Chapter 2

Airport Safety and Security

Dr. Rohafiz binti Sabar

Transport and Logistics Department
Room 2055
04-9287048
email: [email protected]

1 Transport and Logistics Department July 2009

 Airports Safety and Security
Introduction to Safety

 How do we measure (or define) safety?

 Taking a global viewpoint then safety may be expressed in terms of numbers of

aircraft accidents measured against aircraft movements and, on an international
basis, this measure has been chosen by industry to adopt for analysis and
statistical purposes.

 However, this is a rather a simplistic approach to adopt as the air transport

industry has many different ‘systems’ ranging from aircraft design to airport
operations.

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 Airports Safety and Security
Introduction to Safety

 Safety standards in aircraft design are ‘met’ by introducing specific

requirements for aircraft equipment, systems and installations.

 Aircraft systems and associated components are designed such that the more
severe the failure condition then the more improbable such a failure will be.

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Airports Safety and Security
Introduction to Safety

 Although most major international airports have had at least one

catastrophic accident in their lifetime, these tend to occur at random
intervals and are not solely a function of traffic levels but often of other
causal factors (airport layout, human factors, lack of ground radar, language of
communication, system failure etc.).
 Therefore to undertake risk analysis at one airport in isolation, using
irrelevant accident / incident data, could give a misleading impression of the
level of risk at that airport.

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 Airports Safety and Security
Accidents / Incidents

Who is to blame?

Accident Investigators try to avoid a blame culture.

[ICAO Annex 13, Chapter 3, Section 3.1;The sole objective of the

investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of accidents
and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or
liability]

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Airports Safety and Security
Accidents / Incidents: Data Uncertainties

 Are accidents / incidents unique or is there some element of commonality

(ground handling operations, cargo doors etc.)?

 Are past world-wide accidents / incidents applicable or not to the airport

in question (terrain, climate, runway layout, air shows etc.)?

 Causes of past accidents are often identified and addressed (wind shear,

square windows etc.) and thereafter do not occur again

 Cost-benefit analysis often makes safety enhancement measures difficult

to justify (value of human life?)

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Airports Safety and Security
Accidents / Incidents: Runway Operations

 Undershoot (climate, wind shear [MD82 Phuket], microburst, unstable

approach)
 Runway veer-off (loss of directional control, often due to ice / cross wind)
[Britannia, Gerona >>>>]
 Overrun (hydroplaning, skidding, landing long, rejected take-off) [Toronto
>>>]
 Collision (runway incursion, equipment) [Paris >>>>>]
 Foreign Object Debris (anywhere airside) [Concorde]
 Configuration (Spanair, Madrid?)

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9
 Gatwick

Taxiway

26R

26L

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Airports Safety and Security
Accidents / Incidents: Runway Incursions

 Poor communication techniques

 Failure to follow correct procedures

 Poor knowledge of the aerodrome layout

 Loss of situational awareness

 Applies to pilots, air traffic controllers and ground vehicle drivers

 Need to raise awareness of hazards by safety management

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Airports Safety and Security
Airports: Airside Operations

 In recent years, the airline and airport industry and their safety

regulators have become concerned about the level and extent of

damage caused to aircraft during ground handling and also about

the high rate of ‘incidents’ and the associated safety risks to

aircraft, passengers and airport workers.

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Airports Safety and Security
Airports: Airside Operations

It has been estimated that the global cost to the Air Transport Industry of
apron (ramp) accidents and incidents is $2 to 3 Billion annually. Such
enormous financial costs (which equates to 50% of the total losses of all
the world airlines) cannot be allowed to continue in today’s cost
conscious and highly competitive airline business. But even more
important than the commercial perspective is how vulnerable workers
are to the dangers on the apron and to what extent are public safety
issues involved.

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Airports Safety and Security
Airports: Airside Operations
Malaysian A330: After arrival from a flight from Beijing, baggage handlers were unloading
80 canisters weighing 2,000kg when they were hit by the strong toxic fumes. A check
by airport fire and rescue personnel revealed the canisters contained a chemical called
"hydroxy quino-line" which is used for rust-proofing. Several canisters had leaked,
causing severe damage to the aircraft fuselage. The aircraft was considered damaged
beyond repair.

