Study Guide: DISEC

Topic Area A
Reducing Maritime Militarism and Tensions in the South China Sea

Introduction

The South China Sea is one of the "zone-locked" areas defined by different
nations' exclusive economic zones (EEZs). It is surrounded by China, the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Taiwan, hence some
states cannot reach the high seas or enter the South China Sea without
passing through the EEZs of at least one of these coastal states.

As a result, it is critical to clarify the maritime boundary in the South China

Sea in order to identify the rights associated with it. Conflicts in the
South China Sea are characterized by legal ambiguity regarding historic
rights or limited sovereignty in the region. Maritime entitlement
associated with territorial boundaries in the South China Sea has been
disputed for a long time, but until recently it does not seem settled.
Despite the instability, China has continued expanding its military
presence in disputed areas to enhance its maritime power. China has
taken various methods to militarize the area, including restrictions,
construction of military bases, and mobilization of maritime militia. The
South China Sea is a highly disputed area where numerous maritime
boundary and entitlement disputes remain unresolved, and such
disputes seem very likely to soon turn into warfare at any time. The
major cause of the disputes is China’s constant attempt to exercise its
authority over the South China Sea. In 1948, China first issued a
‘U-shaped’ dotted line which occupied 80% of the South China Sea,
which was immediately rejected by neighboring countries such as
Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Nonetheless, China
unilaterally reaffirmed the extended EEZ and its authority by drawing
so-called a “nine-dash line”. As shown in the figure below, a nine-dash
line is largely overlapped with other states’ EEZs and China has
nevertheless claimed its territorial sovereignty within the area without
reasonable legal grounds.
 ● Figure 1: China’s 9-dash line

History

The islands of the South China Sea can largely be grouped into two island chains.
The Paracel Islands are clustered in the northwest corner of the Sea, and the
Spratly Islands in the southeast corner. Reflecting the Rashomon nature of the
dispute, the claimants have argued bitterly over the “true” history of these island
chains. Some have tried to ground their modern claims by proving a long and
unbroken record of national control over claimed features. These states assert
that, for example, their nationals fished around the islands of the Sea or used
them for shelter from storms. In particular, Beijing has taken an active role in
subsidizing archeological digs to find evidence of exclusive Chinese usage of the
Sea’s many features since time immemorial.

It is hard—if not impossible—to wade through these partisan claims (many of

which constitute pure propaganda). No impartial tribunal has yet taken on that
challenge. To the extent that it is possible to draw any conclusions from the
morass, though, it seems fair to say that no claimant has conclusively
demonstrated a pattern of exclusive historical control over the South China Sea,
or even over isolated parts of it. In any case, the issue was moot for most of the
region’s history. Through the first half of the twentieth century, the Sea
remained quiet as neighboring states focused their attention on conflicts
unfolding elsewhere. In fact, at the end of World War II, no claimant occupied a
single island in the entire South China Sea. Then, in 1946, China established
itself on a few features in the Spratlys, and in early 1947, it also snapped up
Woody Island, part of the Paracel Islands chain, only two weeks before the
French and Vietnamese intended to make landfall. Denied their first pick, the
French and Vietnamese settled for the nearby Pattle Island. But even at this
stage, the South China Sea was not seen as a priority by any of the claimants. For
that reason, after suffering their cataclysmic defeat at the hands of Mao’s
Communists, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces retreated to Taiwan and abandoned their
stations in the South China Sea. Even the French and Vietnamese could not be
bothered to take advantage of the lapse in Chinese control, as they were
preoccupied with the rapidly escalating war in Vietnam.

However, the next half century saw accelerating interest in the South China Sea.
In 1955 and 1956, China and Taiwan established permanent presences on
several key islands, while a Philippine citizen—Thomas Cloma—claimed much of
the Spratly Island chain as his own. Once again, this phase of frenetic island
occupation was cooled off by a longer period of inertia. But by the early 1970s,
the claimants were at it once again. This time, though, the scramble was spurred
by indications that oil lurked beneath the waters of the South China Sea. The
Philippines was the first to move. China followed shortly thereafter with a
carefully coordinated seaborne invasion of several islands. In the Battle of the
Paracel Islands, it wrested several features out from under South Vietnam’s
control, killing several dozen Vietnamese and sinking a corvette in the process.
In response, both South and North Vietnam reinforced their remaining
garrisons and seized several other unoccupied features. Another decade of
relative inaction was punctuated once again with violence in 1988, when Beijing
moved into the Spratlys and set off another round of occupations by the
claimants. Tensions crested when Beijing forcibly occupied Johnson Reef, killing
several dozen Vietnamese sailors in the process. Once again, though, tensions
deescalated for a few years, only to rise again in 1995, when Beijing built
bunkers above Mischief Reef in the wake of a Philippine oil concession.

The dispute seemed to take a turn for the better in 2002, when ASEAN and
China came together to sign the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea. The Declaration sought to establish a framework for the
eventual negotiation of a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. The parties
promised “to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would
complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among
others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands,
reefs,
shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive
manner.” For a while, the Declaration seemed to keep conflict at bay. Over the
next half decade, Beijing launched a charm offensive across Southeast Asia, and
the claimants refrained from provoking each other by occupying additional
features.

Rather than fighting battles out on the Sea, though, the claimants began to
needle each other through demarches and notes verbales. In May 2009, Malaysia
and Vietnam sent a joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf setting out some of their claims. This initial submission
unleashed a flurry of notes verbales from the other claimants, who objected to
the two nation’s claims.

In particular, China responded to the joint submission by submitting a map

containing the infamous “nine-dash” line. This line snakes around the edges of
the South China Sea and encompasses all of the Sea’s territorial features as well
as the vast majority of its waters. However, Beijing has never officially clarified
what the line is meant to signify. Instead, it has maintained “strategic ambiguity”
and said only that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the
South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and
jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.
This could mean that China claims only the territorial features in the Sea and
any adjacent waters allowed under maritime law. Or it could mean that China
claims all the territorial features and all the waters enclosed by the nine-dash
line, even those that exceed what’s permitted under maritime law.

