NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention
Author(s): Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis
Source: Foreign Affairs , MARCH/APRIL 2012, Vol. 91, No. 2 (MARCH/APRIL 2012), pp.
2-7
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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NATO's Victory in Libya
The Right Way to Run an Intervention
Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis
Natos operation in Libya has rightly in Tunisia and Egypt. But rather than
been hailed as a model intervention. The capitulate, as had Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali
alliance responded rapidly to a deterio and Hosni Mubarak, Qaddafi launched a
rating situation that threatened hundreds brutal crackdown.
of thousands of civilians rebelling against The international community re
an oppressive regime. It succeeded in sponded swiftly. In late February, the
protecting those civilians and, ultimately, un Security Council placed sanctions,
in providing the time and space necessary an arms embargo, and an asset freeze
for local forces to overthrow Muammar on Libya and referred Qaddafi's crimes
al-Qaddafi. And it did so by involving against humanity to the International
partners in the region and sharing the Criminal Court in The Hague. Shortly
burden among the alliance's members. thereafter, the Arab League suspended
Nato s involvement in Libya demon Libya from its sessions and then called on
strated that the alliance remains an essenthe international community to impose
tial source of stability. But to preserve a no-fly zone. On March 17, the Security
that role, nato must solidify the politicalCouncil granted that request, mandating
cohesion and shared capabilities that made"all necessary measures" to protect civilians.
the operation in Libya possible—particu The United States facilitated this rapid
larly as its leaders prepare for the upcominternational reaction. In late February,
ing nato summit in Chicago this May. Washington was the first country to cut
off Qaddafi's funding, freezing $32 billion
RAPID RESPONSE
in Libyan assets and prompting other
countries
When the people of Libya rose to follow suit. Washington also
up against
led the hoped
Qaddafi in February 2011, many charge for the un resolution that
that the nonviolent protestsauthorized
would thefollow
intervention, justifying the
the successful path of similar uprisings
action as consistent with "the responsibility
Ivo H. Daalder is U.S. Permanent Representative to NAT
Stavridis is Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Comm
U.S. European Command.
[2]
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NATO's Victory in Libya
to protect," the norm that calls on the tered difficulties in protecting the Libyan
international community to intervene people. The proximity of the regime's
when governments fail to safeguard their forces, facilities, and equipment to civilian
own civilians. And on March 19, following infrastructure; the initially limited ability
the un authorization, the United States of the Libyan opposition to defend itself
led a coalition in launching air and missile and the population centers under its con
strikes against Libyan forces—including trol; and the need for nato to minimize
against a large concentration of armored harm to civilians all slowed the operation
vehicles approaching Benghazi, the head and at times led to a perception of dead
quarters of the revolution and home to lock and stalemate.
750,000 people whom Qaddafi had labeled By the middle of August, however, the
as "rats" when he threatened to "cleanse opposition had gained enough strength
Libya house by house." The initial inter to attack Qaddafi's strongholds, first in
vention rescued the people of Benghazi, Tripoli and then in Sirte. Within two
obliterated Libya's air defense system months, the Libyan National Transitional
within 72 hours, and deployed aircraft and Council had secured control over the
naval vessels to enforce the un resolution. entire country and rebels had captured
Following this early success, U.S. and killed Qaddafi. Operation Unified
President Barack Obama sought nato's Protector ended on October 31, 222 days
agreement to take over command and after it had begun.
control of the operation in order to ensure
A TEACHABLE MOMENT
the effective integration of allied and
partnered militaries. Washington would By any measure, nato succeeded in Liby
continue to participate in military opera It saved tens of thousands of lives from
tions but would do so mainly by gathering almost certain destruction. It conducted
and analyzing intelligence, refueling an air campaign of unparalleled precision,
nato and partner aircraft, and contrib which, although not perfect, greatly
uting other high-end military capabilities, minimized collateral damage. It enabled
such as electronic jamming. the Libyan opposition to overthrow one
With many nato countries, including of the world s longest-ruling dictators. And
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, it accomplished all of this without a single
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the allied casualty and at a cost—$1.1 billion
United Kingdom, and the United States, for the United States and several billion
already contributing to the intervention, dollars overall—that was a fraction of that
nato was the logical choice to assume spent on previous interventions in the
command, and it agreed to do so on Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
March 27. Dubbed Operation Unified But the Libya operation had its
Protector, the alliance's mission in Libya challenges as well, both in conception and
consisted of three separate tasks: policing in execution. If nato is to replicate its
the arms embargo, patrolling the no-fly success in the future, it must examine
zone, and protecting civilians. Although and learn from these challenges.
