COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT B ULLETIN 10 111

Yugoslavia and the Cold War

Co-editor’s note: During the early years of the Cold Soviet and Yugoslav documents on the meetings. Csaba
War, Yugoslavia became one of the focal points of the Békés, a research fellow at the Institute for the History of
East-West rivalry. As part of its “containment” strategy, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, offers an interesting
the United States tried to promote fissures within the snapshot of both Stalin’s thinking about the establishment
Communist world that would undercut Soviet expansion- of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) as
ism and eventually lead to the disintegration of the Soviet well as Yugoslav (and Hungarian) perspectives on the
empire. As recent studies have shown, the break between organization in 1947. By contrast, the document found
Joseph Stalin and Josip Broz Tito was hailed as a major and published by the Russian historian Dmitrii
success of this “wedge strategy” and influenced U.S. Volkogonov throws new light on one of the more bizarre
policy towards Moscow’s Eastern European and Asian efforts in the late Stalin years to eliminate the Yugoslav
allies in the ensuing years. After the split became evident leader. Documents obtained from the Russian Foreign
in 1948, the Truman administration adopted a policy of Ministry Archives by former CWIHP fellow Andrei
“keeping Tito afloat” by extending military support and Edemskii illuminate the difficult process of Soviet-
economic aid to Tito. Efforts to promote Tito’s influence Yugoslav rapprochement in the mid-1950s. Gibianskii’s
among the satellites and to entice Tito to join NATO, second essay, as well as the documents concluding this
pursued by both the Truman and the Eisenhower adminis- Bulletin section, explore the evolution of Soviet-Yugoslav
trations, however, failed. His increasing commitment to relations in the aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian Revolu-
the non-aligned movement and rapprochement with the tion. The essay was first presented as a contribution to the
Soviets in the mid-1950s increasingly undermined U.S. 26-28 September 1996 conference on “Hungary and the
support for Yugoslavia. Though the aid program was World, 1956,” a major international scholarly conference
eventually terminated, the United States continued to co-sponsored by the National Security Archive (Washing-
support “Titoism” as an alternative to the Soviet model.1 ton, DC), the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungar-
Much less is known about the origins, process and ian Revolution (Budapest), and the Cold War International
impact of the Soviet-Yugoslav split within the Communist History Project.4
world. What changed Stalin’s mind about the Yugoslavs, The transcripts of the 1946 and 1948 Stalin-Tito
whom, in 1945, he considered heirs to his throne and who meetings also inaugurate a major CWIHP initiative on
considered themselves his most faithful disciples? What “Stalin as a Statesman.” Based on the recently-published
turned Tito and other top Yugoslav communists in the appointment books for Stalin’s Kremlin office, the Cold
words of John L. Gaddis, “from worshipful acolytes into War International History Project will try to document
schismatic heretics?”2 Did policy differences over a Stalin’s conversations and correspondence with foreign
Balkan entente with Bulgaria or Yugoslav ambitions leaders as comprehensively as possible, with a view to
towards Albania cause the rift? Or was it, as Vojtech capturing “the voice of Stalin” in the Soviet foreign
Mastny has argued, an “incompatibility of affinities” — policy-making process. The compilation and comparison
the very Stalinist disposition and fervor of the Yugoslav of transcripts, memoranda, cables and other sources from
Communists, which, despite their genuine devotion for the both Russian and other archives will allow researchers to
Soviet fatherland and socialism, antagonized the Soviet draw conclusions about Stalin’s thinking on foreign policy
leader?3 issues from a richer and broader source base. For ex-
With the following essays and documents, the Cold ample, the 1948 Stalin-Tito conversation, printed below,
War International History Project presents new evidence sheds light not just on Stalin’s views on Yugoslavia, but
on Yugoslavia’s role in the early years of the Cold War. also on his feelings about the Chinese Communist revolu-
Research on this subject is not an easy task. In Moscow, tion. “Triangulations” of this kind promise new insights
tougher declassification policies and shrinking archival for all historians of Stalin and the early years of the Cold
budgets have posed difficulties. Even more desperate is War.
the situation in the former Yugoslavia where the recent
conflict has left archives in shambles. Despite these 1 See, most recently, Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat. The
difficulties, Leonid Gibianskii, a senior research fellow at United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, 1997).
2 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History
the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies at the Russian
(New York, 1997), 49.
Academy of Sciences, has unearthed major new findings 3 Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin
in the archives in Moscow and Belgrade. His first article Years (New York, 1996), 37.
covers key episodes in Soviet-Yugoslav relations — the 4 For further information on the conference, see CWIHP Bulletin 8-9
1946 and 1948 Stalin-Tito meetings. Based on access to (Winter 1996/7), 355-357.
Yugoslav as well as Soviet materials, Gibianskii compares
112 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the

Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin’s Meetings
with Communist Leaders of
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948
by Leonid Gibianskii

I. The Documents also abound. In the case of Dedijer, who used the
Documents pertaining to Joseph Stalin’s meetings Yugoslav records of both meetings, the omissions and
with Eastern European communist leaders hold particular misrepresentations stemmed from deliberate selectiveness
importance in the study of the initial stage of the Cold War. with data, made to correspond to the official Yugoslav
As a rule, records of such meetings, stored in Russian and version of events, formulated after the conflict of 1948.4
Eastern European archives, contain extremely important The same is also characteristic of Kardelj’s memoirs,
materials for the purpose of clarifying: how relations where this tendency was apparently further abetted by the
developed between Moscow and its dominions (both fact that the author, one of the founding architects of the
individually and collectively) during the first postwar official Yugoslav version, came to believe, after many
years; what kind of problems arose within the bloc; and years of repetition, in his own inventions especially those
what Soviet actions were taken to resolve them in the concerning the 10 February 1948 meeting. At the same
Kremlin’s interests, what correlation existed at various time he could not consult the original documents as he was
times between Soviet policies and the “people’s democra- dictating his recollections while seriously ill, only a few
cies” regarding the state of their relations with the West; months before his death.5 Djilas, on the other hand, was
how these relations and developments in the international already a dissident when writing his memoirs and was not
arena were viewed by Stalin and his Eastern European interested in following the official version, and in this
interlocutors; and what questions were discussed and what respect his account is more trustworthy. However, in a
goals were set on the given topic. In this regard, the number of instances he was let down by his memory, and
archival documents printed below on the 27-28 May 1946 as a result he allowed mistakes and inaccuracies and at
meeting of the Kremlin boss with a visiting Yugoslav times suffered the influence of by-then habitual stereo-
government delegation headed by Josip Broz Tito as well types brought into usage by Dedijer. All of this was fully
as the 10 February 1948 conference, also in Moscow, of discovered only in recent years, when I was able, finally,
Stalin and his inner circle members (Viacheslav Molotov, to examine the original archival materials pertaining to
Andrei Zhdanov, Georgii Malenkov, Mikhail Suslov) with both meetings.
leading officials from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, are of With regard to Stalin’s 27 May 1946 meeting with
particular interest.1 Tito and members of the Yugoslav delegation accompany-
Both these meetings occupy important places in the ing him, there are two known documents: a Yugoslav
early history of the Soviet bloc and have figured more than record in handwritten Serbo-Croatian discovered in the
once in the historiography on this period. Until recently, Josip Broz Tito Archive in Belgrade (Arhiv Josipa Broza
however, the original documents pertaining to these Tita),6 and a signed typewritten copy of the Soviet record
meetings remained inaccessible in the archives of Mos- of the meeting, stored in the Archive of the President of
cow, Belgrade, and Sofia, and researchers could refer only the Russian Federation (APRF) in Moscow.7 The
to the descriptions of both meetings contained in the Yugoslav record was made by members of the Yugoslav
official biography of Tito, published after the Soviet- delegation: Blagoe Neshkovich, at the time head of the
Yugoslav conflict of 1948 and written by one of the Serbian Communist Party Central Committee and the
leading Yugoslav propagandists of the time, Vladimir Serbian government, and Koche Popovich, chief of the
Dedijer,2 as well as—with regard to the second meeting— General Staff of Yugoslavia. The Soviet record was
in the memoirs of two Yugoslav participants Milovan written down by the USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia,
Djilas and Edvard Kardelj, published significantly later.3 Anatolii Lavrent’ev. Both records were co-published in
In addition, these accounts, which for many years consti- 1993 in the Moscow journal Istoricheskii arkhiv (the
tuted the sole source of information for both these events Yugoslav record in Russian translation) by Yurii Murin,
and which were widely used in Western and Yugoslav associate of the APRF, and myself, along with my intro-
historiography (the study of this topic was for a long time duction and footnotes.8
forbidden in the USSR and in most other communist As for the Soviet-Yugoslav-Bulgarian meeting on 10
countries), were not sufficiently complete; they omitted February 1948, there are archival documents kept by each
much of significance; inaccuracies and misrepresentations of the three sides. The Josip Broz Tito Archive in
 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT B ULLETIN 10 113

Belgrade has an extensive handwritten Yugoslav report by Commission, and the Ministry of Industry), reiterated the
Djilas (in Serbo-Croatian using the Cyrillic alphabet), proposal for Soviet participation in the exploitation of
which he put together upon his return from Moscow on the Yugoslav natural resources, by offering concession rights
basis of notes he took during the course of the meeting, as well, to which Moscow replied by agreeing to the
and which was presented during the Central Committee of creation of joint enterprises, but not to concession
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CC CPY) Politburo rights.15 In addressing the Soviet government in Septem-
meeting on 19 February 1948.9 In addition, the Tito ber 1945 and February 1946, Hebrang, in the name of the
archive contains a ciphered telegram reporting on the government of Yugoslavia, put forth a program for the
meeting and its results, sent from Moscow to Belgrade by establishment of such enterprises not only for excavation,
the Yugoslav delegation on the day following the meeting but also for his country’s refining industry and the con-
with Stalin.10 Among the documents of the former struction of power plants and transportation systems.16
Central Party Archive of the Central Committee of the Despite its positive response, the Soviet side delayed
Bulgarian Communist Party (CC BCP), currently stored in practical ratification of these plans, and only in mid-April
the Central State Archive (Tsentralen d’rzhaven arkhiv) in 1946 did the new USSR ambassador Lavrent’ev inform
Sofia, there is a stenographic record of the 10 February Kardelj and Hebrang of Soviet interest in the Yugoslav
1948 meeting, made by Traicho Kostov, at the time proposals. The ambassador, however, discovered a certain
Georgii Dimitrov’s closest associate in the Bulgarian amount of hesitation on the Yugoslav side: in their
government.11 This same archive also contains a record preparations to send a delegation to Moscow for trade
made by Vasil Kolarov, another Bulgarian government negotiations, they strictly limited its authority to the
official present at the meeting; it is essentially a repetition finalization of an agreement for bilateral shipment of
of Kostov’s stenographic record, having been put together goods for 1946, while postponing the discussion of
using Kostov’s material, with the exception of a few fundamental questions of economic collaboration for a
stylistic corrections and small addenda.12 Finally, the later time. This was noted by Lavrent’ev in his discus-
APRF contains a still-classified Soviet record of the 10 sions with Kardelj and Hebrang.17
February 1948 meeting. This record, the text of which I The hesitation evident in Belgrade was brought about
was also able to examine (but which is not printed below), by complications within the Yugoslav government. By
was made by the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of limiting the assignment of the delegation that was to go to
the USSR, Valerian Zorin, who attended the meeting.13 Moscow, Tito lowered its status, thus allowing him, in
For both the 1946 and 1948 meetings, the records of turn, to designate the Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolai
all the participating sides are on the whole compatible and Petrovic, as its leader, and not Hebrang, as was previously
sometimes almost entirely correspond in the essential planned. Tito told one of his close associates that Hebrang
contents of the discussions. At the same time, on certain could not be sent to the USSR, because he supported a
questions touched upon at the meetings, the records of misguided economic policy. When he found out about
each side contain relatively significant discrepancies in this, Hebrang asserted that Tito’s main reason for not
their accounts of the course of the discussion and in their wanting to send him to Moscow was the fact that follow-
focus on the opinions expressed. At times, one record ing Hebrang’s visit there in January 1945, a number of
contains something that is not mentioned in another. As a telegrams from the Soviet government began to be
rule, the Soviet records are shorter, drier, more formal, addressed not any longer just to Tito or to Tito and
exhibiting a more generalized character, whereas the Kardelj, but to Tito, Kardelj, and Hebrang.18 Hebrang
Yugoslav and Bulgarian records are more detailed, often believed that Tito viewed this as a sign of special relations
punctuated with verbatim dialogue and expressions, between the Kremlin and Hebrang and a danger to the
particularly those of Stalin and Molotov. A comparative hierarchy which had formed within the Yugoslav govern-
analysis of these archival documents allows one to piece ment. During the discussion with Lavrent’ev on 17 April
together a fairly complete picture of both meetings, the 1946, in response to the ambassador’s question regarding
reasons and reasoning behind them, the topics discussed, the change in the Yugoslav position on economic negotia-
and the decisions arrived at. tions, Hebrang did not mention his suspicions, but imme-
diately following the meeting laid them out in a letter to
II. The Background Kardelj, apparently counting on his support. Kardelj,
The 1946 meeting was first proposed by the Yugoslav however, did not support Hebrang, and handed the letter
side in connection with questions of further Soviet over to Tito.19 The latter promptly called a Politburo
economic and military-technical assistance to the Commu- meeting on April 19, during which he sharply condemned
nist regime in Yugoslavia. As early as 1944, Kardelj had Hebrang. During this and the following meeting on April
raised the question of joint-stock enterprises with the 24, the Politburo sided with the condemnation and
USSR for the purpose of exploiting mineral deposits in resolved to exclude Hebrang from the Politburo and
Yugoslavia.14 In the spring of 1945, CC CPY Politburo remove him from the majority of his government posts.20
member Andrea Hebrang, the chief economic official (he Alarmed by the apprehensions voiced by Lavrent’ev to
headed the Economic Council, the Yugoslav Planning Kardelj and Hebrang concerning the Yugoslav position on
114 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

the economic agreement with USSR, on April 18 Tito Yugoslav-Albanian relations.

received the Soviet ambassador and announced that in the A week before his visit, Tito told Lavrent’ev that, in
near future he himself would go to Moscow in order to addition to those issues mentioned above, the agenda for
sign the agreement on economic cooperation.21 the Moscow talks should also include “general foreign
In that same meeting with Lavrent’ev, Tito also said policy questions,” including those pertaining to the
that the projected economic cooperation must also include upcoming peace conference in Paris and the question of
the Yugoslav military-industrial sector, meaning Soviet Yugoslav relations with Bulgaria.30 Clearly, he consid-
assistance “in the establishment of infrastructure for ered it important to discuss with the Soviet leadership the
military production.”22 Such assistance had been in part more significant aspects of the international situation given
already rendered in the past, but Tito wanted it to be the unfolding Cold War, including the coordination of
continued and further broadened, and as early as January actions between the USSR, Yugoslavia, and the other
1946 he had spoken regarding this matter with the previ- Soviet-bloc countries. Of course, the Yugoslav leader had
ous USSR ambassador in Belgrade, Ivan Sadchikov, in to be particularly troubled by those international problems
particular noting the possibility of using projected Soviet- that directly affected Yugoslavia: specifically, those
Yugoslav joint-stock enterprises for building the Yugoslav concerning the Balkans and the Mediterranean-Adriatic
military industry.23 There was a plan to send a special region. As for Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations, what was
military delegation to the USSR to discuss these questions; implied was the completion of the Treaty of Friendship,
candidates for this delegation were mentioned in the CC followed by the union of the two countries in a federation,
CPY Politburo meeting on April 9.24 Now, in his discus- which had become a topic of discussion among Moscow,
sion with Lavrent’ev on April 18, Tito announced his Belgrade, and Sofia as early as late 1944-early 1945. At
intentions to conduct negotiations with the Soviet govern- that time, neither the plan for establishing the federation,
ment on this matter himself during a visit to Moscow.25 nor the wish to sign a treaty of alliance between Yugosla-
On April 29, Lavrent’ev informed Tito of the Soviet via and Bulgaria, could be implemented. The reasons for
government’s positive response towards the proposed visit this were the vetoes placed on these intentions by London
to Moscow for the purpose of discussing the aforemen- and Washington as participants in Allied control over
tioned questions.26 Later, the Soviet government abruptly Bulgaria, as well as disagreements over the structure of the
moved forward the date of the visit: on May 7, the future federative union: Yugoslavia wanted for Bulgaria to
ambassador informed Tito that the visit had to take place have the same status as each of the six federation units of
during the second half of May, and that in addition the Yugoslavia, that is, essentially become subordinate to the
Soviet government wanted to discuss with him the latter, whereas Bulgaria, supported by Stalin, was in favor
question of the Yugoslav-Albanian Treaty on Friendship, of a “dual federation” with equal status between Yugosla-
the completion of which was being planned by via and Bulgaria.31 Later, Tito’s interest in the federation
Belgrade.27 The treaty projected by Yugoslavia and its with Bulgaria waned significantly. He reacted negatively
accompanying agreements on closer economic, military, to the Bulgarian proposal to return to the question of the
and border cooperation, calculated to integrate Albania treaty and the federation, put forth in April 1946 by the
with Yugoslavia in an increasing manner, drew serious Bulgarian envoy in Belgrade, Petro Todorov, pointing out
attention in Moscow, where the possibility of Albania’s that under current circumstances such steps would still be
inclusion into the Yugoslav federation as a result of the inexpedient, in particular prior to the settlement of
Yugoslav-Albanian talks was not being ruled out.28 While Bulgaria’s postwar international situation. Tito notified
not explicitly opposing Belgrade’s special patronage Lavrent’ev of his position and requested Moscow’s
toward Tirane, the Soviet side nevertheless preferred to opinion on this account.32
restrain the development of any further contacts, in
particular by deferring, at least for the near future, the III. The Meetings
completion of the secret Yugoslav-Albanian military It is clear from the Soviet and Yugoslav records of the
agreement planned by Belgrade and any decision on meeting between Stalin and Tito in the Kremlin on 27 May
Albania’s inclusion in the Yugoslav federation. In the 1946 (printed below) that the discussion centered primarily
report “On the question of Yugoslav-Albanian relations,” on questions of Soviet economic assistance to Yugoslavia
compiled by the chief of the Balkan Sector in the USSR through the creation of joint-stock enterprises, on assis-
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Aleksandr tance in establishing the Yugoslav military industry and
Lavrishchev, in preparation for Tito’s visit to Moscow, this equipping the armed forces, and on Yugoslav-Albanian
position was based on the need to avoid a possible and Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations.
negative reaction from the West which would have The result of the discussion regarding the first two
complicated Yugoslavia’s and Albania’s positions in the questions was the signing of an agreement on 8 June 1946,
international arena.29 Whether this was the real reason for which provided for the establishment of a number of joint-
the Soviet position or not, it is clear that the Soviet stock enterprises in Yugoslavia (for extracting and refining
leadership decided to hasten Tito’s visit in order to sway crude oil, excavating bauxite, and producing aluminum,
him towards the Kremlin’s desired position with regard to excavating and producing lead, exploration and mining of
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 115

coal, ferrous metal production, civilian aviation, the dinner in Stalin’s dacha that followed the Kremlin meeting
Danube ship industry, the Yugoslav-Soviet Bank, and, in (and which is absent from the Soviet record but sparsely
the future, lumber and cellulose-paper industry), as well as summarized in the Yugoslav version), among other things,
for Soviet technical assistance in many branches of the problems of strengthening of the Soviet bloc, relations
Yugoslav economy (in electrical, food, textile, chemical between Communist parties, the situation in Greece and
and metal-working industries, in the production of Czechoslovakia, the Italian “craving for revenge,” and the
construction materials, and in agriculture,),33 and for an question of the Polish-Czechoslovak dispute over Tesin
understanding to follow this with the signing of a concrete (Cieszyn) were mentioned. Judging by the handwritten
agreement on supplying the Yugoslav army through a notes made by Tito during the return-trip from Moscow,
long-term loan and shipments for the Yugoslav military the visit also included a discussion of Austria, Yugoslav-
industry.34 Austrian relations and Yugoslav relations with the other
With regard to Yugoslav-Albanian relations, Stalin, Slavic countries.37 However, as with much of the dinner
judging from the records of the meeting, stated his discussions at Stalin’s dacha, the contents of these are not
endorsement of the closest possible alliance between mentioned in the document.
Albania and Yugoslavia and even for Belgrade’s patronage As for the Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting on 10
towards Tirane, but clearly strove to avoid Albania’s direct February 1948, this took place exclusively on the basis of
inclusion in the Yugoslav federation. The archival Moscow’s demands. The reasons were Stalin’s strong
documents obtained up to now do not clearly answer the dissatisfaction with the foreign policy moves of Sofia and
question whether his arguments for postponing unification Belgrade, undertaken without Soviet permission or even in
until the resolution of the Trieste question were a true defiance of Kremlin directives.38 There had been three
reflection of the Soviet position or merely a tactical ruse, such moves. The first was the public announcement by the
in actuality concealing the desire to obstruct completely governments of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in early August
Albania’s unification with Yugoslavia. In either case, as a 1947 that they had agreed upon (i.e., were on the verge of
result of the Moscow negotiations, the question of unifica- signing) a treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual
tion was, for the time being, removed from the agenda. In assistance. This was done in direct defiance of Stalin’s
addition, the Soviet side, having given its consent to the orders which specified that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty
Treaty of Peace and Mutual Assistance and to an agree- had to wait until a peace treaty with Bulgaria had come
ment for close economic cooperation between Yugoslavia into effect. Following a sharp, though not public, outcry
and Albania, notified the Albanian government of its from the Kremlin, Dimitrov and Tito, in a display of
support for the signing of these agreements and “for disciplined submission, acknowledged their mistake.
orienting Albania toward closer ties with Yugoslavia,” and However, in January 1948 two more moves were under-
facilitated the signing of the aforementioned Yugoslav- taken without Moscow’s consent. First was Dimitrov’s
Albanian documents in July 1946.35 statement to the press regarding the possibility of a
The Soviet and Yugoslav records demonstrate that federation and a customs union of East European “people’s
during the meeting with Stalin, Tito argued his position democracies,” even including Greece, in which such a
against a federation with Bulgaria. But the Yugoslav regime would be established. The other move was Tito’s
record does not contain Stalin’s disagreement with Tito’s appeal to Hoxha for consent to deploy a Yugoslav division
position, while the Soviet record directly states that Stalin in Albania. In this appeal, to which Hoxha responded
insisted on the importance of such a federation, though he positively, the Yugoslav leader warned of a Western-
believed that at first one could limit oneself to the Treaty supported Greek invasion of Albania, but Djilas later
of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. It is unlikely that the maintained that in fact Tito wanted to use the deployment
Soviet record would contain something which Stalin did of forces to fortify the Yugoslav position in Albania,
not actually say; thus, in this instance it is probably true to fearing a loss of ground as a result of growing Soviet
fact. However, it remains a mystery why Stalin rejected participation in Albanian affairs. In either case, the
Molotov’s observation at the meeting that it would be Yugoslav move was taken without consultation with the
better to postpone the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty until the Soviet leadership, which, having learned of the plans to
signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria. Indeed, Molotov’s send a division to Albania, sharply condemned such
remark was invariably the Soviet position both before and actions via Molotov’s telegrams to Tito. Although
after the meeting.36 Perhaps the answer to this mystery subsequently the Yugoslav leader halted the deployment of
will be found in further research. the division, high-ranking Yugoslav representatives were
As for the discussion of “general political questions,” swiftly sent to Moscow. At the same time, Bulgarian
mentioned by Tito before the trip, they were also touched emissaries were also being sent there in connection with
upon: during the Kremlin meeting itself there was a the aforementioned statement by Dimitrov, which had
discussion on a possible strategy with regard to the already been publicly condemned by Pravda, and subse-
handling of the Trieste question in Paris, the current and quently Dimitrov himself went to the Soviet capital.
future status of Yugoslav relations with Hungary and As for the course of the meeting in Moscow, sufficient
Greece, and, during further conversation at the evening coverage is provided by the Djilas report printed below
116 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

