GWDC Rig HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project

Part 4 – Risk and Hazard Management

PART 4.0 – RISK AND HAZARD MANAGEMENT

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 1 of 19

GWDC Rig HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Risk and Hazard Management

4.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 3

4.2 Definition of Major Accident Hazards..................................................................................3

4.3 Method of Hazard Assessment.............................................................................................. 3

4.4 HSE-Critical Tasks....................................................................................................................... 4

4.5 Hazards and Effects Register.................................................................................................. 5

4.5.1 H-01.02 Hydrocarbons in Formation - Blowout resulting in Fire and/or Explosion........5
4.5.2 H-20.01 H2S in formation....................................................................................................... 5
4.5.3 H-01.06 Hydrocarbon - Fire or Explosion during Well Clean-Up Operations.................6
4.5.4 H-03.01 Cellulosic Materials – Fire in the Camp................................................................6
4.5.5 H-04.03 Conventional Explosive Material - Unwanted Detonation..................................6
4.5.6 H-06.03 Heavy Objects/Equipment Overhead - Dropped Objects (Derrick/Crane).......6
4.5.7 H-07.01 Objects under Tension - Structural Failure...........................................................7
4.5.8 H-08.01 On Land Transportation – Crew Change Bus involved in Road Accident........7
4.5.9 H-09.01 Severe Weather....................................................................................................... 7
4.5.10 H-27.02 Security Related Hazards-Terrorist attack............................................................7
4.5.11 H-30.01 Hazardous Goods Transport – Transport of Diesel/Crude Oil by Truck...........8

4.6 Matrix of Permitted Operations.............................................................................................. 8

4.6.1 Equipment Unavailability........................................................................................................ 8
4.6.2 Concurrent Operations........................................................................................................... 8

4.7 Conclusions................................................................................................................................... 9

List of Figures

4.1 Hazard and Effects Management Process

4.2 Method of Hazard Assessment
4.3 Bow-tie Analysis

List of Tables

4.1 Risk Matrix

4.2 Hazard Checklist
4.3 HAZID Study
4.4 Critical Hazards and Effects Register
4.5 MOPO Matrix of Permitted Operations
4.6 Hazard Overview from HAZID Meeting

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 2 of 19

GWDC Rig HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Risk and Hazard Management

4.1 Introduction

This part of the HSE Case provides a demonstration that all potential major accident hazards have
been identified, the risks from the hazards evaluated and understood, and the controls required to
manage the threats and consequences have been identified.

4.2 Definition of Major Accident Hazards

The relationships between the frequency and consequences of an event; i.e. the risk, used for this
assessment are shown in table 4.1. The risk matrix and definitions are taken from Ref. 4.1, with the
frequency terms modified for this assessment.

The scope of this HSE Case is the assessment of the major accident hazards, i.e. those, which if
realised, have the potential to cause multiple fatalities, extensive asset damage, a massive effect on
the environment or a national or international negative impact on the reputation of GWDC.

4.3 Method of Hazard Assessment

The initial identification of project hazards was the subject of a desktop HAZ-ID (Hazard
Identification) exercise by operation and HSE department manager. The HAZID addressed all of the
three key activities of the project (Rig Operation, Transportation Activities, and Camp Activities). The
principal objectives were to identify the potential major accident hazards associated with each key
activity and the controls and recovery measure in place to manage the hazards. The method of
hazard assessment used is illustrated in Figure 4.2.

The technique of “Bow-Tie” analysis (see Figure 4.3 below) is also used to assist in the Structured
Hazard Identification and Control Process (SHIDAC) , to:

 Identify and document the “lines of defence” of “HSE barriers” which are in place;
 Facilitate a qualitative assessment of any gaps;
 Help to form an assessment of event likelihood.

Figure 4.1: Hazards and Effects Management Process

Are people, environment, assets or reputation

Identify exposed to potential harm? Identify hazards and
effects resulting from operations
What are the causes and consequences?
Assess How likely is loss of control?
What is the risk and is it tolerable?
Can the causes be eliminated?
Control What controls are needed?
How effective are the controls?
Can the potential consequences or effects
Recover be mitigated?
What recovery measures are needed?
Are recovery capabilities suitable and sufficient?

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 3 of 19

GWDC Rig HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Risk and Hazard Management

Figure 4.2: Method of Hazard Assessment

Figure 4.3: Bow Tie Analysis

4.4 HSE-CRITICAL TASKS

As discussed, control and mitigating measures are associated with HSE-critical tasks that must be
carried out prior to, or during, the drilling operation in order to ensure the major hazards are correctly
managed. The HSE-critical tasks are listed in Part 7 of this HSE Case.

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 4 of 19

GWDC Rig HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Risk and Hazard Management

4.5 Hazards and Effects Register

This section provides an outline description of each of the hazards assessed for this HSE Case. The
Bow-tie diagrams for the hazards, which present detailed information on the barriers and escalation
factors included for each hazard, are contained in Appendix A (still to be included).

Table 4.4 presents the primary register of the hazards assessed in the HSE Case, the threats and
consequences identified and the risk matrix ratings assigned to each consequence. Table 4.6
presents a summary of the risk levels for the hazards assessed in the HSE case.

4.5.1 H-01.02 Hydrocarbons in Formation - Blowout resulting in Fire and/or Explosion

A major release of well fluids and gases can occur during drilling or associated well operations in the
event of loss of well control. This can result in an environmental incident or, if ignition occurs, a fire
or explosion with potential for loss of life and destruction of the rig.