it immediately solidified the maritime The first lesson is that nato is uniquely
blockade and the no-fly zone, it encoun positioned to respond quickly and
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ■ March /April 2012
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Ivo H. Daalder andJames G. Stavridis
effectively to international crises. Some The second lesson of Libya is that
countries have significant military reach. although nato's political unity is
But when a group of countries wants to improving, more work must be done.
launch a joint intervention as a coalition— Nato allies overcame their early differences
which confers political legitimacy—only on Libya and forged a course of action
nato can provide the common command acceptable to all. Every ally contributed to
structure and capabilities necessary to plan the operation through nato's command
and execute complex operations. Multi structure, and no allies restricted the use
lateral coalitions built on an as-needed of their personnel assigned to nato
basis, by contrast, have no common doc command centers in places such as Möns,
trine for conducting military operations, Belgium; Naples, Italy; or Ramstein,
no common capabilities or command Germany. But although 14 member states
structure for quickly integrating national contributed directly to Operation Unified
forces into a cohesive campaign, and no Protector, an equal number did not. Many
standing mechanisms for debating and of the countries that did not participate
then deciding on an agreed course of lacked the resources to do so but still lent
action. Such ad hoc coalitions therefore their political support. Some countries,
almost always rely disproportionately such as Germany, however, decided not to
on a single nation to bear the brunt of participate even though they could have.
security burdens that ideally should be Berlin did not block nato's decision to
more equally shared. act in Libya and even assisted alliance
In Libya, nato coordinated the operations as a whole by increasing its
actions of 18 countries—14 member involvement in aerial surveillance in
states and four partners—under a unified Afghanistan. But it abstained from the
command. The United States certainly un Security Council vote authorizing
played a critical role, providing intelli the intervention and stayed out of the
gence, fueling, and targeting capabilities. military operation. And even though
But other states made similarly indis Poland assisted by selling precision
pensable contributions. France and the munitions to other nato countries, it,
United Kingdom flew over 40 percent too, refrained from participating directly.
of the sorties, together destroying more Some commentators, such as Anne
than a third of the overall targets. Italy Applebaum, have expressed fears that
provided aircraft for reconnaissance the absence of a substantial number of
missions and, along with Greece, access nato members from the mission in Libya
to a large number of air bases. Belgium, signaled a lack of solidarity or, worse, the
Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the emergence of a two-tiered alliance, in
United Arab Emirates deployed fighters which some members focus on humani
for combat operations, and Jordan, the tarian and peacekeeping missions and
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, others bear the burden of combat.
and Qatar helped enforce the no-fly Such a concern is misplaced—at least
zone. Many of these states, as well as for now. When nato's work is viewed
Bulgaria and Romania, also deployed through the context of the entire span of
naval assets to enforce the arms embargo. its missions, from that in Afghanistan to
[4] FOREIGN AFFAIRS ■ Volume 91 No. 2
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antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden,
it becomes clear that every member state
participates to the best of its abilities—
THE ST. MARY'S
including Germany and Poland, both
MASTER OF ARTS
of which are playing significant roles in
IN
Afghanistan and Kosovo. Yet although
the Libya operation showed that the allies' INTERNATIONAL
political commitment to nato is improv
ing, the allies must work to translate RELATIONS
this political will into reality by sharing
more equitably in the alliance's overall
defensive burden.
Bridge international borders
The intervention in Libya also through experiential learning
demonstrated that a politically cohesive and a cross-disciplinary,
nato can tackle increasingly complex, and hands-on curriculum.
increasingly global, security challenges.
Distance learning available in the
For its first 40 years, nato concentrated
security policy concentration
on defending the borders of its member
states. But after the Cold War, the alliance
expanded its focus beyond deterrence,
making it the partner of choice for inter
national security operations. This trend
STMAPyS
began with the Partnership for Peace in UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
the mid-1990s, a program of practical
cooperation and political dialogue with (210) 436-3101
nonmember states across Europe and
[email protected]Central Asia. And it has continued into www.shnarytx.edu/grad
the current century, with 50 nations San Antonio, Texas
placing their forces under nato's
command as part of the International
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
Nato again took the lead in Libya.
Some countries hesitated to place nato
in charge of a military action, fearing
that the alliance would not garner enough
support in the region, but it turned out
that Arab states preferred to work through
nato; several of them, such as Jordan,
Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates, A CATHOLIC AND MARIANIST LIBERAL ARTS INSTITUTION
had already participated in nato-led
More than 25 diverse master's, Ph.D
operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan,
and others had fostered closer relations and online master's programs available
in the Graduate School
with nato through the Mediterranean
[5]
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Ivo H. Daalder andJames G. Stavridis
Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation mobile targets common in contemporary
Initiative. These programs, launched in operations, plan joint operations in
1994 and 2004, respectively, expanded parallel with fast-paced political decisi
natos ability to partner with countries making, support the targeting process
in North Africa and the Middle East. with legal advice, and provide timely an
These partnerships with non-NATO reliable information on operational
members signify the increasing role of developments to the public. Nato has
the alliance beyond its borders. Such also neglected to cultivate essential too
cooperation may not have a decisive for military campaigns, such as intelligence
military impact; as in the Balkans and surveillance, reconnaissance, precision
Afghanistan, alliance members supplied targeting, and aerial refueling—despite
the bulk of the military capability in nearly two decades of experience that
Libya. (Nearly 90 percent of the non have demonstrated their value.
