MODULE 15 RIGHTS of PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Section 12(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. The
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families

Section 12 provided the rights of suspects or under custodial investigation. At this stage, the person is
not yet an accused as there is yet no case file against him.

The ff are the right of the suspect under Section 12 Article 3:

1. Right to remain silent
2. Right to competent and independent counsel preferable his own choice
3. Right to be reminded that if the person cannot afford the service of the counsel, he must be
provided with one
4. Right to informed of his rights
5. Right against torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other mean which vitiate free
will
6. Right against secret detention place, solitary, incommunicado, or similar forms of detention
7. Right to have confession or admissions obtained in violation of these shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

Note: Even if the person consent to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the moment he
asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
present.

Miranda vs Arizona, 384 US 436 (1996)

“the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to
be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior
to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided
the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.”

People vs Malngan the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those
not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner

MIRANDA RIGHTS – The person under custodial investigation must be warned that:

1. He has a right to remain silent;

2. That any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him; and
3. That he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION – mean questioning initiated by law enforcers officers after a person after
taken into custody or deprive of freedom of action in any significant way. (Miranda vs Arizona)
- Refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to
be general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular person as taken into custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lend itself to elicit incriminating
statement (People vs Del Rosario)
- People vs Del Rosario - From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario
was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time
he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain,
he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not
apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers.
- Rhode Island vs Innis - Here, there was no express questioning of
respondent; the conversation between the two officers was, at least in
form, nothing more than a dialogue between them to which no
response from respondent was invited. Moreover, respondent was not
subjected to the "functional equivalent" of questioning, since it cannot
be said that the officers should have known that their conversation
was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
respondent. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers
were aware that respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to
his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children, or that
the police knew that respondent was unusually disoriented or upset at
the time of his arrest.
- There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were
obtained as a result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation,
threat or promise of reward or leniency nor that the investigating
officer could have been motivated to concoct the facts narrated in said
affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and
freely or voluntarily given. (People v. Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v.
 Tiongson 6 SCRA 431, People v. Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People v. Pingol
35 SCRA 73.)

Administrative Investigation - the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-
appellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture. Thus we held in one case
that admissions made during the course of an administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines do not
come within the purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the constitutional provision also does
not extend to admissions or confessions made to a private individual, or to a verbal admission made to a
radio announcer who was not part of the investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a personal
confidante and not in his official capacity.

Police Lineup

1. Neither the lineup itself nor anything required therein violated respondent's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, since merely exhibiting his person for observation by witnesses
and using his voice as an identifying physical characteristic involved no compulsion of the accused to
give evidence of a testimonial nature against himself which is prohibited by that Amendment. Pp. 388
U. S. 221-223.
2. The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to counsel not only at his trial but at any
critical confrontation by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well
determine his fate and where the absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial. Pp.
388 U. S. 223-227.
3. The post-indictment lineup (unlike such preparatory steps as analyzing fingerprints and blood
samples) was a critical prosecutive stage at which respondent was entitled to the aid of counsel.

People vs Macam After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench where
the police officers first talked to the victims before the confrontation was held. The circumstances
were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken
identification. Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.

However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at the police
line-up. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial identification
of an uncounseled accused can not be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-
court identification made by the prosecution witnesses.

People vs Piedad The claim by the defense that Niel’s pre-trial identification was suggestive due to
the absence of a police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that even before
the incident, Luz Lactawan knew the accused.8 Fidel, on the other hand, knew Niel because they
played basketball together.9 Hence, the witnesses were not identifying persons whom they were
unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused
were presented before the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones
responsible for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply because
they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were certain they recognized
the perpetrators of the crime.10
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION

Extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is
that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused’s
rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial
confession has been denounced.

Even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file
charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his
rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible. (People vs.
Sayaboc, G.R. 147201, January 15, 2004)

To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession must be express and voluntarily executed in

writing with the assistance of an independent and competent counsel, and a person under custodial
investigation must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very start thereof. The presence of
counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the extra-judicial confession, and the assistance given
must be independent and competent, that is, providing full protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused. (People vs Bagante)

People vs Gallardo We have held that "while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person
under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask
for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he
never raised any objection against the formers appointment during the course of the investigation and
the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer."

People vs Barasina the word "preferably" under Section 12[1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does
not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were
otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who
can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one
reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the charter.

De castro vs People of the Philippines A person undergoing a normal audit examination is not under
custodial investigation and, hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the law enforcement
officer contemplated by the rule.

Seized Articles

People vs Wong Chuen Ming At the outset, the Court holds that the signatures of accused on the
boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing "shabu", are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of
the records reveals that accused were never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire time
that they were under investigation. Specifically, accused were not informed of their Miranda rights i.e.
that they had the right to remain silent and to counsel and any statement they might make could be
used against them, when they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while
they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp
Crame.

