G.R. No.

145804 February 6, 2003

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,

DECISION

ABOUT THIS CASE: Naligsan siya og train sa pagka tumba niya sa sumbagay nila sa
gwardya.

● Si Navidad ang naligsan sa train. Si Escartin ang kasumbagay ni Navidad na gwardya. Si

The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled
"Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.," which has
modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City,
exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority
(LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.

FACTS:

● On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad,
then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment
of the fare).
● While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an
altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however,
was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first
blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell,
an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was
struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
● On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along
with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman,
the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of
her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.

The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting
evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in
his assigned task.
RTC’s DECISION:

On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it adjudged:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the
following:

"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;

2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;

3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;

"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;

"c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;

"d) Costs of suit.

"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.

"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed."

Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals.

CA’s DECISION:

● On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating
Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA
and Roman jointly and severally liable.
● The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded
the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered
the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token therefor.
● In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the
security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin
inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of
Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and
operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to
present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could
not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October
2000.

In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:

"I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING

"II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

"III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

ARGUMENT:

● Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual
findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that
the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome.
● Petitioners would insist that Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall
on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The
LRTA would add that the appellate court’s conclusion on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had
testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
● Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of
carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and
entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a
contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable
for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a
common carrier.

Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers. The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or
injury to its passengers, provides:

"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."

"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."

"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission."

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide
safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of
carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers
(a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence
of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by
simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of
the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to
an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on
how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show,
the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that
negligence must be proved.

IN THIS CASE:

● The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify
the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the
safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the
services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the
common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
● Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the
provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil
Code.
 ● The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis
of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can
only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee,
a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further,
how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent
contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation
can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting
in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well
apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.

AS TO THE LIABILITY:

Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor
Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is nothing
to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its
employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the appellate court is not without
substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.

There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act
or omission, he must also be absolved from liability.

Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation
between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or
negligence.

The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss

suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
19
damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but
only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is
absolved from liability. No costs.

SO ORDERED.