with the aforementioned corrections and additions from mentioned statement to the press in January 1948. This
other records included in the footnotes. However, certain prompts the suspicion that the Soviet leader, in speaking of
points of the 10 February 1948 meeting merit clarification three federations, was in actuality only pursuing the goal
or additional commentary. 39 of sinking Dimitrov’s proposal. It is perhaps significant, in
The first and perhaps the most important is the this regard, that Stalin said nothing at all specific about
continual Soviet insistence throughout the meeting that the either the Polish-Czechoslovak or the Hungarian-Roma-
aforementioned foreign policy moves undertaken by nian federations, mentioning them only in the most
Belgrade and Sofia without Kremlin consent constituted abstract form. Moreover, he spoke much more specifically
serious mistakes, insofar as they might be used by the USA of the federation of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania.
and Britain against the interests of the USSR and the Clearly, only the latter of these was the immediate goal of
“people’s democracies.” In particular, as evidenced by the his comment on federations, while the reference to the
record of the meeting, Stalin placed special significance on previous two seems more plausible as a strictly tactical
the fact that these misguided moves might bolster the move, used to camouflage his true intentions. As for the
position of supporters of a more hard-line policy against question of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav-Albanian federation,
the Soviet Union and its East European underlings, according to both the Djilas report, printed below, and the
possibly enabling them to achieve success in the upcoming Soviet record of the meeting, Stalin stated that a union
elections for the U.S. Congress and President in fall 1948. between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia must come first, only
How much did this contention reflect the actual Soviet then followed by the inclusion of Albania into this
desire to avoid an unfavorable reaction in the West? And Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation (the Bulgarian records do
was there not some deliberate fomenting of fear on the part not contain such a statement). It is apparent that such a
of the Soviets, as a means of precluding any kind of plan fundamentally differed from Belgrade’s intentions to
attempt at independent action, without consultation with merge Albania with Yugoslavia, and was therefore put
Moscow, on the part of Bulgarian and Yugoslav leaders? forth as a counterbalance to these intentions. Finally, the
At this time researchers do not have at their disposal the Djilas report, as well as all the other records (though the
Soviet documents which would provide a clear answer to Soviet record is not as direct as the others on this point),
these questions. Undoubtedly, the Soviet leadership was notes Stalin’s statement that the creation of the Yugoslav-
sufficiently aware of potential Western reactions to Bulgarian federation ought not be delayed. This raises the
particular statements or actions of either the Kremlin itself question: Did he really favor such a development, and if
or the “people’s democracies.” Nevertheless, while so, why? Documents currently at our disposal do not
accusing Sofia and Belgrade of making moves leading to provide a clear answer. After 1948, the official Yugoslav
an undesirable deterioration in relations with the West, the version always maintained that Stalin was attempting to
Soviet side at the same time considered it entirely accept- force a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation as a means, using
able to implement its own plans, which were obviously the more obedient government of Bulgaria, more effec-
fraught with a potential escalation of conflict with the tively to control Yugoslavia. However, no documentary
Western powers. It is sufficient to recall the Soviet- evidence was ever given in defense of this, while histori-
induced Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February ography contains numerous and entirely different readings
1948, or (to an even greater degree) Soviet measures to of his statements in favor of a swift unification of Bulgaria
limit access to Western sectors in Berlin three months later, and Yugoslavia.40
which led to the Berlin blockade crisis. It seems that the The third point is, how did the question of the Greek
basis for Soviet condemnation of the Yugoslav and partisan movement come up during the February 10
Bulgarian initiatives was, in the final analysis, the dissatis- meeting? All records note that its discussion arose in
faction with the independence of the decisions themselves, connection with the question of Albania. However,
undertaken by Sofia and Belgrade without sanction from according to the Djilas report and—though not so di-
Moscow, although it is entirely possible that at the same rectly—the Soviet report, Stalin began to express his
time the Kremlin was genuinely apprehensive of possible doubts concerning the prospects of the guerrilla war in
Western reactions to these moves. Greece in response to Kardelj’s conclusions regarding the
The other significant point was the question of the threat of an invasion of Albania, while the Bulgarian
origin of Stalin’s statement at the February 10 meeting of records do not note such a connection. According to the
the possibility of creating three federations in East Europe: Soviet record, still prior to the discussion of the Albanian
Polish-Czechoslovak, Hungarian-Romanian, and Bulgar- question, Dimitrov was already asking Stalin concerning
ian-Yugoslav-Albanian. As of now, historians do not have the prospects of future assistance to the Greek partisans.
at their disposal documents which would provide a direct In any case, it is not clear from any of the records whether
explanation for this. However, according to all records of Stalin had planned before the meeting to discuss the future
the February 10 meeting, in speaking of the possibility of of the Greek partisan movement or whether the Greek
three federations, Stalin set this idea in opposition to the question popped up spontaneously.
proposal for a federation or confederation of all East Finally, the fourth point is the manner in which Stalin
European countries, put forth by Dimitrov in the afore- raised the question of the importance of signing protocols
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 117

of commitment to mutual consultation between the USSR 7 Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of the
and Bulgaria and the USSR and Yugoslavia on foreign President of the Russian Federation; APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis’
policy questions. The Djilas report states that this proposal (op.) 1, delo (d.) 397, listy (ll.) 107-110.
8 “Poslednii vizit I. Broza Tito k I.V. Stalinu” ([J. Broz Tito’s
was advanced by Stalin and Molotov within the context of
final visit to J.V. Stalin], Istoricheskii arkhiv 2 (1993), pp. 16-35.
accusations directed at Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for not 9 AJBT KMJ, I-3-b/651, pp. 33-40. Minutes of the CPY
informing Moscow of their projected foreign policy Politburo meeting on 19 February 1948 are in Arhiv Jugoslavije
activities. At the same time, the Bulgarian and Soviet [Archives of Yugoslavia: henceforth AJ], fond 507, CK SKJ, III/
records portray the matter in an entirely different light: 31 a (copy).
Stalin proposed to sign such a protocol in response to 10 AJBT, KMJ, I-3-b/651, pp. 45-46.
Dimitrov’s complaint that Moscow gave out little informa- 11 Kostov’s stenographic record, or more specifically its
tion regarding its position on important foreign policy deciphered version in Bulgarian, was also included in Georgii
questions. Here, as in the case with the Greek partisan Dimitrov’s journal, stored in the same archive: Tsentralen
d’rzhaven arkhiv (documents from the former Central Party
movement, we do not have at our disposal documents to
Archives (TsPA), henceforth TsDA-TsPA), f. 146, op. 2, arkhivna
determine whether Stalin was actually planning to raise
edinitsa (a.e.) 19, ll. 103-128. The rights to the journal now kept
this question, or whether he was simply availing himself of in the archive, including Kostov’s stenographic record, are held
the opportunity provided by Dimitrov’s statement. by Georgii Dimitrov’s adopted son Boiko Dimitrov, to whom I
The records printed below of Stalin’s meetings with am deeply grateful for giving me a copy of the text of this record.
Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist leaders constitute an 12 TsDA-TsPA, f. 147, op. 2, a.e. 62, ll. 5-35 (manuscript).
important source for historical study and point out direc- Kolarov also noted in Russian some statements by Stalin and
tions for further archival research. Molotov (ibid., ll. 1-4).
13 The archive has a typewritten copy.
14 Minutes of conversation of Zorin and Gerashchenko,
department heads in the People’s Commissariat for Foreign
Leonid Gibianskii is a senior researcher at the Institute of Affairs of USSR, with Kardelj and the chief Yugoslav military
Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of envoy in Moscow, Velimir Terzic, 23 November 1944. Arkhiv
Sciences, and most recently the coeditor [with Norman vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of Foreign
Naimark] of The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Policy of the Russian Federation, henceforth, AVP RF), f. 0144,
Eastern Europe, 1944-1949 (Westview Press: Boulder, op. 28, papka (p.) 114, d. 4, ll. 220-221.
15 Copy of Kardelj’s letter to Tito, dated 28 May 1945, AJ, f.
1997).
Edvard Kardelj, kutija (box) “Sabrana dela”, t. IX (X), No. 9, p.
1 Editor’s Note: The May 27/28 meeting only lasted 90 minutes 82; the USSR Embassy memorandum to the Yugoslav govern-
before breaking up for an early morning snack. Stalin was a ment (May 1945) in AJBT, KMJ, I-3-b/616.
16 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent’ev and Hebrang on
night owl and many of his summits (including the 1948 meeting
included here) should be “double-dated,” although for conve- 17 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 26;
nience, the earlier day is often used to identify meetings. On the memorandum “Economic Relations Between the USSR and
abolition of nocturnal summons under Khrushchev, see John Yugoslavia,” 22 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d.
Gaddis, We Now Know (Oxford, 1997) p. 206. 10, ll. 6-7.
2 Vladimir Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju [Josip 17 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent’ev and Hebrang on
Broz Tito: Materials for Biography] (Belgrade, 1953), pp. 447- 16 April and between Lavrent’ev and Hebrang on 17 April 1946,
453, 497-504. For a slightly different version, in English AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 20-21; Hebrang’s letter
translation, see Tito Speaks (London, 1953) and Tito (New York, to Kardelj, dated 17 April 1946, AJBT, KMJ, I-3-b/623, l. 1.
18 Hebrang’s letter to Kardelj, dated 17 April 1946, AJBT, KMJ,
1953).
3 Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York, 1962), I-3-b/623, pp. 1-3.
19 The letter still remains in Tito’s archive: see previous
pp. 114-120 (in Yugoslavia this could only be published almost
three decades later: Milovan Djilas, Razgovori sa Staljinom footnote.
20 Copies of minutes of these Politburo meetings, AJ, f. 507,
(Belgrade, 1990), pp. 111-118); Edvard Kardelj, Borba za
priznanje i nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944-1957: Secanja CKSKJ, III/17; III/18. The decision was secret, and it was
[The Struggle for Recognition and Independence of New published only when the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict broke out in
Yugoslavia 1944-1957: Memoirs] (Belgrade-Ljubljana, 1980), 1948; see Borba (Belgrade), 30 June 1948.
21 Minutes of conversation between Tito and Lavrent’ev, 18
pp. 112-117.
4 Thirty years later Dedijer himself admitted this selectiveness, April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 31.
22 Ibid.
explaining that this was entirely due to the fact that he was
23 Memorandum “On the creation of an industrial infrastructure
writing the book from the perspective of the Yugoslav govern-
ment. Vladimir Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza for the production of ammunition in Yugoslavia,” 27 May 1946,
Tita [New Materials for Josip Broz Tito’s Biography], vol.3 AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, ll. 19-20.
24 Copy of minutes of this Politburo meeting, AJ, f. 507,
(Belgrade, 1984), pp. 283-284, 291-293.
5 While dictating his memoirs, Kardelj asked to verify, corrobo- CKSKJ, III/16.
25 Minutes of conversation between Tito and Lavrent’ev, 18
rate and expand many of his recollections on the basis of archival
documents. See Edvard Kardelj, Borba, p. 14. April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 31.
6 Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavihe 26 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent’ev and Tito, 29
(henceforth AJBT, KMJ), I-1/7, pp. 6-11. April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 62.
118 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

27 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent’ev and Tito, 7 May Yugoslavia, 1 July 1946: AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15,
1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 76. ll. 167-168; and ibid., d. 16, l. 1.
28 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent’ev and Kardelj, 23 36 See L. Ya. Gibianskii, “Problemy mezhdunarodno-
April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 45; also see politicheskogo strukturirovaniia Vostochnoi Evropy v period
footnote 28. formirovaniia sovetskogo bloka v 1940-e gody” [Problems of
29 Memorandum, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, ll. 1-3. East European International-Political Structuring during the
30 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent’ev and Tito, 20 Period of the Formation of the Soviet Bloc during the 1940s], in
May 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 100. M.M. Narinskii et al., eds., Kholodnaia voina: novye podkhody,
31 I considered this problem in my “Balkanskii uzel” [The novye dokumenty [The Cold War: New Approaches, New
Balkan Knot], in O.A. Rzheshevskii, ed., Vtoraia mirovaia Documents] (Moscow, 1995), pp. 103, 105, 106-107.
voina: Aktual’nye problemy [The Second World War: Contempo- 37 These notes, untitled and undated, can be found in AJBT,
rary Problems] (Moscow, 1995), pp. 96-101. KMJ, I-1/7, pp. 51-52.
32 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent’ev and Tito, 22 38 I have examined this episode elsewhere in more depth on the
April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 39-41. basis of Russian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian archival materials.
33 Copy of “Agreement on Economic Cooperation Between the See, e.g., “The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Formation
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federative People’s of the `Socialist Camp’ Model,” in Odd Arne Westad et al., eds.,
Republic of Yugoslavia,” 8 June 1946, Arkhiv Ministerstva The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989 (London & New
vneshnikh economicheskikh sviazei Rossiiskoi Federatsii York, 1994), pp. 30-39; “The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav
[Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Conflict and the Cominform,” in Giuliano Procacci et al., eds.,
Russian Federation)], fond: Treaty-Legal Department, op. 11876, The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/
d. 55, ll. 17-19. 1949 (Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli: Annali, Anno
34 Negotiations for a concrete agreement were being carried out Trentesimo) (Milano, 1994), pp. 469-472, 474.
by a special Yugoslav military-trade delegation which arrived in 39 Detailed analysis of this meeting can be found in: L.Ya.
Moscow in fall 1946. The type and the amount of materials Gibianskii, “K istorii sovetsko-iugoslavskogo konflikta 1948-
designated for shipment to Yugoslavia were determined by the 1953 gg.: sekretnaia sovetsko-yugoslavo-bolgarskaia vstrecha v
Soviet side on the basis of a Yugoslav procurement application, Moskve 10 fevralia 1948 goda” [On the History of the Soviet-
the first of which was handed over at the time of Tito’s visit. See, Yugoslav Conflict of 1948-1953: The Secret Soviet-Yugoslav-
e.g., the correspondence between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Bulgarian Meeting in Moscow on 10 February 1948], Sovetskoe
Affairs and the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow during November slavianovedenie (since 1992 Slavianovedenie) 3 and 4 (1991) and
1946-March 1947; AVP RF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, ll. 121, 125, 1 and 3 (1992). For a shorter analysis see my “The 1948 Soviet-
132-143; ibid., op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, l. 23. Yugoslav Conflict...,” pp. 40-42.
35 Minutes of conversations between Lavrent’ev and Enver 40 For more details see L. Ya. Gibianskii, “K istorii...,”
Hoxha (the latter had arrived in Belgrade by then), 24 June 1946, Sovetskoe slavianovedenie no. 1 (1992), pp. 55 ff.
and between Lavrent’ev and Hysni Kapo, Albanian Minister in

For further documentation on:

• the Soviet-Yugoslav split

• the 1956 Hungarian Crisis

• Stalin as a Statesman

visit the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin at:

 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT B ULLETIN 10 119

I. Soviet and Yugoslav Records of the ment of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations. Yugoslavia
Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May 1946 has a fair amount of mineral and ore deposits, but it is in
no position to organize production, since it does not
A. The Soviet Record: possess the necessary machinery. In particular, Yugoslavia
has oil deposits, but no drilling machines.
Record of Conversation of Com. Stalin said: “We will help.”
Generalissimus I.V. Stalin with Marshal Tito Regarding com. Stalin’s questions, whether Yugosla-
via was producing aluminum, copper and lead, Tito
27 May 1946 at 23:00 hours1 answered in the affirmative, noting that Yugoslavia had
Secret many bauxite and ore deposits for the production of these
Present: metals.
from the USSR side – [USSR Foreign Minister] V.M. Com. Stalin noted that the Ministry of Foreign Trade
Molotov, USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia A.I. had informed Yugoslavia of its readiness to participate in
Lavrent’ev; talks regarding the establishment of mixed associations,
but no final answer had been received from Yugoslavia.
from the Yugoslav side — Minister of Internal Affairs, A. As a result, the impression was created that Yugoslavia
Rankovich; Head of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General was not interested in forming such associations.7
K. Popovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Tito objected, stating that on the contrary, he had
Serbia, Neshkovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers spoken several times with ambassador Sadchikov8 about
of Slovenia, Kidrich; Yugoslav Ambassador to USSR, V. the Yugoslav government’s desire to create mixed Soviet-
Popovich.2 Yugoslav associations.
Regarding com. Stalin’s note whether it will not be
At the start of the meeting com. Stalin asked Tito necessary to allow other powers into the Yugoslav
whether, in the instance of Trieste being granted the status economy following the formation of mixed Soviet-
of a free city, this would involve just the city itself or the Yugoslav associations, Tito answered that the Yugoslav
city suburbs, 3 and which status would be better - along government had no intention of allowing the capital of
the lines of Memel [Klaipeda, Lithuania] or those of other powers into its economy.
Danzig [Gdansk, Poland].4 Tito replied that the suburbs of Subsequently, com. Stalin summarized, saying that in
the city are inhabited by Slovenians. Only the city itself this way the Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation was
would be acceptable. Though he would like to continue to being conceptualized on the basis of forming mixed
argue for including Trieste in Yugoslavia. Further, Tito, in associations.
the name of the Yugoslav government, expressed gratitude Tito affirmed this, stating that he was intent on
to com. Molotov for the support that the Soviet delegation presenting the following day his proposals, in written
showed in the discussion of the question of the Italian- form, on this subject.9
Yugoslav border at the Council of Ministers of Foreign With respect to the question of military cooperation,
Affairs in Paris.5 Tito said that the Yugoslav government would like to
Com. Molotov gave a report on the differences in receive shipments from the Soviet Union to supply the
status between Memel and Danzig, pointing out that the military needs of Yugoslavia, not in the form of mutual
status along the lines of Memel is more acceptable. trade receipts, but in the form of loans. Yugoslavia has a
Com. Stalin asked Tito about the industrial and small military industry which could produce grenade
agricultural situation in Yugoslavia. launchers and mines. In a number of places there were
Tito replied that all land had been sown the intermedi- cadres. But there were no corresponding arms, since the
ate crop was awaited, and that industry was working well. Germans carried them away. The Yugoslav government
After which, com. Stalin invited Tito to present the would like to receive some machinery from Germany as
group of questions which the Yugoslav delegation wished reparations for the reconstruction of certain military
to discuss this evening. factories. But Yugoslavia cannot by itself provide for all
Tito put forth the following questions: economic of its military needs, and in this regard, the Yugoslav
cooperation between USSR and Yugoslavia, military government is hoping for assistance from the Soviet
cooperation,6 and Yugoslav-Albanian relations. Union.
Regarding the question of economic cooperation, Tito Com. Stalin said that Yugoslavia ought to have certain
said that Yugoslavia did not want to turn to the United military factories, for example, aviation [factories], for
States for credit. If America were to agree to provide Yugoslavia may produce aluminum given the presence of
loans, then this would be tied to demands for political rich bauxite deposits. In addition, it was necessary to have
concessions from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia does not have artillery munitions factories.
the means for further industrial development. The Tito noted that [artillery] gun barrels may be cast in
Yugoslav government would like to receive assistance the Soviet Union and then further assembly may be done
from the Soviet Union, in particular, through the establish- in Yugoslavia.
120 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

Touching upon the question of Yugoslavia’s water Com. Stalin noted that one need not fear this. During
borders, com. Stalin said that, for the purpose of safe- the initial stages things could be limited to a pact of
guarding them, it was important to have a good naval fleet. friendship and mutual assistance, though indeed, more
You need to have torpedo boats, patrol boats, and armored needs to be done.
boats. Although the Soviet Union is weak in this regard, Tito agreed with this.
we will nevertheless, in the words of com. Stalin, help Com. Molotov noted that at the present time difficul-
you.10 Regarding Albania, com. Stalin pointed out that the ties may arise from the fact that a peace treaty had not yet
internal political situation in Albania was unclear. There been signed with Bulgaria. Bulgaria was perceived as a
were reports that something was happening there between former enemy.14
the Communist Party Politburo and Enver Hoxha. There Com. Stalin pointed out that this should not be of
had been a report that Kochi Dzodzej11 wants to come to significant importance.15 For example, the Soviet Union
Moscow in order to discuss certain questions prior to the signed a treaty of friendship with Poland before Poland
party congress.12 Enver Hoxha has also expressed desire was even recognized by other countries.16
to come to Moscow together with Dzodzej. Further, com. Stalin summarized the meeting, saying
Com. Stalin asked Tito whether he knows anything that what the Yugoslav government is looking for in
about the situation in the Communist Party of Albania. economic questions and in military matters can be ar-
Tito, appearing unacquainted with these questions, ranged. A commission must be established to examine
replied that Hoxha’s visit to Belgrade was being proposed these questions.
for the near future. That is why he, Tito, believes that the Tito informed com. Stalin of Yugoslavia’s relations
reply to the Albanians should note that Dzodzej’s and with Hungary, notifying of Rakosi’s17 visit to Belgrade.
Hoxha’s proposed visit to Moscow will be examined Tito declared that the Yugoslav government had decided
following Hoxha’s visit to Belgrade. not to raise the question of Yugoslavia’s territorial de-
Com. Molotov noted that we were trying to hold back mands against Hungary (demands on the Ban’skii triangle
the Albanians’ efforts to come to Moscow, but the Alba- [“Baiskii triangle,” the region along the Hungarian-
nians were determined in this. Yugoslav border centered on the city of Baia.])18 in the
Com. Stalin noted that the Albanians’ visit to Moscow Council of Ministers.19 Tito expressed his satisfaction
might bring an unfavorable reaction from England and with Yugoslavia’s signing of an agreement with Hungary
America, and this would further exacerbate the foreign on reparation payments.
policy situation of Albania. Com. Stalin noted that if Hungary wanted peaceful
Further, com. Stalin asked Tito whether Enver Hoxha relations with Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia had to support
agreed with including Albania in the Federation of these endeavors, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia’s primary
Yugoslavia. difficulties were in its relations with Greece and Italy.
Tito replied in the affirmative. Recorded by Lavrent’ev.
Com. Stalin said that, at the present time it would be
difficult for Yugoslavia to resolve two such questions as [Source: Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), f.
the inclusion of Albania into Yugoslavia and the question 45, op. 1, d. 397, ll. 107-110. Published in Istoricheskii arkhiv,
of Trieste. No. 2, 1993. Translated by Daniel Rozas.]
Tito agreed with this. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

As a result, continued com. Stalin, it would be wise to

first examine the question of friendship and mutual B. The Yugoslav Record
assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia.
Tito said that, above all, this treaty must provide for Yugoslav Record of Conversation of I.V. Stalin
the defense of the territorial integrity and national indepen- and the Yugoslav Government Delegation
dence of Albania. Headed by J. Broz Tito, 27-28 May 1946
Com. Stalin said that it is important to find a formula In the Kremlin
for this treaty and to bring Albania and Yugoslavia closer 27.V.46*, 23:00 hours.
together.13
Com. Stalin touched on the question of including [*Recorded by B. Neshkovich.]
Bulgaria in the Federation.
Tito said that nothing would come of the Federation. [Translator’s note: the brackets used in the text are from
Com. Stalin retorted: “This must be done.” the Russian translation of the Serbo-Croatian document.
Tito declared that nothing would come of the federa- Any brackets and notes by the English translator will
tion, because the matter involved two different regimes. In hereafter be denoted by “trans.”]
addition, Bulgaria is strongly influenced by other parties,
while in Yugoslavia the entire government, [though] with [Present:] Stalin, Molotov, Lavrent’ev, Tito, Marko,20
the presence of other parties, is essentially in the hands of Kocha,21 Vlado,22 Kidrich, Neshkovich.
the Communist Party.
Stalin: “Beautiful people, strong people.”
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 121

