Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal

Empirical research in accounting: alternative approaches and a case for “middle-range” thinking
Richard Laughlin
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Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 8 Iss 1 pp. 63 - 87
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 Empirical
Methodological themes research in
Empirical research in accounting: accounting
alternative approaches and a case for
“middle-range” thinking 63
Richard Laughlin
University of Sheffield, UK
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Introduction
There would be few today that would dispute that empirical research in
accounting is of central importance. Yet it is interesting to note that, as
Mattessich (1980) points out, this centrality is of recent origin. It is only in the
1970s that this shift in accounting research gained centre stage. Prior to this
time “normative” thinking and theorizing was paramount.
The reason for this shift in the 1970s is clearly complex yet it is not
unconnected with, first, the disillusionment with normative thinking and
second, with the interest in the shift to more descriptive studies from multiple
branches of the research community. On the first point what became clear in the
1970s was that the normative ideas which had been generated over previous
decades did not appear to be readily taken up and used in practice. It was as
though a “tissue rejection” problem was occurring – the suggested design for
accounting systems seemed to have an irrelevance to current practices. This led
to calls for a greater descriptive understanding of the functioning of current
accounting practices in the hope that such an appreciation would lead to the
design of more meaningful and appropriate normative systems. Cooper (1981,
p. 198) makes this plain when he suggests that “…only through a well-
grounded understanding of how systems operate can we prescribe how
accounting systems should be changed”. The second factor leading to the
1970s’ demands for greater empirical understanding of accounting was because
of the calls for this move from both the “economics” and “behavioural” wings of
the accounting academic research community (see also Hopwood, 1989 who
makes similar connections). The developments in financial economics and

The author would like to thank Peter Armstrong, Tony Berry, James Guthrie and Rolland
Munro for their helpful, critical comments on previous drafts of this article. He would also like
to thank colleagues at the Flinders University of South Australia, the University of Wollongong
(Australia), the University of the South Pacific (Fiji), the University of Canterbury (New
Zealand), Massey University (New Zealand), the Management Control Association and the
University of Essex for their insightful comments at the presentation of previous drafts of the
article. Particular thanks are due to Jane Broadbent who has not only commented on all Accounting, Auditing &
Accountability Journal, Vol. 8
previous drafts of the paper but has also been active in the formation of the ideas. Despite all No. 1, 1995, pp. 63-87. © MCB
this assistance any errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the author. University Press, 0951-3574
 AAAJ particularly the generation of the efficient market hypothesis and the opening
8,1 up of agency theory created demands as well as openings for accounting
academics sympathetic to this thinking for empirical research. This led a range
of accounting academics, primarily in Rochester and Chicago, to call for the
development of “…a positive accounting theory which will explain why
accounting is what it is, why accountants do what they do, and what effects
64 these phenomena have on people and resource utilization” (Jensen, 1976, p. 13).
Those purposefully distancing themselves from this strongly quantitative
emphasis in accounting were making similar pleas. Thus, for instance,
Hopwood writing in 1979 made plain that “…recently I have become ever more
aware of how little we know about the actual functioning of accounting systems
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in organisations” (Hopwood, 1979, p. 145). This concern was one that became
shared by a range of more “behavioural” accounting researchers the world over.
As a result of these and other factors, the 1980s generated a wide range of
empirical studies in accounting from various theoretical and methodological
approaches. Those borrowing from financial economics laboured long over
alternative theories and the design of ever more sophisticated methods while
leaving the wider methodological questions alone. Those of a more
“behavioural” persuasion, on the other hand, have absorbed massive energy,
conducted much debate, and generated immense diversity of approach on
theoretical and methodological questions. As a result the last decade or so has
led these “behavioural” accounting academics to borrow and adapt theoretical
and methodological approaches from the writings and thinking of some notable
social and political theorists and used these diverse approaches in developing
our understanding of accounting practice.
This increased diversity of approach has brought increased tension into the
literature between different proponents of various approaches. The battles
between the “economics” and “behavioural” wings have been present since the
early 1980s (cf. Christenson, 1983; Lowe et al., 1983) although more recently
cross-border talks have given way to the design of separate empires with their
own respective partisan journals. However, in the last few years with the
proliferation of more and more “behavioural” approaches to empirical research,
battles are beginning to emerge within this broad boundary, with those relying
on post-modernists, such as Foucault, being particularly in the firing line (cf.
Armstrong, 1994; Neimark, 1990).
Both the proliferation of alternatives and these public battles leave those
starting out on the road to research, and even those well-grounded in one
perspective, perplexed and confused as to the significance or otherwise of what
all this means for undertaking research. It is for both these parties (i.e. those
newly entering research and those well entrenched in their particular approach)
that this article is particularly targeting. It is also hoped that its wide-ranging
perspective will be of interest to those who are at the forefront of creating the
battle lines between the various approaches.
 An inevitable temptation when undertaking any empirical research is to Empirical
launch into data collection assuming that theoretical and methodological research in
problems will naturally sort themselves out as the work proceeds. To some accounting
degree this may well be the case and there will be little damage caused through
this approach. However, there is a certain advantage and importance of making
deliberate choices on these matters prior to undertaking any study. The reason
quite simply is that all empirical research will be partial, despite any truth 65
claims to the contrary, and thus it would be better to be clear about the biases
and exclusions before launching into the empirical detail.
This underlying assumption guides the following. Building on this
admittedly instrumentally rational assumption the choice process described
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below works on a two stage process. The first stage involves abstracting from
the different schools of thought and indicating how all have characteristics
which can be encapsulated on a range of key continuums, the position on which
needs to be decided prior to undertaking any empirical investigation. The
second stage involves a deliberate association with actual schools of thought
expressing different positions on these continuums.
In more detail the article has three substantive sections. The first section
posits the continuums, the position on which arguably needs to be decided prior
to undertaking any empirical study. The second section highlights a range of
alternative approaches that are available, tracing some of the key social
philosophers who have generated these alternatives. It also highlights the
different positions they hold on the continuums highlighted in the first section.
Third, in the final substantive section, a case is argued for what could be
broadly described as “middle-range” thinking, a term borrowed, but somewhat
distant, from the interpretation of Robert Merton (1968).
The article as a whole is intended to add new dimensions to the theoretical
and methodological debate. Through its ordering processes it is hoped to
highlight the inevitable truth that all empirical research is partial and
incomplete and that theoretical and methodological choices are inevitably made
whether appreciated or not.

