Case Number 1

People of the Philippines v Rullepa y Guinto

FACTS
Rullepa was charged with the rape of Cyra May Buenafe, with a complaint filed before the RTC
of Quezon City. He was employed as the house boy of Cyra Mae’s parents. According to Gloria Buenafe,
Cyra May’s mother, Cyra May told her of the incident while she was preparing for dinner. Thus, after the
arrival of her husband, she relayed to him what happened. Later, Gloria and her husband verified the
incident with Ronnie, who readily admitted doing those things, but only once, contrary to Cyra Mae’s
allegation that it happened twice.
According to Gloria, Cyra May was only 3 and a half years old when the rape happened. The
Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory found that there were
abrasions on the labia minora of Cyra May. Rullepa denied having anything to do with the abrasions,
claiming that she could have scratched herself which caused the abrasions. He also claims that his
earlier admission was made only out of fear.
The RTC found Rullepa guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to death. Hence, the
automatic appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC erred in imposing death penalty to the accused.

RULING
YES. A person's appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court. In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victim's
certificate of live birth or other similar authentic documents. The victim and her mother, however,
testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape.
There is no reasonable doubt that the second element of statutory rape is present: that the
victim was below 12 years old. Because of the huge disparity between the alleged age (3) and the age
sought to be proved (12), the trial court would be able to ascertaining the victim's age from her
appearance. The disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can
easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance
corroborates the relative's testimony.
However, reasonable doubt exists that the victim was below 7 years old. A mature three and a
half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year-old. The appearance of the
victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and the testimony of the mother is, by
itself, insufficient.
 As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at
the time of the commission of the offense, accused- appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death
penalty. Only reclusion perpetua can be imposed.
 Case Number 2
Yap v Inopiquez
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1431, 9 May 2003
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

FACTS
SPO2 Yap arrested Laurente by virtue of an arrest warrant on March 6, 1999. On the same day,
Judge Inopiquez issued an order of release on the basis of a cash bond posted on March 8. Also on
March 6, Judge Inopiquez issued another order of release, this time based on a property bond that was
subscribed and sworn to him on March 10, however the date was changed to March 6.
Thus, Yap filed an administrative complaint against Judge Inopiquez. The respondent judge
claimed that the official receipt was actually issued on March 6 and it was the clerk of court who
altered the date because Yap angrily protested that a receipt should not have been issued because it
was a Saturday.

ISSUE
Whether or not oral evidence prevails over documentary evidence

RULING
NO. It is a basic rule of evidence that between documentary and oral evidence, the former
carries more weight.
As gleaned from the documentary evidence, the cash bond was posted on March 8 not on
March 6, 1999, as shown by the official receipt. While the property bond, in substitution of the cash
bond, was filed on March 10 as shown by the jurat. In contrast, both Orders of Release were issued on
March 6. Therefore, there is no doubt that the respondent ordered the release of the accused despite
the fact that there was no bail filed and approved for his provisional liberty.
In the instant case, respondent not only failed to perform his judicial duties in accordance with
the rules, he acted in bad faith. Despite the fact that he ordered the release of a person lawfully arrested
even before he had posted bail, he tried to hide his culpability by altering the dates of the cash bond
and property bond. His actuations constitute gross misconduct which merits sanctions even if he
already retired.
 Case Number 3
Bank of the Philippine Islands v Mendoza
G.R. No. 198799, 20 March 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS
Respondents Amado and his mother, Maria Mendoza opened a savings account in BPI Gapan
Branch and deposited $16,264 in US Treasury check payable to Maria. After the lapse of the clearing
period, they withdrew the amount of $16,244.
BPI received a notice from Bankers Trust Company New York that the check was dishonored
due to the amount being altered. This was evidenced with an email and a photocopy of the check with a
notation because the original copy of the check was confiscated by the US Government. Thus, BPI
informed the respondents and demanded reimbursement.
The RTC ruled in BPI’s favor. However, the CA reversed the decision because the presentation of
a mere photocopy of the subject check is in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.