U.S. forces in Afghanistan, for example, Instead of investing in nato, many
come from countries in Europe.) But member states have depended on the
this kind of burden sharing is politically United States to compensate for these
essential to the overall effectiveness of deficiencies. In Libya, Washington
nato's operations. The participation of provided 75 percent of the intelligence,
Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, and the United surveillance, and reconnaissance data
Arab Emirates and their support for employed to protect Libyan civilians
Libyan opposition forces proved critical and enforce the arms embargo. It also
to the liberation of Tripoli, both by contributed 75 percent of the refueling
demonstrating Arab political support planes used throughout the mission—
and by providing additional military without which strike aircraft could not
capabilities. Regional participation also have lingered near potential targets in
helped allay potential friction within order to respond quickly to hostile forces
the alliance, reassuring many otherwise threatening to attack civilians. And U.S.
reluctant nato members of the mission's commanders in Europe had to quickly
legitimacy dispatch over 100 military personnel to the
nato targeting center at the outset of
IT GETS BETTER the intervention when it became clear that
However successful, natos intervention
other member states lacked the knowledge
in Libya suggested that the organization
and expertise to provide their aircraft
with the correct targeting information.
must strengthen its basic infrastructure
if it hopes to increase its role inThe
global
heavy reliance of alliance members
security. Nato's integrated command
on the United States during the conflict
structure and shared funding bind the the cost of a decade of Euro
highlighted
alliance together, but serious gapspean underinvestment
remain in in defense. On
its overall capabilities. Within average,
the com U.S. allies in Europe now spend
mand structure, for example, justthe1.6 percent of their gdps on their
alliance
has failed to devote the necessary resourc
militaries, and many spend less than one
percent; the
es to developing key skills, including theUnited States, in contrast,
capacity to find and engage the
spends
typesoverof
four percent of its gdp. The
[6] FOREIGN AFFAIRS ■ Volume 9i No. 2
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NATO's Victory in Libya
fact that Washington spends nearly three continue to succeed only if every member
times as much on defense as the other state chooses the latter course.
27 nato allies combined has opened a Should nato members rise to the
growing divide in the capabilities of the challenge, their investments will fund
member states. As former U.S. Secretary vital programs that can address some
of Defense Robert Gates warned in of the shortfalls of the Libya operation.
his valedictory policy address last June,One such program is the Alliance Ground
this imbalance threatens to create a Surveillance system, which is designed
two-tiered alliance that will ultimately to help locate mobile and concealed
prove unsustainable. ground forces and will thereby strengthen
Nato began to address these short nato's intelligence, surveillance, and
falls before the war in Libya began. At reconnaissance operations. Members
the Lisbon summit in November 2010,should also consider pooling their invest
for example, the alliance adopted a new ments in aerial refueling and precision
"strategic concept" to guide it for the guided weapons and sharing data on
next decade. In it, the allies committedtheir own national munitions stockpiles
in order to improve planning.
to deploying the "full range of capabilities
necessary to deter and defend against The allies must also remember that
any threat to the safety and security of the operation in Libya was relatively
small—about one-fifth the size of that
[its] populations." It also identified and
prioritized the ten capabilities that in Kosovo in terms of the number of
member states agreed were essential to military assets involved. If defense
the organization's strength not only in spending continues to decline, nato
today's operations (such as enhanced may not be able to replicate its success
methods to counter improvised explosive in Libya in another decade. Nato
devices and improvements in information members must therefore use the Chicago
sharing) but also in the future (such as summit to strengthen the alliance by
missile defense and joint intelligence, ensuring that the burden sharing that
surveillance, and reconnaissance—a key worked so well in Libya—and continues
deficiency in Libya). in Afghanistan today—becomes the
The alliance will now have to summon rule, not the exception.©
the political will to implement these
standards in a period of fiscal austerity.
Nato countries can continue to invest in
their military capabilities on their own—
which means investing inefficiently and
often insufficiently, while leaning on an
increasingly impatient United States to
make up the difference. Or member states
can invest through nato and other multi
national programs, saving money, pro
moting cooperation, sharing capabilities,
and demonstrating solidarity. Nato will
FOREIGN AFFAIRS · March/April2012
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