Dimensions for theoretical and methodological choices

Perhaps Burrell and Morgan (1979) have done most to help design an abstracted
classification schema for understanding broad streams of social science
approaches to empirical research. Their framework inspired a range of
accounting-related classifications in the literature (most notably Chua, 1986;
Hopper and Powell, 1985; Laughlin and Lowe, 1990). While there has been much
criticism of their framework (see for instance Willmott (1990, forthcoming) and
the many citations in these articles) it is a useful starting point for this section
in its search to create an abstracted set of key characteristics under which
various social science approaches can be located.
What Burrell and Morgan (1979) create is a two-by-two matrix based on two
bipolar continuums. One continuum posits alternative approaches to social
 AAAJ science (ranging from “subjectivist” to “objectivist”) the other contains different
8,1 assumptions about the nature of society (ranging from the “sociology of
regulation” to the “sociology of radical change”). The multiple nature of the
social science continuum is actually a five part schema related to ontology,
human nature, nature of society, epistemology and methodology.
While the simple bipolar dualism that Burrell and Morgan (1979) have
66 introduced for these important areas is too simplistic as Willmott (1990,
forthcoming) so ably demonstrates, it is quite probable that they have indeed
isolated many, if not most, of the key domains for choice. Indeed a position on
being (ontology), on the role of the investigator (human nature), on perceptions
of society (society), on perceptions on understanding (epistemology) and ways
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to investigate the world (methodology) are implicit in the various approaches to

empirical research. Expressing these in the context of choices that have to be
made before undertaking any empirical investigation it is possible to cluster
these concerns under three broad bands which can be conveniently labelled
“theory”, “methodology” and “change” choices. In broad terms choice with
regard to “theory” involves deciding on a view about the nature of the world
(Burrell and Morgan’s “ontology”) and what constitutes knowledge either past
or present and how it relates to the current focus of investigation (Burrell and
Morgan’s “epistemology” assumption). The choice in relation to “methodology”
involves taking a position on an amalgam of the nature and role of the observer
in the discovery process (Burrell and Morgan’s “human nature” assumption)
and the level of theoretical formality in defining the nature of the discovery
methods (Burrell and Morgan’s “methodology”). Finally, the choice in relation to
“change” involves taking a position on whether the investigation is
intentionally geared to achieve change in the phenomena being investigated
(Burrell and Morgan’s “society” assumption).
On the “theory” dimension we can express the amalgam of concern in relation
to the level of prior theorizing and prior theories that can legitimately be
brought to the empirical investigation. This links to ontological assumptions
about the nature of the world we are investigating and our views about its
materiality as well as its generality of representation through previous
theoretical endeavours. High levels of prior theorizing are indicative of an
assumed material world (which exists distinct from the observers’ projections
and bias) which, despite empirical variety, has high levels of generality and
order and has been well researched through previous studies. The current
investigation becomes little more than an additional incremental study in the
great general theoretical design which has been unfolding over maybe centuries
of time. As such the detail and diversity of the empirical focus is not as
important in comparison with the question as to whether the observations
continue to confirm the well-developed theory which is brought to the
investigation. Low levels of prior theorizing, at the far extreme, assume that the
world is not material – it is a projection of our minds – and since such
projections differ, generalities are impossible. Equally, learning from or relying
 on previous theoretical studies and insights is both inappropriate and Empirical
potentially corrupting of the diversity and detail of the present study. In this research in
position the empirical detail is not mere confirmable or refutable “data” for accounting
some prior theory but becomes important in its own right. This detail becomes
the theory for this particular phenomena but cannot be transferred to another
study for the reasons that other theories could not be used in the context of this
study – both are separate and distinct and should be approached as such. 67
The “methodology” dimension can have more or less of a theoretical
definition for the “set of spectacles” that forms the nature of the methods for the
empirical investigation which also has implicit implications for the role of the
human agent in the process. By this is meant the idea that the actual way of
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conducting the investigation can either be defined according to some theoretical

model of how the observer should see or is more reliant on the implicit
perceptual powers of the individual observer. This links to the role of the
observer as well as the assumptions concerning human nature. Where there is
a high theoretical definition for the resulting methods then there is an implicit
assumption that the observer is largely irrelevant to the process and his or her
subjectivity or bias, which at the far extreme are assumed not to exist, plays no
part in the process. At the “low” end of this continuum, on the other hand, the
individual observer is permitted and encouraged to be free to be involved in the
observation process completely uncluttered by theoretical rules and regulations
on what is to be seen and how the “seeing” should be undertaken. This is taken
on board with the clear assumption that the observer is free-thinking and
variable in his or her perceptual skills and rather than seeing this as a problem
it is built on as a strength. This does not mean that no rules and/or constraints
are exerted over the observer in his or her observation process. However, these
are defined in such a way that they attempt to avoid theoretical and rational
closure (i.e. the characteristics of those on the high end of the continuum in this
methodology dimension) but rather preserves the subjectivity and variability of
the perceptual differences of the observer. While these rules may not be
formalized as some written code, for fear of shifting the emphasis into a more
“theoretical”, “rational” mode of operating and thus obliterating subjectivity
and variability, the presence of any type of rules invariably is a restriction on the
observer’s freedoms. Whether this is always recognized by those advocating
this way of seeing is unclear. However, what is clear is that whatever rules are
defined they will always attempt to preserve differences in perceptual powers
since a belief in this variability and its importance in discovery processes forms
the foundation for this way of seeing.
The final choice dimension refers to “change”. What change means is
complex and uncertain. However, in general, it refers to attitudes by the
researcher concerning the worth or otherwise of maintaining the current
situation that is being investigated as well as views about the necessity for
actually doing something about this situation. These two aspects of change
differ since it is possible for an investigator to value the need for change but not
 AAAJ have either the conviction or possibility to engender the change that is required.
8,1 While this is recognized it is not unreasonable to assume that those who adopt
a critical perspective with regard to the phenomenon being investigated would
also want to do something about it even if not in a position to see through the
change required. On the basis of this assumption those who believe in “high”
levels of change are of the view that everything they see is bound to be
68 inadequate and incomplete and in need of change even though not always in a
position to engender the change desired. Those who believe in “low” change see
little problem in maintaining the status quo. This would also include those who
see understanding as an aid to control and thus who may, on occasions, be very
proactive in any phenomenon when it deviates away from an accepted
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equilibrium (i.e. the status quo). Those in the “middle” on this continuum are
more strategic in their attitude to change – open to maintaining certain aspects
of current functioning but also open to challenging the status quo.
It is possible, therefore, to think of these three choices on three different
scalars ranging from high to low. The “theory” dimension refers to high to low
levels of usage of prior theorizing before undertaking any investigation. The
“methodology” dimension ranges from high to low levels of theoretical closure
on the methods of investigation. The “change” dimension relates to high to low
levels of critique with regard to the status quo and the need for change in the
phenomena being investigated. Even though it is possible to describe these
continuums in these simple terms it is important to stress that each includes an
amalgam of quite complex variables as the above detailed descriptions indicate.
It is also important to stress that the descriptors “high”, “medium” and “low”
are not precise, definable or measurable.
These three choices are clearly interrelated although on a three-dimensional
plane as Figure 1 suggests. The theory and methodology dimensions are

Theory choice: level

of prior theorization

High Medium Low

High

Methodological
choice: level of
theoretical nature Medium
of methods
e
Low ang
Ch

Figure 1. Change choice: level of emphasis

Dimensions on the given to critique of status quo
choice process for and need for change
(high/medium/low)
empirical research
 arguably related in a simple linear way. Those who believe in high levels of Empirical
prior theorizing will also see great value in high levels of theoretically defining research in
the methods of investigation. Likewise those who want to reduce to a minimum accounting
prior theorizing will prefer a similar minimal theoretical definition in the
investigatory methods. The change dimension is less predictable and hence the
reason for it cutting across both the theory and methodology continuums.
However, there is a connection to the theory dimension. In fact, while this is a 69
separate choice element at one level it is not independent of the chosen
theoretical perspective. In fact it is possible to go further and to suggest that
those choosing to pursue high levels of change in current configurations of the
phenomena under investigation are likely to be those who have chosen to bring
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high levels of prior theorization to the research site. Likewise those who have a
low change emphasis are more likely to be those who also believe in the need for
low levels of prior theorization. While these are likely norms it is not certain
that these connections follow in all cases. Thus, for instance, it is not impossible
that the very nature and type of a sophisticated and detailed prior theory may
deliberately exclude any “normative” critique of the focus of the theory. It is for
this reason that the change dimension purposefully straddles the theory and
methodology dimensions but is likely to follow from the nature of the
theoretical perspective adopted.

