but the petitioner did not set up said defense, and he was convicted on May 16,
1946 by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 74311 and sentenced to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. As the petitioner has not yet
completed the service of the total penalty of six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of
imprisonment, to which he was sentenced in cases Nos. 73820, 14862, and 74312, it is not
necessary for us to decide now whether or not he has to serve also the sentences rendered in the
above mentioned cases Nos. 14683 and 74311.

The penalties imposed upon the petitioner for evasions of service of sentence have not been
affected by the absolute pardon granted to him remitting the unserved penalty to which he was
finally sentenced for the crime of murder; because petitioner was convicted of evasions of service of
sentence before the pardon and while he was serving said sentence of conviction for murder, which
was then still in full force.

Petition is therefore denied. So ordered.

Art. 160 – Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous officer.

People vs Peralta
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Facts:

February 1958, Peralta among other inmates of New Bilibid Prisons, conspired and mutually helped one
another, with evident premeditation and treachery, armed with deadly weapons, feloniously killed Jose
Carriego, Eugene Barnosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts of New Bilibid. Aggravating circumstance of
quasi-recidivism is present because the crime was committed while the offenders were convicted by final
judgments. Upon motion of the fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed the charge against one of
the accused for lack of evidence. After prosecution of the case, the charge against 6 accused were
dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case against them. After trial, 5 of the accused were also
acquitted, then 1 died.

Issue:
(1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish
between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death
sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing
multiple death penalties.

Ruling:
The evidence shows that the accused acted in concert from the moment they bolted their common
brigade until the time they killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. Although Parumog, Larita, and Luna did
not participate in the actual killing of Carriego, they are all equally guilty and collectively liable for
conspiracy. Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony, not participation in all details of the
execution. All those who help and cooperate in the consummation of a previously planned felony are co-
principals. Thus, all six accused are guilty of the slaughter of Carriego, Barbosa, and Santos Cruz, each of
which is guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder.
Multiple death penalties can be served simultaneously, as they must be executed in accordance with
article 70. There are two modes of serving multiple penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first
rule states that two or more penalties must be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties
permits it, while the second rule requires simultaneous service for multiple capital penalties.

The six accused were all serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa due to final judgment
convictions. The penalty for each offense must be imposed within its maximum period, as mandated by
article 160 of the Revised Penal Code. Viada argues that the severe penalty on a quasi-recidivist is
justified due to his perversity and incorrigibility.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora,
Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three
separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them
shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of
P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.

People vs. Alicia, 95 SCRA 227

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Before the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, the accused, Arturo Alicia and Victor
Bangayan, were charged with the crimes of Murder and of Multiple Frustrated Murder (Criminal
Case No. CCC-VII-1391-Rizal) committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of May, 1972, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa,
Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed
accused, while then confined at the said institution, each armed with improvised
deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and acting together and mutually helping
one another, with treachery, evident premeditation and deliberate intent to kill – did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab:

1. Pedro Madjos, No. 76970-P

2. Felipe Macerin, No. 53421-P

3. Victorio Sansanan, No. 58203-P

4. Sulficio Sulina, No. 79723-P

 all prisoners serving final sentences in the same institution while then unarmed and
unable to defend themselves from the attack launched by the accused thereby
inflicting upon Pedro Madjos a stab wound which directly cause his death and
simultaneously inflicting upon Felipe Macerin, Victorio Sansanan and Sulficio Sulina
stab wounds in the different parts of their bodies, the accused having performed all
the acts of execution which would produce the offense of murder, but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is
by the timely arrival of prison guards which deterred the accused from inflicting
further injuries on their victims and the timely and able assistance of the NBP
Hospital Staff in treating the injured.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, the accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial
court ordered a mandatory presentation of the prosecution's evidence. Trial followed and on January
28, 1974, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Victor Bangayan and Arturo Alicia, GUILTY,
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences
them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the victim, the amount
of P10,000.00 jointly and severally; to pay moral damages in the amount of
P5,000.00 and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, jointly and severally; and
to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.

Likewise, finding the accused, Victor Bangayan and Arturo Alicia, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of Multiple Frustrated Murder, as defined under Article
250 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, the Court hereby
sentences each one of them to suffer the penalty of TEN (10) YEARS AND ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS AND FOUR (4)
MONTHS of prision mayor as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the offended
parties in the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00, as
exemplary damages, jointly and severally: and to pay their proportionate shares of
the costs.

xxx xxx xxx

The case is now before Us on automatic review pursuant to Rule 122, Section 9 of the Rules of
Court.

