Case No.
1
GR No. 164987. April 24, 2012
LAMP, petitioner vs. Secretary of Budget and Management, respondent
Facts: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality
and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided
for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner’s argument: Complainant alleged that special provision of PDAF (use and release of fund)
is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators
and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to
propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
This runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter,
spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive
function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in
fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction, and, therefore, impermissible and
must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.
Respondent’s argument: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based
on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel. Miserably lacks
legal and factual grounds
Issues:
(1) W/N the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case
(2) W/N the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
Law and provision subject of statutory construction: Special provision of PDAF. Every presumption
should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution To justify the nullification of the law or its
implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution.
Ruling:
(1) Yes. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute,
as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real
or substantial controversy before the Court.
(2) No. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the
law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court
must sustain legislation because “to invalidate a law based on baseless supposition is an affront to
the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.”
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that,
indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them
according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse
of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is
outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs
which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed
by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines
whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by
the Executive.” This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws
and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
Case No. 2
GR No. 110249. August 21, 1997
Alfredo Tano, complainant vs. Hon. Salvador Socrates, respondent
Facts:
On December 15, 1992, the Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 banning the shipment of
all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City effective for five years (from 1993 to 1998). To
implement the said ordinance, the City Mayor issued Office Order No. 23 ordering inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out via aircraft or seacraft.
Likewise, on February 19, 1993, the Provincial Government of Palawan, enacted Resolution No. 33 and
Ordinance No. 2, series of 1993, prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and
shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of five years in and coming from
Palawan Waters.
Primary interest of petitioners-individuals is to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of the
criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have
been resolved.
The second set of petitioners merely claim that being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be
adversely affected by the ordinances.
Petitioner’s argument:
Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the
1987 Constitution.
Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor's permit could be
granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to
issue the permit.
As Ordinance No. 2 is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the
others have to be dismissed.
Ordinance No. 2 took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways;
and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly
prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and
essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion."
Respondent’s Argument:
Ordinance No. 2 is a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare
clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), in congruence to its specific power to
protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment,
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447(a)(1)(vi), Section
458(a)(1)(vi), and Section 468(a)(1)(vi), of the LGC.
They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the Province of Palawan had "the right and
responsibility to ensure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells within its territory remain
healthy for the future generation.
They further asserted that ordinance covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which
were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not
dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect and preserve the
pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate.
Issue: W/N the ordinances and resolution enacted by the LGU of Puerto Princesa, Palawan are valid
Law and provision subject of statutory construction:
Ordinance Nos 15-92 and 2, and Resolution No. 33. It is settled that laws (including ordinances enacted
by LGUs) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction.
In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt
exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality.
Ruling:
No. there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution and
applicable laws. As to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the
Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means, while as to the
latter, a substantial distinction existed "between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of
selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live. Further,
the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class.
The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged ordinances do not suffer any infirmity, both under the
Constitution and applicable laws, including the Local Government Code. There is no showing that any
of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is
not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and,
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the
principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to
LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential
right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose
rentals, fees or charges therefor. The LGUs are directed to enact ordinances that protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as
dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing. Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates
that the general welfare provisions of the LGC "shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the
local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the
people of the community."
Moreover, the ordinances find full support under R.A. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic
Environment Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act which adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable
development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and
endangered environment of the province.
Case No. 3
GR No. 188550. August 19, 2013
Deutsche Bank AG Manila, complainant vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent
Facts: Petitioner withheld and remitted to respondent fifteen percent (15%) branch profit remittance tax
(BPRT) on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany (DB
Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years.
Petitioner requested from the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its
entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty. Petitioner filed a
Petition for Review before CTA alleging the inaction of the BIR on its claim. CTA denied the
petition on the ground that the application for a tax treaty relief was not filed with
ITAD prior to the payment by the former of its BPRT and actual remittance of its
branch profits to DB Germany, or prior to its availment of the preferential rate often percent (10%)
under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty provision.
CTA En Banc likewise ruled that the 15-day rule for tax treaty relief application under RMO No. 1-
2000 cannot be relaxed for petitioner. Thus, this petition.
Petitioner’s argument: believes that it made an overpayment of the BPRT which cause them to file an
administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate before the BIR Large Taxpayers
Assessment and Investigation Division.
Respondent’s argument: counters that the requirement of prior application under RMO No. 1-2000 is
mandatory in character. RMO No. 1-2000 was issued pursuant to the unquestioned authority of the
Secretary of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the NIRC.
