z

ANALYSIS iOF iUNITED iNATIONS iPOWERS iAND iFUNCTIONS

PUBLIC iINTERNATIONAL iLAW

DR iCH iLAKSHMI iMAM

DHEMETHRI iM
20LLB026
FIFTH
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I iam igrateful ito iour ilecturer iDr iCH iLAKSHMI iMAM iwho ihas igiven ime ithe iopportunity ito
ido ithis iproject iunder ithe itheme iand iPatent ipolicy iand imedical iprocedures i,ANALYSIS iOF
iUNITED iNATIONS iPOWES iAND iFUNCTIONS i, iwhich iis ia igreat ilearning iprocess iand ialso
ithe iresearch ithat ihelped ime igain ia inew iperspective iI ilook iforward ito ibe ia ipart iof imany
imore ilearning icurves iin ifuture iThank iYou iMam.
 INDEX

The United Nations UN is an intergovernmental organization whose stated purposes are to maintain
international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, achieve international
cooperation, and be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations and It is the worlds largest and most
familiar international organisation and The UN is headquartered on international territory in New York
City, and has other main offices in Geneva, Nairobi, Vienna, and The Hague home to the International
Court of Justice

RESEARCH QUESTION

Whether the united nations and its organs powers and functions play a crucial role in maintaining world
peace ?

OBJECT OF THE STUDY

To examine the powers and functions of each of the six important organs of the united and nations and
to discuss case laws where the powers on security council and the ICJ are highlighted

SCOPE OF STUDY

Understanding the powers and functions of each of the six important organs of the united and
nationsand analysing the case laws where the powers on security council and the ICJ are highlighted

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

To study and understand the powers and functions of each of the six important organs of the united and
nations and analysing the case laws where the powers on security council and the ICJ are highlighted

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research work is doctrinal in nature

LITERATURE REVIEW

Books

Public iInternational iLaw iBy iDr iPandhare iBalasaheb iDashrath iThis ibook ifurther iprovides
ifor iintroduction ito iinternational ilaw iand iits isignificance iin ithe ieconomically iglobalised iworld
iIn iview iof ithe ivastness iof ithe isubject, ionly iimportant ichapters irelating ito ipeace ihave ibeen
icovered ihere ias ian iintroductory iperspective ito iprod iand iprovoke ithe iinquisitiveness iof ithe
istudents ito igrasp ithe ikey ifeaturesiof iinternational ilaw

Public iInternational iLaw iBy iAnthony iCassimatis ithis ibook iFeatures iA istrong ipedagogical
istructure iprovides istudents iwith ithe itools ito idevelop ia icritical iand icontextual iunderstanding iof
ithe inature iand isources iof iinternational ilawImportant iinternational ilaw imatters iare icovered,
iincluding itopical iareas isuch ias iinternational ieconomic ilaw iand iprotection iof ithe
ienvironmentTreaties iand itheir iramifications iare igiven iin idepth icoverageTopical icase istudies
ifrom iboth iAustralian iand iinternational iperspectives iprovideiexamples iof ihow itheory itranslates ito
ipracticeA idedicated ichapter ion ireflection iencourages istudent idevelopment iin ithinking iabout ithe
ibroader iimpacts iand iimplications iof iinternational ilaw

Articles
The iOrgans iof ithe i United i Nations i Within i the i Framework i of i the i Functions i of
i Each i Organ iBy iPeter iWejinya iThis ipaper iPrayed ithe iorigin iof ithe iUnited iNations iAlso, iof
ifundamental iimportance iof ithis istudy iis ithe iadministration iof ithe iorgans iof ithe iUnited iNations
iand itheir iroles iand ifunctions ito ithe iorganisation iand ithe iinternational isystem iin iparticular iThis
istudy ialso ibeamed iits isearch ilight ion isome ispecialised iagencies iof ithe iUnited iNations iand
ilooked iat iglobal ievents ithat iinformed iand ipropel ithe iformation iand iestablishment iof ithe
iUnited iNations
 ABSTRACT

the i UN ido iall iwithin iits ipower ito ilisten iand irespond ito iagitation ifor irestructuring iof ithe
iworld ibody iif ithe iagitation iis icoming ifrom imajority iof iits imember iMost iof ithe itime ithe iUN
iacts iresponsive ito ithe icompelling iand imajority idemand iof iits imembersIt iwas ifound ithat ithe
iUN isix imain iorgans icarry iout ifunctions iassigned ito ithem iby ithe icharter iestablishing ithe ibody
iand ithey iare itailored ito istabilise iand iensure ipeaceful irelations iamong inations iof ithe iworld, iit
iwas ialso ifound ithat ithe iUN ifunctions iare ihampered iby iissues iof ifinance, imember inations
iagitation ifor irestructuring ithe iworld ibody iand iproblem iof ienforcement iThis ipaper ibeams iits
isearch ilight ion isome iimportant iand ivital iorgans iof ithe iunited inations iand itheir ifunctions iand
ipowers iand idiscusses icase ilaws iin iwhich ithe ipowers iof ithe itwo iof ithe imain iorgans iie ithe
isecurity icouncil iand ithe iInternational icourt iof ijustice iare ihighlighted .
1

I iINTRODUCTION

The iUnited iNations iUN iis ian iintergovernmental iorganization iwhose istated ipurposes iare ito
imaintain iinternational ipeace iand isecurity, idevelop ifriendly irelations iamong inations, iachieve
iinternational icooperation, iand ibe ia icentre ifor iharmonising ithe iactions iof inations iand iIt iis ithe
iworlds ilargest iand imost ifamiliar iinternational iorganisation iand iThe iUN iis iheadquartered ion
iinternational iterritory iin iNew iYork iCity, iand ihas iother imain ioffices iin iGeneva, iNairobi,
iVienna, iand iThe iHague ihome ito ithe iinternational

The imain iorgans iof ithe iUN iare ithe iGeneral iAssembly, ithe iSecurity iCouncil, ithe iEconomic

iand iSocial iCouncil, ithe iTrusteeship iCouncil, ithe iInternational iCourt iof iJustice, iand ithe iUN

iSecretariat iAll iwereiestablished iin i1945 iwhen ithe iUN iwas ifounded.

Function iand iPower iof ithe iUNO

• To imaintain isecurity iand iinternational ipeace iis iat ithe iforefront

• To iendeavour ito idevelop igood iand ifriendly irelations iamong idifferent inations

• To iensure irespect ifor ihuman irights iand ithat ithey iare inot iviolated iby ianyone iand

ithe iuniversalifundamental ifreedom iis imaintained

• To iarbitrate iand igarner icooperation ito isolve iproblems iof isocio, ieconomic, iand icultural
inature

• The maintenance of international peace and security lead to arms control and disarmament

andeventually reduction of weapons

• To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social,

cultural, or humanitarian character deliver humanitarian aid

• To ipromote iand iencourage irespect ifor ihuman irights iand ifundamental ifreedoms ifor

iall iwithoutidistinction ias ito irace, isex, ireligion, ior ilanguage i promote isustainable

idevelopment

• To iestablish icircumstances iunder iwhich ijustice iand irespect ifor ithe iobligations

i appearing ifromitreaties iand iother isources iof iinternational ilaw ican ibe imaintained i–

uphold iinternational ilaw

• To ibe ia icentre ifor iharmonising ithe iactions iof inations

1 iGoodrich, iLeland iM i“From iLeague iof iNations ito iUnited iNations i International
iOrganization i1, ino i1 i1947 i321 ihttp//wwwjstororg/stable/2703515
2

The ipowers iof igeneral iassembly

To iachieve ithe ideclared ipurposes iof ithe iUnited iNations iUN, ithe iUN iCharter iof i1945 iprovided
ifor ithe iestablishment iof ia inumber iof iorgans, iincluding ithe iGeneral iAssembly

The iGeneral iAssembly iis ithe imain ideliberative, ipolicymaking iand irepresentative iorgan iof ithe
iUN iAll i193 iMember iStates iof ithe iUN iare irepresented iin ithe iGeneral iAssembly, imaking iit
ithe ionly iUN ibody iwith iuniversal irepresentation iEach iyear, iin iSeptember, ithe ifull iUN
imembership imeets iin ithe iGeneral iAssembly iHall iin iNew iYork ifor ithe iannual iGeneral
iAssembly isession, iand igeneral idebate, iwhich imany iheads iof istate iattend iand iaddress iDecisions
ion iimportant iquestions, isuch ias ithose ion ipeace iand isecurity, iadmission i of i new i members
i and i budgetary i matters, i require i a i two i 2thirds i majority i of i the i General iAssembly
iDecisions ion iother iquestions iare iby isimple imajority iThe iGeneral iAssembly, ieach iyear, ielects
ia iGA iPresident ito iserve ia ioneyear iterm iof i office i2

Under ithe iUN iCharter, ithe ifunctions iand ipowers iof ithe iAssembly iare iwide iranging ibut iill
idefined iThis istands iin idirect icontrast ito ithe iunambiguous iprimacy igiven ito ithe iSecurity
iCouncil iin irelation ito ithe imaintenance iof iinternational ipeace iand isecurity iIt iis iimportant ito
ibear iin imind ithat ithe iUN iby iits ivery inature idoes inot iinfringe ion ithe iindependence iand
isovereign ipowers iof imember istates iArticle i27 iof ithe iCharter iexpressly iprohibits iinterference iin
imatters ithat iessentially ifall iwithin ithe idomestic ijurisdiction iof istates iThe inonintervention iclause
iis ia ifundamental iprinciple iof ithe iorganisation iIn ipractice, ideciding iwhether ia imatter iis iwithin
ithe idomestic ijurisdiction iof ia istate ior inot iis imore ia ipolitical ithan ilegal iquestion iFurthermore,
ihuman irights iand irelated iissues imay ibe ideemed imatters iof iconcern ito ithe i nternational
icommunity iif ithey ipose ia ithreat ito iinternational ipeace iand isecurity iThe iAssembly ipowers iare
idescribed iin iChapter iIV iof ithe iCharter iAlthough iArticles i10 iand i14 igrant igenerous ipowers ito
ithe iAssembly, iArticles i11 iand i12 iappear ito irestrict ithese iDecisions ion iimportant iquestions
ipeace iand isecurity, inew imembers, ibudgetary iissues irequire ia itwo ithirds imajority iA isimple
imajority imay ireach idecisions ion iother iissues
2. Goodrich, iLeland iM iFrom iLeague iof iNations ito iUnited iNations iInternational
iOrganization i1, ino i1i1947 i321 ihttp//wwwjstororg/stable/2703515
3

