Understanding Androids Security Framework
William Enck and Patrick McDaniel Tutorial October 2008
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Telecommunications Nets.
The telecommunications industry is in a period of
transition to open handsets, open/augmented services and high-speed data.
Openmoko LiMo Android
Idea: open platform to application developer ingenuity,
will lead to new market drivers and differentiators.
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This tutorial
We are here to describe the security available in Android. Goals
Broadly catalog Android's application architecture Describe how security policy is dened within Android Describe the interfaces used to dene policy Best practices for using those interfaces Show some pitfalls leading to insecure applications
We not here to teach you to build Android apps ...
Follow along at http://siis.cse.psu.edu/android_sec_tutorial.html
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What is Android?
One of the most anticipated smartphone operating
systems -- led by Google
Complete software stack Open source (Apache v2 license) ... mostly
Open Handset Alliance
... 30+ industrial partners
Google, T-Mobile, Sprint, HTC,
LG, Motorola, Samsung, Broadcom, Intent, NVIDIA, Qualcomm, and many more.
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History of Android
The Open Handset Alliance Vision (from their website)
Open interfaces (dialer, SMS, ...) All applications are created equal Breaking down application boundaries Fast & easy application development
The Google Phone rumors go back to at least 2006
Google acquired Android, Inc. in July 2005 Nov. 2007 - initial SDK release (multiple revs: M3, M5, 0.9, 1.0) Sep. 2008 - T-Mobile announces G1 (available Oct. 2008) Oct. 2008 - Source code released (some Google apps omitted)
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Android Phones
An Android contains a number of
applications
Android comes installed with a number of
basic systems tools, e.g., dialer, address book, etc. Developers use the Android API to construct applications.
All apps are written in Java and executed
within a custom Java virtual machine.
Each application package is contained in a
jar le (.apk)
Applications are installed by the user
No app store required, just build and go. Open access to data and voice services
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Architecture
The Android smartphone operating system is built upon Linux
and includes many libraries and a core set of applications.
The middleware makes it interesting
Not focused on UNIX processes Uses the Binder component framework
Originally part of BeOS, then enhanced
by Palm, now used in Android
Phone Application
Reference Monitor Policy
Contacts Application
Maps Application
Binder Component Framework
Applications consist of many
components of different types
Android Middleware
Applications interact via components
Linux
We focus on security with respect to the component API
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Component Model
While each application runs as its own UNIX uid,
sharing can occur through application-level interactions
Interactions based on components Different component types
Activity Service Content Provider Broadcast Receiver Target component in the
start Activity return Starting an Activity for a Result Activity
Activity start/stop/bind call Service
callback Communicating with a Service
same or different application
but rst ...
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Read/Write Query Activity return Querying a Content Provider Content Provider
System Activity Service Receiving an Intent Broadcast
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Send Intent
Broadcast Receiver
Intents
Intents are objects used as inter-component signaling
Starting the user interface for an application Sending a message between components Starting a background service
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Activity Component
The user interface consists of a series of
Activity components.
Each Activity is a screen. User actions tell an Activity to start
another Activity, possibly with the expectation of a result.
The target Activity is not necessarily in
the same application.
Directly or via Intent action strings. Processing stops when another Activity is
on top.
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Service Component
Background processing occurs in Service components.
Downloading a le, playing music, tracking location, polling, etc. Local vs. Remote Services (process-level distinction)
Also provides a service interface between applications
Arbitrary interfaces for data transfer
Android Interface Denition Language (AIDL)
Register callback methods Core functionality often implemented
as Service components
e.g., Location API, Alarm service
Multiple interfaces
Control: start, stop Method invocation: bind
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Content Provider Component
Content Provider components provide a standardized interface
for sharing data, i.e., content (between applications).
Models content in a relational DB
Users of Content Providers can perform
queries equivalent to SELECT, UPDATE, INSERT, DELETE
Works well when content is tabular Also works as means of addressing les
URI addressing scheme
content://<authority>/<table>/[<id>] content://contacts/people/10
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Broadcast Receiver Component
Broadcast Receiver components act as specialized event Intent
handlers (also think of as a message mailbox). to specic action strings (possibly multiple)
component is automatically called by the system
Broadcast Receiver components subscribe
action strings are dened by the system or developer
Recall that Android provides automatic
Activity resolution using action strings.
