1. R.A. No.

3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

CORPUZ, HONG, IBARRA, NAGORITE

Mejorada vs Sandiganbayan

Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed as a temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of Public
Works and then as a right of way agent in the Office of Highway District engineer. His duty was to negotiate
with property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements for the purpose of compensating
them for the damages incurred.

Petitioner contacted the owners of the affected lots and informed them that he could work out their claims
for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of said highway. He
required the claimants to sign blank copies of Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of
Real Properties and Agreement to Demolish

In the said documents, the of the respective properties of the claimants were made to appear very much
higher the actual value claimed. The assessed value of the property as evidenced by the Declarations of
Real Property shows that claimed damage was almost the same with the actual value of the property.

Months after, the accused accompanied the claimants to the Office to receive payments and he also
personally assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers. Right after he received the money, they went to
his car where they were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only P 1000 pesos each, and P 5,000
to the one claimant.

ISSUE: WON the essential elements constituting the offense penalized by Sec. 3e of RA 3019 have been
clearly and convincingly proven by the prosecution (YES)

Petitioner contends that the last paragraph of Sec. 3e is applicable only to public officers charged with the
duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions; that since he is not charged with the duty of
granting these permits, then he is not the officer contemplated under this provision.
De Jesus Sr. vs Sandiganbayan

The Ombudsman charged the accused public officers De Jesus, the Mayor of Anahawan, Ang, his Vice
Mayor and Apigo, the treasurer of falsification of public documents. There were two information filed: in the
first one, it alleged that the three falsified the requests for quotation and abstract of proposal of canvass by
making it appear that the Lumber and Hinundayan Lumber submitted quotations for the supply of coco
lumber, when in they did not in fact do so; and the second alleged that the petitioners, taking advantage of
their positions gave unwarranted advantage to De Jesus Jr. (son of the mayor) by awarding to him the
supply of coco lumber.

ISSUE AND RULING:

WON SB erred in finding the accused guilty of two crimes charged when these referred only to one
transaction (NO)

They alleged that the SB erred in finding them guilty of both falsification under RPC and violation of Sec. 3
of RA 3019. The prosecution correctly pointed out that Sec. 3 expressly allows the filing of two charges
based on ONE TRANSACTION.

ISSUE: WON the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy among them. (NO)

The prosecution is not required to prove conspiracy by evidence that the three local officials sat down and
came to an agreement to commit the crimes which they were charged with. Such conspiracy may be proven
by a number of circumstances from which one may infer that the accused were animated by a common
criminal purpose

The treasurer certified by her signature that a canvass of suppliers was undertaken, and their quotations
were correct when in fact, did not take place since the document lacked the required signatures of the
supposed bidders.
Alvarez vs People
The petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan’s fourth division for violating Sec. 3e of RA 3019. At
the time of the subject transaction, he was the Mayor of the Municipality of Munoz. In 1995, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Munoz under Reso. No. 136, invited the President of the Australian Professional
Inc. (API) in connection with the municipal government’s plan to construct a four-storey shopping mall. It
also approved the adoption of the project under the Build Operate Transfer arrangement. An invitation for
other proposals was published in a tabloid. The Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee
recommended the approval of API’s proposal as the lone bidder. After the signing of the MOA, the structures
built in the area were demolished. However, no mall was constructed after the API stopped working within
a few months. Thereafter, a complaint was filed against the petitioner for giving the API unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference by awarding to the latter the contract of construction of the shopping
mall. In his defense, Alvarez claimed that the plan was to borrow from the GSIS to finance the project but
the Vice Mayor Romero Ruiz, showed the published advertisement of API building similar BOT projects in
Laguna. He emphasized that not a single centavo was spent by the municipal government for the said
project. However, when asked during the cross-examination if they verified with the SEC the contractor’s
financial capability, he answered in the negative.
The Sandiganbayan found that:
● Petitioner railroaded the project
● There was not competitive bidding
● The contractor was unqualified to undertake the project
● The provisions of the BOT law and relevant rules and regulations were disregarded and not followed.
● Municipal government suffered damages
ISSUE: WON the petitioner cannot be held liable under Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 because the municipality did
not disburse any money in the said project.
No. the disjunctive word OR connotes that either the act of (a) “causing any undue injury to any party
including the government” and (b) “giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference” qualifies as a violation of this provision. It connotes these two modes need not to be present at
the same time. The presence of one would suffice for conviction.
Under the second mode, damage is not required. It suffices that the accused had given unjustified favor or
benefit to another, in exercise of his official, administrative, or judicial functions.
[3rd Element of Sec. 3 (e): His action caused undue injury to any private party, including the government or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences in discharge of his functions. Proof
of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned is enough to convict. Damage or
injury caused by the petitioner’s acts, though alleged in the information, need not be proven for as long as
the act of giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference either through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence was established. The prosecution was able to
prove that the petitioner acted with manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence in awarding the
BOT contract to an unlicensed and financially unqualified contractor.
The court sustained and affirmed the Sandiganbayan ruling in holding that petitioner violated Sec. 3 (e) and
that he cannot shield himself from criminal liability simply because the SB passed the necessary resolutions
adopting the BOT project and authorizing him to enter into the MOA. It is apparent that the unwarranted
benefit in this case lies in the fact that API was allowed to present its proposal without compliance of the
requirements provided by RA 6975 as amended by RA 7718 which requires that a BOT project be awarded
to the bidder who has satisfied the minimum requirement and met the technical, financial, organizational,
and legal standards, that the municipal government never conducted public bidding prior to the execution
of the contract. As the local chief executive, he is not only expected to know the proper procedure in the
bidding and award of infrastructure contracts such as BOT projects., he is also duty bound to follow it and
his failure to discharge this duty constitutes gross and inexcusable negligence.
People vs Go

This case is an offshoot of the SC decision in the case Agan Jr. vs PIATCO which nullified the various
contracts awarded by the government through DOTC to the PIATCO for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the NAIA III. In connection to this, a complaint was filed against several individuals from
alleged violation of RA 3019. Among those charged was Go who was then the Chairman of PIATCO, for
having supposedly conspired with the DOTC Sec. Enrile in entering into a contract which is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable
cause, Sec. Enrile died. Go filed a motion to quash, and was granted by the SB.

ISSUE: WON the court lack jurisdiction over the person of the accused due to the death of his alleged co-
conspirator public official.

No. private persons when acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted and if found guilty, be
held liable from the pertinent offenses under Sec. 3 of RA 3019.

While it is true that by reason of Sec. Enrile’s death, there is no longer any public officer with whom the
respondent can be charged. However, it does not mean that the allegation of conspiracy between them can
no longer be proved. The only thing extinguished by the death of Sec. Enrile is his criminal liability. This
fact did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between the
deceased as a public officer and him as a private person.

Conspiracy in its nature, is a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the
joint act or intent of two or more persons.

The SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations
of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249.
This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
said public officers.

In the instant case, the respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy
with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been
charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this
can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already
divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving the respondent. To rule otherwise would
mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction
but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
CONSIGNA v. PEOPLE
[G.R. Nos. 175750-51. April 2, 2014.]
DOCTRINE:
The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019: (1) the accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any undue injury to
any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. Further, there are two ways by which a public official violates
Sec. 3 (e) in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including
the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.

FACTS:
In June 1994, petitioner Consigna, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte obtained as
loan from private respondent Moleta to pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to
construct the municipal gymnasium as the municipality's Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet
arrived. As payment, Consigna issued 3 LBP checks; however, LBP, upon presentation for payment,
informed Moleta that the municipality's account was already closed and transferred to DPB, and that
Consigna has been relieved from her position. Hence, Consigna was charged with Section 3 (e) of R.A.
3019.

On the other hand, Consigna averred that the charge was erroneous because borrowing of money is not a
function of a Municipal Treasurer under the LGC. She asserts that the last sentence of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A.
3019 cannot cover her.

ISSUE: W/N Consigna may be liable for Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 (YES)

RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.

The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019: (1) the accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any undue injury to
any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. Further, there are two ways by which a public official violates
Sec. 3 (e) in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including
the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
Lastly, the last sentence of the said provision is not a restrictive requirement which limits the application or
extent of its coverage. A prosecution for violation of Sec. 3 (e) will lie regardless of whether or not the
accused public officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions."

In this case, it was not only alleged in the Information, but was proved with certainty during trial, that the
manner by which Consigna perpetrated the crime necessarily relates to her official function as a municipal
treasurer. Consigna’s official function created in her favor an impression of authority to transact business
with Moleta involving government financial concerns. There is, therefore, a direct relation between the
commission of the crime and petitioner's office. Further, Consigna was charged of violating Sec. 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019 under the alternative mode of "causing undue injury" to Moleta committed with evident bad
faith, for which she was correctly found guilty.
PCGG v. OMBUDSMAN
[G.R. No. 193176. February 24, 2016.]
DOCTRINE:
Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 requires that there be injury caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers. On the other hand, Sec. 3
(g) does not require the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties who
conspire with public officers, its core element being the engagement in a transaction or contract that is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

FACTS:
In 2004, petitioner PCGG filed before the Ombudsman accusing respondents of violating Section 3 (e) and
(g) of R.A. 3019 for their participation in the alleged behest loans extended by PNB to Hercules Minerals
and Oils, Inc. (HMOI).

Assisted by a Technical Working Group, the PCGG investigated the loans granted by PNB to HMOI, a
domestic corporation engaged in mining copper ores to produce copper concentrates. PCGG contended
that the loans extended by PNB to HMOI were in the nature of behest loans. It asseverated that because
PNB unduly accommodated HMOI, as evidenced by said loans which were grossly disadvantageous to the
government, as well as the public, respondents must be prosecuted under Sec. 3 (e) and (g).

However, the Ombudsman found that there was nothing on the loan agreements to indicate that HMOI
unduly influenced PNB into granting it loans or that unwarranted favors had been extended to it. Thus, the
presumption that regular duty was observed and exercised stands. Further, they held that there were no
indications that the loan rested solely on said endorsement of then President Marcos for its approval.

ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it found no probable cause to
hold respondents liable for violation of Secs. 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019 and consequently, dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence (YES)

RULING:
The Court held in the affirmative.

Violation of Sec. 3 (e) requires that there be injury caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantages or
preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers. Its elements are: (1) that the accused are
public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the
prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that
they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is
caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public
officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

On the other hand, Sec. 3 (g) does not require the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantages or
preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers, its core element being the engagement in
a transaction or contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The elements
of the offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction
on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.

Taking into consideration the foregoing elements, the Court finds that there may be liability arising from
violation of Sec. 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. The fact that PNB appeared to be unduly exposing its finances
by extending iniquitous loans to HMOI, despite the latter being undercapitalized and, notwithstanding the
inadequacy of the collaterals being offered to secure the loans, should have been sufficient basis for the
Ombudsman to find probable cause.
TRIESTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 70332-43. November 13, 1986.]
DOCTRINE:
What is contemplated in Sec. 3(h) of R.A. 3019 is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one
has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. The official need not dispose his shares
in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law
aims to prevent the dominant use of influence, authority and power.

FACTS:
Generoso Trieste, Sr., the Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan, was charged by the Tanodbayan with 12
counts of alleged violations of Sec. 3 (h) of the R.A. 3019 for having financial or pecuniary interest in a
business, contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official
capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the purchases of construction
materials by the municipality from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which the accused
is the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder.

After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision, convicting the petitioner in all the twelve
criminal cases.

ISSUE: W/N Trieste may be held liable for the violation of Sec. 3 (h) of R.A. 3019 (NO)

RULING:
The Court held in the negative.

What is contemplated in Sec. 3(h) of R.A. 3019 is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one
has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. The official need not dispose his shares
in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law
aims to prevent the dominant use of influence, authority and power.

In the present case, there is no evidence that Trieste had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence,
power, and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. Trieste should not be faulted for Trigen's
transaction with the municipality, which the latter has been dealing with even before Trieste has assumed
the mayorship. Further, it is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for nondelivery, under
delivery or overpricing regarding any of the transactions.
GO v SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 172602. September 3, 2007.]
DOCTRINE:
To determine the culpability of the accused under Sec. 3 (g) of R.A. 3019, it need only be established that
the accused is a public officer; that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government;
and that such a contract is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to that government. Private individuals
may not be indicted within such provision instead, he may be charged for violation of Sec. 4 (b) in relation
to Sec. 3 (g).

FACTS:
Henry Go, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), was
accused of conspiracy with Vicente Rivera, Jr., Secretary of Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), for entering into contract which is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government in relation to the voided 1997 Concession Agreement and the Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA) entered into by the government with Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc (PIATCO).

Go moves for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court, contending that it was an error to charge him
with the violation given that he was not a public officer, a necessary element of the offense under Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019.

ISSUE: W/N a private individual may be charged with violation of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019 (NO)

RULING:
The Court held in the negative.

Sec. 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 clearly punishes public officers who, on behalf of the government, enter into
contracts or transactions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby. To determine the culpability of the accused under such provision,
it need only be established that the accused is a public officer; that he entered into a contract or transaction
on behalf of the government; and that such a contract is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to that
government.

The act treated in Sec. 3 (g) partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as
defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
However, said provision applies restrictively only to public officers entering into a contract on behalf of the
government manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government.

It is well-settled that penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and liberally for the accused, so
much so that the scope of a penal statute cannot be extended by good intention or by implication. Therefore,
the current information which lumped petitioner with a public official for conspiracy to violate Sec. 3 (g), is
totally infirm. If warranted, Go should be charged for violation of Sec. 4 (b) in relation to Sec. 3 (g).
Javier v. Sandiganbayan

[September 11, 2009. G.R. No. 147026-27]

Facts

Petitioner Javier, a private sector representative of the Governing Board of the National Book Development
Board (NBDB), was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 before the Sandiganbayan for her
failure and refusal to return and/or liquidate her cash advances intended for official travel abroad which did
not materialize despite due demand by the Resident Auditor and Executive Director of NBDB.

The Commission on Audit, then, charged petitioner with Malversation of Public Funds, as defined and
penalized under Art 217 of the RPC, for not liquidating the cash advance granted to her in connection with
her supposed trip abroad.

Petitioner averred that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear her case since she is not a public
officer or employee and that she belongs to the Governing Board only as a private sector representative,
hence, she may not be charged under RA 3019.

Issue

W/N petitioner, a private sector representative, is a public officer.

Ruling

Yes. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law
invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the
government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it
has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public
sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position outside
the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the
purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved.

Pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office.
Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of NBDB.

On the other hand, the RPC defines a public officer as any person who, by direst provision of the law,
popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance
of public functions in the government or shall perform in said government or in any of its branched public
duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public
officer.
Casing v. Ombudsman

[G.R. No. 192334. June 13, 2012}

Facts

Petitioner, the designated Head of Task Force Traffic of Novaliches District Center, was charged for
violation Section 3(b) of RA 3019 when he indirectly demanded and received a share from the salary of
complainants, as a consideration for having successfully employed the complainants as traffic enforcers in
Petitioner’s area of jurisdiction, and also through the taking of complainants’ Christmas subsidy, which was
allocated by the Quezon City government for its employees.

Issue

W/N the ombudsman erred in charging petitioner for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 because the
probable cause was not proved by clear and convincing evidence.

Ruling

No. In line with the constitutionally-guaranteed independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and coupled
with the inherent limitations in a certiorari proceeding in reviewing the Ombudsman's discretion, this Court
has consistently held that so long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, his decision
should stand. In a criminal proceeding before the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman merely determines
whether probable cause exists, i.e., whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. Probable cause is a
reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.

A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure
a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. L-50691, L-52263, L-52766, L-52821, L-53350, L-53397, L-53417 & L-53520]
Facts: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the decision which affirmed the conviction of petitioner for
violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019. Petitioner stresses there was no bad faith. He stresses that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of RA 7718 and while it is true that petitioner may have deviated from some of the
procedure outline in the law, the essential purpose of the law – that a project proposal be properly evaluated and that
parties other than the opponent be given opportunity to present their proposal – was accomplished. SOLGEN – the
findings of the SB and the SC of the Built-operate-transfer (BOT) law and its rules have not been followed in the bidding
and award of the contract to Australian professional were based on the documents of the project which have not been
questioned by petitioner. Despite the claim of substantial compliance, it is undisputed that it did not include the required
company profile of the contractor and that the publication of the invitation for comparative proposals were defective.
Issue: W/N the prosecution was able to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, alleged gross inexcusable negligence,
evident bad faith or manifest partiality of the petitioner.
Ruling: Yes. Notably, petitioner’s invocation of good faith deserves scant consideration in the light of established facts,
as found by the Sandiganbayan and upheld by this Court, clearly showing that he acted with manifest partiality and
gross inexcusable negligence in awarding the BOT project to an unlicensed and financially unqualified contractor. It
bears stressing that the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed even if bad faith is not
attendant. Thus, even assuming that petitioner did not act in bad faith, his negligence under the circumstances was not
only gross but also inexcusable. Submission of documents such as contractor’s license and company profile are
minimum legal requirements to enable the government to properly evaluate the qualifications of a BOT proponent. It
was unthinkable for a local government official, especially one with several citations and awards as outstanding local
executive, to have allowed API to submit a BOT proposal and later award it the contract despite lack of a contractor’s
license and proof of its financial and technical capabilities, relying merely on a piece of information from a news item
about said contractor’s ongoing mall construction project in another municipality and verbal representations of its
president. In his testimony at the trial, petitioner admitted that after the awarding of the contract to API, the latter did
not comply with the posting of notices and submission of requirements. He simply cited the reason given by API for
such non-compliance, i.e., that the BOT law does not provide for such requirements. This clearly shows petitioner’s
indifference and utter disregard of the strict requirements of the BOT law and implementing rules, which as local chief
executive, he is mandated to follow and uphold. Petitioner’s reliance on the representations and statements of the
contractor on the compliance with legal requirements is an unacceptable excuse for his gross negligence in performing
his official duties. He must now face the consequences of his acts relative to the failed project in violation of law.
The substantial compliance rule is defined as "compliance with the essential requirements, whether of a contract or of
a statute." Contrary to petitioner’s submission, his gross negligence in approving API’s proposal notwithstanding its
failure to comply with the minimum legal requirements prevented the Sangguniang Bayan from properly evaluating said
proponent’s financial and technical capabilities to undertake the BOT project. Such gross negligence was evident from
the taking of shortcuts in the bidding process by shortening the period for submission of comparative proposals, non-
observance of Investment Coordinating Committee of the NEDA approval for the Wag-wag Shopping Mall Project,
publication in a newspaper which is not of general circulation, and accepting an incomplete proposal from API. These
forestalled a fair opportunity for other interested parties to submit comparative proposals. Petitioner’s argument that
there was substantial compliance with the law thus fails. The essential requirements of the BOT law were not at all
satisfied as in fact they were sidestepped to favor the lone bidder, API. Petitioner was grossly negligent when it glossed
over API’s failure to submit specified documents showing that it was duly licensed or accredited Filipino contractor, and
has the requisite financial capacity and technical expertise or experience, in addition to the complete proposal which
includes a feasibility study and company profile. These requirements imposed by the BOT law and implementing rules
were intended to serve as competent proof of legal qualifications and therefore constitute the "substantial basis" for
evaluating a project proposal. Petitioner’s theory would allow substitution of less reliable information as basis for the
local government unit’s determination of a contractor’s financial capability and legal qualifications in utter disregard of
what the law says and consequences prejudicial to the government, which is precisely what the law seeks to prevent.
We have held that the Implementing Rules provide for the unyielding standards the PBAC should apply to determine
the financial capability of a bidder for pre-qualification purposes: (i) proof of the ability of the project proponent and/or
the consortium to provide a minimum amount of equity to the project and (ii) a letter testimonial from reputable banks
attesting that the project proponent and/or members of the consortium are banking with them, that they are in good
financial standing, and that they have adequate resources. The evident intent of these standards is to protect the
integrity and insure the viability of the project by seeing to it that the proponent has the financial capability to carry it
out. Unfortunately, none of these requirements was submitted by API during the pre-qualification stage.
COLOMA [Link], G.R. NO. 205561

FACTS: Coloma was the Director of the Philippine National Police Academy (PNPA)at the time of the alleged violation
of R.A. No. 3019. In 1999, he was designated as Special Assistant and Action Officer to the Director, Logistics and
Installation Services (LIS)of the Philippine Public Safety College (PPSC). Then PPSC President Ernesto B. Gimenez
(Gimenez)assigned Coloma to assist in the search for a suitable construction site of the Philippine National Police
Regional Training Site 9 Annex in Bongao, Tawi-Tawi (RTS 9).

