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Administrative Law
I. Quasi-legislative (rule-making) power

a. Non-delegation doctrine

With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution

provides that "the Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those
which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely
legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as
the authority to make a complete law — complete as to the time when it shall
take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable — and to determine the
expediency of its enactment. Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may
be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative
power, it must appear that the power involved is purely legislative in
nature — that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative
department. It is the nature of the power, and not the liability of its use or
the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of its delegation.

Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is

subject to the following recognized limitations or exceptions:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of

Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2)

of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

(Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461,
168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005)

b. Test for valid delegation of legislative power

In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the

delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented
by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under

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which the legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.

(Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461,
168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005)

i. Completeness test

The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job
must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a
complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between
delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and
delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The
Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. (Edu v. Ericta, G.R. No.
L-32096, October 24, 1970)

The law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do
when it reaches him except enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will
prevent its enforcement unless they are first filled, the delegate will then have
been given the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a discretion essentially legislative in order to repair the omissions.
This is invalid delegation. (Guingona v. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22,
1991)

Completeness refers to ”the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it
shall be applicable.” (See Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos.
168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005)

ii. Sufficient standard test

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which

implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by
which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the

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act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. What is sought to be obtained as in Calalang v.
Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." (Edu v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-32096,
October 24, 1970)

Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained

only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that
the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the
exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency
concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both
be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner
prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a
delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that
the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the
absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may
be implied. (Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. v. Alcuaz, G.R. No.
84818, December 18, 1989)

A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. (Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207,
168461, 168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005)

c. Types of permissible delegation

i. Ascertainment of fact

Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the

power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of
contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to
depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or
limitations on their authority. While the power to tax cannot be delegated to
executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an
exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine
the existence of facts on which its operation depends.

The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis
for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is
simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information
and making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the
legislature may perform through its members, or which it may delegate to
others to perform. Intelligent legislation on the complicated problems of
modern society is impossible in the absence of accurate information on the
part of the legislators, and any reasonable method of securing such
information is proper. The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of
government does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon
which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed
determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to application of

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legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for
Congress itself properly to investigate. (Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita,
G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005)

It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily
involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence
of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of
the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are,
validly conferrable upon executive officials provided the party affected
is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No.
2056, section 2. (Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963)

ii. Filling-in the details

That is to say, the law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and
bailing of hemp the Fiber Board with the power and authority to
devise ways and means for its execution. In legal effect, the Legislature
has said that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine Islands it must
be inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board or that purpose and
vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a
delegation of legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of
administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and
intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not
inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that
would have to be vested in a board of commission.

The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the
inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its
enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or commission,
how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality
or even fraud in the administration of the law is not an argument against its
constitutionality.

We have given this case the careful consideration which its importance
deserves, and are clearly of the opinion that the act in question, is not a
delegation of legislative power to the Fiber Board, and that the powers given
by the Legislature to the board are for an administrative purposes, to enforce
and carry out the intent of the law. (Alegre v. Collector of Customs, G.R. No.
L-30783, August 27, 1929)

d. Limits on rule-making power

To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the

following requisites to be valid:

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;

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3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and

4. It must be reasonable.

(Lokin v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010)

e. Publication and effectivity

General rule: To be valid and effective, administrative issuances should be

fully published and filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register
(ONAR). Otherwise, they are legally invalid, defective, and unenforceable.

Exceptions: (1) interpretative regulations; (2) those merely internal in nature

(i.e., regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public); and (3) letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.

(See Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985 and Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 101279, August 6,
1992)

On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the
affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is
required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular
the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated
differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through
the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines.

(De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 109023, August 12, 1998)

However, the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and
submitted their respective comments is not compliance with the fundamental
rule that the GRAM Implementing Rules, or any administrative rules whose
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must be published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The requirement of
publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be
dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was public
consultation and submission by the parties of their comments.

(National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms (NASECORE) v.

Energy Regulation Commission, G.R. No. 163935, February 2, 2006)

II. Quasi-judicial power

a. Cardinal primary rights (Based on Ang Tibay v. Court of

Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1950))

1. Right to a hearing, including the right to present his/her own case and

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 submit evidence in support thereof;
2. Tribunal must consider evidence presented;
3. Decision must be supported;
4. Evidence must be substantial evidence;
5. Decision must be based on evidence must be presented or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
6. Person deciding on the case must act on his/her independent
consideration of law and facts and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate; and
7. Decision must show issues involved and reasons for decision.

b. Principles connected to the cardinal primary rights

i. Opportunity to be heard

In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or
a right to be heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to have
been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit position
papers. The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter
and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. More often than not, a
litigant may be heard more creditably through pleadings than through oral
arguments. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Due process was designed
to afford an opportunity to be heard, and an actual verbal hearing need
not always be held. The necessity of conducting a hearing is addressed to
the sound discretion of the labor arbiter.

(Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
113911. January 23, 1998.)

ii. Substantial evidence

Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

iii. Form of Judgment

Similarly, it is a basic tenet of due process that the decision of a government

agency must state the facts and the law on which the decision is based. The
COA decision merely stated conclusions of law. Facts and circumstances,
as well as the why's, the what's and the how's of the disallowance,
were patently missing, inaccurate or incomplete. The COA cannot just
perform its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of government
funds at sheer discretion. There has to be factual basis why the expenditure
is alleged to be fraudulent or why was there a misrepresentation. Liability
depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the
head of a government agency. The COA even mentioned the anti-graft law
which imputes liability for a grossly disadvantageous contract entered into by
a government functionary. But as to why and how the disbursement of

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funds in this case was considered disadvantageous must be duly
supported by findings of facts.
(Albert v. Gangan, G.R. No. 126557, March 6, 2001)

The constitutional mandate that, "no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based," does not preclude the validity of "memorandum
decisions," which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

***

However, also in Permskul, this Court laid down the conditions for the validity
of memorandum decisions, to wit:

The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of

fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference,
which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately
available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the
incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access
to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a
statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should
actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court
in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the
decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was
made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely
affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it is
based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that
such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood
that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article
VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its
violation.