Marcelo vs Sandiganbayan However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters
were validly seized from petitioner and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioner’s
admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion on February 17,
1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters
themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful
arrest.

Confession to Newsmen
People vs andan - Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation
do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in
response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have
held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence.
People vs Endino - we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have
been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly
examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task
for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions
from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution.
Other Confession
People vs Malngan - Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution.
Illinois vs Perkins An undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give
Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit an incriminating
response.
RE-ENACTMENT People vs Luvendino Thus, it is not clear from the record that before the re-
enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional rights including,
specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived such right before proceeding with the
demonstration. Under these circumstances, we must decline to uphold the admissibility of evidence
relating to that re-enactment.
 Fruit of Poisonous Tree Doctrine
Harris vs New York, 401 U.S 222
In Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (154), the Court permitted physical evidence, inadmissible in
the case in chief, to be used for impeachment purposes.

"It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully
obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence
in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield
against contradiction of his untruths. Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion
of the Fourth Amendment."
"[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in
reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility."
New York vs Quaries
We hold that on these facts there is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda
warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability
of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. In a
kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these officers, where spontaneity rather than
adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of the day, the application of the exception
which we recognize today should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression
hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer.6 Undoubtedly most police
officers, if placed in Officer Kraft's position, would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely
unverifiable motives—their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain
incriminating evidence from the suspect.
Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “ the only
practical mean of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure/”

Right, that cannot be waived: to be informed of Miranda Rights.

Module 16 - Right to Bail
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Rule 114, Section 1 ROC

Section 1. Bail defined.— Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as required under
the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond,
cash deposit, or recognizance. (1a)Sec.

2. Conditions of the bail; requirements.– All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all case until its final
determination, unless the proper court directs otherwise; (b) The accused shall appear before the
proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules; (c) The failure of the accused to appear
at the trial without justification despite due notice shall be deemed an express waiver of his rights
present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and (d) The
accused shall surrender himself for execution of the final judgment.

The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount of the undertaking
and the conditions herein required. Photographs (passport size) taken recently showing the face, left
and right profiles of the accused must be attached thereto. (2a)

Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.

When right may be invoked

Herras Tehhankee vs Rovira - person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he
should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him.''
People vs San Diego the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for
bail. The court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary
of the evidence presented by the prosecution(requisite hearing); otherwise, it would be uncontrolled
and might be capricious or whimsical.
Cortes vs Juge Catral the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong is a matter of judicial discretion
Lavides vs CA bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health
and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial. (Enrile vs.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015))
MODULE 17 - RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence
in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Presumption of Innocence

People vs Sumili (G.R No. 212160 February 4, 2015) - buy bust

It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the
drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral
certainty that they are the same seized items.Failing in which, the acquittal of the accused on the
ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right,36 as in this case.
People of the Philippines vs. Umipang (G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012)- buy bust -- chain of custody--
corpus delicti
Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused
from the crimes of which he or she was convicted. This is especially true when the lapses in procedure
were "recognized and explained in terms of justifiable grounds." There must also be a showing "that
the police officers intended to comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable
consideration/reason." However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards
prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of
the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence.This uncertainty cannot be remedied by
simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross,
systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in
the performance of official duties. As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully
establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the
accused. For the arresting officers’ failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude from
the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting officers deliberately
disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165. These lapses effectively produced serious doubts on
the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-up. Thus,
for the foregoing reasons, we must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, "as every fact
necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
People of the Philippines vs. Quintal (G.R. No. 184170, February 2, 2011) rape ---
There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a
woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has
been committed and where her testimony passes the test of credibility the accused can be convicted
on the basis thereof. A dangerous precedent as it may seem, there is however a guideline provided
also by jurisprudence in scrutinizing the testimony of the victim, namely: (a) while an accusation for
rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.

The credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as well as the inconclusive medical
finding, tends to create doubt if AAA was indeed raped.
People vs. Tumambing (G.R. No. 191261, March 2, 2011)-
This case is about how the credibility of the rape victim’s identification of her attacker often depends
on her spontaneous actions and behavior following the rape.

A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the identification
of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has
been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the offender’s identity.
The constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an
identification that is full of uncertainties.
People of the Philippines vs Paloma While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties, this presumption is disputable by contrary proof and cannot prevail over
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. The totality of the evidence
presented in this case does not support Paloma’s conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense.
The constitutional presumption is that the accused is innocent even if his defense is weak as long as
the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him. People of the Philippines vs Ambih

Proof beyond reasonable doubt

People vs. Webb, et. al. (G.R. No. 176864, December 14, 2010)
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the
innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat
lodged immovable between teeth.
People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 (1971)

Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer
evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard this
Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently whatever defense is offered by the
accused. Only if judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had
been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should sentence be one
of conviction. It is thus required that circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into count.
The proof against him must survive the reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
away judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to
a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
Presumption of Guilt - it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that
when certain facts have been proven they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of
the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be rational connection between that facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not
unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience.
(people vs Mingao)

For example, in graft and corruption cases of public officials, the excess income or state of a public
official is a prima facie evidence to this crime. The accused has the burden of proof to show his
innocence.