The prosecution presented as its witnesses Dr. Argente Alejandro, Tolentino Avelina, Francisco
Cometa, Jr., Sulficio Sulina, Loneida Panopio and Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr..

Dr. Argente Alejandro, a physician employed in the Bureau of Prisons Hospital, testified that he
treated Felipe Macerin who sustained two lacerated wounds (two inches right midaxillary line and
one-third inch around the right elbow just above the distal portion all over the bone), both of which
could have been caused by an improvised weapon usually used by prisoners in Muntinlupa; that he
sutured the wounds and gave the victim an IPS anti-tetanus syrup and antibiotic five per cent
dextrose and water; that Felipe Macerin had already been admitted to the hospital for treatment of
siptomiasis when these injuries were inflicted upon him; and that the injuries of Macerin had been
cured and he recovered, but sixteen days after the stabbing incident he died of Maxonia (the doctor's
certificate of the NBP Hospital shows that the cause of his death is "Carcinoma-Liver").
He further testified that aside from Felipe Macerin, he also treated Sulficio Sulina and Victorio
Sansanan for injuries resulting from the stabbing incident at Ward 3 of the NBP Hospital; that Sulficio
Sulina sustained four (4) lacerated wounds (one inch subcostal left parasternal line; one inch supra
clavicular region right; two inches right elbow; and two inches hyposgastrion); that he conducted an
exploratory operation, suturing his urinary bladder which was penetrated in the distal part of the elum
and part of the dentary column; that the injuries of the internal organs of Sulina would have been
fatal without surgical intervention and that they could have been caused by an improvised weapon
used by prisoners; that Sulficio Sulina recovered from his injuries and was discharged on June 24,
1972; and that Victorio Sansanan was treated by him for a superficial lacerated wound (one-half of
an inch at the back lever of the dentary parasipital area) which was not fatal.

Furthermore, he testified that another prisoner, Pedro Madjos died in the hospital and his cadaver
was forwarded to the Muntinlupa Board of Investigation for autopsy; that he examined the cadaver
and saw one wound which is 1.5 cms., one foot long from the axillary line, which caused his death
as it penetrated the heart.

Tolentino Avelina, an investigator in the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prisons, declared
that he investigated a stabbing incident which transpired on May 2, 1972 inside Ward 3 of the New
Bilibid Prisons Hospital wherein Pedro Madjos Felipe Macerin, Victorio Sansanan and Sulficio Sulina
were attacked and stabbed by other prison inmates, and that said investigation was reduced in
writing (Exhibit "B"). He declared that when he arrived at the office before 8:00 o'clock in the morning
on said date, he was informed of the stabbing incident so he immediately proceeded to Ward 3 of
the NBP Hospital to investigate and determine who the victims were and their assailants. In the court
of his investigation he took written statements from appellant Arturo Alicia on May 2, 1972 (E exhibit
"C") wherein the latter admitted before him that he (Alicia) was the one who stabbed Pedro Madjos,
Victorio Sansanan and Felipe Macerin (Exhibit "C-2") with an improvised weapon (Exhibit "D"), and
from Victorio Sansanan on July 1, 1972 (Exhibit "E"), one of the victims in that incident, wherein
Sansanan Identified his assailant as Arturo Alicia. Sulficio Sulina executed a written statement on
June 19, 1972 (Exhibit "F"), pointing to Victor Bangayan (Exhibit "F-2") as his assailant.

Francisco Cometa, Jr., a prison guard in the Investigation Section of the Bureau of Prisons, testified
that he investigated prisoner Victor Bangayan on May 2, 1972, in connection with the stabbing
incident at the NBP Hospital and reduced the investigation in writing (Exhibit "I"); that in that
statement, Bangayan admitted that he was one of those who attacked the victims (Exhibit "I-2") and
that he used an improvised deadly weapon (Exhibit "I-3"); that appellants explained that they
attacked and stabbed their victims because the latter were members of the rival Batang City Jail
Gang, and were planning to attack them and other members of the Commando Gang.

Sulficio Sulina, one of the victims and an inmate in the New Bilibid Prisons, testified that on May 2,
1972, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, while confined in the hospital, he was stabbed five times
by appellant Victor Bangayan.

Leonida Panopio, a resident physician, testified that on May 2, 1972, she learned about a stabbing
incident where the victims were Madjos, Macerin, Sansanan and Sulina, and about the death of
Madjos, and that she accordingly prepared a death report (Exhibit "A-4").

