Const. Petition No.06/2023
CMA/Concise Statement
On behalf of the Respondent/PML-N
Filed On:-28-09-2023
Raja Amer Khan & others
VERSUS
Federation of Pakistan & others
sssseeseee Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:-
Counsel for the Respondent/PML-N: Salahuddin Ahmed, ASC
Syed Rifagat Hussain Shah, AOR
INDEX -
Sr. 5 Page
Ne Description Date Ne
1 | Concise Statement 28-09-2023 | 01-23
Certified that the paper book as bound is complete and correct
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah
‘Advocate-on-Record
Supreme Court of Pakistan
Islamabad
For the Responden/PML-N
Dated:-28-09-2023(Original Jurisdiction)
CMA No. /2023
IN
Const. Petition No.6/2023
Raja Amer Khan & others
VERSUS
Federation of Pakistan & others
Respondents
CONCISE STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE -
NAWAZ [‘PML-N’] PURSUANT TO ORDER DATED 18.9.2023
Respectfully sheweth:
1. The PML-N contends the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act 2023 ['the
2023 Act’] is intra vires the Constitution and is good! law..As such, all the instant
petitions challenging the same may be dismissed and the interim order passed by this
Court on 13.4.2023 may be vacated,
2. Three questions emerge from the pleadings and arguments of the petitioners:
A) Can Parliament legislate on the practice and procedure of this Court and, in
any event, override the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
B) Can Parliament can create a right of (intra-court) appeal against orders passed by
this Court under Article 184 (3)?
©) Whether, even assuming the above, do the provisions of the 2023 Act otherwise
violate any provisions of the Constitution and, if so, which and to what extent?
A) Can Parliament legislate on the practice and procedure of this Court and, in
any event, override the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
3. Three objections are raised to the Parliament's power to legislate on the practice
‘and procedure of the apex Court:i) Allowing a legislature to regulate court practice and procedure (regardless
Of the actual content of the legislation) violates the independence of judiciary.
‘Thus the term “Jaw” in Article 191 must be read restrictively to exclude statutes.
ii) Alternatively, “Jaw” must be interpreted broadly to include judge-made
law relating to judicial practice and procedure which must take precedence over
‘statute in the event of conflict.
Parliament lacks, in any case, legislative competence to regulate the
practice and procedure of the Supreme Court due to the language of the relevant
constitutional articles and the Entries in the Federal Legislative List.
iv) _ Even otherwise, such legislation cannot contravene the Supreme Court
Rules 1980, which are to be afforded primacy.
‘Submissions on Objection (i): Allowing Parliament to legislate on judicial procedure and
practice violates Judicial Independence
4. Article 191 provides “{s)ubject to the Constitution and law, the Supreme Court
‘may make rules regulating the practice and procedure of the Court.” Notably, Article
202, which deals with the practice and procedure of the High Courts and subordinate
courts, is couched in an almost identical terms - “/sJubject to the Constitution and law, a
High Court may make rules regulating the practice and procedure of the Court or of any
court subordinate to it.”
5. Irrespective of any question of legislative competence, the Petitioners argue the
doctrines of separation of powers and independence of judiciary require that Parliament
cannot have any role in regulating judicial practice and procedure. Thus, the word “law”
in Article 191 should be read restrictively to mean only judge-made law and not statutory
law. It is argued in other provisions of the Constitution, where the framers intended to
allow statutory intervention, the words “Act of Parliament” are used instead of “law”,- 3 a
6. But if “Jaw” in Article 191 excludes statutory legislation, the same. meaning must
be ascribed to Article 202. The Constitution guarantees fair trial, due process and
independence of the judiciary in relation to all courts and not just the Supreme Court. In
that case, statutory legislation affecting practice or procedure in a High Court or
subordinate courts would be equally unconstitutional.
7. The argument, pitched so high, is plainly absurd. It would entail striking down all
co parts of, inter alia, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Code of Civil Procedure
1908, the Specific Relief Act 1877, the Limitation Act 1908, the Succession Act 1925,
the West Pakistan Civil Courts Act 1962, the Guardian and Wards Act 1890, the Family
Courts Act 1964, the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972, the Admiralty Ordinance 1980, the
Contempt of Court Act 2003, the Companies Act 2017, the Financial Institutions
Ordinance 2001 and the Election Act 2017. All these laws (and dozens more) regulate the
practice and procedure of courts (subordinate, special, High Courts and the Supreme
Court) in their general and special jurisdictions. Provisions of these statutes detail, infer
alia, the parties that possess standing, who may represent them, the form and substance
of the pleadings to be filed, how and when they can be amended and responded to, how
and to whom notices are to be issued, how and which witnesses are to be summoned, how
oral and documentary evidence is to be recorded, the manner of disposal of interlocutory
and main applications, what temporary and final reliefs can be granted, how judgments
and orders are to be enforced and executed, time limits for various sets and even the
number (and ranks) of judges that shall adjudicate any particular category of cases or
appeals. If all this is considered impermissible legislative interference into the exclusive
domain of the judiciary, then, while the judiciary may be independent - it shall be of no
‘practical utility to the people of Pakistan.