The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision

should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth.
It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of decision may be
resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both
parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal
complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the
laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple
litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is
obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss
it.

(Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008 citing Francisco
v. Permskul, G.R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989)

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The actual exercise of the disciplining authority's prerogative requires a prior
independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with
this requirement results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority
should not merely and solely rely on an investigator's recommendation, but
must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There can be no
shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the livelihood
of the person administratively charged.

(Department of Health v. Camposano, G.R. No. 157684, April 27, 2005)

The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment
and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of
practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to
investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the
officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and
discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.

(American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-26803,

October 14, 1975)

iv. Reviewing authority must be impartial

In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, the decision of

the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court
after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the
Secretary's own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the
incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of
administrative justice," the Court said:

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn
out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than
the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of
the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same
view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first
view of the case.

(Rivera v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 115147, January 4, 1995 citing
Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 261)

v. Respondent not entitled to investigation report

Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to

furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary,
we unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an administrative
case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire
into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented
against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent

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no doubt had been accorded these rights.

More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of

appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings
of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondents removal from office was
grounded. This resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the
basis of any further remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we
cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her access to the
investigation report.

(Pefianico v. Moral, G.R. No. 132248, January 19, 2000)

III. Other powers

a. Rate-fixing power

In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed
rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least
two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (Administrative Code,
Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 9(2)).

Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate-fixing and its far-
reaching effects on millions of commuters, government must not relinquish
this important function in favor of those who would benefit and profit from
the industry. Neither should the requisite notice and hearing be done away
with. The people, represented by reputable oppositors, deserve to be given
full opportunity to be heard in their opposition to any fare increase.

The present administrative procedure, to our mind, already mirrors an orderly

and satisfactory arrangement for all parties involved. To do away with such a
procedure and allow just one party, an interested party at that, to determine
what the rate should be, will undermine the right of the other parties to due
process. The purpose of a hearing is precisely to determine what a just and
reasonable rate is. Discarding such procedural and constitutional right is
certainly inimical to our fundamental law and to public interest.

(Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, G.R. No. 115381, December 23,
1994)

b. Licensing power

Administrative Code, Book VII, SECTION 17. Licensing Procedure.—(1) When

the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be
preceded by notice and hearing, the provisions concerning contested cases
shall apply insofar as practicable.

(2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations
or when public security, health, or safety require otherwise, no license may
be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without notice and hearing.

Administrative Code, Book VII, SECTION 18. Non-expiration of License.—

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Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal
of a license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing
license shall not expire until the application shall have been finally determined
by the agency.

IV. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

Well-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under the special and technical
training and knowledge of such agency. Administrative agencies are
given a wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of their
adjudicative functions, latitude which includes the authority to take judicial
notice of facts within their special competence.

(Quiambao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128305, March 28, 2005)

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the
matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that
its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical
matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will
be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies
"where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence
of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view" (United
States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, Emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since
the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which
entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a
technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in
possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court
does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative
to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral
resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It
behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory
power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an
administrative agency.

One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the

interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder
is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts
(Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399, at 407).

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The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call
for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after
the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and
determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is salutarily served.
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to an
administrative agency are secured, and the limited function of review by the
judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort, for ascertaining
and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues, to agencies that
are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through
experience, and by more flexible procedure (Far East Conference v. United
States, 342 U.S. 570).

(Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, April 18,
1990)

V. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

a. General rule

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies which mandates that

relief should first be sought from the highest or most superior
administrative agency, the likes of the Cabinet, may prove that a resort to
the courts would be unnecessary, prevent the courts from being swamped by
a resort to them in the first instance, strengthened by the rule on comity and
convenience which requires Us to raise our hands until the administrative
process has been finally completed, and thus it is after judicial review is no
longer premature that the courts may ascertain, in proper cases, whether the
administrative action or findings are not in violation of law, whether they are
free from fraud or imposition and whether they find substantial support from
the evidence.

(Paredes v. CA, G.R. No. 113357, February 1, 1996)

Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does

not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a
long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that
it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for
a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed
waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it. (Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29, 1996)

b. Exceptions

i. Purely legal question (Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106

Phil. 446);
ii. Urgent (Alzate v. Aldana, G.R. No. 14407, February 29,
1960); extremely limited time (Quasha v. SEC, G.R. No.
L-47536, May 13, 1965);

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 iii. Small amount involved (Cipriano v. Marcelino, G.R. No. L-
27793, February 28, 1972);
iv. Administrative appeal is merely permissive (Corpuz v.
Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-17860, March 30, 1962); no express
provision requiring administrative appeal (Civil Service
Commission v. Department of Budget Management, 464
SCRA 115);
v. Administrative inaction (Department of Agrarian Reform v.
Apex Investment and Financing Corp., 401 SCRA 283);
vi. Irreparable damage involved (De Lara v. Clorivel, G.R. No.
L-21653, May 31, 1965); and
vii. Waiver (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438).

2022 Jurists Pre-bar Notes on Administrative Law. For exclusive use of Jurists Bar reviewees. © 2022
by Jurists Review Center, Inc. Unauthorized copying, dissemination, sharing, uploading, downloading, and
storage strictly prohibited and will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, including the filing of
administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, IBP, and SC as well as the filing of criminal
charges. Page 12 of 12