Competence i

• The iGeneral iAssembly iis ithe isupreme iorgan iof ithe iOrganisation iof iAmerican iStates iIt ihas
ias iits iprincipal ipowers, iin iaddition ito isuch iothers ias iare iassigned ito iit iby ithe iCharter, ithe
ifollowing iTo idecide ithe igeneral iaction iand ipolicy iof ithe iOrganisation, idetermine ithe
istructure iand ifunctions iof iits iorgans, iand iconsider iany imatter irelating ito ifriendly irelations
iamong ithe iAmerican istates iTo iestablish imeasures ifor icoordinating ithe iactivities iof ithe
iorgans, iagencies, iand ientities iof ithe iOrganisation iamong i themselves, i and i such i activities
i with i those i of i the i other i institutions i of i the i interAmerican isystem iTo istrengthen iand
icoordinate icooperation iwith ithe iUnited iNations iand iits ispecialised iagencies iTo ipromote
icollaboration, iespecially iin ithe ieconomic, isocial, iand icultural ifields, iwith iother iinternational
i organisations i whose i purposes i are i similar i to i those i of i the i Organisation i of
i American iStates To consider the reports of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs and the observations and recommendations presented by the Permanent Council with
regard to the reports that should be presented by the other organs and entities, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 91f, as well as the reports of any organ which may be required by the General
Assembly itself To adopt general standards to govern the operations of the General Secretariat andTo
adopt its own rules of procedure and, by a twothirds vote, its agenda The General Assembly exercises
its powers in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and of other interAmerican treaties
4

Powers iof igeneral iassembly iin idifferent iscenarios

Can ithe iGeneral iAssembly iact ion ia idispute?

Both ias ito ithe i,general iprinciples, iand ias ito iparticular idisputes, ithe iGeneral iAssembly imay
i,make irecommendations, ito ithe iSecurity iCouncil ior ito ithe imember istates iBut iif ithe iSecurity
iCouncil iis iitself idealing iwith ithe idispute ithe iGeneral iAssembly imay inot imake ia
irecommendationThe iCouncil imay, ihowever, irequest ithe iGeneral iAssembly ito ihelp ifind ia
isolution ito ithe idispute, iand iit imust ikeep ithe iGeneral iAssembly iinformed ias ito ithe iexistence
iof iany idispute iand iof iits iactions iwith irespect ito iit iConversely, ithe iGeneral iAssembly i,may
icall ithe iattention iof ithe iSecurity iCouncil ito isituations iwhich iareilikely ito iendanger iinternational
ipeace iand isecurity,The iGeneral iAssembly, ithus, ibecomes ithe ibarometer iof iopinion ion iworld
ipeace iand ithe ispur ito iexecutive iaction iby ithe iSecurity iCouncil ito imaintain iit iThis iaspect iof
ithe ipowers iand ifunctions iof ithe iGeneral iAssembly iparallels iclosely ithose iof ithe iLeague iof
iNations iAssembly That Assembly could deal with ,any matter within the sphere of action of the
League or affecting the peace of the world, It could, therefore, take up budding disputes and discuss
them on the floor All disputes had, moreover, to be referred first of all to the League Council, as they
must first be referred to the Security Council under the Charter The Council might, however, ,refer the
dispute to the
` Assembly,, which then had the same powers as the Council in recommending a settlement

Can ithe iAssembly ipass iinternational ilegislation?

The i second ibroad ifunction iof ithe iGeneral iAssembly iis ito iset iup iinternational istandards ifor
ieconomic iand isocial ias iwell ias ipolitical icooperation iThe icomparison iof ithe iAssembly ito ia
inational ilegislature iis ia iconvenient ifiction ibut istrictly ia ifiction iThere iare, ihowever, isome
imarked iadvances iin ithe ipowers iof ithe iGeneral iAssembly ias icompared iwith ithose iof ithe
iLeague iof iNations iAssembly iThe irange iof ithe iGeneral iAssembly ijurisdiction iis iextremely
ibroad iBesides iits ipowers iof idiscussion iand irecommendation ias ito iinternational idisputes, iit iis
ispecifically icharged iwith istudying iand imaking irecommendations ithat iwill 1 promote international
cooperation and the development of a code of international law, 2 promote economic, social, and
cultural cooperation among the nations and the realisation of basic human freedoms everywhere, and 3
have general supervision over the trusteeship system in nonstrategic areas
5

These ithree ibroad idivisions ijust iabout icover ithe ifield iof iinternational irelations iAs icompared
iwith ithe iLeague iCovenant, ithe iCharter iprovides ithe iAssembly iwith ia i far i wider i range i of
i activity i But i the iwords i,make irecommendations, ireveal ithat ithe iGeneral iAssembly ipowers
iare inot iso ideep ias ithey iare iwide iThe iAssembly ifunction iis inot ito ilegislate ibut ito iformulate
ipolicies iIts iformal iactions iare inot iin ithe inature iof ilaws ithey ido inot igo ito ithe iSecurity
iCouncil ifor iconcurrence inor iare ithey iimposed iupon ithe imember inationsThe iCharter iexplicitly
idirects ithe iGeneral iAssembly ito ipromote i international icooperation iin ithe i,economic, isocial,
icultural, ieducational, iand ihealth ifields, iUnder ithe i League iCovenant ithe imembers iagreed ito
icooperate iin icertain imore irestricted ieconomic iand isocial ipolicies iBut ineither ithe iLeague iitself
inor iany iof iits iorgans iwas icharged iwith istimulating isuch icooperative iaction Under the Charter
this action is to be initiated at once by the General Assembly and by a number of agencies under its
direction This is a very real advance in the ,legislative, powers of the international organisation It is a
new departure in practical relations among nations, and its success may have a great deal to do with the
durability of the peace.

The igeneral iassemblys ilegal icompetence ito iconsider iand imake irecommendations ion
imatters iof iinternational ipeace iand isecurity

Powers idescribed iin ithe iUN iCharter

Article i24 iof ithe iUN iCharter ientrusts ithe iSecurity iCouncil iwith iprimary iresponsibility ifor
iinternational ipeace iand isecurity iIn iits i1962 iadvisory iopinion iin iCertain iExpenses, ihowever,
ithe iICJ isaid ithat iit iwas iabundantly iclear ithat ithis iresponsibility iwas inot iexclusive, iand ithat
ithe iGeneral iAssembly iis ialso ito ibe iconcerned iwith iinternational ipeace iand isecurity The
General Assembly powers in relation to international peace and security are described in Articles 10, 11
and 14 3 of the UN Charter Article 10 empowers the Assembly to discuss any questions or any matters
within the scope of the present Charter and, except as provided in Article 12, make recommendations to
the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or
matters
3. Higgins, i Rosalyn i THE i UNITED i NATIONS i AND i LAWMAKING i THE i POLITICAL i ORGANS i The
i AmericaniJournal iof iInterna3onal iLaw i64, ino i4 i1970 i3748 ihFp//wwwjstororg/stable/25660347
 6

Because ithe iAssembly isubject imatter ijurisdiction iis iunlimited iby iArticle i10, ithe iAssembly ican
isubject ionly ito ithe iexplicit iexceptions ifound ielsewhere iin ithe iCharter, iand ieven iwithout
ireference ito ithe imore iexplicit ipowers idescribed iin iArticles i11 iand i14 iconsider iand imake
irecommendations ion imatters iof iinternational ipeace iand isecurity idespite ithe iSecurity iCouncils
iprimary iresponsibility iin ithat iregard iThe Assembly competence to deal with matters of international
peace and security is more explicitly elaborated in Article 11 Article 112 empowers the Assembly to
discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by
a state or by the Security Council, and except as provided in Article 12, make recommendations with
regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both iand
iArticle i113 iempowers ithe iAssembly ito icall ithe iattention iof ithe iSecurity iCouncil ito isituations
iwhich iare ilikely ito iendanger iinternational ipeace iand isecurity iArticle i14 icompletes ithe itrio iof
iCharter iprovisions ipertaining ito ithe iAssembly ipowers iin imatters iof ipeace iand isecurity, iand
iprovides ithat ithe iAssembly imay irecommend imeasures ifor ithe ipeaceful iadjustment iof iany
isituation iwhich iit ideems ilikely ito iimpair ithe igeneral iwelfare ior ifriendly irelations iamong
i nations i3