[Stalin:] “A hardy nation.” ite.” T[ito] explained where the deposits were, as well as
Molotov: agreed.23 the locations Bora, Trepcha and Rasha31 - and that we
Stalin: Asks how was our trip. have good coal, but not coke for house ovens.
Tito [says] it went well... 3) M[olotov said that] one of the Italian economic
Stalin (chuckling, ironically): “How is my ‘friend’ arguments for receiving Rasha is the fact that without it
[Russian word used in text] Shubashich?” Italy would only be able to meet 20% of its demand.
Tito (similarly) [says], he is in Zagreb, in the coop.24 4) The army.
And also Grol.25 S[talin]: “This is right, that in the event of war,
Stalin (similarly): “And how is my `friend’ [Russian because of the difficulty of supply, that [there ought to be]
word used in text] Grol?” as much military industry in the country as is possible. It
Tito (similarly): “He’s in Belgrade”... would be good to develop the aviation industry, given the
[Tito:] “We always had measures to suppress them. rich bauxite deposits, and, as for artillery, the forging
The parties exist only formally, though in fact they don’t ought to be done within the country.”
exist. In reality, only the Communist party exists.”26 S[talin]: “For coastal defense, you need to build
Stalin chuckled pleasantly at this. formations of fast, light, and mobile ships, for Italy will be
Stalin: “What kind of crop will you have?” left with a sufficiently strong Navy (about two squad-
Tito: “An especially good one. The land has been well rons).”
sown. In the passive regions27 it will be good. The T[ito]: “... In Boka Kotorska32 ships of 30,000 tons
assistance of UNRRA28 will not be needed. There will be can be stationed.”
lots of fruit.” S[talin]: “These days they build ships of 60,000 tons.
Stalin: “Have you sown everything?” Currently we are having great difficulties in naval fleet
Tito: “Everything has been sown.” construction, but we must assist you. I agree to assist you
Stalin: “What is your plan? What would you like to with equipment for munitions and light firearms factories.
raise [for discussion]?” We will also assist you with cadres, who will help to
Tito: puts forth economic and military questions. organize officer improvement schools, which would in 1-2
Stalin during the whole time: “We’ll help!” years be turned into an Academy (on the level of the
* [Stalin] “How are Kardelj and Djilas?”29[* Here a line Frunze [Academy]).
was moved from below where it is denoted by *__*.] Shipments for the Y[ugoslav] A[rmy] will be made
T[ito]: “Well. We couldn’t all come, and so only half outside the framework of trade agreements - that is, free
of the government is here.” and on credit.
S[talin]: “The English and Americans don’t want to It is very important that you have a naval fleet. We
give you Trieste!” (chuckling). will assist you in the construction of shipyards and bases
T[ito]: thanked for the support, [said] that the people and corresponding nav[al] cadres.
send their greetings to Stalin and Molotov, [speaks] of the We will assist you with the extraction of oil.
great political significance [of Soviet support]. Together with munitions factories, it is important to
Molotov: “But you still do not have Trieste...”. reestablish arsenals, with which we will also assist you. It
T[ito]: nevertheless, [Soviet support] is of great is necessary to examine the possibility of constructing
pol[itical] importance...30 aviation-engine factories.”
* During the time that Tito [...]*. 5) Albania*.
[Further, two lines are crossed out:”S[talin]: “What
27.V.46** do you think of [doing] with Albania?”
23:00 h. T[ito]: “Sign...”.]T[ito] [with regard to the naval
[** Recorded by K. Popovich.] fleet]: “We must know whether our border will be along
…1) S[talin]: “On our part we made a proposal to Albania or the coast.”
your comrades, responsible for eco[nomic] questions, S[talin]: “What exactly are you proposing?”
whether you would agree to the establishment of joint T[ito]: “To sign one good treaty to help Albania - a
enterprises. We will hold nothing against you if you treaty to defend independence, this will help both in the
decline. Poland, for ex[ample], declined on the grounds given situation and with regard to the naval threat.”
that the Americans may, in their turn, raise questions of S[talin]: “This is a new formulation, but it ought to be
establishing joint enterprises.” examined and worked out. You worked out a good treaty
T[ito]: “No, such is not my opinion nor the opinion of with Czechia and found a new formulation: not only
other leaders - [on the contrary, we think] it is necessary.” against Germany and its allies during the war, but also
2) S[talin]: “...I agree to the establishment of these against its future allies.33 But one needs to think about it
enterprises as you see fit...”. (M[olotov]: “In those fields more and find an appropriate formulation.
that are more beneficial both for you and for us...”) Right now is not the time for a federation (not with
S[talin]: expressed interest in where our oil and Bulgaria either). Most important now is the question of
bauxite deposits are located. “You have very good baux- Trieste, and this must be decided first. But if you want a
122 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

treaty right now, both are possible (Trieste and Albania) at bourg[eois] parties, the monarchy and the Bulg[arian]
the same time” (at this he chuckled). position on signing a peace treaty.”
T[ito]: “Three times we put off Enver Hoxha’s visit to S[talin]: “Correct, but they must be offered help.”
B[el]g[ra]de, since we were planning on a meeting with 7) Hungary.
you. Generally speaking, we are ready to sign an agree- T[ito]: “We have no territ[orial] demands. Since the
ment with Albania assuring [its—trans.] “sovereignty.” int[ernal] polit[ical] situation has been corrected there, we
***. have dropped our territ[orial] demands in accordance with
[***Here text has been inserted from below, marked your advice.”37
by ******__******.]S[talin]: “Do you know Enver? S[talin]: “Right. If you have good relations with your
What kind of person is he?**** [**** Further text is nor[thern] neighbor, then Greece will also look at you
crossed out: “They were trying to visit us, but they do not differently... And does Greece raise any demands with
want to send Enver by himself - they want Kochi Dzodzej regard to Yugoslavia?”
to accompany him.” This phrase is printed in a slightly T[ito]: “There were provocations against us, but not in
altered form further below.] Is he a communist? Are there recent times.”
any internal problems of their own - what is your informa- S[talin]: “The Eng[lish] maintain an army there in
tion on this?” order to prop up the reactionary forces, and yes, possibly
T[ito]: “I did not see Enver Hoxha [sic—trans.], he is for other reasons as well.”
a young man, but in the course of the war he became T[ito]: (laughs): “We have demands against them:
popular... Aegean Maced[onia] and Salonikki.”
****** We will work out an agreement and foster M[olotov]: “Yes, Salonikki is an old Slavic city. You
circumstances for greater closeness.” need access to the Aegean sea.”
S[talin] agreed.****** S[talin]: “Damn it* [*Russian words used in docu-
T[ito]: “...and in general, the government consists of ment.] Many comrades have gone to Bulg[aria], but things
young people. As far as we know, there aren’t any kind of are not moving, not developing as they should. The
special problems.”34 com[munists] have influence, but they do not hold
S[talin]: “They were trying to come here, but they do corresponding positions in the state apparatus. We should
not want to send Enver alone, but Kochi Dzodzej wants to have told them to remove Stainov.38 Currently we have
come with him - as some kind of restraint. What do you there the Sec[retary] of the Min[istry] of For[eign]
know of this?” Affairs.”** [**Russian word used in document.]
T[ito]: “We are not aware [of this] nor of the presence T[ito]: “I later explained to Rakosi that we demanded
of some kind of disagreements.” Petchui39 because of strat[egic] reasons and in order to
S[talin]: “We are constantly putting off their visit. help the Hung[arian] communists, since the reactionary
What do you think, should we receive them? We think forces were beginning to raise their heads.”
that there is no need.” S[talin]: “And did they really believe you?..”40
T[ito]: “Yes, we can take care of everything with S[talin]: “And what further plans have you for
them.” tonight?”
S[talin]: “Right now it would be inconvenient for us T[ito]: “We don’t have [a plan].”
and for them. Better if we help them through you.”35 S[talin] (laughing): “Leadership, but without a state*
S[talin]: after this, expressed the opinion that some- [*Russian word used in document.] plan!” (laughing).
thing is amiss in the Alb[anian] Politburo. Vlado: “We accommodated ourselves to meet with
Marko: “Comrades in the Politburo do not see Env[er] you.”
Hoxha as a sufficiently solid party member, and thus they S[talin]: “Then we can have a snack.”** [**Russian
always insist on him being accompanied by Kochi word used in text and alongside in brackets an explanation
Dzodzej as the most senior party member in the Politburo. in Serbo-Croatian is given: “to eat something”.]
At the April plenum they discussed the question of the M[olotov]: “If you are inviting us, then with great
party line, especially with regard to Yugoslavia and the pleasure.”
S[oviet] Union, and ascertained certain mistakes, and At the villa***
excluded Seifulla Maleshov36 from the Politburo as a
bearer of these mistakes. Since then, the leadership has [*** Russian words used in text with explanations in
been more consistent.” Serbo-Croatian alongside in brackets.]
T[ito]: “We can resolve this question with them.”
S[talin]: “Good.” S[talin]. Regarding Togliatti41: theoretician, journal-
6) Bulgaria. ist, can write a good article, a good comrade, but to gather
S[talin]: “Are you currently in favor of a federation people and “guide” them - this he cannot do; he has
with Bulgaria?” difficult circumstances there.
T[ito]: “No. Now is not the time. For they have not Torres [Thorez] and Duclos: good comrades.42
yet definitively resolved many things: the army, the Jose (Diaz)43 was good, intelligent. Passionaria 44 is
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 123

not the same, she cannot gather and lead; at this difficult USSR Soviet of Ministers, member of the Politburo, secretary
time she is in no condition to govern. In Rumania there are (essentially general secretary) of the Central Committee [CC] of
good young comrades. the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) (TsK VKP(b)); Josip
Broz Tito (1892-1980) - chairman of the Council of Ministers of
In Germany F. is a good leader, Pieck - “the fa-
Yugoslavia, general secretary of the Communist Party of
ther”**** [****Russian word used in document.], is Yugoslavia (CPY); V.M.Molotov (Skriabin: 1890-1986) - vice-
gathering people and resolving various questions...45 chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR Minister of Foreign
Germans are nothing without orders. of Affairs, member of TsK VKP(b) Politburo; A.I. Lavrent’ev
The International - there’s nothing to say.46 (1904-1984); Aleksandr Rankovich (1909-1983) - Politburo
Referenda - “but it’s nonsense”*****47 member, secretary of CC CPY, in charge of organizational and
cadre affairs; Kocha Popovic (b.1908); Blagoe Neshkovich (b.
[***** Russian words used in quotes in the document.] 1907), also CC secretary of the C[ommunist] P[arty] of Serbia;
Boris Kidrich (1912-1953), at the 7 May 1946 meeting of the CC
CPY Politburo was appointed to the post of Chairman of the
Warlike people are trying to draw in the Greeks. 48
Economic Council and Minister of Industry and Trade (AJ-CK
“Do you want another war, to have your backs beaten SKJ.III 19) in place of Hebrang (see introduction), the official
again, to have Slavs lose another ten million? - If you do appointment took place in June after returning from Moscow;
not want this, then the Slavs must unite in a single front Vladimir Popovic (1914-1972).
with the Sov[iet] Union.” Only the more important Yugoslav activists who had arrived
The idea of revenge in Italy. in Moscow were present at the meeting with Stalin. In addition
Realism and idealism of Benes:49 realist, when shown to those noted above, the delegation accompanying Tito in his
strength, but would be an idealist if he felt he was in visit to USSR included the assistant Chief of the General Staff
possession of strength (this is an answer to Tito’s remark: Rade Khamovich, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Zdenko
Ulepich, directors of the departments of the Navy and of Military
Benes is an English person, though a realist).
Industry in the Ministry of People’s Defense of Yugoslavia,
“Firlinger50 will go with the communists.” Srechko Manola and Miyalko Todorovich, commander of the
Relations between Czechia and Poland: Entertaining People’s Defense Corps of Yugoslavia (state security force) Jovo
as a pre-election maneuver; fact is, they did not undertake Vukotich, member of the Union Planning Commission Zvonko
any dip[lomatic] steps.51 Morich, author Radovan Zogovic, in charge of cultural policy
Yugoslavia is a democracy* [*further crossed out: affairs and CC CPY agit[ation]-prop[aganda]. See Archive of
“new”] of a special type (non-Soviet type), different from Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 144, op. 6,
all others. p. 8, d. 2, ll. 169-170; Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (Josip Broz Tito
“We are Serbs, Molotov and I ... we are two Archives, Belgrade), F. Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavije [hereafter
AJBT-KMJ], I-1/7, L.1.)
Serbs...”** [**Phrase composed of Russian words.] 3 The majority of the Trieste population was Italian, while the
“Slovenian*** [***Russian word used in text.] adjoining region [oblast’] was settled primarily by Slovenians
mercenary intelligentsia.”52 and Croatians. Yugoslavia, with the USSR’s support, claimed
Eucalyptus.53 this entire territory, which had been included as a part of Italy
“Tito must take care of himself, that nothing would following World War I. The Yugoslav proposal was to grant
happen to him ... for I will not live long ... laws of physiol- Trieste the status of a separate federal unit, within the parameters
ogy..., but you will remain for Europe...”54 of the Federated Yugoslav state, while granting the port of Trieste
Churchill told him about Tito..., that he is “a good the jurisdiction of a free port. The Western powers came out
man.” - St[alin]: “I don’t know him, but if you say so, that against transferring Trieste and its adjoining regions to Yugosla-
via. Western diplomats were discussing possible compromises
means he must be good. I will try to meet him.”55
by granting Trieste and its adjoining regions the special status of
Let Djido come, so I could rest under his care... “I will a “free city.” Later, by the end of June 1946, such a proposal was
cure my migraine under his care.”56 made by France.
“Bevin - an English Noske”57 4 Under the Versailles treaty of 1919, Danzig (Gdansk) and an
Vlado inquired about Marko, and after Marko, about adjoining region, up until that time under claim by Poland from
Vlado... Germany, were given a special status under the protection of the
“Beriia - Marko - who will subvert whom?”58 League of Nations. Danzig had the status of a demilitarized free
city with its own laws and government organs, while control of
[Source: Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita. Fond Kabinet Marsala its foreign relations and its water and rail transport lines was held
Jugoslavije. I-1/7. L. 6-11. Original. Manuscript. Document by Poland, to whose customs system it also belonged. Memel
obtained and translated into Russian by L. Gibianskii; translated (Klaipeda) and its adjoining region, until 1919 having also
into English by Daniel Rozas.] belonged to Germany but now claimed by the new Lithuanian
state, was at first put under the control of the Entente, and then
1 According to the register of persons received by Stalin, the transferred to Lithuanian authority under the conditions of the
meeting lasted from 23:00 hours, 27 May 1946, to 00:30 hours, special convention of 1924. It stipulated significant autonomy
28 May 1946. Note by Yu.G. Murin, Archive of the President of for Memel in its internal affairs, laws and executive organs, but
the Russian Federation (APRF), Fond (f.) 45, Opis’ (op.) 1, Delo which nevertheless had to operate under the parameters of the
(d.) 416, List (l.) 95 ob. Lithuanian constitution.
2 I. V. Stalin (Djugashvili; 1879 (1878)-1953 - chairman of the 5 The Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of the USSR, USA,
124 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

Great Britain, France and China was created by the decision of Materials for Josip Broz Tito’s Biography], T. 3 (Belgrade, 1984),
the Potsdam conference in preparation for a peace treaty with pp. 244-245.)
Germany and its former European allies. At the CFM meeting in 8 I.V. Sadchikov (b. 1906), USSR ambassador to Yugoslavia
Paris during 25 April - 16 May 1946, where, among other things, from March 1945 to February 1946. He was replaced by
the peace treaty with Italy was being drafted for later examina- Lavrent’ev.
tion by the Paris peace conference, a central point of discussion 9 On the following day Tito proposed that in order to make
became the establishment of a new Italian-Yugoslav border, in comments the Yugoslav delegation should take the draft of the
connection with the problem of Trieste and its adjoining territory. agreement put together by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade.
The Soviet delegation under Molotov’s leadership actively (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 119.) As a result,
supported Yugoslav territorial claims. on 8 June 1946, concurrently with the inter-government agree-
6 During the meeting with Lavrent’ev on 18 April 1946, Tito ment on mutual shipment of goods for 1946 (Historical-Foreign
announced his intention to visit Moscow to discuss economic Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties
cooperation, and also noted that such cooperation “must also of the Russian Federation, f. Treaty-Legal Department, op.
include the sphere of military industry.” (See AVP RF, f. 0144, 11876, d. 55, ll. 14-16), Mikoian and Petrovic signed an
op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 31.) Yugoslavia, having received from the agreement on economic cooperation. This agreement provided
USSR during 1944-46 large-scale shipments of weapons, for the creation of eight Soviet-Yugoslav joint-stock enterprises
ammunition, military equipment, and military machinery in Yugoslavia: extraction and refinement of crude oil, extraction
(including equipment for 32 infantry divisions, several aviation of bauxite and production of aluminum, extraction and produc-
divisions, tank and artillery brigades), had made similar requests tion of lead, exploration and extraction of coal, ferrous metal
previously. Since the summer of 1945, Yugoslavia had been production, civilian aviation, the Danube shipping company, and
sending requests to the Soviet government for captured factories, the Soviet-Yugoslav bank. It also provided for further examina-
workshops, and materials for the production of ammunition, tion of the proposed lumber and paper-cellulose enterprise. The
mainly from Soviet occupation zones in Germany and Austria. agreement contained the overall equal-term scheme for enterprise
The Soviet side tried to fulfill these incoming requests in part. organization, while the actual establishment of each of these was
(Ibid., d. 10, ll. 18-19; ibid., f. 144, op. 5, p. 5, d. 2, ll. 44, 46, 49- to be formulated by separate concrete agreements. (See ibid., ll.
50; ibid., op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, l. 43.) However, Tito, who had 17-19.) In addition to the establishment of enterprises, the
proposed even in January 1946 to send a military delegation to agreement provided for Soviet technical assistance to Yugoslavia
Moscow for the purpose of agreeing on a general plan for the in areas of electrical, food, textile, chemical, and metal forging
training and equipping of a 350-400,000 men-strong Yugoslav industries, as well as the production of building materials and in
army, tried to get the USSR to render broader assistance in the agriculture (ibid., l. 17). Like other documents signed during this
construction of the Yugoslav military industry, possibly through visit, the agreement on economic cooperation was not published.
mixed Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises. (Ibid., f. 0144, op. 30, p. The joint communique issued in connection with the visit stated
118, d. 10, ll. 19-20.) On April 9, during an expanded meeting of only that “decisions were made concerning close economic
the CC CPY Politburo, the members of the military delegation cooperation between both friendly countries.” Pravda, 12 June
which was to go to USSR for negotiations were mentioned: K. 1946.
Popovic, Z. Ulepic, S. Manola, M. Todorovic (Arhiv Jugoslavije But the carrying out of the agreement met with difficulties.
(Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade), F. SKJ, CK SKJ [hereafter By February 1947, an agreement had been reached only with
AJ-CK SKJ] III/16), that is, the same people who later accompa- regard to the establishment of two enterprises: civilian aviation
nied Tito to Moscow. and the Danube shipping company. As for the others, the main
7 Stalin was referring to the situation as of mid-April 1946 (see stumbling block was tied to the production of Yugoslav mineral
introduction). However, following this, the trade delegation led resources: Yugoslavia insisted that the value of mineral deposits
by the Minister of Foreign Trade Petrovic, which visited Moscow be counted as part of their share of the investment, while the
during the first half of May, was assigned the task, in addition to Soviet side maintained that the overall value of mineral deposits
preparing an agreement for mutual shipments of goods, of also could not be counted as investment. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op.
holding negotiations to draft agreements on economic coopera- 30, p. 118, d. 16, ll. 75, 109-110.) This was discussed by the CC
tion, including the establishment of joint enterprises. Thus, these CPY Politburo in late September 1946, where frustration with the
questions were discussed by the delegation during its negotia- Soviet position was voiced, with some members, as Lavrent’ev
tions with the Soviet partners prior to Tito’s arrival. (See AVP later found out, going so far as to compare this to the “capitalist
RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 12, l. 5; ibid., d. 15, ll. 38, 90.) On countries’” mining of Yugoslav mineral resources before the war.
the question of joint enterprises, there were disagreements, which (See AJ-CK SJK. III/21; AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 16. ll.
had emerged already during late April, when separate negotia- 75-76.) And when in early 1947 the Yugoslav government
tions commenced in Belgrade on the first of these, an aviation sought decisive action from Molotov and even Stalin himself for
enterprise: the Yugoslav delegates considered the Soviet version the swift establishment of the planned enterprises on the basis of
of the agreement on this enterprise unacceptable to Yugoslavia. Yugoslav proposals, Stalin, during a 19 April 1947 meeting with
The examination of this question was transferred over to the Kardelj, announced that there must be no further establishment of
Moscow talks on the general problems of organizing future enterprises and proposed instead to assist Yugoslav industrializa-
enterprises. Both sides expressed mutual dissatisfaction with tion through Soviet shipments of complex machinery and
each other’s position with regard to the negotiations on the materials, access to blueprints and technical documentation, and
aviation enterprise. (See ibid., d. 10, ll. 6-7; d. 15, ll. 89-90; the dispatch of specialists on terms of credit. (See ASSIP-PA,
Arhiva Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove SFRJ 1947 god, F-IV, Str. Pov. 125, 1234, 1238; AJBT-KMJ, I-3-6/639,
(Archives of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the ll. 2-3; ibid., I-3-6/646, ll. 9-11.) Yugoslavia agreed, and the
SFRY [Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia], Belgrade), Politicka corresponding agreement was signed in Moscow on 25 July
arhiva (hereafter ASSIP-PA), 1948 god. F-I, Pov. 1535; V. 1947.
Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita [New
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 125