In 2001, Coloma submitted a report (After Mission Report)on the construction of the training facilities, stating, among
others, that: the land development was 100% complete; the construction of the administration building was 90%
accomplished; and the construction of the fifty-capacity barracks and classroom had just started and was expected to
be completed by December 15, 2001. In the same report, Coloma allegedly attached the Deed of Donation signed by
Juain iBahad in favor of the [Link], SPO4 Gilbert Concepcion conducted an investigation. In his report,
SPO4 Concepcion stated that his team conducted an ocular inspection and interviewed the supplier of materials and
the Land Bank officials. They discovered the following irregularities: 1) the land development which Coloma reported
to be 100% completed referred only to the exact site where the administration building and the one-unit classroom were
erected; 2) only the administrative building with one unit classroom was erected; 3) the construction of the 50-capacity
barracks which Coloma reported to have been started was nowhere to be found; 4) the 50-capacity mess hall had also
been erected; 5) the appropriate cost of the facilities constructed and the improvements made on the project was valued
at around ₱3,150,000.00 only, contrary to what was reported by Coloma that the payment made for the project was
₱5,722,278,29; 6) the payment made by the contractor and the supplier of the construction materials was deposited at
Land Bank Tawi-Tawi Branch under current accounts booked with Coloma as joint depositor; and 7) contrary to
Coloma’s After-Mission Report stating that the value of the property on which the training facilities were constructed
was ₱1,500,000.00, the value of the property per hectare was only P 9,730.00 as per a provincial ordinance of Tawi-
Tawi fixing the schedule of fair market value of real properties.

In 2006, Coloma was indicted in the Information filed with the Sandiganbayan which upon arraignment, he entered a
plea of "not guilty. In defense, Coloma claimed that he had nothing to do with the construction of the project because
he was not the contractor and by the time he executed his After-Mission Report, he had already been relieved from his
position at the PPSC. He also claimed that Engr. Vacnot failed to present factual and legal basis on how he came up
with the amount of ₱3,180,000.00 as actual cost for the [Link], Coloma stressed that he did not act in bad faith
by being one of the signatories of the current accounts for the creditors of PPSC because he simply followed the order
of then PPSC President Gimenez. He was not guilty either of misrepresentation when he stated that the project was
almost complete because his report merely embodied his latest factual observation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Coloma’s conviction for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 was proper.

HELD: The Court held in the [Link] crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 has the following
essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (b)
he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused
any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. All these elements exist in this case.

The first element is present. Coloma was indisputably the Director of the PNPA at the time material to the charge
against him. Apart from this, he never denied his designation as the Special Assistant and Action Officer to the Director
of the LIS-PPSC. From the task of selecting the site for RTS 9 to the dealings with the contractors for the project, this
latter position signifies Coloma’s task to oversee and administer the construction of RTS 9. As to the second element,
Coloma’s argument is basically a denial of bad faith on his [Link] discrepancies of the results of the inspection are
too obvious to ignore. These incongruities do not project plain bad judgment on Coloma’s part. Uncontroverted as they
were, the results of the inspection would lead to the conclusion that Coloma’s statements in his report were distortions
of facts. This is tantamount to moral obliquity and fraud which the law seeks to penalize. Besides, by making himself a
signatory to the accounts, Coloma cannot deny his participation in the implementation of the project. Simple logic would
dictate that a person who has a direct hand in the payment of creditors is expected to keep abreast in the development
of the project. Thus, there is really no reason for Coloma to give erroneous information unless he, mindful of the
numerous irregularities in the implementation of the project, was ill-motivated in doing so. Here manifests Coloma’s
evident bad faith. Notably, the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed even if bad faith
is not [Link], even assuming for the sake of argument that Coloma did not act in bad faith in rendering his
report, his negligence under the circumstances was not only gross but also inexcusable. As to the third element, as
explained by Sandiganbayan, the undue injury caused by Coloma to the government is based on two grounds: 1) as a
co-signatory in the current accounts created for the payment of creditors,Coloma reserved to himself control over the
deposits to and withdrawals therefrom, and 2) the cost of the RTS 9 as declared by Coloma in his report was significantly
higher than the actual cost computed after inspection.
AMBIL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Eastern Samar Governor, Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden, Alexandrino Apelado were found
guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring with Apelado, ordered the release of
then criminally charged and detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter transferred from the
provincial jail to the the governor’s residence. They allowed said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused Ambils
residence for a period of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was done without any court order.
Petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however, that Adalims transfer was
justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the
provincial jail. Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed Decision finding petitioners guilty of
violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not apply to his case because the provision
contemplates only transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the law punishes a public officer who extends
unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor
to Mayor Adalim, a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the mayor pursuant to
his duty as a Provincial Jailer under the Administrative Code of 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes
himself entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of duty. Apelado, Sr.,
on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between him and petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner
Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely following the orders of a superior when he transferred the
detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes immunity from criminal liability.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the absence of jurisprudence that restricts the
application of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 to transactions of a pecuniary nature. The OSP explains that it
is enough to show that in performing their functions, petitioners have accorded undue preference to Adalim
for liability to attach under the provision. The OSP also reiterates petitioners' lack of authority to take custody
of a detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that petitioners are not entitled to the
benefit of any justifying circumstance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are liable?

HELD: The Court held in the negative. In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following
elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
and (3) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers. The accused shall be in the
jurisdiction of Sandigan bayan because the Governor's salary grade is more than 27 and Apelado is a co-
accused even though he has only a salary grade of 22.

As to the second element, the petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring
the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s
contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his power as the Provincial
Jailer of Eastern Samar.

The third element is lacking. The Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted benefits
and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by causing his release from prison
and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability
of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points.

First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides that the
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses, permits or other concessions and he is not such government officer or employee. Second, the
purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public officer.
MENDOZA-ARCE v. OMBUDSMAN

FACTS: There was a Special Proceeding to for the will of Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz and Santiago Villaruz
was one of the oppositors. The said case was assigned to the sala of Judge Patricio Santiao was initially
the administrator of the estate of Remedios but he was removed for patent neglect. His eldest brother
Nicolas Villaruz, Jr. replaced him and he filed a motion for the approval of his bond as administrator. The
motion was opposed by Jose Maria, another brother, and attached to their opposition was a certification
executed by Remedios, which authorized Santiago to take possession of her nipa lands and gave Santiago
the option for leasing such lands. Judge Patricio issued an order recognizing the validity of the certification
and the administration of the new administration was subject to them but this was not reflected in the
dispositive portion of the order. The case was, in the meantime, reassigned to Judge Pestaño who
approved Nicolas’ bond. After receiving Judge Pestaño’s order, Susan Mendoza-Arce, prepared a Letter
of Administration (LOA) in favor of Nicolas and this was based on the form prescribed in the Manual for
Clerk of Courts. Acting on the LOA, Nicolas took possession of the entire estate of Remedios including the
nipa lands, which were leased to Santiago. Santiago filed a letter-complaint to the Ombudsman claiming
that Mendoza violated Article 171 of the RPC and Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 for showing manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Ombudsman found sufficient basis for the filing of
the informations against Mendoza. Mendoza claims she was not guilty of the crimes and she merely issued
the LOA based on the Manual.

ISSUE: Whether Mendoza violated Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.

HELD: The Court held in the negative. There is no probable cause for the filing of information for violation
of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. The elements of the offense under Sec. 3(e) are: 1) That the accused are public
officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2) That said public officers committed the
prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; 3) That
they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; 4) That such injury is
caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5) That the public
officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

All elements must be proven, however, in this case the issuance of the LOA there is no basis for finding
Mendoza to have acted with “partiality” or bias or “bad faith”, nor with “gross negligence”. The work of a
Clerk of Court, although an officer of the Court, a public officer, and an officer of the law, is not that of a
judicial officer but essentially a ministerial one.

The LOA issued by Mendoza was performed as a ministerial duty. She merely copied substantially the form
for letters of administration prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Courts. The LOA is not accurate for lack
of reference to the lease agreement in favor of Santiago but this does not equate to gross negligence or
from some corrupt motive. She used the phrases in the Manual prescribed by the Court, instead of
employing her own words.
 2. R.A. No. 7080 (Anti-Plunder Act)
CASTILLO, QUIAMCO

Joseph Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:
Former Preside nt Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under A 7080 as amended
by RA 7659. It was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him: (1) it suffers from the vice
of vagueness; (2) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; (3) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan Informations against petitioner. Estrada
filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation consideration/
reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was denied.

Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding that a probable cause for the offense of
plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused. Estrada moved to
quash the Information on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague. [NO]

RULING: We discern nothing in the foreqoing that is vague or ambiquous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts" A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general
terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. A statute or
act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.

In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects - it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.

The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is

outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
 Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People, [Link].
G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016

FACTS: On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit
whose charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence were granted,
except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under
Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which were denied by the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong. After the Prosecution rested its case,
accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not
establish a case for plunder against them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was
sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration
filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte [NO]
2. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution? [NO]
3. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating,acquiring ill-gotten wealth in total amount of not less than 50M? [NO]

RULING:
1. [NO] The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the
identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder.
Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such identification, but also
because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they
were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set
out in the information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.
In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the State against
the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.

2. [NO] The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury. To discern the proper import of
the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion,
misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur
a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase
is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own; to misappropriate means
to own, to take something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly,
unforeseeably, or not as intended;” and malversation occurs when “any public officer who, by reason of the duties of
his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property,
wholly or partially.”

3. [NO] No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50 Million was adduced
against GMA and Aguas. The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
valued at not less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the
criminal prosecution. As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-
gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas
or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also
no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the
CIFs [Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
3. R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
GONZAGA, ROSALES
 4. P.D. No. 46 (Punishing Public Officials and Employees to Receive and for Private Persons
to Give Gifts on any Occasion Including Christmas)

5. R.A. No. 9485 (Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007)

6. R.A. No 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse Law)

CALUMPANG, MAMARIL, PACIS, ARENAS

People v. Rayon
G.R. No. 194236
30 January 2013

FACTS:
XYZ and the appellant got married and begot five (5) children, namely: AAA, XXX, YYY, Jr., BBB,
and ZZZ. She stated that AAA is “mentally deficient,” but could play musical instruments. XYZ recalled that
when she was still pregnant with their fifth child, the appellant would bring AAA to a videoke bar without her
knowledge, and they would usually return home at 1:00 a.m. Upon their return, AAA would complain of
experiencing loose bowel movement, and of pain in her stomach. One time, when XYZ arrived at their
house after buying rice, she saw the appellant embracing AAA and spreading her legs; the appellant then
put his hand on AAAs breast, inserted his other hand inside her underwear, and touched her vagina. When
the appellant noticed XYZs presence, he immediately stood up and instructed her to prepare food. XYZ felt
“bad and afraid,” but did not confront the appellant. She instead went to the kitchen to do her chores.

On December 16, 2005, BBB revealed to XYZ that the appellant had raped her. XYZ requested
assistance from a municipal social worker who, in turn, told her to file a case before the police. BBB recalled
that while she was in her room in December 2005, the appellant grabbed her and removed her short pants
and panty; the appellant then removed his short pants, mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
She felt pain, but could not shout because the appellant covered her mouth with his hands. Afterwards, the
appellant inserted his penis into her anus. BBB disclosed the incident to XYZ who, in turn, accompanied
her to the police.

In his defense, the appellant confirmed that XYZ is his wife, and that the alleged victims are their
daughters. He claimed that XYZ falsely accused him of raping AAA because he disallowed her to have an
American “pen pal.” He further maintained that AAA was usually in their neighbors house when he comes
home from work. The appellant also denied BBBs allegation that he sodomized her.

RTC AND CA RULING

IN THE CASE OF AAA
- Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610
IN THE CASE OF BBB
- Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape under Article 266-A, in relation with Article 266-
B, of the Revised Penal Code

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling of ca is correct.

RULING: The SC held that YES, it is correct. However, it held that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 instead of Sec 10(a) in the case of AAA. Sexual abuse
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements: (1) the accused commits an act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct. (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years old. In the present case, all the elements
of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 have been established. First, the appellant embraced
AAA, parted her legs, touched her breasts, inserted his hand inside the victims underwear, and touched
her vagina. Second, the appellant used his moral ascendancy over her daughter in order to perpetrate his
lascivious conduct. Finally, AAA was below 18 years of age at the time of the incident, based on her birth
certificate and on her mother’s testimony.
 People v. Matias
G.R. No. 186469
13 June 2012

FACTS:
Appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente and private complainant AAA were neighbors In the
evening of June 6, 2004, AAA, a minor, was on her way to the vegetable stall of a certain
"Manuela" to buy something when, all of a sudden, appellant pulled her towards a house that was
under construction. There, he forced her to lie on a bamboo bed, removed her shorts and
underwear, and inserted first his finger, and then his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened
to kill her if she should report the incident to anyone. When AAA arrived home, she narrated to
her mother and aunt what the appellant did to her. In defense, appellant claimed that in the
evening of the incident, he and his uncle, Romeo Matias, were doing construction work at the
house of his aunt. He was therefore surprised when two policemen arrested him at around 6:30
in the evening of even date and detained him at the Baler Police Station

The RTC convicted of the appellant for “rape” under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 and
gave credence to AAA’s testimony, which was straightforward and positive. On the other hand,
it found appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi as weak, taking into consideration that his aunt's
house where he was allegedly doing construction work was just a few meters away from the
vegetable stall, clearly making it possible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the
incident. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether it was correct to convict appellant of "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article Ill of RA
7610. (YES)

RULING:
Under Section 5 (b). Article Ill of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual
abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for
statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, if the victim is 12 years or
older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or
rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code.

In this case, the RTC, convicted appellant for "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article Ill of RA 7610
upon a finding that AAA was a minor below 12 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense. However, a punctilious scrutiny of the records shows that AAA was born on April 23,
1991, which would make her 13 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Thus,
appellant can be prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b). Article Ill of RA 7610 for sexual
abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d), the RTC
concluded that AAA was the "victim of sexual abuse labeled 'rape', considering the established
fact that there was sexual intercourse between him and AAA. Thus, appellant's conviction was
clearly under Sec. 5 (b), Article lll of RA 7610 or sexual abuse and not for rape under Article 266-
A of the RPC.
 People v. Abello
G.R. No. 151952
25 March 2009

FACTS:
The victim in these cases is twenty-one (21) year old AAA. She contracted polio when she
was seven (7) months old. She was not able to study on account of her difficulty in walking. Hence,
she could only read and write her name including that of her friends.

On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock (sic) in the early morning, AAA was sleeping in
their house in Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila along with her sister-in-law and nephew.
She was suddenly awakened when Abello … mashed her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around
3:00 a.m. Abello again mashed the breast of AAA practically under the same previous situation
while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because
of the light coming from outside which illuminated the house. Then on July 8, 1998, at around
2:00 a.m., Abello this time placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The latter got awaken
when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA exclaimed "Aray" forcing the accused
to hurriedly enter his room. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. The victim on the same date
reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Paragraph 2, Article 226-A,
Republic Act [No.] 8353
CA: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Violation of Section 5, Article III of
Republic Act [No.] 7610

ISSUE: Whether or not he is liable under Sec. 5 Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.

RULING:
No because in the present case, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing
that force or coercion attended Abello’s sexual abuse on AAA; the evidence reveals that she was
asleep at the time these crimes happened and only awoke when she felt her breasts being
fondled. More importantly, AAA cannot be considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
While the records show that the RTC, the CA and the investigating prosecutor who filed the
corresponding Informations, considered AAA’s polio as a physical disability that rendered her
incapable of normal function, no evidence was in fact presented showing the prosecution’s
compliance with the implementing rules. Specifically, the prosecution did not present any
evidence, testimonial or documentary, of any medical evaluation or medical finding from a
qualified physician, psychologist or psychiatrist attesting that AAA’s physical condition
rendered her incapable of fully taking care of herself or of protecting herself against sexual abuse.
 People v. Brioso
G.R. No. 209344
27 June 2016

FACTS:
Around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of May 31, 2001, the victim, AAA, who was then four (4) years old,4
was playing at the basketball court near their house located at Barangay Dimanayat, San Luis, Aurora. Accused-
appellant then approached and asked her to go with him to a nearby mango tree where he promised to give her
candies. When AAA agreed, the accused-appellant took her hand and led her to the mango tree which was near
his house.

Upon reaching the mango tree, the accused-appellant immediately removed AAA's short pants and
panty then proceeded to mash her private organ and inse1ied his finger into her vagina. Thereafter, the accused-
appellant made her lie down on the ground and inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant warned
AAA not to tell anybody about what he did to her, otherwise he will kill her. Stricken by fear, AAA went home
without telling anybody about her ordeal. Accused was charged with two offenses, the first of which is rape under
paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, and the second is rape as an act of sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the same law in relation to RA 7610.

The RTC gave full credence to the testimony of AAA holding that she testified on the rape that happened
toher in a straightforward and credible manner. The RTC also cited the findings of the medico-legal which
corroborated the testimony of AAA. The trial court did not give weight to accused-appellant's defense of alibi
because the place where he claims to be at the time of the rape is just a few minutes walk from the scene of the
crime, hence, it is not physically impossible for him to be at the said scene at the time of the commission of the
rape. The RTC further held that AAA positively identified accused-appellant as the one who raped her. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether in imposing penalty for the crime of rape by sexual assault RA 7610 shall apply. (YES)

RULING: In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of statutory rape and this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from these
findings.

