RAUL OFRACIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply when only one of the parties was negligent. For
the doctrine to apply, it must be shown that both parties were negligent but the negligent act of
one was appreciably later in time than that of the other. It may also apply when it is impossible to
determine who caused the resulting harm, thus, the one who had the last opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so will be held liable.1
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision3 which
affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision4 convicting Raul Ofracio (Ofracio) of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Damage to Property.
On May 29, 2002, Ofracio was driving a tricycle loaded with lumber when it collided with the
tricycle being driven by Roy Ramirez (Ramirez). Ramirez was hit by the lumber, causing his
instantaneous death. Ramirez's tricycle was also damaged in the collision.5
On June 25, 2002, a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide with damage to
property was filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Sorsogon City against
Ofracio. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities found probable cause and issued a warrant for
Ofracio's arrest.6
On August 7, 2002, Ofracio entered a plea of not guilty to the charge against him.7
The parties admitted the following during the pre-trial conference:
(T)he place, date[,] and time of the incident subject of the case; identity of the parties; that there
was a vehicular accident involving two tricycles one of which was driven by accused Raul
Ofracio; an investigation was conducted by the police authorities; and the competence of Dra.
Myrna Listanco, who issued the Certificate of Death of the victim, Roy Ramirez.8
The prosecution presented the following as their witnesses: (a) SPO2 Camelo Murillo (SPO2
Murillo) (b) Carlos Dayao (Dayao); (c) Rosario Ramirez (Rosario); and (d) Dr. Larry Garrido
(Dr. Garrido).
SPO2 Murillo testified that he was on duty at the Police Sub-Station 2 when a tricycle driver
reported an accident in Bibincahan, Sorsogon City. When he arrived at the scene of the accident,
he saw Ramirez lying face down on the road. He then asked a barangay tanod to bring Ramirez
to the hospital. At the accident scene, he observed that some of the lumber atop Ofracio's tricycle
had pierced the windshield of Ramirez's tricycle.9
Dayao testified that he was conversing with some friends at around 11:00 p.m. when he heard a
loud thud and cries for help. He and his friends ran towards the noise and found Ramirez
bloodied and lying on the ground, face down. Dayao admitted that he did not see the actual
collision of the tricycles.10
Rosario was the deceased's mother and she testified on the expenses she incurred in burying her
son and filing a case against Ofracio.11
Dr. Garrido, an expert witness who testified on the post-mortem examination report conducted
by Dr. Myrna Jasmin-Listanco, concluded that the cause of Ramirez's death appeared to be
"cerebral hemorrhage secondary to skull fracture secondary to vehicular accident."12
The defense presented two witnesses: (a) Ofracio and (b) Reyden Despuig (Despuig).
Ofracio testified that on May 29, 2002, past 11:00 p.m., he was transporting forty-six (46) pieces
of lumber in a tricycle with Despuig as his passenger.13
Ofracio claimed that he was slowly and carefully driving because of his heavy cargo. As he was
driving, he suddenly saw a bright light 4 to 5 meters in front of him. The collision occurred in
Ofracio's lane, with his tricycle hitting Ramirez's sidecar. He admitted fleeing the scene of the
accident but the following day, when he went to the hospital for his own injuries, he voluntarily
surrendered to the police when he found out that they knew about his involvement in the
collision.14
Despuig corroborated Ofracio's testimony. 15
On June 1, 2011, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2 of Sorsogon City found Ofracio
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional as maximum. Ofracio was also ordered to compensate the heirs of Ramirez in the
amounts of P60,950.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P30,000.00 as
moral damages.16
Ofracio appealed, but the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52 of Sorsogon City affirmed the ruling
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. The Regional Trial Court also denied his motion for
reconsideration.17
Ofracio elevated the Regional Trial Court's ruling to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
Regional Trial Court erred in holding him liable under the doctrine of last clear
chance.18 However, the Court of Appeals19 upheld the findings of both the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities and the Regional Trial Court.20
In his Petition for Review on Certiorari21 before this Court, petitioner posits that the Court of
Appeals failed to take judicial notice of the laws of physics which find application in any
vehicular accident.22 Petitioner presents computations to show that contrary to the lower courts'
findings, perceiving the imminent collision at a distance of only 4 or 5 meters, was not enough to
avoid the collision, since the total stopping distance was 5.39m.23
Furthermore, petitioner maintains that he was slowly driving because his tricycle was weighed
down by the 46 pieces of lumber it was transporting.24 He states that the lumber on top of his
tricycle were still in their original position even after the collision, supporting his testimony that
he was not driving at high speed.25
Petitioner likewise claims that transporting lumber on top of a tricycle is a common practice in
Sorsogon City and cannot be considered as imprudence and negligence per se, as long as the
necessary precautions are taken to secure the lumber to the tricycle.26
In its Comment,27 respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, states that the factual issues raised in the Petition are beyond the ambit of a petition for
review on certiorari.28 Respondent also posits that the lower courts did not err when they
unanimously found that even if Ramirez was driving his tricycle in a zigzagging motion,
petitioner still had the last clear chance to avoid the collision.29
Petitioner was directed to submit a reply to respondent's Comment but he manifested that he was
waiving his right to do so.30
The only issue raised for this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner should be held liable
under the doctrine of last clear chance.