A number of possible threats have been identified which could cause the loss of primary well control
(i.e. taking a kick). These are summarised as:

 swabbing when tripping;

 incorrect hole fill up during tripping;
 failure to maintain mud weight;
 mud losses to formation; and
 loss of well hydrostatic head during cementing.

The primary control measure against taking a kick is to maintain the drilling fluid hydrostatic head
during all phases of the well. In the event that primary well control cannot be properly maintained,
the well can be controlled by secondary well control, i.e. closing-in the blowout preventers (BOPs).

The recovery actions for the resultant release of well fluids concentrate on containing the spill and
preventing ignition. Evacuation of personnel will then take place. If ignition does occur, the response
will be to evacuate all remaining staff (if present) from the rig-site to safeguard lives. Safeguarding
the rig is always a secondary concern.

Environmental considerations dictate that water based drilling fluid will be used. This significantly
reduce the risk of hydrocarbon oil/gas being absorbed into the drilling fluid with subsequent surface
release. Again this threat has been included for completeness.

Two consequences were assessed:-

o a blowout at the rig floor level; and
o an explosion and/or fire from a release of gas at the rotary table or mud pit area

Based on the acceptance criteria and the risk level, sufficient barriers have been identified for all
causes, escalation factors and consequences.

4.5.2 H-20.01 H2S in formation released during drilling or well services operations

Entering dangerous H2S atmospheres A level of H2S at or above 100 ppm is Immediately
Dangerous to Life and Health(IDLH). Entry into IDLH atmospheres can only be made using:

A full facepiece positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) with a minimum
service life of thirty minutes, or

A combination full facepiece pressure demand supplied-air respirator with an auxiliary self-contained
air supply.

If H2S levels are below 100 ppm, an air-purifying respirator may be used, assuming the filter
cartridge/canister is appropriate for hydrogen sulfide. A full facepiece respirator will prevent eye
irritation.

Workers in areas containing hydrogen sulfide must be monitored of signs of overexposure.

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 5 of 19

GWDC Rig HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Risk and Hazard Management

Never attempt a rescue in an area that may contain H2S without using appropriate respiratory
protection and without being training to perform such a rescue.

Consistent monitoring by fixed H2S detectors will be mandatory while in drilling or service wells.

Based on the acceptance criteria and the risk level, sufficient barriers have been identified for all
causes, escalation factors and consequences.

4.5.3 H-01.06 Hydrocarbon - Fire or Explosion during Well Clean-Up Operations

A release of hydrocarbon well fluids can occur due to loss of containment of the well testing
equipment during the well clean-up operations. The hazard has been assessed separately from the
release of hydrocarbons from the formation due to the completed well status (i.e. tubing string and
Xmas Tree) during well clean-up operations. Loss of containment could occur as a result of
corrosion, erosion, overpressure, operator error, impact damage or incorrect assembly.

Recovery actions are developed for a fire/explosion in the well test area.

Based on the acceptance criteria and risk level defined, sufficient barriers have been identified for all
causes, escalation factors and consequences.

4.5.4 H-03.01 Cellulosic Materials – Fire in the Camp

A fire in the camp can develop as the result of smoking, faulty electrical appliances or accident in the
galley. Consequences are fatalities due to smoke inhalation and exposure to high heat flux and
destruction of the camp area. Principal control measures involve restriction of smoking to designated
areas only, maintenance of electrical equipment and galley procedures.

Mitigation systems include smoke detection and fire alarm systems, provision of fire extinguishers
and training of staff in emergency response and camp evacuation.

Based on the acceptance criteria and risk level defined, sufficient barriers have been identified for all
causes, escalation factors and consequences, with the exception of deliberate acts of vandalism
against which there can be few defences.

4.5.5 H-04.02 Conventional Explosive Material - Unwanted Detonation

Conventional explosive materials will be transported by road to the rig site and stored there at
certain periods for specific operations. The activities could comprise perforating tubing or casing
prior performing a remedial operation, explosive backing-off (string shot) and explosive cutting,
wireline set packers or bridge plugs.

The threats from storage and use of explosives, and also for the retrieval of mis-runs, have been
assessed. Explosives are stored at the rigsite in lockable cabinets in a defined area and will be on
the site for a minimum period of time. A number of special precautions are undertaken prior to the
arming and running of perforating guns, including the control of stray currents (radio silence,
shutdown of machinery) and restriction of the area to essential personnel only.

The recovery actions for an explosion at the drill floor or catwalk level have been assessed.

Based on the acceptance criteria and risk level defined, sufficient barriers have been identified for all
causes, escalation factors and consequences.

4.5.6 H-06.03 Heavy Objects/Equipment Overhead - Dropped Objects (Derrick/Crane)

Dropped objects covers any item which is suspended overhead from the derrick during drilling
operations, or overhead from the rigsite crane in support of general rig operations.

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 6 of 19

GWDC Rig HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Risk and Hazard Management

Given the scope of this HSE Case, a number of objects have been excluded from the assessment,
e.g. hand tools, as these are not considered to have the potential to cause major accident hazards.
The control of these incidents will however be addressed under the normal HSE-MS controls for
personnel working at height.

The threats of pulling the travelling blocks into the crown block, a dropped load from the crane and
auxiliary equipment (such as the Top Drive System) with components falling from the derrick onto
the rig floor have been assessed.

The recovery actions have been assessed for potential multiple fatalities on the drill floor or pipe rack
areas.

Based on the acceptance criteria and risk level defined, sufficient barriers have been identified for all
causes, escalation factors and consequences.

4.5.7 H-07.01 Objects under Tension - Structural Failure

This hazard group considers the possibility of failure of objects under tension, principally the drill line,
derrick or drill line braking system. These failures could result in heavy loads or structural
components falling to the drill floor and causing multiple fatalities.