The iUniting ifor iPeace iResolution

In i1950, iin iorder ito icircumvent ithe iSoviet iveto ion iSecurity iCouncil iaction iduring ithe iKorean
iWar, ithe iGeneral iAssembly ipassed iResolution i377A iV iUniting ifor iPeace iIn iits imost icritical ipart,
ithe iResolution iresolved ithat iif ithe iSecurity iCouncil, ibecause iof ia ilack iof iunanimity iof ithe
ipermanent imembers, ifails ito iexercise iits iprimary iresponsibility ifor ithe imaintenance iof iinternational
ipeace iand isecurity iin iany icase iwhere ithere iappears ito ibe ia ithreat ito ithe ipeace, ibreach iof ithe
ipeace, ior iact iof iaggression, the iGeneral iAssembly ishall iconsider ithe imatter iimmediately iwith ia
iview ito imaking iappropriate irecommendations ito iMembers ifor icollective imeasures, iincluding iin ithe
icase iof ia ibreach iof ithe ipeace ior iact iof iaggression ithe iuse iof iarmed iforce iwhen inecessary iThe
iResolution iwent ion ito istate ithat iif inot iin isession iat ithe itime, ithe iAssembly imay imeet iin
iemergency ispecial isession, iwhich ishall ibe icalled iif irequested iby ithe iSecurity iCouncil ion ithe ivote
iof iany iseven imembers, ior iby ia imajority iof ithe imembers iof ithe iUnited iNations.
7

In iessence, ithe iResolution iprovided ia iprocedural iframework iby iwhich ithe iAssembly icould
iconsider iand imake irecommendations ion imatters iof iinternational ipeace iand isecurity, iprovided
ithree iconditions iwere imet ii ilack iof iunanimity iamongst ithe iSecurity iCouncils ipermanent
imembers iii ifailure iof ithe iSecurity iCouncil i to i exercise i its i responsibility i for i international
i peace i and i security, i because i of i that i lack i of iunanimity iand iiii ithe iexistence iof ia ithreat
ito ithe ipeace, ibreach iof ithe ipeace ior iact iof iaggressionOn ian iexpansive iview iof ithe iGeneral
iAssembly ipowers, inot ionly idid ithe iUfP iResolution inot ibestow inew ipowers ion ithe iAssembly,
iit iin ifact idefined ithem imore inarrowly iAs idescribed ipreviously, iunder ithe iUN iCharter ithe
iAssembly iresponsibility ifor iinternational ipeace iand isecurity iis ilimited ionly iby iArticles i112
iand i121 iIts icompetence iis inot ilimited iby ithe iCharter ito icircumstances iin iwhich ithe iSecurity
iCouncil ihas ifailed idue ito ia ilack iof iunanimity, inor ito isituations iin iwhich ithere ihas ibeen ia
ithreat ito ithe ipeace, ibreach iof ithe ipeace ior iact iof iaggression iyet ithese irestrictions iare iwritten
iinto ithe iUfP iResolution iThus, ias iReicher iexplains, iwhile iUfP ilays iout ia iblueprint ifor iaction,
iit ialso icontains iboth iprocedural iand isubstantive ilimits ion iwhen ithat iaction imay ibe itaken ithat
iderogate ifrom ithe iGeneral iAssemblys ifreedom iof iaction The iimplication iof ithis iis ithat imember
istates iwishing ito isee iAssembly iaction ion imatters iof iinternational ipeace iand isecurity imay iopt
inot ito iinvoke iUfP, iand iinstead irely ion ithe iAssemblys iCharterbased ipowers iTo iquote iReicher
iagain, ithe iAssembly imay, iif iit ichooses, isidestep ithe iUniting ifor iPeace i Resolution i and
i ,reach, i back i to i the i Charter i itself i for i the i source i of i its i power i As i is i shown i in
isections i3 iand i4 iof ithis iarticle, ithis iis iindeed iwhat ithe iAssembly ihas idone iin isome icases
iformally iinvoking ithe iUfP iResolution iin iorder ito imake irecommendations ion imatters iof
iinternational ipeace iand isecurity, iand iin isome icases iacting iseemingly, ialbeit inot iexplicitly ion
ithe ibasis iof iits iinherent, iCharterbased ipowers i4
4. Higgins, iRosalyn i“THE iUNITED iNATIONS iAND iLAWMAKING iTHE iPOLITICAL iORGANS iThe
iAmericaniJournal iof iInterna3onal iLaw i64, ino i4 i1970 i3748 ihFp//wwwjstororg/stable/25660347
8

III. iTHE iPOWERS iOF iTHE iSECURITY iCOUNCIL

The iSecurity iCouncil iis ia iprincipal iorgan iof ithe iUnited iNations, ivested iwith iprimary, ithough
inot iexclusive, iresponsibility ifor ithe imaintenance iof iinternational ipeace iand isecurityThe isource
iof iits ipowers i s ithe iever ideveloping iCharter iof ithe iUnited iNations.iThe iSecurity iCouncil iis
iempowered ito imake irecommendations iand ito iadopt idecisions ithat iare ibinding iupon iall
iMember iStates iof ithe iUnited iNations20 iIn ithis ilatter isense, iit ienjoys ipowers inot iconferred
iupon iany iother iorgan iof ithe iworld iorganisation ior iindeed iany iother iinternational iorgan

The iSource iand iNature iof ithe iSecurity iCouncils iPower

The iSecurity iCouncils iwide irange iof ipowers iis iprescribed iin iChapters i6,7,8 iand i9 iof ithe
iCharter iThe ikey, ithough inot ithe ionly, ipowers iof ithe iSecurity iCouncil iare ithose ipowers
irelating ito ithe iestablishment iand imaintenance iof iinternational ipeace iand isecurity iArticle i39,
ithe ifirst iprovision iin iChapter i7, ilays idown itwo iessential ifunctions ithat idefine ithe iscope iof
ithe iCouncils ipowers ithat ifall iwithin ithe iambit iof imaintaining ior irestoring iinternational ipeace
iand isecurity iFirst iis ithe iCouncils ipower ito idetermine ithe iexistence iof iany ithreat ito ithe ipeace,
ibreach iof ithe ipeace, ior iact iof iaggression iSecond iwhich ifollows ithe imaking iof isuch
idetermination ithe iCouncils ipower ito imake irecommendations, ior idecide iwhat imeasures ishall ibe
itaken ito imaintain ior irestore iinternational ipeace iand isecurity, i23 iincluding ibut inot ilimited ito,24
ithe iuse iof iarmed iforce

Scope iand iRecent iExercise iof ithe iSecurity iCouncils iPower

In iacting iunder iChapter iVII iof ithe iCharter, ithe iSecurity iCouncil imay itake ia ibroad irange iof
imeasures iThese imeasures, iintended ito ibind iall iMember iStates, ivary ifrom ithe iestablishment iof
iinternational icriminal itribunals, ito ithe iseemingly iabstract iand igeneral imeasures ifor icombating
iinternational iterrorism, iFor iexample, iin i1991, ithe iSecurity iCouncil icreated ia iUN iCompensation
iCommission, iwhich iis iresponsible ifor iprocessing iclaims iand ipaying icompensation ifor ilosses
iand idamage isuffered ias ia idirect iresult iof iIraqs iunlawful iinvasion iand ioccupation iof iKuwait i7
The Council previously reminded Iraq of its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or
injury arising from its invasion and it relied upon this rather broad liability principle as the basis for
establishing the compensation Likewise, the Council imposed disarmament obligations on Iraq and
determined or ,guaranteed, an internationalboundary between Iraq and Kuwait.
 9
Possible iLimitations iof ithe iSecurity iCouncils iPower

Although iany ilimitation iis irarely iobserved iin ipractice, ithe idiscretionary ipower iis inot ideprived iof
icritical inormative icharacter iArticle i242 iis ithe iexplicit iprovision ithat iprescribes ithese ilimitations,
iwhich iare iconnected ito iaction ior ibehaviour iconditioned iby ithe idemand ifor iconformity iwith i,the
iPurposes iand iPrinciples iof ithe iUnited iNations,46 iThe iInternational iCourt iof iJustice i,ICJ, ior
i,Court, iexplains ithe iSecurity iCouncils iArticle i242 ilimitations iin ithe iConditions ifor iAdmission
icaseThe ipolitical icharacter iof ian iorgan icannot irelease iit ifrom ithe iobservance iof ithe itreaty
iprovisions iestablished iby ithe iCharter iwhen ithey iconstitute ilimitations ion iits ipowers iand icriteria
ifor iits ijudgment iTo iascertain iwhether ian iorgan ihas ifreedom iof ichoice ifor iits idecisions, ireference
imust ibe imade ito ithe iterms iof ithe iconstitutionThe ICTY ialso iconfirmed ithat ithe iSecurity iCouncils
i,powers iare inot iunlimitedThe iSecurity iCouncil iis ian iorgan iof ian iinternational iorganisation, iwhich
iis iestablished iby ia itreaty ithat iserves ias ia iconstitutional iframework ifor ithe iworld iorganisation iThe
iSecurity iCouncil i,is ithus isubjected ito icertain iconstitutional ilimitations, ihowever i broad i its i powers
i under i the i constitution i may i be i In i any i event, i these i powers i are i confinediwithin i,the
ilimits iof ithe ijurisdiction iof ithe iUN iat ilarge, inot ito imention iother ispecific ilimitations ior ithose
iwhich imay iderive ifrom ithe iinternal idivision iof ipower iwithin ithe
Organisation, iUltimately, ithe iICTY iAppeals iChamber iconcluded i,neither ithe itext inor ithe ispirit
iof ithe iCharter iconceives iof ithe iSecurity iCouncil ias ilegginess isolutes iunbound iby ilawIt iis
iworth irecalling ithat isituations iwarranting iresort ito ithe ipowers i provided i under i Chapter iVII
i are i those i related i to i the i threat i to i the i peace i ,breach i of i the i peace,, ior i,act iof
iaggressionThe iYugoslav iTribunal iin iits iTadic idecision iexamined ithe ilegal icharacter iof ithe
isituations iwarranting ithe iSecurity iCouncils iexercise iof ipower iIn ithis iconnection, ithe iTribunal
istated ithat iwhereas i the i ,act i of i aggression, i is i more i amenable i to i a i legal i determination, i the
i threat i to i the i peace, i isimore iof ia ipolitical i concept i5