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Source: CAP 642

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Airports Safety and Security
Safety: Third Party Risk

 Was the 4 October 1992 Amsterdam accident (El Al B747) a statistical

freak or inevitable? >>>>

 Airport Growth and Safety: A Study of the External Risks of Schiphol

Airport and Possible Safety-Enhancement Measures, Rand Corporation,

1993 >>>

 Third Party Risk near Airports and Public Safety Zone policy (UK DETR)

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Airports Safety and Security
Safety: Third Party Risk

 Estimated in terms of statistics and probabilities

 Function of annual aircraft movements and population

 Natural location of airports relative to urban areas (Hong Kong,

Singapore, Amsterdam Schiphol, London City, Heathrow)

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Airports Safety and Security
Introduction to Security

Terrorism has been an ongoing threat to the aviation industry for the last
50 years and is now becoming an ‘old’ problem. Three distinct phases in
aviation terrorism have emerged during this period:
 Phase 1: 1948 to 1968 - flight from persecution or prosecution (take me to /
from Cuba).
 Phase 2: 1968 to 1994 - the political phase (aircraft hijacking, leading to
introduction of hand baggage searches, mid-air explosions instigated hold
baggage x-rays, reconciliation and searches).
 Phase 3: 1994 to date - the aircraft as a weapon of destruction,

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Airports Safety and Security
Security: Methods of Attack ~ Hijack

 Smuggle arms and / or explosives on board aircraft in accessible

position
 Storm and take control of flight deck and cabins
 Use the crew and passengers as hostages
 Use the aircraft as a place of confinement from which to negotiate
 Use the aircraft as an airborne missile (Sept. 11th.)
 Not all hijackers are terrorists

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Airports Safety and Security
Security: Methods of Attack ~ Hijack

 November 1996, Ethiopian Airlines

 3 Criminals

 Weapons include bottle of whiskey, fire extinguisher and axes

 Lack of knowledge about payload range

 Determined, ruthless, fanatical

 140 deaths when plane crash landed in sea just off land

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Airports Safety and Security
Security: Methods of Attack ~ Sabotage

 Smuggle a sabotage device on board an aircraft to destroy it in the air

or on the ground (Pan Am, Air India)

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Airports Safety and Security
Security: Methods of Attack ~ Direct Confrontation
 International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) – ICAO Annex 17
Eighth Edition April 2006 ‘safeguarding international civil aviation
against acts of unlawful interference’ No power of enforcement over
member states
 ICAO Security Manual – (RESTRICTED) Guidance on the
interpretation and implementation of Annex 17. No power of
enforcement over member states
 International Air Transport Association (IATA) – IATA Security Manual
– (RESTRICTED) Covers all aspects of security aviation, providing
guidance and reference materials. No power of enforcement over
member airlines.
 European Directives and National legislation: Power of
enforcement

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 Airports Safety and Security
Security: Airport Schematic
Aircraft

Gate
Immigration Lounge
lounge

Airside
Baggage Baggage
claim Immigration system

Customs Security

Check-in
Arrivals
Landside
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Airports Safety and Security
Security: Staff Identification
 Airside access restricted to identified personnel
 ID cards to include a photograph and be valid only for specific areas.
 Issued by airport security and in UK DfT requires criminal record check
for airside access and counter terrorism check for certain aviation
functions.
 PIN codes can be used with passes to prevent ‘transfer’ of cards or use
of card if stolen. Cards / PIN should be immediately withdrawn on
termination of employment.
 Visitors have special passes and are accompanied at all times, in UK they
(and their baggage) are searched at all control points.