Based on the acceptance criteria and risk level defined, sufficient barriers have been identified for all
causes, escalation factors and consequences.

4.5.8 H-08.01 On Land Transportation – Crew Change Vehicle involved in Road Accident
This hazard considers the potential for multiple fatalities as the result of transportation of the crew to
and from the rig site from the airport by crew vehicle(PSD). Furthermore, there is the risk of fatalities
to third parties and other road users.

Control measures concentrate on ensuring the mechanical integrity of the vehicles, the competency
of the drivers and the condition of the road. Mitigation measures are identified as the medical
facilities provided on the bus and at the campsite (hospital and medic available 24 hours per day)
and the medivac plan to ensure personnel reach appropriate medical facilities with the minimum of
delay.

Based on the acceptance criteria and risk level defined, sufficient barriers have been identified for all
causes, escalation factors and consequences.

4.5.9 H-09.01 Severe Weather

The hazard of severe weather typically is the cause of another hazard. For example, strong winds
creating extreme storm factors can result in human physical effects and structural failure of the mast
or cranes; lightning can lead to fire; storm, fog or heavy rain can result in vehicle accident or heavy
rain can cause flooding leading to pit overflowing and subsequent environmental impact. Hot
weather can result in heat stroke.

The Garraf Project will be conducted all year round. Extremely sandstorms are frequent in
Summer(July-August) with maximum wind strength occasionally.

Given the above statistical data, the principal hazard of extreme weather in the Garraf area is
considered to be ‘hot temperatures’ in combination with high sandstorms.

4.5.10 H-27.02 Security Related Hazards-Terrorist attack

In the Garraf area, it is unlikely to occur and no terrorist threat identified to drilling rigs or other
installations, and of drilling and completion operations in the area of South Iraq(Info).

Project Security Plan and ERP Plan shall be the guiding profiles and barriers to cope with the
security issues.

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 7 of 19

GWDC Rig HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Risk and Hazard Management

Based on the acceptance criteria and risk level defined, sufficient barriers have been identified for all
causes, escalation factors and consequences.

4.5.11 H-30.01 Hazardous Goods Transport – Transport of Hazardous Goods by Truck

Diesel and heavy oil is required at the rigsite for the electrical generators. These materials will be
transferred to and from the wellsite by road and hence there is the potential for a road traffic accident
to result in spillage resulting in environmental damage or fire. Similarly, a road traffic accident with a
truck carrying other hazardous chemicals, such as highly toxic or radio-active material could have
severe consequences if these substances were able to leak to the environment.

Although the likelihood for above incidents and respective consequences to happen is relatively
minor, the damage to the reputation of GWDC could be significant.

Control measures are similar to those in place for crew transportation. Some additional measures
apply to minimise the risks to spillage, emission or leakage. Mitigation measures are addressed by
the Emergency Response Plans, as developed by Garraf Projet

Based on the acceptance criteria and risk level defined, sufficient barriers have been identified for all
causes, escalation factors and consequences.

4.6 Matrix of Permitted Operations

A Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) has been distilled from the hazard assessment and
defines limitations on activities during periods of abnormal operating conditions. Three such
abnormal conditions have been identified during the hazard assessment:

 equipment unavailability - especially with regard to protective or detection equipment;

 concurrent high risk activities - such as during well clean-up activities; and
 severe weather - such as sandstorms and effect on structure/lifting equipment

The identified restrictions placed on operations should be regarded as a minimum and additional
restrictions may be required during the course of the drilling programme.

The MOPO is included as Table 4.5.

4.6.1 Equipment Unavailability

To permit operations whilst equipment is unavailable e.g. failed or on maintenance, is a critical

decision. The MOPO matrix for permitted operations assists in the decision making process. The
inclusion of equipment in the matrix does not dictate that its functionality be proven prior to the
activity shown commencing or continuing. For this a regular inspection and maintenance programme
should be in place as detailed in the maintenance programs of the companies on site (see Section
2.7). Three categories of entry have been made and these are detailed below.

No restrictions on operation
X Operations not permitted if equipment is unavailable/non functional
@ Operations permitted subject to remedial/additional measures being employed or subject
to other equipment availability to perform the same function

4.6.2 Concurrent Operations

Restrictions on concurrent activities identified during the hazards assessments are detailed as
follows:-
 Drilling and well services activities may require suspension during periods of extreme weather,
usually hot weather with high winds/sandstorms. The exact requirements are situation specific
and will require to be assessed by the rig site management team (GWDC Rig Manager and/or
with PCIBHV Representatives).

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 8 of 19

GWDC Rig HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Risk and Hazard Management

 Drilling and well clean-up activities will require special precautions during periods of high levels
of activity. Movement of tubular in the vicinity of the well production and clean-up/well testing
equipment will be restricted. Noise levels might be a hindrance to conduct adequate
communication.
 Drilling and well services activities may be conducted in concurrent mode on the same cluster
location.
Note that the initial exposure of well hydrocarbons during well clean-up operations will be performed
during daylight hours only.