10 The outcome of the visit was announced in a joint communi- closer relations with Yugoslavia.” This had an influence on the
que: “The government of USSR agreed to equip the Yugoslav Albanian position and in particular on Hoxha, who arrived in
Army with weapons, ammunition, etc. on conditions of long-term Belgrade in late June 1946, where he consulted with Lavrent’ev
credit, as well as to assist in the reestablishment of the Yugosla- before signing the corresponding Yugoslav-Albanian documents
vian military industry.” (Pravda, 12 June 1946.) However, no in early July. (Ibid., d. 15, ll. 167-168; ibid., d. 16, l. 1.)
concrete agreement had been signed at this point. It was to be 14 Already since late 1944, the leadership of the communist
worked out in special negotiations. Even during Tito’s visit, the parties of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, having come to power, began
Yugoslav General Staff forwarded requests, on the basis of which talks on uniting both countries into a federation. The talks were
the Soviet General Staff determined the type and quantity of sanctioned, if not even initiated, by Stalin himself, who at the
materiel to be shipped to Yugoslavia, and a portion of the time was in favor of expediting the creation of such a body.
shipments began to arrive even before the forthcoming agree- Apparently, he had intended this as a means to significantly
ment. (See AVP RF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, ll. 132-134; ibid., op. strengthen the “people’s democracy” in Bulgaria: first, with the
7, p. 12, d. 1, l. 23.; ASSIP-PA, 1945/1946 god., F-IV, Str. Pov. help of the more stable communist regime in Yugoslavia, and
968; ibid., 1947 god., F-IV, Str. Pov. 1881.) second, reckoning that by uniting with Yugoslavia—a member of
11 Enver Hoxha (1908-1985) - first secretary of the CC CPA the anti-Hitler coalition—Bulgaria would successfully shed its
[Com. Party of Albania], chairman of the Council of Ministers of status as a vanquished nation and consequently escape U.S. and
Albania. Kochi Dzodzej - organizational secretary of CC CPA, British prerogatives stemming from their participation in the
vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of establishment of allied control. In early 1945, however, the
Internal Affairs, the number-two man in the Albanian government Western allies, exercising these prerogatives, vetoed the
at the time. In 1948 he lost in the power struggle against Hoxha, establishment of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. And when
was stripped of all posts, arrested, and executed in 1949. Stalin in turn decided to have Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for now
12 In February 1946 the CC CPA Plenum resolved to call the sign only a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the veto
First CPA Congress on 25 May 1946. However, the Congress was extended to this as well. The matter had to be put off to
was not called until November 1948. follow the signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria. See L. Ya.
13 The memorandum “On Yugoslav-Albanian Relations,” put Gibianskii, “U nachala konflikta: balkanskii uzel” [“The
together by the director of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Beginning of Conflict: the Balkan Knot”], Rabochii klass i
(MFA) Balkan sector, A.A. Lavrishchev, in preparation for Tito’s sovremennyi mir 2 (1990), pp. 172-173.
visit to Moscow, labelled the completion of the Yugoslav- In early 1946, although the peace treaty was still far off, the
Albanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance “useful and Bulgarian side began to pose the question to the Soviet and
important,” and contained only the recommendation to avoid Yugoslav governments of resuming the Bulgarian-Yugoslav talks
mentioning Italy in the treaty, adopting instead the wording from on federating, broken off a year ago. This was done mainly in
the Yugoslav-Polish treaty signed in March 1946, which could be January 1946, during the Moscow visit of the Bulgarian prime-
used against Italy if it tried to “renew aggression.” (The minister and the ministers of foreign and internal affairs. In his
Yugoslav-Polish Treaty provided for mutual military and other reply Molotov pointed out the importance of holding off on
assistance using all available means, if one of the countries “is federation and the Treaty of Alliance until a more opportune
drawn, as a result of invasion, into military operations against moment. (ASSIP-PA, 1945/1946 god., F-1, Str. Pov. 433, 434.)
either Germany, a country which had been allied with Germany Nevertheless, in April the Bulgarian envoy in Belgrade posed the
during the last war, or any other country which had directly or by same question to Tito and Lavrent’ev. Tito, like Molotov, told
any other means allied with Germany or its allies in such an the Bulgarian envoy that such steps, if taken prior to signing a
aggression.”) As for the “discussion of incorporating Albania peace treaty with Bulgaria, would cause harm. Nevertheless, in
into the Yugoslav Federation,” the memorandum recommended relating this to Lavrent’ev, the Yugoslav leader stated “in a
to put this off, “in order not to exacerbate the international significantly decided tone that he cannot currently support the
positions of Yugoslavia and Albania.” It further specified that it idea of establishing a federation with Bulgaria,” as the latter
be put off until peace treaties were signed with Italy and Austria, continued to remain a formal monarchy, and in particular because
and Albania was included into the UN. “By the same reasoning” the communist party influence in Bulgaria was “incomparably
it advised to refrain from signing a secret military agreement weaker” than in Yugoslavia. However, certain that Bulgaria
between Yugoslavia and Albania, and to “simplify the border would once again raise this question, Tito asked the Soviet
situation without signing a special agreement, so as not to attract ambassador to ascertain Moscow’s position on signing the
British and American attention to this matter.” (See AVP RF, f. Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship. (See AVP RF, f. 0144,
0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, l. 3.) op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, ll. 39-41, 47-48.) And in the discussion
In his meeting with Tito, Stalin stayed close to this strategy. with Lavrent’ev a week before his visit to the USSR, speaking on
However, it is unclear whether his arguments to put off federation the agenda for the Moscow talks, he pointed out the importance
for the time being were an actual expression of the Soviet policy of examining Yugoslav relations not only with Albania, but with
or simply a tactical ploy, intended to shield the real Soviet efforts Bulgaria as well. (Ibid., l. 100.)
to prevent Albania’s unification with Yugoslavia altogether, The Yugoslav position coincided with the Soviets’, as
which later became one of the reasons for the 1948 conflict. As a reflected in the MFA USSR report by Lavrishchev, “On Relations
result of the 1946 Moscow talks, the question of direct Albanian between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.” The report was completed on
unification with Yugoslavia was for the time being removed from 27 May 1946, the day of Tito’s arrival in Moscow and his
the agenda. In addition, the Soviet side, having given Tito the reception by Stalin. Its accompanying suggestions for talks with
“okay” for the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Yugoslav leader stated that although “the establishment of the
the Agreement on Close Economic Cooperation with Albania, Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation would correspond to the interests
informed the Albanian government that it had come out in favor of both countries,” it would be a mistake to undertake its
of these agreements and of further “Albanian orientation toward creation, as well as to conclude the Treaty of Friendship and
126 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

Mutual Assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, prior to with Tito had not been fulfilled by the ruling regime. Afterwards
signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria and resolving “difficult lived in Zagreb under surveillance by state security organs.
internal-political questions” within both countries. (Ibid., d. 10, 25 Milan Grol (1876-1952) - during the war, member of the
ll. 13-17.) monarchy’s government in exile, in March 1945 took the post of
15 It is unclear why, contrary to the previous Soviet position vice-premier in Tito’s united government. Resigned in August
expressed in Lavrishchev’s report and in Molotov’s statements 1945, accusing the ruling regime of being in the hands of the
during the meeting, Stalin suddenly announced that the Bulgar- CPY and thus in violation of the Tito-Subasic agreement, and
ian-Yugoslav treaty could be concluded prior to signing the peace became one of the leaders of the legal opposition formed in fall
treaty with Bulgaria. However, at the meeting with Stalin a few 1945. Following the first elections to the skupscina (parliament)
days later, which, along with Tito and accompanying Yugoslav in November 1945, when the opposition was defeated and was
officials, also included the Bulgarian leaders Georgii Dimitrov, practically destroyed, Grol retired from politics and devoted
Vasil Kolarov and Traicho Kostov, it was decided that the himself to the theater.
Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty would be signed after concluding the 26 Following the 1945 elections, the opposition parties were in
peace treaty with Bulgaria. In addition, it was provided that the effect liquidated, while the parties comprising the People’s Front,
matter would involve the closest cooperation between Yugoslavia run entirely by the CPY, began to take on an increasingly
and Bulgaria. See N. Ganchovskii, Dnite na Dimitrov kakvito gi fictitious and deceptive character.
vidyakh i zapisyakh (Sofia: 1975), vol. 1, p. 220.) 27 Regions that do not export foodstuffs, particularly bread, and
16 The reference is to the regime that appeared in Poland in July are even unable to support themselves.
1944 with the arrival of Soviet forces, and which was established 28 The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency.
by the Soviet Union and Polish communists relying on its 29 Eduard Kardelj (1910-1979) - member of the Politburo,
military presence. On 21 April 1945, when the treaty between Secretary of CC CPY, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers,
USSR and this regime was concluded, the Western allies chairman of the Oversight Commission of Yugoslavia; Milovan
continued to recognize the Polish government in exile. Djilas (b. 1911) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY,
17 Matyas Rakosi (1892-1971) - General Secretary of the minister without portfolio.
Hungarian Communist Party, deputy prime-minister. 30 Reference made to Molotov’s support at the CFM meeting in
18 The question of Yugoslav territorial claims on Hungary was Paris, 25 April - 16 May 1946 (see note #5).
raised by the Yugoslav representatives to the Soviet government 31 Known deposits of non-ferrous metals.
already towards the end of the war. In particular, Hebrang, 32 The gulf on Yugoslavia’s Adriatic coast.
assigned by Tito to visit Moscow in January 1945 (see introduc- 33 Such a formulation was not contained in the Yugoslav-
tion), put forth to Stalin claims to the region of the city of Pecs Czechoslovak, but in the 1946 Yugoslav-Polish agreement on
and the “Bais triangle.” Stalin at the time replied that such a friendship and mutual assistance (note 13). The agreement of
question could be put before the allied powers only in the event friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation in peacetime,
that the Yugoslav population in these regions started to “clamor” signed by Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia on 9 May 1946 made
for unification with Yugoslavia. The question of possibly posing no mention of former German wartime allies. It stated that the
Yugoslav territorial demands to Hungary and relocating Hungar- signing parties would render each other military and other
ians from Yugoslavia was discussed in April-May 1946 by assistance using all available means, if one of them “is brought
Yugoslav and Soviet representatives of various ranks. In late into conflict with Germany, the latter having repeated its
April 1946, Tito also discussed the matter with Rakosi, who had aggressive policies, or with any other country which had aligned
come to Belgrade. The Yugoslav leader expressed readiness not itself with Germany for the purpose of aggressive action.”
to put the territorial demands on Hungary before the Council of 34 Tito was obviously being sly, as evidenced by the following
Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference, but with the reply from Rankovic, who referred to both the CC CPA Plenum
condition that the Yugoslav minorities in Hungary be granted which had expelled Maleshov from the government (see
ethnic rights and Yugoslav economic interests be ensured in introduction), and the clear criticism by a number of Albanian
border regions. Rakosi agreed. (See AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p.53, d. Politburo members toward first Party secretary and head of
872, l. 16; ibid., f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 12, l. 6; ibid., d. 13, ll. government Hoxha.
19, 22-23; ibid., d. 15, ll. 39, 64-65.) 35 The Soviet Union’s assistance to Albania, in particular
19 Reference is to the Council of Foreign Ministers (see note military assistance using Yugoslavia as a go-between, was
#5). undertaken immediately following the war. When in summer
20 Pseudonym of Aleksandr Rankovic. 1945, during the first Moscow visit by the Albanian government
21 Koca Popovic. delegation, the question of arming and equipping the Albanian
22 Vladimir Popovic. army was being discussed, the USSR government enacted a
23 According to Dedijer’s account given in his book, Stalin said resolution to send shipments of arms and other military materiel
this when Tito began to introduce to him members of the to Albania “via the government of Yugoslavia,” that is, within the
Yugoslav delegation, and Molotov nodded his head in agreement context of shipments to Yugoslavia. (See “New documents on the
with Stalin’s words. See Vladimir Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito: Great Fatherland War,” Kommunist [The Communist] 7 (1975), p.
Prilozi za biografiju [Josip Broz Tito: Materials for a Biography] 52.) On the eve of Tito’s visit to Moscow in May 1946, Kardelj
(Belgrade, 1953), p. 448. expressed to Lavrent’ev the opinion that USSR trade operations
24 Ivan Subasic (1892-1955) - June 1944-March 1945 prime- in Albania must be carried out by mixed Soviet-Yugoslav
minister of the Yugoslav monarchy’s government in exile, signed enterprises, once these were established. See AVP RF, f. 0144,
an agreement with the National Liberation Committee of op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 108.
Yugoslavia with Tito at its head and took the post of foreign 36 Seifulla Maleshov (b. 1900) - member of the CC CPA
minister within the national coalition government formed by Tito Politburo in charge of economic policy; expelled from the
in March 1945. Resigned in fall 1945, stating that his agreement Politburo by the CC CPA Plenum in February 1946.
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 127

37 See note 19. dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, Stalin by no means had
38 Petko Stainov (1890-1972) - Bulgarian foreign minister given up on administering via directives to the leadership of
1944-1946, activist in the union “Zveno”—a party belonging to Communist parties—only the organizational forms and the
the Fatherland Front controlled by the Communist party. In early concrete mechanism of such administration were changed. Thus,
June 1946, during a meeting with Dimitrov, Kolarov and Kostov in speaking of the impossibility of reestablishing the “old style of
(see note 15), Stalin announced that “you must show your teeth [the Communist] International,” he spoke only within that
to the rightist Zvenists” and that another prominent member of context. At the same time he discussed with the Yugoslav and
“Zveno,” Damyan Velchev, must be removed from the post of Bulgarian guests his plan to set up a new organizational structure
Minister of War. (See Tsentralen d’rzhaven arkhiv - Sofiia for the international communist movement: an informational
(Central State Archives - Sofia), former Tsentralen partien arkhiv bureau which would unite a number of communist parties.
[hereafter TsDA-TsPA] under TsK on BCP, f. 1, op. 5, A.e. 3, l. According to the Yugoslav delegation members’ accounts
134.) Stalin’s orders were carried out in both cases. reported by Dedijer, the question of establishing the information
39 See note 19. Pechui—Serbian name for the city of Pecs in bureau was raised by Stalin during a conversation with Tito, and
Hungary. later during the joint meeting with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian
40 Judging by handwritten notes made by Tito upon his return delegations, when he emphasized that the new organ must
from Moscow, during the visit the Soviet side had discussed, maintain an informational character and its decisions would not
along with the aforementioned topics, the question of Austria and be binding on a communist party which disagreed with the
Yugoslav-Austrian relations, as well as Yugoslav relations with decision. (See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, pp. 453, 471.) That the
other Slavic countries. (See AJBT-KMJ. I-1/7, ll. 51-52.) question was put forth in this manner is supported by the
41 Palmiro Togliatti (1893-1964) - general secretary of the handwritten notes Tito made a few days after returning from
Italian Communist party. Moscow. (See AJBT-KMJ, I-3-s/11, ll. 1-2.) Most likely these
42 Maurice Thorez (1900-1964) - general secretary of the remarks, including the statement that there “can be no talk” of
French communist party; Jacques Duclos (1896-1975) - member reestablishing the Comintern, were a tactical move intended to
of the Politburo, secretary of CC F[rench]CP, second in rank at help his interlocutors “swallow” his idea to create the
the time. Dedijer’s description of the meeting with Stalin on 27 Informbiuro (Cominform) as some kind of entirely different
May 1946 states that “the leader” had mentioned a “great “democratic” organ of which they had no reason to be wary.
deficiency” in Thorez. “Even a dog that doesn’t bite, said Stalin, 47 Possibly the reference is to the Greek referendum to be held
shows its teeth when he wants to scare someone, but Thorez can’t on 1 September 1946 to decide whether to continue the monar-
do even that...” Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 451. chy, which was a focus of intense political struggle.
43 Jose Diaz (1895-1942) - general secretary of the Spanish 48 Greece was at the time the arena of a sharp and intensifying
Communist party, died in the US. confrontation which in the second half of 1946 began to erupt
44 Pseudonym of Dolores Ibarruri (1895-1990), who became the into an armed struggle between the partisan forces and the Greek
general secretary of the Spanish Communist party following J. government, with the former having been created under the
Diaz’s death. leadership of the Greek Communist party and receiving assis-
45 Wilhelm Pieck (1876-1960) - leader of the German commu- tance from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, and the latter
nist party, became one of the two chairmen of the Socialist Unity relying on military support from Great Britain and, later, the
Party of Germany (SED) following the April 1946 merger of the USA.
Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social-Democratic 49 Eduard Benes (1884-1948) - president of Czechoslovakia.
party into the SED in the zone of Soviet occupation. It is unclear Attempted in the years immediately following the war to
who the writers referred to by “F.” navigate between the USSR and the West, but was forced into
Dedijer’s account of the evening dinner mentions that resignation following the de facto coup carried out in February
Stalin, in characterizing the leaders of foreign Communist 1948 by communists relying on Soviet political support.
parties, expressed his opinion, alongside those already men- 50 Zdenek Firlinger (1891-1976) - one of the officials in the
tioned, regarding the chairman of the Czechoslovak communist Czechoslovak Social-Democratic party, head of the Czechoslo-
party Klement Gottwald and the general secretary of the vak government in 1945-1946, actively supported the communist
Communist Party of Great Britain Harry Pollit. See Dedijer, party, including during the coup in February 1948.
Josip Broz Tito, p. 451. 51 Reference is made to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry
46 The phrase obviously referred to the impossibility of announcement delivered on 24 April 1946 to the ambassadors of
reestablishing the Comintern. Apparently Stalin told the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France, which officially put forth
Yugoslav delegation the same thing he had said ten days earlier territorial claims on Poland for the so-called border region of
in his meeting with Dedijer, Kolarov and Kostov, of which an Teshinskaya Silesia. The Czechoslovak-Polish dispute regarding
unidentified record has been preserved, written most likely by Teshin continued for some time following the end of World War
Kostov. According to this account, Stalin told the Bulgarian II and reached its peak around late April-May 1946, on the eve of
delegation: “We will never reestablish the old style of the the first post-war parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia, held
[Communist] International. It was created with the example on May 26, a day before Stalin’s meeting with Tito. From the
provided by Marx, who expected that revolution would take record of conversation published herein, it follows that Stalin
place concurrently in all countries. However, this does not regarded the Czechoslovak announcement entirely as a pre-
correspond to our current ideology.” In additional remarks, election maneuver. The question of Teshin was obviously raised
Stalin criticized the Comintern, stating that its directives had tied by the Yugoslav guests, for even on May 7, in his discussion with
the hands of the Communist party, which “we untied” “when we Lavrent’ev, Tito inquired as to Moscow’s opinion of the
dissolved the Comintern.” (See TsDA-TsPA under CC on BCP, f. Czechoslovak demarche and informed him that the Polish
1, op. 5, A.e. 3, l. 138.) In reality, Comintern directives were ambassador to Belgrade had addressed him, Tito, with a request
issued by Stalin himself. And even following the announced to influence the Czechoslovak government to renounce these
128 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

claims. AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 77. Report of Milovan Djilas about a secret Soviet-Bulgar-
52 According to Dedijer’s account, Stalin had spoken about the
ian-Yugoslav meeting 10 February 19481
Slovenian intelligentsia with Kidric, himself a Slovenian, using a
play on words—”podlaya [sycophantic] intelligentsia” and
Kardelj and Vacaric arrived in Moscow on Sunday,
“podlinnaya [genuine] intelligentsia.” See Dedijer, Josip Broz
February 8, and until Tuesday, February 10, nobody gave
Tito, p. 452.
53 Dedijer’s book mentions that Stalin advised the Yugoslavs to them any news. On Tuesday before noon Baranov2
plant eucalyptus, as this is the best tree for ship-building, and phoned to say that Kardelj and the others should stay put,
related how many years ago he had read in a book that this tree because in the evening, at nine o’clock we would be
grows well in South America. So having received the seeds, he invited to the Kremlin. Lesakov told us that the Bulgar-
undertook to plant them in the Crimea where it took root very ians arrived on Monday, but stressed that these were “the
successfully and grew very quickly. Stalin promised to send top guys” from Bulgaria—Dimitrov, Kolarov and Trajco
eucalyptus seedlings to Yugoslavia. See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, Kostov.
pp. 452-453.
54 In Dedijer’s account of the 27 May 1946 meeting these words Indeed, we were invited to the Kremlin at nine o’clock
in the evening. We arrived punctually, but since the
are tied to an episode where, following a lengthy period during
which the guests had sat at the dinner table, Stalin stood, walked Bulgarians were late, we sat for 10-15 minutes in Stalin’s
over to the record player in the corner, and began to play record reception room, and when they joined us, we walked in [to
after record—all Russian folk songs. While listening to one of Stalin’s office].
the records, he started to sing along and dance. Molotov and So, the meeting took place on Tuesday, February 10,
others present met this with exclamations of how robust Stalin at 9:15 Moscow time, and it lasted about three hours.
was, from which followed Stalin’s response about the laws of When we entered [the room], Soviet representatives were
physiology, which dictated that he would not live long. Stalin already there. Those present at the meeting were: Stalin
added that Tito must take care of himself in order to be there for
(at the head of the table), Molotov, Malenkov, Zhdanov,
Europe. And further, according to this account, Stalin looked at
Suslov and Zorin (to the right side from Stalin along the
Molotov and noted: “Viacheslav Mikhailovich will remain
here....” He then proposed to Tito to drink to “bruderschaft” table), and Dimitrov, Kolarov, Kostov, Kardelj, Djilas,
[brotherhood] (and then to all the other Yugoslav guests); they Vacaric (to the left side from Stalin along the table).
clinked glasses, embraced, and then “the leader” with the Molotov spoke first. At first, he stressed that this was
exclamation “I still have strength left!” grabbed the Yugoslav already a matter of serious disagreement between them
leader by the armpits and lifted him three times. (See Dedijer, [the Soviets] and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These dis-
Josip Broz Tito, p. 452.) However, the Yugoslav political and agreements were inadmissible both from the party and the
cultural activist Josip Vidmar later maintained that, upon state point of view. As examples of the serious discord he
returning from accompanying Tito to Moscow, Kidric told of a
gave three: firstly, the conclusion of the Yugoslav-
different scene at the evening dinner at Kuntsevo: it was he,
Bulgarian Treaty of Union— lack of coordination between
Kidric, who grabbed and lifted Stalin, and that the latter laughed
and spoke compliments. See J. Vidmar, Obrazi (Ljubljana, 1980), the USSR, on one hand, and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on
p. 396. the other hand; secondly, the declaration of Dimitrov about
55 Prime-minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill (1874- a Federation of East European and Balkan countries,
1965), having met Tito in August 1944 in Italy, said this to Stalin including Greece — lack of coordination between the
during his visit to Moscow in October 1944. In actuality, Stalin USSR, on one side, and Bulgaria, on the other; thirdly, the
by this point had already met Tito in person, when the latter introduction of a Yugoslav division into Southern Albania
secretly visited Moscow in late September.
56 Djido—Djilas’ pseudonym. Stalin knew from Tito that Djilas
(Korcha)3 — lack of coordination between the USSR, on
one hand, and Yugoslavia, on the other. As to the first
suffered from headaches.
57 Ernest Bevin (1881-1951) - one of the leaders of the Labor point, he stresses that the Soviet government informed the
party and a trade-unionist in Great Britain, foreign minister Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments—and they agreed to
during the early years following World War Two. Gustav Noske this—that one should not conclude a treaty with Bulgaria
(1868-1946) - German Social-Democratic activist, member of until the expiration of limitations imposed by the Peace
government following the November 1918 revolution in Treaty [with Bulgaria in 1946]. However, the Yugoslav
Germany, became famous as one of the organizers of the and Bulgarian governments concluded the treaty, and the
suppression of revolutionary action taken by the radical wing of Soviet government learned about it from the newspapers.
the German labor movement. With regard to the second point he stresses that comrade
58 L.P. Beria (1899-1953) - member of CC VKP(b) Politburo,
Dimitrov grew too fond of press conferences. Meanwhile,
vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Dedijer’s
account states that Stalin joked about Beria and Rankovic, both
if Dimitrov and Tito make announcements for the press,
in charge of security organs in their respective countries—who the whole world believes that such is also the view of the
will subvert whom? According to this account, also present Soviet Union.4
among the Soviet participants at the evening dinner at Kuntsevo, At this moment, Stalin cut in to remind [us] that the
aside from Stalin and Molotov, were A. A. Zhdanov, Beria and Poles who were in Moscow in those days, spoke against
N.A. Bulganin. See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 451. [the Federation]. That means that the Soviet representa-
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
tives first asked them what they thought of Dimitrov’s
declaration. And they said that they agreed, but when
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 129