Alternative approaches to empirical research in accounting

The growing interest in empirical research in understanding the nature of
accounting within organizations and society has generated a range of
intellectual “borrowing” from social and political thought. Various definable
schools of thought exist now in accounting research. These include the quasi-
science of the accounting economists (cf. Watts and Zimmerman, 1986),
symbolic interactionism (for example, Colville, 1981; Tomkins and Colville,
1985) ethnomethodology (for example, Berry et al., 1985) structuration (for
example, Macintosh and Scapens, 1990; Roberts and Scapens, 1985), Marxism
and labour process theory (for example, Armstrong, 1987; Hopper and
Armstrong, 1991; Tinker, 1985), German critical theory (for example, Arrington
and Puxty, 1991; Broadbent et al., 1991; Laughlin, 1987) and French critical
theory and post-structuralism (for example, Arrington and Francis, 1989;
Miller and O’Leary, 1987). While these schools of thought and the literature
cited are not intended to be exhaustive they broadly define major schools of
thought which have been used to explore the nature of accounting in
organizations and society in the last ten to 15 years. Taken together these broad
streams of thought, given that each covers multiple proponents and nuances of
thought only some of which have been explored to date, cover most of the
significant schools of social and political thought in the social sciences.
This claim is clearly debatable but rather than be drawn into this discussion
the following highlights the nature of these and allied approaches according to
the three-way choice criteria described in the previous section. This is
 AAAJ Theory choice: levels
of prior theorization
8,1 High Medium Low
Positivism (L)
High Realism (L)
Instrumentalism (L)
Conventionalism (L)
70 Methodological German Symbolic
choice: level Medium critical interactionism
of theoretical theory (M) (Kuhn) (L)
nature of
methods
Marxism (H) Structuration (L) Pragmatism (L)
French Symbolic
interactionism
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Low critical theory (L) (Blumer) (L)

Ethnomethodology
(L)
Figure 2.
Characteristics of Change choice: level of emphasis
alternative schools of given to critique of status quo
and need for change
thought (high/medium/low)

summarized in Figure 2. Each approach is depicted in the cell referring to its

implicit theoretical and methodological chosen position with the change
element marked as L, M or H (referring to low, medium and high,
respectively). The empty cells are theoretical possibilities but do not currently
appear to be occupied. The positioning for each approach, which is only
indicative, could be justified individually. However, a rather more rigorous
and meaningful method for arriving at the same justification is via a brief
historical profile of the “father figures” behind these approaches. This allows
us to note “family resemblances” as well as “relatives” both those owned and
disowned. Figures 3 to 5 trace, in diagrammatic form, these key individuals
with their linkage (via dotted lines to indicate intended and actual gaps in the
genealogy) to the contemporary schools of thought highlighted in Figure 2.
Figure 3 depicts in broad terms what is, in effect, a claim that there are three
major streams of empirical investigative endeavour which are traceable to
respectively Auguste Comte, Immanuel Kant/Georg Hegel and Immanuel
Kant/Johann Fichte. Each of these streams of thought are, in turn, traceable to
the endeavours of early scientists such as Bacon (1561-1626), with his
dominant Christian underpinning of God’s ordering of a rational world
waiting to be discovered through rational processes, to the more agnostic
position and division between the European “rationalists” (for example,
Descartes (1596-1650), Spinoza (1632-1677), Leibniz (1646-1716)) and the
English “empiricists” (for example, Locke (1632-1704), Berkeley (1685-1753),
Hume (1711-1776)). The “rationalists” maintained that it was possible through
reason to obtain an “…absolute description of the world uncontaminated by
the experience of any observer” (Scruton, 1982, p. 14). “Empiricists”, on the
other hand, “…argued that we have no ideas at all other than those which
 Georg Hegel Empirical
(1770-1831)
research in
accounting
"Idealism"
(enlightenment)
Immanuel Kant
(1724 -1803)
71
Johann Fichte
(1762 - 1814)
"Rationalism"
17th Century
Early
science
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"Empiricism"
17th Century

Positivism
Figure 3.
"Positivism" An overview of key
Realism
Auguste Comte changes/continuities in
Instrumentalism theoretical and
(1798 - 1857)
Conventionalism methodological thought

come to us via our senses” (Brown, 1969, pp. 60-1). As a result, to the
“empiricists”, any statements, apart from those of pure logic, can be known to
be “…true or false only by testing them in experience” (Brown, 1969, pp. 60-
1). The claims and counter-claims between these major streams of thought in
the seventeenth century were remarkable: both claimed absolute truth for
their chosen approach and each was dismissive of the other’s perspective on
understanding. This battle, which seemed to have no solution, was finally
resolved by Kant’s amalgamation and critique of both schools of thought
followed by Comte’s somewhat unquestioning binding together of these
different traditions.
To Kant neither experience nor reason alone can generate understanding
and, of arguably more importance, all discovery is mediated through human
beings making the insights generated always conditional and inevitably
subjective. His critique of the “rationalists” and “empiricists” is a tortuous
journey, but in essence his criticism against the former is that it generates
form without content and for the latter that it derives content without form.
More fundamental though is the very fact that, to Kant, all insights are
inevitably subjective because no knowledge is generated distinct from the
observer whose reasoning and experiential powers are not uniform or
determined. Scruton (1982, p. 18) puts the issues succinctly in the following
way:
Objects do not depend for their existence on my knowing them; but their nature is determined
by the fact that they can be perceived. Objects are not Leibnizian monads, knowable only to
the perspectiveless stance of “pure reason”; nor are they Humean “impressions”, features of
my own experience. They are objective, but their character is given by the point of view
through which they can be known.
 AAAJ Georg Hegel
(1770-1831)
8,1 The change/
critical line
Wilhelm
Dilthey 
(1833 -1911)  ... Pragmatism
 ... Structuration
72 

The Max 
subjective/ Weber 
objective (1864 -1920)
... Symbolic
line ... interactionism
... (Kuhn)
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Immanuel
Kant
(1724 -1803)

... Symbolic
Johann Fichte ... interactionism
Figure 4. (1762 - 1814) ... (Blumer)
An overview of the The stability/
non-critical The
Kant/Fichte line of subjective/
line
theoretical and subjective ... Ethnomethodology
methodological thought line