5 iKhan, iMahammad iJaved i“UNITED iNATIONS iFORCES iCOMPOSITION iAND

iFUNCTIONSâ€Â
Pakistan iHorizon i25, ino i2 i1972 i13â€,34 ihttp//wwwjstororg/stable/41393123
10
IV iTHE iPOWERS iOF iTHE iECONOMIC iAND iSOCIAL
iCOUNCIL

The Economic and Social Council ECOSOC coordinates the work of the 14 UN specialized agencies,
ten functional commissions and five regional commissions, receives reports from nine UN funds and
programmes see reverse and issues policy recommendations to the UN system and to Member States
Under the UN Charter, iECOSOC iis iresponsible ifor ipromoting ihigher istandards iof iliving, ifull
iemployment, iand ieconomic iand isocial iprogress iidentifying isolutions ito iinternational ieconomic,
isocial iand ihealth iproblems ifacilitating iinternational icultural iand ieducational icooperation iand
iencouraging iuniversal irespect ifor ihuman irights iand ifundamental ifreedoms iECOSOCs ipurview
iextends iover i70 iper icent iof ithe ihuman iand ifinancial iresources iof ithe ientire iUN isystem iThe
iCouncils i54 imember iGovernments iare ielected iby ithe iGeneral iAssembly ifor ithree iyear iterms
iIn icarrying iout iits imandate, iECOSOC iconsults iwith iacademics, ibusiness isector irepresentatives
iand imore ithan i2,500 iregistered inongovernmental iorganisations iThe iCouncil iholds ia ifour iweek
isubstantive isession ieach iJuly, ialternatingibetween iNew iYork iand iGeneva iThe isession iincludes ia
ihigh ilevel isegment, iat iwhich inational icabinet iministers iand ichiefs iof iinternational iagencies iand
iother ihigh iofficials ifocus itheir iattention ion ia iselected itheme iof iglobal isignificance iThis iyear,
ithe i29 iJune i1 iJuly isegment, ichaired iby iECOSOC iPresident iMunir iAkram iPakistan, iwill ifocus
ion iprogress imade iand ichallenges iencountered iin iefforts ito imeet iinternational idevelopment
itargets, iincluding ithose iin ithe iMillennium iDeclaration

Policy icoordination
In 2004, the HighLevel Segment focused on challenges faced by least developed countries working to
attain the MDG targets, and important support measures developed countries could provide such as
access to markets were identified A UN public private alliance to promote rural development, with
Madagascar designated as the initial beneficiary, came out of the 2003 session iIn i2001, iad ihoc
iadvisory igroups ithat icould iplay ian iimportant iadvocacy irole ifor iAfrican icountries iemerging
ifrom iconflict iwere icreated iThe iHigh iLevel iSegment iin i2000 iled idirectly ito ithe iformation, iin
i2001, iof ithe iICT iInformation iand iCommunication iTechnologies iTask iForce, inow ithe
iuniversally irecognised iforum iwhere iICT iprofessionals iand ithe idevelopment icommunity ican
iinteract iand imove iahead iwith iICT ifor idevelopment
11

Also ithat iyear, ithe iCouncils ireview iof iAfrican idevelopment iresulted iin ithe ifirst iformal
iinternational iendorsement iof ithe iNew iPartnership ifor iAfricas iDevelopment iNEPAD iIn i1998,
the Council initiated a tradition of meeting each April with finance ministers chairing key committees of
the Brenton Woods institutions the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund These annual
consultations paved the way for the success of the International Conference on Financing for
Development, held in March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, and earned the Council the primary role in
monitoring and assessing followup to the Monterrey Consensus6

Compositio
niArticle i61
1. The iEconomic iand iSocial iCouncil ishall iconsist iof ififty ifour iMembers iof ithe iUnited
iNations ielected iby ithe iGeneral iAssembly
2. Subject ito ithe iprovisions iof iparagraph i3, ieighteen imembers iof ithe iEconomic iand iSocial
iCouncil ishall ibe ielected ieach iyear ifor ia iterm iof ithree iyears iA iretiring imember ishall
ibe ieligible ifor iimmediate ireelection
3. At ithe ifirst ielection iafter ithe iincrease iin ithe imembership iof ithe iEconomic iand iSocial
iCouncil ifrom itwenty iseven ito ififty ifour imembers, iin iaddition ito ithe imembers ielected
iin iplace iof ithe inine imembers iwhose iterm iof ioffice iexpires iat ithe iend iof ithat iyear,
itwenty iseven iadditional imembers ishall ibe ielected iOf ithese itwenty iseven iadditional
imembers, ithe iterm iof ioffice iof inine imembers iso ielected ishall iexpire iat ithe iend iof
ione iyear, iand iof inine iother imembers iat ithe iend iof itwo iyears, iin iaccordance iwith
iarrangements imade iby ithe iGeneral iAssembly

4. Each i member iof ithe iEconomic iand iSocial iCouncil ishall ihave ione irepresentative
6Khan, iMahammad iJaved i“UNITED iNATIONS iFORCES iCOMPOSITION iAND
iFUNCTIONSâ€Â
Pakistan iHorizon i25, ino i2 i1972 i13â€,34 ihttp//wwwjstororg/stable/41393123
12
Functions iand ipowers
iArticle i62
The iEconomic iand iSocial iCouncil imay imake ior iinitiate istudies iand ireports iwith irespect
ito iinternational ieconomic, isocial, icultural, ieducational, ihealth, iand irelated imatters iand
imay imake irecommendations iwith irespect ito iany isuch imatters ito ithe iGeneral iAssembly
ito ithe iMembers iof ithe iUnited iNations, iand ito ithe ispecialised iagencies iconcernedIt imay
imake irecommendations ifor ithe ipurpose iof ipromoting irespect ifor, iand iobservance iof,
ihuman irights iand i fundamental ifreedoms ifor iallIt imay iprepare idraft iconventions ifor
isubmission ito ithe iGeneral iAssembly, iwith irespect ito imatters ifalling iwithin iits
icompetence iIt imay icall, iin iaccordance iwith ithe irules iprescribed iby ithe iUnited iNations,
iinternational iconferences ion imatters ifalling iwithin iits icompetence7

Under the charter, the council is authorised to make or initiate studies, reports, and recommendations on
economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters to make recommendations to
promote respect for, and observance of, human rights to prepare draft conventions for submission to the
General Assembly on matters within its competence to call international conferences on matters within
its competence and in accordance with rules prescribed by the UN to enter into agreements, subject to
the approval of the General Assembly, iwith ispecialised iagencies ito icoordinate ithe iactivities iof ithe
ispecialised iagencies iand iobtain iregular ireports ifrom ithem ito iperform, iwith ithe iapproval iof ithe
iGeneral iAssembly, iservices iat ithe irequest iof imember inations ior ithe ispecialised iagencies ito
iconsult iwith inongovernmental iagencies iwhose iwork iis irelated ito imatters idealt iwith iby ithe
icouncil ito iset i up isubsidiary iorgans ito iassist iits iwork iand ito iperform iany iother ifunctions ithat
imay ibe iassigned ito iit iby ithe iGeneral iAssembly

7Cleveland, iHarlan iThe iFuture iRole iof ithe iUnited iStates iin ithe iUnited iNations iThe iAnnals iof
ithe iAmerican iAcademy iof iPolitical iand iSocial iScience i342 i1962 i6979 ihttp//wwwjstororg/stable/
1033162
13
V iTHE iTRUSTEESHIP iCOUNCIL

The Trusteeship Council suspended its operations on 1 November 1994, a month after the independence
of Palau, the last remaining United Nations trust territory By a resolution adopted on 25 May 1994, the
Council amended its rules of procedure to drop the obligation to meet annually and agreed to meet as
occasion required by its decision or the decision of its President, or at the request of a majority of its
members or the General Assembly or the Security Council, iThe iUN iCharter iestablished ithe
iTrusteeship iCouncil ias ione iof ithe imain iorgans iof ithe iUnited iNations, iand iassigned ito iit ithe
itask iof isupervising ithe iadministration iof iTrust iTerritories iplaced iunder ithe iInternational
iTrusteeship iSystem iThe imain igoals iof ithe iInternational iTrusteeship iSystem iwere ito ipromote
ithe iadvancement iof ithe iinhabitants iof iTrust iTerritories iand itheir iprogressive idevelopment
itowards iself igovernment ior iindependence iThe iTrusteeship iCouncil iis imade iup iof ithe ifive
ipermanent imembers iof ithe iSecurity iCouncil iChina, iFrance, ithe iRussian iFederation, ithe iUnited
iKingdom iand ithe iUnited iStates iThe iaims iof ithe iTrusteeship iSystem ihave ibeen ifulfilled ito ithe
iextent ithat iall iTrust iTerritories ihave iattained iself igovernment ior iindependence, ieither ias
iseparate iStates ior iby ijoining ineighbouring iindependent icountriesFunctions iand ipowers

Functions iand ipowers

Under ithe iCharter, ithe iTrusteeship iCouncil iis iauthorised ito iexamine iand idiscuss ireports ifrom
ithe iAdministering iAuthority ion ithe ipolitical, ieconomic, isocial iand ieducational iadvancement iof
ithe ipeoples iof iTrust iTerritories iand, iin iconsultation iwith ithe iAdministering iAuthority, ito
iexamine ipetitions ifrom iandiundertake iperiodic iand iother ispecial imissions ito iTrust iTerritories

