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1.
2. If do so they have to lower their price because each firm in a monopolistically
competitive market faces a downward sloping demand curve.
3. FALSE. Because the accounting profit is zero.
4. Choose A because in short run, P > AVC but in long-run, P<ATC
5. a and b
Quantit
Price y TR MR MC
50 0 0
40 5 200 40 10
30 10 300 20 10
20 20 400 10 10
15 30 450 5 10
10 50 500 2.5 10
0.19230
5 102 510 8 10
2.5 200 500 -0.10204 10
c. Max’s profit-maximising is at (P,Q) =(20,20), at this point MR and MC make an
intersection.
8.
a, Jestar: Nothing is strictly dominated by Low Price => eliminate Nothing
More Advertising is strictly dominated by Low Price => eliminate More Advertising
Virgin Blue: Nothing is strictly dominated by Low Price => eliminate Nothing
More Advertising is strictly dominated by Low Price => eliminate More Advertising
b. In the full game:
Jestar: Nothing is strictly dominated by Low Price
More Advertising is strictly dominated by Low Price
Virgin Blue: Nothing is strictly dominated by Low Price
More Advertising is strictly dominated by Low Price
c. According to the answer in a and b, Jestar and Virgin Blue absolutely play Low Price
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=> The equilibrium outome is (Low Price, Low Price)=(3,3)
d. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium is (Low Price, Low Price)=(3,3)
e. If two firms cooperate with each other, they will get a better outcome which is (5,5). It
means that they both doing nothing.
f. They are not able to cooperate with each other. Because the priority of a firm is
maximizing their profit. So, if Virgin Blue play Nothing, Jestar will play Low Price in
which they get a highest payoff is 8.
g. If the firms play game repeatedly, the equilibrium outcome is still the same which is
(Low, Low)=(3,3).