Since the publication of the nine-dash line, the region has grown increasingly
concerned by China’s perceived designs on the South China Sea. In 2012, Beijing
bore out some of these concerns when it snatched Scarborough Shoal away
from the Philippines. The two states had quarreled over allegations of illegal
poaching by Chinese fishermen. After a two-month standoff, the parties agreed
to each withdraw from the Shoal. Manila did. Beijing did not. Since then, China
has excluded Philippine boats from the Shoal’s waters.

In response to this escalatory move, Manila filed an arbitration case against

China on January 22, 2013, under the auspices of the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Philippine claimed center around maritime law
issues, although China asserted that they cannot be resolved without deciding
territorial issues first. For that reason, Beijing largely refused to participate in
the proceedings, although it drafted and publicly released a position
paper opposing the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Philippines submitted its
memorial as well as a response to China’s position paper.
As the case proceeded in the background, China adopted an increasingly
assertive posture in the region. In early May 2014, a Chinese state-owned oil
company moved one of its rigs into waters claimed by Vietnam south of the
Paracel Islands. This provocation touched off confrontations between
Vietnamese and Chinese vessels around the rig, as well as rioting against
foreign-owned businesses in parts of Vietnam. Faced with this pushback, China
withdrew the rig in mid-July, a month ahead of schedule.

Additionally, Beijing launched an accelerating land reclamation campaign across

the South China Sea. In at least seven locations, Chinese vessels poured tons of
sand to expand the size of features occupied by China. Beijing also began
construction of infrastructure on much of this reclaimed land, including an
airstrip capable of receiving military aircraft. Although other claimants have
reclaimed land in the past, China has reclaimed around 3000 acres of new land,
more than all other claimants combined over the history of their claims,
according to the U.S. Department of Defense.

The other claimants condemned this latest project as counterproductive, and

President Obama urged China to stop throwing elbows and pushing people out
of the way in pursuit of its interests. Beijing has not complied with these
entreaties, and it is unclear what the next twist or turn in the story of the South
China Sea will be.

The South China Sea’s delineation as “international water” dates back to the late
Ming period (1403 – 1644) and the introduction of European trade companies in
East Asia. With an increased European presence in Asia, European ideals of free
passage and trade policies clashed with the tributary system of the Chinese
Empire. The understanding of the South China Sea as “international water” is
derived from the European understanding of the freedom of navigation rather
than from the Chinese understanding of the South Sea. For China, the South Sea
was a part of the Chinese Empire and a critical economic thruway for trade and
exploration.

China’s legal claim rests in an assertion of first discovery in the second century
CE. China also asserts that the South China Sea was mapped by Chinese
scholars in the third century CE and that archeological evidence from several
islands match Han Dynasty era artifacts (placing them in the early second
century CE). If true, these assertions would be the earliest historical basis of any
claimants, as the claims of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia are derived
from later events, including European colonization. Incorporated into China’s
claim is the assertion that many of those subsequent events, including the
French colonization of the habitable South China Sea in the Spratly and Paracel
Islands, were illegitimate and do not negate China’s historical claims.
It is easily verifiable that China had continuous trade contact with what was
called the South Sea Region, which referred to the nations in South and
Southeast Asia from a China-centric perspective. The known trade routes with
this region were predominant during the Kingdom of Wu (222 CE – 279 CE) and
continued to expand during the subsequent Liang Dynasty (502-587 CE), with
Funan (present-day part of Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam) acting as a major
entrepot for South Sea Region trade in the Mekong River Basin by the sixth
century CE. By the thirteenth century, continued trade with the South Sea
Region relied on the shipping capacities of Malay city-states in the absence of
Chinese naval power.

While the International Court of Arbitration governing maritime disputes has

made it clear that (in legal terms) historical claims are wholly irrelevant to
territorial and maritime disputes in the case of the South China Sea, the People’s
Republic of China continues to assert the relevance of its historical claims.
Despite the clear legal discourse on the subject of historical claims, the narrative
of China – the largest actor in the region – must be considered and understood
when analyzing the disputes. So long as actors are operating within different
frameworks – with China continuing to call attention to historical claims and the
international community continuing to focus on unenforceable international
law, meaningful discussion and eventual resolution of the South China Sea
disputes will be out of reach.

The existing debate over Chinese historical claims is whether they are relevant
to the present-day territorial and international waters in the South China Sea.
The International Court of Arbitration and ASEAN have said no, but the Chinese
government continues to argue that they are indeed relevant and constitute a
valid present-day claim. It is not the validity of China’s presence in the South
China Sea that is in question. Rather, it is whether a trading presence (in which
shipping lanes circumvented the open ocean and dangerous rocks of the South
China Sea islands) can be considered a legitimate present-day claim of
sovereignty to the various islands in the South China Sea.

It is possible that historical claims are not about attachment to a specific piece of
land, as evidenced by the sweeping nature of the nine-dashed line. Rather,
China’s concern may be in recalling the traditional hierarchical Asian paradigm
in which the “middle kingdom” acted as the center of a tributary system of
various levy-paying states. In exchange, the Chinese Emperor would offer
protection to a series of states whose relative power was starkly inferior to
China’s (Percival, 2007). This system, which was in use throughout most of
China’s history, ended with European colonialism in Asia, particularly with the
French colonization of Vietnam in 1885, during which China failed to protect its
tributary client state. While the nature of this tributary arrangement changed
throughout China’s history, such as the privatization of trade and establishment
of a customs system by the Kangxi Emperor in the late 17th century, the
Sino-centric nature of such a

system heralds many of the underlying assumptions to the present-day Chinese

historical claims in the South China Sea. Alongside claims to the South China
Sea, Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative is seen to be a resurrection of these
tributary ideals.