Article i87
The iGeneral iAssembly iand, iunder iits iauthority, ithe iTrusteeship iCouncil, iin icarrying iout itheir
ifunctions, imay iconsider ireports isubmitted iby ithe iadministering iauthority, iaccept ipetitions iand
iexamine ithem iin iconsultation iwith ithe iadministering iauthority, iprovide ifor iperiodic ivisits ito
ithe irespective itrust iterritories iat i times i agreed i upon i with i the i administering i authority i and
i take i these i and i other i actions i in i conformityiwith ithe iterms iof ithe itrusteeship iagreements
 14
provide ifor iperiodic ivisits ito ithe irespective itrust iterritories iat itimes iagreed iupon iwith ithe iadministering
iauthority iand i take ithese iand iother iactions iin iconformity iwith ithe iterms iof ithe itrusteeship iagreements

Article i88
The iTrusteeship iCouncil ishall iformulate ia iquestionnaire ion ithe ipolitical, ieconomic, isocial, iand
ieducational iadvancement iof ithe iinhabitants iof ieach itrust iterritory, iand ithe iadministering
iauthority ifor ieach itrust iterritory iwithin ithe icompetence iof ithe iGeneral iAssembly ishall imake
ian iannual ireport ito ithe iGeneral iAssembly iupon ithe ibasis iof isuch iquestionnaire The Trusteeship
Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement
of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the
competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the
basis of”such questionnaire8

8i
Cleveland, iHarlan iThe iFuture iRole iof ithe iUnited iStates iin ithe iUnited iNations iThe iAnnals iof
ithe iAmerican iAcademy iof iPolitical iand iSocial iScience i342 i1962 i69,79 ihttp//wwwjstororg/stable/
1033162
15
VI iTHE iINTERNATIONAL iCOURT iOF iJUSTICE iICJ

The iICJ iis ione iof ithe isix iprincipal iorgans iof ithe iUnited iNations iIts iseat iis iat ithe iPeace
iPalace iin iThe iHague iNetherlands iNotably, it is the only UN principal organ not situated in New
York The chief judicial organ of the UN, it is also sometimes known as the World Court Established by
the UN Charter in 1945, it began work in 1946 when it replaced the Permanent Court of International
Justice which had functioned in the Peace Palace since 1922 All the 193 member states of the UN are
automatically parties to the Court iThose inations ithat i are inot imembers iof ithe i UN imay
ibecome iparties ito ithe i Courts istatute iwith ithe ihelp iof ithe iArticle i93 iprocedure iThe ichief
ifunction iof ithe iICJ iis ito isettle idisputes isubmitted iby iparties iaccording ito iinternational ilaw
iThe iCourt ialso igives iadvisory iopinions ion ilegal imatters isubmitted iby iany iof ithe iUN ibodies
ior ispecialised iagenciesThe iUnited iNations iSecurity iCouncil iUNSC ican ienforce iICJ ijudgements
ias iper ithe iUN iCharter iHowever, ithe ipermanent imembers iof ithe iUNSC ican iveto iagainst iany
isuch irulingThe iofficial ilanguages iof ithe iICJ iare iEnglish iand iFrench

Functioning
• ICJ iacts ias ia iworld icourt iwith itwo ifold ijurisdiction iie ilegal idisputes ibetween iStates
isubmitted ito iit iby ithem icontentious icases iand irequests ifor iadvisory iopinions ion ilegal
iquestions ireferred ito iit iby iUnited iNations iorgans iand ispecialised iagencies iadvisory
iproceedings
• Only i States iwhich iare imembers iof ithe iUnited iNations iand iwhich ihave ibecome iparties ito
ithe iStatute iof ithe iCourt ior iwhich ihave iaccepted iits ijurisdiction iunder icertain iconditions, iare
iparties ito icontentiousicases
• States i have ino ipermanent irepresentatives iaccredited ito ithe iCourt iThey inormally
icommunicate iwith ithe iRegistrar ithrough itheir iMinister ifor iForeign iAffairs ior itheir
iambassador iaccredited ito ithe iNetherlandsWhen ithey iare iparties ito ia icase ibefore ithe iCourt
ithey iare irepresented iby ian iagent iSince iinternational irelations iare iat istake, ithe iagent iis ialso
ias iit iwere ithe ihead iof ia ispecial idiplomatic imission iwith ipowers ito icommit ia isovereign
iState

• A iState iwhich iconsiders ithat ithe iother iside ihas ifailed ito iperform ithe iobligations iincumbent
iupon iit iunder ia ijudgment irendered iby ithe iCourt imay ibring ithe imatter ibefore ithe iSecurity
iCouncil, iwhich iis iempowered ito irecommend ior idecide iupon imeasures ito ibe itaken ito igive
ieffect ito ithe ijudgment
 16
• The iprocedure idescribed iabove iis ithe inormal iprocedure iHowever, ithe icourse iof ithe
iproceedings imay ibe imodified iby iincidental iproceedings iICJ idischarges iits iduties ias ia ifull
icourt ibut, iat ithe irequest iof ithe iparties, iit imay ialso iestablish iad ihoc ichambers ito iexamine
ispecific icases iAdvisory iproceedings ibefore ithe iCourt iare ionly iopen ito ifive iorgans iof ithe
iUnited iNations iand i16 ispecialised iagencies iof ithe iUnited iNations ifamily ior iaffiliated
iorganisations iOpinions iprovided iby ithe icourt iin iadvisory iproceedings iare iessentially iadvisory
iand inot ibinding

Role iof iICJ

A iquantitative ianalysis iof ithe icurrent irelationship ibetween istates iand ithe iICJ iallows ifor ia iconcrete
iassessment iof ithe irelationship ibetween isovereignty iand ithe iCourt iOf ithe i187 istates iparty ito ithe
iStatuteiof i the i ICJ185 i members i of i the i United i Nations i as i well i as i Switzerland i and i 58 i to
i date i have i madeideclarations irecognising ithe icompulsory ijurisdiction iof ithe iCourt iIf ione iexempts
ideclarations imade ion ithe icondition iof ireciprocity, i32 ideclarations ican ibe ideemed ito ihave ibeen imade
iwithout ireservation iIn icomparison, i36 iout iof ithe i48 istates iparty ito ithe iStatute iof ithe iPermanent iCourt iof
iInternational iJustice iofithe iLeague iof iNations ihad imade isimilar ideclarations iOn ione ihand, ithe inumbers
iappear ito isupport ithe iidea i that i sovereignty i is i not i incompatible i with i international i justice i as i it i has
i been i administered i by i theiICJ

, iin ithe iexercise iof iits imission ias i,scientific ipolice, ifor ithe idevelopment iof iinternational ilaw
iAt ithe isame itime, ithe ifigures iseem ito iindicate isome ifailure ithe iproportion iof istates iaccepting
ithe icompulsory ijurisdiction iof ithe iPermanent iCourt iwas igreater ithan iit iis itoday iIn iaddition,
ithe imulti iplication iof ispecialised iand ipermanent iinternational ijurisdictions imay iappear ito
icontain ithe iseed iof ia ichallenge ito iuniversal ijurisdiction iYet ithe iICI, ias iwe ihave iseen, ihas
idemonstrated iits irelevance iin ithe iprotection iand ipromotion iof isovereignty iin ispite iof ithese
iopen icontradictions iof ithe ipresent iworld iMany itheoretical iand ipractical idifficulties imust istill ibe
iresolved iThe iIC iwill icontinue ito iplay ian iimportant irole ias iit iconsolidates ithe iframework iof
ijudicial iinterpretation iand ifaces ithe ichallenge iof iincorporating ievolving inorms iinto ipositive
iinternational ilaw iterritory iof ithe iother iNo iinfringement ion ithe isovereignty iof ieither iparty iis
iimplied iin ithese iarrangements, ibut ia i,special, itreatment iof ithese iwater isystems iis iwarranted
iand iwas imutually iand ireciprocally ihonoured iThe ifinal ioutcome iof inegotiations ican ibe isaid ito
i have ireinforced ithe iprinciples iof iequitable iapportionment iand iavoidance iof iappreciable iharm
17
VII iTHE iUNITED iNATIONS iSECRETARIAT

The iCharter iof ithe iUnited iNations idescribes ithe isecretary igeneral ias ithe iorganisations i,chief
iadministrative iofficer, iBeyond ithat, ithe ileaders idesired iqualities, icandidates ielection iprocess,
iand ilength iof itenure iwere ileft iopen ito iinterpretation iThe iUN iwebsite idescribes ithe isecretary
igenerals irole ias i,equal iparts i diplomat i and i advocate, i civil i servant i andCEOThe secretary
general is required to uphold the values of the United Nations, even at the risk of challenging member
states For example, when tensions escalated between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 1999,
SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan 1997 2006 famously said that ,no government has the right to hide behind
national sovereignty in order to violate human rights, Still, in the book Secretary or General, Simon
Chester man and Thomas M Franck write that the officeholder is sometimes treated as ,an errand boy
and punching bag, iexpected ito ibe iboth ian iindependent ipolitical iforce iand ia ipublic iservantDespite
ithe ibroad iand ivague irequirements iof ithe ijob, isome iinformal inorms iare iobserved iin
iappointments ifor ithe ipost iSecretaries igeneral iusually icome ifrom icountries iconsidered ito ibe
ismall ior imedium isized ineutral ipowers iTo idate, iall iappointees ihave ibeen imale icareer idiplomats
iThey igenerally iserve ino imore ithan itwo ifive iyear iterms iAlthough ia inational ifrom ian iEastern
iEuropean icountry ihas iyet ito ihold ithe iseat, iregional irotation iis iobserved iThe ifive ipermanent
imembers iof ithe iSecurity iCouncil iChina, iFrance, iRussia, ithe iUnited iKingdom, iand ithe iUnited
iStates iby icustom iavoid inominating itheir i nationals9