ISSUE
Whether or not the best evidence rule was violated with the presentation of the photocopy of the
US treasury check

RULING
YES. Under Section 3, Rule 130, in cases where the document was lost or destroyed or cannot
be produced in court, it is crucial that the offeror proves:
(a) the existence or due execution of the original
(b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non- production in court
(c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can
be attributed.
In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the requisites under Section 3 of Rule 130. First, the
existence or due execution of the subject check was admitted by both parties. Second, the reason for
the non-presentation of the original copy of the subject check was justifiable as it was confiscated by
the US government for being an altered check. And third, absent any proof to the contrary and for the
reasons already stated, no bad faith can be attributed to BPI for its failure to present the original of the
subject check. Thus, applying the exception to the Best Evidence Rule, the presentation of the
photocopy of the subject check as secondary evidence was permissible.
 Case Number 4
Magdayao v People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 152881, 17 August 2004
Callejo, Sr., J.

FACTS
Magdayao was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Magdayao issued a PNB check in the
amount of 600,000 pesos to Olvis in payment of his obligation. However, the check was dishonored due
to insufficient funds when Olvis tried to draw the check against Magdayao’s account. Magdayao then
offered to replace the checks with 2 other checks, so Olvis returned the original check to Magdayao.
But he still failed to pay.
During the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, the prosecution offered the photocopy of the
PNB check, which the court admitted. Magdayao insisted that the photocopy of the subject check is
inadmissible in evidence because of the prosecution’s failure to produce the original copy.

ISSUE
Whether or not the photocopy of the PNB check is inadmissible in evidence against Magdayao.

RULING
NO. The check is admissible. The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or
control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence.
The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to
the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production
of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces
tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When
such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to
produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
In this case, Magdayao never produced the original of the check, much less offered to produce
the same. He even complained of the prosecution's violation of the best evidence rule. He cannot feign
ignorance of the need for the production of the original copy of the check which is in his possession.
The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant
him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do following his numerous
unjustified postponements.
 Case Number 5
Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez
G.R. No. 170604, 2 September 2013
Bersamin, J.

FACTS
The heirs of Alvarez filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita
Prodon. They aver that their parents were the registered owners of the parcel of land but they could not
find the owner’s duplicate copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title. They also stated that the original
copy is in the Registry of Deeds and it contained an entry stating that the property was sold to Prodon
subject to the right of repurchase. They prayed that the entry be cancelled and that Prodon be held
liable for damages.
In her answer, Prodon stated that the late Maximo Alvarez had executed the deed of sale with
the right to repurchase and that she had become the absolute owner of the property due to its non-
repurchase within the given 6-month period.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The RTC
ruled in favor of Prodon stating that although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence in
court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence.

ISSUE
Whether or not the prerequisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been complied
with.

RULING
NO. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the
evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery
of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.
The given case does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase. The principal issue was whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase had really
existed. Despite the fact that the terms of the writing were not in issue, the RTC inexplicably applied the
Best Evidence Rule to the case and proceeded to determine whether the requisites for the admission of
secondary evidence had been complied with, without being clear as to what secondary evidence was
sought to be excluded.
 Case Number 6
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman
G.R. No. 165487, 13 July 2011
Perez, J.

FACTS
Nelson Santos applied for a license to engage in the business of storing palay in his warehouse
in Tarlac. In order to secure a license, he was required to post a cash bond, a bond secured by real
estate, or a bond signed by a duly authorized bonding company. Country Bankers Insurance Corp
issued 2 warehouse bonds, one of which was done through Antonio Lagman. An indemnity agreement
was signed by the parties, binding themselves to be solidarily liable with the petitioner. Thereafter,
Santos secured a loan and used the warehouse receipts as collateral.
When he defaulted in payment upon maturity, and the sacks of palay cannot be found, Country
Bankers was compelled to pay 1.16 million pesos. Thus Country Bankers filed a complaint for sum of
money against Lagman and the other co-signees.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. Lagman appealed, stating that a new bond was executed in
1990 which novated the previous bonds that were issued in 1989. He presented a photocopy of the
new bonds as evidence.

ISSUE
Whether or not the photocopy of the bond is admissible in evidence.