Regardless of the motivations or rationale behind the resurgent employment of

historical claims in the South China Sea, those histories have become
increasingly relevant to the debate over sovereignty and the occupation of
uninhabitable islands in the region. The lack of legally legitimate historical
claims to South China Sea islands (beyond the trade routes argument) leaves the
Chinese perspective with no legal standing under international law. With each
state using its own narrative to support their claims, there is little chance for
historical and factual reconciliation – making the historical realities and claims
of China crucial to the understanding of the current status of the region. As
China continues to advance its activities in the South China Sea, it is crucial to
reach a better understanding of why Beijing is in pursuit of a larger military and
diplomatic presence in southeast Asia.

The Process of Militarisation

China has fully militarized at least three of several islands it built in the
disputed South China Sea, arming them with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile
systems, laser and jamming equipment and fighter jets in an increasingly
aggressive move that threatens all nations operating nearby, a top US military
commander said Sunday.

US Indo-Pacific commander Admiral John C Aquilino said the hostile actions

were in stark contrast to the Chinese president Xi Jinping’s past assurances that
Beijing would not transform the artificial islands in contested waters into
military bases. The efforts were part of China’s flexing its military muscle, he
said.

“Over the past 20 years we’ve witnessed the largest military buildup since world
war two by the PRC,” Aquilino told the Associated Press in an interview, using
the initials of China’s formal name. “They have advanced all their capabilities and
that buildup of weaponization is destabilizing to the region.”

There were no immediate comments from Chinese officials. Beijing maintains its
military profile is purely defensive, arranged to protect what it says are its
sovereign rights. But after years of increased military spending, China now
boasts the world’s second-largest defense budget after the US and is rapidly
modernizing its force with weapons systems including the J-20 stealth fighter,
hypersonic missiles and two aircraft carriers, with a third under construction.

Aquilino spoke with the Associated Press onboard a US navy reconnaissance

aircraft that flew near Chinese-held outposts in the South China Sea’s Spratly
archipelago, one of the most hotly contested regions in the world. During the
patrol, the P-8A Poseidon plane was repeatedly warned by Chinese callers that
it illegally entered what they said was China’s territory and ordered the plane to
move away. China’s official position however is that it remains committed to a
peaceful resolution of the South China Sea issue. For example, China’s Foreign
Ministry asserted in July 2020 that “China is not seeking to become a maritime
empire” and that it “treats its neighboring nations on an equal basis and
exercises the greatest restraint.”

“China has sovereignty over the Spratly islands, as well as surrounding maritime
areas. Stay away immediately to avoid misjudgment,” one of the stern radio
messages said in a veiled threat to the P-8A Poseidon Plane. As the P-8A
Poseidon flew near the Chinese-occupied reefs, some appeared to house
multi-story buildings, warehouses, hangars, seaports, runways, and radars. Near
Fiery Cross, more than 40 vessels could be seen apparently anchored.

Aquilino said the construction of missile arsenals, aircraft hangars, radar

systems and other military facilities on Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and Fiery Cross
appeared to have been completed but it remained to be seen if China would
pursue the construction of military infrastructure in other areas.

“The function of those islands is to expand the offensive capability of the PRC
beyond their continental shores,” he said. “They can fly fighters, bombers plus all
those offensive capabilities of missile systems.” China sought to shore up its vast
territorial claims over virtually the entire South China Sea by building island
bases on coral atolls nearly a decade ago. The US responded by sending its
warships through the region in what it calls freedom of operation missions. The
US has no claims itself but has deployed navy ships and aircraft for decades to
patrol and promote free navigation in international waterway and airspace.

China routinely objects to any action by the US military in the region. The other
parties – the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei – claim all or
part of the sea, through which approximately $5tn in goods are shipped every
year.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), whose most
recent charter came into force in November of 1994, constitutes the current
basis of international law in the South China Sea disputes (UNCLOS, 2016). Long
before the inception of recognized international maritime law, and throughout

much of pre-modern history the South China Sea played a pivotal role as an
“intersection of history” as the primary route for the vital trade connection
between China and India, Europe, and the Middle East. Many of the claims to the
South China Sea are derived from this pre-modern era on the basis that traders
and admirals settled on or stopped at the Spratly and Paracel islands while
traversing the South China Sea on trading trips. All claimants in the South China
Sea disputes, including China, are signatories to UNCLOS, which sets forth clear
laws for the waters surrounding the territories of nation-states. All regulations
are established from the baseline of sovereign and inhabited islands, making the
law’s application to the South China Sea particularly challenging. Legal maritime
rights in terms of UNCLOS are derived from the status of land features, which
are the focal point of claims made to islands in the South China Sea by Taiwan,
the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and other ASEAN claimants.

UNCLOS Provisions and Regulation Areas:

● Territorial Waters: 12 Nautical Miles from low-water line – can use all
resources and set all regulations.
● Contiguous Waters: 12 Nautical Miles beyond Territorial Water
Boundary – can enforce only taxation, immigration, customs, and
pollution regulations.
● Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): 200 nautical miles from low-water
line – has exploitative rights to all natural resources. Can regulate but
must maintain freedom of maritime navigation and overflight.

In contrast, the Chinese government’s claim – which is often referred to as the

nine-dashed line claim because of the number of lines on the original map that
were used to mark the boundaries of China’s maritime claims to the region – is
not based on a claim to land features and therefore does not fall within the legal
maritime framework of UNCLOS. Rather, China’s nine-dashed line claim is
derived from a 1947 map drawn by Yang Huairen, a geographer for the
Nationalist Government that fell in 1949. Yang’s work consisted of 11 dashes
that were located in slightly altered locations. One notable exclusion from the
renewed 2009 claim is the Gulf of Tonkin, which Mao Zedong ceded to Vietnam
in 1952.