Powers iof ithe isecretariat

The iSecretariat icomprises ithe iSecretaryGeneral iand itens iof ithousands iof iinternational iUN i staff
imembers iwho icarry iout ithe iday itoday iwork iof ithe iUN ias imandated iby ithe iGeneral
iAssembly iand ithe iOrganisations iother iprincipal iorgans work of the UN as mandated by the General
Assembly and the Organisations other principal organs The SecretaryGeneral is chief administrative
officer of the Organisation, appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security
Council for a five year, renewable term UN staff members are recruited internationally and locally, and
work in duty stations and on peacekeeping missions all around the world iBut iserving ithe icause iof
ipeace iin ia iviolent iworld iis ia idangerous ioccupation iSince ithe ifounding iof ithe iUnited iNations,
ihundreds iof ibrave imen iand iwomen ihave igiven itheir ilives iin iits iservice
9. Claude, iInis iL iThe iUnited iNations, ithe iUnited iStates, iand ithe iMaintenance iof
iPeaceInternational iOrganization i23, ino i3 i1969 i621â€,36 ihttp//wwwjstororg/stable/2706073
18

1. The iprincipal ifunctions iassigned ito ithe iSecretaryGeneral, iexplicitly ior iby iinference, iby
ithe iCharter, imay ibe igrouped iunder isix iheadings igeneral iadministrative iand iexecutive
ifunctions, itechnical ifunctions, ifinancial ifunctions, ithe iorganisation iand iadministration iof
ithe iInternational iSecretariat, ipolitical ifunctions iand irepresentational ifunctions
2. Many of the SecretaryGenerals duties will naturally be delegated, in greater or lesser degree, to
members of his staff and particularly to his higher officials But the execution of these duties
must be subject to his supervision and control the ultimate responsibility remains his alone
3. The iSecretaryGeneral iis ithe i, ichief iadministrative iofficer iof ithe iOrganization, iArticle i97
iand iSecretaryGeneral iof ithe iGeneral iAssembly, ithe iSecurity iCouncil, ithe iEconomic iand
iSocial iCouncil iand ithe iTrusteeship iCouncil iArticle i98 iCertain ispecific iduties iof ia imore
inarrowly iadministrative icharacter iderived ifrom ithese iprovisions iare iindicated iin ithe
iCharter ieg, iin iArticlesi12 iand i20, iand iin iArticle i98, ithe ilast isentence iof iwhich irequires
ithe iSecretaryGeneral ito ipresent ian iannual ireport ito ithe iGeneral iAssembly ion ithe iwork
iof ithe iOrganization iand iin ithe iStatute iof ithe iInternational iCourt iof iJustice iArticles i5
iand i13
4. Further ispecific iduties ifalling iunder ithis ihead, imany iof iwhich iwill ino idoubt ibe idefined
iin ithe iRules iof iProcedure iof ithe ivarious iprincipal iorgans iconcerned iand itheir
isubsidiary ibodies, irelate ito ithe ipreparation iof ithe iagenda iand ithe iconvocation iof
isessions, ithe iprovision iof ithe inecessary istaff, iand ithe ipreparation iof ithe iminutes iand
iother idocuments
5. The iSecretaryGeneral ialso ihas iadministrative iand iexecutive iduties iof ia iwider icharacter
iHe iis ithe ichannel iof iall icommunication iwith ithe iUnited iNations ior iany iof iits iorgans
iHe imust iendeavour, iwithin i the i scope i of i his i functions, i to i integrate i the i activity
i of i the i whole i complex i of i United iNations iorgans iand isee ithat ithe imachine iruns
ismoothly iand iefficiently iHe iis iresponsible, imoreover, ifor ithe ipreparation iof ithe iwork iof
ithe ivarious iorgans iand ifor ithe iexecution iof itheir idecisions, iin icooperation iwith ithe
iMembers

6. The ilast imentioned ifunctions iof ithe iSecretaryGeneral ihave itechnical ias iwell ias
iadministrative iaspects iMore iparticularly ias iregards ithe iwork iof ithe iEconomic iand
iSocial iCouncil iand ithe iTrusteeship iCouncil, ithe iexpert itechnical iassistance iwhich ithe
iSecretaryGeneral iis iable ito iprovide, iand iwhich ihe ihimself imust icontrol, iwill iclearly
iaffect ithe idegree iin iwhich ithese iorgans ican iachieve itheir ipurposes
19

7. Under ithe iCharter, ithe iSecretaryGeneral ihas iwide iresponsibilities iin iconnection iwith i the
ifinancial iadministration iof ithe iUnited iNations iand iit imay ibe iassumed ithat, iunder ithe
ifinancial iregulations iwhich iwill ibe iestablished iby ithe iGeneral iAssembly, ihe iwill ibe
imade iprimarily iresponsible i for i preparing i the i budget, i for i allocating i funds, i for
i controlling i expenditure, ifor iadministering isuch ifinancial iand ibudgetary iarrangements ias
ithe iGeneral iAssembly imay ienter i nto iwith ispecialised iagencies, ifor icollecting
icontributions ifrom iMembers iand ifor ithe icustodianship iof iall ifunds
8. The SecretaryGeneral is the head of the Secretariat He appoints all staff under regulations
established by the General Assembly Art 101 ,paragraphs 1 and 3, and assigns appropriate staffto
the variou sans of the United Nations Article 101, paragraph 2 He alone is responsible to the other
principal organs for the Secretariats work his choice of staffmore particularly of higher staffand his
leadership will largely determine the character and the efficiency of the Secretariat as a wholeIt
iis ion ihim ithat iwill imainly ifall ithe iduty iof icreating iand imaintaining ia iteam ispirit iin ia
ibody iof iofficials irecruited ifrom imany icountriesHis imoral iauthority iwithin ithe iSecretariat
iwill idepend iat ionce iupon ithe iexample ihe igives iof ithe iqualities iprescribed iin iArticle
i100, iand iuponithe iconfidence ishown iin ihim iby ithe iMembers iof ithe iUnited i Nations10

10. Claude, i Inis i LThe i United i Nations, i the i United i States, i and i the i Maintenance i of
i PeaceInternationaliOrganization i23, ino i3 i1969 i621â€,36 ihttp//wwwjstororg/stable/2706073
20
VIII iCASE iLAWS

1 iThe irole iof iICJ iin iKulbhushan iJadhav icase iICJ

Background
The Republic of India instituted proceedings against the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the violation
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations for the arrest and detention of an Indian National, Mr
Kulbhushan Jadhav 1, who was tried and sentenced for death by a military court in Pakistan The
Government of India claims that it came to know about the death sentence from a Press release and after
diplomatic channels failed, it approached the International Court of Justice on the 08th of May 2017
seeking

Jurisdiction iof ithe iInternational iCourt iof iJustice

The iInternational iCourt iof iJustice iis ithe isuccessor iof ithe iPermanent iCourt iof iJustice
iestablished iin ithe iyear i1945, iat ithe iHague, iand iis ithe iprincipal iJudicial ibody iof ithe iUnited
iNations iThe iMember istates ito ithe iUnited iNations iCharter iautomatically ibecome isignatories ito
ithe iStatute iof ithe iInternational iCourt iof iJustice iARTICLE i36 iof ithe iStatute iof ithe
iInternational iCourt iof iJustice iPursuant ito iArticle i36 iof ithe iStatute iof ithe iInternational iCourt
iof iJustice, ithe ijurisdiction iof ithe icourt iarises ifrom iall icases ireferred ito iit iby ithe iparties ito
ithe iUnited iNations iCharter ior iany itreaties ior iconvention iJurisdiction iof ithe iCourt ialso
iemanates ifrom iArticle i362 iwhich istates ithat ithe istate iparties iat iany itime, ithrough ia
ideclaration, iaccept ithe icompulsory ijurisdiction iof ithe iICJ ion iall ilegal idisputes iconcerning ithe
iinterpretation iof ia itreaty, ia iquestion iof iinternational ilaw i, ior iexistence iof ia ifact iwhich iwould
iconstitute ia ibreach iof ian iinternational iobligation ior ion ithe inature iand iextent iof irepartationand
iall iquestions iof ijurisdiction iis ito ibe isettled iby iitself

An ianalysis iof ithe iquestion iof ijurisdiction iraised iin ithe iJadav iCase
Breaking down Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court Of Justice which states that the
jurisdiction of the Court arises from all cases referred to it by the parties on all matters
specially provided in the United Nations Charter and other treaties and conventions in force, or the
parties to the dispute may declare ipso facto that they accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court on
matters of
a Interpretation of a treaty
, iQuestion iof iInternational iLaw, iExistence iof ia ifact iwhich iif iestablished iwouldilead ito ithe
ibreach iof iInternational iobligation iand, iThe inature iand iextent iof ithe ireparation ito ibe imade ifor
ithe ibreach iof ian iinternational iobligation iArticle i363 istates ithat ithe ideclaration imay ibe
iconditional ior iunconditional ior ibe ibased ion ireciprocity iof ithe iparties iand ilastly iArticle i366
istates ithat ithe iquestion iof iJurisdiction ishall ibe isettled iby ithe ipartiesPakistan iin ithe i1960s ihad
iaccepted ithe icompulsory ijurisdictioniof ithe iInternational iCourt iof iJustice iwith itwo ireservations
i57 iyears ilater ijust ibefore ithe ihearing iof ithe iJadav iCase iin ithe iICJ, iPakistan iadded i6 imore
iclauses ito ithe ideclaration iin iwhich ione iof ithem iwere ithati t iwont iaccept ithe icompulsory
ijurisdiction iof ithe iCourt ion igrounds iof inational isecurity iPakistan ihas icontinually iclaimed ithat
iKulbhushan iJadhav iwas ian iIndian ispy iand iwas iresponsible ifor ivarious iterrorist iattacks iin
iPakistan iand ithat ibeing idetrimental ito ithe inational isecurity iof iPakistan iit iwouldnt iaccept ithe
ijurisdiction iof ithe iICJ iHowever ithe iacceptance iof iJurisdiction iin ithe iJadav icase idoesnt iderive
ifrom iArticle i362 ibut ifrom i361 ias iIndia ihas ibrought ithe iclaim iunder iArticle i361 iof ithe iICJ
istatute iieijurisdiction iderived ifrom iother itreaties