RULING
NO. The copy is inadmissible. According to the Best Evidence Rule, the original document must
be produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. Under Rule 130, Section 5, a photocopy,
being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the
offeror must prove the following: the existence or due execution of the original; loss and destruction of
the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and absence of bad faith on the part of the
offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.
In the given case, Lagman mentioned during direct examination that there were actually 4
duplicate originals of the 1990 bond. When more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all
of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, before a secondary evidence can be
given. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals.
 Case Number 7
Flores y De Leon v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 222861, 23 April 2018
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS
Roderick France, while driving a taxi, figured in a vehicular accident with a jeepney. He was
issued a traffic violation receipt by PO2 Jessie Flores and his driver’s license was confiscated.
Additionally, PO2 Flores demanded 2,000 pesos from him as a condition for the return of his driver’s
license. When France told him that he cannot pay him within 2 days, Flores told him to come back on
the third day, while he is serving his night shift.
France sensed that something is wrong, so he went to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Task Force. They marked 4 500 peso bills that France was supposed to give to PO2 Flores. PO2 Flores
was later arrested via an entrapment operation pursuant to a complaint filed by France.
The RTC ruled in favor of France. Flores appealed, stating that the Best Evidence Rule was
violated because the prosecution's exhibits were mere photocopies and the original pieces of the
marked money used during the entrapment operation were never even presented.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Best Evidence Rule was violated.

RULING
NO. The non-presentation of the original pieces of the marked money is not fatal to the cause of
the prosecution. The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject
of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document actually executed, or exists, or in
the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
In the given case, the marked money was presented solely for the purpose of establishing its
existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is
admissible without the need of accounting for the original. More importantly, these four pieces of P500
bills were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses during the trial. As such, the absence of the
original pieces of the marked money did not militate against the cause of the prosecution.
 Case Number 8
RCBC Bankard Services Corporation v Oracion
G.R. No. 223274, 19 June 2019
Caguioa, J.

FACTS
Moises and Emily Oracion were granted credit card accommodations by RCBC. They used the
credit card for various purchases but failed to pay RCBC a total amount of 117k even after receipt of
the statements of account and a demand letter. Thus, RCBC filed a complaint for sum of money before
the MeTC. In its complaint, RCBC attached "duplicate original" copies of the Statements of Account and
the Credit History Inquiry.
For failure of respondents to file an answer within the required period, the MeTC considered the
case submitted for resolution pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure. The MeTC, without delving
into the merits of the case, dismissed it for the failure of RCBC to discharge the required burden of
proof in a civil case.
Upon appeal, the RTC ruled that RCBC should have proved that the attachments in support of
the complaint are originals and not merely substitutionary in nature.

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC erred in affirming the decision of the MeTC.

RULING
NO. The Court cannot just concede that the pieces of documentary evidence in question are
indeed electronic documents. For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must
pass the test of admissibility.
In the given case, the petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence
because it failed to authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of
evidence.
Also, what petitioner had in mind when it filed the complaint was to have the annexes admitted
as duplicate originals as the term is understood in relation to paper-based documents. Thus, the
annexes or attachments to the complaint of petitioner are inadmissible as electronic documents, and
they cannot be given any probative value.
 Case Number 9
National Power Corporation v Codilla
G.R. No. 170491, 3 April 2007
Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS
M/V Dibena Win is a vessel owned and operated by Bengpai Shipping, Co. It bumped and
damaged one of the power barges of NPC. Thus, NPC filed for damages before the RTC. NPC filed its
formal offer of exhibits which included exhibits that were mere photocopies. Respondents opposed the
admission of the exhibits, which the RTC granted. NPC filed a petition for certiorari arguing that the
exhibits were admissible in evidence. It stated that the photocopies, having been “produced
electronically”, are equivalent to their respective original on the basis of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not a photocopy of a documentary evidence constitute electronic evidence

RULING
NO. An electronic document refers to information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols, or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a
right is established, or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which
is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved, or produced electronically.
In the given case, although the photocopies submitted by NPC were produced through an
electronic process, they contained documents which were signed by persons manually. Thus, NPC’s
argument that the exhibits were the functional equivalent of their originals is a wrong interpretation of
the law. Because a person’s signature affixed manually cannot be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced.
 Case Number 10
Maliksi v Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 203302, 12 March 2013
Carpio, J.