In comparing the two maps, scholars in addition to the U.S. State Department–
have noted that the 2009 dashes come far closer to the shores of nations in the
region than did the 1947 map. Figure 2 depicts the nine-dashed line in relation
to China’s 200 nm EEZ (as defined by UNCLOS) with the artificial islands that
were constructed inside the EEZs of the Philippines and Malaysia. In this map,
the aggressiveness of the Chinese claim and the seriousness of the conflict
becomes obvious. To make matters worse, the current legal structure for
governing

maritime disputes is not equipped to resolve such varying definitions and claims
to the sovereignty of what are, in most cases, uninhabitable atolls and reefs.

● Figure 2: China’s South China Sea Claims (2009)

 ● Figure 3: China’s South China Sea Claim (1949)

Major Stakeholders

China

China is one of the main stakeholders in the conflict, as it claims almost 80

percent of the sea along with the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China’s position is
based on its historical presence and sovereignty over the sea, as well as its
natural extension of its continental shelf. China has been involved in diplomatic
and military confrontations with other claimants, such as Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan.
China’s stake in the South China Sea is not only driven by its national interests,
but also by its strategic and economic considerations. The South China Sea is a
major trade conduit, where one-third of the world’s shipping occurs. It is also
rich in natural resources, such as seafood and oil reserves. China wants to
secure its access and control over these resources, as well as to protect its
maritime security and sovereignty. China also views the South China Sea as a
vital part of its Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure and development
project that aims to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa.

Taiwan
Taiwan’s stakes in the south china sea conflict are complex and multifaceted.
Taiwan is one of the six claimants in the disputed waters, along with China,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Taiwan occupies the largest
natural land feature in the South China Sea, Taiping Island (also known as Itu
Aba), which is part of the Spratly Islands. Taiwan also claims sovereignty over
the Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal.
On paper, Taiwan and China share the same claims, based on the dashed or
U-shaped line that appears on both Taiwanese and Chinese maps. Taiwan’s
position in the South China Sea is important for several reasons. First, it affects
the stability and security of the region, as Taiwan is a major stakeholder and
potential partner for dialogue and cooperation. Second, it influences the
cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China, as well as Taiwan’s relations
with other countries that have interests or involvement in the South China
Sea. Third, it reflects Taiwan’s identity and aspirations as a democratic and
responsible actor in the international community.

Brunei
Brunei is one of the claimant states in the South China Sea dispute. Brunei has
limited claims that center on the Louisa Reef in the Spratly islands, parts of
which are also claimed by China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and
Taiwan. Brunei’s foreign ministry has urged countries to discuss issues
bilaterally and underscored that negotiations should be based on the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international
law. Brunei’s two-step approach indicates that while the mechanism for
conflict-resolution is bilateral and adherent to UNCLOS, it also stresses the
importance of the ASEAN-China code of conduct. Brunei has maintained its
two-step approach in addressing the South China Sea and insists that specific
issues in the maritime region should be addressed bilaterally.

Philippines

The Philippines is an important actor in the South China Sea conflict, as it has a
stake in the security, sovereignty, and economic interests of the region. The
Philippines claims parts of the sea, including the Spratly Islands, which are also
claimed by China and other neighboring countries. The Philippines has been
involved in several incidents with China over the disputed waters, such as the
2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, the 2016 arbitration case, and the 2021
Whitsun Reef incident. The Philippines has also sought to strengthen its defense
capabilities and alliances, such as the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the US,
the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US, and the 2021
joint patrols with Japan. The Philippines has also pursued diplomatic
engagement with China, such as the 2017 bilateral consultation mechanism and
the 2019 memorandum of understanding on oil and gas cooperation. However,
the Philippines faces challenges in balancing its relations with China and its
allies, as well as in enforcing its rights under international law. The 2016
arbitration ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in favor of the
Philippines was largely ignored by China and has not been fully implemented by
the Philippines. The Philippines also faces domestic pressures from various
sectors, such as the military, the public, and the media, to adopt a more assertive
or conciliatory stance toward China. The Philippines’ role in the South China Sea
conflict is therefore complex and dynamic, as it tries to safeguard its personal
interests while ensuring regional stability and cooperation.

Malaysia
The importance of Malaysia in the South China Sea conflict is that it is one of the
claimant states of the Spratly Islands, which are also claimed by China and other
neighboring countries. Malaysia claims sovereignty over ten atolls in the
Spratlys archipelago, as well as jurisdiction over some submerged features,
based on the continental shelf principle. Malaysia’s policy towards the dispute
has been largely consistent over the past three decades, aiming to protect its
sovereignty and sovereign rights, uphold international law and foster peace and
stability in the region. Malaysia has pursued three main strategies to achieve
these policy outcomes: defend its claims, de-emphasize the dispute to maintain
friendly relations with China, and promote the ASEAN-led conflict management
process. However, Malaysia faces challenges in balancing its interests and
relations with China and its allies, as well as in enforcing its rights under
international law. Malaysia has been involved in several incidents with China
over the disputed waters, such as the 2019 standoff near Luconia Shoals, the
2020 intrusion by Chinese survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8, and the 2021 breach of
its airspace by Chinese military aircraft . Malaysia has also sought to strengthen
its defense capabilities and alliances, such as the 2019 acquisition of four littoral
mission ships from China, the 2020 joint exercises with the US Navy, and the
2021 joint patrols with Indonesia . Malaysia has also pursued diplomatic
engagement with China, such as the 2017 bilateral consultation mechanism and
the 2019 memorandum of understanding on oil and gas cooperation. However,
these efforts have not resolved the underlying tensions or deterred China’s
assertive actions in the South China Sea. Therefore, Malaysia’s role in the South
China Sea conflict is important but also complex and dynamic, as it seeks to
protect its national interests while maintaining regional stability and
cooperation.
Vietnam
Vietnam is one of the claimant states of the Spratly Islands, which are also
claimed by China and other neighboring countries. Vietnam claims sovereignty
over 21 islands and reefs in the Spratlys archipelago, as well as jurisdiction over
some submerged features, based on the continental shelf principle. Similarly to
Malaysia, Vietnam’s policy towards the dispute has been largely consistent over
the past three decades, aiming to protect its sovereignty and sovereign rights,
uphold international law and foster peace and stability in the region. Vietnam
has pursued three main strategies to achieve these policy outcomes: defend its
claims, de-emphasize the dispute