In forgery, the person found in possession of a forged document and the one who used it is presumed to
be the forger, unless contrary is proven.

On the other hand, presumption of guilt is any presumption within the criminal justice system that a
person is guilty of a crime, for example a presumption that a suspect is guilty unless or until proven to be
innocent.

Applicability to Juridical Person

this Court made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in relation to criminal
proceedings, as follows:

. . . It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not
criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the
penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code,
seizure proceedings, such as those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character,
the main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful
importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate
from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both
kinds of penalties may be imposed.

Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in
nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a
penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In
this case, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

As explained in the case of Nera vs. The Auditor General:

The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or a law. Exception is made in the charter only during the custodial investigation of a
person suspected of a crime, who may not waive his right to counsel except in writing and in the
presence of counsel, and during the trial of the accused, who has the right "to be heard by himself and
counsel," either retained by him or provided for him by the government at its expense. These
guarantees are embodied in the Constitution, along with the other rights of the person facing criminal
prosecution, because of the odds he must contend with to defend his liberty (and before even his life)
against the awesome authority of the State.
In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgent nor is it deemed
essential to their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that without such representation he will not be
bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he
cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.

OFFICIAL DUTY

People vs Martos we cannot even presume that official duty was regularly performed by the arresting
officers, for it cannot by itself prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded an
accused person. "If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

EQUIPOISE RULE
PEOPLE VS ZAFRA In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused.22 While a lone
witness’ testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in certain instances, the testimony must be clear,
consistent, and credible—qualities we cannot ascribe to this case. Jurisprudence is consistent that for
testimonial evidence to be believed, it must both come from a credible witness and be credible in
itself – tested by human experience, observation, common knowledge and accepted conduct that has
evolved through the years.23 Clearly from the foregoing, the prosecution failed to establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was indeed in possession of shabu, and that he freely and
consciously possessed the same.

The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle,

fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused
is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must
rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.24 In this
case, the prosecution’s evidence failed to overcome the presumption of innocence, and thus,
appellant is entitled to an acquittal.

Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment.1âwphi1 Where there is
reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have been
established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long
standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of
right.
CORUPUS VS PEOPLE The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the
evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence
should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the
prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of
persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding
that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has
breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
 DIZON PAMINATUAN VS PEOPLE
In his book on constitutional law,22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz said:

Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary

presumptions based on the experience of human conduct [People vs. Labara, April 20, 1954].
Unexplained flight, for example, may lead to an inference of guilt, as 'the wicked flee when no man
pursueth, but the righteous is as bold as a lion. Failure on the part of the accused to explain his
possession of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable presumption that it was he himself who
had stolen it [U.S. vs. Espia, 16 Phil. 506]. Under our Revised Penal Code, the inability of an
accountable officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him will be considered prima facie
evidence that he has appropriated them to his personal use [Art. 217]. According to Cooley, the
constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is "some rational connection between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall
not be so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary mandate" [1 Cooley, 639].

The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the
testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary,
even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used
to buy from a certain Fredo.

Right to be heard personally or by counsel

IMPORTANCE OF COUNSEL
PEOPLE VS HOLGADO Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the
court has four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to
have attorney before being arraigned; 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask him if
he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must
assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 — If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his
own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.

Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court
did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of
one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant
him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court to the
accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question
fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is
worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion
from the court that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation
of the due process clause contained in our Constitution.

One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail
if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this
reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so
desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
Delgado vs CA This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the
bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a
lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering
the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of
due process.
The accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the
cause of the defense and acts accordingly; an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, and not
simply a perfunctory representation.

The right to counsel during the trial is (GENERALLY) not subject to waiver.

The right to defend himself in person, provided that he can properly protect his right without the
assistance of a counsel which is usually applicable ONLY before MTC involving light offense

Improvident Plea of Guilt

People vs Baluyot To start with, the court a quo did not even ascertain for itself whether the accused
completely understood the precise nature of the charge and the meaning of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, craft and abuse of superior strength as having attended the commission of
the crime, so as to obviate any doubt as to the possibility that they have misunderstood the nature
and gravity of the charge to which they were pleading guilty.