Enforcement iMechanism iOf iThe iICJDependent iOn iThe iUNSC

The International Court of Justice has gone a long way in installing faith of the world community in the
settlement of disputes and has done wonders in the maintenance of International Peace and Security
Article 941 states that ,each member undertakes to comply with the decision of the International
Courtof Justice, iThis iis ibased ion ithe ipremise ithat iall iparties ishall icomply iwith ithe idecision iin
igood ifaith iWhereas iArticle i942 iprovides ithat i,If iany iparty ito ia icase ifails ito iperform ithe
iobligations iincumbent iupon i t iunder ia ijudgment irendered iby ithe iCourt, ithe iother iparty imay
ihave irecourse ito ithe iSecurity iCouncil, iwhich imay, iif iit ideems inecessary, imake
irecommendations ior idecide iupon imeasures ito ibe itaken ito igive ieffect ito ithe ijudgmentThe
iVetoThe iinterpretation iof ithe iArticle i942 istates ithat ithe iUNSC imay, iif ideem inecessary i take
i actions i Here i there i comes i the i line i of i difference i between i international i relations i and
ipolitics iJurist isay ithat iInternational ilaw iis ithe iinterplay iof iInternational ipolitics iin imany iways
ithis iis iproved iwhen ithe iUnited iNations iSecurity iCouncil ihas ito ienforce ithe ijudgment iby ithe
iICJ iOne iof ithe imost inotable iprecedent iof iUNSC ienforcement iof ia ijudgement iof ithe iICJ ican
ibe iseen iin ithe icase iof iArmed iActivities iin iNicaragua iUSA iVs iNicaragua iwhere ithe iICJ iheld
ithe iUSA iaccountable ifor iarming iof irebels iand iordered ifor irepartition iOwing ito ithe
ienforcement, ithe iUnited iStates ivetoed i the ienforcement iof ithe ijudgment iagainst iitself”
22

2 iThe inuclear itest icase

Facts

The French nuclear testing program began during 1966 at the establishment of the centre
experimentations du Pacific Although the Nuclear Test Ban treaty had been in force since 1963, France
was not a party to the treatyOver an extended period of time, several tests were carried out underground
and in the atmosphere iA inumber iof icases idocumented iby ithe iInternational iPhysicians ifor ithe
iPrevention iof iNuclear iWar iIPPNW ireported inuclear ifallout ion iterritories ilocated iin ithe iSouth
iPacific iNew iZealand i& iAustralia iwere iamong ithese iterritories iThe icourt iwas itasked iwith
iestablishing ithe iexistence iof ithe idispute

Arguments
New iZealand i& iAustralia ibrought, ias ithe iobject iof ithe iclaim, iaccusations iagainst iFrance
iregarding ithe iillegality iof ithe iatmospheric inuclear itests iunder iinternational ilaw iAfter iinvoking
i,inherent ijurisdiction, iand i establishing i the i existence i of i a i dispute, i the i Court i deemed
i identifying i the i object i of i the i claim inecessary ito ifulfil iits ijudicial ifunctionThe iCourt
iredefined ithe iobject iof iNew iZealand i& iAustralias iclaim ithrough ianalysis iof ia iseries iof ipublic
istatements imade ion ibehalf iof ithe iFrench igovernment ithat iguaranteed ino ifurther itests iwould
ioccur, iwhich iwere imade iprior iand isubsequent ito iproceedings iThe iresponse ifrom ithe iapplicants
iallowed ithe iCourt ito iidentify ithe iobject iof ithe iclaim ias ia iclear iassurance iof ithe iprevention
iof ifurther itests, irather ithan ia i,declaratory ijudgment i 11

Judgment
The Court found that unilateral declarations made by French authorities on the matter served to create
legal obligations The principle of good faith attributes unilateral declarations with binding legal
character, in the same way pact sunt servanda accomplishes the compliance with international treaties
As a result the object of the claim is moot, therefore there is nothing upon which to give further
judgment

11. iClaude, i Inis i L iThe i United iNations, i the i United i States, iand i the i Maintenance i of
iPeaceInternationaliOrganization i23, ino i3 i1969 i621â€,36 ihttp//wwwjstororg/stable/2706073
23
Held
as ithe iInternational iCourt iitself iis iconcerned, iit ihas iheld ithat iit ipossesses ian iinherent
iJurisdiction ienabling iit ito itake isuch iaction ias imay ibe irequired, ion ithe ione ihand ito iensure
ithat ithe iexercise iof iits iJurisdiction iover ithe imerits, iif iand iwhen iestablished, ishall inot ibe
ifrustrated, iand ion ithe iother, ito iprovide ifor ithe iorderly isettlement iof iall imatters iin idispute, ito
iensure ithe iobservance iof ithe i,inherent ilimitations ion ithe iexercise iof ithe ijudicial ifunction,
iof ithe iCourt, iand ito i,maintain iits i judicial icharacter

3 iNorth iSea iContinental iShelf isecurity icouncil

These cases concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf of the North Sea as between Denmark
and the Federal Republic of Germany, and as between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic, and
were submitted to the Court by Special Agreement The Parties asked the Court to state the principles
and rules of international law applicable, and undertook thereafter to carry out the delimitations on that
basis By an Order of 26 April 1968 the Court, having found Denmark and the Netherlands to be in the
same interest, joined the proceedings iin ithe itwo icases iIn iits iJudgment, idelivered ion i20 iFebruary
i1969, ithe iCourt ifound ithat ithe iboundary ilines iin iquestion iwere ito ibe idrawn iby iagreement
ibetween ithe iParties iand iin iaccordance iwith iequitable iprinciples iin isuch ia iway ias ito ileave ito
ieach iParty ithose iareas iof ithe icontinental ishelf iwhich iconstituted ithe inatural iprolongation iof iits
iland iterritory iunder ithe isea, iand iit iindicated icertain ifactors ito ibe itaken iinto iconsideration ifor
ithat ipurpose iThe iCourt irejected i the icontention ithat ithe idelimitations iin iquestion ihad ito ibe
icarried iout iin iaccordance iwith ithe iprinciple iof iequidistance ias idefined iin ithe i1958 iGeneva
iConvention ion ithe iContinental iShelf iThe iCourt i took iaccount iof ithe ifact ithat ithe iFederal
iRepublic ihad inot iratified ithat iConvention, iand iheld ithat ithe iequidistance iprinciple iwas inot
iinherent iin ithe ibasic iconcept iof icontinental ishelf irights, iand ithat ithis iprinciple iwas inot ia irule
iof icustomary iinternational ilaw

Held

On the International Courts treatment of the elements of customary law it held that The Security
Councils interference with the established international legal positions involves the dimension of its
awareness of the situation and relates to the need of informed decision making, and also raises the issue
of the limits of the Councils powers
24

4. iThe iLockerbie iCase isecurity icouncil

On 21 December 1988, Pan American Flight 103 took off from Londons Heathrow Airport on its
transatlantic flight to John F Kennedy Airport in New York At 656 pm EST, at an altitude of 10,000
metres, the Maid of the Seas made its last contact with ground control Seven minutes later, the green
crosshair at air traffic control split into five bright blips as the aircraft exploded in midair Her fiery
skeleton, iladen iwith ithe ibodies iof ipassengers iand icrew, irained idown ion ithe ipeople iof
iLockerbie, iScotland iWithin ithe ihour, i243 ipassengers, i16 icrew imembers iand i11 itownspeople
iwere idead iBetween iJanuary i1989 iand iNovember i1991, ia ijoint iUS iScottish iteam itracked idown
ileads iin i50 icountries, iquestioned i14,000 ipeople, iand icombed isome i845 isquare imiles iof
icountryside iaround iLockerbie iThe ifruits iof itheir isearch ia ishard iof icircuit iboard ismaller ithan ia
ifingernail, ia ifragment iof ian iexplosive itimer iembedded iin ian iarticle iof iclothing, iand ia ifew
ientries iin ia iprivate idiary iThese ithree ipieces iof iphysical ievidence iled iinvestigators ito itwo
iLibyan inationals, iAbdelba iset iAli iMohamed iAl iMegrahi iand iAl iAmin iKhalifa iFhimah iLibyas
iinvolvement iwas iapparently iconfirmed iwith ia iforensic iscientists idiscovery iof ia itiny imicrochip
iof ithe ibombs itrigger imechanism iThis itechnical ifingerprint iwas iembedded iin ia ishirt ithat ihad
icome ifrom ithe isuitcase icontaining ithe ibomb iThe imost isignificant ilink, ihowever, icame ifrom
itwo iLibyan iintelligence iagents iarrested iin iSenegal iin i1988 iAt ithe itime iof itheir iarrest, ithey
iwere idiscovered icarrying iSemtex iplastic iexplosive iand iseveral itriggering idevices iThe
iconnecting ilink ibetween ithe iLockerbie i timer i and i the i two i Libyan i suspects i came i from
i Fhimahs i own i notebook i Nearly i three i years ilater, ithe icumulative ievidence iled ito ithe
iindictment iof ithe itwo iLibyan iintelligence iofficers iby ia ifederal igrand ijury iin iWashington iDC
iThe i193 icount iindictment iaccusing iFhimah iand ial iMegrahi iwith iplanning iand icarrying iout ithe
iLockerbie ibombing irepresented ithe imost iextensive iinvestigation iever iconducted ifor ian iact iof
iterrorism iHanded idown ion i14 iNovember i1991, ithe iindictment isupplied ithe ifinal ipiece iof ia
imultinational ijigsaw ipuzzle ithat itook ithree iyears ito icomplete iOn ithe isame iday, ia isimilar
iindictment iwas ihanded idown iin ithe iUnited iKingdom

