Wittgenstein´s Critique of Gödel´s Incompleteness Results

Martin Ohmacht, Klagenfurt

Motto: "Don´t treat your common sense like an umbrella. When you contradiction, whereas the statement which was used by
come into a room to philosophize, don´t leave it outside but bring it Gödel in his proof is not contradictory, although it looks as
in with you" (Wittgenstein 1939 LFM Unit VI page 68) if it is. Gödel´s statement runs as follows:
This statement cannot be proved

It is often said that Gödel´s famous theorem of 1931 is It is of utmost importance to see the point: that the Liar´s
equal to the Cretian Liar, who says that everything that he confession leads to a contradiction, whereas this state-
says is a lie. But Gödel´s result is only similar to this ment does not!
sophism and not equivalent to it. When mathematicians
deal with Gödel´s theorem, then it is often the case that
they become poetical or even emotional: some of them 2. Mathematicians become emotional when
show a high esteem of it and others despise it. Wittgen- they comment on Gödel´s result
stein sees the famous Liar as a useless language game
which doesn´t excite anybody. Gödel´s first incomplete- Now let me, before I present the kernel of Wittgenstein´s
ness theorem shows us that in mathematics there are reaction to Gödel, embark on the reactions of mathemati-
puzzles which have no solution at all and therefore in cian to this important contribution to mathematics. There is
mathematics one should be very careful when one an important author, whom some of you may already know
chooses a puzzle on which one wants to work. Gödel´s : I am talking of Stuart Shanker. He contributes a paper of
second imcompleteness theorem deals with hidden more than a hundred pages on „Wittgenstein and Gödel“.
contradictions – Wittgenstein shows a paradigmatic There are two important points, which I want to quote to
solution: he simply shrugs his shoulders on this problem you.
and many mathematicians do so today as well. Wittgen- One of the most important facts in this long paper is that
stein says than Gödel´s results should not be treated as Shanker compares Gödel´s result with a symphony (1988
mathematical theorems, but as elements of the humanistic page 156). (He quotes the idea from Nagel&Newman 1958
sciences. Wittgenstein sees them as something which page 94f).
should be worked on in a creative manner.
It is quite remarkable that a philosopher of mathematics
should become poetical about a mathematical result; one
1. Gödel in 1931 worked near the abyss of could even say that Shanker becomes emotional about
contradiction this result of the year 1931. There is a strong positive
connotation in his evaluation. There is a rule in the
Let me first give a brief overview on Gödel´s results of philosophy of science that one should not make value
1931 – because when I speak of Gödel I am always only judgements about scientific results - yet that is exactly
thinking of this year. Gödel has achieved many other what Shanker does: he expresses his high esteem of
results, but they are not discussed in literature to the same Gödel´s theorems without shyness. The direction of his
degree as his result of 1931. statement is a positive one: you will see in a moment why I
have to stress this.
Gödel has proved in a formal manner that mathematics
has gaps. His result is very tricky. In secondary literature I There are, as well, negative statements about Gödel –
have found the statement, that Gödel works near the for example in „Collier´s encyclopaedia“. I quote from the
abyss of contradiction (see my book on the Heptagon, edition of the year 1969. In an article on the philosophy of
Ohmacht 1997, page 88). I want to show this closeness to mathematics, it is said that Gödel has „unfortunately“
contradiction by exposing two statements to you, both of (1969 Vol 15, page 550a) proved his result. It is quite an
which bear a close resemblance to Gödel´s result, but the unprecedented expression in the philosophy of mathe-
two are different in the sense that one renders a contradic- matics to say that a result has been achieved „unfortu-
tion and the other renders the desired result, and this nately“. I want to engrave this on your minds and this is
situation exists even though these two sentences are very why I want to repeat myself: the anonymous author within
similar in their structure. this encylcopaedia says that Gödel has „unfortunately“
proved this result.
The first statement was and always has been very
popular within philosophy. The sentence is attributed to So here is my conclusion in this section: there is a
Epimenides. (Taschner (2002, page 17) maintains that it contradiction about Gödel. Some authors are quite
was reported by a Sophist named Eubulides). It has delighted about the ingenuity of Gödel´s proof – and others
something puzzling in it. It runs as follows: are disgusted by it.
„I am lying“
A friend of mine, who is a computer specialist is always 3. Wittgenstein sees the Liar´s Paradox as a
saying that Gödel´s result stemmed from this utterance, useless language game
and he is right in the sense that Gödel was inspired by this
sentence. One can read on page 149 of the first volume of This contradiction on the level of attitudes towards Gödel
Gödel´s “Collected Works”: “It [the incompleteness result] warns us that an investigation on the reception of this
is closely related to the “Liar”” . But it is wrong to say that result is not such an easy task.
Gödel´s argument is equivalent to the Liar, because Gödel I have found a quotation in an essay by a mathematician
used a slightly different statement for his proof. The reason who is in error about Wittgenstein and Gödel: he states
for this slight shift is, that the Liar´s confession renders a

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 Wittgenstein´s Critique of Gödel´s Incompleteness Results - Martin Ohmacht

