DIVISION

[ GR No. 51494, Aug 19, 1982 ]

JUDRIC CANNING CORPORATION v. AMADO G. INCIONG +

DECISION

201 Phil. 456

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

Petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining order, to annul and set aside the Order issued by
the Regional Director of the Ministry of Labor on November 15, 1978 in
Case No. R4-STF-5515-78, entitled: "United Lumber and General Workers
of the Philippines (ULGWP), et al., complainants, versus Judric Canning
Corporation, respondents," which ordered the herein petitioner to reinstate
immediately herein private respondents Norma Pineda, Vicky Peñalosa,
Leonila Morales, Teresita Balmaceda, Adelina Valenzuela, and Juanita
Reposar to their former positions with full backwages from the date of their
dismissal up to their actual reinstatement; the Order issued by the
respondent Amado G. Inciong on August 3, 1979, which affirmed the
aforestated order of the Regional Director and dismissed the appeal of the
herein petitioner; and the Writ of Execution issued in said case on
September 24, 1979.
The records show that the herein private respondents Norma Pineda, Vicky
Peñalosa, Leonila Morales, Teresita Balmaceda, Adelina Valenzuela, and
Juanita Reposar are employees of the petitioner corporation and are
members of the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines
(ULGWP). On August 19, 1978, the said complainants were allegedly not
allowed to report for work due to their union activities in soliciting
membership in a union yet to be organized in the company and their time
cards were removed from the rack. As a result, the said complainants and
their labor union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the
petitioner with Region IV of the Ministry of Labor, seeking the
reinstatement of the complainants with full backwages.[1]
The herein petitioner denied having locked out the complainants and
claims that the said complainants failed to report for work and abandoned
their positions. The petitioner also denied having knowledge of the union
activities of the complainants until August 30, 1978, when it was served
notice of a petition for direct certification filed by the complainant union. [2]
After hearing the parties, or on November 15, 1978, the Regional Director of
Region IV of the Ministry of Labor, after finding that the petitioner had
dismissed the complainants without valid cause, ordered the petitioner to
immediately reinstate the complainants to their former positions with full
backwages from the date of their dismissal up to their actual reinstatement.
[3]

