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Opinion | OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
At 50, the Cuban Missile Crisis as Guide
By GRAHAM ALLISON JUNE 15, 2012
Fifty years ago, the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear
disaster. During the standoff, President John F. Kennedy thought the chance of
escalation to war was “between 1 in 3 and even,” and what we have learned in
later decades has done nothing to lengthen those odds. Such a conflict might have
led to the deaths of 100 million Americans and over 100 million Russians.
The main story line of the crisis is familiar. In October 1962, a U.S. spy plane
caught the Soviet Union attempting to sneak nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba,
90 miles off the U.S. coast.
Kennedy determined at the outset that this could not stand. After a week of
secret deliberations with his most trusted advisers, he announced the discovery to
the world and imposed a naval blockade on further shipments of armaments to
Cuba.
The blockade prevented additional materiel from coming in but did nothing
to stop the Soviets from operationalizing the missiles already there. A tense
second week followed during which Kennedy and the Soviet premier, Nikita
Khrushchev, stood “eyeball to eyeball,” neither side backing down.
Saturday, Oct. 27, was the day of decision. At the last minute, the crisis was
resolved without war, as Khrushchev accepted a final U.S. offer pledging not to
invade Cuba in exchange for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles.
Every president since Kennedy has tried to learn from what happened in that
confrontation. Ironically, half a century later, with the Soviet Union itself only a
distant memory, the lessons of the crisis for current policy have never been
greater.
Today, it can help U.S. policy makers understand what to do — and what not
to do — about a range of foreign policy dilemmas, particularly the standoff with
Iran over its nuclear program.
The current confrontation between the United States and Iran is like a Cuban
missile crisis in slow motion. Events are moving, seemingly inexorably, toward a
showdown in which the U.S. president will be forced to choose between ordering a
military attack and acquiescing to a nuclear-armed Iran.
Those were, in essence, the two options Kennedy’s advisers gave him on the
final Saturday: attack or accept Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. But Kennedy
rejected both. Instead of choosing between them, he crafted an imaginative
alternative with three components: a public deal in which the United States
pledged not to invade Cuba if the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles; a private
ultimatum threatening to attack Cuba within 24 hours unless Khrushchev
accepted that offer; and a secret sweetener that promised the withdrawal of U.S.
missiles from Turkey within six months after the crisis was resolved.
Looking at the choice between acquiescence and air strikes today, both are
unacceptable. An Iranian bomb could trigger a cascade of proliferation, making
more likely a devastating conflict in one of the world’s most economically and
strategically critical regions. A preventive air strike could delay Iran’s nuclear
progress at identified sites but could not erase the knowledge and skills ingrained
in many Iranian heads.
The truth is that any outcome that stops short of Iran having a nuclear bomb
will still leave it with the ability to acquire one down the road.
The best hope for a Kennedyesque third option today is a combination of
agreed-on constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities that would lengthen the fuse on
the development of a bomb; transparency measures that would maximize the
likelihood of discovering any cheating; unambiguous (perhaps secretly
communicated) threats of a regime-changing attack should the agreement be
violated; and a pledge not to attack otherwise. Such a combination would keep
Iran as far away from a bomb as possible for as long as possible.
The Israeli factor makes the Iranian nuclear situation an even more complex
challenge for American policy makers than the Cuban missile crisis was. In 1962,
only two players were allowed at the main table. Fidel Castro, the Cuban prime
minister, sought to become the third, and had he succeeded, the crisis would have
become significantly more dangerous. Precisely because the White House
recognized that the Cubans could become a wild card, it cut them out of the game.
Kennedy informed the Kremlin that it would be held accountable for any attack
against the United States emanating from Cuba, however it started.
Today, the threat of an Israeli air strike strengthens President Barack
Obama’s hand in squeezing Iran to persuade it to make concessions. But the
possibility that Israel might actually carry out a unilateral airstrike without U.S.
approval must make Washington nervous, since it makes the crisis much harder
to manage. Should the domestic situation in Israel reduce the likelihood of an
independent Israeli attack, U.S. policy makers will not be unhappy.
It has been said that history does not repeat itself, but it does sometimes
rhyme. Five decades later, the Cuban missile crisis stands not just as a pivotal
moment in the history of the Cold War but also as a guide for how to make sound
decisions about foreign policy.
Graham Allison is director and professor of government at the Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy
School of Government. This is a condensed version of an article that will appear
in the July-August issue of Foreign Affairs.
A version of this op-ed appears in print on June 16, 2012, in The International Herald Tribune.
© 2017 The New York Times Company
