Case #1: Evelio B. Javier vs. COMELEC and Arturo F.
Pacificador
G.R Nos. 68379-81 | Sept. 22, 1986 | Cruz, J.
Facts:
● Javier and Pacificador were candidates in Antique for Batasang Pambansa in the May
1984 elections.
● On May 13, 1984, the eve of elections, the followers of the petitioners were ambushed
and killed, allegedly by Pacificador’s men. 7 suspects, including the respondent, are now
facing trial for these murders.
● The voting was held and the post-election developments were to run true to form.
● The petitioner claimed there were attempts to railroad the respondent’s proclamation and
went to the COMELEC to question the canvass of the election returns.
● However, his complaints were dismissed and the respondent was proclaimed winner by
the Second Division of the COMELEC.
● Subsequently, the petitioner came to the Court, arguing that the proclamation was void
because it was made by a division and not the COMELEC en banc as required by the
Constitution.
● Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the respondent took his oath as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa.
● On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the COMELEC ordered the provincial board of
canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate until further orders.
● On June 7, 1984, the same division ordered the board to immediately convene and
proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission.
On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was
set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of 5-day period of appeal,
which the petitioner had seasonably made.
● On July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this
petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador, the elected Assemblyman of
the Province of Antique.
● This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioner Jaime
Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that
he was a former law partner of the respondent, Opinion had refused.
● The petitioner then came to the court, asking to annul the said decision on the basis that it
should have been decided by COMELEC en banc as it falls under its jurisdiction.
● The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was
gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight.
Issue:
Whether or not there was due process in the proclamation of the private respondent.
Ruling:
No. Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the
time, and the particular relationship between Commissioner Opinion and Pacificador, one could
not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the body would be adverse to the
petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his objection
to the transfer of the case to another division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His
conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of innocence and proved the motives of
the Second Division when it rendered its decision.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to
the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated, they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in
his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be
equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone
the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed,
on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the
prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only possible, due process demands
that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must
be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized his duty and
abided by this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second
Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered
the proceeding null and void.
Case #2: Maximo Calalang vs. A.D Williams et. al.
GR No. 47800 | December 2, 1940
Facts:
● Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila,
brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A.
D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as
Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan
Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
● The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the
following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic: 1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street
from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30pm to 530 pm; and 2) along Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at AntipoloStreet to Echague Street from 7 AM to
11PM.
● The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to
theDirector of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the
provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the
approval from theSecretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
● On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10, 1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to
the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
● It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director
of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and
control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issue:
Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people?
Ruling:
No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
The writ of prohibition is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner.
Case #3: Richard N. Rivera vs. Genesis Transport Service, Inc. et. al.
GR. No. 215568 | August 3, 2015 | Leonen, J.
Facts:
● Rivera was employed by respondent Genesis Transport Service, Inc. (Genesis) beginning
June 2002 as a bus conductor, assigned to the CubaoBaler, Aurora route. As part of the
requisites for his employment, he was required to post a cash bond of P6,000.00.
Respondent Riza A. Moises is Genesis’ President and General Manager.
● In his Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter, Rivera acknowledged that he was
dismissed by Genesis on account of a discrepancy in the amount he declared on bus ticket
receipts. He alleged that on June 10, 2010, he received a Memorandum giving him
twenty-four (24) hours to explain why he should not be sanctioned for reporting and
remitting the amount of P198.00 instead of the admittedly correct amount of P394.00
worth of bus ticket receipts. He responded that it was an honest mistake, which he was
unable to correct "because the bus encountered mechanical problems.”
● On July 20, 2010, Genesis served on Rivera a written notice informing him that a hearing
of his case was set for July 23, 2010. Despite his explanations, Rivera's services were
terminated through a written notice dated July 30, 2010. Contending that this termination
was arbitrary and not based on just causes for terminating employment, he filed the
Complaint for illegal dismissal, which is subject of this Petition.
● The respondent claimed that Rivera’s misdeclaration of the amount in the bus ticket
receipts and failure to remit the correct amount clearly violated Genesis’ policies and
amounted to serious misconduct, fraud and willful breach of trust; thereby justifying his
dismissal.
● The Labor Arbiter dismissed Rivera’s complaint and gave credence to the respondents’
claim.
● The National Labor Relations Commission’s Second Division affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Rivera’s employment was terminated for just cause by Genesis Transport
Service, Inc.
Ruling:
No. Misconduct and breach of trust are just causes for terminating employment only when
attended by such gravity as would leave the employer no other viable recourse but to cut off an
employee's livelihood. The Labor Code recognizes serious misconduct, willful breach of trust or
loss of confidence, and other analogous causes as just causes for termination of employment.
However, to justify termination of employment, misconduct must be so severe as to make it
evident that no other penalty but the termination of the employee's livelihood is viable.
What is involved is a paltry amount of P196.00. All that has been proven is the existence of a
discrepancy. No proof has been adduced of ill-motive or even of gross negligence. From all
indications, petitioner stood charged with a lone, isolated instance of apparent wrongdoing.
Absent any other supporting evidence, the error in a single ticket issued by petitioner can hardly
be used to justify the inference that he has committed serious misconduct or has acted in a
manner that runs afoul of his employer's trust. More so, petitioner cannot be taken to have
engaged in a series of acts evincing a pattern or a design to defraud his employer. Terminating
his employment on these unfounded reasons is manifestly unjust. To infer from a single error that
the petitioner committed serious misconduct or besmirched his employer's trust is grave abuse of
discretion.
Case #4: Isabelita C. Vinuya et. al., vs. Alberto G. Romulo et. al.
GR. No. 162230 | April 28, 2010 | Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
● Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the
purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.
● Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages
and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. Their
communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly
tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and
held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by
Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners
have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and
mental and emotional suffering.
● Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DA, and OS, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women"
stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to
assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan's compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for crimes against humanity and
war crimes committed against them?
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan. Political
questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such category
involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "the conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative--'the political’--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."
Not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the
question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question.Neither could petitioners herein assail the said
determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be
inimical to our country's foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
withJapan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region.For the Court to
overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign
policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment
has been constitutionally committed.