(wrongly) that Wittgenstein never made a single remark research. Those who are suspicious will stop participating
about Gödel. Karl Sigmund writes: "Another remarkable in research, but as long as they cannot frame their
parallel between Hahn and Wittgenstein is that both never suspicious attitude into a proof, the others will continue in
mentioned Gödel in their philosophical writings" (DePauli- their search.
Schimanovich/Köhler/Stadler 1995 page 240). This
statement annoys me: Wittgenstein has, on the contrary,
done quite a lot of work on Gödel, his LFM (VGM in 5. The question of a hidden contradiction
German), which is in the long version called „Lectures on
the Foundations of Mathematics Cambridge 1939“ are Wittgenstein´s critique of Gödel´s results of 1931 must be
st
mainly devoted to Gödel. subdivided into his reception of Gödel´s 1 Incompleteness
nd
Theorem and his reception of Gödel´s 2 Incompleteness
In this book Wittgenstein makes a remark, which is central Theorem. What I have said about unsolvable puzzles
to our topic. Wittgenstein’s position is as following: refers to the first incompleteness theorem – now let us
embark on the second. The question of hidden contradic-
"„I am lying“ [...] it is just a useless language game and tions arises here.
why should anybody be excited" (Wittgenstein LFM Unit
XXI page 207) The problem here is the principle of "ex falso sequitur
quodlibet": from a contradictory proposition anything can
Indeed, Wittgenstein´s statement accurately reflects the be concluded. It is exactly this point that makes Gödel´s
attitude of mathematicians of around 1900 towards our second Incompleteness Theorem a little bit confusing: If
problem. Some researchers knew very well about the mathematics should contain a contradiction, then it can be
contradictions which arise when one mathematicizes the proved that mathematics is free from contradictions!
known paradoxes. Especially Cantor did know that there
were „inconsistent sets“, like the well known set of all sets. Wittgenstein has a simple solution for this "horror
contradictionis" from which mathematicians suffer: he says
The problem with Wittgenstein´s statement is that it is "Well then, just don´t draw any conclusions from a
dis-integrative; the Liar´s paradox is excluded from contradiction".(LFM Unit XXII page 220). Now I want to
mathematics, and here Wittgenstein works right against refer to Collier´s Encyclopaedia again and we shall see
Gödel, whose ingenious idea was, on the contrary, to that mathematicians have adopted Wittgenstein´s method:
mathematicize the liar´s paradox by using this Gödel
numbering technique. This had beforehand seemed to be "... no contradiction has ever been detected during that
impossible. period. So most mathematicians have simply stopped
worrying about these matters and go on with their work
as if they believed that no contradiction will ever occur"
4. To give up the solving of a puzzle (Vol 15 page 550 column a). So, we can conclude from
this statement that mathematicians just shrug their
My fourth paragraph concerns puzzles, especially shoulders and – they largely ignore Gödel´s result.
unsolvable puzzles. This paragraph is a central point in my
presentation; now when I talk on puzzles, I could also
chose the word „enigma“, which means essentially the 6. Gödel´s reaction to Wittgenstein´s
same. It is the Greek word and the reason why I shall use
it is, that a puzzle might be confused with a jigsaw puzzle.
reaction to the Incompleteness Theorems
A jigsaw puzzle contains a collection of pieces made from Now I must warn you, this paragraph contains a frustrating
cardboard. It is for children and it has a remarkable bit of literature. When it comes to research work done on
property: if one has enough time and motivation, then a Gödel, Hao Wang is an important author: his book,
jigsaw puzzle always has a solution. (Unless if a part of "Reflections on Kurt Gödel", is a voluminous account of the
cardboard has been lost.) When I talk about enigmata, talks which he had with Gödel. The miracle which
then I want to use a concept which arises for example, becomes apparent here is, that Gödel allowed Hao Wang
when one reads Thomas Samuel Kuhn. to come into contact with him. On page 48, under the title
Here, it is not known whether the enigma has a solution "Relation to the Schlick Circle", Hao Wang begins to report
or not. Here, when I discuss this property hopefully in a on Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein occurs relatively often in this
clear manner, then there is an acute logical distinction: book – from the Index, it can be seen, that he occurs more
there are enigmata that have a solution and there are than 40 times.
enigmata that do not. Hao Wang shows that Gödel studied Wittgenstein´s
When one studies the history of science, whereby the Tractatus in 1927, and the later reading of Wittgenstein
history of mathematics is meant here, a lot of fuss is made was presented to him by Hao Wang. Hao Wang and Gödel
about such puzzles – Kuhn uses the word “crisis”. Kuhn´s discussed Wittgenstein on the 5th of April 1972, but the
point is: ”Failure to achieve a solution discredits only the material which Hao Wang produces in his book in enriched
scientist and not the theory” (1996 page 80). If one wants by a letter which Gödel sent to the mathematician Menger
to be a normal scientist, it is advisable not to tackle on the 20th of May in the same year. I want to present the
unsolvable puzzles. quotation from Hao Wangs book in full, because it is so
important. Here, Gödel writes:
Wittgenstein´s central point in his LFM is the following: if
several researchers try to solve the enigma and many "As far as my theorem about undecidable propositions is
researchers fail to be successful, this does not mean that concerned, it is indeed clear ... that Wittgenstein did not
the puzzle is unsolvable. Wittgenstein uses the word "we" understand it (or pretended not to understand it). He
which is a short form of what Kuhn later calls the scientific interprets it as a kind of logical paradox, while in fact it is
community: "We ... perhaps gave up the problem just the opposite, namely a mathematical theorem within
altogether" (LFM Unit IX page 88) It might even be the an absolutely uncontroversial part on mathematics
case that some researchers suspect that the puzzle may (finitary number theory or combinatorics)" (page 49).
be unsolvable, while others are still entangled in fruitless