Mariano Cueva, Jr., a physician and medicolegal officer of the NBI, testified that he personally
conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Pedro Madjos and his post-mortem findings are embodied
in his Necropsy Report No. N-72-845 (Exhibit "L"); that according to his findings, the stab would
found on the left side of the abdomen of the late Pedro Madjos was 14 cms. from the center line and
17 cms. above the hipbone, 1-½ inches in width, penetrating the body of the left, about 15 cms.,
involving vital structures and causing serious or severe hemorrhage which caused his death; that the
external characteristic of the wound indicates that the stabbing instrument was sharp, pointed with
double edges, like a dagger, a double edged balisong, a knife or any similar stabbing instrument;
that from the direction of the wounds, it appears that the assailant was in front of the victim when he
attacked him; that the death could have occurred several minutes or an hour after the injury was
inflicted; and that it is possible that the attack was sudden and unexpected in view of the absence of
any sign that the victim attempted to parry the blow.

During the trial, the appellants testified in their behalves.

Appellant Victor Bangayan, an inmate of the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, testified that he
is presently confined at the New Bilibid Prisons, serving sentence for the crime of robbery holdup
and at the same time awaiting the outcome of his appeal from a judgment of conviction in a murder
case wherein he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death (G.R. No. L-36234, submitted for
decision with this tribunal). He declared that when the incident took place, he was confined at the
NBP Hospital due to swollen jaw and recuperating from fever. He claimed that he stabbed Madjos
because they quarreled in a gambling game wherein the latter cheated him After he stabbed the
victim he surrendered voluntarily to the prison authorities and voluntarily gave his statement to the
investigators.

Arturo Alicia, also an inmate of the New Bilibid Prisons, testified that he is serving sentence for the
crime of robbery he committed in Manila; that on May 2, 1972, he had a drinking spree with his
companions, using alcohol which they bought from a hospital attendant; that after drinking he went
to his "tarima"; that all he knew was that he stabbed Pedro Madjos but he had no intention of killing
him; that on the date of the incident he was confined in the hospital because he was vomiting blood;
that he also stabbed Victorio Sansanan and Felipe Macerin; and that after the incident he
surrendered to the authorities and voluntarily gave his statement to them.

It has been sufficiently established by the evidence that in the early morning of May 2, 1972, Pedro
Madjos, Felipe Macerin, Victorio Sansanan and Sulficio Sulina, all persons serving sentences for
one reason or another and confined in Ward 3 of the prison hospital, were attacked and stabbed by
appellants who were armed with improvised pointed instruments. This resulted in the death of Pedro
Madjos and the infliction of numerous stab wounds on the persons of Macerin, Sansanan and Sulina
injuries which could have caused their death were it not for the timely arrival of prison guards and for
the medical assistance rendered to them by the prison hospital personnel. Macerin was about to
plug in an electric iron when he was stabbed by prisoner Arturo Alicia. Pedro Madjos was massaging
the body of Victorio Sansanan, who was then suffering from asthma, when he and Victorio were
stabbed by Arturo Alicia. Sulficio Sulina was stabbed by Victor Bangayan while he was asleep on a
mat laid on the cement floor of Ward 3, adjacent to the attendant's table. Appellants admitted to the
investigators that they stabbed the victims because of the reported plan of the latter to attack them
the following day. Hence, in the evening of May 1, 1972, appellants Alicia and Bangayan decided to
attack the members of the Batang City Jail Gang early the following morning.

In her brief, counsel de oficio for the appellants, Atty. Eugenia Banzon Jose contends that appellants
acted in selfdefense in view of the imminent attack upon them by the rival gang that none of the
elements which would qualify the crime as murder had been proven; that the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism should not have been applied, and on the contrary, appellants should
have been given the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty.

To begin with, a plea of guilty admits all the material allegations of the Information, including the
attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime. Prescinding from the foregoing,
self-defense is an affirmative allegation which the accused must prove with sufficient, satisfactory
and convincing evidence. Here, no such evidence has been presented. To support the claim that
1
the offense was not qualified by treachery, the counsel de oficio makes capital of the testimony of
Dr. Cueva to the effect that when Pedro Madjos was stabbed, his assailant was in front of him,
hence the attack on the victim was face to face. But the same witness, Dr. Cueva, also testified that
it was possible that the attack was sudden and unexpected because of the absence of any sign that
the victim attempted to parry the stabbing thrust, and appellants admitted that to insure the success
of their ploy they suddenly attacked their victims during the early dawn of May 2, 1972. As a matter
of fact, Sulficio Sulina was still sleeping on the floor when he was stabbed five times by appellant
Victor Bangayan.