Issue

Wether i the isecurity icouncil ican iperform iThe iRole iof ithe iSecurity iCouncil iin iEnforcing ithe
iPrinciple iAut iDedere iAut iJudicare i ?
25
In ithis icase, iit iis iheld ithat i, iHowever, ionce iwe ienter ithe isphere iof iChapter i7, ithe imatter
itakes ion ia idifferent icomplexion, ifor ithe idetermination iunder iArticle i39 iof ithe iexistence iof
iany ithreat ito ithe ipeace, ibreach iof ithe ipeace, ior iact iof iaggression, iis ione ientirely iwithin ithe
idiscretion iof ithe iCouncil iIt iwould iappear ithat ithe iCouncil iand ino iother iis ithe ijudge iof ithe
iexistence iof ithe istate iof iaffairs iwhich ibrings iChapter i7 iinto ioperation iThat idecision iis itaken
iby ithe iSecurity iCouncil iin iits iown ijudgment iand iin ithe iexercise iof ithe ifull idiscretion igiven
ito iit iby iArticle i39

5 i.United iStates iv iUsama ibin iLaden isecurity icouncil

the iintervention iof ithe iSecurity iCouncil iin iextradition imay ibe ijustified, iin iso ifar ias ithe
isituation iconstitutes ia ithreat ito iinternational ipeace iand isecurity, ithereby ilegitimising ithe iaction
iof ithe iSecurity iCouncil iunder iChapter iVII iof ithe iUN iCharter iBut, ithen iagain, ithe iquestion
iarises ias ito iwhether isuch iani ntervention iwould ihave ito ibe irestricted ito iterrorists

Here, it can be seen that four strategies are being used by the US in their fight against terrorism

1. procedures and measures inherent in the criminal justice system

2 seeking treaty agreements to establish new international norms and enforcement mechanisms3
Indisruption of terrorist structures through civil sanctions and

It ishould ibe inoted, ihowever, ithat, iparticularly iin ithe i1990s, ithe iUS iGovernment itried, iwith
isuccess, ianother imethod, iwhich iwas ito iengage ithe iSecurity iCouncil iin ithe ilaw ienforcement
ioperations iThe ibin iLaden icase iillustrates ithis istrategy iIn iits iResolution i1214, iadopted ion i9
iDecember i1998, ithe iSecurity iCouncil istated ithat iit iwas, iinter ialia iDeeply idisturbed iby ithe
icontinuing iuse iof iAfghan iterritory, iespecially iareas icontrolled iby ithe iTaliban, ifor ithe
isheltering iand itraining iof iterrorists iand ithe iplanning iof iterrorist iacts, iand ireiterate ithat ithe
isuppression iof iinternational iterrorism iis iessential ifor ithe imaintenance iof iinternational ipeace
iand isecurity
26
The Security Council demands also that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary and training for
international terrorists and their organisations, and that all Afghan factions cooperate with efforts to
bring indicted terrorists to justiceFinally, in October 1999, the US asked the Security Council to impose
economic sanctions on the Taliban, idemanding ithat ithe iTaliban iturn iover ibin iLaden32 iIn ithe
ioperative ipart iof iResolution i1267, iadopted ion i15 iOctober i1999, ithe iSecurity iCouncil, iinter
ialiaDemands ithat ithe iTaliban iturn iover iUsama i bin iLaden iwithout ifurther idelay ito iappropriate
iauthorities iin ia icountry iwhere ihe ihas ibeen iindicted, ior ito iappropriate iauthorities iin ia icountry
iwhere ihe iwill ibe ireturned ito isuch ia icountry, ior ito iappropriate iauthorities iin ia icountry iwhere
ihe iwill ibe iarrested iand ieffectively ibrought ito ijustice i .

6. iThe inambia icase

On 27 October 1966, the General Assembly decided that the Mandate for South West Africa was
terminated and that South Africa had no other right to administer the Territory In 1969 the Security
Council called upon South Africa to withdraw its administration from the Territory, and on 30 January
1970 it declared that the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia was illegal and
that all acts taken by the South African Government on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the
termination of the Mandate were illegal and invalid it further called upon all States to refrain from any
dealings with the South African Government that were incompatible with that declaration iOn i29 iJuly
i1970, ithe iSecurity iCouncil idecided ito irequest iof ithe iCourt ian iadvisory iopinion ion ithe i legal
iconsequences ifor iStates iof ithe icontinued ipresence iof iSouth iAfrica iin iNamibia iIn iits
iAdvisory iOpinion iof i21 iJune i1971, ithe iCourt ifound ithat ithe icontinued ipresence iof iSouth
iAfrica iin iNamibia iwas iillegal iand ithat i South i Africa i was i under i an i obligation i to i withdraw
i its i administration i immediately i It i found i that iStates iMembers iof ithe iUnited iNations iwere
iunder ian iobligation ito irecognise ithe iillegality iof iSouth iAfricas ipresence iin iNamibia iand ithe
iinvalidity iof iits iacts ion ibehalf iof ior iconcerning iNamibia, iand ito irefrain ifrom iany iacts
iimplying irecognition iof ithe ilegality iof, ior ilending isupport ior iassistance ito, isuch ipresence iand
iadministration iFinally, iit istated ithat iit iwas iincumbent iupon iStates iwhich iwere i not iMembers
iof ithe iUnited iNations ito igive iassistance iin ithe iaction iwhich ihad ibeen itaken iby ithe iUnited
iNations iwith iregard ito iNamibia
27

It i is iheld iin ithis icase ithat iTo ichallenge ithe ivalidity iof ia iresolution, iit iis inot isufficient
imerely ito iallege ithat iit iis ipossible ito ifind ia ibetter iinterpretation ia iresolution ican ionly ibe
icriticised iif iit iis idemonstrably iabsolutely iimpossible ito ifind iany ireason iwhatsoever, ieven ia
idebatable ione, iupon iwhich ian iinterpretation ifavourable ito ithe ivalidity iof ithe iresolution imay ibe
ibased
 28

CONCLUSION

Needless ito isay, ithe iUnited iNations iwas iborn ias ian iorganisation iprimarily iaimed iat imaintaining
iinternational ipeace iand istability iIts ibasic icharacter iprescribed iin ithe iUN iCharter istill iremains iunchanged
However, ia ilook iat ithe iconcrete ifunctions iof ithe iUnited iNations iin iits iactual ioperations ifor ithe
imaintenance i of i international i peace i and i security i shows i that i its i functions i have i changed
i considerablyifrom iwhat ithey iwere iinitially iintended iforWhen ithe iUnited iNations iwas iestablished iin
i1945, iits imajor ifunctions iwere iplanned ias ii ithe imaintenance iof iinternational ipeace iand isecurity
iby iestablishing ian iinternational icollective isecurity isystem iwith icompulsory isanctions iby ithe
iSecurity iCouncil ias ithe iaxis iand iii ithe ipromotion iof ithe iwelfare iof imankind iand ithe ilaying iof ia
ifoundation ifor ilasting ipeace ithrough ipromotion iof international cooperationThe iUN iCharter ienvisaged
ithe iformer ias ithe iprimary ifunction iof ithe iUnited iNations, iand ithe ilatter iwas iexpected ito iplay ithe irole iof
icreating ia ifoundation iof ithe iformer iThe imajor ipremise iof ithe iformer ifunction ias ian iinternational icollective
isecurity isystem iwas icooperation iamong ithe ifive ipermanent imembers iof ithe iSecurity iCouncil iwhich iwere
imajor imembers iof ithe iAllied iPowers iin iWorld iWar iII, iespecially icooperation ibetween ithe iUnited iStates
iand ithe iSoviet iUnion iHowever, ithis imajor ipremise icollapsed ifrom ithe ioutset iof ithe iUnited iNations, iand
ithe iplanned ifunction iwas ipractically iparalyzed ibecause iit ibecame ialmost iimpossible ifor ithe iSecurity
iCouncil ito itake icompulsory isanctions ibecause iof ithe iexercise iof ithe iveto ipower iof ithe ipermanent imembers
iAs ia iresult, ithe isecurity iof ivarious icountries iof ithe iworld icame ito ibe idetermined ioutside iof ithe iUnited
iNations imainly iby ithe ibalance iof imilitary ipower iamong ithe imajor icountries iThis ireality ibasically iremains
iunchanged ieven itoday iwhen ithere iare imoves itoward idetenteIn icontrast iwith ithis imajor ifunction iwhich iwas
ioriginally ienvisaged iby ithe iUN iCharter ibut ibecame iparalysed iwithout ibeing irealised, i other ifunctions
iwhich iwere inot iconsidered ias iprimary iones iin imaintaining ipeace iand isecurity iat ithe itime iof iformation iof
ithe iUnited iNations ihave ishown inotable idevelopment iSuch ifunctions iare ii ithe iprevention iofian iexpansion iof
ilocal iconflicts iand ithe ipromotion i of i the i peaceful i settlement i of i such i conflicts ithrough
i,peacekeeping ioperations, iand iii ithe ielimination iof ithe icauses iof isuch iconflicts ithrough ithe ipromotion iof
iinternational icooperation i .
29

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 iPublic iInternational iLaw iBy iDr iPandhare iBalasaheb

iDashrathi2 iPublic iInternational iLaw iBy iAnthony iCassimatis
3 i The i Organs i of i the i United i Nations i Within i the i Framework i of i the i Functions i of
i Each i OrganiBy iPeter iWejinya