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 Airports Safety and Security
Security: Hand Baggage Screening

 Hand baggage x rayed

 Dual scanning with x rays of two differing energies giving colour
coded displays to differentiate metallic, organic and inorganic objects
 Throughput depends on pax profile
 Colour coded image most effective

Orange = organic
Blue = inorganic
Green = amorphous
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 Airports Safety and Security
Security: Hand baggage screening – Threat Image
Projection (TIP)

 TIP inserts digital threat images into the regular flow of bags
displayed on the computer screen.
 An “escape” is recorded if the checkpoint operator does not
respond to the virtual threat projection within the allotted time
period.
 Proven to increase treat detection :

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 Airports Safety and Security
Security: Hand Baggage Screening – Trace Detection

 Swab on wand rubbed on baggage

 Swab remove and placed in scanner for analysis
 Detects minute traces of all known explosives and narcotics
 Takes 8 seconds

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Airports Safety and Security
Security: Hold Baggage
 Reconciliation of passengers with hold baggage (ideally should be on
the same plane)
 100% screening of all hold baggage (ideally) ~ incorporates multi-level
screening (50% > 85% > 95% > 99.5% > ‘where is the owner?’)
 Organic elements (explosives, Christmas cake)have low atomic weight,
show up as orange on x-ray pseudo colour
 Explosives have specific bands of vapour pressure ~ very low for
military explosive, high for commercial blasting powder
 Liquid explosives
 Multiple screening required by some airlines

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 Airports Safety and Security
Security: Hold Baggage Screening Equipment

 5.5m long x 2m high

 Can scan up to 1800 bags per hour

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 Airports Safety and Security
Security: Hold Baggage Screening Equipment

 Dual energy X-ray automatic explosive detection gives up to 5 views

per bag
 Identifies suspect bag from atomic weight, shape and density of contents
 Maximum bag weight 50kg, maximum bag size 2.5m x 1m x .8m
 Average decision time 2 seconds
 Baggage assessment is a five stage process

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 Airports Safety and Security
Security: Terminal Forecourt Security

No private vehicles

Solid steel bollards

Reinforced concrete
barriers

LHR

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Airports Safety and Security
Security: Current and Future Developments

 Biometrics, iris scan, finger / hand scan >> pre-employment, access

control and immigration ~ cost ???? Implementation time???

 Frequent flyer travellers

 Passenger profiling

 ID smart cards

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Airports Safety and Security
References and Bibliography
 Systematic safety assessment of aircraft (Lloyd & Tye)

 AAIB, NTSB, BFU, BE, ANSV (or equivalent) reports

 Third Party Risk near Airports and Public Safety Zone policy (UK

DETR)

 Boeing Commercial Jet Aircraft Accidents: varies – 2007

http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf

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Airports Safety and Security
References and Bibliography

 Flight Safety Foundation [http://www.flightsafety.org], Aviation Safety

World, July 2006 > date; Airport Operations, Accident Prevention,
Human factors & Aviation Medicine, 1988 > 2006
 Airport Growth and Safety. A Study of the External Risks of Schiphol
Airport and Possible Safety Enhancement measures, RAND, 1993.
 Attitude or Latitude? Australian Aviation Safety, G R Braithwaite,
Ashgate, 2001

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Airports Safety and Security
References and Bibliography

 ICAO Annex 17 – Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts

of Unlawful Interference, 8th Edition 2006

 Aviation and Transportation Security Act 2001 [USA]

 Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 [UK]

 Terrorism Act 2000 [UK]

 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 [UK]

 Aviation Transport Security Act [Australia

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Airports Safety and Security
References and Bibliography
 EU Regulation 300/2008 :
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:097:0072:0084:EN:
PDF
 EU Regulation 2320/2002: Common rules in the field of aviation security
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc
&lg=en&numdoc=302R2320

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Airports Safety and Security
References / Legislation
 K. M. Sweet, Aviation and Airport Security: Terrorism and Safety Concerns
(Prentice Hall)
 C. Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation, 2002
 C. Williams, S. Waltrip, Air Crew Security (Ashgate)
 J Zellan, Aviation Security: Current Issues and Developments, Nova Science,
2004
 The Management of Aviation Security, Denis Phipps, Pitman Publishing, 1991
 Moxon R, MSc Lecture Notes Airport Operations
 Study on European aviation security system funding
http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/safety/studies_en.htm

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