The accused in the case at bar is charged with two offenses, the first of which is rape under paragraph
1 (d), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, and the second is rape as an act of sexual assault under paragraph
2, Article 266-A of the same law. Indeed, two instances of rape were proven at the trial. First, it was established
that the accused-appellant inserted his penis into the private part of his victim, AAA. Second, through the
testimony of AAA, it was proven that the accused-appellant also inserted his finger in AAA's private part.

With respect to the penalty for rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC,
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, AAA was four (4) years old. Section 5 (b),
Article III if RA 7610 states that, "Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be:
Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period." The abovequoted paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual
abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one - through coercion,
intimidation or influence - engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child.

In the present case, AAA was four years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Pursuant to
the above-quoted provision of law, accused-appellant was aptly prosecuted under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of
the RPC, as amended, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed
therein, which is prision mayor, considering that AAA was below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense, and considering further that accused-appellant's act of inserting his finger in AAA's
private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that
provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
 Torres v. People
G.R. No. 206637
18 January 2017

FACTS:
CCC, AAA's uncle, previously filed a complaint for malicious mischief against Torres, who allegedly
caused damage to CCC's multicab. AAA witnessed the alleged incident and was brought by CCC to testify
during the barangay conciliation. On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin,
Bohol waiting for the conciliation proceedings to begin when theychanced upon Torres who had just arrived
from fishing. CCCs wife, who was also with them at the barangay hall, persuaded Torres to attend the
conciliation proceedings to answer for his liability. Torres vehemently denied damaging CCC's multicab. In
the middle of the brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres damaged CCC's multicab and
accused him of stealing CCC's fish nets.
Torres told AAA not to pry in the affairs of adults. He warned AAA that he would whip him if he did
not stop. However, AAA refused to keep silent and continued to accuse Torres of damaging his uncle's
multicab. Infuriated with AAA's meddling, Torres whipped AAA on the neck using a wet t-shirt. Torres
continued to hit AAA causing the latter to fall down from the stairs. CCC came to his nephew's defense and
punched Torres. They engaged in a fistfight until they were separated by Barangay Captain Hermilando
Miano. Torres hit AAA with a wet t-shirt three (3) times. Based on the physical examination conducted by
Dr. Vicente Manalo, Jr., AAA sustained a contusion.
Torres testified that he had just arrived tired from fishing when CCC badgered him to answer for
the damage he had allegedly caused to CCC's multicab. AAA abruptly interrupted the heated discussion
between the two men. Angered by what AAA had done, Torres told AAA to stop making unfounded
accusations or he would be forced to help him. AAA called Torres bluff, which further provoked Torres.
Torres attempted to hit AAA but was thwarted by the timely intervention of CCC, who suddenly attacked
him. Torres claimed that CCC filed this case to preempt him from filing a complaint for physical injuries
against CCC. He also claimed that he tried to settle the matter with CCC and CCC's wife. However, the
parties failed to reach an agreement due to the unreasonable demands of the spouses.

ISSUE: Whether or not Torres is guilty under Other Acts of Child Abuse under Section 10, paragraph A of
Republic Act No. 7610 (YES)

RULING: Torres is liable under Other Acts of Child Abuse under Section 10, paragraph A of Republic Act
No. 7610. The court affirms petitioner's conviction. The act of whipping a child three (3) times in the neck
with a wet t-shirt constitutes child abuse. The court rejects petitioner's contention that his act of whipping
AAA is not child abuse but merely slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. The victim, AAA,
was a child when the incident occurred. Therefore, AAA is entitled to protection under Republic Act No.
7610, the primary purpose of which has been defined in Araneta v. People: Republic Act No. 7610 is a
measure geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival of the
most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate
under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development”.

Although it is true that not every instance of laying of hands on the child constitutes child abuse,
petitioner's intention to debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child can be
inferred from the manner in which he committed the act complained of. To note, petitioner also used a wet
t-shirt to whip the child not just once but three (3) times. Common sense and human experience would
suggest that hitting a sensitive body part, such as the neck with a wet t-shirt would cause an extreme
amount of pain, especially so if it was done several times. There is a also reason to believe that petitioner
used excessive force. Otherwise, AAA would not have fallen down the stairs at the third strike. AAA would
likewise not have sustained a contusion. If the only intention of petitioner were to discipline AAA and stop
him from interfering, he could have resorted to other less violent means. Instead of reprimanding AAA or
walking away, petitioner chose to hit the latter. The Petition is DENIED, the conviction of petitioner Van
Clifford Torres y Salera for violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 are AFFIRMED.
 Jabalde v. People
G.R. No. 195224
15 June 2016

FACTS:
Lin testified that in the year 2000, he was a Grade 1 pupil of Cawitan Elementary School.
At around 9:00 a.m. of December 13, 2000, he was playing “langit lupa” during recess with Ray
Ann, Marco, Nova and another classmate. During the course of their game, he touched the
shoulder of Nova, Jabalde’s daughter, causing the latter to fall down and wounding her head. He
then helped Nova to stand while one of his classmates called Jabalde. Afraid of what happened,
he ran towards a dilapidated building, which was near the place of the incident. Soon thereafter,
Jabalde arrived and slapped him on his neck and choked him. Lin was able to get out of her hold
when he removed her hands from his neck.

He immediately ran towards their house some 500 meters away from the school. He told
his mother Aileen about the incident. Thereafter, he was brought to Sta. Catalina Hospital for
treatment and a medical certificate was then issued to him.

Jabalde posits that in her case, the act of inflicting injuries, however minute they were, is
punishable under the RPC particularly Article 266(1)22 which defines slight physical injuries;
hence, she should be punished under the RPC and not under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No.
7610.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of Jabalde as constitutive of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A.
No. 7610.

RULING:
No. The records of the case do not show that Jabalde intended to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin as a human [Link] laying of the hands on Lin
was an offshoot of Jabalde’s emotional outrage after being informed that her daughter’s head was
punctured, and whom she thought was already dead. In fact, her vision got blurred and she
fainted. When she returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the board for about
five to ten [Link] would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution’s
witness herself testified that the abrasions suffered by Lin were just “mildly inflicted.” If Jabalde
indeed intended to abuse, maltreat and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-year-old boy
with heavy blows.

The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin is just a product of the instinctive
reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and danger as manifested only by mild
abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin, thus, negating any intention on inflicting physical
injuries. Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade
or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the
crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element of intent was not established with the
prescribed degree of proof required for a successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI
of R.A. No. 7610.
 Bongalon v. People
G.R. No. 169533
20 March 2013

FACTS:
The Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court RTC Legazpi
City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610. During trial, the Prosecution
showed that on May 1, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the
evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of
the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him
“sissy”; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like “strangers” and “animals”;
that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back of his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; that the petitioner then
went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come
out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando, father of Jayson later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City
Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional
Training and Teaching Hospital; that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting
that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1×1 cm.
contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left.

On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he
only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about
Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting
invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from
harming his daughters. To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not
hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters “Kimi” and why he had burned
Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a “sissy.” She insisted that it
was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described the petitioner as a
loving and protective father.

RTC: RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged.
CA: The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime charged (NO)

RULING: Petitioner’s acts did not constitute child abuse. Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the
RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on
the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-
quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson
had been intended to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been
done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern
for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan.
With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor
of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor. Not
every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of the
Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the
accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be
punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.

Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner
was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. WHEREFORE, we SET
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment: (a) finding petitioner George Bongalon
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266,
of the Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c) ordering
him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.
 Rosaldes v. People
G.R. No. 173988
8 October 2014

FACTS:
Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old boy and a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School located
in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, hurriedly entered his classroom. He accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher,
Petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, she asked Michael to
apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, she went to Michael and pinched him
on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael’s body hit a desk.
As a result, he lost consciousness. She proceeded to pick Michael up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down
on the floor. After the incident, she proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael, accompanied by two of
his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about the incident. His
mother and his aunt reported the incident to their Brgy. Captain. Michael was also examined by a doctor and the incident
was reported to the Police Station.

RTC: Criminally charged Rosaldes and convicted with child abuse in the RTC of Iloilo City.
CA: On appeal, the CA affirmed her conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosaldes shall be held liable with the crime of child abuse. (YES)

RULING: Rosaldes is guilty of the crime charged. First, the Court finds that the contention that she did not deliberately
inflict the physical injuries suffered by Michael to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or
degrade his dignity, is utterly bereft of merit. Credence cannot be given to her insistence that her acts came under the
doctrine of in loco parentis. Although as a school teacher, she could duly discipline Michael as her pupil, her infliction
of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered
at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction
of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority (i.e., in loco parentis).

Second, proof of the severe results of the her physical maltreatment of Michael was provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador,
the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about
1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the time the boy had sustained his injuries.
Hence, Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610 defines child abuse, thusly: (b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans intrinsic worth and dignity of child as human being;
3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

In the crime charged against the Rosaldes, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words
that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be
habitual. The CA concluded that the Rosaldes "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-
year old boy,” when she committed the acts stated above. On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain
experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school
altogether out of fear of Rosaldes, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust
again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Rosaldes was guilty of child abuse
by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael as a human being.

Third, it was also shown that Michael’s physical maltreatment by Rosaldes was neither her first nor only maltreatment
of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination that she had also experienced Rosaldes’
cruelty. She was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City for maltreatment of another child named Dariel Legayada.
Such previous incidents manifested that she had “a propensity for violence.” Last, Rosaldes’ claim that the information
charging her with child abuse was insufficient in form and substance deserves scant consideration. The information
explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged against her in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse
found in Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain her challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form
and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a
motion to quash on the ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not
charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
 People v. Chingh
G.R. No. 178323
16 March 2011

FACTS:
Evidence for the Prosecution- VVV was only 10 years old at the time of the incident. On 11 March 2004 at around
8:00 p.m., along with five other playmates, VVV proceeded to a store to buy food. While she was beckoning the
storekeeper, who was not then at her station, Armando approached and pulled her hand and threatened not to shout
for help or talk. Armando brought her to a vacant lot, about 400 meters from the store. While in a standing position
beside an unoccupied passenger jeepney, Armando mashed her breast and inserted his right hand index finger into
her private part. Despite VVV’s pleas for him to stop, Armando unzipped his pants, lifted VVV and rammed his phallus
inside her vagina, causing her to feel excruciating pain. The genital examination of VVV conducted Dr. Baluyot showed
a "fresh laceration with bleeding at 6 o’clock position" in the child’s hymen and "minimal bleeding from [said] hymen
laceration." Her impression was that there was a "clear evidence" of "penetrating trauma" which happened within 24
hours prior to the examination. The photograph of the lacerated genitalia of VVV strongly illustrated and buttressed Dr.
Baluyot’s medical report.
Evidence for the Defense - Armando denied that he raped VVV. Under his version, in the night of 11 March 2004, he
and his granddaughter were on their way to his cousin’s house. As it was already late, he told his granddaughter to just
go home ahead of him while he decided to go to market to buy food. While passing by a small alley on his way thereto,
he saw VVV along with some companions, peeling "dalanghita." VVV approached him and asked if she could go with
him to the market because she will buy "dalanghita" or sunkist. He refused her request and told VVV instead to go
home. He then proceeded towards the market, but before he could reach the market, he experienced rheumatic pains
that prompted him to return home. Upon arriving home, at about 8:30 o’clock in the evening, he watched television with
his wife and children. Shortly thereafter, three (3) barangay officials arrived, arrested him, and brought him to a police
precinct where he was informed of VVV’s accusation against him.
RTC: RTC found overwhelming evidence to convict Armando of Statutory Rape. CA: CA found Armando not only guilty
of Statutory Rape, but also of Rape Through Sexual Assault. The CA ratiocinated that coupled with the credible, direct,
and candid testimony of the victim, the elements of Statutory Rape and Rape Through Sexual Assault were indubitably
established by the prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused Armando is guilty of the two offenses. (YES)

RULING: The CA correctly found Armando guilty of the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A, of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353, or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997. From the Information, it is clear
that Armando was being charged with two offenses, Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A of the RPC, and rape
as an act of sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A. Armando was charged with having carnal knowledge of
VVV, who was under twelve years of age at the time, under paragraph 1 (d) of Article 266-A, and he was also charged
with committing an act of sexual assault by inserting his finger into the genital of VVV under the second paragraph of
Article 266-A. Indeed, two instances of rape were proven at the trial. First, it was established that Armando inserted his
penis into the private part of his victim, VVV. Second, through the testimony of VVV, it was proven that Armando also
inserted his finger in VVV’s private part.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV was ten (10) years old. This calls for the
application of R.A. No. 7610, or "The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act," which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in Section 5 (b), Article
III. Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but
also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but
also where one — through coercion, intimidation or influence — engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child. In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Pursuant
to the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty
prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years of age, and considering further
that Armando’s act of inserting his finger in VVV’s private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the
appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion
temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation
to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is
undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have
disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A. No.
8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or those "persons below
eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
 Malto v. People G.R. No. 164733 (21 September 2007)

FACTS: Petitioner John Malto, then 28, was a professor in Assumption College in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City.
On the other hand, private complainant AAA, then 17 years old, was his student in his Philosophy II class. Malto started
to show AAA amorous attention where he would call her on the phone and paged her romantic messages at least thrice
a day. Young, naïve and coming from a broken family, AAA was overwhelmed with the attention and slowly got attracted
to him until they had a “mutual understanding” and became sweethearts.
On November 19, 1997, Malto brought AAA to Queensland Lodge and once inside the motel room, kissed her at the
back of her neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her blouse. She resisted but he was too strong for
her. He stopped only when she got angry at him. Until on November 26, 1997, when Malto asked AAA to talk in private
and brought her to Queensland Lodge. Malto threatened AAA to end their relationship if she would not have sexual
intercourse with him. This made AAA to hesitantly agree out of pressure and fear. In July 1999, AAA ended her
relationship with Malto. She learned that he was either intimately involved with or was sexually harassing his students
in Assumption College and in other colleges where he taught. In particular, he was dismissed from the De La Salle
University-Aguinaldo for having sexual relations with a student and sexually harassing three other students. His
employment was also terminated by Assumption College for sexually harassing two of his students. It was then that
AAA realized that she was actually abused by Malto. Depressed and distressed, she confided all that happened
between her and petitioner to her mother, BBB. This prompted BBB to file administrative and criminal complaints
against Malto.
Malto offered denial and alibi. One of which was that AAA became his sweetheart when she was already 19 years old
and after he was dismissed from Assumption College. However, the trial court found the evidence for the prosecution
sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction for the violation of Article III, Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610. The CA affirmed
the conviction even if it is found that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610. Petitioner contends that the CA erred in sustaining his conviction although it found that he did
not rape AAA. For him, he should have been acquitted since there was no rape. He also claims that he and AAA were
sweethearts, and their sexual intercourse was consensual.
ISSUE/s:
1) Whether the offense stated in the information was wrongly stated; (YES)
2) Whether the real nature of offense is determined by facts alleged in information and not by designation; (YES)
3) Whether Malto violated Sec. 5(b) of Art. III of RA 7610; (YES)
4) Whether the consent of the child is immaterial in cases involving violations of Sec. 5 of RA 7610. (YES)
RULING:
1) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against
him. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstance. In this case, the designation of the offense in
the information against petitioner was changed from "violation of Section 5 (b), Article III" of RA 7610 to "violation of
Section 5 (a), Article III" thereof. Sec. 5(a) punishes acts of sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution where
the child is abused primarily for profit. On the one hand, Sec. 5(b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only
a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence,
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. The information against petitioner did not allege anything
pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. What it charged was that petitioner had carnal knowledge or
committed sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was induced and/or seduced by petitioner who
was her professor to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and AAA was a 17-year old minor.
2) Failure to designate the offense by statute does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. In this case, Malto can still be convicted of the offense based on the facts recited in
the information and duly proven during trial.
3) All the elements of the offense are satisfied in this case: a) first element, the accused commits the acts of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct. Malto’s acts were covered by the definitions of “Sexual Abuse” and “Acts of
Lascivious Conduct” under the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigations of Child Abuse Cases; b)
second element, the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. In this
case, Malto exercised his influence and moral ascendancy over AAA which allowed him to commit lascivious acts on
her and eventually engage her in sexual intercourse; and c) third element, the child, whether male or female, is below
18 years of age. Children are defined under the law as persons below 18 years of age or those over but are unable
to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination due
to physical or mental disability. As such, AAA was a child during the incidents.
4) The sweetheart defense is unacceptable for purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse
cases under RA 7610. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent
to sexual intercourse with another person as s/he can easily be the victim of fraud as s/he is incapable of full
understanding or knowing the nature or import of his/her actions. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or
committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes
the offense. It is a malum prohibitum.
 Flordeliz v. People
G.R. No. 186441
3 March 2010

FACTS:
Sometime in March 1995, ABC, the wife of petitioner and the mother of private complainants AAA
and BBB, left for Malaysia as an overseas worker. AAA and BBB were left under the care and custody of
petitioner, their father. In April 1995, while sleeping with BBB and AAA, who was then 11 years old,
petitioner touched AAA’s vagina, then played with it. AAA cried and told petitioner that it was painful. The
latter stopped but warned AAA not to tell anyone about it. Petitioner allegedly committed the acts against
AAA repeatedly.

Not long after, petitioner was convicted of homicide and imprisoned in Muntinlupa City. In 2001,
petitioner was released on parole. Petitioner allegedly started molesting BBB in May 2002. Whenever BBB
visits petitioner, the latter would insert his 2 fingers into her vagina. The same incident was committed again
on New Year’s Day, the day before before AAA’s birthday, and on All Saint’s Day. Notwithstanding the
repeated incidents of sexual abuse committed against her, BBB did not reveal her experiences to anybody
because of fear for her life and that of her mother.

AAA and BBB had the chance to reveal the abuse when their mother ABC arrived for a vacation.
AAA immediately told ABC what petitioner did to her. When confronted by ABC, BBB likewise admitted the
repeated abuses committed by petitioner. ABC reported the incidents to the NBI. After conducting medical
examinations on AAA and BBB, the attending physician remarked that there was a "disclosure of sexual
abuse and she noted the presence of hymenal notch in posterior portion of hymenal rim that may be due
to previous blunt force or penetrating trauma suggestive of abuse." With these findings, petitioner was
charged with the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness, committed against AAA, and nine (9) counts of Qualified
Rape through Sexual Assault, committed against BBB, before the RTC.

ISSUE/s: Whether petitioner be charged of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610 without stating in
the information.

RULING:
YES. Section 32, Article XIII of the IRR of RA 7610 defines lascivious conduct as follows: “The
intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.”