Thus, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances which partakes the nature of a statute and have in
their favor a presumption of legality.
Issue: W/N the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive persons or corporations of
the benefit of a tax treaty.
Law and provision subject of statutory construction: RP-Germany Tax Treaty vis-à-vis RMO No. 1-
2000. Presumption against violation of International Law. The constitution provides for the
adherence to the general principles of international law (Article II, Sec. 2 1987 Constitution).
Every treaty is binding upon the parties, and obligations must be performed (Article 26,
Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties).
Ruling: No. the SC ruled that the petitioner is entitled to a refund. There is nothing in RMO 1-2000
indicating a deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty for failure to comply with the 15-day period. The
denial of availment of tax relief for the failure to apply within the prescribed period (under the
administrative issuance) would impair the value of the tax treaty. Also, the obligation to comply with
the tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO1-2000 because the non-compliance with
tax treaties would have negative implications on international affairs and would discourage
foreign investments.
Case No.4
G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997.
Karen E. Salvacion, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., Father and Natural Guardian, and
Spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion , petitioners, vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines, China Banking Corporation and Greg Bartelli Y Northcott , respondents
Facts: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, lured Karen, then 12 y/o to go with him to his apartment.
Greg Bartelli detained Karen for (4) days and raped the child (3) times a day. Greg Bartelli was charged
for serious illegal detention and (4) counts of rape by the RTC Makati and to pay the necessary
damages. Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a notice of garnishment served to China Banking Corp,
where the dollar account of Bartelli was deposited. Petitioners filed with RTC Makati for damages
against the foreigner and tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation.
However, China Banking Corp. invokes Sec. 113 Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that dollar
deposits are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order/process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.
Petitioner’s argument: Stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing that
"Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever." should be
adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have
the bank deposit of Bartelli garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation
of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors
an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it
has provided a safe haven for criminals like Bartelli since criminals could escape civil liability for their
wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign
currency deposit account with an authorized bank
Respondent’s argument:
Central Bank alleges that the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not
exceed its power or authority because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No.
6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from
attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that
it does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based
on a law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of
procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of a class. Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one
reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or
process of any court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit
System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of
respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman
sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of Bartelli; that it is
only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the
sufferings petitioners has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular NO. 960; and that despite the harsh effect of these laws on
petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.
Issue: W/N the dollar bank deposit of Bartelli in China Banking Corp be exempted as raised by the
latter.
Law and provision subject of statutory construction : Sec. 113 Central Bank Circular No. 960 and RA
6426. Presumption against injustice. The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. If
the Court rule that the questioned Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is application to a foreign transient, injustice would
result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign gust liked accused Bartelli. This would negate Art.
10 of New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation of application of laws,
it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. When the statute is silent
or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience
Ruling: No. Provisions of Sec. 133 of CB Circular No. 960 are inapplicable because of its peculiar
circumstances and the Court requires respondents to comply with the writ to execution and to release to
petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would justify the judgement.
.
Case No. 5
G.R. No. 83736. January 15, 1992.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner vs. TMX Sales, Inc., respondent
Facts: respondent filed its quarterly income tax return for the 1981 1Q, declaring an income of
P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981. During
the subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that when it filed on April 15,
1982 its Annual ITR for the year ended December 31, 1981, it declared a gross income of P904,122.00
and total deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of P6,156,525.00.
Thereafter, on July 9, 1982, TMX Sales, Inc. thru its external auditor, SGV & Co. filed with the
Appellate Division of BIR a claim for refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid
income tax.
This claim was not acted upon by the BIR Commissioner. On March 14, 1984, TMX Sales, Inc. filed a
petition for review before the CTA against the Commissioner, praying that the petitioner praying that be
ordered to refund to TMX Sales, Inc. the amount of P247,010.00, representing overpaid income tax for
the taxable year ended December 31, 1981.
On April 29, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition of TMX Sales,
Inc. and ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund the amount claimed.
Respondent’s argument: The CIR averred that TMX is already barred by prescription for claiming the
refund since more than 2 years has elapsed between the date of payment which occurred on May 15,
1981 and the filing of the claim in court which occurred on March 14, 1984. (Sections 292 and 295 of
the Tax Code of 1977, as amended).
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the two-year prescriptive period to claim a refund of erroneously collected tax
provided for in Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code should
commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid, as contended by the petitioner,
or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment), as claimed by the private
respondent?