Stalin told them that the Soviet Union was against it, they is a mistake because such a Federation is not feasible.11
also said that they were against, but they had previously Dimitrov says that he did not target the USSR by his
believed that this was a position and request of Moscow.5 assertion that Austria-Hungary had blocked a Bulgarian-
Stalin adds that the subsequent clarification by Dimitrov Serb customs union. He stresses, at last, that there are
(he probably had in mind the announcement of the essentially no disagreements between the foreign policies
Bulgarian telegraph agency) explained nothing. Stalin of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.
quotes from this announcement that says how Austria- Stalin interrupts and asserts that there are substantial
Hungary had thwarted a customs union between Bulgaria differences and there is a practice of the Leninists—to
and Serbia, and adds that it means—the Germans had recognize differences and mistakes and to liquidate them.
worked against a customs union, and now we do (i.e. the Dimitrov says that they make mistakes because they are
Soviet Union).6 Stalin adds that Dimitrov diverts attention only learning foreign policy, but Stalin replies to this that
from domestic issues to foreign affairs—Federation, etc.7 he [Dimitrov] is a senior political figure who had been
Then Molotov passes to a third point of disagreement engaged in politics for forty years, and in his case it is not
and stresses from the very beginning that they [in Mos- mistakes, but a different perception [than the USSR’s] (he
cow] accidentally learned about the entry of the Yugoslav [Stalin] said it two or three times during the meeting,
troops into Albania. The Albanians told the Russians that addressing Dimitrov).12 As to the repeated emphasis by
they thought that the entry of the Yugoslav troops had been Dimitrov on the fact that Bulgaria must get closer with
coordinated with the Soviet Union, and meanwhile it was other countries for economic reasons, Stalin says that he
not so. At that moment Molotov began citing some sort of agrees if one speaks of a customs union between Yugosla-
dispatches, and Stalin told him to read them aloud. He via and Bulgaria, but if one speaks of Romania (later, as I
asks Stalin which message he should read. Stalin leans recall, he also mentioned Hungary), then he is against it.
[over] and points out [one]. Molotov reads a message In general, when he spoke about such ties of Bulgaria with
from [Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia] Lavrent’ev about which the Soviet Union disagreed, most often [he] cited
his meeting with Tito. From this reading, it becomes clear Romania as an example. It happens as a result of a clause
that the message is an answer to the question of the Soviet about the customs union in the Bulgarian-Romanian treaty
government if there is a decision about the entry of and because, I believe, that the joint Bulgarian-Romanian
Yugoslav troops into Albania, and it says that such a communique calls for coordination of plans between
decision—coordinated with Hoxha—really exists, that the Romania and Bulgaria. These issues were raised at the
motive comes from the notification about a probable attack meeting and often referred to by Soviet representatives.
against Albania; then the message points out that Tito said They have in mind a forthcoming conclusion of the treaties
that he does not agree with Moscow that in case of an between Bulgaria and Hungary, and [Bulgaria and] other
entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, the Anglo-Ameri- countries. Thus, Soviet criticism of Romanian-Bulgarian
cans would intervene beyond a campaign in the press. relations touches on future Bulgarian-Hungarian relations,
Tito, according to the message, said that, if it came to and, obviously, on the relations of Yugoslavia with
anything serious, Yugoslavia and the USSR would sort it Hungary and Romania.
out [raskhlebivat kashu] together, however, after the Then Kolarov began to speak. He says about this part
Soviet demarche about this issue he would not send a from the Bulgarian announcement regarding a customs
division [to Albania]. At the end, Molotov points out that union between Serbia and Bulgaria, where nobody meant
Tito did not inform them about his disagreement with to hint at the USSR, and as to the customs union between
Moscow. He stresses that disagreements are inadmissible Romania and Bulgaria, the Romanians are also all for it.
both from the party and state viewpoint and that disagree- Besides, the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty had been earlier
ments should be taken out [for discussion], and not sent to the Soviet government and it already made only
concealed, and that it is necessary to inform and consult. one amendment so that an article [on the joint defense]
One must be cautious with regard to press conferences.8 against any aggressor would be replaced by an article
Following Molotov, Dimitrov spoke. He, as well as against Germany or a power that could be in alliance with
the other Bulgarians and Kardelj (he was the only one it, and there were no comments on the Bulgarian-Roma-
among the Yugoslavs who spoke), did not give his reasons nian customs union. Then a brief exchange between Stalin
coherently, because Stalin kept interrupting him. He said and Molotov occurs. Molotov confirms what Kolarov
that what Yugoslavia and Bulgaria publicized at Bled was says. Stalin stresses again that he is against the Bulgarian-
not a treaty, but only a statement that a future treaty had Romanian customs union, although Bulgarians have a
been agreed upon. Soviet representatives affirm that they reason to think otherwise, on the basis of dispatches. He
learned about this affair from newspapers, etc. 9 Dimitrov stresses that he did not know that there was an article
stresses that Bulgaria’s economic difficulties are so serious about a customs union in the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty
that it cannot develop without cooperation with other that had been previously sent to the Soviet government.
countries. It is true that he got carried away at a press Dimitrov says that that it was the very cause why in his
conference.10 Stalin interrupts and tells him that he statement he went further than necessary.13
wanted to shine with a new word, and that is wrong, and it Stalin says to him that he [Dimitrov] wanted to
130 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

surprise the whole world and adds that it looked like the we are linked to Albania economically and that we
secretary of the Comintern was explaining tediously and underwrite [soderzhim] its army. Two or three times Stalin
meticulously what should be done and how. [Stalin] says interrupted. For instance, regarding a Greek invasion of
that this gives food to American reactionaries [reaktziia]. Albania, he said that it was possible. Then he asked if the
He then speaks about the significance of the American situation was really such that one should not have any faith
elections and [says] that one should be careful to do in the Albanian army, and added that the Albanians must
nothing to give the reactionaries arguments that could be taught and their army must be built up. Molotov says
facilitate their victory. In his opinion, we should not give that they have no information about any kind of attack on
the reaction anything to snatch at [nikakoi zatsepki]. The Albania and wondered that we withhold our information
current American government still contains itself, but from them. Then, reacting to Kardelj’s explanation that
money bags [denezhniie meshki] and sharks can come to the anti-Albanian campaign in Greece is worsening, Stalin
power. The reactionaries in American, when they hear demanded [to know] if we believe in the victory of the
such statements, say that in Eastern Europe there is not Greek guerrillas. Kardelj responds that we do. Stalin says
only a bloc in the making, but [the countries] are merging that recently he and the rest of his collaborators have had
into common states. He tells Dimitrov and the others that grave doubts about it. He says that one should assist
they are overdoing it [perebarshchivaiut], like the Young Greece [i.e. guerrillas] if there are hopes of winning, and
Communists and then like women take everything to the if not, then we should rethink and terminate the guerrilla
streets. Then he makes a linkage to the issue of Albania. movement. The Anglo-Americans will spare no effort to
The three world powers—the USSR, England, and keep Greece [in their sphere],19 and the only serious
America guaranteed Albania’s independence by a special obstacle [zakavika] for them is the fact that we assist the
agreement. Albania is our weakest spot, because other guerrillas. Molotov adds that we are constantly and
states are either members of the United Nations, or justifiably blamed for assistance to the guerrillas. Stalin
recognized, etc., but Albania is not [recognized]. If says that if there are no conditions for victory, one must
Yugoslav troops entered Albania, the reactionaries in not be afraid to admit it. It is not for the first time in
England and America would be able to use it and step history that although there are no conditions now, they will
forward as defenders of Albanian independence. Instead appear later.20 Then Kolarov speaks and tells that the
of sending troops we should work intensely to build up the American, British and French embassies appealed to them
Albanian army, we should teach the Albanians, and then, if [Bulgarians] with a warning not to recognize the govern-
they are attacked, let the Albanian Skupcina [parliament] ment of Markos.21 Kolarov says that the American
appeal to Yugoslavia for help. He makes an example of ambassador is courteous, but the British ambassador is
China, where nobody14 can reproach the USSR,15 but the arrogant. Stalin cuts in and says that it means that the
Chinese are fighting well and advancing; he then adds that American is a great scoundrel and they [ambassadors of
the Albanians are not worse than the Chinese and they the US and UK] always trade roles. Stalin also said that
must be taught. Then he adds that we should sign a we should not link the future of our state with a victory of
protocol about joint consultations.16 He says that the the guerrillas in Greece. On Dimitrov’s comment that a
Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs do not report anything [to victory of the Monarchists-Fascists would seriously
the Soviets], and they [the Soviets] have to find out aggravate the situation in the Balkans, Stalin says that it is
everything on the street, usually ending up faced with a not proven.
fait accompli. Then Dimitrov and Kolarov spoke about other matters
Kostov then begins to complain how hard it is to be a that did not relate to the agenda of the meeting. Among
small and undeveloped country. He would like to raise other things, Molotov cited a paragraph from the
some economic issues. Stalin cuts him short and says that Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty which read that Yugoslavia and
there are competent ministries to do it, and this is the Bulgaria would act in the spirit of the United Nations and
discussion of the differences. would support all initiatives directed at the preservation of
Kardelj starts to speak.17 On the first point [of peace and against all hotbeds of aggression. Molotov cites
disagreements] he says that it was not a treaty that was from the treaty to reject Dimitrov’s attempts at a linkage
published, but only a communiqué about the discussion between the struggle against “hotbeds of aggression” with
leading to a treaty; he adds that we [Yugoslavs and the actions of the United Nations. Stalin adds that it would
Bulgarians] were too hasty. This triggers an exchange mean a preventive war which is a Komsomol [i.e. juvenile]
similar to that when Dimitrov made the same point. stunt, a loud phrase, material for the enemy. Stalin then
[Andrei] Zhdanov intervenes and says that they [in the tells a story, hinting at the Komsomol behavior, that there
Soviet Union] learned about this matter from the newspa- was a seaman in Leningrad after the revolution who
pers. On Albania he says that not informing them on that condemned and threatened the whole world by radio.22
was a serious error. Stalin cuts in and says that we [in Molotov then spoke about oats that Albania asked the
Yugoslavia] oversimplify this matter, but it is a compli- USSR for, and that Tito had told Lavrent’ev that Yugosla-
cated matter.18 Kardelj then mentioned the constant Greek via would give oats, and after that the Yugoslavs are
provocations, the weakness of the Albanian army, and that instructing the Albanians to buy oats in Argentina.23 Stalin
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 131

said half-jokingly that the Yugoslavs are afraid of having weapons. And it turned out that the Chinese, not the
Russians in Albania and because of this are in a hurry to Soviet comrades, were right, as Stalin says. But he does
send their troops.24 He also said that the Bulgarians and not believe that the case of the Greek guerrillas falls into
Yugoslavs think that the USSR stands against a unification the same category. On China he says that they [the
of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but it does not want to admit Soviets] do not have their people there, except in Port
it. Molotov raised some kind of a point from the Bulgar- Arthur [Lushunkov] which is a neutral zone according to
ian-Romanian communiqué about the coordination of the treaty with the Chinese government. He spoke about
plans and mentioned that it would have been essentially a the tactics of the Chinese who avoided attacking cities
merger of these states. Stalin is categorical that this is until they had accumulated sufficient strength.27
inconceivable and that Dimitrov would soon see for Kardelj speaks again and says it was a mistake that we
himself that it is nonsense, and instead of cooperation it [the Yugoslavs] failed to inform them. Stalin interrupts
would bring about a quarrel between the Romanians and him and says that it was not a mistake, it was a system [a
Bulgarians. Therefore mutual relations should be limited policy] and that we do not inform them on anything.
to trade agreements. Then Stalin and Molotov propose a protocol on
Then Stalin laid out a Soviet view that in Eastern mutual coordination of foreign affairs. Kardelj agrees with
Europe one should create three federations—Polish- that. Stalin proposes that we inquire of them [the Soviets]
Czechoslovak, Romanian-Hungarian and Yugoslav- on all questions of interest to us, and that they would also
Bulgarian-Albanian.25 Bulgaria and Yugoslavia [he said] inform us about everything.28
may unite tomorrow if they wish, there are no constraints Then Dimitrov diverted the conversation to economic
on this, since Bulgaria today is a sovereign state. Kardelj and other issues. When Dimitrov says there are important
says that we were not in a hurry to unify with Bulgaria and economic issues, Stalin cut him short by remarking that he
Albania, in view of international and domestic moments, would speak about it with a joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian
but Stalin reacts to it by saying that it should not come too government. During subsequent discussion Stalin raised a
late, and that the conditions for that are ripe. At first, question about how the Albanians would react to such a
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria must unite, and then let Albania union, and Kardelj and Djilas explained to him that the
join them. This should be agreed upon through People’s Albanians would accept it well, because it would be in
Skupcina [parliaments], by the will of the peoples. Stalin their national interests, considering that eight hundred
thinks that one should begin with political unification and thousand Albanians reside in Yugoslavia.29 Stalin also
then it would be difficult [for the West] to attack Albania. said with regard to Albania that one on our side [u nas
As to a Bulgarian-Yugoslav unification, Stalin repeatedly odin] has already committed suicide,30 and that we want
stressed that this question has ripened, and one even began to overthrow Hoxha and that it should not be done hastily
a discussion about the name of [a united] state. and crudely—“the boot on the throat”—but gradually and
Then Kardelj returned to the issue about what after all indirectly. Stalin says again that at first Yugoslavia and
one should do in Albania, but [Stalin’s] answer boiled Bulgaria ought to unite, and then Albania should join
down to what Stalin said earlier, i.e., the Albanian army them. And Albania must declare itself about its desire to
ought to be taught, and that Albania should ask for join. Then Kostov raised the question that the [Bulgarian-
assistance in case of aggression. As to oats, Kardelj says Soviet] treaty about technical assistance, also about
that it is possible that the enemy interfered to spoil patents, licensing and authors’ rights, is not favorable for
Yugoslav-Soviet relations (Molotov kept silent).26 Then the Bulgarians (he failed to mention if this treaty has
Kardelj says that he does not see any big differences already been signed). Molotov said that this matter will
between Yugoslavia and the USSR in foreign policy. need consideration, and Stalin said that Kostov should
Stalin interrupts him and says that it is incorrect, that there submit a note [to Molotov].
are differences and that to hide them would mean oppor- Then we discussed the answer of the Sovinformburo
tunism. We should not be afraid to recognize differences. to the slander of the Americans regarding [their] publica-
Stalin stresses that even they, Lenin’s pupils, many times tion of the documents on Soviet-German relations.31
disagreed with him. They would have a quarrel on some Kardelj gave a positive assessment to the answer published
issue, then talk it over, work out a position and move on. in Pravda and Dimitrov says that the Western powers
He believes that we should put the question more boldly wanted to unite with Germany against the USSR. Stalin
about the guerrillas in Greece. Then he mentions the case replies that he had nothing to hide [on vse vynosit otkrito],
of China again, but now he raises another aspect. In and the Western powers did not speak openly, in particular
particular, that they [the Politburo] invited the Chinese that Europe without Russia means against Russia. Molotov
comrades and considered that there were no conditions for remarks during the conversation that the Bulgarians do not
successful uprising in China and that some kind of “modus put enough camouflage on the number of their troops and
vivendi” [with the Guomindang] had to be found. The that it exceeds the clauses [about limits] in the Peace
Chinese comrades, according to Stalin, in words agreed Treaty, and the Bulgarians may be criticized for it.
with the Soviet comrades, but in practice kept accumulat- Dimitrov said to this that, on the contrary, the number is
ing forces. The Russians twice gave them assistance in even below the limit stipulated by the Peace Treaty.
132 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

Molotov was satisfied with that [answer] and did not the interview a plan was set forth which goes too far without any
mention it again.32 Dimitrov raised the issue about the attempt to consult with whomever it may concern. A question
conclusion of a treaty on mutual assistance between the was put forth of creating a federation or a confederation, a
customs union that would include both Poland and Greece. Com.
USSR and Bulgaria. He stressed that it would be of great
Georgii Dimitrov speaks of all these things without being granted
significance for Bulgaria. Stalin agreed with this, but authority by anyone concerned. This is misguided in principle
added that among the Quisling countries33 [the USSR] and is tactically harmful. This eases the burden of the creators of
would first conclude treaties with neighbors: with Roma- the Western bloc.” And further: “We must take the position in
nia—this treaty is almost ready, with Hungary and such a way that all would know—both enemies and friends—that
Finland. this is our point of view. We consider this absolutely wrong and
Then Stalin underlines that we (i.e. Yugoslavia and unacceptable in the future.” This is contained in slightly
Bulgaria) must build up our economy, culture, army, and abbreviated form in the Soviet record as well.
5 According to Bulgarian and Soviet records this was spoken by
that a federation is an abstraction.
Molotov, not Stalin. Kolarov’s account puts it in the following
Suddenly Stalin asked about “our friend Pijade,”34
manner: “When we spoke with the Polish comrades, they said:
Kardelj told him that he is working on our legislation.
We thought that this was Moscow’s opinion. Everyone thinks
Kardelj asked [the Soviets] about their opinion what that if Dimitrov or Tito speaks of a number of countries, it
answer should be given to the Italian government who originates from the USSR. In essence, the Polish comrades said
asked the Yugoslav government to support Italian claims to that they are against Georgii Dimitrov’s idea and consider it
govern their former colonies. Stalin said that these misguided.”
demands must be supported and asked Molotov how [the 6 According to the Bulgarian and Soviet records, this was also
Soviet side] responded. Molotov says that they still have spoken by Molotov, while Stalin supplemented this with separate
to respond and that he believes they should wait. Stalin remarks.
7 Before these statements by Stalin, the Bulgarian records,
told them that there is no point in waiting and the answer
particularly Kolarov’s account, show the following remarks by
should be sent immediately. He said that former Italian
Molotov:
colonies should be put under Italian governance [trustee- “[Czechoslovak President Eduard] Benes’ newspaper immedi-
ship] and remarked that kings, when they could not agree ately hastened to write that `Dimitrov puts out communist plans,
over the booty, used to give [disputed] land to a weakest and now the Czech communists must answer.’ On the other
feudal so they could snatch it from him later at some hand, this position of Georgii Dimitrov contradicts the declara-
opportune moment, and that feudal lords invited a for- tion of the nine communist parties.” The same is corroborated by
eigner to rule them so they could easily overthrow him the Soviet record.
8 According to Bulgarian and Soviet records, this statement by
when they become fed up with him.
Molotov sounded more categorical. Kolarov’s account records
On this note the conversation ended.
the following words: “In the future, com. Georgii Dimitrov must
I would remind [napominaiu] that the criticism of
rid himself and us of the risks of such statements.”
Dimitrov by Stalin, although rough in form, was expressed 9 [Translator’s Note: This intervention is presented dramatically
in friendly tones. This report was composed on the basis in Djilas’s book. “”Yes, but you didn’t consult with us!” Stalin
of notes taken at the meeting and from memory. shouted. “We learn about your doings in the newspapers! You
chatter like women from the housetops whatever occurs to you,
[Source: Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Fond Kabinet Marshala and then the newspapermen grab hold of it.” (p. 175)—V.Z.]
Jugoslavije I-3-b-651, ll.33-40. Translated by Vladislav Zubok 10 The Bulgarian and Soviet records note somewhat stronger
(National Security Archive)] self-criticism by Dimitrov. Kolarov recorded his words: “This
was harmful and fundamentally misguided. This was self-
1 [Translator’s Note: In Conversations with Stalin (1962) indulgence. Such statements will not be repeated in the future.”
11 According to Bulgarian records, in particular Kolarov’s,
Milovan Djilas recounted this meeting in great detail. He
mentioned that he had submitted a written report of that meeting Stalin said: “We wanted to say another word. The Poles and
to the Yugoslav Central Committee, but that he could not get Czechs are laughing at your federation. Ask them—do they want
access to it when he wrote the book. As the comparison of the it?” The same is corroborated by the Soviet record.
12 According to the Bulgarian records, in particular Kolarov’s
document with the book reveals, Djilas’ memory retained with
remarkable precision some pivotal moments of the conversa- account, Stalin said to Dimitrov: “You are a politician and must
tion.—V.Z.] think not only of your own intentions, but also of the conse-
2 Baranov, Leonid Semenovich—assistant director of the CC quences of your statements.” Later, returning once more to this
VKP(b) [Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party question, the Soviet leader said to Dimitrov: “You are an old
(of Bolsheviks)] Department of Foreign Policy. politician. What possible mistakes could one speak of? You may
3 The statement concerns the Yugoslav intention of deploying a have another goal in mind, but you yourself will not admit it.
division, which never took place. You must not give interviews so often.” According to the Soviet
4 In the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov’s account, this is record, Stalin, noting that Dimitrov has apparently another goal
presented in the following manner: that must be revealed, added that these are not little children
“It seems to us that com. Georgii Dimitrov has taken a fancy to sitting here, and Dimitrov is not a “pre-schooler.”
press conferences and interviews, thus giving opportunity to be [Translator’s Note: This part of the conversation is dramatized in
prompted with questions which ought not be discussed in the first Djilas’ book in the following dialogue:
place. This is misguided and undesirable. During the course of “Stalin, decidedly and firmly: `There are serious differences,
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 133

Why hide it? It was Lenin’s practice always to recognize errors an analysis of the current forces of the partisans and their
and to remove them as quickly as possible.’ enemies. Recently I have started to doubt the prospects of a
Dimitrov, placatingly, almost submissively: ‘True, we erred. But partisan victory. If you are not convinced that the partisans will
through errors we are learning our way in foreign politics.’ win, the partisan movement ought to be wrapped up. The
Stalin, harshly and tauntingly: ‘Learning! You have been in Americans and the English are very interested in the Mediterra-
politics fifty years—and now you are correcting errors! Your nean sea. They want to have a base in Greece and will spare no
trouble is not errors, but a stand different from ours.’” means to preserve a government that listens to them. This is an
Then Djilas writes that Dimitrov’s ears “were red, and big red important international question. If the partisan movement is
blotches cropped up on his face covering his spots of eczema. wrapped up, then they will have no reason to attack you. It’s not
His sparse hair straggled and hung in lifeless strands over his so easy to start a war now. If you are convinced that the partisans
wrinkled neck. I felt sorry for him...The Lion of the Leipzig have a chance of victory, then that’s a different matter. But I
Trials...looked dejected and dispirited.” (pp. 176-177)—V.Z.] somewhat doubt it.”
13 The entire conversation recorded by Djilas about the draft of The Bulgarian records note the following remark by Kostov:
a Bulgarian-Romanian treaty sent to the Soviet government, “We believe that a defeat of the partisan movement in Greece
which in turn expressed no objections over the article on the would create a very difficult situation for other Balkan coun-
customs union, is absent from the Soviet and Bulgarian records. tries.” To this Stalin replied:
Kolarov’s account contains only the following phrase: “Kolarov “Of course the partisans must be supported. But if the prospects
points out that the treaty with Romania had been harmonized for the partisan movement are falling, it is better to postpone the
with Moscow.” fight until better times. That which is lacking in relative forces
14 [Translator’s note: “nobody” here means the United States cannot be supplemented with moans and exclamations. What is
and Great Britain, not the Communist Party of China. This needed is a thoughtful reckoning of forces. If this shows that at
phrase reveals Stalin’s emphasis on realpolitik as a method to the present time the matter is moving nowhere, one must not be
prevent “imperialists’” consolidation and intervention into afraid to admit it. There have been other instances when partisan
Balkan affairs.—V.Z.] movements were terminated given an unfavorable situation. If
15 The Bulgarian records contain the following words expressed it’s impossible today, it will be possible tomorrow. You are afraid
by Stalin over this matter: “You see the kind of war that is raging to state the question clearly. You are under the impression of a
in China. We don’t have a single one of our soldiers there.” “moral obligation.” If you cannot lift the weight which you have
16 According to Bulgarian records, the question of signing a hoisted upon yourselves, you must admit it. You must not be
protocol on mutual consultation arose in connection with afraid of some kind of a “categorical imperative” of moral
Dimitrov’s statement on 10 February concerning Moscow: “We obligation. We do not have such categorical imperatives. The
also receive little information from here.” Stalin responded: entire question rests in the balance of forces. We go into battle
“You have the right to demand from us to keep you informed. not when the enemy wants us to, but when it’s in our interests.”
Let us then put together a protocol on obligatory consultation Further discussion of the Greek question, following these
between us on all important international questions.” This is observations by Stalin, is recorded in the Bulgarian records:
similarly recorded in the Soviet record. “Kardelj: Over the next several months the chances of the
17 [Translator’s note: According to Djilas, “he was red and, what partisans will become clear.
was a sign of agitation with him, he drew his head down between Stalin: In that case, fine, you can wait. Perhaps you are right. I
his shoulders and made pauses in his sentences where they did also doubted the abilities of the Chinese and advised them to
not belong.” (p. 179)—V.Z.] come to a temporary agreement with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-
18 [Translator’s note: The exchange on the failure to inform the Shek]. They formally agreed with us, but in practice continued
USSR on sending Yugoslav troops to Albania was more serious on their own course—that is, mobilizing the forces of the
and emotional, according to Djilas’ book: “”Stalin shouted, “This Chinese people. After this, they openly raised the question: we
could lead to serious international complications...” Kardelj will continue to fight; the people support us. We said: fine, what
explained that all that had not yet been final and added that he do you need? It turned out that the conditions were very
did not remember a single foreign problem but that the Yugoslav favorable to them. They turned out to be right, we turned out to
Government did not consult with the Soviets…“It’s not so!” be wrong. Maybe we will turn out to be wrong here as well. But
Stalin cried. “You don’t consult at all. That is not your mistake, we want you to act with certainty. Kolarov: Will America allow
but your policy—yes, your policy!” Cut off, Kardelj fell silent a partisan victory?
and did not press his view.” (pp.179-180)—V.Z.] Stalin: They won’t be asked. If there are enough forces for
19 [Translator’s Note: In Djilas’s book Stalin says: “No, they victory, and if there are persons capable of employing the force
have no prospect of success at all. What do you think, that Great of the people, then the fight must be continued. But one must not
Britain and the United States—the United States, the most think that if things are not successful in Greece, then everything
powerful state in the world —will permit you to break their line is lost.”
of communication in the Mediterranean Sea! Nonsense. And we The Soviet record overall corroborates this course of
have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as discussion, but sets it down in significantly condensed form,
quickly as possible.” (p. 182) —V.Z.] without a number of details. In particular, it does not record
20 As noted in the Bulgarian records, in particular in Kolarov’s Kostov’s remark found in Bulgarian records on the difficult
account, Stalin cautioned the Yugoslav side against careless consequences the defeat of the Greek partisans would bring to
involvement in Albania, where the USA and England might strike other Balkan countries (in the Djilas report this remark is
back, claiming to be defenders of Albanian independence. With attributed to Dimitrov), and Kardelj’s negative reply to Stalin’s
this in mind, Stalin put this question to Kardelj: “If the Greek question whether Yugoslavia would go to war in the event of a
partisans are defeated, will you go to war?” Kardelj replied in Greek partisan defeat. In addition, the Soviet record corroborates
the negative. To which Stalin said: “I am arguing on the basis of Kardelj’s optimistic assessment, noted by Djilas, of the prospects
134 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