Based on the definition, petitioners act of touching AAA’s vagina and playing with it obviously
amounted to lascivious conduct. Considering that the act was committed on a child less than twelve years
old and through intimidation, it is beyond cavil that petitioner is guilty under the aforesaid laws.

The Court is aware that the Information specifically charged petitioner with Acts of Lasciviousness
under the RPC, without stating therein that it was in relation to R.A. No. 7610. However, the failure to
designate the offense by statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous
specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the
facts constituting the crime charged. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the information or by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but
by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.

In this case, the body of the Information contains an averment of the acts alleged to have been
committed by petitioner and unmistakably describes acts punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610. The resolution of the investigating prosecutor, which formed the basis of the Information, a copy
of which is attached thereto, stated that petitioner is the victim’s biological father. There was, therefore,
substantial compliance with the mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against
him.
 People v. Dahilig
G.R. No. 187083
13 June 2011

FACTS:
AAA, 16 years old and a helper, was sleeping in her quarters when the accused made sexual
advances on her. She shouted for help from her co-helper but to no avail because the latter was sound
asleep. Eventually, the accused succeeded to undress her. Then, he forced his penis into her vagina which
caused her pain and then returned to his quarters when he was done. The accused left their employer's
house the following day when AAA confronted him. AAA then informed her employer about the incident.
Their employer immediately assisted her in filing a case against the accused which caused his arrest The
accused offered to marry AAA but the latter refused. The medico-legal examination on AAA disclosed that
there was a healing laceration in her hymen although no spermatozoa was found.

The accused denied the allegations and contended that the sexual congress that transpired
between them was consensual as she was then his girlfriend. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape as what he laid before the court for its consideration was a mere
self-serving claim of their relationship. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision but clarified that the crime
charged should have been "Child Abuse" as defined and penalized in Sec. 5 (b) of RA No. 7610, since the
complainant was a minor at the time of the commission of the offense.

ISSUE/s: Whether the crime committed was Rape (Violation of Art. 266-A par. 1 in relation to Art. 266-B,
par. 1 of the RPC) or Child Abuse as defined and penalized by Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.

RULING:
As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the elements of both crimes
(Rape and Child Abuse) are present in this case. Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 provides that if the victim of sexual
abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory
rape under Art. 266-A(1)(d) of the RPC and penalized with reclusión perpetua. On the other hand, if the
victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of
RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the RPC. However, the offender cannot be
accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A
person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be
complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on
complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an
offense penalized by a special law.

Accordingly, the accused can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be convicted
therefor. Considering, however, that the information correctly charged the accused with rape in violation of
Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, par. 1 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and that
he was convicted therefor, the CA should have merely affirmed the conviction.
 Garingarao v. People
G.R. No. 192760
20 July 2011

FACTS:
AAA, 16 years of age, was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her father BBB and
mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. AAA was admitted at the hospital for further observation.
The next day, her father and mother left the hospital to process AAA’s Medicare papers and to attend to
their store, respectively, leaving AAA alone in her room. When her father returned to the hospital, AAA told
him that she wanted to go home. The doctor allowed them due to AAA’s insistence but instructed her that
she should continue her medications. At home, AAA told her parents that Garingarao sexually abused her.
They went back to the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They inquired from the nurses’
station and learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that day.

An Information was filed against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610.
During the trial, AAA testified that, Garingarao, entered her room to check her medications and if she was
still experiencing pains. Garingarao lifted AAA’s bra and touched her left breast and insisted that he was
only examining her. Garingarao also slid his finger inside AAA’s private part and only stopped when he saw
that AAA really had her monthly period.

In his defense, the accused testified that he went inside AAA’s room to administer her medicines
and check her vital signs. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case was motivated by the argument he
had with AAA’s father about the administering of medicines. He was supported by the testimony of the
nursing aide, Tamayo. Garingarao further alleged that, assuming the charges were correct, there was only
one incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as such, he should have been convicted only of acts of
lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610. The RTC found Garingarao guilty as charged and gave
credence to the testimony of AAA over Garingarao’s denial, which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the single incident of act of lasciviousness would suffice to hold the accused liable under
RA 7610.

RULING:
YES. It is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only [Link] 3 (b) of
RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. The lone testimony of the offended party, if
credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only
once is enough to hold the accused liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610.
 Caballo v. People
G.R. No. 198732
10 June 2013

FACTS:
An Information was filed charging Caballo with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA
7610. AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old, in her uncle’s place in Surigao City.
Her uncle was a choreographer and Caballo was one of his dancers. During that time, AAA was
a sophomore college student at the University of San Carlos and resided at a boarding house in
Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went to Cebu City to attend the Sinulog Festival and
there, visited AAA. After spending time together, they eventually became sweethearts.9
Sometime during the third week of March 1998, AAA went home to Surigao City and stayed with
her uncle. In the last week of March of the same year, Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual
intercourse with him. This was followed by several more of the same in April 1998, in the first and
second weeks of May 1998, on August 31, 1998, and in November 1998, all of which happened
in Surigao City, except the one in August which occurred in Cebu.10 In June 1998, AAA became
pregnant and later gave birth on March 8, 1999.

During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo was only able to induce AAA to lose
her virginity due to promises of marriage and his assurance that he would not get her pregnant
due to the use of the “withdrawal method.” Moreover, it claimed that Caballo was shocked upon
hearing the news of AAA’s pregnancy and consequently, advised her to have an abortion. She
heeded Caballo’s advice; however, her efforts were unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution
averred that when AAA’s mother confronted Caballo to find out what his plans were for AAA, he
assured her that he would marry her daughter.

Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their first sexual intercourse, AAA
was no longer a virgin as he found it easy to penetrate her and that there was no bleeding. He
also maintained that AAA had (3) three boyfriends prior to him. Further, he posited that he and
AAA were sweethearts who lived-in together, for one (1) week in a certain Litang Hotel and
another week in the residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually, they broke up due to the intervention
of AAA’s parents. At a certain time, AAA’s mother even told Caballo that he was not deserving of
AAA because he was poor. Lastly, he alleged that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but
was always rejected because she was still studying.

The RTC found Caballo guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the accused coerce or influence the victim into consummating sexual acts.

RULING: Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate, or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following: x x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim
 is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez), the elements of the foregoing

offense are the following:(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; (b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

In this case, the existence of the first and third elements remains undisputed. Records
disclose that Caballo had succeeded in repeatedly having sexual intercourse with AAA who,
during all those instances, was still a minor. Thus, the only bone of contention lies in the presence
of the second element. On this note, the defense submits that AAA could not be considered as a
“child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse” since the incidents to do not point to any
form of “coercion” or “influence” on Caballo’s part.

In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s actuations may be classified
as “coercion” and “influence” within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610: First, the most
crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at the time of
the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a child under the law. In this respect, AAA
was not capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions and in consequence,
remained vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case. Second, coupled with
AAA’s minority is Caballo’s seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23 years old at the time
of the commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The age
disparity between an adult and a minor placed Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to
enable him to force his will upon the latter. Third, Caballo’s actions effectively constitute overt acts
of coercion and influence. Records reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for
her, and even promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would not get
pregnant since he would be using the “withdrawal method” for safety. Irrefragably, these were
meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with
him, with which he succeeded. Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties’ first sexual encounter,
it is observed that the brash and unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room
and pressed on her to have sex with him, effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position
of duress. An important factor is that AAA refused Caballo’s incipient advances and in fact, asked
him to leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a
situation deprived of the benefit of clear thought and choice. In any case, the Court observes that
any other choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA ‘s minority as above
discussed.

Hence, considering that Caballo’s acts constitute “coercion” and “influence” within the
context of the law, and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with
Caballo due to the same, she is deemed as a “child exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse”; as such, the second element of the subject offense exists. Finding all elements to be
present, the Court hereby sustains Caballo’s conviction for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of
RA 7610.
 7. R.A. No 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women And Their Children Act Of 2004)
PALMARES, ROMERO, GARCIA, MIGUEL, ILUSTRE

DEL SOCCORO VS VAN WILSEM

FACTS:
Petitioner Del Socorro and respondent Van Wilsem got married in Holland.
They had a son named Rodrigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, they
ended their marriage by obtaining a divorce decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.
Thereafter, petitioner and her son returned to live in the Philippines. According to petitioner,
respondent Van Wilsem promised to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to their son.
Later, respondent remarried a Filipina and resided also in Cebu where the petitioner
[Link] filed a complaint
against respondent for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter's unjust refusal to support their
minor child. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien.

ISSUES:
1. Whether a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child
2. Whether the act of respondent Van Wilsem in denying support to his child,
if proven, has already prescribed

RULING:

1. The Court held in the affirmative. Respondent Van Wilsem, a foreigner, can
be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child as the crime is committed in the Philippines. He is
residing in Cebu thus Philippine courts have jurisdiction.

He may be held liable under section 5 (e) (2) and (i):

Section 5 (e) (2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the
woman's children insufficient financial support

[Link] Court held in the negative. The obligation to give support does not
prescribe. The act of respondent Van Wilsem in denying support to his child
under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,which
started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime
charged has clearly not prescribed.
Dela Fuente vs Dela Fuente

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo met in UST and became sweethearts. Later,
they got married. However, Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life.
Rodolfo was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria Teresa, and would even skip work at his
family's printing press to stalk her. Rodolfo's
jealousy was so severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who was staying
at their house because he suspected his cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover. Rodolfo also
treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have sex 4 or 5 times a day. At times, Rodolfo
would fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch break, just so they could have sex.
Rodolfo also suggested that they invite a third person with them while having sex, or for Maria
Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's presence. Rodolfo's suggestions made Maria
Teresa feel molested and maltreated. Whenever Maria Teresa refused Rodolfo's advances or
suggestions, he would get angry and they would quarrel.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition

for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

RULING:

The Court held in the affirmative. Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by
intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing
acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what
marriage and partnership entail.

Respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards petitioner, which show his need to intimidate
and dominate her, is a classic case of coercive control. His acts reveal a pattern of behavior meant
to dominate his wife through different tactics such as isolating his through wife from her family
and friends, physical violence, stalking and intimidation. This is coercive control, a form of
psychological violence as provided by R.A. No. 9262.
 8. R.A. No 9775 (Anti-Child Pornography Act Of 2009)
BOQUIREN, GUTIERREZ
9. R.A. No 8049, as amended by RA 11053 (Anti-Hazing Act)
PURUGGANAN
10. R.A. No. 6539, as amended by RA Nos. 7659 and RA 10883 (AntiCarnapping Law 2017)
AMILHAMJA, STA. ANA, DOMINGO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRILE DONIO y UNTALAN

G.R. No. 212815, March 1, 2017
FACTS: At 2:30 in the morning, a speeding tricycle abruptly stopped a few meters from the checkpoint and caught the attention
of the police officers. SP04 Taberdo and two others approached the vehicle. The driver, later identified as Donio, was noticeably
agitated while repeatedly kicking the starter of the tricycle. When asked for his identity, he introduced himself as Raul La yug and
then handed to SP04 Taberdo a temporary license bearing the said name. The police officers asked the driver and his companions,
co-accused Paulino and Ryan, to bring the vehicle, a Honda TMX 155 tricycle, to the checkpoint when they failed to produce its
certificate of registration and the official receipt.
Upon visual search of the vehicle, they discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo inside. They seized the tricycle and the bolo,
and then brought the three to the police station. At 9 o'clock in the morning, Donio asked permission to leave in order to get the
registration papers. The officers allowed him, however, he did not return.
Meanwhile, around 6:30 in the morning of the same date, Rodrigo Layug was searching for his brother Raul, the victim, who has
not returned home since last night. Raul was the driver of Rodrigo's tricycle. Rodrigo met with his tricycle driver cousin fr om
Mawaque to ask him if he saw his brother. His cousin accompanied him to Barangay Madapdap where they found the remains of
Raul. Dr. Dizon conducted the post-mortem examination of Raul's body and determined that he sustained stab wounds caused by
a sharp instrument. The RTC convicted Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide. The trial court ruled that the prosecution
established all the elements of the crime. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable doubt that Donio is guilty of the crime of
carnapping with homicide.

RULING:
After a judicious review of the records and the submissions of the parties, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse Doni o' s
conviction.
Records show that all the elements of camapping in the instant case are present and proven during the trial.
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.
The tricycle was definitely ascertained to belong to Rodrigo, as evidenced by a Deed of Conditional Sale in his favor. Donio was
found driving the vehicle in the early morning of November 26, 2003, the same day Rodrigo was looking for his missing brother
Raul. Also, SP04 Taberdo positively identified Donio as the driver he flagged down at the checkpoint in his testimony.

Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in the instant case, We now discuss the argument that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are insufficient to convict Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide.
Defendant alleges that while it is true that criminal conviction may be predicated on a series of circumstantial evidence, the same
must be convincing, plausible and credible. It cannot be discounted that SP04 Taberdo testified only on the circumstances after the
alleged carnapping. He failed to establish his alleged participation prior to or during the actual taking of the vehicle.
Such contention fails scrutiny. The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused can
no longer be proved by any other evidence. Circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence, if sufficient, can replace direct
evidence as provided by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds that the confluence of the following pieces of circumstantial evidence,
consistent with one another, establishes Donio's guilt beyond reasonable doubt:

First, Donio was driving the tricycle when he, Paulino and Ryan were accosted during a checkpoint at the junction of the MacArthur
Highway by elements of the Concepcion Police Station at around 2:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003;

Second, his possession of the vehicle was not fully explained as he failed to produce its registration papers;

Third, he was in possession of the victim's temporary license. He even presented it and introduced himself as Raul to the police;

Fourth, a bloodstained mini jungle bolo was found inside the tricycle;

Fifth, Rodrigo ascertained that Raul was the driver of his tricycle, and that he was looking for him on the same day that Donio and
the others were flagged down;
Sixth, Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the evening on November 25, 2003 when he passed by at the Mawaque
Terminal at the comer of MacArthur Highway and Mawaque Road.

Seventh, the Bantay Bayan of Madapdap Resettlement found Raul's body at around 6:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003 at
a vacant lot towards the road to Sta. Lucia Resettlement comer Barangay Dapdap.

Eighth, Raul sustained multiple stab wounds caused by a sharp instrument as depicted in the post-mortem examination sketch by
Dr. Dizon and reflected in the Certificate of Death.

Ninth, Donio was subsequently apprehended and SP04 Taberdo positively identified him as the driver they flagged down at the
checkpoint. Likewise, the victim's lifeless body was found sprawled with multiple stab wounds and was noted in a state of rigor
mortis.

From the foregoing, it was established that Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the evening on November 25, 2003,
and that his body was discovered at 6:30 in the morning the next day. Considering the condition of the body upon discovery, he
could have been killed between 10:00 in the evening and 3:30 in the morning on the next day. Donio and his companions were
hailed at the checkpoint at around 2:30 in the morning aboard the missing tricycle. Taking into account the distance of the Mawaque
Terminal area or of the vacant lot near Barangay Dapdap from the junction of the MacArthur Highway in Concepcion, Tarlac and
the time they were hailed at the checkpoint, it can be logically concluded that Donio and the others were in contact with Raul during
the approximate period of the latter's time of death. Also, it was during that period that they gained possession of the vehicle.

Thus, the only rational conclusion that can be drawn from the totality of the foregoing facts and circumstances is that Donio and
his companions, to the exclusion of others, are guilty of carnapping the tricycle and of killing Raul in the course thereof.
 MEL DIMAT v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181184 January 25, 2012
FACTS:
Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a Nissan Safari. Officers of the Traffic Management
Group spotted the Nissan Safari bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the
vehicle, they found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp
Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.

Mantequilla affirmed that he owned the vehicle. The vehicle was carnapped at a parking area. He reported
the carnapping to the TMG. Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the vehicle in
good faith and for value and later sold it to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he
sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they
were not actually the same vehicle.

RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing [Link] affirmed but modified the penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that
was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.

HELD: Yes. The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who
took no part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes,
or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal
he makes to gain for himself or for another.

Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law thus requiring no proof of criminal intent. Dimat knew that the
Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. The vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had
no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to produce new documents confirmed to Dimat that the
Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made
no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no
moment since she did not stand accused in the case.
 11. PD 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law)
DAYTIA

Estrella v. People | G.R. NO. 212942 | June 17, 2020

FACTS: PAL is an importer of the fast fluid system, Skydrol Hydraulic Fluid (Skydrol), from its manufacturer Solutia,
Inc. (Solutia) based in the United States. According to PAL, Skydrol is not available in the local market per Solutia's
letter/certification. In 1998, PAL's Maintenance and Engineering Management Information noticed that its acquisition
and use of Skydrol remained unusually high notwithstanding the downsizing of its operations due to financial crisis.

Upon investigation, Yao found that Aerojam Supply and Trading (Aerojam), a sole proprietorship owned by petitioner
and his wife, Melinda, was selling five gallons of Skydrol to Air Philippines at a low price. Philippine National Police
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) conducted a surveillance operation. They received an
information that the subject item was to be delivered in the premises of the Air Philippines on board a jeep.

Thus, on the day of the delivery, petitioner alighted a jeep and when he was about to deliver the pails, he was
apprehended. When asked to present documents for the merchandise he was carrying, petitioner could not produce
any. He pointed to a certain Jupel as having custody of the documents, but the latter did not appear.

Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that he is a salesman who sells aircraft spare parts, lubricants, accessories, and
chemicals related to aviation. He also asserted that PAL was not the only airline using Skydrol in the country considering
that other airlines are also using the same hydraulic fluid. Accordingly, he got his supply of Skydrol from International
Business Aviation, Inc. (IBAI) but the company had already closed. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals found him guilty of violating P.D. 1612.

ISSUE: Whether the elements of the crime of Fencing were established by the prosecution.

RULING: YES, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the RTC and CA. First, the occurrence of theft was duly
established by the prosecution. Yao categorically testified that despite the downsizing of PAL's operation in 1998 or
reduction of Aircraft, there was still unusual upward movement of PAL's Skydrol consumption. Thus, it was concluded
that someone was stealing Skydrol from PAL which prompted its management to conduct an investigation and seek
the assistance of the PNP-CIDG.

Second, the petitioner was caught in possession and in the process of disposing pails of Skydrol to Air Philippines.
Petitioner also failed to produce Jupel, the alleged source, and the legal documents supporting the ownership of the
confiscated pails of Skydrol which clearly suggest that the pails of fluid proceed from the crime of theft. In fact, the
manufacturer/supplier of Skydrol itself certified that it never authorized Aerojam to sell the subject hydraulic fluids and
these were sold only to PAL and not to any other airline.

Third, for failing to prove ownership of the Skydrol confiscated from him, petitioner should have known that the three
Skydrol pails were derived from an illegal source. Petitioner failed to present his alleged supplier, a certain "Jupel" and
the pertinent documents proving that their transaction was legal. As to the last element of Fencing, the Court rules that
the RTC and the CA committed no error in finding the petitioner's intent to gain. There is no question that the pails of
Skydrol Hydraulic Fluid were found in possession of petitioner.