While this logic may seem obvious and unsurprising to our twentieth-century
minds it was revolutionary in eighteenth-century thought. It was also far from
fully worked through by Kant. It was this latter aspect which was key in
understanding the diversity of perspectives which followed Kant’s
“enlightenment”. Two areas of ambivalence in Kantian thought are significant.
The first is related to the ontological question concerning a material existence.
If all insights are mediated through experience then to what degree is reality,
real, tangible and distinct from our mental images? The second relates to
critique and change in the subjective interpretation of observers. Are there any
conditions in which it is possible to say interpretation X by individual Y is
incorrect? Neither of these questions and concerns were adequately answered in
Kant’s writing leading to major differing interpretations even in his own
students. Thus his two most notable students (Georg Hegel and Johann Fichte)
came to interpret Kantian thought in totally different ways because of these
ambivalences. Hegel interpreted Kant’s thinking in such a way as to give
emphasis to a material world which could be understood and misunderstood.
He also gave emphasis to an ideal to which we should be aiming. These
emphases, together, introduced notions of critique and change into
understanding and action. Fichte, on the other hand, emphasized the highly
subjective side of the ambivalences in Kantian thought. Everything to Fichte
was a projection of our minds thus making a material existence uncertain. This
led inevitably to a lack of critique in terms of interpretation. Put simply, if
everything is a projection of our minds what right has anybody to question and
challenge another person’s projections? Both interpretations are Kantian
although markedly different. It is from these diverse roots that even greater
diversity has been generated as Figures 4 and 5 indicate.
 Before looking at this diversity, however, it is important to take note of the Empirical
rather more conservative amalgamation of the “rationalist” and “empiricist” research in
traditions through the thinking of Auguste Comte. Comte’s thinking came
during the height of the enlightenment developments generated by Kant which
accounting
were sweeping European academic circles. It came about as partly a reaction to
what was clearly seen as a highly subjectivist twist in the understanding
process. Comte, rather than be part of this, went back to rationalist and 73
empiricist traditions, as Kant had, and reworked them into a rather less critical
amalgamation. What was needed, according to Comte, was not an
abandonment to subjectivism but a balanced amalgamation of rationalism and
empiricism into a new method (which he called “positivism”) which would
allow absolute descriptions of the empirical world to be made distinct from any
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observer bias and clearly separated from any attitude concerning the need for
change in the observable referent. Critique and a desire for change was value-
driven and not part of positivism and therefore was forcibly excluded. Comte’s
positivism was a tightly defined rational, deductive process coupled with
similarly clear rules on how to observe the empirical world – subjectivity,
values and bias played no part in the makeup of positivism. The seeming
certainty, which Comte introduced, was clearly like nectar to those worried by
the shifting subjectivism of the “age of enlightenment” which Kant had
engendered. It clearly grew in significance as Kolakowski (1972, p. 122) points
out:

Critical,
hope,
spiritual
line Marxism

Immanuel Georg Karl

Kant Hegel Marx German
(1724 -1803) The (1770 -1831) Critical, (1818 -1883) critical
change/ hope theory
critical non-
line spiritual
Critical, line
despair,
non-spiritual
line
Friedrich French
Nietzsche critical
(1844 - 1900) theory

Figure 5.
Johann Fichte
(1762 - 1814) An overview of the
The stability/ Kant/Hegel line of
non-critical theoretical and
line methodological thought
 AAAJ Positivism dominated the spirit of the age to such an extent that even Kantians sought to
interpret Kant – or to impute his thoughts – in such a way as to retain only what was
8,1 compatible with a broadly conceived positivism.

With this, the golden age of the enlightenment was dinted but not destroyed.
However, Kantian thought and its derivatives, from this point on, was, and
continues to be, on the defensive. The desire for certainty, which Comtean
74 thought guaranteed, seemed to have, and continues to have, the upper hand in
the epistemological battle even though the opposing Kantian forces are far from
destroyed.
There are four contemporary schools which can be seen to be derivable from
Comtean thought as Figure 3 indicates. There is the direct “heir apparent” of
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positivism with its tight definition of explicans and explicandums. Realism,

which allows more freedom with regard to the definition of explicans (see Keat
and Urry (1982, Chapter 2) for more details on this), is an outgrowth of
positivism but again not an abandonment of its Comtean roots. The deviant
members of this group are instrumentalism and conventionalism. The former
gives away the birthright of Comtean thought by maintaining that theories are
only ever instruments for prediction – they have no explanatory power.
Conventionalism, which normally includes the thinking of Lakotos, Kuhn and
Feyerabend, with Kuhn’s scientific paradigms predominating, is the more
sociological end of Comtean thought. These approaches introduce the observer
or the observers’ community into the discovery process. Kuhn, for instance,
maintains that it is a “paradigm” which binds a community of scholars together
and guides their “normal science” behaviour. This paradigm is subject to
revolutionary change where it is seen to fail to fulfil its guiding purposes for the
community of scholars.
Together these are the more established and establishment approaches to the
process of discovery and are well represented in the accounting studies which
have their roots in economics and finance. While they arguably fail to express
these roots adequately (cf. Christenson, 1983; Laughlin, 1981; Lowe et al., 1983)
they nevertheless are rightly located in these Comtean derivatives enjoying the
public esteem which comes with this association.
While the Comtean derivatives are tightly clustered no such tightness is
apparent in the Kantian alternatives. Thus, for instance, as Figure 4 indicates,
the Kantian/Fichtean line has a further branching through Dilthey and Weber.
Both can be seen to be key in providing a more objective (but still subjective)
dimension to Fichtean thought. However, there remains a direct route from
Fichte, through key individuals such as Husserl, to ethnomethodology and the
more subjective wing of symbolic interactionism (following the Chicago school
under Blumer’s leadership), yet Dilthey’s and Weber’s wistful eye towards, but
not complete acceptance of, the objectivism of Comtean thought was significant
in giving a more objective twist to Fichtean thinking. This infiltration, yet its
attempt not to remove the subjective element within Fichtean thinking, has
generated a range of different contemporary schools of thought as Figure 4
 indicates. Symbolic interactionism following Kuhn (not Thomas Kuhn (the Empirical
originator of paradigms) but M.H. Kuhn) and the Iowa school with its greater research in
emphasis on “objective” meanings can be seen to be influenced by this accounting
Weberian branch. Likewise Giddens’ structuration theory which has an
emphasis on underlying structures in all actions, while maintaining the
importance of the detail in particular actions, has similar influences. Even
pragmatism, that “typically American” (Kolakowski, 1972, p. 182) school of 75
thought, following the thinking of Mead, James and Pierce, with its “getting-on-
with-life” approach and its heavy borrowing from all and every way of thinking
if it is deemed to be “relatively attractive” (Rorty, 1982) to the inquirer, can be
seen to be located in this branching with its apparent belief in both subjective
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and objective dimensions to knowledge.

The Weberian development of Fichtean thought is not as marked as the
further divide in the Kantian/Hegelian branching which is depicted in Figure 5.
The major point of division is between Hegelian derivatives and those whose
major inspiration is Nietzsche. Hegel, as we have already seen, had a
fundamental belief in a material world in which understanding of and change in
its design was possible and appropriate. Those following Hegelian thought can
be divided between the “right” and “left” Hegelians. The “right” Hegelians
believed in the view that the Prussian State was near to being the absolute in
societal configurations expressing as it did all that Hegel believed the material
world somehow should express. The “left” Hegelians, on the other hand, led
primarily by Marx, maintained that the ideal state was still to be discovered or
rather created. Both believed in an ideal, both held out hope of a better society
which would supply complete understanding of what really constituted
“reality” yet they differed on its actuality at the time of their writing. The “right”
Hegelians, once realizing that Prussia was not all that it was deemed to be,
shifted into a more clearly religious mode believing in the coming of heaven on
earth. The “left” Hegelians, on the other hand, continued their critical
endeavours in the hope that a better state could be created. The traditional
Marxist interpretation of this is in some classless society whereas German
critical theory, particularly following Habermas’ lead, see this in terms of a
society able to communicate rationally and openly with one another. While
Marxism and German critical theory share a common heritage in the hope for a
better future, Nietzsche gives no grounds for such beliefs. While his roots go
back to Hegel much of the lineage of hope is largely dissipated. Nietzsche is
associated particularly with facing realistically the “death of God”. He sees the
very concept of hope, which he traces to a residual Christian belief and its
implicit underlying values, groundless, pointless and basically wrong. As a
result there is a certain despair in this philosophy which is given a double
emphasis with his view of history concerning the “endless recurrence of time”.
To Nietzsche history repeats itself – it is different but it is basically the same. No
era is better than another and, as a result, the concept of progress is
meaningless. The post-modernist tradition, expressed through French critical
 AAAJ theory encapsulated in work by notable thinkers such as Foucault, Derrida and
8,1 Lyotard, follows Nietzschean thought with its abandonment of concepts such as
hope, a better state or similar values and concerns.
While the above cannot claim to be anything other than a general and
incomplete picture of centuries of thought it hopefully provides a thumbnail
sketch to note the common family roots behind seemingly diverse
76 contemporary approaches.
It also helps to provide a clearer rationale for why the different approaches
are positioned as they are in Figure 2 in terms of different perspectives on
theory, methodology and change. Thus the Comtean derivatives are all located
in the “high” theory and methodology domains with a “low” change emphasis.
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This is not surprising given their collective assumptions of a material world