4.7 Conclusions

1 The hazard assessment was carried out during the planning phase of the drilling operations and
identified barriers and controls that need to be in place to manage the potential major accident
hazards associated with the Garraf Project.
2 The most significant potential major accident hazards are considered to be:
 Loss of control of the hydrocarbons in formation leading to drilling blowout with associated
potential for fire and explosion. This has the potential to cause fatalities amongst the drill
crew and loss of the rig and has the potential to cause fire; and
 Accident during transportation of personnel and hazardous goods to the site with the
potential for multiple fatalities or environmental damage.
3 Less severe, but still potentially significant hazards are considered to be:
 Release of hydrocarbon from the well test equipment during well clean-up/testing leading to
fire and explosion at the rig site;
 Development of a fire in the camp;
 Falling objects resulting in impact fatalities; and
 Premature detonation of downhole explosives causing fatalities.
4 Assessment of these hazards through Rig Matrix modelling indicates that sufficient control and
mitigating measures are in place (or will be put in place) such that the risk can be considered to
be as low as reasonably practicable.
5 Lower consequence hazards have not been analysed but are controlled through the application
of GWDC operating and safety procedures, summarised in Part 2 of this HSE Case.

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 9 of 19

GWDC Rig HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Risk and Hazard Management

Table 4.1 : Risk Matrix

Increasing Probability
A B C D E
Never heard of in Has occurred in Has occurred in Has occurred per Happens several
People Assets Environmental Reputation drilling industry drilling industry GWDC drilling year in GWDC times per year in
industry operations GWDC operations
0 No Injury No Damage No Effect No Impact
1 Slight Injury Slight Damage Slight Effect Slight Impact
2 Minor Injury Minor Damage Minor Effect Limited Impact
3 Major Injury Localised Damage Localised Effect Considerable Impact
4 Single Fatality Major Damage Major Effect National Impact
Multiple
5 Extensive Damage Massive Effect International Impact
Fatalities
Categories
Manage for continuous Incorporate risk
Intolerable
improvement reduction measures

Potential Impact Definition Potential Impact Definition

People Environment / Socio-Cultural
0 No Injury No injury or damage to health 0 No Effect No financial consequences. No environmental risk.
Not detrimental to individual employability or to the performance of present work Negligible financial consequences. Local environmental damage within the fence and within
1 Slight Injury 1 Slight Effect systems.
Detrimental to the performance of present work, such as curtailment of activities or some days absence to Contamination. Damage sufficiently large to affect the environment. Single exceedance of
2 Minor Injury recover fully up to a maximum of one week.
2 Minor Effect statutory or prescribed criteria. Single complaint. No permanent effect on the environment.
Leading to permanent partial disablement or unfitness to work or detrimental to performance of work over an Limited loss of discharges of known toxicity. Repeated exceedance of statutory or prescribed
3 Major Injury extended period, such as long-term absence
3 Localised Effect limit and beyond fence/neighbourhood.
Single fatality or victim with permanent total disablement or unfitness for work. Also includes the possibility of Severe environmental damage. GWDC is required to take extensive measures to restore the
4 Single Fatality multiple fatalities (maximum of 3) in close succession due to the incident, e.g. explosion 4 Major Effect contaminated environment to its original state. Extended exceedance of statutory or
prescribed limits.
May include four fatalities in close succession due to the incident, or multiple fatalities (four or more) each at Persistent severe environmental damage or severe nuisance extending over a large area. In
Multiple
5 different points and/or with different activities 5 Massive Effect terms of commercial or recreational use or nature conservancy, a major economic loss for
Fatalities GWDC. Constantly exceed statutory or prescribed limit.
Assets Reputation
0 No Damage No damage to equipment 0 No Impact No public awareness
1 Slight Damage No disruption to process. Minimum cost of repair. (Below $10,000) 1 Slight Impact Public awareness of the incident may exist. There is no public concern.
Possible brief disruption to the process. Isolation of equipment for repair. (Estimated cost below $100,000) Some local public concern. Some complaints received. Slight media and/or local political
2 Minor Damage 2 Limited Impact attention with potentially negative aspects for GWDC operations.
Plant partly down. Process can (possibly) be restarted. (Estimated cost of repair below $1,000,000) Regional public concern. Numerous complaints. Extensive negative attention in local media.
Localised Considerable
3 3 Slight national media and/or local/ regional/national policies with potentially restrictive
Damage Impact measures and/or impact on grant of licences. Mobilisation of action groups.
Partial loss of plant. Plant shut down. (For at most two weeks and/or estimated cost of repair below National public concern. Continuing complaints. Extensive negative attention in the national
4 Major Damage $10,000,000) 4 National Impact media and/or regional/national policies with potentially restrictive measures and/or impact on
grant of licences. Mobilisation of action groups.
Total loss of plant. Extensive damage. (Estimated cost of repair exceeding $10,000,000) International impact – international public attention. Extensive negative attention in
Extensive International international media and national/international politics. Potential to harm access to new areas,
5 5 grants of licences and/or tax legislation. Concerted pressure by action groups. Adverse
Damage Impact
effects to GWDC operations in other countries.

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 10 of 19

GWDC Site HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Hazard Assessment