FACTS
Maliksi was a mayoral candidate in Imus, Cavite. After the canvassing of votes, Saquilayan was
proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Maliksi filed an election protest before the MTC. After the manual
revision of the ballots, Maliksi was declared the duly elected mayor. Saquilayan filed an appeal.
However, upon inspection, it appeared that the integrity of the ballots had been compromised.
Thus, COMELEC ordered the examination of the digital images of the contested ballots as
stored in the Compact Flash cards. After counting, COMELEC proclaimed Saquilayan as a winner.
Maliksi filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the resort to ballot images violated the best evidence
rule.

ISSUE
Whether or not the best evidence rule was violated

RULING
NO. In the case of Vinzon-Chato v HRET, it was ruled that he picture images of the ballots, as
scanned, and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise “official ballots” that faithfully capture in electronic
form the votes cast by the voter. The digital images of the physical ballots are electronically and
instantaneously generated by the PCOS machines once the physical ballots are fed into and read by the
machines. Thus, the images are not secondary evidence. The physical ballots and the ballot images in
the CF cards are both original documents, with the same evidentiary weight. Thus, the BER is not
violated.
 Case Number 11
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v Ssangyong Corporation
G.R. No. 170633, 17 October 2007
Nachura, J.

FACTS
Ssangyong is a supplier of MCC Industrial Sales. They conduct their business through telephone
calls and facsimile transmissions. Ssangyong would send invoices through fax. If MCC conforms with
the invoice, its representative would affix his signature on the faxed copy and then send it back to
Ssangyong thru fax. The parties agreed on the same and purchase of 220 metric tons of stainless
steel. MCC, however, failed to pay half of its obligation.
Ssangyong cancelled the sales contract and filed a civil action for damages. MCC filed a
demurrer to evidence alleging that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented are
inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE
Whether or not the print out and the photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic
evidence and are admissible.

RULING
NO. Facsimile transmissions are not considered electronic data messages or electronic
documents, thus, they cannot be admitted as electronic evidence. To be admissible in evidence as an
electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under
the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."
The terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.
In the present case, therefore, the invoices, which are mere photocopies of the original fax
transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate
courts.
 Case Number 12
Eagleridge Development Corporation v Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.
G.R. No. 204700, 24 November 2014
Leonen, J.:

FACTS
Eagleridge Development Corporation, Naval, and Oben are the defendants in a collection suit
initiated by Export and Industry Bank. By virtue of a Deed of Assignment, EIB transferred EDC's
outstanding loan obligations to respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. The terms
used in the Deed of Assignment which were not defined therein derive their meaning from the Loan
Sale and Purchase Agreement executed by the same parties.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement.
Cameron filed its comment alleging that petitioners have not shown "good cause" for the production of
the LSPA and that it is irrelevant to the case.
The RTC denied the motion. Its decision was affirmed by the CA. However, the SC reversed the
decision and required Cameron to produce the LSPA and its annexes. Cameron alleges that the
production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule.

ISSUE
Whether or not the production of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement will violate the parol
evidence rule

HELD
NO. The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of
assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to
determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment.
Also, what is forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or extrinsic
evidence, not those expressly referred to in the written agreement.
Since the deed of assignment was produced in court by respondent and marked as one of its
documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is
necessary for its understanding may also be inquired into by petitioners.
 Case Number 13
Spouses Amoncio v Benedicto
G.R. No. 171707, 28 July 2008
Corona, J.:

FACTS
In 1997, Spouses Wilfredo and Angela Amoncio entered into a contract of lease with Garcia over
a 120 sq meter portion of their 600sq meter property. They also entered into a contract of lease with
Benedicto over a 240 sq meter portion of the same property. However, in 1999, Garcia preterminated
his contract while Benedicto stopped paying his monthly rentals. Also, Benedicto made improvements
on an unleased portion of the property and began to occupy Garcia’s portion. They demanded that he
pay is arrears and desist from continuing his construction to no avail. Then they filed a complaint for
recovery of possession of real property.
Benedicto, on the other hand, avers that the Spouses Amoncio owed him money, and that they
agreed to construct 5 commercial buildings: 1 to Garcia, 2 to the spouses, and 2 to Benedicto. They
also agreed that he was to finance the construction and petitioners were to pay him for the two
buildings assigned to them.
The RTC ruled in favor of Benedicto. The spouses contend that the trial court disregarded the
parol evidence rule which disallowed the court from looking into any other evidence relating to the
agreement of the parties outside the written contract between them.