to maintain friendly relations with China, and promote the ASEAN-led conflict
management process. However, Vietnam faces challenges in balancing its
interests and relations with China and its allies too, as well as in enforcing its
rights under international law. Vietnam has been involved in several incidents
with China over the disputed waters, such as the 1974 Paracel Islands battle,
the 1988 Johnson South Reef skirmish, the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig
standoff, and the 2019 Vanguard Bank incident. Vietnam has also sought to
strengthen its defense capabilities and alliances, such as the 2016 acquisition of
six Kilo-class submarines from Russia, the 2019 joint exercises with the US
Navy, and the 2020 joint patrols with Indonesia. Vietnam has also pursued
diplomatic engagement with China, such as the 2011 bilateral agreement on
basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues and the 2019
memorandum of understanding on oil and gas cooperation. However, these
efforts have not resolved the underlying tensions or deterred China’s assertive
actions in the South China Sea. Therefore,

Vietnam’s role in the South China Sea conflict is important but also complex and
dynamic, as it seeks to protect its national interests while maintaining regional
stability and cooperation.
QARMA

● What are the legal and historical bases of each claimant state’s
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the disputed features and waters in
the South China Sea?
● How can the claimant states disaggregate their claims to specific
features rather than entire island groups, and apply the relevant
criteria of international law, such as effective occupation, physical
geography, and maritime entitlements?
● To what extent is demilitarization of the South-China Sea required?
● How can the claimant states resolve their overlapping claims through
peaceful means, such as bilateral or multilateral negotiations,
arbitration, or adjudication?
 ● How can the claimant states cooperate on managing the resources and
environment of the South China Sea, such as through joint
development agreements, fisheries management, or marine
protection?
● How can the claimant states enhance trust and confidence among
themselves and with other stakeholders, such as through dialogue
mechanisms, code of conduct, or crisis management protocols?
● How can the claimant states balance their interests and relations with
major powers, such as China and the United States, without
compromising their sovereignty and security?

Topic Area B

Impact of Private Military Security Contractors on Global Security

Table of Contents
About the Committee............................................................................................................................. 3
Introduction to the topic....................................................................................................................... 4
Technical Terms & Definitions............................................................................................................ 5

Mercenaries...................................................................................................................................... 5 Private
Military Companies.......................................................................................................... 5 Private Security
Companies.......................................................................................................... 5
Extraterritoriality.............................................................................................................................5
Grey-Zone Operations..................................................................................................................... 5
Just-War Theory..............................................................................................................................6

1. jus ad bellum:..........................................................................................................................6 a. Just

Authority..................................................................................................................6 b. Just
Cause.........................................................................................................................6 c. Right
Intention.................................................................................................................6 d. Reasonable
Hope.............................................................................................................7 e.
Proportionality................................................................................................................ 7 f. Last
Resort.........................................................................................................................7

2. jus in bello:.............................................................................................................................. 7 a.
Discrimination and Non-Combatant Immunity.......................................................7 b.
Proportionality................................................................................................................ 8

Historical Background.......................................................................................................................... 8
Stakeholder Analysis...........................................................................................................................10
USA:................................................................................................................................................... 10
UK:..................................................................................................................................................... 10
Russia:............................................................................................................................................... 11
China:................................................................................................................................................. 11
France:............................................................................................................................................... 11
Pakistan:........................................................................................................................................... 11
India:.................................................................................................................................................. 11 Role of
Media......................................................................................................................................... 12 Past
International Actions:.................................................................................................................12
Impacts....................................................................................................................................................14
Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMAs)........................................................................ 15
Bibliography...........................................................................................................................................15

About the Committee

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is the First
Committee of the General Assembly of the total Six Main Committees. It deals
with the establishment of ceasefires in various international conflicts, along
with planned disarmament of various war-ridden/ conflicted regions. Unlike the
Security Council, any resolutions passed by DISEC, a General Assembly, only act
as recommendations, and are not legally binding, however, that does not void
the existing mandate of any other resolution of similar substance passed by the
Security Council. This means that if there happens to be a contention between a
resolution passed by DISEC, and a resolution passed by the Security Council, the
one passed by the Security Council will take precedence due to its legally
binding nature, unless the Security Council later adopts the recommendation
provided by DISEC.

It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope
of the UN Charter relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the
United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of
international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament
and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and
measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.
It implements its solutions through various methods, which may involve the use
of peacekeeping forces, such as the Blue Helmets, and the use of Watchdog and
AD-HOC Committees to gain progress reports of the procedure, on a timely
basis, with the assistance of the involved parties, and voluntary international
actors. It is not compulsory for DISEC to have the approval of the Security
Council to provide recommendations for demilitarization, disarmament, and
establishment of a ceasefire in the region, however, these recommendations will
not be legally binding upon the involved stakeholders, unless seconded by the
Security Council.

In the current era, DISEC is a pillar to achieving international stability and global
peace, due to the significance of its various initiatives, which include use of
nuclear research for peaceful purposes, controlling illicit arms trade, disarming
terrorist groups in conflict, and assistance in implementation of international
weapons control treaties and resolutions, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Convention on
Cluster Munitions, etc. Furthermore, the framework of DISEC involves regular
involvement in maintaining regional security in conflicted areas, which is why
strategies for disarmament are being updated in real-time due to events
occurring in the present.