The action string was assigned to an Intent object Sender can specify component recipient (no action string)
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The Android Manifest
Manifest les are the technique for describing the contents
of an application package (i.e., resource le) Each Android application has a special AndroidManifest.xml le (included in the .apk package) describes the contained components
components cannot execute unless they are listed
species rules for auto-resolution species access rules describes runtime dependencies optional runtime libraries required system permissions
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Manifest Specication
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Example Applications
FriendTracker Application
FriendTracker Service to poll for friend locations
Broadcasts an Intent when near a friend
FriendProvider Content Provider to store location of friends
Cross references friends with system Contacts Provider
FriendTrackerControl Activity to start and stop the Service BootReceiver Broadcast Receiver to start the service on boot
FriendViewer Application
FriendViewer Activity to display list of friend locations FriendMap Activity to show friends on a map (on right) FriendReceiver Broadcast Receiver to display when near
Available from http://siis.cse.psu.edu/android_sec_tutorial.html
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Component Interaction
System Server Contacts Application
ViewContact
System Service
Broadcast Intent
start
FriendTracker Application
start Broadcast Intent FriendTracker
FriendViewer Application
BootReceiver
FriendReceiver
FriendMap
start/stop
read,write read
start FriendViewer
FriendTracker Control
FriendProvider
read
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Dening Security Policy
Android focuses on Inter Component Communication (ICC) The Android manifest le allows developers to dene an
access control policy for access to components
Each component can be assigned an access permission label Each application requests a list of permission labels (xed at install)
Androids security model boils down to the following:
Application 1
Permission Labels
Application 2 B: l1 X C: l2
Permission Labels
A: ...
Inherit Permissions
l1,...
...
However, there are a number of exceptions ...
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Public and Private Components
Exception: Components can be public or private.
Default is dependent on intent-lter rules The manifest schema denes an exported attribute
Why: Protect internal components
Especially useful if a sub-Activity returns a result e.g., FriendMap Activity in our example
Implication: Components may unknowingly be (or
become) accessible to other applications.
Best Practice: Always set the exported attribute.
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Implicitly Open Components
Exception: If the manifest le does not specify an access
permission on a public component, any component in any application can access it.
e.g., the main Activity for an Application Permissions are assigned at install-time
Why: Some components should provide global access
Implication: Unprivileged applications have access
e.g., FriendReceiver in our example (spoof notication)
Best Practice: Components without access permissions should
be exceptional cases, and inputs must be scrutinized (consider splitting components).
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Implicitly Open Components
Exception: If the manifest le does not specify an access
permission on a public component, any component in any application can access it.
e.g., the main Activity for an Application Permissions are assigned at install-time
Why: Some components should provide global access
Implication: Unprivileged applications have access
e.g., FriendReceiver in our example (spoof notication)
Best Practice: Components without access permissions should
be exceptional cases, and inputs must be scrutinized (consider splitting components).
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Intent Broadcast Permissions
Exception: The code broadcasting an Intent can set an
access permission restricting which Broadcast Receivers can access the Intent.
Why: Dene what applications can read broadcasts
e.g., the FRIEND_NEAR message in our example
Implication: If no permission label is set on a
broadcast, any unprivileged application can read it.
Best Practice: Always specify an access permission on
Intent broadcasts (unless explicit destination).
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Intent Broadcast Permissions
Exception: The code broadcasting an Intent can set an
access permission restricting which Broadcast Receivers can access the Intent.
Why: Dene what applications can read broadcasts
e.g., the FRIEND_NEAR message in our example
Implication: If no permission label is set on a
broadcast, any unprivileged application can read it.
Best Practice: Always specify an access permission on
Intent broadcasts (unless explicit destination).
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Pending Intents
Exception: PendingIntent objects allow another application to
nish an operation for you via RPC.
Introduced in the v0.9 SDK release (August 2008) Execution occurs in the originating applications process space
Why: Allows external applications to send to private components Used in a number of system APIs (Alarm, Location, Notication) e.g., timer in FriendTracker Service Implication: The remote application can ll in unspecied values. May inuence the destination and/or data integrity Allows a form of delegation Best Practice: Only use Pending Intents as delayed callbacks to
private Broadcast Receivers/Activities and always fully specify the Intent destination.
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Pending Intents
Exception: PendingIntent objects allow another application to
nish an operation for you via RPC.
Introduced in the v0.9 SDK release (August 2008) Execution occurs in the originating applications process space
Why: Allows external applications to send to private components Used in a number of system APIs (Alarm, Location, Notication) e.g., timer in FriendTracker Service Implication: The remote application can ll in unspecied values. May inuence the destination and/or data integrity Allows a form of delegation Best Practice: Only use Pending Intents as delayed callbacks to
private Broadcast Receivers/Activities and always fully specify the Intent destination.