of a partisan victory in Greece, though at the same time noting According to the Soviet record, Stalin used the term “federation”
his qualification that this is possible only in the absence of direct only in connection with the Bulgarian-Yugoslav union, though
US assistance to the Greek government, apparently meaning also noting that first Bulgaria and Yugoslavia could be united,
intervention by the American military. and then Albania could also be included. Neither the Soviet nor
21 The reference is to the creation of a Provisional Democratic Bulgarian records contain any mention of a conversation, found
Government of Greece, declared by the decision of the leadership in the Djilas report, regarding the name of the united Yugoslav-
of the Communist Party of Greece in late December 1947. This Bulgarian country.
government would be headed by the commander of the partisan 26 Kardelj’s reply on possible enemy interference in the
forces, member of the Communist Party Politburo, Markos shipment of oats is not mentioned either in the Soviet or
Vafiadis, known at the time as “general Markos.” The Bulgarian Bulgarian records. The Soviet record mentions only Kardelj’s
records note that at the 10 February 1948 meeting Stalin said on words that the question of oats is unclear to him.
this subject: “The bordering countries must be the last to 27 Ed. Note: For the Bulgarian version of this Greek-Chinese
recognize the Markos government. Let others, who are further comparison, see footnote above.
away, recognize it first.” This statement by Stalin—that 28 The Bulgarian and Soviet records do not contain such a
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania must refrain from recognizing dialogue between Stalin and Kardelj. According to the Bulgarian
the Greek revolutionary government, and allow other “people’s records, such a dialogue took place between Stalin and Dimitrov.
democracies,” not bordering Greece and not accused of interfer- 29 According to the Bulgarian records, this was stated not by
ing in its internal affairs, to recognize it—is absent from the Kardelj and Djilas, but by Stalin himself.
Soviet record. However, it does contain a statement by Kardelj 30 [Translator’s Note: This is a reference to Nico Spiru, a
(not present in the Bulgarian records) declaring that it would be member of the Albanian leadership with links to Belgrade, who
better for Albania or Bulgaria to recognize Markos, and not committed suicide in November 1947.—V.Z.]
Yugoslavia, for the latter is a member of the UN. 31 [Translator’s Note: Early in 1948 the US Department of State
22 [Translator’s Note: This “seaman” must be Fedor published the documents on the Nazi-Soviet talks and agreements
Raskolnikov, a famous Bolshevik and agitator of the Baltic fleet, in 1939-41, seized in Germany at the end of the Second World
later a Soviet emissary to ignite the Muslim revolution in Asia. War.—V.Z.]
He defected in 1937 from Bulgaria, where he was ambassador 32 According to the Soviet record, Dimitrov said nothing of the
and wrote a letter to Stalin denouncing his regime and the purges kind, and, indeed, said that the Bulgarian government would take
of Bolsheviks in the USSR.—V.Z.] measures to cover more carefully their forces and weapons.
23 On 13 December 1947, Lavrent’ev, on orders from Moscow, 33 [Translator’s Note: In other words, the countries that
informed Tito of the Albanian government’s request for a collaborated with Nazi Germany during the Second World
shipment of 5 thousand tons of oats from the USSR, and inquired War.—V.Z.]
whether Yugoslavia had any objections to this. Two days later, 34 [Translator’s Note: A member of the Central Committee of
Tito replied to the ambassador that the shipments from the USSR the Yugoslav Communist Party. On Stalin’s remarks about Pijade
are not needed: Albania will receive the oats from Yugoslavia. to Djilas, see Conversations with Stalin, p. 154.—V.Z.]
However, the oats promised by Yugoslav never arrived in
Albania. Even after the meeting in Moscow, during the second ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

half of February 1948, Lavrent’ev, in his discussion with Kardelj,

attempted to find out why this occurred. Kardelj explained this
through a misunderstanding and lack of cooperation between the
corresponding government bodies in Yugoslavia. AVP RF, f.
0144, op. 32, p. 128, d. 8, ll. 3, 8, 96, 102-103, 114-115.
24 The Bulgarian records note this statement by Stalin in the
following manner: “The Yugoslavs, apparently, are afraid that
we will take Albania away from them. You must take Albania,
but wisely.” The Soviet record notes this statement by Stalin in
more detail. It notes his words that “the Yugoslavs, apparently,
are afraid that we will take Albania from them, and that’s why
they want to deploy their forces there sooner. They believe that
we are tearing away from them their union both with Bulgaria
and with Albania, and want to present us with a fait accompli.”
25 The Bulgarian records present this thought by Stalin in the
following manner: “Only three federations are possible and
naturally inherent: 1) Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; 2) Romania and
Hungary and 3) Poland and Czechoslovakia. These are the
possible and realistic federations. A confederation among
ourselves is something far-fetched.” Somewhat further along in
the Bulgarian records are the following words by Stalin: “You
must not delay with uniting three countries—Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria and Albania.” The Soviet record does not include the
idea of three federations, and only mentions that Stalin remarked
on the natural rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria,
Romania and Hungary, and Poland and Czechoslovakia, while
calling the idea of a single federation of all countries “nonsense.”
 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT B ULLETIN 10 135

Soviet Plans to Establish the COMINFORM in Early

1946: New Evidence from the Hungarian Archives
by Csaba Békés

I
t has been long debated by scholars when the idea of being a reaction to the intensification of frictions between
forming a new Communist world organization after the allies, originally was a part of a wider Soviet scheme
the Second World War was raised. In the absence of aimed at fostering Communist takeover in East Central
relevant sources the still prevailing classical interpretation Europe by peaceful means, while preserving Soviet-
suggests that this idea was a Soviet reaction to the Western cooperation as well.
Marshall Plan introduced in the Summer of 1947 and after The document published below, is an excerpt from the
the Soviet Union’s refusal of the plan, the formation of the speech of Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the
Eastern Bloc and its ‘executive committee’, the Hungarian Communist Party at the 17 May 1946 meeting
COMINFORM, was a logical next step in breaking off of the Central Committee of the HCP.3 As part of a long
relations with the West. Surprisingly enough, no evidence survey on current international issues, he informed the CC
of any kind has emerged from Russian archives from the members about the Soviet conception on the setting up of
time of their partial opening in 1991 pertaining to this a new Communist-world organization. He gave a detailed
important topic. However, documents discovered by analysis to his audience of how this new body would be
Russian scholar Leonid Gibianskii in the Tito archives in different from the KOMINTERN using exactly the same
Belgrade show that the idea of setting up such an organiza- arguments presented at the time of the setting up of the
tion was already discussed during the talks between Stalin KOMINFORM in September 1947. Between 28 March
and the Yugoslav leader in Moscow in May-June 1946.1 and 2 April 1946, Rákosi had been on a secret mission in
Documents from Hungarian archives not only confirm Moscow, where he was trying to achieve better terms for
that a Soviet plan to re-establish a Communist-world Hungary at the forthcoming peace conference.4 On 1 April
organization was in the making already as early as March 1946, he met with Stalin and Molotov, and it is likely that
1946, but they also show that the implementation of the at this point he received the information he presented later
plan was postponed in order to avoid its potential negative to the Central Committee.5
effects during the forthcoming elections in France, Besides stressing the general importance of the
Czechoslovakia and Romania as well as in the course of document as the earliest known evidence of Soviet plans
the ongoing European peace settlement.2 This proves that for the establishment of the later KOMINFORM, it is also
the idea of setting up the later COMINFORM, rather than worth noting that during recent talks between the Hungar-

Speech by Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party at the Meeting of
the Central Committee, 17 May 1946
[…] Finally I would like to raise another question, which, like socialism, we have not spoken much about so far. This refers to
the creation of a new International. The comrades know that the third International had to be dissolved, because progress proved
that it damaged rather than benefited the growth of the communist parties. […] When we arranged the third International, I
remember the trouble we went to to show that we wanted a centralized, strong International with executive powers, similar to how
Marx imagined the International in 1864, and not just the sorting office and so on that the second International became before the
First World War. And this was the catastrophe of the third International. Because instead of every country looking separately for the
conditions for revolution, and not trying the impossible task of centralizing and directing the whole movement, it directed it from
the center. The result was that the parties gave up independent politics, continually looked in the direction of the center, and waited
for its instructions. This view led the comrades to announce the discontinuation of the third International. And afterwards, now that
the International has been discontinued, the parties are coming forth one after the other to say how the existence of the Interna-
tional limited their progress, e.g. most recently we heard from our Yugoslav comrades how much such a central institution held
them back, which, unaware of local conditions, sometimes demanded quite the opposite of what they needed. So such an Interna-
tional can no longer be established. On the contrary, the International should be such that it does not hinder the progress of
individual parties, that it provides a means for individual parties to execute the tasks leading to the liberation of the proletariat,
bearing local circumstances in mind. I should immediately say that as far as this is concerned, the new International cannot be
compared to the previous ones. This will not be an organizing body; its task will be to compose, to help in making objections, to
communicate the good or bad experiences of one country’s communist party to that of another country, that they should learn from
their neighbors’ experiences and losses. This will undoubtedly be very useful, as not just us, but communist parties the world over
are beginning to feel that without the exchange of experiences and objections they cannot produce adequate plans on international
questions. It is such an International that we now intend to establish, and this International will help rather than hinder the
international communist movement. On the same note, the view will change that was widely spread at the third International, for
136 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

example, that we have to wait for the conditions for revolution to appear in at least a bunch of countries, and only then can we
instigate the revolution. I remember that when the situation was revolutionary in Germany in 1923, in all the neighboring
countries we prepared for such revolutionary action, so that there could be a revolutionary situation in more than one country at
the same time. I remember that in the Czech Republic, France and other countries where the situation was not nearly as developed
as in Germany, we prepared assistance programs, similar uprisings, etc. History has shown that that was wrong. Now we are going
to follow another route. Here I should immediately say that not many people are aware of this interpretation of the dissolution of
the International, because they did not talk about it very much in this period and therefore completely incorrect views are spread
amongst some of the parties. For example when we were with the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia and we tried to reconcile
the Hungarian Communist Party’s line on the question of the Hungarians in Slovakia with that of the Czechoslovak Communist
Party, the comrades announced the theory that the International had to be dissolved, because the international aspirations [meaning
“national aspirations” — Cs. B.] of the individual Communist Parties are so much at odds with each other, that they could not be
fitted into the agenda of an International. Because of this they calmly recommended to us that we should attack the Czech
Communist Party, while they attack the Hungarian Communist Party. We rejected this theory. We were convinced that this was
wrong, and that Stalinist reasoning would say something totally different. There is not even a trace to show that the national
aspirations of the particular communist parties do not fit into the International; it points to completely different reasons. Now that
communist parties have everywhere become stronger and come to the fore, there should be pressure for the institution of the
Communist International or some other international communist body. At the moment this is being disturbed by the whole list of
parties preparing for elections. The comrades know that they are preparing for elections in France, Czechoslovakia and Romania,
and that our comrades there are otherwise occupied. They are also occupied with the question of peace. But as soon as the
elections die down and peace is agreed, at that moment this will come to the fore and then we will establish some kind of
international body. One part of this conception is that in these changed circumstances, whenever a country achieves the conditions
for the liberation of the proletariat or for socialism, this will be carried out, with no regard for whether the respective country is in
a capitalist environment or not. This is also a new perspective, which simply means that in a country where as a result of the work
of the communist party these conditions are present, it has to be realized. This is fresh encouragement for all Communist Parties,
because now it will principally be dependent on their work whether or not the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat are
created in their own country.
[Source: Archives of the Institute for Political History (AIPH), Budapest, 274. f. 2/34. Translated by David Evans.]

ian and the Yugoslav Communist leaders the latter com- quoted by: Robert C. Tucker: “The Cold War in Stalin’s Time,”
plained about how the KOMINTERN, unaware of local Diplomatic History, Vol. 21:2 (Spring 1997), 275. See also Leonid
Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War,”
conditions, sometimes demanded quite the opposite of in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.
what they needed. Paradoxically, although Tito and the 2 I first presented this finding at the international conference:
Yugoslav leaders now themselves became proponents of Internal Factors Facilitating Communist Takeover in East Central
the new Communist organization, their eventual rupture Europe 1944-1948, Opocno, Czech Republic, 9-11 September 1993,
with the rest of the Soviet bloc was caused by exactly the see: Csaba Békés, “Mad’arská politická krize na jare 1946,”
same Soviet attitude. Rákosi’s speech also provides an Suodobé Dejiny (Praha), 1994. No. 4-5. pp. 509- 513.
3 Archives of the Institute for Political History, (AIPH) Budapest,
important contribution to the “blueprint debate” on 274. f. 2./34.
whether Stalin had a plan to sovietize these countries. The 4 For the story of this Hungarian Communist initiative see: Csaba
conception, outlined by Rákosi, obviously repeating what Békés, “Dokumentumok a magyar kormánydelegáció 1946. áprilisi
he had heard in Moscow, shows a cautious, but deter- moszkvai tárgyalásairól. (Documents on the negotiations of the
mined, policy: in those countries where the Communist Hungarian Government Delegation in Moscow in April, 1946)”
Régió (1992), 3, 161-194; for an English version see: “The Commu-
party itself would be able to create favorable internal
nist Parties and the National Issue in Central and Eastern Europe
conditions for a smooth and peaceful takeover, they would (1945-1947). An Important Factor Facilitating Communist Takeover
be allowed to do so. However, at this stage, in the spring in the Region,” 6. Martie 1945: Incepturile communizarii Romaniei.
of 1946 Stalin, eager to maintain cooperation with the Editure Enciclopedia, (Bucharest, 1995), 245-253.
Western Allies, did not plan to permit any kind of forceful 5 No minutes of that meeting have been found to date on either side.
takeover, relying on direct Soviet support, or implying After returning from Moscow Rákosi reported on his visit at the 3
April Politburo meeting but according to the then prevailing practice
civil war. no minutes were taken. However, on 18 April, he gave a speech at
the meeting of party secretaries of factories and plants in Budapest,
where he briefly summarized the Soviet ideas on setting up a new
Dr. Csaba Bekes is a research fellow at the Institute for the History of Communist World organization (AIPH 274. f. 8/14).
the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in Budapest. A former CWIHP
fellow, Dr. Bekes has written widely on the international dimensions The Institute for the
of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. He is co-editor (with Malcolm History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution
Byrne and Christian Ostermann) of a forthcoming National Security
Archive document reader on the 1956 crisis. Dohány u. 74
H-1074 Budapest/HUNGARY
1 L. Gibianskii: “Kak voznik Kominfom: Po novym arkhivnym
materialam,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1993), No. 4. 135-136,
Fax: 011-36-1-322-3084
 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT B ULLETIN 10 137

Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito

[Co-editor’s Note: The following excerpt is from a document, discovered and published by Russian military historian
Dmitrii Volkogonov (1928-1995) in the Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow, outlining various
options to assassinate the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito with the help of Iosif Romual’dovich Grigulevich alias “Max,”
a Soviet agent who had been involved earlier in operations to kill Trotskii and later became a historian and correspond-
ing member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The document, classified as top secret and prepared in the Ministry of
State Security (MGB), was addressed personally to Stalin (in its only copy). While, according to Volkogonov, Stalin did
not indicate his authorization of the operation on the document, it is likely that he approved of it since preliminary
preparations began. Grigulevich, for example, had to write a “farewell letter” to his wife to cover up Soviet government
involvement in case the assassination failed. Following Stalin’s death in March 1953, however, the operation was
terminated.]

“The MGB USSR requests permission to prepare a among the crowd, allowing “Max” to escape and cover up
terrorist act (terakt) against Tito, by the illegal agent all traces.
‘Max’,” Comrade I.R. Grigulevich, a Soviet citizen and 3. To use one of the official receptions in Belgrade to
member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since which members of the diplomatic corps are invited. The
1950 ([biographical] information attached).1 terrorist act could be implemented in the same way as the
“Max” was placed in Italy on a Costa Rican passport, second option, to be carried out by “Max” who as a
where he was able to gain the confidence and enter the diplomat, accredited by the Yugoslav government, would
circles of South American diplomats as well as well- be invited to such a reception.
known Costa Rican political and trade figures visiting In addition, to assign “Max” to work out an option
Italy. whereby one of the Costa Rican representatives will give
Using these connections, “Max”, on our orders, Tito some jewelry in a box, which when opened would
obtained an appointment as the special plenipotentiary of release an instantaneously-effective poisonous substance.
Costa Rica in Italy and Yugoslavia. In the course of his We asked Max to once again think the operation over
diplomatic duties, in the second half of 1952, he visited and to make suggestions on how he could realize, in the
Yugoslavia twice. He was well received there, with entrée most efficient way, actions against Tito. Means of contact
into circles close to Tito’s clique; he was promised a were established and it was agreed that further instructions
personal audience with Tito. “Max’s” present position would follow.
offers us opportunities to carry out active measures It seems appropriate to use “Max” to implement a
(aktivnye deistviia) against Tito. terrorist act against Tito. “Max’s” personal qualities and
In early February of this year, we summoned “Max” intelligence experience make him suitable for such an
to Vienna for a secret meeting. While discussing options, assignment. We ask for your approval.”
“Max” was asked how he thought he could be most useful,
considering his position. “Max” proposed some kind of [Published on 11 June 1993 in Izvestiia. Translated by
active measure against Tito personally. Natasha Shur (CWIHP)]
In relation to this proposal, there was a discussion
with him [Max] about how he imagined all of this and as a
result, the following options for a terrorist act against Tito Dmitrii A. Volkogonov (1928-1995) was a prominent
were presented. Russian military historian. For several years, Volkogonov
1. To order “Max” to arrange a private audience with headed the Institute of Military History of the Soviet Army
Tito, during which a soundless mechanism concealed in and since 1991 chaired a special parliamentary commis-
his clothes would release a dose of pulmonary plague sion which oversees the handling of the former Soviet
bacteria that would guarantee death to Tito and all present. archives. His numerous publications include Iosif Stalin:
“Max” himself would not be informed of the substance’s Triumf i tragediia (Moscow, 1989) and Lenin:
nature, but with the goal of saving “Max’s” life, he would Politicheskii portret (Moscow, 1994).
be given an anti-plague serum in advance.
2. In connection with Tito’s expected visit to London, 1 Not printed.
to send “Max” there to use his official position and good
personal relations with the Yugoslav ambassador in
England, [Vladimir] Velebit, to obtain an invitation to the
expected Yugoslav embassy reception in Tito’s honor.
The terrorist act could be accomplished by shooting
with a silent mechanism concealed as a personal item,
while simultaneously releasing tear gas to create panic
138 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

The Turn in Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 1953-55

By Andrei Edemskii

Between the spring of 1953 and July 1955, relations with Yugoslavia changed sharply from collaborating with
Yugoslavia “as a bourgeois country” (May 1953) to Mikoian’s May 1955 toast with Yugoslav leaders to the “prosper-
ity of Yugoslavia.” Unfortunately, the correspondence carried out in 1954 and early 1955 between the central commit-
tees of the two ruling parties is not available in the archives. Other documents, however, can illuminate the earlier
stages of the shift. Below, two Foreign Ministry internal reports prepared by M. Zimianin in May 1953 and October
1954 illustrate the radical change of opinion reached at the 31 May 1954 Presidium meeting in which the need to foil
the “anti-Soviet plans of the Anglo-American imperialists and to use all means to strengthen our influence over the
Yugoslav people” prevailed, opening the door to rapprochement. [Ed. Note: N. Bulganin discussed this decision and
the ostensible resistance to it by Molotov and the Foreign Ministry during the July 1955 plenums, excerpted in this
CWIHP Bulletin]

About the Situation in Yugoslavia and duced serious positive results, has increased the influence
its Foreign Policy of the USSR among the peoples of Yugoslavia, has helped
explode the aggressive, anti-Soviet plans of the USA in the
To Comrade V. M. Molotov Top Secret Balkans, and made difficult the actions of anti-Soviet
The internal policy of the Tito clique, after breaking elements in Yugoslavia itself.
with the USSR and peoples’ democratic countries, aimed At the same time it is impossible not to see that the
at restoring capitalism in Yugoslavia, at the liquidation of Yugoslav ruling circles have normalized with the USSR
all the democratic accomplishments of the Yugoslav within the bounds of their self-interest…
people, and at the fascistization of the state and army Under the given conditions, it seems appropriate to
personnel. put forward measures for the further development of
In foreign policy, the efforts of the ruling circles of Soviet-Yugoslav relations that would force the Yugoslav
Yugoslavia aim at broadening economic and political ties government to come closer to the USSR and the peoples’
with capitalist states, first and foremost with the USA and democracies.
England. This has made Yugoslavia dependent on them We make the following proposals.
and has drawn it [Yugoslavia] into aggressive blocs To poll (zondazh) the Yugoslav government regarding
organized by the Anglo-American imperialists…. joint action with the USSR against US plans to draw Italy
and the Balkan Union into a broadening of anti-Sovietism
27 May 1953 in the region. To clarify the position of the Yugoslav
government on establishing diplomatic relations with the
[Source: AVP RF f. 06, op. 12a, por. 74, pap. 617, ll. 7-12. GDR.
Translated by David Wolff] If the test [results] of the Yugoslav government on two
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
or three major foreign policy questions are positive, this
will be an important condition towards the resurrection of
the Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Aid between the
On Recent Yugoslav Foreign Policy USSR and Yugoslavia [of 1945].
(second half of 1954)
21 October 1954
Yugoslavia’s foreign policy measures in the second Head of the IV European Sector of the Foreign Ministry
half (July-October) of this year have been dictated, as far Zimianin
as can be judged by sources, by the government’s attempt
to strengthen the country’s position by improving relations [Source: AVPRF f. 021, op. 8-a, por. 184, pap. 11, ll. 16-21.
with the countries of the capitalist camp and by normaliz- Translated by David Wolff]
ing relations with the USSR and other countries of the ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

democratic camp…
The [Fourth European] Sector [of the Foreign Minis- Andrei Edemskii, a former CWIHP fellow, is a researcher
try] considers it possible to come preliminarily to the at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the
following conclusions and proposals: Russian Academy of Sciences.
The Soviet Union’s policy on Yugoslavia has pro-
 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT B ULLETIN 10 139

Soviet-Yugoslav Relations and the

Hungarian Revolution of 1956

By Leonid Gibianskii

[Co-editor’s Note: The following essay by Leonid Gibianskii, a senior researcher at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan
Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow and coeditor [with Norman Naimark] of The Establishment of
Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949, introduces a fascinating set of documents on Yugoslav-Soviet
relations in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Hungary on 4 November 1956. Though the immediate concern was the
fate of Imre Nagy, the reform communist leader of the Hungarian Revolution, who had fled to the Yugoslav embassy in
Budapest, the documents make clear that both Moscow and Belgrade were aware that more fundamental issues in the
Soviet-Yugoslav relationship were at stake. The full version of Gibianskii’s essay, which was abbreviated for this
introduction, can be found in the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin (cwihp.si.edu). The documents printed below were
obtained by the National Security Archive and CWIHP and translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie. Additional
documents may be found in the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin.]