Introduction to the topic

Private Military and Security Companies have always had a multi-faceted
impact on global security, which is primarily due to the complexity, and
controversial state of their work. What needs to be understood in real-world
terms is the disparity between the proclaimed use of PMCs and PSCs, in
comparison to the actual tasks carried out by those very groups in the conflicted
regions they have been deployed in. Due to the lack of an existing international
framework in holding these corporations, and the states that deploy them,
accountable, in any case of violation of international law, the parties in concern
will be prosecuted in the country that initially deployed them, which is a means
for carrying out unfair trials, with reduced sentences, and sometimes complete
pardons for all crimes due to “service to the state”. This in turn means that no
international body has the jurisdiction to carry out trials for these very
corporations, due to 2 reasons:

Firstly; these organizations do not fall within the mandate of most international
courts, as they are not governmental institutions;
Secondly, in case of accountability of involved states, the situation is variable for
every nation, particularly influenced by the recognition of the court’s
jurisdiction over them by the country in question, wherein many countries
involved with PMCs do not recognize the International Criminal Court (ICC), or
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).
It is the issues in drafting an accountability framework for PMSCs and countries,
the disparity between the proclaimed and the actual use of PMSCs in conflicts,
and the analyzation of case studies along with comparing pros and

cons of PMSCs which will be the main points of interest of the debate at
JTMUN’s DISEC this year.

Technical Terms & Definitions

Mercenaries

Mercenaries are professionally hired soldiers, who are paid to fight on the
behalf of a party in a conflict. They have no connections with any corporate body
or nation, and their task is absolute regardless of any political interests.

Private Military Companies

Private Military Companies are non-governmental organizations that can be

hired by nations, or other organizations for the purpose of carrying out military
tasks in foreign lands, or the training of personnel, etc. It is sometimes used
synonymously with PSCs and Mercenary Groups.

Private Security Companies

Unlike Private Military Companies, Private Security Companies are

non-governmental organizations that are used for non-combat purposes, such
as personnel protection and/or site security.

Extraterritoriality

This legal concept allows PMSC operators to be subject to their domestic laws
rather than the laws of the host country where they carry out their task, which
may create legal protection and jurisdiction challenges in cases of accountability
for the actions carried out by these organizations in conflict-ridden regions.

Grey-Zone Operations

Gray-Zone Operations are actions that fall between the vague terms of war, and
peace. They are used in conflicts for countries to gain an advantage through
non-military, or ambiguous use of military means. These gray zone actions
include election meddling, economic coercion, and the enigmatic use of
unconventional force.

Just-War Theory

The Just War Theory is an ethical and philosophical principle that serves as an
accountability mechanism in provisions of international law, whenever
reciprocation of actions is being considered, and also if there is a legitimate
reason for war. The Just War Theory has 2 main principles:

1. jus ad bellum:
‘jus ad bellum’ refers to conditions that should be fulfilled before war is waged.
These include various principles, which include:

● Just Authority
The principle of Just Authority suggests that a war is just only if waged by
a legitimate authority. Such authority is rooted in the notion of state
sovereignty and derived from popular consent. Even if their cause is just,
individuals or groups whose authority is not sanctioned by society
members cannot justifiably initiate war.
● Just Cause
The principle of Just Cause suggests that the state waging war should
only be doing so in a case of self-defense against aggression. This is
applicable in two contexts, firstly, if the state that is to have war waged
upon them, attacked the nation that is waging the war, in a form of
needless aggression, as in that case, the state waging the war would have
Just Cause. The second application is under the context of the
Responsibility To Protect (R2P) which states that it is the responsibility of
every state to provide its citizens with the right to life and liberty, and if it
is violated, it is the responsibility of the international community protect
the civilians of that nation, in which case the contexts of sovereignty are
inapplicable. However, it is important to note that R2P is not legally
binding.
● Right Intention
According to the principle of right intention, the aim of war must not be to
pursue narrowly defined national interests, but rather to re-establish a
just peace. This state of peace should be preferable to the conditions that
would have prevailed had the war not occurred.
● Reasonable Hope
According to the principle of reasonable hope, there must be good
grounds for believing that the desired outcome can be achieved. Arms
may not be used and deaths incurred in a futile cause or when the
probability of success is very low. This principle involves weighing the
costs and benefits of waging war, and "emphasizes that human life and
economic resources should not be wasted" on war efforts that are certain
to fail.
● Proportionality
The principle of proportionality stipulates that the violence used in the
war must be proportional to the attack suffered. The means should be
commensurate with the ends, as well as be in line with the magnitude of
the initial provocation. States are prohibited from using force not
necessary to attain the limited objective of addressing the injury suffered.
 ● Last Resort
The principle of last resort stipulates that all non-violent options must be
exhausted before the use of force can be justified. A just war can only be
waged once all other diplomatic avenues have been pursued.

2. jus in bello:
‘jus in bello’ refers to the conditions that should be implemented during the time
the war is ongoing. These include 2 major principles, which are:

a. Discrimination and Non-Combatant Immunity

The principles of Discrimination and Non-Combatant Immunity emphasize the
need to distinguish combatants from civilians or non-military objects. It requires
parties to a conflict to direct attacks only against legitimate military targets, and
to refrain from deliberately targeting civilians or civilian targets

b. Proportionality
The difference between the principle of proportionality of ‘jus ad bellum’ and
‘jus in bello’ is that ‘jus ad bellum’ requires the use of force to be proportional to
the attack originally suffered, whereas ‘jus in bello’ states that the
proportionality of force to be used should not be more than what is required to
reach the objective. This means that damage and destruction should be minimal
if the objective can be reached with it.