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Content Provider Permissions
Exception: Content Providers have two additional security features
Separate read and write access permission labels URI permissions allow record level delegation (added Sep 2008)
Why: Provide control over application data
e.g., FriendProvider uses read and write permissions
Implication: Content sharing need not be all or nothing
URI permissions allow delegation (must be allowed by Provider)
Best Practice: Always dene separate read and write permissions.
Allow URI permissions when necessary
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Content Provider Permissions
Exception: Content Providers have two additional security features
Separate read and write access permission labels URI permissions allow record level delegation (added Sep 2008)
Why: Provide control over application data
e.g., FriendProvider uses read and write permissions
Implication: Content sharing need not be all or nothing
URI permissions allow delegation (must be allowed by Provider)
Best Practice: Always dene separate read and write permissions.
Allow URI permissions when necessary
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Service Hooks
Exception: A component (e.g., Service) may arbitrarily invoke
the checkPermission() method to enforce ICC.
Why: Allows Services to differentiate access to specic
methods.
e.g., .addNick() method of IFriendTracker
Implication: The application developer can add reference
monitor hooks
Best Practice: Use checkPermission() to mediate
administrative operations.
Alternatively, create separate Services
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Service Hooks
Exception: A component (e.g., Service) may arbitrarily invoke
the checkPermission() method to enforce ICC.
Why: Allows Services to differentiate access to specic
methods.
e.g., .addNick() method of IFriendTracker
Implication: The application developer can add reference
monitor hooks
Best Practice: Use checkPermission() to mediate
administrative operations.
Alternatively, create separate Services
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Protected APIs
Exception: The system uses permission labels to mediate access to
certain resource APIs resources
Why: The system needs to protect network and hardware
e.g., Applications request the android.permission.INTERNET label
to make network connections.
Implication: Allows the system or a user to assess how
dangerous an application may be. APIs
Best Practices: Judiciously request permissions for protected
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Permission Protection Levels
Exception: Permission requests are not always granted Permissions can be:
normal - always granted dangerous - requires user approval signature - matching signature key signature or system - same as signature, but also system apps
Why: Malicious applications may request harmful permissions
e.g., privacy implications of receiving FRIEND_NEAR
Implication: Users may not understand implications when
explicitly granting permissions.
Best Practice: Use signature permissions for application
suites and dangerous permissions otherwise
Include informative descriptions
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Permission Protection Levels
Exception: Permission requests are not always granted Permissions can be:
normal - always granted dangerous - requires user approval signature - matching signature key signature or system - same as signature, but also system apps
Why: Malicious applications may request harmful permissions
e.g., privacy implications of receiving FRIEND_NEAR
Implication: Users may not understand implications when
explicitly granting permissions.
Best Practice: Use signature permissions for application
suites and dangerous permissions otherwise
Include informative descriptions
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Lessons in Dening Policy
Relatively straightforward model with policy dened in
the manifest le ... but many exceptions
Some thought is needed to avoid ...
Spoong Intent messages (FriendReceiver) Privacy leaks (e.g., FRIEND_NEAR broadcast)
The policy expands into the code
Broadcast permissions, checkPermission(), etc
Keeping malicious applications from
acquiring permissions is tricky
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Install-time Verication
Deciency: Android does not have a way to holistically evaluate
system and application policy or specify security goals
For example, to evaluate if the system and installed applications fulll
some security requirement
Will granting a permission break the phones security?
Kirin - enhanced installer we have been developing
Extracts policy from the manifest les of all applications Uses Prolog to generate automated proofs Evaluation must only be performed at
of compliance of provided policy invariants install-time, and therefore does not impact runtime performance
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Summary
It is highly likely that Android is going to be installed many
millions of cell phones within the next 12 months.
If you are building applications, you need to be aware of
what access other applications are going to be able to do to your user ...
Take away: be defensive! Android security is complex beast, and this tutorial is a rst
step towards understanding and dealing with it.
If you want to learn more, consult Android documentation
(the security model description is lacking),
Recommendation: http://code.google.com/android/intro/
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Thank you
Presentation Slides and Code Examples http://siis.cse.psu.edu/android_sec_tutorial.html Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Lab (SIIS) Department of Computer Science and Engineering The Pennsylvania State University http://siis.cse.psu.edu Google Android SDK and Documentation http://code.google.com/android Android Platform Source Code http://source.android.com
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