which exists distinct from the observer, which has definable patterns which can
be discovered through formal and defined investigatory methods. The “low”
change emphasis is because of the value-laden nature of this critique which is
not part of scientific discovery and hence is purposefully excluded. The
Kantian/Fichtean alternatives, on the other hand, are located at the “low” end of
both the theory and methodology continuums but again with a “low” change
emphasis. Again this is not surprising given an appreciation of Fichtean
thought which emphasizes the subjective nature of interpretation which, at the
far extreme, denies the very existence of a material world distinct from the
observer. Because of this highly subjectivist emphasis the possibility for
critique of alternative interpretations and thus the demand for change is
naturally blunted. The Kantian/Hegelian alternatives, on the other hand, are
sandwiched between these two extremes and have varying “high” to “medium”
levels of prior theorization in their nature and “low” to “medium” theory-led
methodological underpinning. With regard to the change emphasis it is
interesting to note that the complete range of “high”, “medium” and “low” are in
operation for the three alternatives. Traditional Marxism has a “high” change
emphasis being highly critical of the status quo. German critical theory has a
more moderate, “medium”, attitude to change whereas French critical theory
has a “low” critical emphasis of the status quo. The latter may seem surprising,
in some ways, due to the Hegelian influence in this school of thought. However,
the Nietzschean roots have a tendency to shift the change emphasis into the
“low” end of the continuum. While there is clearly a level of critique in this
school of thought with its underlying emphasis that each historical period is no
better, only different, from any previous era the urgency for change is removed
through this underlying belief. Put simply what is the point in changing the
status quo when, using Foucauldian logic and language, all that is happening is
that one “disciplinary power” network is being exchanged for another? It is this
underlying philosophy which makes this school of thought inevitably “low” in
its emphasis for change in the status quo.
These three clusters, therefore, demonstrate an increasing diversity of
perspective. The Comtean alternatives are tightly clustered together in the top
 cell of Figure 2 with a common “low” emphasis on change. The Kantian/ Empirical
Fichteans straddle three cells of Figure 2 but all have a common “low” emphasis research in
on change. The Kantian/Hegelians also straddle three cells in Figure 2 but have accounting
distinct differences in their respective attitudes to change with the full range in
operation among the three approaches.

An argument for “middle-range” thinking 77

Before proceeding it is important to stress that the following is an example of a
possible design of an argument in support of a particular position on the choice
dimensions depicted in Figure 1 and on the actual schools of thought
highlighted in Figure 2. It is offered as a “for instance”, albeit one which the
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author finds convincing. While inevitably it is offered to the reader in the hope
that it has persuasive power this is not its major purpose. Like all arguments it
is contestable as to its logic and susceptibility to rival arguments. This is
entirely accepted and acceptable. The primary purpose of the following is,
however, not to convince but to use this process to remind all would-be
accounting researchers that they too need to argue the merits of their chosen
perspective, to defend their position and be equally prepared to be contradicted.
The location of the schools of thought in Figure 2 in relation to the
dimensions of theory, methodology and change suggests an inevitable
partiality in understanding. There are no comprehensive approaches to
understanding the empirical world. This is well understood by the approaches
coming from Kantian origins. However, those of Comtean thought are less
convinced of this relativity in the understanding process. With their
unquestioning amalgamation of the rationalists’ and empiricists’ traditions
they also readily transferred the belief in absolute truth which was so much a
part of the former schools of thought. What is clear from multiple critiques of
this claim to absolute truth (see for instance Bernstein, 1979, 1983, and
Habermas, 1978, for typical examples) is that it is untenable. Despite the claim
to the contrary and the continuing public esteem given to these schools of
thought they do not generate some absolute and complete picture of reality. The
insights generated through these Comtean derivatives are as partial and
incomplete as any of the other more “subjective” approaches. What is still
surprising, as an aside, is the continuing esteem given to these approaches
which may not be unconnected with our human desire for certainty and a
fascination with something which makes claims to absolute truth. However,
this is something for the sociologists of knowledge to consider and will not be
pursued further in this article.
Choices are contestable, as are the criteria which drive them, with possibly
the most vulnerable being either the criterion that appeals to accuracy of
representation or the choice which unquestioningly tries to amalgamate all
approaches. The notion of representation of reality is highly problematic. In the
thinking of both Fichte and Nietzsche, as we have already seen, the very
concept of representation is uncertain, because of its ontological assumption of
 AAAJ an independent existence of reality distinct from observers’ projections, making
8,1 it a dubious basis for choice. To use this as a choice criterion is, in fact, a
privileging of Comtean and certain Hegelian alternatives which pride
themselves on their representational accuracy. An alternative criterion for
choice is not to have to make a choice at all but rather call for a simple
amalgamation of all the alternatives. This too, however, is not a satisfactory
78 solution to the choice problem due to the mutually exclusive nature of these
alternatives. The very existence of the great divides in the schools of thought
depicted in the previous section suggests such a simple amalgamation is not
possible. This is not to say that a range of scholars have not tried to achieve this.
Notable among these have been Weber and more recently Giddens, yet a closer
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look at either of these specific approaches suggests some subtle rejection of key
concerns (see, for instance, Bernstein’s, 1986 interesting critique of Giddens’
claim to be critical of the status quo in this regard). Thus, arguably, neither of
these routes provides an easy or obvious solution to the problem of choice.
While any criterion is bound to be problematic the following suggests the
need for a discursive argument for a particular position on the three
continuums (which will lead to focusing on one of the many alternative
approaches that are available) as the way forward if a researcher does want to
defend his/her position and convince others in the academic community of its
worth. At one level this privileges Habermasian critical theory, which is built on
the creative power of language and discourse (cf. Habermas, 1984, 1987).
However, support for this approach is not dependent on requiring the reader to
adopt Habermasian critical theory. Justification for this approach to choice is
because of the nature of discourse and argument which is a foundational human
characteristic. What distinguishes human beings from all other animate and
inanimate forms is our sophisticated ability to communicate with one another
through the spoken and written word. This is not to say that as human beings
we have distinct non-verbal skills and abilities which we use extensively in
communication but simply that our ability to talk, discuss and argue with one
another is a basic and very important human trait and one which we should,
and do, use extensively in making important choices in our lives and justifying
them to others. It is this fundamental ability and necessity to use language to
make public what we are doing and why we are doing it and, where we need to
convince, also to use argumentation in this process, that justifies the use of
discursive processes as a criterion for the choice process.
The following, therefore, presents an argument for what can be loosely
referred to as “middle-range” thinking. It is “middle-range” since it argues a
case for taking a mid-point on each of the three continuums (theory,
methodology and change).
Before embarking on this argument it is important to note the intended
distance between the originator of “middle-range” thinking and the one
propounded below. Because Robert Merton’s three editions of Social Theory and
Social Structure (1949, 1957, 1968) have had such a seminal position in
 functionalist thought, and with the increasing dominance of “middle-range” Empirical
thinking in this work, it is easy to make a one-to-one relationship to the research in
approach being argued below. This is not the case, however. Merton’s “middle- accounting
range” thinking was not taking a “medium” approach to theory, methodology
and change in the way suggested in this article. Rather he was concerned that
the grand, primarily Parsonian, theories of social behaviour were failing to
provide the intended generalizations required. His alternative was to undertake 79
more modest theorizing in the first instance in the hope that these limited
discoveries would then lead to grand theories that both he and Parsons, to name
but two, desired. As Merton (1968, pp. 52-3) makes plain:
I believe – and beliefs are notoriously subject to error – that theories of the middle range hold
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the largest promise, provided that the search for them is coupled with a pervasive concern with
consolidating special theories into more general sets of concepts and mutually consistent
propositions. Even so we must adopt the provisional outlook of our big brothers and of
Tennyson: “Our little systems have their day; They have their day and cease to be” (emphasis
in the original).