It must be noted that Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of Fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the
subject of robbery or theft. Thus, in the case, it is incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this presumption by sufficient
and convincing evidence, but he failed to do so. All that petitioner could offer, by way of rebuttal, was a mere denial
and his incredible defense of frame-up. Since the value of the three pails of Skydrol is P27,000.00 the penalty to be
imposed is prision mayor in its maximum period which penalty ranges from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years. This was based on Section 3 (a) of PD 1612, the penalty for Fencing is prision mayor in its maximum period
if the value of the property exceeds P22,000.00, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00.
People v. De Guzman | G.R. NO. 77368 | October 5, 1993
FACTS: A robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where
various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos were taken. The pieces
of jewelry were found in the possession of Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara
in Antipolo, Rizal.

An information for robbery was instituted against the respondents in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Subsequently, an information for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.

Thereafter, the respondents filed a motion to quash on the ground that the Quezon City court
does not have jurisdiction as the information should have been filed in Antipolo, Rizal where the
pieces of jewelry were found. This was granted by the Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether the crime of "fencing" is a continuing offense that could allow the filing of an
information therefore in the place where the robbery or theft is committed and not necessarily
where the property unlawfully taken is found to have later been acquired.

RULING: NO, fencing is not a continuing offense. True, the object property in fencing must have
been previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or theft
occurs is inconsequential. The venue of the crime of fencing is the place where the stolen property
is found.
 Ong v. People | G.R. NO. 190475 | April 10, 2013
FACTS: Azajar was the owner of forty-four (44) Model T494 1100 x 20 x 14 ply Firestone truck tires. He
acquired the same for the total amount of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation. After
Azajar sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.

On February 17, 1995, Azajar learned from his caretaker, Jose Cabal, that all thirty-eight (38) truck tires
were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Azajar, together with caretaker
Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio. Azajar canvassed from
numerous business establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires.

Then, Azajar chanced upon Jong's Marketing. Azajar inquired if Ong was selling any Model T494 1100 x
20 x 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Ong brought out a tire fitting the
description, which Azajar recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk
marking and the serial number thereon. Azajar asked Ong if he had any more of such tires in stock, which
was again answered in the affirmative. Azajar reported this.

A buy bust operation was conducted on the same day. A poseur buyer, named Tito Atienza, inquired thus,
Ong instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which was located beside
his store. After the truck tires were brought in, Azajar entered the store, inspected them and found that they
were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers. The buy bust team was
able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza.

For his defense, Ong alleged that he had been engaged in the business of buying and selling tires for
twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires. Ong alleged
that he bought all the tires for ₱45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995
and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).

The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
P.D. 1612.

ISSUE: Whether appellant was guilty of fencing.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court found all the elements present. First, it is undisputed that a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed.

For the second element, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he
never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession.

For the third element, the Court noted that Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past
twenty-four (24) years, ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown
seller. The Court noted that Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station
for some used tires he wanted to resell before but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty
as a diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.

The prosecution was also able to prove Gold Link and its address were fictitious.

Lastly, for the last element, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust
operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
 People v. Dimat | G.R. NO. 181184 | January 25, 2012
FACTS: Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari. On March 7,
2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the Nissan
Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. They brought it
to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered
owner, Jose Mantequilla. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Galleria’s
parking area and such was reported to the TMG.

For his defense, Dimat alleged that he bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith and for value
from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a different engine number and chassis number on the deed
of sale. Dimat then later sold the vehicle to Sonia. Lastly, Dimat alleged that although the Nissan
Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers took into custody had the same
plate number, they were not actually the same vehicle.

Both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals found Dimat guilty of beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of P.D. 1612

ISSUES: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to
Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court found that Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari
Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to
have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means
that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis.

Second, Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But P.D. 1612 is a special law
and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal
intent.

The Supreme Court also noted that Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino
where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly
showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised
to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino
did not fulfill this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the documents should
not prejudice him in any way.

Based on the above, the Court found that Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not
properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and
official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped,
Tolentino had no documents to show. Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to
produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an
illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check
the papers covering her purchase.
 Lim v. People | G.R. NO. 211977 | October 12, 2016
FACTS: Prosecution: SPO4 Santillana testified that he was an investigator of the theft and
robbery section of Police Precinct No. 3, Talomo, Davao City when Engr. Herminio Gulmatico
went to his office to seek assistance in the recovery of a Komatsu Road Grader bearing Engine
Serial Number 6D951-55845 and Chassis No. GD-51R-100[0]49. SPO4 Santillana was informed
of where it can be found and thus, a search warrant was applied and granted for. The search
warrant was served on Basco Metal Supply where the aforedescribed heavy equipment was
found.

Defense: Accused Mariano Lim testified that he bought the heavy equipment from Petronilo
Banosing for P400,000.00. Banosing showed him a Certificate of Ownership that stated that the
heavy equipment is his. Lim also testified that he even checked with the DPWH in Manila and
found out that the subject heavy equipment is not included in the inventory of equipment of the
DPWH. The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals found Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of fencing under PD 1612.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the petitioner's conviction.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court acquitted Lim. The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution
failed to establish that theft had been committed. In the present case, Engr. Gulmatico failed to
establish his or his office's ownership over the subject grader. Nowhere in the Memorandum
Receipt submitted by the prosecution does it state that the subject grader is owned by the DPWH.
The portions which should show the date acquired, property number, classification number, and
unit value for the grader were left blank.

Being the government agency in charge of construction projects, the DPWH is expected to have
a database of all equipment and materials it uses for easy reference of its employees. The
prosecution's failure to present a sufficient proof of ownership of the grader despite the many
opportunities it had to do so places doubt on the DPWH's claim of ownership. Thus, it cannot be
said that the first element of fencing had been established.

Even assuming that theft had been committed, the third element of fencing is absent in this case.
On the presumption that fencing had been committed as provided by Sec. 5 of PD 1612, the
Supreme Court ruled that petitioner was able to overcome the same by presenting the Affidavit of
Ownership which he secured from Petronilo Banosing.

The Supreme Court also ruled that the lower courts erred in ruling that petitioner should have first
secured a clearance or a permit from the police, in compliance with Sec. 6 of PD 1612. The
Supreme Court held that such provision does not apply in the present case because the clearance
is only required if several conditions are met: first, that the person, store, establishment or entity
is in the business of buying and selling of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value;
second, that such thing of value was obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof; and
third, that such thing of value is to be offered for sale to the public.
 Tan V. People | G.R. NO. 134298 | August 26, 1999
FACTS: Manuelito Mendez, a former employee of Bueno Metal Industries, was arrested for
stealing product materials from the company warehouse. Mendez admitted the accusation and
pointed to Ramon Tan as the one who bought the stolen items. Mendez was forgiven by
complainant but Tan was charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. After trial, Tan was
convicted of the crime charged, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the same.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against
petitioner.

RULING: NO. The Court emphasized that the loss was never reported to the police. And as the
complainant reported no loss, it cannot be held for certain that the crime of theft or robbery was
committed. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent. Further, there was no showing
at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold
to him. Consequently, the prosecution, having failed to establish the essential elements of fencing,
petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.

NOTE: It must be noted that it was not really the absence of report which caused the acquittal of
the accused. Instead, it was because the the Supreme Court cannot hold for certain Mendez
committed the crime. In other words, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
establishing all the elements charged. Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt
the existence of the essential elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense.
 12. R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers & Overseas Filipino Act of 1995)
DE JESUS, CARL ANGELO S.

People vs. Chua, GR No. 184058, March 10, 2010

FACTS
On September 2002, both Melissa Chua and Josie Campos were indicted with large scale illegal
recruitment. She promised to Erik Tan a job employment as a factory worker. Claiming having
worked as a temporary cashier from January to October, 2002 at the office of Golden Gate, owned
by one Marilyn Calueng, she maintained that Golden Gate was a licensed recruitment agency and
that Josie, who is her godmother, was an agent. She alleged that she received P8000 from Tan,
and Marilyn, not King and remitted the same to Calueng.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of illegal recruitment?

Held:
Yes.
According to the law, an illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against
three or more persons individually or as a group. The elements of large scale illegal recruitment
are: (1) the accused undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice
under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license or the authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the accused committed such
illegal activity against three or more persons individually or as a group.
In this case, it is clear that recruitment activities are committed by a nonlicensee or a non-holder of
contracts since per the certification from the POEA, Golden Gate's license only expired on February
23, 2002 and it was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on April 2, 2002. Therefore, the
accused is guilty of illegal recruitment committed in large scale.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF- APPELLEE, VS. ANNA ESPIRITU AND ELLEN
MABBORANG ACCUSED, ISABEL RIOS Y CATAGBUI, ACCUSED
GR 226140 February 26, 2020

Facts:
Sometime during July 2007, at Wardley Building, San Juan Street, Pasay City and within the
jurisdiction of the honorable court, Anna Espiritu and Ellen Mabborang, Isabel Rios by means of
fraudulent acts and pretenses executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally defraud and deceive private complainant
Elmer De Mata. The accused misrepresented themselves as having the capability to contract, enlist
and transport or actually deploy Filipino workers to Taiwan and Singapore. The complainant paid
the amount of P90,000.00 as payment for de Mata’s application and for the processing fee.
The accused failed and continued to fail to deploy the private complainant. As a result, the De Mata
demanded the return of his payment of P90,000. Despite repeated demands, the accused failed
and refused to return the same.

Issue:
Whether the accused was guilty of Illegal Recruitment?

Held:
Yes.
According to Section 6(m) of RA 8042, Illegal Recruitment is committed through the failure of any
person (Whether or not a holder of license or authority) to reimburse documentation and processing
expenses incurred by the worker when the deployment did not occur without the worker’s fault.
This provision also defines Syndicated Illegal Recruitment as being committed by three or more
persons and Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale as being committed against three or more persons.

The Court affirms Rios' conviction for Large Scale Illegal Recruitment under Section 6(m) of RA
8042 committed against Tiglao, Dacillo, Milanes, Papio and Custodio. As regards the offense
purportedly committed by Rios against complainants De Mata, Arevalo and Agcaoili, the Court
holds that Rios' guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Carmen Ritualo Y Ramos v People GR 178337, June 25, 2009

Facts:

On May 1, 2000 in the City of Las Pinas, Biacora went to the house of Ritualo to inquire if she could
help him secure an overseas employment in Australia. Petitioner affirmed that Biacora could leave
for Australia and will give him P160,000. Several dates were set for the departure of Biacora but
none pushed through. He demanded the return of his money but the petitioner failed and refused.
The accused falsely represented himself to have the capacity and power to contract, enlist and
recruit workers for employment abroad. He wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously collected for a fee,
recruited and promised a job placement abroad Felix Biacora without securing the required license
or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.

Issue:

Is the accused guilty of Simple Illegal Recruitment?

Held:

Yes
According to Section 6 of RA 8042, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for. employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two essential elements concur:
(1) that the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers, and
(2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement"
defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices under Art 34
Since the accused is both guilty on the 2 elements as mentioned. The SC held that the accused is
guilty of simple Illegal Recruitment.
 13. R.A. No. 8484 (Access Device Regulation Act of 1998)

Soledad vs. People, GR No. 184274, February 23, 2011

DOCTRINE:

Article 523 of the Civil Code defines "possession” as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a
right."

The acquisition of possession involves two elements: (1) the corpus or the material holding of the
thing, and (2) the animus possidendi or the intent to possess it. Animus possidendi is a state of
mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each
case. It may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the
surrounding circumstances.

In this particular case, petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the
intent to possess.

FACTS:

Sometime in June 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu received a call on his mobile phone
from a certain "Tess" or "Juliet Villar" (later identified as Rochelle Bagaporo), a credit card agent,
who offered a Citi financing loan assistance at a low interest rate. Enticed by the offer, private
complainant invited Rochelle Bagaporo to go to his office in Quezon City. While in his office,
Rochelle Bagaporo indorsed private complainant to her immediate boss, a certain "Arthur" [later
identified as petitioner]. In their telephone conversation, [petitioner] told private complainant to
submit documents to a certain "Carlo" (later identified as Ronald Gobenchiong). Private
complainant submitted various documents, such as his Globe handy phone original platinum gold
card, identification cards and statements of accounts. Subsequently, private complainant followed
up his loan status but he failed to get in touch with either [petitioner] or Ronald Gobenchiong.

During the first week of August 2004, private complainant received his Globe handy phone
statement of account wherein he was charged for 2 mobile phone numbers which were not his.
Upon verification with the phone company, private complainant learned that he had additional 5
mobile numbers in his name, and the application for said cellular phone lines bore the picture of
[petitioner] and his forged signature. Private complainant also checked with credit card companies
and learned that his Citibank Credit Card database information was altered and he had a credit
card application with Metrobank.

Thereafter, private complainant and Metrobank’s junior assistant manager Devilleres lodged a
complaint with the NBI which conducted an entrapment operation.

During the entrapment operation, NBI Special Investigator Arteche posed as the delivery boy of
the Metrobank credit card. Upon reaching the address written of the delivery receipt, Arteche
asked for Henry Yu. Petitioner responded that he was Henry Yu and presented 2 IDs which bore
the name and signature of private complainant, while the picture showed the face of the petitioner.
Petitioner signed the delivery receipt. Thereupon, Arteche introduced himself as an NBI operative
and apprehended petitioner.

Petitioner was thus charged with Violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for "possessing a
counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently applied for."

RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed
petitioner’s conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 (possessing a
counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently applied for).

RULING:

YES. The petitioner was not legally in “possession” of the subject credit card.

The trial court convicted petitioner of possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for,
penalized by R.A. No. 8484. The law, however, does not define the word "possession." Thus, we
use the term as defined in Article 523 of the Civil Code, that is, "possession is the holding of a
thing or the enjoyment of a right." The acquisition of possession involves two elements: the corpus
or the material holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or the intent to possess it.

In this case, prior to the commission of the crime, petitioner fraudulently obtained from private
complainant various documents showing the latter’s identity. He, thereafter, obtained cellular
phones using private complainant’s identity. Undaunted, he fraudulently applied for a credit card
under the name and personal circumstances of private complainant. Upon the delivery of the
credit card applied for, the "messenger" (an NBI agent) required two valid identification cards.
Petitioner thus showed two identification cards with his picture on them, but bearing the name
and forged signature of private complainant. As evidence of the receipt of the envelope delivered,
petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt shown by the messenger, indicating therein that
the content of the envelope was the Metrobank credit card.

Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent to possess.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the credit card never came into his possession because it
was only delivered to him, the above narration shows that he, in fact, did an active part in acquiring
possession by presenting the identification cards purportedly showing his identity as Henry Yu.
Certainly, he had the intention to possess the same. Had he not actively participated, the envelope
would not have been given to him. Moreover, his signature on the acknowledgment receipt
indicates that there was delivery and that possession was transferred to him as the recipient.
Undoubtedly, petitioner knew that the envelope contained the Metrobank credit card, as clearly
indicated in the acknowledgment receipt, coupled with the fact that he applied for it using the
identity of private complainant.
 14. R.A. No. 10173 (Data Privacy Act Of 2012)
NG, SEARES
15. R.A. No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act Of 2012)
MANALO, SUMAGPANG, TABUNAN, ERESE

DISINI vs. SEC. OF JUSTICE, G.R. No. 20335-518, Feb 18. 2014
FACTS: Petitioners in this claim that the new law, RA 10175, is unconstitutional as it violates certain constitutional
rights.
ISSUE: W/N the sec. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 24, and 26 are constitutional.
RULING:
Only the unconstitutional provisions are discussed in this digest***
SEC. 4 The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express
themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that
punishes "aiding or 64 abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. As already stated, the cyberspace is an
incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding
certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally protected freedom of expression of the great
masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law
enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4 (c) (4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet
users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting
ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of
cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4 (a) (1) on Illegal Access, Section 4 (a) (2) on
Illegal Interception, Section 4 (a) (3) on Data Interference, Section 4 (a) (4) on System Interference, Section 4 (a) (5)
on Misuse of Devices, Section 4 (a) (6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4 (b) (1) on Computer Related Forgery, Section 4
(b) (2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4 (b) (3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4 (c) (1) on
Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
SEC. 12 The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when seemingly random bits of traffic data
are gathered in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which can then be used to create
profiles of the persons under surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a person's close
associations, religious views, political affiliations, even sexual preferences. Such information is likely beyond what the
public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected by the right to privacy. But has the
procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn narrowly enough to protect individual rights?
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that
traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing
can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender
or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to
extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies. Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those
"associated with specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the
law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law
enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified communication they want. This
evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

SEC. 19 Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one's papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it
states that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here,
the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The
Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on
the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Not only does Section 19
preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity
of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests:
the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. The Court is
therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of
expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 16. B.P. No. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
ARENO, CHAVEZ, TUPAS, YUMANG

(1) Medalla vs. People, GR No. 193362. January 18, 2012

Doctrine: Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. Novation may only prevent the rise
of criminal liability if it occurs prior to the filing of the Information in court. In other words, novation does not
extinguish criminal liability but may only prevent its rise.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes

Facts: In 1998, Medalla issued to Laxa a check amounting to P742,000 as payment of the loan which he
obtained from the latter. However, the check was dishonored as the account has already been closed. The
petitioner failed to pay the amount of said check despite demand.

The petitioner admitted the issuance of the subject check but only for the purposes of guaranteeing the
loan he obtained from the respondent and was not meant to be encashed. Petitioner further alleged that he
had executed a REM over his land as security for the loan but respondent opted not to foreclose the
mortgage and deposit the check instead.

The MTC convicted Medalla guilty for violation of BP 22. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s decision.

Petitioner claimed that he and the respondent had entered for into a novation of contract effectively
obliterating his liability for the issuance of the said dishonored check.

Issue: Whether the novation subsequently entered by the parties extinguished petitioner’s criminal liability?

Ruling: The SC held in the negative.

Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. Novation may only prevent the rise of criminal
liability if it occurs prior to the filing of the Information in court. In other words, novation does not extinguish
criminal liability but may only prevent its rise.

The fact the petitioner had already made substantial payments to the respondent and that only P25,000.00
out of his total obligation in favor of the respondent remains unpaid is immaterial to the extinguishment of
the petitioner's criminal liability.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the
law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
 (2) LBP vs. Jacinto, GR No. 154622, August 3, 2010

Doctrine: Moreover, it is well settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as
an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Thus, this Court has held that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. The gravamen of the
offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment.
Facts: The First Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from the petitioner Land Bank in the
aggregate amount of P400 million. Ramon Jacinto, FWCC’s President, issued in favor of LBP nine (9)
postdated checks amounting to P465 million and drawn against FWCC’s account at the PNB. Later, before
the checks matured, the parties executed a Restructuring Agreement. When these postdated checks were
presented for payment, they were dishonored for the reason of “drawn against insufficient funds.”

