13 Volume 68 November 1975 721

United Services Section

Meeting 6 March 1975

Restraint Harness Design The telescopic ejection gun was fired by pulling
Squadron Leader D C Reader (Royal Air Force a handle on the front of the seat pan, or an upper
Institute of Aviation Medicine, Farnborough, handle which pulled a face blind over the head, or
Hampshire) said that to ensure that ejection seats by another crew member without warning. Firing
and occupants cleared all parts of the aircraft the gun first unlocked the seat, allowing it to
when ejecting at high speeds, considerable forces separate under gun thrust from the aircraft. As
were required, which must be lower than the the gun extended, secondary cartridges were
limits of human tolerance yet be sufficient to exploded to sustain the thrust of the gun, which
guarantee a safe ejection. An outline was given extended 72 inches (1828.8 mm) in 0.2 seconds.
of the factors that govern human tolerance to To achieve system capability, gun thrust had
brief acceleration and the levels of human toler- always been near the maximum for human
ance in relation to ejection accelerations. tolerance; the combined effect of near maximal
Tolerance to the forces of ejection could be thrust, an incorrect posture and imperfect
increased by efficient restraint, for which a restraint could produce minor wedge fractures
harness was usually provided that gave restraint of the lower spine. Contouring of the seat back
during flight and ejection and also functioned as and base ensured the correct posture on the hard
a parachute harness. The features of restraint and non-compressible surface, and if the posture
harness design that increased tolerance to accelera- was maintained by a correctly adjusted harness,
tion were described and some methods of testing spinal injury should not occur. Some reduction
explained. The advantages and disadvantages of of gun thrust had been achieved by the application
various types of ejection seat harness were of a rocket pack to modern ejection seats.
discussed and future developments outlined.
Injury from contact with parts of the aircraft,
the cockpit canopy or its debris, loose items
from a cockpit or items from another ejection
system could occur but was largely eliminated
Sources of Ejection Injury by design and by sequencing. The system in-
Group Captain A J Barwood (Royal Air Force cluded clearance of the ejection path by jettison
Institute of Aviation Medicine, Farnborough, of the cockpit canopy, but the time factor was
Hampshire) said that the modern ejection escape sometimes so critical that the canopy had to
system could recover aircrew from a crippled be broken by explosive means. Injury from canopy
aircraft from zero forward speed with a high sink penetration might be produced by contact with
rate close to ground level up to 650 knots (335 structure or debris, or even spatter from the
m s-1) at low level. The acceleration applied to explosive unless protection was adequate.
the ejection seat to accomplish this, the exposure
of the crew to high air blast, and the need to Air blast became a major factor at speeds of
achieve full parachute deployment in the shortest over 300 knots (155 m s-1), with an increasing
possible time combined to make ejection a risk of limb flailing. Leg restraint was used on all
traumatic experience. The sources of injury were ejection seats and arm restraint was provided
directly related to the mechanics of the ejection on the latest types. The head was protected from
system. wind loads by the helmet and face mask, but
722 Proc. roy. Soc. Med. Volume 68 November 1975 14
physical head restraint was not applied to any aircraft, it was evident the risk of ejection
ejection seat of British design. The gyrations of injury from a Hunter was very much lower than
the ejection seat during its alignment and decelera- with other aircraft.
tion before parachute extraction could produce
high rotational loads with associated centrifugal Barwood (personal communication) showed
effects, which might give rise to injury. Parachute that with the face-blind system, the incidence of
deployment was normally delayed to a preset fractures was 38 %, but became 69 % when the
altitude and was time-controlled so that the seat pan handle was used: a difference attribut-
opening load was within the tolerance of the able to the posture adopted at the time of
parachute, but high opening loads could be the ejection. The face-blind system, used when
cause of injury. Injury might also occur on urgency was not so great, allowed time to adjust
landing, as often the site could not be selected, and the restraint harness and induced extension of
if descent drills could not be completed before the spine. The pan handle method, used in an
landing. The commoner landing injuries were acute emergency, allowed no time for harness
crush fractures of the spine, twists of the knee adjustment and induced a slight flexion of the
or ankle, and fracture of an extended upper limb. spine. A lower incidence of fractures was ex-
pected following the introduction of the rocket-
The stresses to which the system and aircrew assisted ejection seat, but unfortunately the
were subjected during ejection were maximal, to incidence still remained at 50 %.
achieve maximum capability for the system. The
most important factors in the prevention of In the RAF series the vast majority of injuries
ejection injury were the maintenance of correct were simple compression fractures of one or
posture by correct harness adjustment and the more vertebre, which showed varying degrees
completion of the correct drill before, during and of loss of anterior body height. The antero-
after ejection. When there was time to select superior portion of the vertebral body was most
the ideal speed and altitude, 230 knots (118.5 m frequently involved; the anteroinferior portion
s-1) and 9000 ft (2700 m), and to ensure correct was affected in only 3 cases. The individual's
posture and harness adjustment, no injury height and weight did not appear to influence the
should be sustained. incidence or site of fracture. One pilot who had
ejected twice had 6 fractured vertebrn, acquiring
4 the first time and a further 2 the second; he also
had spondylolisthesis of L5 on Si. In the older
age group two cases had more severe injuries,
Spinal Ejection Injuries including 'bursting' fractures of a dorsal vertebral
Air Commodore C R Griffin (Royal Air Force body, with marked displacement of the anterior
Central Medical Establishment, London) said fragments and rotational deformity of the
that with advancing aircraft capability (the VTO posterior part of the body; the cord must have
aircraft) and the increasing requirement for been at near risk. Of aircrew who sustained
training in low-level attack patterns, continuous spinal fractures, 14% had no symptoms referable
research was necessary to improve the efficiency to their injury and 40% were- unable to state at
of escape systems. All ejection seats had their what stage in their escape their injury occurred.
limitations, and the success rate of ejections was Those who had symptoms usually became pain-
recorded under two headings: those within, and free 4-7 days after injury. Symptoms (apart from
those outside seat design limits. If all criteria loss of height) were not related to the degree of
were fully satisfied the success rate was 94%, compression or extent of the injuries. The com-
whereas when ejection took place outside design monest site in both single and multiple fractures
limits the success rate fell to 15%. Height at the in the RAF series was at the lumbodorsal hinge.
time of ejection also had a bearing on the success This pattern was similar to that occurring in 7
rate; 300 ft (90 m) was apparently the critical other Armed Services. Fracture-dislocations,
level. fractures of the posterior complexes, neuro-
logical complications and disc syndromes had
The annual incidence of spinal fractures follow- not been found.
ing ejection varied between 33 % and 60 %, with an
average incidence of 47.5%. In relation to air- In the RAF, treatment of postejection spinal
craft type, ejections from the Hunter, Canberra fractures had been standardized. Whenever
and Buccaneer showed a high incidence of possible aircrew were referred to an RAF
fractures, while the Gnat had an excellent hospital for clinical and radiological examination;
record. When, however, the total of ejections the latter was mandatory even if no symptoms
was related to the total number of sorties per appeared. If spinal fractures were evident the