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 Wittgenstein´s Critique of Gödel´s Incompleteness Results - Martin Ohmacht

When I first encountered this quotation about two years said, that we should ignore Gödel´s result. This expression
ago, this was a severe attack on my personal comfort – “ignore” is definitely too strong to be a correct interpreta-
and even when I read it now, it is torture for me. tion of what Wittgenstein really says.
Now I would like to bring in Thomas Samuel Kuhn – in But Gödel´s proof is not only a mathematical result. It is
his famous essay he says that when revolutions occur, also a philosophical result, which circumscribes mathe-
then the researchers among each other produce many matics from the outside. One can approach – and I think,
misunderstandings. What I do think about Gödel´s this is what Wittgenstein intends to do – Gödel´s result
statement is the following: Gödel said that Wittgenstein did from a standpoint which lies within the humanities.
not understand him, but did Gödel understand Wittgen- Wittgenstein wants to look at Gödel´s proof not as a
stein?? I think that the question of whether Wittgenstein mathematical result, but as a part of the humanities
has understood Gödel is controversial in character and the ("Geisteswissenschaften") . This is what he means with his
side which I want to take here is, that Wittgenstein did statement about bypassing Gödel.
understand Gödel, though in a creative manner "in einer
geisteswissenschaftlichen Art" (as a part of the humani-
ties).
Literature
7. Wittgensteins Remarks on Gödel´s Collier´s Encyclopaedia 1969 Vol 15, New York: Collier, 550a.
Results DePauli-Schimanovich, Werner / Köhler, Eckehart / Stadler,
Friedrich 1995 The Foundational Debate. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Wittgenstein´s "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathe- Gödel, Kurt 1986 Collected Works (Editors: Solomon Feferman et
matics" were published in 1956, but then in 1978 an al.) Vol 1. Oxford – New York: Clarendon Press.
enlarged edition was published. I want to quote from
Köhler, Eckehart / Weibel, Peter 1986 Gödels Unentscheidbarkeits-
section VII of this edition, most of which was written by beweis. Ideengeschichtliche Konturen eines berühmten mathema-
Wittgenstein in January of the year 1941 (see page 31 for tischen Satzes, in: Kreuzer, Franz (Ed.): Gödel-Satz, Möbius-
this point). Although Wittgenstein´s remark on Gödel does Schleife, Computer-Ich. Wien: Franz Deuticke.
not contain the appropriate respect, which Gödel would Kuhn, Thomas Samuel 1996 The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
have deserved, but it is a very clear statement, which tions. 3rd edition Chicago: Chicago University Press:.
produces in bewilderment on the part of the logicians. Nagel, Ernest / Newman, James R. 1958 Gödel´s Proof. London:
Wittgenstein notes: Routledge.
"My task is, not to talk about ... Gödel´s proof, but to by- Ohmacht, Martin 1997 Wittgenstein über die Nichtkonstruierbarkeit
pass it." (1978 page 383) This statement is not very des Siebenecks. Eine Metapher für die Unvollständigkeit der
Mathematik. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
polite, and it is not entirely clear what Wittgenstein is
heading for when he articulates it. I would like to give an Shanker, Stuart G (Ed.) 1988 Gödel´s Theorem in Focus. London.
interpretation, but I am not very firm here: I am weak. Croom Helm.
Wittgenstein should have been more serious about Taschner, Rudolf 2002 Musil, Gödel und das Unendliche. Wiener
Gödel´s results. Vorlesungen. Wien: Picus.
Wang, Hao 1987 Reflections of Kurt Gödel. Cambridge – London:
Gödel´s proof of 1931 is a firm mathematical result – there MIT Press.
do not arise any questions about it. It is an utterly Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1975 Lectures on the Foundations of
uncontroversial result and Wittgenstein rather should Mathematics Cambridge 1939. Ed. by Cora Diamond. Chicago:
accept it than to make unclear statements about it. When, University of Chicago Press (Quoted as LFM).
about a year ago, I wanted to quote this passage from Wittgenstein Ludwig 1978 Remarks on the Foundation of
memory I paraphrased it in the following way: Wittgenstein Mathematics. 3rd edition revised and reset. Edited by [Link]
Wright. Blackwell: Oxford.

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