M
uch has been written about Soviet-Yugoslav depictions of Belgrade’s policy.
relations with respect to the Hungarian Revolu- Only since the end of the 1980s and beginning of the
tion. Even during the unfolding of the events 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet and Eastern European
themselves and the immediately following period, this communist regimes, has the opportunity arisen for the first
subject became a topic of discussion in mass media time to examine previously unavailable archival materials.
channels and in the press. Later it was touched upon to a In particular, I researched a number of aspects of this
lesser or greater degree in the historiography. However, in subject using documents from Yugoslav and Russian
both cases, this was done, as a rule, on the basis of only (former Soviet) archives.4 In addition, a significant
those facts which were available from public Soviet or number of relevant Russian, Yugoslav, and Hungarian
Yugoslav declarations and actions. The behind-the-scenes archival documents have been published.5 This article is
side of the relations between Moscow and Belgrade based on both already published materials as well as
regarding the 1956 events in Hungary remained hidden unpublished documents from Moscow and Belgrade
long afterwards: both sides, each for its own reasons, archives.6
preferred to keep this secret.1 Moscow’s and Belgrade’s concern towards the
The curtain of secrecy was partially lifted in the Hungarian revolution both differed and coincided simulta-
1970s, first when Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs, which neously. Recently-released documents, including those
had been written, or, more precisely, recorded by him contained in the aforementioned publications,7 leave no
against the will of the Soviet Union after his removal from doubt that the Soviet leadership viewed the events in
power,2 were published in the West; and secondly in Hungary from the very beginning as a deeply threatening
Yugoslavia, where, not without obstacles, the memoirs of event, which had to be stopped at all costs. For this
Veljko Micunovic, who had been the Yugoslav ambassador reason, the Soviets decided on 23 October and again on 31
to the USSR during the 1956 Hungarian crisis, came to October to move troops into Budapest.8 The Yugoslav
light.3 These publications contained some previously situation with regard to the Hungarian revolution was
unknown evidence about secret Soviet-Yugoslav contacts more difficult. Belgrade was not at all interested in
in connection with the development of the revolution in preserving Moscow’s ultra-conservative henchmen
Hungary and its suppression by Soviet troops. However, (Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gerö) and the severe Soviet
despite the importance of the publication of this evidence, mandate in Hungary. To the contrary, the relative liberal-
it was very incomplete, and in a series of cases, imprecise, ization of the regime and the weakening of Soviet control
as a result of the political-ideological prejudices of each of in a neighboring country could open the relatively alluring
the authors, but also because the disgraced Khrushchev, prospect of the emergence, alongside Yugoslavia, of
deprived of the chance to refer to documents, was some- another similar Communist country standing outside of the
times betrayed by his memory, while Micunovic, who had Soviet bloc or at least significantly independent from the
his daily notes at his disposal, had to stay within the Kremlin. However, while the Yugoslav leadership’s
confines of the official Yugoslav version of the time in his conception of the permissible changes in their neighboring
140 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

country was somewhat broader than the far more conser- ately and without reservations expressed his agreement
vative conceptions of the Kremlin rulers, it could approve with this plan, since, in his opinion, the Hungarian events
of liberalization in Hungary only to the degree that it did had gone in the direction of “counter-revolution.”15 True,
not threaten the existence of communist power there. Steps later, when the suppression of the Hungarian revolution by
taken by Belgrade at the very beginning of November the Soviet troops elicited widespread disappointment and
were a reflection of this ambiguous position. condemnation from throughout the world, the Yugoslav
Judging by its actions, the Soviet leadership consid- leadership, in a secret memorandum to Moscow, main-
ered the Yugoslav position to some extent ambiguous. tained that at the Brioni meeting it had accepted the Soviet
Having decided on October 31 to militarily intercede again plan with reservations, as a “lesser evil,” since Khrushchev
and to replace Nagy’s government with a new government and Malenkov had declared that no other means existed for
subservient to Moscow, the CC CPSU Presidium believed preventing the restoration of capitalism in Hungary.
it necessary to hold talks regarding the impending military However, from the very same memorandum, it followed
strike with Tito, the leaders of Bulgaria, Romania, and that Yugoslav reservations did not at all call into question
Czechoslovakia (the agreement of which was never in the undertaking of military actions, but instead stressed the
doubt) and with the new leadership in Poland.9 The goal importance of taking care to insure that the costs of
pursued by the Kremlin was obvious: afraid that Tito and “preserving socialism” to be incurred by the punitive
Wladyslaw Gomulka might condemn the impending measures employed by the Soviet forces should be held to
military action, Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev tried to a minimum. In essence, Tito stated in his correspondence
incline them through direct negotiation toward some sort that the Soviet leadership should “normalize” the situation
of agreement with it, using the argument that a counter- in Hungary not solely by military force but by accompany-
revolution had taken the upper hand in Hungary, threaten- ing simultaneous political measures to create a suitable
ing the complete liquidation of socialist development and Hungarian government with Kadar at its head, which
the establishment of Western control there. As is made would consist of people who had not been compromised
clear in Khrushchev’s memoirs, this very argument was set under Rakosi and were capable of uniting the forces
out at the secret meeting of Khrushchev and CC CPSU supporting the “continuing progress of socialism.”16 This
Presidium members Viacheslav Molotov and Georgii accorded with the intentions of Moscow, which had
Malenkov with Gomulka and the premier of the Polish already been planning such a step and of which
government, Juzef Tsirankevich in Brest on November 1. Khrushchev and Malenkov immediately informed their
However, they could not convince Gomulka of the Yugoslav counterparts.17
necessity of implementing the Soviet plan.10 With even From the memoirs of Khrushchev and Micunovic as
greater disquiet, Khrushchev and Malenkov went on to the well as the subsequent secret correspondence between
meeting with Yugoslav leader Josip Tito,11 expecting, in Moscow and Belgrade, it is clear that there were certain
Khrushchev’s words, that it would be still more compli- differences in the positions of Soviet and Yugoslav
cated.12 But despite this expectation, quite the opposite participants at the meeting. The Yugoslav side especially
occurred. stressed that the government had to condemn the regime of
The secret meeting in Tito’s residence on Brioni island Rakosi-Gerö, and put forth a program for surmounting the
which took place on the night of November 2-3 and at “Stalinist inheritance” and “reforming socialism,” using
which Tito, together with his assistants Edvard Kardelj and the support of recently-emerged worker councils in
Aleksandr Rankovich and in the presence of ambassador Hungary.18 Although the Soviet notions of acceptable
Micunovic, conducted negotiations with Khrushchev and parameters for “reform” were significantly narrower than
Malenkov, was until recently known about partly from the Yugoslav, judging by the documents, they did not
Khrushchev’s memoirs, but for the most part from object to these proposals. As for the selection of people for
Micunovic’s memoirs. According to the latter’s testimony, the government in question, Khrushchev expressed his
there were no records made during the meeting, but support for the candidacy of Ferenc Munnich as prime
afterwards he set down the contents from memory.13 In minister, while the Yugoslav side leaned more toward
one of the documents of the former CC LCY archive, the Kadar. In addition, the Yugoslavs favored including in the
existence of this record was mentioned, but I was not able government certain persons close to Nagy. According to
to locate it.14 Clearly it was the basis for the account of Micunovic, Geza Losonczy and Pal Maleter were men-
the Brioni meeting in Micunovic’s memoirs. But from tioned. Khrushchev also noted the Yugoslav selection of
other archival materials it becomes clear that the memoirs candidates in his memoirs, but, without remembering their
do not include much that was discussed. Both Khrushchev names, maintained that both were rejected as unaccept-
and Micunovic relate the following basic results of the able.19
meeting: when the high ranking Soviet visitors informed From the subsequent secret Soviet-Yugoslav corre-
the Yugoslav side of the Kremlin’s decision to employ spondence it becomes clear that the Yugoslav agreement
military force in Hungary again in order to replace the with the proposed Soviet military intervention was
Nagy government and to “defend socialism,” Tito, to the accompanied at the Brioni meeting with an agreement to
“pleasant surprise” of Khrushchev and Malenkov, immedi- give political assistance to the Soviet troops and in the
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 141

replacement of Nagy with a “revolutionary worker-peasant agreed upon with Khrushchev, they contacted Nagy. But
government.” Until recently, such an agreement was neither Tito nor Kardelj explained what exactly had been
essentially unknown. It is not mentioned in Khrushchev’s undertaken. In correspondence, Tito only tied the
memoirs, while Micunovic’s memoirs contain only an Yugoslav actions to the talks which had been conducted
unclear suggestion that the meeting included a discussion since November 2 between the Yugoslav diplomatic
of the question of Yugoslav efforts to “try to see whether mission in Budapest and Nagy’s close collaborator Zoltan
something can be done with Nagy.” Micunovic did not Santo, who came with the request that, in the event of the
explain what was meant by this, noting only that they had threat of an anti-communist pogrom, he and a few other
in mind “using influence on Nagy in order to minimize communists from the government and party leadership,
casualties and unnecessary bloodshed” and that the Soviet created to replace the collapsed HWP, be allowed to take
participants expressed a special interest in this.20 It refuge at the embassy.25 From documents it is clear that
becomes clear from the correspondence that the Yugoslavs, the envoy Soldatic inquired from Belgrade with regard to
before the start of Soviet actions, were to try to convince Santo’s request and received an answer on November 3
Nagy as well as his closest supporters from in the govern- that refuge would be given.26 However, apart from this
ment to resign.21 exchange, references to Nagy or, more importantly, his
In my earlier published work, I noted that Nagy’s resignation, were not found. Nor did Tito say anything
resignation from the post of prime minister would, under concrete in his later correspondence with Moscow.
these circumstances, signal his government’s liquidation; Whatever the case may be, when at dawn on Novem-
and this, in turn, would have created such a political and ber 4 Soviet troops began actions to suppress the revolu-
legal vacuum that in such conditions the self-declaration of tion and overthrow the Nagy government, the latter not
a new government, created under Soviet aegis, would not only did not resign, but, to the contrary, broadcast an
have seemed like a direct overthrow of the previous announcement on the radio condemning the Soviet
government and the Soviet intervention itself would not intervention as illegal and then, with a large group of
have been formally directed against a recognized Hungar- supporters, including Santo, took refuge at the Yugoslav
ian government. That is why the Soviet participants at the mission. With this, the events took a turn directly contrary
meeting expressed such an interest in agreeing with to what had been anticipated at the time of the Brioni
Yugoslavia to combine their actions with Nagy’s resigna- meeting. Belgrade, having been informed of what had
tion.22 In contrast to Micunovic’s memoirs, from which it happened by Soldatic, found itself in a ticklish situation.27
may be concluded that his question was discussed at Intent on escaping from this extremely uncomfortable
Soviet initiative, it follows from the aforementioned position, the Yugoslav leadership on November 4 informed
Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence that such was the the Soviets of what had transpired and affirmed that
proposal of the Yugoslavs themselves.23 Of course, there Yugoslavia would attempt to influence Nagy to retract his
is room for the possibility that the two may have over- recent statement and, to the contrary, make a statement of
lapped. In any case, the Yugoslav promise would have his support for the Kadar government.28 At the same time,
been in practice, had it been realized, an aid in camouflag- Soldatic received instructions to try to convince Nagy of
ing the Soviet intervention and armed suppression of the this and to prevent him and members of his group from
Hungarian revolution. This character of the Soviet- carrying out any kind of activity and establishing any kind
Yugoslav understanding was acknowledged, obviously, by of contact outside the diplomatic mission.29 However, the
the Yugoslav participants in the negotiations at Brioni, Soviet leadership immediately replied on November 4 that
insofar as they, as it follows from the archival documents, in light of the new situation (i.e., in which Nagy’s govern-
did not show a particular desire to enlighten their col- ment was already overthrown by military force and the
leagues in the Yugoslav leadership about it. Judging by creation of the Kadar government already announced), it
the minutes of the meeting of the executive committee of considered an address by Nagy to be unnecessary and
the CC LCY on November 6, at which Tito informed the proposed that Belgrade hand Nagy and his group over to
rest of the members of this higher party organ about the Soviet troops. They, in turn, would hand them over to
Brioni meeting, the Yugoslav leader preferred to remain Kadar’s government. 30 Evidently in order to achieve a
silent about the said understanding.24 quicker extradition of Nagy and the rest, on November 5,
The Yugoslav side, however, did not fulfill its prom- Khrushchev and Malenkov sent a telegram to Tito,
ise. The documents on which I was able to conduct Rankovic, and Kardelj which spoke of the successful
research do not clarify the reasons for this. In the subse- suppression of the “counter-revolution” in Hungary and
quent correspondence with Soviet leadership, Tito in emphasized that this action had been undertaken in accord
general tried to assure Moscow that the Yugoslav side with what had been agreed to at Brioni and that the results
started to act immediately according to the agreement and of this conference had made the most positive impression
undertook corresponding efforts in Budapest in the second on the CC CPSU Presidium.31
half of November, but were unable to achieve concrete The Soviet demands put Belgrade in a dead-end
results. Kardelj informed the Soviet ambassador in situation: on the one hand, the Yugoslav leadership by no
Belgrade, Nikolai Firiubin, that on November 4, as was means wanted to argue with Moscow, while on the other
142 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

hand it could not agree to surrender Nagy and his com- appeal of November 8 with a proposal on November 10
rades to the Soviet military authorities or to the Kadar that Nagy and Losonczy (who had entered his govern-
government for fear of serious discredit in the eyes of its ment) be sent to Romania. The rest, on condition of a
own people as well as the outside world. Thus, on statement of loyalty to the Kadar government, could
November 5, Tito, Kardelj, and Rankovic replied to receive their freedom and remain in Hungary.38 The
Khrushchev with a proposal to send Nagy and the rest to departure to Romania was, in essence, tantamount to
Yugoslavia.32 On November 7, however, Khrushchev Nagy’s surrender, but formally it was the compromise
categorically rejected this offer in the name of the Soviet asked for by Tito. The Yugoslav government found it
leadership and added a blunt threat: Citing the Brioni impossible to accept such a proposal, which Soldatic had
agreement, he warned that the proposal to send Nagy to already expressed to Kadar on November 11, noting that
Yugoslavia could be seen by Moscow as an example of Nagy’s departure to Romania could, in Belgrade’s opinion,
Belgrade’s secret solidarity with Nagy’s policies and could damage Yugoslav prestige and that Romania is not a
cause “irrevocable damage” to Soviet-Yugoslav rela- suitable country for such a purpose.39 It was clear that the
tions.33 Romanian scenario, involving a country of the “socialist
The Kremlin rejected Kadar’s hesitant proposal, camp” under Soviet control, was virtually tantamount to
which was made to Andropov on November 8, regarding handing Nagy over to the Soviet military or to Kadar’s
the possibility—in order to avoid heightening the tensions government. In addition, such a scenario had no chance of
in relations with Yugoslavia—to allow Nagy and his group Nagy’s acceptance.40 Belgrade, for its part, proposed two
to go to Yugoslavia under the condition that a written scenarios: either a declaration by Kadar’s government
document was received from Nagy stating his resignation guaranteeing Nagy and the rest freedom if they leave the
from the post of prime minister of the overthrown govern- Yugoslav diplomatic mission, or their unhindered depar-
ment and written promises from him and the others not to ture to Yugoslavia.41
harm Kadar’s government. In response to the communica- Like Belgrade, Moscow and its subordinate Kadar
tion received from Andropov, Moscow instructed him to sought to find a solution to this situation, though each in
tell Kadar on behalf of the CC CPSU that it was not their own interest. In contrast to Yugoslavia, which was in
advisable under any circumstances to let Nagy and the a hurry to resolve this question in order to rid itself of the
others go to Yugoslavia, and that the Yugoslavs would be source of difficulty with the USSR, the Soviets at first
forced to agree to the demands for his surrender. As for showed a tendency to outwait the Yugoslav leadership. But
Kadar’s apprehension about aggravating relations with the continued formal existence of the Nagy government,
Belgrade, the CC CPSU Presidium confirmed the position which still had not resigned, seriously aggravated an
set out in Khrushchev’s communication of November 7 to already difficult domestic and international political
Tito, Kardelj, and Rankovic.34 situation for the Kadar government. This provoked great
Insofar as this position did not leave the Yugoslav concern at the meetings of Kadar’s temporary Central
leadership any possibility of slipping between the Scylla of Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (CC
confrontation with the USSR in case Nagy was not HSWP) on November 11 and 16, at which the situation of
surrendered and the Charybdis of its public exposure as an the “two governments” was seen as one of the most
accomplice to Soviet intervention in case he was handed important tasks.42 Diplomatic maneuvers ensued, when
over, on November 8, in a new message to Khrushchev on Kadar first assured Soldatic on November 16 that Nagy
behalf of the CC LCY, Tito tried to explain to the Kremlin and his group could leave the Yugoslav mission without
that Yugoslavia was simply not in a condition to permit the fear of being followed, and, if they wanted, leave Hungary.
surrender of Nagy and the others to the Soviet or Hungar- On the instructions of the Soviet side, he demanded on the
ian authorities for fear of being discredited. At the same following day in the form of a preliminary condition, a
time, Tito tried in various ways to justify why the statement from Nagy and Losonczy that they no longer
Yugoslavs had not achieved Nagy’s resignation, after he considered themselves members of the government, and,
with his entourage had shown up in the Yugoslav mission. together with the others, would agree to support Kadar’s
In the message Yugoslavia’s support for the Kadar govern- government. The Yugoslavs for their part began to work
ment was forcefully emphasized, and it was proposed that towards the Kadar government’s granting them a written
a joint compromise resolution be found, including through promise that Nagy and the others could freely live at home
an amnesty for Nagy and the others hiding in the Yugoslav without repression against them.43
mission in Budapest.35 In the hopes that it would help The arguments surrounding these positions, which
soften Moscow’s position and obtain the assent of the continued until November 21, shifted entirely to the sphere
Kadar government, Belgrade gave a directive to Soldatic of negotiations between Belgrade and the Kadar govern-
on November 9 to try to obtain from Nagy at least a formal ment;44 the Soviet side, able to manipulate Kadar from
announcement of his resignation from the post of prime- behind the scenes, outwardly removed itself from the
minister of the fallen government.36 However, Nagy discussion regarding the Nagy question. Immediately,
refused.37 polemics arose between Hungarians and Yugoslavs
Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership replied to Tito’s (previously avoided by both sides) regarding general
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 143

principles of the Hungarian crisis and the evaluation of Communist parties, especially the French, as well as the
Soviet and Yugoslav policy in Hungary. The ground was Soviet manner of acting without regard to Yugoslav
laid by the publication in the 16 November issue of Borba interests or prestige, as in the case of Nagy’s arrest. The
of Tito’s speech to party activists in Pula on 11 November. expression of such disaffection was a long letter from Tito
In his speech, the Yugoslav leader had justified the Soviet to Khrushchev dated 3 December 1956 which, among
military intervention undertaken on 4 November as the other things, repeated and intensified criticism of Soviet
lesser evil in the face of the threat of “counterrevolution” policy in Hungary and argued the wrongful nature of
and expressed support for Kadar’s government, but at the Soviet accusations against Yugoslavia with regard to the
same time characterized the crisis as a consequence of the Brioni agreement and the Nagy question.48
Soviet support given until the last moment for the Rakosi- In essence, each of the sides occupied a simulta-
Gero regime, including the first Soviet military interven- neously defensive and offensive position, trying to stick
tion on October 24, which naturally provoked outrage in the other side with public and non-public demarches and to
Hungary. Tito connected a similar orientation of Soviet halt criticism made in its direction. The Yugoslav leader-
policy in relation not only to Hungary, but also to other ship used its public demarches for personal justification
Eastern European countries of the “socialist camp” with and for raising its prestige inside Yugoslavia and in the
the fact that among a portion of the Soviet leadership, the international arena (in this respect Kardelj’s speech in the
Stalinist legacy, which he characterized as a product of the Skupshchina played the same role as Tito’s speech in
system that had formed in the USSR, was still strong. Pula).49 For the Soviet leadership the campaign of
Tito’s speech itself and its publication in particular criticism against Belgrade functioned as one of the means
constituted a clear attempt to distance himself from Soviet for reinforcing its control over Eastern European countries
policy in Hungary in light of disappointment with of the “Socialist camp” and over the world Communist
Moscow’s actions both in Yugoslavia and the outside movement.50 Such friction continued towards further
world, while at the same time defending Yugoslavia’s escalation of mutual accusations and counter-accusations
agreement to intervention on 4 November and the support for the rest of 1956 and into the first months of 1957, both
for the Kadar government. The Yugoslav action elicited a in public statements and in a continued exchange of secret
sharp reaction from the Soviet leadership, which, however, letters between Moscow and Belgrade. In particular, the
was expressed primarily in private, in Micunovic’s response to the Yugoslav letter of 3 December 1956
meetings with Khrushchev and other members of the CC became the Soviet letter from 10 January 1957, after
CPSU Presidium. Moreover, the Soviets emphasized that which there followed the Yugoslav answer on 1 February
they did not want to see difficulties arise with Yugoslavia 1957.51 But despite the sharpness of the polemic in this
and charged Belgrade with breaking mutual agreements. correspondence, both sides came to the same basic
The public response to Tito’s speech, made in the form of conclusion: they negatively evaluated the revolutionary
material published in Pravda on November 19 and 23, attempt to liquidate the Communist monopoly over the
rejected Yugoslavia’s evaluations, although, in government in Hungary and considered the military
Micunovic’s opinion, in relatively measured terms, as was suppression of the revolution to be lawful.
the Moscow leadership’s general position toward relations
with Yugoslavia during these days.45
This was also said in connection with Nagy’s deten-
tion by Soviet troops and his group after they had left the Cable, N. Firiubin to Soviet Foreign Ministry
Yugoslav mission on November 22. The proposal for his
4 November 1956
arrest had been sent back on November 17 to the CC
CPSU Presidium by Malenkov, Suslov, and the secretary
Strictly secret
of the CC CPSU, Averkii Aristov, who were present in
Copying is forbidden
Hungary. And Kadar, who was negotiating with Yugosla-
Coded Telegram
via and on November 21 made a written statement
From BELGRADE
guaranteeing safety for Nagy and the others, had been
aware of this plan, endorsed by the Soviet leadership, from PRIORITY
the beginning.46 When Nagy and the others, upon leaving
the Belgrade mission were detained and forcibly sent to Kardelj informed me that on the night of November 4, they
Romania, the Yugoslav leadership limited itself to a protest got in touch with Imre Nagy, as had been agreed upon with
to the Kadar government, while to the Soviets on Novem- comrade Khrushchev.
ber 24 it expressed only “surprise” regarding this inci- Imre Nagy, Santo Zoltan and 11 more Hungarian
dent.47 communists are located in the Yugoslav embassy in
In its private contacts with Moscow, however, Budapest. It is not yet known, Kardelj said, whether Nagy
Belgrade showed increasing unhappiness with Soviet Imre made his last statement in the name of the govern-
encouragement of the anti-Yugoslav campaign carried out ment in Budapest. If he made this statement, they, the
in East European countries and by certain Western Yugoslavs, will try to get him to announce that he did so
144 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