The Petition is meritorious.
Pascual v. Burgos31 instructs that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari and that factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court. While there are
exceptions to this rule, these exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the
parties.32
Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. 33 lists 10 recognized exceptions to the rule:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record.34 (Citations omitted)
The first exception where "the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures" is present here, thus placing this case well-within the exception to the general
rule that only questions of law may be brought to this Court in a Rule 45 petition.
In the case at bar, the lower courts found both parties negligent but that petitioner could have
avoided the accident had he only acted with prudence. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities held:
(T)he accused himself testified, he saw the victim Roy Ramirez' tricycle approaching him in a
zigzagging manner. At this point, the prudent driver seeing the possibility of a collision should
have stopped immediately upon seeing the danger which was clearly approaching. But alas, the
accused did otherwise or proceeded to confront the peril looming closer.
This account cannot absolve the victim, Roy Ramirez from any negligence, as by accounts, he
was driving in a zigzagging manner.
Considering that both drivers were negligent, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance finds
application.35
The Court of Appeals then stated:
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the clear opportunity to avoid the loss but
failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.
In the case at bar, assuming that the deceased Roy Ramirez was indeed driving his tricycle in a
"zigzagging" and fast manner as claimed by Petitioner Raul Ofracio, the latter cannot be
exonerated from his culpability for the death of Roy Ramirez, as he, himself, admitted that he
already saw "a very bright light" / the incoming vehicle "about four (4) or five (5) meters away."
In fact, in his testimony before the trial court, he stated:
....
To our mind, considering that Petitioner was aware of the incoming tricycle as far away as 4 or 5
meters because of the bright headlight of the tricycle, he could have taken precautionary
measures to avoid the collision with the other tricycle. He could have slowed down, parked at the
side of the road, or applied his breaks and stopped on his tracks.
To make matters worse, records show that Petitioner had in his tricycle 46 pieces of lumber[,]
some of which even protruded from his tricycle. The absence of any evidence showing that
Petitioner made efforts to secure the said pieces of wood to his tricycle further evinces his
imprudence and negligence.36
The lower courts surmised that petitioner's failure to avoid the collision when he had every
opportunity to do so made him liable under the doctrine of last clear chance.
The lower courts are mistaken.
The doctrine of last clear chance contemplates two (2) possible scenarios. First is when both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one party happens later in time than the negligent
act of the other party. Second is when it is impossible to determine which party caused the
accident. When either of the two (2) scenarios are present, the doctrine of last clear chance holds
liable for negligence the party who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the resulting harm or
accident but failed to do so.37Bustamante v. Court of Appeals38 further explains:
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent
plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he,
aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the
reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid
an accident.39
From every indication, it was Ramirez's act of driving his tricycle in a speedy and unpredictable
manner (i.e. zigzagging) which caused the accident However, the lower courts also ascribed
negligence to petitioner because he supposedly had enough time to either steer clear of Ramirez
or stop his tricycle altogether to prevent the collision.
The records showed that Ramirez's tricycle hit petitioner's tricycle while the latter was within its
lane, thereby substantiating petitioner's testimony that Ramirez was driving in a zigzag manner.
This also demonstrated that petitioner stayed within his lane the entire time prior to the accident.
Petitioner likewise testified that he was slowly driving prior to the accident, and this was
corroborated by his passenger.40 Additionally, he had 46 pieces of lumber strapped on top of his
tricycle, which made it impossible for him to drive his tricycle at top speed. This was apparent
during his cross-examination:
COURT INTERPRETER:
�
[Ofracio] A. I was still p[l]ying my route that day because of my purpose also to augment the
family income.