Merton’s “middle-range” thinking refers more to an initial limitation of the

social focus for the discovery process, not to the nature of theory, methodology
and change. It uses “high” levels of theory and methodology with minimal
change concern on a limited social concern with the hope that a grand, general
theory for all action and activity can be discovered in due course from the
insights forthcoming. The “middle range” that is referred to below has no faith
in the development of such a general theory. Put simply the “middle range” of
this article maintains that there can only ever be “skeletal” theories in social
phenomena – the hope for a grand theory, similar to Parsonian thought, is
wistful and incorrect quasi-scientific thinking of a highly questionable nature.
But this is only one of the areas of difference – the “middle-range” thinking in
this article also differs to Merton’s emphasis on methodology (with its desire
finally, although maybe not immediately, to adopt highly theoretical methods
for investigation) and change (with its purposeful distance from getting
involved in any value judgements about what is being investigated) dimensions
as well. In sum the following “middle range” is markedly different from
Merton’s “middle range” and should not be confused with it.
As a start to arguing a case for “middle-range” thinking it is important to
appreciate the fundamental nature of this approach in comparison with other
perspectives. In this respect Table I provides an overview of the characteristics
of “middle-range” thinking in relation to the two approaches from which it
differs most and yet also draws most extensively from. These are approaches
which occupy the top-left and bottom-right cells of Figure 2. These contain the
Comtean approaches and the most subjective of the Kantian/Fichtean
alternatives. They are polar opposites and share no common boundaries as
Figure 2 indicates. “Middle-range” thinking, however, is linked to both albeit
only by corner connections, indicating that it draws from both of these
dominant ways of thinking yet is distinct and separate.
 AAAJ
High/high Medium/medium Low/low
8,1 lowa mediuma lowa

Theory characteristics
Ontological Generalizable world “Skeletal” Generalizations
belief waiting to be discovered generalizations may not be there
80 possible to be discovered
Role of theory Definable theory with “Skeletal” theory Ill-defined theory –
hypotheses to test with some broad no prior hypotheses
understanding of
relationships
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Methodology characteristics
Role of observer Observer independent Observer important Observer important
and human and irrelevant and always part of the and always part of
nature belief process of discovery the process of
discovery
Nature of Structured, quantitative Definable approach but Unstructured,
method method subject to refinement ill-defined,
in actual situations, qualitative approach
invariably qualitative
Data sought Cross-sectional data Longitudinal, case- Longitudinal, case-
used usually at one point study based. Heavily study based. Heavily
in time and selectively descriptive but also descriptive
gathered tied to analytical
hypotheses
Conclusions Tight conclusions about Reasonably conclusive Ill-defined and
derived findings tied to “skeletal” theory inconclusive
and empirical richness conclusions but
empirically rich in
detail
Validity criteria Statistical inference Meanings: Meanings:
researchers + researched
researched

Change characteristics
Low Medium Low
emphasis on changing emphasis open to emphasis on
status quo radical change and changing
Table I. maintenance of status quo
Some key status quo
characteristics of the
aTheory, methodology and change ordering
dominant schools of
thought

It is not intended in the following to go through each of the descriptive elements

in Table I in detail but rather to describe in broad terms the characteristics of
these cells on the diagonal of Figure 2.
 The high/high/low combination (of theory, methodology and change Empirical
respectively) is the archetypal model of scientific endeavour assuming a research in
material world, which exists distinct from the perception of users, and which accounting
has generalities and patterns waiting to be discovered. To further this discovery
process, however, requires the use of theoretically defined and definable
methods of observation. Its theoretical logic naturally precludes anything
which may lead to some judgement about the worth or otherwise of the 81
observations, hence critique and change are purposefully excluded from what
constitutes legitimate enquiry. This is the desired state of Merton’s “middle-
range” theories even though he may advocate temporary location in other areas
in the matrix as a vehicle to arrive at this position.
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The low/low/low combination is the exact opposite of the above on theory