The case of People vs. Flores (140 SCRA, 230, July 30, 1971), Where this COURT, speaking through
then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal, said:

The norm that should be allowed where a plea of guilty is entered the defendant, especially in cases
where the capital penalty may be imposed, is that the court should he sure that defendant fully
understood the nature of the charges prefer red against him and the of the punishment provided by
law before it is imposed.
People vs Magsi But more importantly, the Court could have complied, as it failed to do so the first
time, with its bounden duty to apprise and advise the accused of the seriousness of the charges, the
meaning of the qualifying and modifying circumstances, and gravity of the penalty that may be
imposed on him despite the plea of guilty, as well as received prosecution's evidence on the alleged
aggravating circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense charged. But these
considerations notwithstanding, sans any evidence whatsoever from the prosecution nor from the
defense, after Atty. Cariaso's manifestation, and its trite queries addressed to the accused whether he
confirmed the same or not, the Court proceeded to decide the case.
People vs Bensonia It must be stressed that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or secondary
basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital offense
enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted just the same as if no such plea was
entered.25 The court cannot, and should not, relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of
the accused and the precise degree of his culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence. The
reason for such rule is to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the
Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature
of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the
commission of the crime which may justify or require either a greater or lesser degree of severity in
the imposition of the prescribed penalties.

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is
amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of
the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the
performance by the lawyer of his sworn fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and
truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.
PEOPLE vs MURILLO An accused might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit
his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequences of his
plea. The judge therefore has the duty to ensure that the accused does not suffer by reason of
mistaken impressions.16 Requiring the trial court to take further evidence would also aid this Court
on appellate review in evaluating the propriety or impropriety of the plea.

Under the said rule, three things are required from the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital
offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea
and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole
basis of the judgment. (If such is the case, accused be acquitted.)

The accused may be convicted on the crim charged only if independent of the improvident
plea the prosecution evidence was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Right to Lawyer of Choice

People vs. Malunsing United States v. Labial, 19 a 1914 decision, it was held that the failure of the
record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of their right to counsel is not
sufficient ground for the reversal of a conviction…. New trial.
It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become
a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for
the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether
he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if
he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
Libuit vs. People Now, The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has
no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of
arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with
a counsel of his own choice. Worth noting, when the time for the presentation of evidence for the
defense arrived, and the defendant appeared by himself alone, the absence of his counsel was
inexcusable

Deprivation of the Right to be Heard

Moslares vs. CA The rights of an accused during trial are given paramount importance in our laws and
rules on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to be heard by
himself and counsel. Verily, this right is even guaranteed by the Constitution itself. This right has been
recognized and established in order to make sure that justice is done to the accused.

Further, the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. No court of
justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right (People vs.
Lumague, Jr., 111 SCRA 515 [1982]).

It would have thus been more befitting and seemly of the Court of Appeals had it ordered the trial
court to reopen the case for the reception of petitioner's evidence. Granting that petitioner had
sought a number of postponements, the requirements of substantial justice mandate that he should
have been given his day in court. The grant of a reasonable continuance would have been sounder
judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy disposition of the case, but at the
expense of a fundamental right.

Hence, it was error for the trial court to have proceeded with the promulgation of decision on the
premise that petitioner had waived his right to appear in court to present his evidence. Likewise, the
Court of Appeals, in affirming said decision, gravely abused its discretion as it sustained a decision of
the lower court rendered in violation of the right of petitioner to due process. As enunciated in the
case of Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization vs. Laguesma (254 SCRA 565 [1996]), the most
basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard.

As regards the third assigned error, the Court of Appeals held that the defense sought to be
established by petitioner would not, even if considered by the court, exonerate him from his criminal
liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. This declaration seems to be no less than, and is tantamount
to, prejudging the nature of the testimony of petitioner and his witnesses.

It is worthy to note that the alleged criminal liability of petitioner stems from his being the signatory
of the questioned check and his being an officer of the corporation, the actual purchaser of the cars.
As mentioned by the Solicitor General in his Manifestation, and citing the case of Lina Lim Lao vs.
Court of Appeals (274 SCRA 572 (1997]), an officer of a corporation is not to be held criminally liable
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for signing a bum check, upon which premise, the Solicitor
General concludes and recommends that petitioner be given his opportunity to present his evidence.

Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation

People of the Philippines vs. Manansala The right of Manansala to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him enunciated in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution21
was not violated simply because the information had precisely charged him with selling, delivering,
giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being
sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams
of dried marijuana leaves. As Lacerna and similar rulings have explained, the crime of illegal sale of
marijuana defined and punished under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the
prior possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of
illegal possession. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included
in that which is charged.
An accused is denied the right to be informed of the charge against him and to DUE PROCESS where
the statute itself is couched in such INDEFINITE LANGUAGE that it is not possible for men of ordinary
intelligence to determine therefrom what acts/omissions are punished. (Void for Vagueness Rule)
Procedural due process requires that the accused must be informed why he is being prosecuted and
what charge he must meet.
The description and not the designation of offense is controlling in determining whether a person has
been informed of the charges against him. It requires that the complaint of information be so written
to allege the facts constituting the offense charged and all its elements.