No. HAZARD DESCRIPTION

H-01 Hydrocarbons Table 4.2 : Hazard Checklist No. HAZARD DESCRIPTION
H-01.01 Crude oil under pressure H-22 Toxic Solids
H-01.02 Hydrocarbons in formation H-22.01 Asbestos
H-01.03 LPGs H-22.02 Man made mineral fibre
H-01.04 LNGs H-22.03 Cement dust
H-01.05 Condensate, NGL H-22.04 Sodium hypochlorite
H-01.06 Hydrocarbon gas H-22.05 Powdered mud additives
H-01.07 Crude oil at low pressure H-22.06 Sulphur dust
H-01.08 Wax No. HAZARD DESCRIPTION H-22.07 Pig trash
H-01.09 Coal H-14 Open Flame H-22.08 Oil based muds
H-02 Refined Hydrocarbons H-14.01 Heaters with fire tube H-22.09 Pseudo oil based muds
H-02.01 Lube and seal oil H-14.02 Direct fired furnaces H-22.10 Water based muds
H-02.02 Hydraulic oil H-14.03 Flares H-22.11 Cement Slurries
H-02.03 Diesel fuel H-15 Electricity H-22.12 Dusts
H-02.04 Aviation fuel, petrol H-15.01 Voltage > 50 - 440V in cables H-22.13 Cadmium compounds & other heavy
H-03 Other Flammable Materials H-15.02 Voltage > 50-440V in metals
H-03.01 Cellulosic materials equipment H-22.14 Oil based sludges
H-03.02 Pyrophoric materials H-15.03 Voltage > 440V H-23 Corrosive Substances
H-03.04 Carbon fibre reinforced H-15.04 Lightning discharge H-23.01 Hydrofluoric acid
material H-15.05 Electrostatic energy H-23.02 Hydrochloric acid
H-03.04 Dry vegetation H-16 Electromagnetic Radiation H-23.03 Sulphuric acid
H-04 Explosives H-16.01 Ultraviolet radiation H-23.04 Caustic soda
H-04.01 Detonators H-16.02 Infra red radiation H-24 Biological Hazards
H-04.02 Conventional explosives H-16.03 Microwaves H-24.01 Poisonous plants
H-04.03 Perforating gun charges H-16.04 Lasers H-24.02 Large animals
H-04.04 Explosive gases H-16.05 E/M radiation: high voltage ac H-24.03 Small animals
H-05 Pressure Hazards cables H-24.04 Food borne bacteria
H-05.01 Bottled gases under pressure H-17 Ionising Radiation - Open H-24.05 Water borne bacteria
H-05.02 Water under pressure Source H-24.06 Parasitic insects
H-05.03 Non hydrocarbon gas under H-17.01 Alpha, Beta - open source H-24.07 Disease transmitting insects
pressure in pipeworks H-17.02 Gamma rays - open source H-24.08 Cold & flu virus
H-05.04 Air under high pressure H-17.03 Neutron - open source H-24.09 HIV
H-05.05 Hyperbaric operations H-17.04 Naturally occurring ionising H-24.10 Other communicable diseases
H-05.06 Decompression radiation H-25 Ergonomic Hazards
H-06 Hazards Associated with H-18 Ionising Radiation - Closed H-25.01 Manual materials handling
Differences in Height Source H-25.02 Damaging noise
H-06.01,2 Personnel at height H-18.01 Alpha, Beta - closed source H-25.02 Loud, steady noises >85dBA
H-06.03 Overhead equipment H-18.02 Gamma rays - closed source H-25.03 Heat stress
H-06.04 Personnel under water H-18.03 Neutron - closed source H-25.04 Cold stress
H-06.05 Personnel below grade H-19 Asphyxiates H-25.05 High humidity
H-07 Objects under Induced H-19.01 Insufficient oxygen H-25.06 Vibration
Stress atmospheres H-25.07 Work stations
H-07.01 Objects under tension H-19.02 Excessive CO2 H-25.08 Lighting
H-07.02 Objects under compression H-19.03 Drowning H-25.09 Incompatible hand controls
H-08 Dynamic Situation Hazards H-19.04 Excessive N2 H-25.10 Awkward location of workplaces and
H-08.01 On land transport (driving) H-19.05 Halon machinery
H-08.02 On water transport (boating) H-19.06 Smoke H-25.11 Mismatch of work to physical abilities
H-08.03 In air transport (flying) H-20 Toxic Gases H-25.12 Mismatch of work to cognitive
H-08.04 Boat collision hazard to other H-20.01 H2S, sour gas abilities
vessels and offshore H-20.02 Exhaust fumes H-25.13 Long and irregular working
structures H-20.03 SO2 hours/shifts
H-08.05 Equipment with moving or H-20.04 Benzene H-25.14 Poor organisation and job design
rotating parts H-20.05 Chlorine H-25.15 Work planning issues
H-08.06 Use of hazardous hand tools H-20.06 Welding fumes H-25.16 Indoor climate
H-08.07 Use of knives, machetes etc H-20.07 Tobacco smoke H-26 Psychological Hazards
H-08.08 Transfer from boat to offshore H-20.08 CFCs H-26.01 Living on the job/away from family
platform H-21 Toxic Liquids H-26.02 Working and living on a live plant
H-09 Environmental Hazards H-21.01 Mercury H-26.03 Post traumatic stress
H-09.01 Weather H-21.02 PCBs H-27 Security Related Hazards
H-09.02 Sea state/river currents H-21.03 Biocides H-27.01 Piracy
H-09.03 Tectonic activity H-21.04 Methanol H-27.02 Assault
H-10 Hot Surfaces H-21.05 Brines H-27.03 Sabotage
H-10.01 Process piping equipment H-21.06 Glycols H-27.04 Crisis
60-150°C H-21.07 Degreasers H-27.05 Theft, pilferage
H-10.02 Piping equipment > 150°C H-21.08 Isocyanates H-28 Use of Natural Resources
H-10.03 Engine & turbine exhaust H-21.09 Sulphanol H-28.01 Land take
systems H-21.10 Amines H-28.02 Water
H-10.04 Steam piping H-21.11 Corrosion inhibitors H-28.03 Air
H-11 Hot Fluids H-21.12 Scale inhibitors H-28.04 Trees, vegetation
H-11.01 Temperatures 100-150 °C H-21.13 Liquid mud additives H-28.05 Gravel
H-11.02 Temperatures >150 °C H-21.14 Odorant additives H-29 Medical
H-12 Cold Surfaces H-21.15 Alcoholic beverages H-29.01 Medical unfitness
H-12.01 Process piping -25 to -80°C H-21.16 Recreational drugs H-29.02 Motion sickness
H-12.02 Piping equipment < -80°C H-21.17 Used engine oils H-30 Hazardous Goods
H-13 Cold Fluids H-21.18 Carbon tetrachloride H-30.01 Dangerous goods in transport
H-13.01 Oceans, seas & lakes < 10°C H-21.19 Grey and/or black water activities