�
[Atty. Labitag] Q. And because you were then performing something illegal you were driving
your motorized tricycle in a very fast speed?
� �
A. No Sir, at the time I cannot drive my tricycle fast or as fast as I wanted to because the fact
is I had lumber in the tricycle and I cannot make the tricycle run as fast.
� �
Q. You wanted to run the tricycle fast at that time?
A. No Sir.
� �
Q. You cannot run fast because your motorized tricycle was laden with lumber, 46 pieces in
all according to the police report, do you agree with me Mr. witness?
A. I was so careful in driving at that time because I was aware that I had so much lumber in
my tricycle and it was heavy.41
Also, the fact that only two (2) pieces of lumber were dislodged from the roof of petitioner's
tricycle even after the collision supports his testimony that he was slowly driving and that the
pieces of lumber were secured to his tricycle.42
The lower courts concluded that petitioner had ample time to avoid Ramirez as he became aware
of the oncoming tricycle when it was about 4-5 meters away, thus, he should have taken
precautionary measures like slowing down, parking at the side of the road, or even stopping
altogether.43
The lower courts erred on this point.
A tricycle, traveling within the speed limit, can easily cover four (4) to five (5) meters (or 13-
16.5 feet) in a few seconds. A speeding tricycle would traverse the same distance even faster.
Hence, from the moment petitioner saw the approaching tricycle, which was barreling towards
his lane in an erratic and unpredictable manner, no appreciable time had elapsed which would
have afforded him the last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.
Even petitioner's act of transporting lumber on top of his tricycle cannot be said to be a negligent
act per se. This Court takes judicial notice44 that the use of tricycles to transport heavy objects
such as appliances and furniture is a common practice in the Philippines, particularly in rural
areas, as tricycles are readily available and a more affordable way of transporting items,
especially for those who cannot afford to rent a truck or jeepney.
Clearly, the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable here since the prosecution failed to
show beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner negligently acted or that he could have avoided the
accident if he had acted with more prudence.
In the same manner, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner was guilty of reckless
imprudence as punished in Article 36545 of the Revised Penal Code. Reckless imprudence
"consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time[,] and
place."46 It has the following elements:
(1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is
voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time[,] and place.47
Gonzaga v. People48 instructs that the prosecution must show the "direct causal connection
between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of"49 to establish a motorist's
liability for negligence. Gonzaga likewise stressed that mere negligence is not enough to
constitute reckless driving, rather, the prosecution must prove that the motorist acted in utter
disregard of the consequence of his or her action, as it is the "inexcusable lack of precaution or
conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and
brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law."50
Here, petitioner was slowly driving his lumber-laden tricycle on the lane where he was supposed
to be, when Ramirez's tricycle appeared from the opposite direction, moving at great speed and
in an erratic manner, before it crashed into his tricycle. Clearly, there was no imprudent or
negligent act on petitioner's part which led to or contributed to the collision or to Ramirez's
death.
It seems as if the lower courts construed petitioner's flight after the accident as an absolute
manifestation of guilt51 and ignored the other pieces of evidence which pointed to his lack of
negligence. While leaving the severely injured Ramirez after the collision might have been a
badge of guilt, this remains disputable and is not the willful and inexcusable negligence required
to uphold a finding of guilt for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and damage to
property.
For a successful conviction in a criminal case, the prosecution must prove the elements of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt or with moral certainty. Rule 133, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence defines moral certainty as "that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind."
The Constitution requires the prosecution to establish the accused's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt in recognition of the presumption of innocence enjoyed by the accused. People v.
Ganguso52 expounds:
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt
standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused
from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it
discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be
entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of
proof as excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The
conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.53
With the prosecution's failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide or that petitioner was liable under the doctrine of last clear
chance, petitioner must consequently be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November
27, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR No. 35640 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Raul Ofracio is
hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, Inting, Delos Santos, and Rosario, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil 717, 722-723 (1995) [Per J. Vitug,
Third Division] (citation omitted)
2
Rollo, pp. 8-25.
3
Id. at 27-34. The November 27, 2015 Decision docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 35640
was penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and concurred in by Associate
Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy of the Special Sixth
Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4
Id. at 27. The January 8, 2013 Decision was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2012-
8402 and promulgated by Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon City.
5
Id. at 28.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 29.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 29-30.
13
Id. at 30.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 30-31.
17
Id. at 31.
18
Id.