Historical Background
The use of Private Military and Security Contractors has been evident in various
instances of conflicts in the recent past, where the use of these corporations has
called for flagrant human rights violations, political uncertainty, and
disturbances in the state of Law and Order, a few examples have been stated
below for reference:

The following passages talk about PMCs that have been involved in
controversies, which were backed and/or associated with the United States and
other NATO members. These particularly include organizations such as G4S,
Blackwater (presently known as Academi) and Dyncorp.
G4S has been accused of committing various human right violations, in the
African Region, particularly South Africa, where G4S was accused of torturing
nearly 3000 inmates in the Mangaung Prison.
Furthermore, G4S was also accused of providing the Taliban with “protection
payments” in Afghanistan, to safeguard their business interests in the region.

The Black Water Agency was hired by the United States in the Iraq war. The
main controversy that occurred during the time of the Black Water Agency in
Iraq was the Nisour Square Massacre, where combatants from this corporation
killed 17 Iraqi Civilians. The individuals involved were later investigated by a
body of the US, and many of them were declared not guilty of charges and were
let free by the justice system of the United States.

Furthermore, DynCorp, which was also hired by NATO and the US on various
occasions was involved in various human right violations, particularly in

Afghanistan when in 2011 it was used as a tool for sexually abusing children,
which is known as Bacha Bazi in the region.
Employees of DynCorp were implicated in trafficking women and girls to Bosnia
from Russia, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine and other Eastern European countries
and carrying out forced prostitution.

DynCorp was also involved in lawsuits with the United States in the Afghan and
Iraq wars, due to alleged contract fraud of billions of dollars in translation
contracts.

The Wagner Group is a Private Military Company that has been known for its
work in a Pro-Russian manner, such as in the wars of Ukraine and Syria. There
are a few problems that arise from Wagner Group’s association with
international communities that put global security at risk, such as its hiring of
soldiers from prisons, providing inmates with a “total pardon” for all their
activities, if they choose to participate in the organization’s mission.
Furthermore, the Wagner Group has been accused of enforced disappearances
and capturing of Ukrainian civilians, activists, and officers. In the Central African
Republic, it has been accused of numerous human right violations, such as
arbitrary detention and executions, enforced disappearances, sexual
harassment, etc. The Russian Government has denied any and all associations of
itself with the Wagner Group, as President Putin stated, “It simply does not
exist”, which is a contradiction of the fact that the Wagner Group is registered in
Russia as a “Private Military Company”. There is some gray-area regarding the
legitimacy and legality of the Wagner Group, as any and all sorts of privatized
military groups, which include Private Military Corporations, Mercenary
Groups, and Private Security Corporations, are all declared illegal under Article
13(5) of the Russian Constitution and Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code.

A different interpretation of this debate leads us to the contextualization of

Private Military Companies not just as officially registered companies that
provide combat and training services, but also that of militias that do not
directly associate themselves with a state, but still assist them for various
motives due to the inclination of their political beliefs to the main party. This
leads us to the analysis of the armed groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda,
Haqqani Network, and other militias that have different statuses according to
the interpretation of their existence. If specific events that showcase the threat

of these very organizations are to be discussed, then the list is never-ending,

however a few of them have been stated as follows.
The involvement of Al-Qaeda in the attacks on September 11 on the Twin
Towers and the Pentagon is one of the biggest historical events of the 21st
century that highlight the danger of these organizations to global security. The
attack in and of itself caused the death of 3000 civilians, and later led to the
deaths of approximately 40,000 Afghan civilians due to the invasion by the US
and NATO of Afghanistan under the application of Chapter VII, Article 42 and
51 of the UN Charter.

Similarly, the attack on the US Embassy in Kabul in 2011 by combatants from

both the Taliban and Haqqani Network caused 7 deaths and injured 19. These
events show the impacts produced by these militias on global politics, and
diplomatic ties, which ultimately translate into a threat to global security.

Stakeholder Analysis
USA:

The US is the largest employer of PMCs in the world, relying on them for various
tasks such as training, logistics, protection, and intelligence in conflict zones
such as Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, the US has also expressed
concerns about the activities of PMCs hired by other states, especially Russia,
which uses them to advance its strategic interests and influence in regions such
as Africa and the Middle East.

UK:

The UK is home to various Private Military Corporations, such as G4S, Aegis

Defence, etc. It has advocated for their transparency and accountability several
times on international media, however there is a bit of hypocrisy present in
these statements, as the UK is a country that has exploited the principle of
Extraterritoriality, much like its fellow P5 Members. There have been several
occasions that have been left unseen by the justice system of the United
Kingdom, and almost all of them were stemming from issues of human right
violations due to racism, political indifferences, etc.

Russia:

On paper, the Russian Federation does not allow the existence of any mercenary
groups, including Private Military Companies, however, it is not just a “mere
coincidence” that corporations that identify themselves as such just happen to
have the same political motives as the Russian Federation. There have been
multiple credible accusations regarding the employment of the Wagner Group
by the Russian Federation, particularly in the cases of the war in Syria and the
special military operation in Ukraine.

China:
China is another country that has placed an explicit ban on Private Military
Companies (PMCs), however it has not banned the use of Private Security
Companies (PSCs). These PSCs have been used to “provide security for Chinese
Interests in foreign lands”, particularly South Sudan, the Middle East, and
African Nations.

France:

France has neither signed nor ratified the Mercenary Convention of the United
Nations, however, it is a party to the Montreux Document, which is a
non-binding document that highlights the importance of accountability and
transparency in the actions of PMCs. France is a member of NATO, an
organization which has employed PMCs several times in International Conflicts,
particularly Iraq.

Pakistan:

Pakistan as a country does not have any explicit laws regarding the illegality of
PMCs. It has been associated with various militias in border conflicts,
particularly the conflict in Kashmir, where Pakistan has been associated with the
groups of Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Muhammad. These
groups have been associated with various terrorist activities, killings, human
rights violations, etc, in the region.