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 11 of 19

GWDC Site HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Hazard Assessment

Table 4.3 : HAZID Study

Rig Matrix HAZARD SOURCE TOP EVENT (MAJOR ACCIDENT) - RISK POTENTIAL ANALYSE IN HSE CASE USING Rig
HAZARD No. CONSEQUENCES Matrix
P A E R COMMENT
H-01 Hydrocarbons
H-01.02 Major release of hydrocarbons in formation: Loss of well control - B5 B5 B4 B4 Yes
* during drilling, wirelining or cementing a) prolonged, unignited, uncontrolled (C4) (C5) (C5) (C4)
* at or below drill floor flow of hydrocarbons from well
* at choke and kill manifold leading to massive gas release
b) explosion and fire/smoke due to
ignition
H-01.06 Major release of gas from mud system Fire/explosion B1 B2 B0 B0 No – mud system is open to allow rapid
dispersal of release gas. Gas reservoir
is tight and drilling penetration is low. It
will not release significant quantities of
gas.
H-01.01 Major release of gas during well clean-up or Loss of containment – fire or spillage B4 B4 B3 B4 Yes
H-01.05 production on cluster location a) fire/explosion due to ignition of (C2) (C3) (C3) (C3)
H-01.06 hydrocarbon release
H-01.07 b) gas release due to failure of flare No
ignition
H-02 Refined Hydrocarbons
H-02.01 Damage, misuse or failure of equipment or Loss of containment – spillage with D1/2 D1/2 D2/3 N/A No
H-02.02 containers or tanks containing diesel, lube, seal potential for fire
H-02.03 or hydraulic oil
H-03 Other Flammable Materials
H-03.01 Ignition of cellulosic materials in the camp Minor fire with potential to escalate to a B5 B5 B3 B4 Yes
major fire (C4) (C3/4) (C3) (C2/3)
H-03.04 Ignition of dry vegetation surrounding the rig site Fire in dry vegetation B/C1 B0 B/C1 B/C0 No – location has sparse dry vegetation
and likelihood that vegetation will ignite
is very low.
H-04 Explosives
H-04.02 Improper storage or handling of perforating Unplanned detonation. Explosion on B5 B3 B0 B2 Yes
charges during drilling/completion catwalk or drill floor
H-05 Pressure Hazards
H-05.01 Damage to, or misuse of, pressurised gas Loss of containment - fire, explosion, flying B4 B2 B0 B1 No – to be controlled by procedures
bottles for welding, metal cutting, etc. parts (storage and handling), competence of
crews and by good work practice
H-05.02 Failure of pressurised pipework or vessels (i.e. Generation of high momentum jets and C4 C2 C0 C1/2 No – to be controlled by using certified
H-05.03 HP mud systems, bulk storage vessels, well test potential missiles equipment, certified relief systems, PtW,
H-05.04 equipment during pressure testing) procedures, supervisory and rig crew
competence and by good work practice
H-06 Hazard Associated with Difference in Height
H-06.01 Personnel working at height Fall to lower level – injury/fatality C4 C0 C0 C3 No – to be controlled by procedures,
PtW, competence of rig crew and by

Note : Figures in brackets () indicate Industry Practices and GWDC Experience

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 12 of 19

GWDC Site HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Hazard Assessment

Table 4.3 : HAZID Study

Rig Matrix HAZARD SOURCE TOP EVENT (MAJOR ACCIDENT) - RISK POTENTIAL ANALYSE IN HSE CASE USING Rig
HAZARD No. CONSEQUENCES Matrix
P A E R COMMENT
good work practice
H-06.03 Any object dropped from cranes, drawworks or Dropped object with potential for direct B4 C3 C0 C3 No – to be controlled by procedures,
other lifting equipment. impact with personnel (C4) PtW, competence of rig crew and by
good work practice
H-07 Objects Under Induced Stress
H-07.01 Failure of equipment under tension such as Object dropped with potential for impact B4 C3 C0 C3 No – to be controlled by procedures,
slings, wires associated with: with personnel (C4) PtW, competence of rig crew and by
 cranes good work practice
 drawworks
 winches
H-07.01 Failure of derrick due to overloading; Overload Direct impact with personnel B5 C4/5 C0 C3 No – to be controlled by procedures,
of braking system (C3) PtW, competence of rig crew and by
good work practice
H-07.02 Failure of objects under compression such as Unable to operate valves as required C1 C3 C0 C0 No – to be controlled by certified
relief valves and actuators and hydraulic / equipment and by work practices
pneumatic operated devices
H-08 Dynamic Situation Hazards
H-08.01 Land transport incident
a) Crew change bus in road traffic accident Fatalities amongst rig crew C5 C3 C2 C3 Yes
b) Lorry transporting diesel/ crude oil involved Spillage C4 C3 B3 B3 No – to be controlled by procedures
in RTA
H-08.05 Equipment with moving or rotating parts, e.g.: C4 C2 C0 C3 No – to be controlled by using certified
a) grinders/lathes Loss of control - injury equipment, certified relief systems, PtW,
b) pumps and compressors Loss of separation - flying parts procedures, supervisory and rig crew
c) generator Loss of control - total loss of power competence and by good work practice
H-08.06 Misuse or inadequate/defective hand tools, Loss of control - injury D/E2 - - - No – to be controlled by competence of
H-08.07 knives, etc. rig crew and supervisory staff and by
good work practice
H-09 Environmental Hazards
H-09.01 Extreme weather effects Extreme weather is considered as a cause C3 C2 C1 C2 Yes
of potential hazards such as failure of the
derrick (extreme wind loading)