(2) W/N respondent is entitled to a refund.
Law and provision subject of statutory construction: Presumption against absurdity. Section 230 of
NIRC. Court stated that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Where there is ambiguity,
such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Furthermore, courts
must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four
corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular
provision thereof, should be considered.
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The filing of quarterly income tax returns required in Section 85 (now Section
68) and implemented per BIR Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income tax should only be
considered mere installments of the annual tax due. When a tax is paid in installments, the
prescriptive period of two should be counted from the date of the final payment or last installment.
It is because it is expected that no payment is made until the whole tax liability is paid so a part or
a portion thereof cannot operate the commencement of prescription period. When a corporation
paid quarterly corporate income taxes in any of the first three quarters during the taxable year but
incurs a net loss during the taxable year which is in the case of TMX Sales, the 2-year period for
filing a refund shall be counted from the date of filing of annual income tax return.
(2) In this case, TMX Sales, Inc. filed a suit for a refund on March 14, 1984. Since the two-year
prescriptive period should be counted from the filing of the Adjustment Return on April 15,1982,
TMX Sales, Inc. is not yet barred by prescription. Hence, TMX Sales is entitled to a refund.
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” in the visitor’s logbook and used the same in receiving the
copy of a complaint against him at the Office of the Ombudsman. This was discovered and reported to
the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that the petitioner be accordingly charged. Trial Court
found the petitioner guilty of violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise
known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases“. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with
some modification of sentence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of
Commonwealth Act No. 142.
Ruling: NO. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the RTC was reversed
and set aside and petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a
different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the
user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall
within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
RATIO:
CA 142, as amended by RA 6085. Presumption against undesirable consequences .
Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus, in construing a statute the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an
offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. Moreover, as
C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the
accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the
object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of
the court limited.
G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013.
Executive Secretary vs. Forerunner Multi Resources Inc.
Facts:
PGMA issued EO No. 156 (2002) which imposes a partial ban on importation of used vehicles.
Respondent Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. (respondent), a corporation engaged in the importation of
used motor vehicles via the ports of Aparri, Cagayan and San Fernando, La Union, sued the government
in the RTC Aparri, Cagayan to declare invalid EO 156, impleading petitioner public officials as
respondents. Respondent attacked the validity of EO No. 156 for having been superseded by EO No.
418 (2005) which modified the tariff rates of imported used motor vehicles.
Law and provision subject of statutory construction: Presumption against implied repeal. EO 156 and
EO 418.
Issue: W/N EO 418 repealed EO 156.
Ruling: Presumption against undesirable consequences . EO No. 418 did not repeal EO No. 156. The.
subsequent issuance of EO No. 418 increasing the import duties on used motor vehicles did not alter the
policy of the executive department to prohibit the importation of said vehicle. The failure to add
specific repealing clause indicate that the intent was not to repeal previous administration issuances.
EO 156 is very explicit in its prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles. On the other hand,
EO 418 merely modifies the tariff and nomenclature rates of import duty on used motor vehicles.
Nothing therein expressly revokes the importation ban.
Rosalina Penera vs. COMELEC
etitioner Penera sought the
reversal of the decision of
September 11, 2009, which
affirmed the
Resolution dated 30 July
2008 of the COMELEC En
Banc as well as the
Resolution dated 24 July
2007
of the COMELEC Second
Division. The said decision
disqualified petitioner from
running for the office
of Mayor in Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte and
declared that the Vice-Mayor
should succeed Penera.
It was alleged that the
petitioner was unlawfully
engaging in election
campaigning and partisan
political activity prior to the
commencement of the
campaign period. However,
petitioner contends that
was not yet a candidate at the
time of the incident under
Section 11 of RA 8436 as
amended by Section
13 of RA 9369, and her
participation in a motorcade
is not the same as
admitting she engaged in
premature election
campaigning
Petitioner Penera sought the reversal of the decision of COMELEC en banc. The said decision
disqualified petitioner from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and
declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera .
It was alleged that the petitioner was unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan
political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period. However, petitioner contends that
she was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by
Section 13 of RA 9369, and her participation in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she
engaged in premature election campaigning
Issue of the case: Whether Petitioner Penera should be disqualified for premature campaigning.
Ruling: Presumption against implied repeal.
No, the court held that the campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12
May 2007. Penera filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on
29 March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots.
On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing
of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a "candidate,"
even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a citizen’s
protected freedom of expression. acts committed by Penera within the campaign period are not
covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period.
Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her
disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. In it was held that a person
who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