LBP filed against a complaint against the respondent for violation of BP 22. Prosecutor De Joya dismissed
the complaint against respondent, finding that the restructuring agreement novated the original loan
agreement.

Petitioner elevated the matter to DOJ for review. The DOJ held that novation is not a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA reversed the Resolution of
the DOJ and reinstated the Resolution of the Prosecutor dismissing the complaint. While the CA ruled that
novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability, it nevertheless held that novation may prevent
criminal liability from arising in certain cases if novation occurs before the criminal information is filed in
court.

Issue: Whether the Restructuring Agreement is a form of novation that would prevent the criminal liability
of the respondent from attaching?

Ruling: The SC held in the negative. The Court found that the novation of the Credit Line Agreement is
NOT determinative of whether respondent should be prosecuted for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
There was no express stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement that respondent is released from his
liability on the issued checks. On the contrary, the Restructuring Agreement contains a proviso which states
that "This Agreement shall not novate or extinguish all previous security, mortgage, and other collateral
agreements, promissory notes, solidary undertaking previously executed by and between the parties.”

Moreover, it is well settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an
accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Thus, this Court has held that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. The gravamen of the
offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment.

Section 1 of B.P. 22 enumerates the following elements:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

Thus, even if it be subsequently declared that novation took place between the FWCC and petitioner,
respondent is not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for the dishonored checks.
 (3) Lim vs. People, GR No. 190834, November 26, 2014

Doctrine: The payment of the value of the bounced check before the filing of information in court for
violation of BP Blg. 22 exonerates the accused from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Facts: Petitioner issued two checks payable to cash amounting P100,000 for each check. He gave the
checks to Mr. Willie Castor (Castor) as his campaign donation to the latter's candidacy in the elections of
1998. It was Castor who ordered the delivery of printing materials and used petitioner's checks to pay for
the same. Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue
a "Stop Payment" order for the two checks. Thus, the checks were dishonored by the bank. After one month
from receipt of the demand letters and after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor,
petitioner issued a replacement check which was encashed by private complainant.

Six (6) months after petitioner had paid the amount of the bounced checks, two Informations were filed
against him before the MTC. The MTC convicted the petitioner guilty of violation of BP 22. The RTC affirmed
the conviction for criminal liability. No findings as to civil liability because the court agrees with the lower
court that the check was paid. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

Issue: Whether the criminal case for violation of BP 22 be dismissed on the ground that he has fully paid
the amount of the dishonored checks even before the informations against him were filed in court?

Ruling: The SC held in the affirmative.

In the case of Griffith vs CA, the petitioner was acquitted for violation of BP 22 considering that the money
value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two years before the
informations against him were filed.

In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International Bank, the foregoing principle
articulated in Griffith was the precedent cited to justify the acquittal of the accused in said case.

Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period provided for
in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned cases show that the
Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases. Petitioner should not be penalized although all
the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be present. The fact that the issuer of the check had
already paid the value of the dishonored check after having received the subpoena from the Office of the
Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the Information in court.

The payment of the value of the bounced check after the information has been filed in court would no longer
have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from
the commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that
the accused had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded
check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the
letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.

Thus, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition of penalties for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months before
the filing of Informations with the court.
 (4) Campos vs. People & FWCC, GR No. 187401, September 17, 2014

Doctrine: Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing, and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five
(5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Facts: In 1995, Campos obtained a loan amounting to P50,000, payable on installments from FWCC. She
issued several postdated checks in favor of FWCC to cover the payments. Upon presentment for payment,
fourteen of her checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for being drawn against a “closed account.”

FWCC charged Campos for violations of BP 22. The MTC rendered a decision convicting her. This was
upheld by the RTC. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Campos argues that she has no knowledge at the time of the check’s issuance that she did not have
sufficient funds with the drawee bank.

Issue: Whether Campos is guilty for violations of BP 22?

Ruling: The SC held in the affirmative.

To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

The first and third elements are present. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind
which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency
of funds, as it reads: Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing, and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented within ninety days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie
evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC's finding that the required notice of dishonor
from FWCC was received by Campos. Moreover, Campos categorically declared in her petition that, "[she]
has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the
payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the checks.” Clearly, this statement was a
confirmation that she actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC.

Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or making
arrangements for payment in full within five (5) days after receiving notice. Unfortunately, she was not able
to pay. Hence, the Court affirmed her conviction.
 (5) Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, GR Nos. 59568-76, January 11, 1990
Doctrine: A single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences
between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy
because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise
stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense.
Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy.
Facts: This case is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul the resolution of the respondent judge in
9 criminal cases for estafa which denied petitioner’s motion to quash. Said motion to quash was filed by petitioner on
the ground of double jeopardy since the offenses were already included in other criminal cases pending before the
lower court. Petitioner, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum, purchased oil products from it and issued nince checks
as payment. Upon presentation to the Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the
reason that his account was already closed. Petitioner failed to pay the checks despite repeated demands.
Petitioner argues that he would be placed in double jeopardy as all the elements of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of
the Revised Penal Code are also present in that crime punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 namely (1) "the
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof."
Issue: Whether there is double jeopardy upon the filing of nine other informations for estafa against petitioner after he
had earlier been charged with violation of BP 22 for issuing the same bouncing checks?
Ruling: The SC held in the negative. Petitioner is charged with two (2) distinct and separate offenses, first under
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and second, under the Article 315 (2-d) of the RPC for estafa.
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 Article 315 (2-d) of the RPC for estafa

"Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply "Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does by any of the means mentioned herein below . . . .
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the xxx xxx xxx
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is "2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason the fraud;
had not the drawer, without any valid reason ordered the bank to xxx xxx xxx
stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than "(d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an
thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
shall in no case exceed TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS or check."
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court."

Deceit and damage are NOT essential elements Deceit and damage are essential elements

mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge is not applicable
presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued
the same without sufficient funds

a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas The circumstance of issuance of a dishonored check for a pre-
Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre- existing obligation negates criminal liability.
existing obligation
Where the check was issued in payment of a pre-existing
obligation, the issuance of the check does not cause damage to
the payee and so it is but appropriate that he should not be held
for estafa but only for violations of BP 22. But if he issued a check
to induce another to part with a valuable consideration and the
check bounces, then he does inflict an injury to the payee of the
check violating BP 22 and estafa.

violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against estafa is essentially a crime against property
public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system

Mala prohibita Mala in se

A single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the
elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what
the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated,
prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence,
the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy (People v. Miraflores, 115
SCRA 570).

(6) Wong vs. CA, GR No. 117857, February 2, 2001

DOCTRINE: There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing and issuing a check
to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issue that the check is not sufficiently funded; and
(2) by having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to keep
sufficient funds therein or credit with said bank to cover the full amount of the check when presented to the
drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days.

FACTS: Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer of calendars. He had
a history of unremitted collections, which he duly acknowledged in a confirmation receipt he co-signed with
his wife for LPI. Hence, petitioner's costumers were required to issue postdated checks before LPI would
accept their purchase orders. Wong issued 6 postdated checks all dated December 30, 1985 and drawn
payable to the order of LPI. The checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of
customers who failed to issue postdated checks. However, following company policy, LPI refused to accept
the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to apply the checks to the payment of petitioner's
unremitted collections for 1984. Before maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit
the checks and promised to replace them within 30 days. He failed to honor his words and upon deposit of
LPI, the checks were returned for the reason of "account closed." After being notified, petitioner still failed
to make arrangement for payments. He was charged with three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 under
three separate informations, all cases were raffled to the same trial court. Upon arraignment, Wong pleaded
not guilty. After trial, the court issued its decision finding the accused guilty on all charges and was
sentenced to serve an imprisonment of four months on each of the charge. He was also ordered to pay the
amount due plus interest and trial costs. Petitioner appealed his case to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed his conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22.

RULING: Petitioner Luis S. Wong is found liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22

Petitioner contends that the first element does not exist because the checks were not issued to apply for
account or for value. He attempts to distinguish his situation from the usual "cut-and-dried" B.P. 22 case by
claiming that the checks were issued as guarantee and the obligations they were supposed to guarantee
were already paid. This flawed argument has no factual basis, the RTC and CA having both ruled that the
checks were in payment for unremitted collections, and not as guarantee. Likewise, the argument has no
legal basis, for what B.P. Blg. 22 punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for
which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.

As to the second element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima
facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. The maker's knowledge is
presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this
involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check."

The clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the
dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking
days after notice thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the
conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the
offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within
a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be
presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability
thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By current banking practice, a check becomes stale
after more than six (6) months,or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after
the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence. As found by the trial court, private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the
reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained
to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but
failed to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record,
sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee
bank at the time of issuance of the checks. And despite petitioner's insistent plea of innocence, we find no
error in the respondent court's affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing
Checks Law.

However, pursuant to the policy guidelines inAdministrative Circular No. 12-2000, which took effect on
November 21, 2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner should now be modified to a fine of not less than
but not more than double the amount of the checks that were dishonored.
 (7) People vs. Gorospe, GR Nos. L-74053-54, January 20, 1988

DOCTRINE: In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature.
It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance; and that the Bouncing Checks
Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance
of a bouncing check; and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check
but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check.

FACTS: Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corp (SMC). He was charged
with BP 22 at the RTC for issuing a dishonored check in 1983 in favor of SMC (for insufficiency of funds)
and, in spite of repeated demands, failed and refused to make good said check to the damage of SMC. He
was also charged with Estafa for issuing another check for payment of the beer he purchased and refused
to redeem said check despite repeated demands. The RTC of Pampanga dismissed the case because it
said that deceit and damage, the elements of the crimes did not occur in Pampanga, therefore, this court
has no jurisdiction. The checks were made in Guiguinto, Bulacan, and delivered to SMC also in Bulacan.
It was deposited in Planter’s Bank (drawee bank) at Santa Maria, Bulacan and was received by BPI at San
Fernando, Pampanga for clearing purposes.
The Solicitor General points that 2 checks are involved. That Parulan issued PDB’s check (Bulacan) and
was received by SMC at Bulacan. Then it was forwarded to SMC San Fernando, Pampanga where it was
received by the Finance Officer and deposited with BPI San Fernando Branch then the SMC depository
bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa
Maria, Bulacan. This check was the subject of Estafa. For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the
other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are not essential nor required. An essential element of that
offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, it
being mala prohibitum.

ISSUE: Whether or not venue was sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga

RULING: Upon the attendant facts and circumstances we uphold the Petition. The elements of deceit and
damage are not essential nor required. An essential element of that offense is knowledge on the part of the
maker or drawer ofthe check of the insufficiency of his funds. The Anti-Bouncing Checks Law makes the
mere act of issuing a worthless check a special offense punishable thereunder. Malice and intent in issuing
the worthless check are immaterial, the offense being malum [Link] gravamen of the offense is
the issuance of a check, not the non-payment of an obligation. A person charged with a transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In transitory
or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to
try the case, it being understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others.
However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in
one municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.

The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the Philippines,
"the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check". However, it is
likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds,
which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be
within one territory or another. Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the
RTC of Pampanga. And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the
allegations in the Information, which are controlling. The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the
crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below.
 (8) Llamado vs. CA, GR No. 84850, June 29, 1989

DOCTRINE: Section 4 establishes a much narrower period during which an application for probation may
be filed with the trial court: "after [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and—
within the period for perfecting an appeal —."

FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Together with
Jacinto N Pascual, Sr., President of the same corporation, Llamado was prosecuted for violation of BP 22
in Criminal Case No. 85-38653 in RTC-Manila, Branch 49. The 2 co-signed a postdated check payable to
private respondent Leon Gaw worth Php186,500. The check was dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds.
In 1987, the RTC sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year of prision correccional and to pay a fine of
Php200,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He also had to reimburse Gaw P186,500
plus cost of the suit. On Mar. 20, Llamado orally manifested that he was taking an appeal. The records of
the case were then forwarded to the CA. He asked for extensions to appeal, with the last being on Nov. 18.
On Nov. 30, however, Llamado filed in the RTC a Petition for Probation invoking PD No. 968, as amended.
Llamado then filed with the CA a Petition for Probation dated Nov. 16. In 1988, Llamado withdrew his
appeal. The CA also denied his petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's application for probation is barred under P.D. No. 968, as amended

RULING: The Decision of the CA is affirmed.

Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, the trial court could grant an application for probation "at any time" "after
it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant" and certainly after "an appeal has been taken from the
sentence of conviction." Thus, the filing of the application for probation was "deemed — [to constitute]
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal."

Examination of Section 4, after its amendment by P.D. No. 1257, reveals that it had established a prolonged
but definite period during which an application for probation may be granted by the trial court.

Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 was once again amended by P.D. No. 1990. Section 4 establishes
a much narrower period during which an application for probation may be filed with the trial court: "after [the
trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and — within the period for perfecting an appeal
—."As if to provide emphasis, a new proviso
was appended to the first paragraph of Section 4 that expressly prohibits the grant of an application for
probation "if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction." It is worthy of note
too that Section 4 in its present form has dropped the phrase which said that the filing of an application for
probation means "the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal".

The Court of Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to remand the case except for execution of judgment.
Moreover, having invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is not at liberty to attack that
jurisdiction when exercised adversely to him. In any case, the argument is mooted by the conclusion that
we have reached, that is, that petitioner's right to apply for probation was lost when he perfected his appeal
from the judgment of conviction.
 (9) Que vs. People, GR No. 75217-18, September 21, 1987

DOCTRINE: It is clear that it is the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere
act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.

FACTS: Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration of Our minute resolution denying the main Petition for
Review on Certiorari of the decision and resolution of the respondent CA which affirmed the judgment 4 of
the RTC of Quezon City convicting herein petitioner of the crime of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 on
two (2) counts.

In the main Petition filed on August 25, 1986, petitioner seeks a review by certiorari of the appellate court's
decision dated January 14, 1986 and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
same, on the grounds that respondent appellate court not only decided a substantial question of jurisdiction
not in accordance with law and applicable
jurisprudence but also sanctioned the departure by the lower court from the accepted judicial procedures
on the issue of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the decision of both the trial court and appellate court and the denial of the Petition for
Review are in accordance with law and evidence.

RULING: The motion is without merit.

There is no question that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City had jurisdiction over the case as provided
for in the rules of court. The findings of fact of the trial court reveal that the checks in question were issued
at Quezon City as admitted by petitioner himself in his answer when he was sued by the complainant on
his civil liability.

It is of no moment whether the said checks were deposited by the complainant in a bank located outside of
Quezon City. The determinative factor is the place of issuance which is in Quezon City and thus within the
court's jurisdiction.

It is clear that it is the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere act of issuing
a worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.
 (10) Cabrera vs. CA, GR No. 150618, July 24, 2003

DOCTRINE: To prove the first and third elements of the crime, Section 3 of the law provides that the
introduction in evidence of the unpaid or dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or
written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of
the making or issuing of the said checks and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the
dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached
thereto by the drawee on such dishonored checks. It is difficult for the prosecution to prove the second
element because knowledge involves a state of mind.
In order to create the prima facie presumption, that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be
shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy
the amount of the check or shall arrange for its payment. The prosecution is burdened to prove the acts
that gave rise to the prima facie presumption. On the other hand, the drawer has the right to adduce
evidence to rebut the same. It is important to stress that this presumption is not conclusive, or one that
forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the contrary. Thus, the drawer of the check can still
overturn the prima facie presumption by proving that the holder thereof was paid the amount due thereon,
or that arrangements were made for payment in full by the drawee of the check within five banking days
after receipt of notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee bank
FACTS: Petitioner herein was charged and was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The trial court ruled that the evidence on record showed that the
petitioner voluntarily issued the checks in question. Notwithstanding her claim that the said checks were
issued merely to accommodate a business partner and to guarantee the latter's obligations, she was found
guilty as charged. The trial court did not rule on the petitioner's claim that she did not receive any notice of
dishonor from the drawee bank or from the private complainant, or any letter of demand notifying her of
such dishonor and demanding payment of the amounts of the checks. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but
the latter affirmed the decision. After her motion for reconsideration was denied, she filed this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
RULING: The prosecution failed to adduce in evidence any notice of dishonor of the three postdated checks
or any letter of demand sent to and received by the petitioner. For failure of the prosecution to show that
notices of dishonor were served on the petitioner or that she was sent a demand letter notifying her of the
said dishonor, the prima facie presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise. Thus,
there can be no basis for establishing the presence of actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is
an essential element of the offense charged.
The full payment of the amount of the check within five banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor is a
complete defense. Hence, the absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the drawer of the check
the opportunity to preclude criminal prosecution.
A mere oral notice or demand to pay is insufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. It is not
enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. It must
also show that the drawer of the check received the said notice because the fact of service provided for in
the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check.
However, we uphold the decision of the CA affirming the trial court's decision ordering the petitioner to pay
to the private respondent the total face value of the checks in the amount of P209,175.45. We stress that a
check is an evidence of debt against the drawer, and although may not be intended to be presented, has
the same effect as an ordinary check, and if passed upon to a third person, will be valid in his hands like
any other check. Hence, the petitioner is obliged to pay to the private respondent Luis Go
 (11) Svendsen vs. People. GR No. 175381, February 26, 2008

DOCTRINE: For petitioner to be validly convicted of the crime under B.P. Blg. 22, the following requisites
must thus concur: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2)
the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

FACTS: In October 1997, Cristina Reyes (Cristina) extended a loan to petitioner in the amount of P200,000,
to bear interest at 10% a month. After petitioner had partially paid his obligation, he failed to settle the
balance thereof which had reached P380,000 inclusive of interest.4

Cristina thus filed a collection suit against petitioner, which was eventually settled when petitioner paid her
P200,0005 and issued in her favor an International Exchange Bank check postdated February 2, 1999 (the
check) in the amount of P160,000 representing interest.6 The check was co-signed by one Wilhelm Bolton.

When the check was presented for payment on February 9, 1999, it was dishonored for having been Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF).7

Cristina, through counsel, thus sent a letter to petitioner by registered mail informing him that the check
was dishonored by the drawee bank, and demanding that he make it good within five (5) days from receipt
thereof.8

No settlement having been made by petitioner, Cristina filed a complaint dated March 1, 1999 against him
and his co-signatory to the check, Bolton, for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the City Prosecutor’s Office of
Manila. No counter-affidavit was submitted by petitioner and his co-respondent. An Information dated April
13, 1999 for violation of B.P. Blg. No. 22 was thus filed on April 29, 1999 before the MeTC of Manila against
the two.

Bolton having remained at large, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person.10

By Judgment of December 17, 2003, Branch 5 of the Manila MeTC found petitioner guilty as charged.