8. The term “law”, obviously, may be of wider connotation than “dct of
Parliament”. Depending on context and usage, it can include Ordinances, President's
Orders, Rules framed under the authority of the Constitution and also Rules, Regulations
and Bye-Laws framed under authority of a statute, It may include customs, conventions
and even well-established legal principles of judicial creation such as the principles ofHi
tae
natural justice (i.e, judge-made law) and what is sometimes referred in other jurisdictions
as common law. In our jurisdiction, it may include principles of Islamic jurisprudence.
But no matter how widely or narrowly “/aw” is used in any particular context, even its
narrowest definition has always included Acts of Parliament
9. Academics have debated for hundreds of years whether judges make “laws” or
only interpret them. Among practitioners, there is often dispute whether any particular
statutory notification amounts to “delegated legislation” enjoying the status of law or
‘whether itis actually, in substance, merely an administrative order or circular devoid of
legal force. The Petitioners argue, however - pethaps for the first time in our judicial
history - that by using the term “law” in Article 191 instead of “Act of Parliament”, the
intention was to exclude Acts of Parliament.
10. The argument is fallacious. In the first place, it is not an invariable rule of
interpretation that whenever Parliament uses different words within the same legislation —
it intends to connote a different meaning, Sometimes, for purely stylistic reasons, the
drafismen employ different words having the same meaning’.
11. _ In the Constitution, for example, at some places the word “law” is used alone in
phrases like “any law”, “no law” or “by law”, or “subject to law”, “declared by law",
“prescribed by law” or “in accordance with law”?, Even a cursory review of those
constitutional provisions makes clear they mean ‘and include statutory law. At other
places, the preferred phrasing is “law made by the State”, “law made by the Province”,
“law made by the Parliament”, “law made by the Provincial Assembly” or “law made by
the appropriate legislature”*. In yet other places, “Act of Parliament” or “Act of
Provincial Assembly” or “‘Aet of appropriate legislature” is used and, finally, in some
* Crown v. Khushi Muhammad, PLO 1953 FC 170 @ 174; Pakistan Fisherles v. UBL, PLO 1993 SC 109 @ 118,
2 Sec, for example, Articles 4,5, 7 8 9, 10(3) and (4) and (5), 21), 12,33, 15, 16,27, 18,39, 29A, 20,22
(2),23, 26,250, 26,30 (2) 54 GA), 51 (6) (and (e, 63 (2) (a), 66 (2) and (3,206 (3) el, 359 (3), 173
(5), 197, 213 (3), 218 (2), 223, 240, 243 (3), 245 (2), 248 (4), 250 {2) and (2), 279
" See, for example, Articles 3 (3), 6 (3), 87 (2), 97, 98, 138, 140A, 151 (2), 154 (5), 165A, 173 (5), 222, 237,
241, 242,251 (3),
500, for example, Articles 27, 48 (7), 77, 79, 81 (e), 119, 121 (e), 144, 263, 166, 168 (3), 165, 173 (2),
176, 185 (2) (d), 188, 192 (4), 212, 219 (e), 225, 238, 240, 279ane
places the word “legislation” is used’. Sometimes, different expressions are used in the
same Article itself®. Nothing much tums on this.
12, Article 75 (3) makes clear when a Bill of Parliament is assented, or deemed to
have been assented, by the President “ic shall become law and be called an Act of
Parliament®. Similarly, Articles 141 and 142 confer, upon the Parliament and Provincial
Assemblies, the power to make “laws”. Likewise, Article 260 defines “federal law” to
‘mean “q law made by or under the authority of Parliament” while it defines “provincial
Jaw” to mean “a law made by or under the authority of a Provincial Assembly”.
13, In relation to the judiciary, Article 175 (1) provides that, apart from the
constitutional courts, there shall be “such other courts as may be established by law”.
Obviously, it does not mean courts established by judicial precedents. It means courts
established by federal or provincial statutes. Does this statutory power to create (and
abolish) courts - going far beyond mere regulation of judicial practice and procedure -
violate the doctrines of separation of powers or independence of judiciary? ‘The doctrine
of independence of judiciary and the guarantees of due process and fair trial under Article
10A apply with equal force to NAB courts, ATC courts, provincial Consumer Courts,
Environmental Tribunals and all other judicial fora that remain, nonetheless, creatures of
statute, To argue, therefore, that judicial independence is not inftinged when the
legislature creates (or abolishes) courts but is infringed when the legislature regulates
judicial procedure (no matter how beneficial) is illogical.
14, Similarly, Article 175 (2) provides that no court (including constitutional courts)
shall enjoy any jurisdiction “save as is or may be conferred upon it by the Constitution or
by or under any law”. There are numerous examples of jurisdictions conferred upon this
Court” and the High Courts* through statute and not directly by the Constitution itself.
* See, for example, Articles 155 (1) (a}, Entry 37 of the Federal Legislative List,
* See, for example, Articles 89, 128, 173 (1) and (5) and Entry 37 of the Federal Legislative List
1 See, for example, varlous statutory provisions creating direct appellate jurisdiction upon this Court fom,
vvatlous statutory forums over and above the appellate jurisdiction mentioned In Atile 185 Including