H-09.03 Tectonic (earthquake, subsidence) activity Structural failure - - - - No – potential for tectonic activity is
affecting structural integrity and downhole Stuck pipe extremely remote in region of operations
operations
H-10 Hot Surfaces
H-10.01 Hot mud lines, drill pipe, engine exhaust Personal injury D3 - - - No – to be controlled by procedures,
H-10.02 systems, galley cookers, etc PPE requirements, competence of staff
H-10.03 and by good work practice
H-10.04

Note : Figures in brackets () indicate Industry Practices and GWDC Experience

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 13 of 19

GWDC Site HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Hazard Assessment

Table 4.3 : HAZID Study

Rig Matrix HAZARD SOURCE TOP EVENT (MAJOR ACCIDENT) - RISK POTENTIAL ANALYSE IN HSE CASE USING Rig
HAZARD No. CONSEQUENCES Matrix
P A E R COMMENT
H-11 Hot Fluids
H-11.01 Hot fluids - steam, drilling mud Personal injury D3 - - - No – to be controlled by procedures,
H-11.02 PPE requirements, competence of staff
and by good work practice

H-14 Open Flames

H-14.03 Flaring during well clean-up a) Exceeds discharge limits B2 - B2 - Area classification in line with
Welding torches b) Ignition source internationally recognised standards
Welding will be controlled by procedures
H-15 Electricity
H-15.01 High voltage electrical systems a) Electrical shock. C4 - - C2 No – potential for electrical shock
H-15.02 b) Ignition - fire covered by electrical safety procedures
and PtW.
Potential for ignition addressed by Area
Classification requirements
H-15.04 Lightning discharge Ignition of flammable atmospheres / - - - - No – lightning discharge is considered
combustible materials low and with rig earthing, asset damage
is likely to be very low as well
H-16 Electromagnetic Radiation
H-16.01 Ultraviolet radiation during out door working. Exceed exposure limits - - - - No – controlled by work practice
H-16.02 Infrared radiation from flare Exceed exposure limits - - - - No – controlled by work practice
H-17/18 Ionising Radiation - Open /Closed Source
H-17.01 Damage/ loss of alpha, beta, gamma or neutron Exceed exposure limits. Contamination B3 - B4 B3 No – to be controlled by procedures.
H-17.02 source during storage or logging while drilling Sources on site only during drilling
H-17.03 operations (LWD)
H-19 Asphyxiates
H-19.01 Insufficient oxygen atmosphere when working in Asphyxiation leading to fatalities B4 - - B2/3 No – controlled by work practice
confined space or tank
H-19.06 Excessive smoke from ignited blowout or other Asphyxiation leading to fatalities - - - - Yes - but as a consequence of loss of
fires containment of hydrocarbons in
formation (H-01.02).
H-20 Toxic Gases
H-20.01 H2S in formation released during drilling or well H2S release leading to fatalities - - - - Yes
services operations, e.g. in mud returns, on drill
floor or released during blowout

H-20.06 Welding fumes Injury/fatality B4 - - - No – controlled by work practice.

H-21 Toxic Liquids
H-21.05 Chemicals required for drilling and well services Spillage leading to environmental damage B4 - C2 C1 No – to be controlled by procedures and
H-21.13 operations, i.e. liquid additives and brines or exposure of personnel to toxic fumes work practises. MSDS (or equivalent) to

Note : Figures in brackets () indicate Industry Practices and GWDC Experience

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 14 of 19

GWDC Site HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Hazard Assessment

Table 4.3 : HAZID Study

Rig Matrix HAZARD SOURCE TOP EVENT (MAJOR ACCIDENT) - RISK POTENTIAL ANALYSE IN HSE CASE USING Rig
HAZARD No. CONSEQUENCES Matrix
P A E R COMMENT
be available for all chemicals in use
H-21.19 Sewage Out of specification discharge - - B3 - No – sewage will be discharge to septic
tanks which will be pumped out as
required an disposed of properly
H-22 Toxic Solids
H-22.03 Chemicals required for drilling and well services Exceed exposure or discharge limits B3 - B3 - No - all drill cuttings will be disposed of
H-22.04 operations, i.e. cement dust, mud additives, properly with due accord to their
H-22.05 water based mud and cement slurries. composition
H-22.11 Drill cuttings.
H-23 Corrosive Substances
H-23.02 Acids and alkalines required for drilling and well Loss of containment – personnel injury or C3 - C2 - No - to be controlled in the Independent
H-23.04 services operations environmental impact individual procedures
H-24 Biological hazards
H-24.04 Food borne bacteria Illness/ fatality B3 - - - No – to be addressed in kitchen
(C3) practises and training of kitchen staff
H-24.04 Water contamination Illness/fatality B3 - - - No – water purification plant and
H-24.05 periodic water quality checks. Bottled
water for human consumption
H-24.07 Disease transmitting insects Illness/fatality C1 - - - No – unlikely to occur in region
H-24.09
H-24.10
H-25 Ergonomic Hazards
H-25.01 Manual handling operations Injury/ impairment D2/3 - - - No – to be addressed in work practises
H-25.02 High intensity (peak) and loud (steady) noise Exceed exposure limit – hearing injuries B3 - - - No – to be addressed by PtW (PPE
H-25.03 from relief valves, or engine room. and disturbance of local fauna and requirements)
Prolonged high pitch noise during concurrent community By using efficient means of
operations (well clean-up and/or production wile communications (ear defenders with
drilling and running completion on cluster radio) during concurrent activities
location)
H-26 Psychological Hazards
H-26.01 Working away from home, living on a live plant Stress - - - - No – experienced crews