The petitioner corporation appealed to the Ministry of Labor,[4] but its

appeal was dismissed for lack of merit on August 3, 1979.[5] Thereafter, a
writ of execution was issued on September 24, 1979.[6]
Hence, the present recourse. As prayed for, a temporary restraining order,
restraining the respondents from enforcing, implementing and/or carrying
out the writ of execution dated September 24, 1979, was issued on
November 12, 1979.[7]
1. The petitioner contends that the Regional Director's finding, which was
affirmed by the respondent Deputy Minister of Labor, that the petitioner is
guilty of unfair labor practice for terminating the services of the respondent
union members due to their alleged union activities, is not supported by the
evidence of record.
This contention is untenable. The record shows that after the parties had
submitted their respective position papers, a hearing was held, at the
conclusion of which, the respondent Regional Director found that the
private respondents did not abandon their jobs but were dismissed because
of their union activities. This is a finding of fact which may not now be
disturbed.
Besides, the private respondents immediately filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, seeking their reinstatement, on August 24, 1978, soon after their
services were terminated on August 19, 1978. It would be illogical for the
private respondents to abandon their work and then immediately file an
action seeking their reinstatement.
Moreover, there was no reason at all and none has been suggested by the
petitioner, for the private respondents to abandon their work. No employee
with a family to support, like the private respondents, would abandon their
work knowing fully well of the acute unemployment and underemployment
problem and the difficulty of looking for a means of livelihood. As the
Solicitor General stated: "To get a job is difficult; to run from it is
foolhardy."
But, most of all, the petitioner stated that in spite of its position that the
private respondents had abandoned their jobs, it "offered to pay respondent
union members severance pay of one (1) month."[8] This is a clear admission
of the charge of arbitrary dismissal, for why should the petitioner offer to
pay what it calls "severance pay" if the private respondents were not,
indeed, dismissed, or if the petitioner sincerely believed in the
righteousness of its stance?
2. The petitioner further claims that it could not have committed the unfair
labor practice charge for dismissing some of its employees due to their
alleged union activities because the alleged dismissal took place more than
four (4) months before the organizational meeting of the union and more
than one (1) year before actual registration of said union with the Labor
Organization Division of the Bureau of Labor Relations.
The contention is without merit. Under Article 248(a) of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in their
exercise of the right to self-organization" is an unfair labor practice on the
part of the employer. Paragraph (d) of said Article also considers it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to initiate, dominate, assist or
otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it. In this
particular case, the private respondents were dismissed, or their services
were terminated, because they were soliciting signatures in order to form a
union within the plant. In their affidavit, executed on September 19, 1978,
[9]
the private respondents stated:
"Na kami ay nagkampanya upang papirmahin namin sa 'membership form'
ng ULGWP ang nakakarami (majority) sa mga empleyeado at nagharap
kami ng petisyon sa Ministri ng Paggawa upang masertify ang aming unyon
sa Case No. R4-LRD-M-8-403-78;
"Na dahil sa aming pagreklamo sa Pangasiwaan na ibigay sa amin ang mga
biyaya sa ilalim ng Kodigo ng Paggawa at dahil sa pagtayo at pagkampaniya
namin sa mga empleyeado na sumapi sa unyon ay kami ay pinag-initan at
tinanggal sa trabaho ng Pangasiwaan."
For sure, the petitioner corporation is guilty of unfair labor practice in
interfering with the formation of a labor union and retaliating against the
employees' exercise of their right to self-organization.
3. Finally, the petitioner claims that the "respondent Regional Director's
finding, which was affirmed by respondent Deputy Minister of Labor, that
the 'dismissal' of respondent union members 'is conclusively presumed to
be without a valid cause' because petitioner failed to apply for clearance is
contrary to the applicable Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code and is at variance with jurisprudence on the matter."
The petitioner obviously refers to the following portion of the Order of the
Regional Director dated November 15, 1978:
"The record shows that complainants Norma Pineda, Vicky Penalosa,
Leonila Morales, Teresita Balmaceda, Adelina Valenzuela and Juanita
Reposar were employed by respondent in January, 1978, up to August,
1978. They worked continuously up to the time that their services were
terminated by respondent on the ground of abandonment. However,
respondent did not apply for clearance with this Office to terminate the
services of complainants. Hence, their dismissal is conclusively presumed
to be without a valid cause."
Indeed, prior clearance with the Ministry of Labor for the termination of
the private respondents is not necessary in this case since the private
respondents have been employed with the petitioner corporation for less
than one (1) year. Section 1, Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations provides as follows:
"Section 1. Requirement for shutdown or dismissal. - No employer may
shut down his establishment or dismiss any of his employees with at least
one year of service during the last two years, whether the service is broken
or continuous, without prior clearance issued therefor in accordance with
this Rule. Any provision in a collective agreement dispensing with the
clearance requirement shall be null and void."
However, the questioned order finding the dismissal of the private
respondents to be without just cause is not based upon such absence of
prior clearance alone. The respondent Regional Director also found that the
private respondents were dismissed because of their union activities and for
the failure of the petitioners to file a report in lieu of prior clearance, as
provided for in Section 11, Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The questioned order further reads, as follows:
"Moreover, we find that complainants did not abandon their job. They were
terminated due to the fact that they actively campaigned and assisted in the
organization of their union.
"Therefore, the dismissal of complainants is without valid cause,
considering that respondent failed to justify their action and also have not
filed the necessary report as required under the Labor Code."
The error of the Regional Director in stating that the dismissal of the
private respondents was without just cause in view of the absence of prior
clearance from the Ministry of Labor is, thus, not sufficient to warrant a
reversal of the questioned order.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED. The
temporary restraining order heretofore issued is hereby LIFTED and SET
ASIDE. With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De

Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 39, 41, 43.
[2]
Id., p. 50.
[3]
Id., p. 57.
[4]
Id., p. 59.
[5]
Id., p. 80.
[6]
Id., p. 81.
[7]
Id., p. 107.
[8]
Id., p. 29; par. 10(f) of Petition.
[9]
Id., p. 48.