The existence of the qualifying circumstance of premeditation is shown by the fact that as early as
the evening of May 1, 1972, appellants agreed to attack their victims, which plan they executed in
the early morning of the following day. From the time they agreed on their plan until dawn of the next
day when the plan was implemented, sufficient time had elapsed to allow appellants to meditate and
reflect upon their plan and the possible consequences of their act. This decision on the. part of
appellants to attack their victims, was, therefore, the result of meditation, calculation or reflection.
2

Appellants' counsel de oficio makes much ado about the fact that the trial court questioned
appellants as to the fact of their previous conviction. This, she contends, violated the constitutional
rights of the appellants against self-incrimination.

The trial court's question as to the nature of the offense for the commission of which appellants were
serving sentence did not call for incriminating answers. The fact that appellants, at the time of the
commission of the crime, were prisoners in the New Bilibid Prisons serving sentence by final
judgment is not disputed. The status of appellants as such appears in their extrajudicial confessions
(Exhibits "C" and "1") which were submitted in evidence. Since the Information alleges that
appellants committed the afore-mentioned crime "while then confined" in the New Bilibid Prisons,
and the evidence of the prosecution shows that they were inmates of the New Bilibid Prisons serving
sentence by virtue of final judgment, it was proper for the trial court to inquire as to the nature of the
offense for which they were serving sentence.

The lower court correctly found the existence of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-
recidivism, defined under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 160 of the Revised Penal
Code provides:

ART. 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for
another previous offense. — Penalty. — Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62,
any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, sham be
punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.

Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance which imposes the maximum of the penalty
for the new offense. It makes no difference, for the purpose of the effect of quasi-recidivism under
Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, whether the crime for which an accused is serving sentence
at the time of the commission of the offense charged, falls under the said Code or under special
law. Quasi-recidivism is punished with more severity than recidivism proper because the
3

aggravating circumstance of recidivism, as any other aggravating circumstance, may be offset by a

mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, whereas, in a case of quasi-
recidivism the maximum degree of the penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed should
always be imposed irrespective of the presence of any mitigating circumstance.

In the case at bar, both appellants Arturo Alicia and Victor Bangayan were serving sentence for
robbery by virtue of final judgment when they committed the new felony. The existence of quasi-
recidivism renders moot the argument Of appellants' counsel that the trial court failed to consider
certain mitigating circumstances which should have entitled the appellants to a lower penalty.
Although the counsel de oficio of appellants is correct in her statement that after the commission of
the crime appellants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities and executed statements admitting
their participation, and that both pleaded guilty to the Offense, those circumstances notwithstanding,
the imposition of the supreme penalty is in order. However, for lack of votes, the penalty to be
4

meted the appellants must be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The indemnity of P1,000.00 in the murder case is hereby raised to P12,000.00.

People vs Yabut
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Facts: Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed another prisoner. He was
consequently charged for murder. Yabut alleged that it was Villanueva and not him who has given the
fatal blow. However, the court found him guilty. After conviction, he was punished with the maximum
period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in applying Art. 160.

Held: No, Ratio: Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code states that “Besides the provisions of rule 5 of
article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before
beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period
of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.” StatCon maxim: Where the text of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety to resort to the headings or epigraphs of a
section for interpretation of the text, especially where such epigraphs or headings are mere catchwords
or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows.

People vs Layson

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This is an automatic review of the decision dated September 25, 1965 of the Court of First Instance
of Davao in criminal case 8495 imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar
Fugoso and Joventino Garces.

On January 17, 1964 when these four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they were inmates
of the Davao Penal Colony serving sentences of conviction for the following crimes:

Nicolas Layson — kidnapping with robbery, homicide, homicide and

theft;
Cezar Ragub — frustrated murder and homicide;
Cezar Fugoso — robbery in an inhabited house and theft;
 Joventino — robbery hold-up and robbery in an uninhabited
Garces house.

In the early morning of that hapless day, at about 4:45 o'clock, the four accused, armed with bladed
weapons, entered the cell where the unsuspecting victim, prisoner Regino Gasang, was. Layson
locked the door of the room. Without warning and acting in concert they then swiftly took turns in
stabbing Gasang. They thereafter barricaded themselves, refusing to surrender to the trustees who
had come to the scene of the crime, agreeing to surrender only to Vicente Afurong, the supervising
prison guard. Afurong arrived, identified himself, and assured them of their safety, whereupon they
handed their weapons through the hole of the barricaded door and surrendered themselves.