under reactionary pressure [nazhim reaktsiia]. They also In this regard I told Micunovic that on November 5 of
intend to come to an agreement with Imre Nagy so that he this year, the Yugoslav ambassador in Hungary, Soldatic,
will make a statement supporting the government headed made a request to the USSR ambassador in Hungary, com.
by Kadar in Sol’nok. Andropov, for the removal of the Soviet military unit
In Kardelj’s words, such an announcement would which was located in the proximity of the mission building
facilitate the discussion of the Hungarian issue in the since at present the presence of this military unit near the
Security Council and the recognition of Kadar’s govern- Yugoslav mission was not necessary.
ment as the legal government. Kardelj, on Tito’s instruc- I told Micunovic that the Soviet military commander
tions, requested the advice of the CPSU and the Soviet in Budapest for his part considers it possible to comply
government as to whether to continue further talks with with the Yugoslav mission’s request and to remove the
Imre Nagy. Tito also asked the Soviet government to Soviet military unit located near the mission.
convey to Kadar’s government the request that they not I also told Micunovic that we cannot but be astonished
repress those communists who did not immediately take by Koca Popovic’s statement that “public opinion in
the correct line during the recent events in Hungary. Yugoslavia is quite strongly indignant.” If we are talking
Tito, in Kardelj’s words, also asked the Soviet about feelings, then our population, as well as every
government to take measures to protect the Yugoslav Hungarian patriot, is indignant to a far greater degree
embassy from possible attacks on it, especially if reaction- because of the fact that bankrupt degenerates and accom-
aries find out that Nagy, who is located in the embassy, is plices of counter-revolution such as Nagy and company,
supporting Kadar’s government. with whose knowledge worker-revolutionaries and
4/XI-56 N. FIRIUBIN communists were hanged on the streets of Budapest, took
refuge in the Yugoslav embassy after their defeat.
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Micunovic said that he had just acquainted himself

with com. Khrushchev’s letter of November 6 to coms.
From the diary Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic. He cannot speak officially
of D.T. SHEPILOV about the letter as a whole, but personally considers that its
Secret contents and conclusions contradict the understanding
7 November 1956 reached between com. Tito and coms. Khrushchev and
Malenkov during their recent visit to Brioni.
On a Conversation with the Micunovic also stated that he does not differ with me
Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR, Micunovic in the judgment that Imre Nagy and his government
cleared the way for counter-revolution. But there is an
At 14:10, I received the ambassador of Yugoslavia to entire group of people with Nagy among whom there are
the USSR, Micunovic. I told him that I had received his honest communists. During the conversations at Brioni, it
report on the conversation between Minister for Foreign was stipulated that Imre Nagy and the others could
Affairs Koca Popovic and the Soviet ambassador Firiubin improve the position of the new revolutionary worker-
in which Koca Popovic stated that a Soviet tank located peasant government if in one way or another they an-
alongside the building of the Yugoslav mission in nounced their intention to assist this government or, at the
Budapest opened fire on November 6 at 12:45 (Budapest least, not to speak out against it. The presence of Imre
time). The direction of the shot has not been established, Nagy and others presently in the Yugoslav embassy does
but all of the windows in the Yugoslav mission were blown not contradict the understanding which took place between
out and the window frames were damaged, and the event coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov and com. Tito and other
led to panic amongst the people located inside the mission. Yugoslav figures during coms. Khrushchev and
I told Micunovic that I had just spoken with the Malenkov’s visit to Brioni.
commander of the Soviet military unit in Budapest and had I answered that insofar as I was informed of the
instructed him to conduct a careful inquiry into the contents of the conversation which took place at Brioni
veracity of this fact. That will be done and the results of between coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov, on the one
the inquiry will be conveyed to the ambassador. However, hand, and the leaders of Yugoslavia on the other, the
as a preliminary matter the commander of the Soviet Yugoslav government’s provision of asylum to Nagy and
military unit in Budapest categorically states that that sort his entourage in the Yugoslav embassy starkly contradicts
of incident could not have taken place, since everything is the said conversation and understanding. Coms.
completely calm in the region where the Yugoslav mission Khrushchev and Malenkov informed the leadership of the
is located and since the tanks located near the mission party and the USSR government that com. Tito and the
were unlikely to have needed to open fire. However, I other Yugoslav leaders fully agreed with their Soviet
once again confirmed that the results of the inquiry as to comrades’ conclusions that Imre Nagy and his confeder-
the veracity or fictitiousness of the episode of which Koca ates are not only political bankrupts, but are people who
Popovic had informed our ambassador would be conveyed cleared the way for counter-revolution and who them-
to him as well. selves became the accomplices of reactionaries and
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 145

imperialist forces. I know, for example, that during the should not remain in such a government any longer and
conversation, com. Tito stated: “What sort of revolutionary that they should rely on the laboring masses and resist
is Nagy? What sort of communist is he if leading workers, reaction in the most decisive manner. There is no need to
communists and public figures were hanged and shot with remind you that from the very beginning, and also
his knowledge?” throughout our entire conversation, we expressed our
In light of these facts, we are truly astonished and doubts as to the consequences of open help from the
perplexed by the fact that the leaders of the Yugoslav Soviet Army. But bearing in mind that, in accord with
government have sheltered the anti-people group headed your evaluation that such help had become unavoidable,
by Nagy in the walls of the Budapest mission. we considered that nonetheless it would be necessary to do
Micunovic once again repeated that he did not dissent everything possible in order to minimize harm to the task
from our assessment of Nagy. However, it is not necessary of socialism. You recall that we first stated our opinion
to create additional difficulties for the new Hungarian that in such a position it would be best of all to create a
government and provoke the excitement and dissatisfac- government there in which people who had not compro-
tion of the Hungarian and Yugoslav population, as well as mised themselves during the regime of Rakosi would take
additional unpleasantness in the UN and in worldwide part, and at the head of which would be comrade Kadar as
public opinion through certain actions relating to Nagy and a prominent communist who enjoys influence among the
his group, by which he meant that at present they are not Hungarian laboring masses. We considered that it would
taking part in any political activity and are keeping quiet. be good if this government made a public appeal, and
I informed Micunovic that he would be received at subsequently this was done. We agree with this appeal and
18:00 for a conversation with com. Khrushchev. for this reason in our public statements we gave full
support to the government and the program which it
D. SHEPILOV. announced. We believed that you agreed with this, that
Attested: [signature] […] only such a government could once again restore contact
with the laboring masses and gradually eliminate at least
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

the serious [tiazhelye] consequences of the events in

Letter of the CC UCY to the CC CPSU Hungary. You yourselves could see here [u nas] that in all
with an exposition of the views of the leadership of the of our arguments we were guided only by deep concern
UCY on the events in Hungary that the victories of socialism be preserved in Hungary and
that the restoration of the old order, which would have had
8 November 1956, Brioni far-reaching consequences for all countries located in this
part of Europe, including Yugoslavia, be prevented. In
To the first secretary of the CC CPSU, particular, in connection with all of this we put forward
comrade KHRUSHCHEV our thoughts on trying to keep communists, and perhaps
Dear comrades! Nagy himself, out of this government, in which different
We received your letter in which you stated the point anti-socialist elements were located and which for this
of view of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on the issue of very reason was not in a condition to halt the [forces of]
Imre Nagy and others who took refuge in our embassy in reaction on their path to power. Comrades Khrushchev
Budapest. We understand some of your arguments which and Malenkov did not reject these thoughts. On the
are put forward in the aforementioned letter, and [we] contrary, they agreed with them, with some exceptions as
consider them logical, but all the same we must sincerely to Nagy. We considered that in this government and
say that in your letter we were deeply moved by the lack around it there were honest communists who could be very
of understanding of our position and, especially, the lack useful in creating the new government of Janos Kadar and
of understanding of our readiness to resolve this issue in in liquidating the activity of anti-socialist forces. On the
the spirit of reciprocal friendly relations, and not to the basis of this conversation at Brioni, we took some mea-
injury of the international reputation of Yugoslavia as a sures in Budapest on the afternoon of Saturday, 3 Novem-
sovereign country. You agreed with us that Yugoslavia ber of this year.
plays and in the future should play a very useful role in the On November 2, Zoltan Szanto spoke with our
world thanks to the reputation which it has acquired. representative in Budapest. In the course of this conversa-
We will explain in detail to you here, which circum- tion, Szanto expressed the desire that he and some commu-
stances led to the current state of affairs, so that our nists, if it were possible, could leave the building of the
position on this issue becomes clearer to you. government and the CC and could find sanctuary in our
It is true that, during our conversations at Brioni, we embassy, since their lives were being threatened by
agreed on the assessment that the weakness of Imre Nagy’s reactionary bands of rioters. In the spirit of this conversa-
government and the series of concessions made by that tion, our representative answered Szanto that we were
government to reactionary forces led to the risk of the ready to give them shelter if they made their escape
destruction of the existing socialist achievements in immediately. We expected that they would answer on
Hungary. We agreed that the Hungarian communists Sunday, the fourth of the month. However, on the morning
146 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

of the same day, the Soviet Army began its actions, and reaching consequences in our country.
our conversations were ended. Instead of that, early in the In your letter you say that this could have negative
morning of the same day, on the basis of previous conver- consequences for our relations as well, but we consider
sations, Nagy and 15 other leaders of the government and that this should not hinder the development of friendly
the party together with their families arrived at our relations between our parties and countries, [relations]
embassy. When we received the first report about this which of late have already brought significant results. We
event from Budapest, we did not know whether the consider that this issue can be resolved in such a way that
announcement which had been read, which you cite in it not harm either our country, or the Soviet Union, or the
your letter, was in fact Nagy’s announcement or whether it development of socialism in Hungary. We consider that
was published without his knowledge. And so, Nagy and the very friendship which exists between our two countries
his group arrived on the basis of the conversations which demands that the government of the Soviet Union regard
had taken place earlier, before we from Belgrade could the international prestige of Yugoslavia with great under-
react to his announcement, for the authenticity of which standing, as it regards the prestige of the Soviet Union
we had no proof. As soon as we received word that Nagy itself. If we did not behave in this way, the masses of our
and the others had taken refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, people could not understand either the politics of the
comrade Kardelj invited the counselor to the Soviet Soviet Union or the politics of their own Yugoslav
embassy in Belgrade, comrade Griaznov, and told him this government. If we regard matters in this way, then we
fact. Despite the absence of such information, all the must believe that with the aid of the good will of both
same, we then considered that an appropriate announce- countries it is necessary to find a resolution which would
ment by Nagy, if essentially in favor of the Kadar govern- not have a harmful influence on our friendly relations.
ment, could still assist an easing of the situation in Bearing in mind such a state of affairs, it is difficult
Hungary, as we proposed to you. Having not received an for us to believe that you, despite this, will not try to find
urgently requested reply from you in this regard through- another solution, all the more since we consider that, aside
out November 4, we refrained from further actions in that from transportation to Yugoslavia, there are also other
direction. possibilities for resolving this problem in keeping with
If attention is paid to all of this, then it becomes international law, like, for instance, amnesty or something
obvious that only as a result of the speed of events, matters similar. We hope that you in the spirit of everything we
were not clarified and problems were created, which it is have set out will once again examine your position.
now necessary to resolve. We believe that the question of In conclusion we would like once again to return to
whether our embassy in Budapest behaved correctly or not one argument from your letter. Despite the fact that some
is now irrelevant, but that it is important that we jointly malevolent persons can interpret our relationship to Nagy
resolve the problem in the spirit of friendly relations, and to the rest of the group in Budapest, we want to
which we have already restored between our countries and emphasize that we have absolutely no connection with this
our parties, since [the problem] in the final analysis group, nor with the events in Hungary. Moreover, we
appeared as a result of our conversation in Brioni, al- reject the hint about our imaginary connection with the
though, because of events which occurred during the night Petöfi club. Yugoslavia exists just as it is, with all its
from Saturday to Sunday, things have developed in a revolutionary past, with all its experience and understand-
different way than we proposed. After this, essentially, ing of socialist construction. If separate people in Hun-
only their personal issue in regard to their request for gary spoke about her [i.e. Yugoslavia], that does not give
asylum will remain to be decided. anyone the right to impute responsibility to Yugoslavia for
We do not dispute some of your arguments as to the internal events which have entirely different sources and
fact that granting asylum in Yugoslavia to members of the other culprits. Precisely because we saw all of the dangers
former Hungarian government, whose chairman has not hidden in the stormy [events] in Hungary, we were
resigned, could be negative, and do not think that we do extremely restrained and did all we could to act in a calm
not realize that all of this has also brought us some manner. This is evidenced by the arrival in Yugoslavia of
unpleasantness and complications. As we see from your the delegation of the Hungarian Workers’ Party headed by
letter, you have not accepted our proposal that Nagy and Gerö. On the same principle we agreed with you in your
the rest of the group be transported, with your permission, assessment of the course of events in Hungary and
to Yugoslavia, and that puts us, understandably, in a very publicly gave our support to the revolutionary worker-
difficult position. Specifically on that point, we would like peasant government headed by comrade Kadar from the
you to treat the search for a joint way out of all of this with very first day. Accordingly, if someone now tries to accuse
great understanding, since neither by the stipulations in our Yugoslavia of the events in Hungary, for which it bears not
constitution on the granting of the right of asylum, nor by the slightest responsibility, we consider in such a case that
international custom, nor by other considerations which it is in our common interest, and in the interest of social-
we cited earlier, can we break the word we have given and ism to repudiate such rumors.
simply hand over these people. Here we must especially With a comradely greeting
emphasize that such an action by us would provoke far- On behalf of the Central Committee
 C OLD WAR I NTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 147

of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia CPSU,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1993, No. 6, pp. 130-144; A “Jelcin-
(I.B. Tito) dosszie”: Szovjet dokumentumok 1956 - rol. (Budapest, 1993);
Hianyzo lapok 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP
[Source: AP RF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 486, ll. 61-67. Copy. TsKhSD. f. KB leveltarabol (Budapest, 1993); Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok
89. per 45. dok. No. 38. Obtained by the National Security 1956: Az allami- es partkapcsolatok rendezese, az oktoberi
Archive and CWIHP. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie felkeles, a Nagy Imre-csoport sorsa. Dokumentumok (Budapest,
(CWIHP).] 1995); “How the `Hungarian issues’ were resolved: Working
notes of the meetings of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, July-
November 1956,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 2, pp. 73-104
Leonid Gibianskii is a senior researcher at the Institute for and No. 3, pp. 87-121. For an English translation, commentary,
Slavonic Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences and and annotation of the CC CPSU Presidium meetings on the 1956
has published widely on Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Hungarian (and Polish) crises, see Mark Kramer, “Special
Feature: New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956
1 Practically nothing was changed in this sense by the publication Polish and Hungarian Crises” and Mark Kramer, trans. and
of a collection of documents on Yugoslavia’s policies towards annot., “The `Malin Notes’ on the Crises in Hungary and Poland,
Hungary in connection with the Hungarian revolution in 1959: 1956,” in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos.
Politika Jugoslavije prema Madarskoj i slucaj Imre Nada 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 358-384, 385-410.
(Belgrade, 1959). It was compiled and published in connection 6 In Moscow I researched documents in the former archive of the
with the trial that took place in 1958 in Hungary of the group of CC CPSU, now the Center for the Storage of Contemporary
participants in the prominent revolutionary events of 1956 Documentation (henceforward TsKhSD); in Belgrade, I worked
headed by Imre Nagy. The publication had a propaganda aim: to in the former archive of the CC of the Union of Communists of
disprove the accusations made in the course of the trial of Yugoslavia, which now is a fond in the collection of the Archive
Yugoslavia’s participation in statements against the pro-Soviet of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije [henceforward - AJ], f. 507),
communist regime in Hungary. Although the collection, which and in the archive of the former united secretariat on Yugoslav
consisted largely of newspaper publications, also included foreign affairs (Arhiva Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane
fragments of individual archival documents, as a result of the poslove, Politicka arhiva [henceforward ASSIP-PA]). I also used
careful selection that had been exercised in its compilation, it xerox copies of some archival materials kindly provided by my
lacked materials which would have exposed the behind-the- colleagues from the Institute of Slavic Studies and Balkanists of
scenes dimension of Soviet-Yugoslav contacts in connection with the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vyacheslav Sereda and
the Hungarian revolution of 1956. Aleksandr Stykalin, the latter of which I also thank for his help in
2 Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970, translating documents from Hungarian.
1971). I used the corrected Russian original of the recollections, 7 See footnote 5.
which was published in the Moscow journal Voprosy istorii in 8 For the transcript of this meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium,
1990-1995 under the title of “Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich see “How the `Hungarian issues’ were solved,” Istoricheskii
Khrushchev.” arkhiv, 1996, No. 2, pp. 82-83. For the discussion at the meetings
3 Veljko Micunovic, Mockovske godine 1956-1958 (Zagreb, of the CC CPSU Presidium on 28-31 October on the issue of
1977); in this article the second edition (Belgrade, 1984) is cited. whether to resort to a repeat operation by Soviet troops or to
For an English-language edition, see Veljko Micunovic, Moscow refrain from this, see ibid., pp. 88-95, 97-102; No. 3, pp. 87, 90.
Diary (London, 1980). The working notes of the said meetings confirm the circumstance
4 Leonid Gibianskij, Magyarorsag, 1956: Hruscsov es Tito titkos mentioned in Khrushchev’s memoirs, that the discussion of this
levelezese. - Koztarsasag, 1992, 25 szm, pp. 74, 76-77, 80-81; 26 issue in the CC CPSU Presidium was conducted in close
szam, pp. 74, 76-77, 80-81; 27 szam, pp. 29-32; Leonid connection with the negotiations between the Soviet leadership
Gibianskij, “Le trattative segrete sovietico-jugoslave e la and the delegation of the CC of the Communist Party of China
repressione della rivoluzione ungherese del 1956,” Storia (CPC), which was in Moscow from 23-31 October to examine
Contemporanea (Roma), 1994, no. 1, pp. 57-82. I touched on the events in Poland and Hungary (see: “Memoirs of Nikita
this problem briefly in: Leonid Ja. Gibianski, Witali, Ju. Afiani, Sergeevich Khrushchev,” Voprosy istorii, 1992, No. 11-12, pp.
Aleksandr S. Stykalin, “Zur sowjetischen Außenpolitik im Herbst 83-84). In keeping with the data published in recent years in
1956,” in Inge Kircheisen, ed., Tauwetter ohne Frühling: Das China, on 30 October 1956, the Chinese Politburo telegraphed a
Jahr 1956 im Spiegel blockinterner Wandlungen und message to the delegation in Moscow to transmit Beijing’s
internationaler Krisen (Berlin, 1995), pp. 42-44. opinion to the Soviet leadership, that the Soviet troops should not
5 Of the most essential publications of documents, see: “Hungary, be withdrawn from Hungary and should support communist
April-October 1956: Information of Iu.V. Andropov, A.I. power in that country. On 31 October, the Chinese delegation
Mikoian, and M.A. Suslov from Budapest,” Istoricheskii arkhiv informed Khrushchev about this; see Chen Jian, “Beijing and the
(Moscow), 1993, No. 4, pp. 103-142; “Hungary, October- Hungarian Crisis of 1956,” paper presented to the International
November 1956: From the archives of the CC CPSU,” Conference “Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival
Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1993, No. 5, pp. 132-160; “Hungary, Evidence,” Budapest, 26-29 September 1996, organized by the
November 1956 - August 1957: From the archive of the CC National Security Archive, the Institute for the History of the
148 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10

1956 Hungarian Revolution, and the Cold War International 39 TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 4-5; published in Hungarian in
History Project. Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 210-211.
9 “Hungary, October-November 1956,” p. 146. 40 Nagy demonstrated a decisive rejection of compromise with
10 “Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev,” Voprosy istorii, the Kadar government and the Soviet side, and in relation to
1994, No. 5 (hereafter - Khrushchev’s Memoirs), pp 75-76; “How sending him to Romania, gave a categorical refusal to the
the `Hungarian issues’ were resolved,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, Romanian representative, Walter Roman, who visited him ten
No. 3, p. 92. days later. Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 195, 285-
11 On 31 October in the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, a telegram 286.
confirmed by the CC CPSU was sent from Moscow, in which 41 Ibid., pp. 192-193, 210; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 4-5.
Khrushchev proposed a secret meeting with Tito at any location 42 Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 196-203, 230-232.
in Yugoslavia or the USSR “in connection with the situation 43 Ibid., pp. 233-240; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 5, ll. 3-4.
which had arisen in Hungary.” On the same day, Moscow was 44 On these negotiations, see Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok
informed in a telephonogram from the embassy that Tito agreed 1956, pp. 241-257, 259-275.
to a meeting and would prefer to conduct it in his residence on 45 Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 184-191, 195-199, 200-
the island of Brioni, where he was then residing. See “Hungary, 201.
October-November 1956,” p. 146; “How the ‘Hungarian issues’ 46 TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 5, l. 4; ibid., d. 3, l. 11.
were resolved,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 3, p. 91. 47 Ibid., d. 5, ll. 19-26.
12 Khrushchev’s Memoirs, p. 77. 48 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-83; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 4,
13 Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 157, 164. ll. 24-33. See CWIHP Electronic Bulletin.
14 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-91 (st. sign. 1-1/63), p. 4. 49 The available documents so far do not permit an explanation
15 Khrushchev’s Memoirs, p. 77; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, of the extent to which differences inside the Yugoslav leadership
pp. 158-159. might have played a role here.
16 AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-78, l. 2; 119-95, l. 7-8, 50 Obviously, the struggle within the CC CPSU Presidium is also
TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84, p. 18. expressed here. Its more conservative members, above all
17 Khrushchev’s Memoirs, p. 77; Micunovic, Mosckovske Molotov and Kaganovich, in the course of the suppression of the
godine, p. 159. Hungarian revolution, spoke against any even purely declarative
18 TsKhSD, f. 89, per, 45, dok. 84, s. 18; AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, criticism of the Rakosi regime by Kadar, and in reply to the
119/I-95, l. 61; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 159-160. objections of Khrushchev and a series of other officials in the
19 Khrushchev’s Memoirs, pp. 77, 78; Micunovic, Mosckovske Soviet leadership, scared them with the danger of the Kadar
godine, pp. 159-161; AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-78, l. 3. government’s slide on “the Yugoslav path.” See “How the
20 Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 160-161. ‘Hungarian issues’ were resolved,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996,
21 AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-77, l. 1; 119/I-78, l. 2-3; 119/I- No. 3, pp. 111-112, 114-117.
92 (st. sign. 1-I/64), l. 3; TsKhSD, f. 89, per, 45, dok. 83, p. 4. 51 The Soviet letter of 10 January 1957, signed by Khrushchev, is
22 Gibianskij, Magarorsag, 1956... - Koztarsasag, 1992, 25 szam, in TsKhSD, f. 39, per. 45, dok. 83; AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-
p. 81. 92. The Yugoslav response of 1 February 1957, signed by Tito, is
23 See footnotes 53 and 54. in AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-95, l. 1-35, 58-76, and TsKhSD,
24 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, III/67. f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84. See CWIHP Electronic Bulletin.
25 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-78, l. 3; 119/I-95, l, 14, 64-65;
TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84, p. 21; “Hungary, October-
November, 1956,” p. 149.
26 Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, p. 159.
27 Ibid., p. 160. See Cable from Firiubin to Soviet Foreign
Ministry, 4 November 1956, printed below.
28 “Hungary, October-November 1956,” p. 119. Printed below.
29 Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 160-161.
30 “Hungary, October-November 1956,” pp. 149-150.
31 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-76.
32 About this telegram, see AJ, f. 507, CD SKJ, IX, 119/I-77, l. 1;
Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 171-174.
33 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-77, ll. 1-4.
34 “Hungary, October-November 1956,” pp. 151-153.
35 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-78, ll. 1-7. Printed below.
36 Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, p. 190.
37 Ibid., p. 191.
38 On the Soviet reply, see. ibid., pp. 194, 210; TsKhSD, f. 89,
op. 2, d. 3, ll. 4-5; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, p. 178; AJ, f.
507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-80 (st. sign. 1-I/57), l. 3.