Accused is also made liable to pay private complainant Cristina C. Reyes civil indemnity in the total amount
of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P160,000.00) representing his civil obligation covered by
subject check.

Meantime, considering that other accused Wilhelm Bolton remains at large, let a warrant of arrest against
him ISSUE. Pending his apprehension, let the case against him be sent to the ARCHIVES.

As priorly stated, the RTC affirmed the MeTC judgment and the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in finding that the first element of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 – the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check "to apply on account or for value" – was present. (Second
element is wanting)

RULING: The petition is impressed with merit.

For petitioner to be validly convicted of the crime under B.P. Blg. 22, the following requisites must thus
concur: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

Petitioner admits having issued the postdated check to Cristina. The check, however, was dishonored when
deposited for payment in Banco de Oro due to DAIF. Hence, the first and the third elements obtain in
the case.

As for the second element, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that:

[t]he making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker
or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by
the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee.

The evidence for the prosecution failed to prove the second element. While the registry receipt, which is
said to cover the letter-notice of dishonor and of demand sent to petitioner, was presented, there is no proof
that he or a duly authorized agent received the same. Receipts for registered letters including return receipts
do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the
letters. Thus in Ting v. Court of Appeals, this Court observed:

x x x All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone
received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of one of the petitioners or of their authorized agent
remains a mystery. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their authorized agent
did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.17

For failure then to prove all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, petitioner’s acquittal is in order.

Petitioner is civilly liable, however. For in a criminal case, the social injury is sought to be repaired through
the imposition of the corresponding penalty, whereas with respect to the personal injury of the victim, it is
sought to be compensated through indemnity, which is civil in nature.

This Court deems it fair and reasonable then, consistent with existing jurisprudence, to adjust the civil
indemnity to P16,000, the equivalent of petitioner’s unpaid interest on the P200,000 loan at 12% percent
per annum as of February 2, 1999, the date of the check, plus 12% per annum interest to be computed
from April 29, 1999, the date of judicial demand (date of the filing of the Information) up to the finality of this
judgment. After the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the total amount
due shall bear interest at 12% per annum. In any event, the presentation of the promissory note may be
dispensed with in a prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as the purpose for the issuance of such check
is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s criminal liability. It is for the purpose of determining his
civil liability that the document bears significance. Notably, however, Section 24 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law provides that "Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for
a valuable consideration, and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party
thereto for value." It was incumbent then on petitioner to prove that the check was not for a valuable
consideration. This he failed to discharge.
 (12) Magno vs. CA, GR No. 96132, June 26, 1992

DOCTRINE: The element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner
never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a
matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom
petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not
communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which
was covered by L.S. Finance Management.

FACTS: Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not
have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that
while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary
equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International
Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries
(hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a
distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)

Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds
to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management
Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and
able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide
him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)

The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to
thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to
P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal
level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however,
unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the
same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest

As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS
Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option
to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who
in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the
same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit
the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.

To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks
dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the
four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on
the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank
Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September
15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of
P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage
equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who
advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the
latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the
reason "account closed."

After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was
convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases.

ISSUE: Whether the checks were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required under
Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. (No)

RULING: When viewed against the following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for
which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime could not have been
committed by petitioner:

a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain facts are truly as they are
represented to be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423)

A cross-reference to the following term shows:

Fitness for Particular Purpose: —

Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods
are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is, unless excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose, (Ibid.,
p. 573)

b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the performance of some contract,
to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment and to that
extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.

To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge to intrust
to the care of another. The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or
convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also,
the money so deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly
accepted and generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits payable
on demand and for which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on demand,
or on certain notice or at a fixed future time.

Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner
never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a
matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom
petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not
communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which
was covered by L.S. Finance Management.
 (13) People vs. Nitafan, GR No. 75954, October 22, 1992

DOCTRINE: A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand." A check is also
defined as " [a] written order or request to a bank or persons carrying on the business of banking, by a party
having money in their hands, desiring them to pay, on presentment, to a person therein named or bearer,
or to such person or order, a named sum of money.”

A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does not distinguish
but merely provides that "[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any check knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which
check is subsequently dishonored . . . shall be punished by imprisonment
FACTS: Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged before respondent court with violation of B.P. 22 in an
Information alleging ––

That on . . . January 10, 1985, in the City of Manila . . . the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make or draw and issue to Fatima Cortez Sasaki . . . Philippine Trust Company Check No.
117383 dated February 9, 1985 . . . in the amount of P143,000.00, . . . well knowing that at the time of issue
he . . . did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which check . . . was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor,
said accused failed to pay said Fatima Cortez Sasaki the amount of said check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. 2

On 18 July 1986, private respondent moved to quash the Information of the ground that the facts charged
did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum
check which was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. On 1 September 1986,
respondent judge, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the
questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor
General in behalf of the government.

ISSUE: Whether a memorandum check issued postdated in partial payment of a pre-existing obligation is
within the coverage of B.P. 22. (Yes)

RULING: A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum", "memo"
or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder
absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment. Such a check is an evidence of debt against
the drawer, and although may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as an ordinary check,
and if passed to the third person, will be valid in his hands like any other check.

From the above definition, it is clear that a memorandum check, which is in the form of an ordinary
check, is still drawn on a bank and should therefore be distinguished from a promissory note, which
is but a mere promise to pay. If private respondent seeks to equate memorandum check with promissory
note, as he does to skirt the provisions of B.P. 22, he could very well have issued a promissory note, and
this would be have exempted him form the coverage of the law. In the business community a promissory
note, certainly, has less impact and persuadability than a check.

Verily, a memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand." A check is also defined
as " [a] written order or request to a bank or persons carrying on the business of banking, by a party having
money in their hands, desiring them to pay, on presentment, to a person therein named or bearer, or to
such person or order, a named sum of money.”

A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does not distinguish
but merely provides that "[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any check knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which
check is subsequently dishonored . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . ." (Emphasis supplied
). 12 Ubi lex no distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not matter
whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was
issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a
bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check,
whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum.

We are not unaware that a memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not be
presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan fall due. This understanding
may be manifested by writing across the check "Memorandum", "Memo" or "Mem." However, with the
promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it
from penal sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of check
be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provision of B.P. 22 on the basis
of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted — to
stem the proliferation of unfunded checks.

After having effectively reduced the incidence of worthless checks changing hands, the country will once
again experience the limitless circulation of bouncing checks in the guise of memorandum checks if such
checks will be considered exempt from the operation of B.P. 22. It is common practice in commercial
transactions to require debtors to issue checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment. To
determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will
greatly erode the faith the public responses in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities.
 (14) Tan vs. Mendez, Jr. GR No. 138669, June 6, 2002

DOCTRINE: No compensation can take place between petitioners and respondent as respondent is
not a debtor of petitioners insofar as the two checks representing collections from the Baao ticket
sales are concerned. Article 1278 of the Civil Code requires, as a prerequisite for compensation, that the
parties be mutually and principally bound as creditors and debtors. If they were not mutually creditors and
debtors of each other, the law on compensation would not apply. In this case, the memorandum shows that
some unencashed checks returned to respondent to allegedly offset the dishonored check were from the
Baao ticket sales which are separate from the ticket sales of Respondent. Respondent only acted as an
intermediary in remitting the Baao ticket sales and, thus, is not a debtor of petitioners.

FACTS: Petitioners Steve Tan and Marciano Tan are the owners of Master Tours and Travel Corporation
and operators of Philippine Lawin Bus Co., Inc., while respondent Fabian Mendez, Jr. is the owner of three
gasoline stations in Iriga City, Ligao, Albay, and Sipocot, Camarines Sur. Petitioners opened a credit line
for their buses’ lubricants and fuel consumption with Respondent. At the same time, the latter was also
designated by petitioners as the booking and ticketing agent of Philippine Lawin Bus Co. in Iriga City.

Under such arrangement, petitioners’ drivers purchased on credit fuel and various oil products for its buses
through withdrawal slips issued by petitioners, with periodic payments to respondent through the issuance
of checks. On the other hand, respondent remitted the proceeds of ticket sales to petitioners also through
the issuance of checks. Sent together with respondent’s remittance are the remittances of the ticket sales
in the Baao Booking office, which is managed separately and independently by another agent, Elias
Bacsain.

Accordingly, petitioners issued several checks to respondent as payment for oil and fuel products. One of
these is FEBTC check no. 704227 dated June 4, 1991 in the amount of P58,237.75, as payment for gasoline
and oil products procured during the period May 2 to 15, 1991. Said check was dishonored by the bank
upon presentment for payment for being drawn against insufficient funds.

Respondent sent a demand letter dated June 21, 1991 to petitioners demanding that they make good the
check or pay the amount thereof, to no avail. Hence, an information for violation of B.P. 22 was filed against
petitioners.

At the trial, the prosecution presented FABIAN MENDEZ, JR., the private complainant, and MULRY
MENDEZ. They testified that FEBTC check no. 704227 and other checks in the amount of P235,387.33
were dishonored upon presentment for payment to the bank and that they called petitioners’ attention
regarding the matter. They sent a demand letter to petitioners asking them to make good the check or pay
the value thereof, but petitioners did not heed the request. Instead, petitioners told respondent Fabian to
wait a while. After respondent initiated this case, petitioners attempted to settle the same along with other
cases pending in other courts in Iriga City. They asked for more time to settle their obligations because they
were still waiting for a tax credit certificate in the amount of P517,998 to be issued by the Ministry of Finance,
that they would use to settle the cases. 5

On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner MARCIANO TAN and ISIDRO TAN as witnesses. In
his testimony, Marciano averred that he cannot be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the amount
subject of the check had already been extinguished by offset or compensation against the collection from
ticket sales from the booking offices. He presented a memorandum 6 dated June 10, 1991 showing the
return to respondent of various unencashed checks in the total amount of P66,839.25 representing
remittance of ticket sales in the Iriga and Baao offices that were earlier sent by Respondent. After the
alleged offset, there remains a balance of P226,785.83.

After trial, the trial court convicted petitioners for violation of B.P. 22.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners can be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law; and

2. Whether or not payment through compensation or offset can preclude prosecution for violation of B.P.
22.

RULING:
1. The law enumerates the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 to be (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.

We find all the foregoing elements present in this case. Petitioner Marciano admitted that he drew the
subject check as payment for the fuel and oil products of respondents. He knew at that time that there were
no sufficient funds to cover the check because he had uncollected receivables. The check was thus
dishonored upon presentment to the bank for payment.

The law has made the mere act of issuing a bum check a malum prohibitum, is an act proscribed by
legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. The gravamen of the offense under
this law is the act of issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment. Thus, even if there had been payment, through compensation or some other means, there could
still be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. We find that no reversible error was committed by the courts a
quo in finding petitioners guilty of violation of B.P. 22.

2. It bears stressing that the issue of whether or not the obligations covered by the subject check had been
paid by compensation or offset is a factual issue that requires evaluation and assessment of certain facts.
This is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. We have repeatedly held that
this Court is not a trier of facts 20 The jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of
Appeals is confined to the review of errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals, whose findings of fact
are conclusive absent any showing that such findings are entirely devoid of any substantiation on record.

On this aspect, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court that the alleged compensation is
not supported by clear and positive evidence. The trial court noted that the total amount of the two checks
issued by petitioners is P293,625.08 while the total amount of the returned checks amounted to only
P66,939.75. No application of payment was made as to which check was to be paid. These factual findings
should be accorded respect and finality as the trial court is in the best position to assess and evaluate
questions of fact. These findings will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that
the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances that would substantially affect the disposition of the
case. As found by the trial court, petitioners’ defense of compensation is unavailing because petitioners did
not clearly specify in the memorandum dated June 10, 1991 which dishonored check is being offset.
Applying Article 1289 in relation to Article 1254 of the Civil Code, the unencashed checks amounting to
P66,839.25 should have been applied to the earlier dishonored check amounting to P235,387.33 which is
more onerous than the subject check amounting to only P58,237.75.

We also note that no compensation can take place between petitioners and respondent as
respondent is not a debtor of petitioners insofar as the two checks representing collections from
the Baao ticket sales are concerned. Article 1278 of the Civil Code requires, as a prerequisite for
compensation, that the parties be mutually and principally bound as creditors and debtors. If they were not
mutually creditors and debtors of each other, the law on compensation would not apply. In this case, the
memorandum shows that some unencashed checks returned to respondent to allegedly offset the
dishonored check were from the Baao ticket sales which are separate from the ticket sales of Respondent.
Respondent only acted as an intermediary in remitting the Baao ticket sales and, thus, is not a debtor of
petitioners. Interestingly, petitioners never alleged compensation when they received the demand letter,
during the preliminary investigation, or before trial by filing a motion to dismiss. Moreover, if indeed there
was payment by compensation, petitioners should have redeemed or taken the checks back in the ordinary
course of business. There is no evidence on record that they did so.

Finally, while we sustain the conviction of petitioners, we deem it appropriate to modify the penalties
imposed. We delete the penalty of imprisonment and in lieu thereof, we impose upon petitioners a fine
amounting to double the value of the subject check, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or
non-payment.

Additional Notes:

Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-
2001, established a rule of preference in imposing penalties in B.P. 22 cases. Section 1 of B.P. 22 imposes
the following alternative penalties for its violation, to wit: (a) imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not
more than one year; or (b) a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which
fine shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (c) both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The rationale of Adm. Circular No. 12-2000 is found in our rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals and
Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines. We held in those cases that it would best serve the ends of criminal
justice if, in fixing the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the same philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, i.e. that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of
the social order.

To be sure, it is not our intention to decriminalize violation of B.P. 22. Neither is it our intention to delete the
alternative penalty of imprisonment. The propriety and wisdom of decriminalizing violation of B.P. 22 is best
left to the legislature and not this Court. As clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, the clear tenor and
intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty,
but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22. Where the
circumstances of the case, for instance, clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the more appropriate penalty. This rule of
preference does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. 22. Neither does it defeat
the legislative intent behind the law. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances
warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the judge. Should the judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not to be deemed
a hindrance. In this case, we note that petitioners had exerted efforts to settle their obligations. The fact of
returning the unencashed checks to respondent indicates good faith on the part of petitioners. Absent any
showing that petitioners acted in bad faith, the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment in this case is proper.
 (15) Lim Lao vs. CA, GR No. 119178, June 20, 1987

DOCTRINE: Although the offense is covered by a special law and intent is not necessary to convict a
person of violating a special law, nevertheless, BP Blg. 22 required that “the person who makes or draws
and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds”.
FACTS:

Petitioner Lina Lim Lao was a junior officer of Premiere Investment House (Premiere) in its Binondo Branch.
As such officer, she was authorized to sign checks for and in behalf of the corporation. In the course of the
business, she met complainant Father Artelijo Pelijo, the provincial treasurer of the Society of the Divine
Word through Mrs. Rosemarie Lachenal, a trader for Premiere. Father Palijo was authorized to invest
donations to the society and had been investing the society's money with Premiere. Father Palijo had
invested a total of P514,484.04, as evidenced by the Confirmation of Sale No. 82-6994 (Exh. 'A') dated July
8, 1993. Father Palijo was also issued Traders Royal Bank (TRB) checks in payment of interest:

Check # 299961 Date: Oct. 7, 1993 Amount: P150,000.00

Check # 299962 Date: Oct. 7, 1983 Amount: P150,000.00
Check # 323835 Date: Oct. 7, 1983 Amount: P26,010.73

All the checks were issued in favor of Artelijo A. Palijo and signed by petitioner and Teodulo Asprec, who
was the head of operations. Further evidence of the transaction was the acknowledgment of postdated
checks dated July 8, 1983 and the cash disbursement voucher.

When Father Palijo presented the checks for encashment, the same were dishonored for the reason 'Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds' (DAIF). Father Palijo immediately made demands on Premiere to pay him the
necessary amounts. He first went to the Binondo Branch but was referred to the Cubao Main Branch where
he was able to talk with the President, Mr. Cariño. For his efforts, he was paid P5,000.00. Since no other
payment followed, Father Palijo wrote Premiere a formal letter of demand. Subsequently, Premiere was
placed under receivership.

Petitioner and Asprec were sued by Father Pelijo. However, the notice of dishonor was sent to the Cubao
branch(main office) and not in Binondo branch.

Petitioner’s defense was that she did not know the insufficiency of funds and did not receive the notice of
dishonor so she had no actual notice of the bouncing of the checks.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioner not knowing there was insufficient funds during the time she signed
the check can exculpate her from the crime? YES
2. Whether or not the notice of dishonor being sent to the Cubao branch and not to the Binondo
Branch constituted constructive notice and was binding on the appellant as notice? NO

RULING:

Justice Luis B. Reyes, enumerated the elements of the offense defined in the first paragraph of Section 1
of B.P. 22, thus:

● That a person makes or draws and issues any check.

 ● That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value.
● That the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment.
● That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

1. Knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is an essential element that has to be proved before a
person can be convicted of violating BP Blg No 22

Although the offense is covered by a special law and intent is not necessary to convict a person of
violating a special law, nevertheless, BP Blg. 22 required that “the person who makes or draws and
issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds”.

This meant that knowledge had to be proven as it was an element in the crime. There is a
presumption of knowledge after the fact of the drawing of the check and refusal due to insufficiency
of funds but this is only a prima facie presumption and can be rebutted by the appellant

In this case, it was proven through her testimony that as part of the corporation’s procedure, she
had to sign blank checks and that it was Asprec, which supplied the names of the payee and the
amounts to be drawn.

Furthermore, the testimony of the former Treasurer of Premiere, Veronilyn Ocampo, proved that it
was the sole responsibility of the Treasury Department to fund the checks. It was not part of the
appellants job to find out if the checks were well-funded, hence she could not have had knowledge
that she was signing a bum check.

2. The responsibility under BP Blg No. 22 is personal, the petitioner should have had actual
knowledge of the bouncing of the check. But, this information was withheld by Ms. Ocampo
according to her testimony because Premiere was already in a crisis because of the mass
withdrawals of investment by their clients. Also, the notice of dishonor would have given petitioner
5 days to pay the payee the amount, which could not be drawn due to insufficiency of funds.
Because the notice was not given to her, she was not able to avail of the 5 days grace period to
escape culpability.

Petitioner Lina Lim Lao is ACQUITTED.

 (16) Idos vs. CA, GR No. 110782, September 25, 1998

DOCTRINE: The best evidence of the existence of the partnership, which was not yet terminated (though
in winding up stage) were the unsold goods and uncollected receivables.