Gasang died shortly after being brought to the prison hospital. Death was caused by severe internal
and external hemorrhage and shock, all secondary to multiple stab wounds.

Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because the latter urinated on their
coffee cups a number of times. Garces stated that he killed Gasang because the latter spat on him a
week before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying.

On March 25, 1964 all the accused were indicted for the crime of murder. The information recites:

The undersigned accuses Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino
Garces of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 160, of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:

That on or about January 17, 1964, in the Davao Penal Colony, Municipality of Panabo,
Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-mentioned
accused, while then being convicts serving in the said Davao Penal Colony their
corresponding sentences of conviction by reason of final judgment imposed upon them,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, armed with sharp-pointed
instruments, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with said weapons Regino Gasang, their co-inmate in the said Colony, thereby inflicting upon
him serious injuries which caused his death; with the aggravating circumstances of (1)
recidivism with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, and (2) all of them
with two or more prior convictions.

Upon arraignment, all the four accused, assisted by counsel de officio, freely and
spontaneously pleaded guilty. Notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the court a quo proceeded to
receive testimony because of the gravity of the offense. On September 30, 1965 the court rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of
the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
with the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty in favor of all of them and the aggravating
circumstances of recidivism and having been previously punished for two or more crimes to
which the law attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and
Cezar Ragub, the aggravating circumstance of having been punished with two or more
offenses to which the law attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the accused Cezar
Fugoso and Joventino Garces and the aggravating circumstances consisting of any two of
the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information which are treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength for one is sufficient to qualify the crime to
 murder and the special aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime charged
while serving the penalty imposed upon them for previous offenses as regards all the
accused and conformably with Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences all
of them to DEATH, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Regino
Gasang in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty imposed and to pay the costs proportionately.

For the purposes of this review, suffice it to consider, on the one hand, the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and the special aggravating circumstance
of quasi-recidivism, and, on the other, the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.

We reject the recommendation of the Solicitor General that the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation be considered in favor of all the accused. For this circumstance to exist, it is
necessary that the act which gave rise to the obfuscation be not removed from the commission of
the offense by a considerable length of time, during which period the perpetrator might recover his
normal equanimity.1

Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling against Gasang because the latter
urinated on their coffee cups several times, all these taking place at least ten days before the actual
slaying. Gasang spat on Garces a week before the day of the killing. All of the accused plotted to kill
Gasang a few days before January 17, 1964. In the light of these circumstances, it is evident that
sufficient time had elapsed during which the accused regained their equanimity. They moved their
evil scheme forward to consummation after obtaining weapons from their fellow inmates whose aid
they had solicited. The aforenarrated circumstances negate the presence of passion and
obfuscation; upon the contrary, they prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation.

Treachery attended the commission of the crime. The necropsy report (exh. I) and the diagram (exh.
J), plus the testimony of Dr. Guillermo de Guzman, conclusively prove that the victim was killed in a
manner insuring utter suddenness and complete surprise in the execution of the offense, with
resultant incapability of the victim to offer resistance. That there was abuse of superior strength
would suffice to qualify the crime to murder, but this circumstance must be considered as absorbed
in treachery.2

Treachery qualifies the killing to murder;3 evident premeditation becomes a mere generic
aggravating circumstance4 which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. A
qualifying circumstance not only gives the crime its proper and exclusive name but also places the
author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that specially prescribed for
said crime.5

The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was correctly
considered against all the accused, who, at the time of the commission of the offense, were
undoubtedly serving their respective sentences for previous convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its
effect the punishment of the accused with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for
the new felony, and cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. 6

When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused admitted all the material facts and
circumstances alleged in the information. The crime of murder is punished with reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death. Because of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance
of quasi-recidivism, this Court is left with no alternative to affirming the death penalty imposed by the
court a quo.
It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused the aggravating circumstance of
having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches lighter penalties
because the said aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires that the offender against whom
it is considered shall have served out his sentences for the prior offenses. Here all the accused were
yet serving their respective sentences at the time of the commission of the murder.

Concurrence in the grim view that we take of this case is given by Attorney Potenciano Villegas, Jr.,
counsel de officio for the four accused, who unqualifiedly recommends affirmance of the judgment a
quo.

It is indeed a lethal hand that pens affirmance of a death sentence, but ours is the inescapable duty
to enforce the inexorable mandate of the law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub,
Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces, is affirmed. The indemnification to the heirs of the victim,
Regino Gasang, is hereby increased to P12,000,7 to be paid jointly and severally by the four
accused. Costs de officio.