India:

India is a country that has neither signed nor ratified the UN Convention against
the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, nor has it signed
the Montreux Document, both of which are considered to be very

important pieces of legislation in the case of regulating use of PMSCs. India also
has a safety concern regarding the rapid expansion of Pakistani PMCs and
Chinese PSCs, due to the fact that most of its security policies are concentrated
on these 2 countries on its borders.

Role of Media
The role played by the media is crucial in the status quo, due to the
monopolization of access to information and social media by Western Media
outlets and sources, which gives them the authority to control information as
they please. This leads us to the contextualization of various Militias and armed
groups as terrorists, particularly in the Middle East and Asian Countries. It is
perhaps due to this perspective that the international debate is normally very
one-sided, however via different interpretations, various organizations, such as
the armed militias that have been villainized by the west, such as the Wagner
Group, can also be “justified” as freedom fighters, which has been done in the
case of DynCorp and Black Water Agency. It is important to understand the
picture painted of Western PMCs as freedom fighters can be changed into an
imagery of the very terrorist groups that western media despises. Furthermore,
to fuel international conflicts, various international agencies provide
information and news on a regional basis, to create an increased hatred
between the countries of the Middle East/ Asia, and the countries of Europe and
USA. It is primarily due to such characterization that there has been a steep rise
of islamophobia from the early 2000s in these very western countries,
particularly those that were a part of NATO. This is a threat to international
security for two reasons: Firstly, that segregation of people with different
beliefs will lead to an increased hatred, creating tension among nations globally.
Secondly, the overall representation of opposing parties as terrorists will close
any room for diplomacy.

Past International Actions:

The International Community has taken various steps towards transparency
and accountability of PMCs, so that they are not a threat to global security

Mercenary Convention:

1. Article 5 (1) states:

“States Parties shall not recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries and shall prohibit
such activities...”

2. Article 5 (2) states:

“States Parties shall not recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries for the purpose of
opposing the legitimate exercise of the inalienable right of peoples to
self-determination, as recognized by international law, and shall take, in conformity
with international law, the appropriate measures to prevent the recruitment, use,
financing or training of mercenaries for that purpose.”

Protocol I of Geneva Convention:

Article 44 specifies that any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into
the power of an adverse party shall be a prisoner of war. This provision goes on
to specify that combatants are required to distinguish themselves from the
civilian population with some sort of external sign; where this is not possible,
combatants must carry their arms openly during the preparation and
commission of each military engagement. If they do not do so, they forfeit their
right to POW status.

Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa:

 1. Article 3 states:
“Mercenaries shall not enjoy the status of combatants and shall not be
entitled to the prisoners of war status.”
2. Article 4 states:
“A mercenary is responsible both for the crime of mercenarism and all related
offenses, without prejudice to any other offenses for which he may be
prosecuted.”

General Commentary/ Loopholes

In the aforementioned articles, it is clearly understandable that there exist

contradictions within international law due to the spectrum of foreign policies
that exist regarding the issue, as various states argue the recognition of

Mercenaries as Prisoners of War (POWs), particularly here in the contexts of

the Geneva Convention and the Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism
in Africa.

Impacts
Economic

There are 2 different types of economic impacts when considering the usage
and hiring of PMCs, the first being the positive and the second being negative.
Firstly, the increasing market of PMSCs creates more job opportunities for
individuals which in turn boosts national economies of host countries of these
PMSCs, the same is the case due to the rise in demand of these corporations in
international conflicts, recent examples include Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, etc.
This triggers a continuous cash-flow in the market of these PMCs, which allows
for stronger economies.

Secondly, these PMCs have adverse impacts upon economies as well, due to the
destruction of public property, loss of human lives, etc. Human casualties can
not be ruled out whenever it comes to involvement of these PMCs in
international conflicts, as it is a very common phenomenon, yet on a larger scale
it becomes a huge burden on developing economies, as these nations have to
provide the families of the deceased with support, health and educational
services, without any significant immediate contribution of such groups to the
economy, which in turn leads to the reduction of governmental assets, causing
hyper-inflation.

Socio-Political

The Socio-Political Impacts are also very significant, as the involvement of these
organizations increases political stakeholders in a conflict, creating further
political uncertainty in already conflicted zones. This is disruptive of the social
order of these regions, as the public becomes oppressed, and these
governments turn into puppet states of the west, which in turn harms their
values of political independence. One example of such an event is the Afghan
Invasion by NATO.

Human Rights

The usage of PMCs in conflicts causes various Human Right Violations, as due to
the lack of transparency which is often exploited by the employees of these
corporations, various human right violations such as sexual abuse, enforced
disappearances, and extrajudicial killings occur in these regions. Due to these
events, educational facilities are also disturbed.

Legal System

The justice system is under pressure due to the growth of Private Military
Companies (PMCs). Legal ambiguities make accountability more difficult and
erode confidence in these institutions since it is more challenging to hold those
responsible accountable. While secrecy and protected information obstruct
transparency, PMC contractual obligations could affect impartiality. As a result,
as it balances upholding security and the rule of law at once, public confidence in
the legal system may decline.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMAs)

1. Should the principles of Extradition, or Extraterritoriality be supported
when prosecuting the crimes of PMSCs and Mercenary Groups?
2. How can the international community enhance accountability and
regulation of PMSCs to prevent human rights abuses and violations of
international law?
3. How can transparency in the operations and contracts of PMSCs be
improved to ensure proper oversight by governments and international
bodies?
4. How do PMSCs influence economic and geopolitical dynamics in
conflict-prone regions, and how can potential negative impacts be
mitigated?
5. How does media bias contribute to the shaping of public perception about
international conflicts and the public image of parties involved?

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