FACTS:
Petitioner Irma Idos (Idos) was engaged in the business of leather tanning. In 1985, private complainant
Eddie Alarilla joined Idos, forming a partnership business. However, the partnership did not last long as it
was dissolved one year after. Upon liquidation, the business had P1,800,000 receivables and stocks.
Alarilla’s share was P900,000 for which Idos issued four checks. Alarilla was able to encash the first three
checks but failed to encash the last check. After failure to comply with the formal demand of Aralilla to Idos,
the former filed an information for violation of BP 22 against the latter. Idos defense stated that the checks
were only given as assurance of his share in the assets of the partnership and that it was not supposed to
be deposited until the stocks had been sold. RTC ruled the Idos was guilty of the crime charged which the
Court of Appeals affirmed, hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Idos is guilty of violation BP 22. NO
2. Whether or not the partnership is dissolved. NO

RULING:
1. The subject check was to be funded from receivables to be collected and goods to be sold by the
partnership, and only when such collection and the sale were realized. Petitioner issued the subject
check to evidence only the complainant’s share or interest in the partnership, or at best, to show
her commitment that when receivables are collected and goods are sold, she would give to private
complainant the net amount due him representing his interest in the partnership. Since petitioner
issued these four checks without actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, she could not be
held liable under BP 22 when one not honored right away.

2. Even if the parties agreed to dissolve the partnership, such agreement did not automatically put an
end to the partnership, since they still had to sell the goods on hand and collect the receivables
from debtors. In short, they were still in the process of winding up, or the process of settling
business affairs after dissolution, when he check in question was issued. Upon dissolution, the
partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed.
The best evidence of the existence of the partnership which was not yet terminated were the unsold
goods and uncollected receivables, which were present in this case.
 (17) Sycip vs. CA, GR No. 125059, March 17, 2000

DOCTRINE:
The Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), is violated when the following elements are present:
1. The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
2. The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment;
and
3. The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

FACTS:
On August 24, 1989, petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel Realty
Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit in the latter’s project at Bacoor, Cavite. Upon execution of the contract
to sell, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in the amount of
P9,304.00,covering 48 monthly installments. After moving in his unit, Sycip complained, to FRC regarding
defects in the unit and incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint.
Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notorial notices to the effect that he was suspending his
installment payments on the unit pending compliance with the project plans and specifications, as approved
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Sycip and twelve (12) out of fourteen (14) unit
buyers then filed a complaint with the HLURB. The complaint was dismissed as to the defect, but FRC was
ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its townhouse project. Sycip appealed the
dismissal of the complaint as to the alleged defects.
Notwithstanding the notorial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycip’s postdated checks
in its possession. Sycip sent “stop payment orders” to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other
postdated checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his checking account to
avoid paying bank charges every time he made a “stop payment” order on the forthcoming check. Due to
the closure of petitioner’s checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC file a
complaint against petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is criminally liable of the B.P. Blg. 22

RULING:
The Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), is violated when the following elements are present:
4. The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
5. The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment;
and
6. The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

In this case, although the first element of the offense exists, the other elements have not been established
beyond reasonable doubt.

The second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the check’s issuance that
he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22
creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third
elements of the offense are present. But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it
will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. Such knowledge of the insufficiency
of petitioner’s funds “is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds.” But
such presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, the other party has presented
evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of
the offense charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable presumption.

We are of the view that petitioner had a valid cause to order his bank to stop payment. The third element
of “subsequent dishonour of the check…without valid cause” appear to us not established by the
prosecution. Following Article 11 (5) of the RPC, petitoner’s exercise of a right of the buyer under Art 23 of
PD 957 is a valid defense to charges against him.

Sec 23 of PD 957: The buyer of a townhouse unit has the right to suspend his amortization
payments, should the subdivision or condominium developer fail to develop or complete the project
in accordance with duly approved plans and specifications.

What are involved in this case are postdated checks. Postdating simply means that on the date indicated
on its face, the check would be properly funded, not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then.
The checks were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. However, there
was no showing that at the time said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit
in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment. The closure of petitioner’s
Account No. 845515 with Citibank was not for insufficiency of funds. It was made upon the advice of the
drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty bank charges each time petitioner issued a “stop payment” order
to prevent encashment of postdated checks in private respondent’s possession. Said evidence contradicts
the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But it establishes petitioner’s state of
mind at the time said checks were issued. Petitioner definitely had no knowledge that his funds or credit
would be insufficient when the checks would be presented for encashment.
 (18) Bautista vs. CA, 143375, July 6, 2001

DOCTRINE: The ninety (90)-day period creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge, but it is not a
conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the contrary.

FACTS:

Sometime in April 1998 petitioner Ruth D. Bautista issued to private respondent Susan Aloña a check dated
8 May 1998 for P1,500,000.00 drawn on Metrobank Cavite City Branch. On 20 October 1998 private
respondent presented the check for payment. The drawee bank dishonored the check because it was drawn
against insufficient funds. On 16 March 1999 private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with the City
Prosecutor of Cavite City. Petitioner then submitted her own counter-affidavit asserting in her defense that
presentment of the check within ninety (90) days from due date thereof was an essential element of the
offense of violation of BP 22. Since the check was presented for payment 166 days after its due date, it
was no longer punishable under BP 22. On 22 April 1999, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution
recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner for violation of BP 22, which was approved by
the City Prosecutor. Bautista filed a motion to review the resolution with Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor (ORSP) for Region IV, but it was denied. On 1 October 1999 petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review of the resolution of the ORSP. The appellate court issued the assailed
Resolution issued by ORSP. CA further stated it is an error to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of
Rules of Civil Procedure in their case because ORSP resolution does not fall under a quasi-judicial body.
The petitioner escalated the complaint to SC using the defense that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary
investigation performs a quasi-judicial function.

ISSUE: Is the 90-day period an essential element of BP 22, to warrant the defense of the petitioner.

RULING:

It is clear that petitioner is being prosecuted for violation of the first paragraph of the offense. The court is
not convinced that the 90-day period is an essential element of the crime as claimed by the petitioner. The
ninety (90)-day period creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge, but it is not a conclusive
presumption that forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the contrary. The term prima facie
evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition
it supports or to establish the facts, or to counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a
conviction.
 17. P.D. No. 1613 (Anti-Arson Law)
TEE
18. P.D. No. 1689 (Swindling By Syndicate)
PALOMERA

COMPILATION OF DOCTRINES:
1. Elements of syndicated estafa under PD 1689: Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, the
elements of syndicated estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in
Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling
is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public. [Section 1, PD 1689; Guy vs. CA, GR
No. 187919, April 25, 2012 & February 20, 2013]

2. What is considered as a syndicate: a syndicate, [which may be any organization,

corporation, or association], is formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful
scheme for the misappropriation of the money contributed by the members of the
association. In other words, only those who formed and manage associations that receive
contributions from the general public who misappropriated the contributions can commit
syndicated estafa. [Guy vs. CA, GR No. 187919, February 20, 2013].

3. Syndicates are composed of 5 or more people:

a. P.D. No. 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death regardless of
the amount involved, provided that a syndicate committed the crime.

A syndicate is defined in the same law as "consisting of five or more persons

formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme." Under the second paragraph, it is provided
that if the offenders are not members of a syndicate, they shall nevertheless
be held liable for the acts prohibited by the law but they shall be penalized
by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud is
more than P100,000.00 [Catiis vs. CA, GR No. 153979, February 6, 2006].

b. As held in a ruling by the Supreme Court, the Information should charge 5 or

more people, otherwise it cannot be argued that there was a syndicate, to wit:

"The Information specifically charged only four persons without specifying any
other person who had participated in the commission of the crime charged, thus,
based on the definition of syndicate under the law, the crime charged was not
committed by a syndicate."
xxx
"If the government has chosen to indict only four persons, without more, the
obvious reason is that only the persons actually charged were involved in the
 commission of the offense, thus, there was no syndicate." [Catiis vs. CA, GR No.
153979, February 6, 2006]

4. The law will still apply via the second paragraph even if there is no syndicate,
provided that the defining element is present: when the number of the accused are
five or more, the crime is syndicated estafa under paragraph 1 of the Decree. If the
number of accused is less than five but the defining element of the crime under the
Decree is present, the second paragraph of the Decree applies [this second
paragraph provides for a lesser penalty [reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua] as
opposed to the first paragraph which provides for life imprisonment to death]. [Guy vs. CA,
GR No. 187919, February 20, 2013].

5. This defining element is provided in the same case: “for the second paragraph of
Section 1 to apply the definition of swindling in the first paragraph must be satisfied: “the
offenders should have used the association they formed, own or manage to
misappropriate the funds solicited from the public.” [Guy vs. CA, GR No. 187919,
February 20, 2013].

6. In relation to the preceding item pertaining to the defining element, members of the
syndicate must be owners or managers: Only those who formed and manage
associations that receive contributions from the general public who misappropriated the
contributions can commit syndicated estafa. [Guy vs. CA, GR No. 187919, February 20,
2013]

PERSONAL NOTE: In the same case [Guy v. CA, 2013], the Court cited People v. Balasa to state
that the accused would have been convicted if they were owners or employees who used their
position to defraud. However, it should be noted that these employees in the Balasa case either
held managerial positions such as treasurer or disbursing officer or that these employees i.e. a
cashier, were also incorporators of the erring organization.

7. The law covers commercial banks, it does not distinguish as to the nature of the
corporation: A bank is a corporation whose fund comes from the general public. P.D. No.
1689 does not distinguish the nature of the corporation. It requires, rather, that the
funds of such corporation should come from the general public. This is bolstered by
the third "whereas clause" of the quoted law which states that the same also applies to
other "corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public."
[Guy vs. CA, GR No. 187919, April 25, 2012]

8. The law will not apply regardless of the number of the accused in these instances
[Guy vs. CA, GR No. 187919, February 20, 2013]:
a. the entity soliciting funds from the general public is the victim and not the
means through which the estafa is committed; and
b. the offenders are not owners or employees who used the association to
perpetrate the crime, in which case, Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code
applies.
 GUY v. CA
G.R. 187919, April 25, 2012 & February 20, 2013
NOTE: The syllabus only provides for the ruling on April 25, 2012. There was another SC ruling that was initiated by a
Motion for Reconsideration on the same case. It contains the same G.R. numbers, but only differs in the date. I included
this ruling as it completely reversed the decision as to the liability arising from PD 1689.

FACTS: In 1999, Radio Marine Network (Smartnet), Inc, hereinafter "RMSI", claiming to do
business under the name Smartnet Philippines and/or Smartnet Philippines, Inc., hereinafter
"SPI", applied for an Omnibus Credit Line for various credit facilities with Asia United Bank,
hereinafter "AUB". Subsequently AUB granted it a P250 million Omnibus Credit Line, under the
name of Smartnet Philippines, RMSI's Division.

RMSI submitted a proof of authority to open the Omnibus Credit Line and peso and dollar
accounts in the name of Smartnet Philippines, Inc., which Gilbert Guy, et al. represented as
a division of RMS, as evidenced by the letterhead used. Attached to this authority was the
Amended Articles of Incorporation of RMSI, doing business under the name of Smartnet
Philippines, and the Secretary's Certi︎cate of SPI authorizing its directors, Gilbert Guy and
Philip Leung to transact with AUB.

Prior to this major transaction, however, and, unknown to AUB, while RMSI was doing business
under the name of Smartnet Philippines, and that there was a division under the name Smartnet
Philippines, Gilbert Guy, et al. formed a subsidiary corporation, the SPI with a paid-up capital of
only ₱62,500.00.

Believing that SPI is the same as Smartnet Philippines - the division of RMSI - AUB granted to it,
among others, Irrevocable Letter of Credit No. 990361 in the total sum of $29,300.00 in favor of
Rohde & Schwarz Support Centre Asia Ptd. Ltd., which is the subject of these consolidated
petitions.

RMSI later refused to pay for its liabilities. Hence, a case of syndicated estafa under PD 1968
was filed against the petitioners.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of the crime of syndicated estafa. [YES - 2012;
NO - 2013]
2. Whether or not AUB, being a commercial bank, is covered under PD 1689. [YES - 2012]

RULING:
1. [NOTE: as mentioned previously, this part of the ruling has been amended by a later
ruling.]

Yes, the petitioners are liable. First it must be established that estafa was committed.

Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury. In this case, these are the circumstances which indicate deceit:
 a. The petitioners are interlocking directors of RMSI and SPI, represented to AUB in
their transactions that Smartnet Philippines and SPI were one and the same entity;
b. The petitioners used the business names Smartnet Philippines, RMSI, and SPI
interchangeably and without any distinction. They successfully did this by using
the confusing similarity of RMSI’s business name, i.e., Smartnet Philippines – its
division, and, Smartnet Philippines, Inc. – the subsidiary corporation;
c. The petitioners were able to hide the identity of SPI, by having almost the same
directors as that of RMSI;
d. In order to let it appear that SPI is the same as that of Smartnet Philippines, they
submitted in their application documents of RMSI, including its Amended Articles
of Incorporation; and
e. The petitioners also used RMSI letterhead in their official communications with the
bank and the contents of these official communications conclusively pointed to
RMSI as the one which transacted with the bank.

The petitioners intent to deceive AUB was manifest from the start as they laid down
all the necessary materials needed for the deception, to wit:
a. Establishing Smartnet Philippines as a division of RMSI;
b. Organizing a subsidiary corporation, the SPI, with only P62,000 as the capital; and
c. It subsequently changed the corporate name of Radio Marine Network Inc. into
RMSI.

Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, the elements of syndicated estafa are:

a. estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Artilce 315 and 316 of the Revised
Penal Code is committed;
b. the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and
c. defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or
farmers associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.

The 5 accused were all involved in the formation of the entities utilized to defraud
AUB and that they were the officers and directors of both RMSI and SPI whose
conformities paved the way for AUB to grant the letter of credit, save for Galvez, but who
was present in the scheme through their signed correspondences and attendance
in the meetings with AUB.

The petitioners used these corporations to carry out the illegal and unlawful act of
misrepresenting SPI as a mere division of RMSI. Despite knowing SPI’s separate
juridical personality, applied for a letter of credit secured by SPI’s promissory note,
knowing fully that SPI has no credit line with AUB. The circumstances of the creation
of these entities and their dealings with the bank reveal this criminal intent to
defraud and to deceive AUB.

[NOTE: This part now pertains to the latter ruling in February 2013.]

Upon the filing for a Motion for Reconsideration by the petitioners, the liability under
PD 1968 was modified into simple estafa under Art. 315. The ruling on other issues
remained untouched.
 Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689 speaks of a syndicate formed with the intention
of carrying out the unlawful scheme for the misappropriation of the money contributed by
the members of the association. In other words, only those who formed and manage
associations that receive contributions from the general public who
misappropriated the contributions can commit syndicated estafa.

Gilbert Guy, et al., however, are not in any way related either by employment or
ownership to AUB. They are outsiders who, by their cunning moves, were able to defraud
an association, which is the AUB. Theirs would have been a different story, had they
been managers or owners of AUB who used the bank to defraud the public
depositors.

Furthermore, the Court also clarified the rule on the second paragraph of Sec. 1, which
provides:

“When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.”

As provided in jurisprudence, for the second paragraph of Section 1 to apply the

definition of swindling in the first paragraph must be satisfied: the offenders should
have used the association they formed, own or manage to misappropriate the funds
solicited from the public.

2. Yes, AUB is still among those corporations covered under the law. It was established
that the defraudation of AUB resulted in the misappropriation of the money which it
solicited from the general public in the form of deposits.

As previously also held, a bank is a corporation whose fund comes from the general public.
The law does not distinguish the nature of the corporation or organization. What it
requires is that the funds of such corporations should come from the general
public.

3. In sum and substances and by precedential guidelines, the Court held that:
a. Presidential Decree No. 1689 also covers commercial banks as it covers all
corporations that draw their funds from the general public;
b. to be within the ambit of the Decree, the swindling must be committed through the
association, the bank in this case, which operate on funds solicited from the
general public;
c. when the number of the accused are five or more, the crime is syndicated estafa
under paragraph 1 of the Decree;
d. if the number of accused is less than five but the defining element of the crime
under the Decree is present [i.e. that there was an association formed for the intent
of fraud and the same was used to commit the fraud], the second paragraph of the
Decree applies (People v. Romero, People v. Balasa); and
e. the Decree does not apply regardless of the number of the accused, when (a) the
entity soliciting funds from the general public is the victim and not the means
through which the estafa is committed, or (b) the offenders are not owners or
employees who used the association to perpetrate the crime, in which case, Article
315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code applies.
 CATIIS v. CA
G.R. 153979, February 6, 2006

FACTS: On January 2000, the respondents Reynaldo Patacsil, Enrico Lopez and Luzviminda
Portuguez, along with Margielyn Tafalla, hereinafter "Patacsil", "Lopez", "Portuguez", "Tafalla"
respectively, and other unnamed persons conspired and operated in a syndicated manner
consisting of 5 or more persons through corporations registered with the SEC and/or unregistered
foreign entites defrauded petitioner Catiis.

This was done through falsely or fraudulently pretending or representing themselves as a

legitimate exchange trading businesses to Catiis and the general public. These respondents
succeeded in inducing Catiis and other persons to give and deliver money amounting to
USD 123,461.14 despite having the knowledge that these registered or unregistered entities are
not licensed nor authorized to engage in foreign exchange trading corporations. These funds
were solicited from the public in general.

The RTC ruled that there was no syndicate as only 4 people were charged in the Information.
However, it instead imposed the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua
pursuant to the second paragraph of Sec. 1 wherein it provides that the same penalty shall be
imposed if the amount of fraud exceeds P100,000.

Upon appeal to the CA, it affirmed the RTC's ruling.

Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the term "any person" under PD
No. 1689 must be understood in its singular meaning so that even only one person can be indicted
under the said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred when it ruled that at least 5 persons should be
charged under PD No. 1689. [NO]

RULING: No, the RTC did not err when it ruled that at least 5 persons should be charged
under PD No. 1689.

P.D. No. 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death regardless of the amount
involved, provided that a syndicate committed the crime. A syndicate is defined in the same law
as "consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme."

Under the second paragraph, it is provided that if the offenders are not members of a
syndicate, they shall nevertheless be held liable for the acts prohibited by the law but they
shall be penalized by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud is
more than P100,000.00.
The Information specifically charged only four persons without specifying any other person
who had participated in the commission of the crime charged, thus, based on the definition of
syndicate under the law, the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate.

The wordings in the information that the accused conspired with each other "in a syndicated
manner consisting of five (5) or more persons through corporations registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying
out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme" is not sufficient compliance
with the requirements of the law on what constitute a syndicate. It bears stressing that the
first paragraph of the accusatory portion of the Information charges only four persons.

To repeat, P.D. No. 1689 has provided for the definition of a syndicate and it is controlling. As
correctly found by the trial court, if the government has chosen to indict only four persons,
without more, the obvious reason is that only the persons actually charged were involved
in the commission of the offense, thus, there was no syndicate.

Petitioner's reliance in People v. Romero is not tenable as the Court did not impose the penalty
of life imprisonment to death on the accused since the prosecution failed to clearly establish that
the corporation was a syndicate as defined under the law. There is no other way of establishing
a syndicate under P.D. No. 1689 than by the adherence to the definition provided by law.