and methodology yet shares a common attitude concerning change yet for
different reasons. At the far extreme of this perspective, reality, distinct from
our human perceptions and projections, does not exist. While this is an extreme
position for all those sharing this viewpoint, generalizations are not assumed to
exist and be waiting to be discovered. Equally, methods of enquiry need to be
uncluttered from theoretical definition on the grounds of the potential damage
they may do to the perceptual process. While those of a more scientific
persuasion share a common disregard for critique and change it is not for the
same reason. Values and personal views are important to Fichteans yet because
there is always a mixture between reality and our projections of reality, which
on occasions are one and the same, there is no natural mechanism for a critique
of interpretations.
The medium/medium/medium approach, on the other hand, takes aspects of
the above approaches on the theory and methodology dimensions while taking
a less dismissive perspective on critique and change. This approach recognizes
a material reality distinct from our interpretations while at the same time does
not dismiss the inevitable perceptive bias in models of understanding. It also
recognizes that generalizations about reality are possible, even though not
guaranteed to exist, yet maintains that these will always be “skeletal” requiring
empirical detail to make them meaningful. To the Comteans, variety in the
empirical detail is irrelevant and can be encompassed in and through the
theoretical terms of the emerging general theory. However, to the “middle-
range” thinkers the empirical detail is of vital importance. It complements and
completes the “skeletal” theory. It may, on occasions, enrich the “skeleton” since
it is from empirical investigation that the “skeletal theory” is derived. However,
expansion of the “skeleton”, once discovered, is not guaranteed. In fact, it is
assumed that the empirical detail will always be of importance to make the
“skeleton” complete in particular contexts. The “skeleton” metaphor is intended
to paint a picture of incompleteness yet also reasonable stability. It is also
intended to register the point that the metaphorical “flesh”, “sinews”,
“psychological make-up” etc. are important additions leading to definable and
important differences in the make-up of the resulting “whole being”. Just as the
 AAAJ skeleton remains unchanging yet incomplete to encapsulate the nature of
8,1 human beings, so a “skeletal” theory may also be similarly unchanging (being
the extreme of legitimate generality) and always require the diverse empirical
“flesh” to arrive at meaningful “whole beings”. Similar logic applies to “middle-
range” thinking with regard to methodology. In this context the theoretically
defined nature of the methods of observation are not abandoned but are
82 designed in such a way as to preserve the accepted subjective variety in
perceptual powers. Again the intention is to design a methodology which sets
“skeletal” rules for processes of discovery which still allows for variety and
diversity in observational practice. Finally the medium position on change
keeps open the possibility that in certain circumstances critique and ultimate
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change are important but not in other situations. This more conditional
approach to critique and change is clearly more complex than either the
deliberate exclusion as with the Comteans or the ontological necessity for
exclusion as with the Fichteans. It requires a deliberate and deliberated
evaluatory policy to decide when critique and change are appropriate.
With this background, to not only “middle-range” thinking but to the
dominant alternatives from which it differs yet draws, the following presents a
case under the three areas of concerns (theory, methodology and change) for the
middle ground. This will be conducted, not in the abstract, but in relation to
specific aspects of empirical research in accounting.
It is important to stress again that the following can be nothing more than an
argument which the reader may not find convincing. Thus, for instance, the
language of “strengths” and “weaknesses” is not claimed in some absolute
sense but is inevitably value-laden. However, these categories are presented in
the context of the implications that particular stances on theory, methodology
and change have for our comprehension of accounting within organizations and
society.
From a theoretical perspective the “medium” position is arguably a more
realistic depiction of the social and technical nature of accounting systems
design. As is now well recognized, in both the “economics” and “behavioural”
wings of accounting research, accounting practices are not some technical,
context-free phenomenon. Few theorists would argue against the importance of
depicting this context as part of any theory of accounting. However, to adopt a
“high” theoretical emphasis means that this context is understood, clear,
uniform and generalizable making the actual detail of insignificant importance.
Thus a “high” level theory of accounting can be likened to any other scientific
theory. As with, say, a theory of gravity, where it does not matter whether it is
an apple or person or other object that is falling to the ground, since all
differences can be expressed through the theoretical categories of weight and
volume, so a “high” level theory in accounting becomes equally uninterested in
any tangible differences, per se, that may exist in accounting systems. All
differences are assumed away through definable theoretical categories. On the
other hand, to give a “low” emphasis to prior theorization, suggests that each
 system is separate and separable from another with all detail, in every situation, Empirical
being of equal, unique importance. In this situation no learning is possible or research in
appropriate. All contextual variables are unique and separate and generalizable accounting
only to the accounting system being explored. It becomes invariably impossible
to reduce all contextual diversity into theoretical categories leaving the richness
of the picture to be portrayed largely “as it is” without theoretical refinement.
In the accounting context it can be argued that both schools of thought have 83
strengths but also severe weaknesses with the former being preserved,
admittedly with some refinement, in the “medium” ground. Accounting theory
will never be like a theory of gravity. Accounting is a social practice conducted
by diverse social actors. To claim that it has generalizable, theoretical
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characteristics similar to gravity is a proposition where there has to be some

considerable leap of faith. The continuation of the belief “as if ” these
generalizations exist clearly leads to a considerable complexity-reduction
process which becomes questionable in the extreme. The attempt to learn from
across a range of diverse specific instances in a rigorous manner, however, is the
great strength of this way of thinking. On the other hand it is the inability to
learn from other situations for those adopting a “low” prior theorization
perspective which is the great weakness of this position. The necessity
constantly to “rediscover the wheel” and to claim everything as important and
vital, which is so much a part of this perspective, takes, as given, that
everything is independent, unique and original. Intuitively this seems to be a
gross denial of any commonality which even at the social level arguably exists.
The great strength of this position, however, is its respect for the detail of actual
situations. Instead of arguing away diversity, through theoretical categories, the
“low” prior theorization position respects the detail that is there. This respect
for detail but also the possibility of learning from other situations through
theoretical insights, which is the strength of the “high” position, are preserved
in the “medium” perspective on theory. Its design and use of “skeletal” theories,
which cannot stand on their own but need empirical “flesh” to make them
meaningful and complete, is a way to preserve both the strengths of the “high”
and “low” perspectives while avoiding their respective weaknesses.
From a methodological perspective the medium position again preserves the
strengths of both the “high” and “low” positions while avoiding the weaknesses
of both. The weakness of the “high” perspective on methodology is its
inevitably tight theoretical definition of its “way of seeing”. This may be
appropriate where the theory being tested is clear and unambiguous and
requires a sophisticated “set of spectacles” to see what needs to be seen. If this
is not the case, which, as argued above, is the situation in accounting, then there
is a danger that using this highly specific mechanism for viewing the empirical
world ends up defining the nature of that world according to its limited
perceptual categories. Although this is a weakness where the theory being
tested is far from unambiguous, the strength of the “high” perspective on
methodology is its need to make public the perceptual process adopted. It
 AAAJ makes plain to all concerning the design of the “set of spectacles”. It is this lack
8,1 of clarity which is at the heart of the weakness at the “low” end of the
methodology continuum. Here it is assumed that it is better to be “natural” and
uncluttered theoretically in defining the nature of the “way of seeing”. This is
deemed to allow greater openness in the discovery process, which clearly is the
major strength of this position, yet it also creates a closed picture concerning
84 the rules which are being used in the perception process. It is this latter aspect,
coupled with an inevitable variety and uncertainty in the perceptual process, if
one assumes, following Kant, that our perceptual powers are far from uniform,
that are the weaknesses of this position. In the “medium” position, however, the
perceptual rules are made public and clear, but their nature is “skeletal”,
encouraging and allowing flexibility and diversity in the discovery process. In
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this way it is part-constrained and part-free which again is a combination of the

strengths of both approaches while avoiding the weaknesses of both.
With regard to the “change” continuum the argument for the “medium”
position is because of its greater balance in its attitude to the status quo. The
argument for “high” levels of change assumes that everything is basically in
need of change. Nothing is satisfactory or acceptable or worthy of preservation.
At the “low” end of the change continuum everything is satisfactory and in
need of preservation. There is nothing wrong with anything. Both positions are
arguably untenable and very extreme. Again the “medium” position holds open
the possibility that the status quo should continue while also keeping open that
change is required. This more balanced perspective, which neither argues that
everything is right nor that it is wrong, calls for a rather more sophisticated
model of change to make this judgement. It is this change model which is
central to this “medium” position on the change dimension.
In terms of actual social science approaches that reflect this medium
perspective on theory, methodology and change only German critical theory
seems to satisfy this demand as depicted in Figure 2. In fact it is probably unfair
to say that all German critical theory possesses these medium tendencies. As
Held (1980) perceptively indicates, critical theory is a diverse body of thought
centred on four key characters – Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and latterly
Habermas. There is great diversity of thought in these four proponents and
while it is probably fair to register them all as “middle-range” thinkers the first
three lean rather more heavily towards a Marxist position (which in Figure 2 is
“high” on the theory and change continuums and “low” on the methodology
continuum). Habermas, on the other hand, with his complex theoretical and
methodological model (which is well-summarized in his two major works
(Habermas, 1984, 1987)) provides the most complete example of “middle-range”
thinking to empirical research in not only accounting but also other social
dimensions. It has a more balanced approach to the social world maintaining
that current configurations are not all inappropriate with the supply of various
models (primarily through his thesis on “inner colonization of the lifeworld”) to
allow some judgements on this issue to be made. Already the literature in the
accounting area is starting to use and adapt Habermas’ insights in empirical
research in accounting (cf. Arrington and Puxty, 1991; Broadbent and
 Laughlin, 1994; Broadbent et al., 1991; Dillard, 1991; Laughlin, 1987; Laughlin Empirical
and Broadbent, 1993; Power and Laughlin, 1992, 1995) but this literature has research in
only scratched the surface of this important endeavour.
accounting
A concluding thought
It would be wrong to claim that the above argument for “middle-range”
thinking and its support for German critical theory, in the Habermasian 85
tradition, as a way forward for empirical research in accounting, is not heavily
value-laden and biased. Like all arguments it is intended to provoke counter-
points and disagreement. The author welcomes such a debate. Overall this
article is intended to encourage not only the debate concerning this particular
position but also all approaches that each and every researcher adopts. If this
Downloaded by Professor Richard Laughlin At 06:42 09 September 2015 (PT)

article has done nothing else than to raise the important point that undertaking
any empirical study of accounting is adopting a perspective on theory,
methodology and change, which is contestable and needs to be defended, then
it has achieved a great deal.