H-27 Security Related Hazards

H-27.02 Terrorist attack Injury/ fatalities - - - - Unlikely to occur
Asset damage No terrorist threat identified to drilling
Loss of property rigs or other installations in South
Iraq(info).
H-27.05 Theft, pilferage Loss of property - - - - No – all locations provided with security
H-28 Use of Natural Resources
No significant hazards identified - - - -
H-29 Medical
Note : Figures in brackets () indicate Industry Practices and GWDC Experience

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 15 of 19

GWDC Site HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Hazard Assessment

Table 4.3 : HAZID Study

Rig Matrix HAZARD SOURCE TOP EVENT (MAJOR ACCIDENT) - RISK POTENTIAL ANALYSE IN HSE CASE USING Rig
HAZARD No. CONSEQUENCES Matrix
P A E R COMMENT
No significant hazards identified - - - -
H-30 Hazardous Goods
H-30.01 Spillage of diesel/crude oil during road Environmental damage B4 C2 B3 B2 Yes
transportation

Note : Figures in brackets () indicate Industry Practices and GWDC Experience

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 16 of 19

GWDC Site HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Hazard Assessment

Table 4.4 : Critical Hazards and Effects Register

HAZARD (Rig Matrix) THREATS TOP EVENT CONSEQUENCES RISK MATRIX

No. DESCRIPTION P A E R
H-01.02 Hydrocarbons in 1.1 Swabbing while tripping Loss of well control  Prolonged, unignited, B5 B5 B4 B4
Formation 1.2 Loss of circulation or returns uncontrolled flow of
1.3 Insufficient mud weight hydrocarbons from well leading
1.4 Improper hole fill-up during to massive gas release
tripping/casing operations  Explosion and fire/smoke due
1.5 Cementing operations to ignition
H-01.01 Hydrocarbon Gas 2.1 Operation Outside Design Loss of containment from well test  Gas release B4 B4 B3 B4
H-01.05 released during well 2.2 Mechanical Integrity Failure equipment to perform well clean-up  Explosion and fire due to
H-01.06 clean-up Loss of containment from well in ignition
H-01.07 production on cluster location
H-03.01 Cellulosic Materials 3.1 Smoking Fire in the camp  Fatalities B5 B5 B3 B4
3.2 Cooking Activities  Destruction of the Camp
3.3 Electrical Fault
H-04.02 Perforating Charges 4.1 Storage of explosives Unwanted detonation  Explosion on drill floor B5 B3 B0 B2
4.2 Use of explosives
H-06.03 Heavy Objects/ 5.1 Travelling blocks pulled into crown Dropped object  Multiple drill floor fatalities from B4 C3 C0 C3
Equipment Overhead block dropped object
5.2 Dropped load from crane
5.3 Auxiliary equipment falling from
derrick or other structures
H-07.01 Objects Under Tension 6.1 Failure of drill line from material Structural failure/ loss of control  Multiple fatalities at drill floor B4 C4 C0 C3
(Structures) defect or wear
6.2 Overloading of derrick
6.3 Overloading of braking system
H-08.01 Land Transport – Crew 7.1 Poor Vehicle Maintenance Loss of control / crash  Passenger fatalities B5 C3 C2 C3
Change 7.2 Poor Road Conditions
7.3 Driver Error
H-30.01 Dangerous Goods in 8.1 Poor Vehicle Maintenance Loss of control / crash / vessel(s)  Spillage of crude oil / diesel or B4 C2 B3 B2
land transport activities 8.2 Poor Road Conditions containing goods split open other dangerous goods
8.3 Driver Error

It is the responsibility of the HSE Case Custodian to ensure the technical accuracy of the ___________
register and that it is reviewed and updated as a consequence of operating experience, change Wang Quansheng __________________
or review. Garraf Project Manager Date
HSE Case Custodian

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 17 of 19

GWDC Site HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Hazard Assessment

Table 4.5 : Matrix of Permitted Operations

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 18 of 19

GWDC Site HSE Case for Iraq Garraf Project
Part 4 – Hazard Assessment

Table 4.6 : Hazard Overview from HAZID Meeting

MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARD Risk Matrix

TOP EVENT AND CONSEQUENCES P A E R
1. Hydrocarbons (oil, gas and condensate) in formation: B5 B5 B4 B4
Blowout resulting in hydrocarbon release or fire/explosion
2. Hydrocarbon gas (well testing equipment): B4 B4 B3 B4
Fire or explosion during well clean-up/production operations
3. Cellulosic material: B5 B5 B3 B4
Fire in the camp
4. Conventional explosive material: B5 B3 B0 B2
Unwanted detonation during storage, at drill floor or catwalk
5. Heavy objects/ equipment overhead: B4 C3 C0 C3
Dropped objects from crane or derrick
6. Objects under tension (structures): B4 C4 C0 C3
Structural failure (drill line, derrick, braking failure)
7. On land transportation: B5 C3 C2 C3
Vehicular crash during crew change
8. Hazardous goods in transport activities: B4 C2 B3 B2
Spillage and/or emission of toxic/radio-active material

KEY:
Intolerable P Potential for Fatalities
ALARP zone A Potential for Asset Damage
Low risk E Environmental and Social Impact
R Damage to National/International Reputation

Part 4 HSE Case Rig GW 52 Page 19 of 19