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105. Amanda Ball. 2004. A sustainability accounting project for the UK local government sector?. Critical Perspectives on Accounting
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 106. Alan Lowe. 2004. Postsocial relations. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 17:4, 604-628. [Abstract] [Full Text]
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107. Nongnooch Kuasirikun, Michael Sherer. 2004. Corporate social accounting disclosure in Thailand. Accounting, Auditing &
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108. Keith Dixon *. 2004. Experiences of an accounting educator in Kiribati. Accounting Education 13, 311-327. [CrossRef]
109. Niklas Kreander, Ken McPhail, David Molyneaux. 2004. God's fund managers. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
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110. Richard Thorpe, Tony Beasley. 2004. The characteristics of performance management research. International Journal of
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111. Stan Brignall, Joan Ballantine. 2004. Strategic Enterprise Management Systems: new directions for research. Management
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112. Christopher J. Cowton. 2004. Managing financial performance at an ethical investment fund. Accounting, Auditing &
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113. James Guthrie, Lee Parker. 2004. Diversity and AAAJ: interdisciplinary perspectives on accounting, auditing and
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114. Alan Lowe. 2004. The spacing and timing of [a chic] critique. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15, 279-291. [CrossRef]
115. Alan Lowe. 2004. Methodology choices and the construction of facts: some implications from the sociology of scientific
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116. Wai Fong Chua. 2004. Translating social theory—a critical commentary. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15, 255-260.
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117. Richard Laughlin. 2004. Putting the record straight: a critique of ‘methodology choices and the construction of facts: some
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118. E. Arrington. 2004. Rhetoric and the radically chic: how arguments about academic accounting fall off the runway. Critical
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119. Jill Hooks, David Coy, Howard DaveyTHE TENSION BETWEEN ACCOUNTORS AND ACCOUNTEES: EVIDENCE
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120. Jane Broadbent, Richard LaughlinManagement of a Research Team 149-161. [CrossRef]
121. Anthony J. Berry, David T. OtleyCase-Based Research in Accounting 231-255. [CrossRef]
122. Jeffrey Unerman. 2003. Enhancing Organizational Global Hegemony with Narrative Accounting Disclosures: An Early
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123. Sue Llewelyn. 2003. What counts as “theory” in qualitative management and accounting research? Introducing five levels of
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124. Pekka Pihlanto. 2003. The role of the individual actor in different accounting research perspectives. The holistic individual
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125. Jane Broadbent, Richard Laughlin. 2003. Control and legitimation in government accountability processes: the private finance
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126. Jane Broadbent, Richard Laughlin. 2002. Accounting choices: technical and political trade‐offs and the UK’s private finance
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127. ROB GRAY. 2002. OF MESSINESS, SYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABILITY: TOWARDS A MORE SOCIAL AND
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128. Christopher J. Cowton, Sue Dopson. 2002. Foucault’s prison? Management control in an automotive distributor. Management
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129. Colin Dey. 2002. Methodological issues. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 15:1, 106-121. [Abstract] [Full Text]
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130. Jane Broadbent, Kerry Jacobs, Richard Laughlin. 2001. Organisational resistance strategies to unwanted accounting and finance
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131. Sven Modell. 2001. Performance measurement and institutional processes: a study of managerial responses to public sector
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132. John Burns, Juhani Vaivio. 2001. Management accounting change. Management Accounting Research 12, 389-402. [CrossRef]
133. Lee D. Parker. 2001. Reactive planning in a Christian Bureaucracy. Management Accounting Research 12, 321-356. [CrossRef]
134. Alan Lowe. 2001. After ANT ‐ An illustrative discussion of the implications for qualitative accounting case research.
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 135. Carlos Larrinaga-Gonzalez, Jan Bebbington. 2001. Accounting change or institutional appropriation?—A case study of the
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136. Abu Shiraz Rahaman, Stewart Lawrence. 2001. A negotiated order perspective on public sector accounting and financial
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137. Robert W. Greenhalgh. 2000. Information and the transnational SME controller. Management Accounting Research 11,
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138. Lew Perren, Paul Grant. 2000. The evolution of management accounting routines in small businesses: a social construction
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139. Christine Ryan. 1999. Australian public sector financial reporting: a case of cooperative policy formulation. Accounting,
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140. Martin Kelly, Howard Davey, Neil Haigh. 1999. Contemporary accounting education and society. Accounting Education 8,
321-340. [CrossRef]
141. Karen A. Van Peursem. 1999. A theory of public health sector report: forging a new path. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability
Journal 12:4, 413-440. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
142. Elaine Harris. 1999. PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT: A EUROPEAN FIELD STUDY. The British Accounting Review
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143. Cyril Tomkins. 1999. The big agenda. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 12:1, 83-87. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
144. Jane Broadbent. 1999. Research Agendas for the New Millennium: Celebrating Methodological Diversity. Pacific Accounting
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Review 11:1/2, 35-39. [Abstract] [PDF]

145. Constantinos V. Caramanis. 1998. Assessing the impact of “liberalisation” on auditor behaviour. Accounting, Auditing &
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146. Jane Broadbent, Richard Laughlin. 1998. Resisting the “new public management”: Absorption and absorbing groups in schools
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147. Tony Tollington. 1998. What are assets anyway? Some practical realities. Management Decision 36:7, 448-455. [Abstract]
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148. Susan Richardson, Catherine Blakeney. 1998. The undergraduate placement system: an empirical study. Accounting Education
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149. Warwick Funnell. 1998. The narrative and its place in the new accounting history: the rise of the counternarrative. Accounting,
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150. Jane Broadbent, Richard Laughlin. 1997. Developing empirical research: an example informed by a Habermasian approach.
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 10:5, 622-648. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
151. Roger L Burritt, Stephen Welch. 1997. Accountability for environmental performance of the Australian Commonwealth
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152. Lee D. Parker, Bet H. Roffey. 1997. Methodological themes. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 10:2, 212-247.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
153. Sonja Gallhofer, Jim Haslam, Steven Cahan. 1997. REVIEW OF PACIFIC ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 1988–96. Pacific
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154. Sonja Gallhofer, Jim Haslam. 1996. No blinkered view: critical reflections on the teaching of a compulsory course component
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155. Christopher Humphrey, Robert W. Scapens. 1996. Rhetoric and case study research: response to Joni Young and Alistair
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156. Christopher Humphrey, Robert W. Scapens. 1996. Methodological themes. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
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157. Susan Richardson, John Cullen, Bill Richardson. 1996. The story of a schizoid organization. Accounting, Auditing &
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158. David Otley, Jane Broadbent, Anthony Berry. 1995. Research in Management Control: An Overview of its Development.
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159. David Shearn, Jane Broadbent, Richard Laughlin, Heidrun Willig‐Atherton. 1995. The Changing Face of School Governor
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