ISSUE
Whether or not the parol evidence rule no longer apploes after petitioners failed to object to
Benedicto’s testimony

RULING
YES. The present case does not appear to fall under any of the exceptions of the rule on parol
evidence. Petitioners failed to make a timely objection against respondent's assertion of their prior
agreement on the construction of the buildings.
Where a party entitled to the benefit of the parol evidence rule allows such evidence to be
received without objection, he cannot, after the trial has closed and the case has been decided against
him, invoke the rule in order to secure a reversal of the judgment.
 Case Number 14
People v Umali y Amado
G.R. No. 84450, 4 February 1991
Medialdea, J.

FACTS
Gloria and Suzeth Umali were charged with violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. In order to crack down on the supplier of marijuana to minors in Quezon, police sought the
help of Francisco Manalo. Francisco Manalo was detained in Tiaong Minicipal Jail. He was likewise
investigated for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act. He was also facing other charges such as
concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes against property. In return he asked the policeman to
help him in some cases pending against him. Manalo was give 4 marked bills from sources known to
him. The instruction was for Manalo to bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him to the police
headquarters. After a few minutes, he returned with two foils of dried marijuana which he allegedly
bought from Gloria Umali. A search warrant was issued to search the house of Gloria Umali which
resulted in the confiscation of 16 foils of dried marijuana leaves and the marked bills.
The trial court found Umali guilty. She alleges that witness Manalo is not reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value.

ISSUE
Whether or not the court gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of Manalo

RULING
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article
821 of the Civil Code which states that persons "convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or
false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."
Since the Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a
witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, the fact that he is facing several criminal
charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness. The testimony of a witness
should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he was actuated by improper
motive. Hence, in the absence of any evidence that Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his
testimony must be accorded full credence.
 Case Number 15
People v Aleman y Longhas
G.R. No. 181539, 24 July 2013
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS
Aleman was found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. The prosecution’s case hinges
on the eyewitness account of Mark Almodovar. Almodovar states that he was playing basketball when
he needed to urinate. While urinating near the court, he saw a fat man being followed by 2 men, one
with a knife and the other with a gun. He then witnessed the man with the knife stabbing the fat man
repeatedly, on different parts of his body. After taking the fat man's personal belongings, the two men
left. He followed them to a place and there, he saw them bury the knife and cover it with soil. After this,
he followed them again and saw one of the culprits uncover his face.
Almodovar was 14 years old when he testified. He is a deaf-mute. He was assisted in his
testimony by, a licensed sign language interpreter. Aleman appealed his conviction, alleging that
Almodovar is not qualified to be a witness.

ISSUE
Whether or not Mark, a deaf-mute, is a credible witness.

RULING
YES. The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness.
The rule is that “all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.” A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses,
such as his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about
his/her environment and experiences. A deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has
the faculty to make observations and he/she can make those observations known to others. Deaf-
mutes are competent witnesses where they:
1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath;
2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and
3) can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter.
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark understood and appreciated
the sanctity of an oath and that he comprehended the facts he testified on.
 Case Number 16
People v Bustos
G.R. No. L-27200, 20 January 1928
Villa-Real, J.

FACTS
Francisco Bustos and Angel Del Castillo engaged in a dispute while trying to determine the
boundaries of the lands they occupied. Montemayor and Macaspac ran to the place of the fight and
were able to separate the two. Montemayor conversed with Angel while Macaspac took Bustos home.
Yumul, Angel’s wife, who was also present, went to her house. On nearing her home, she heard the cries
of her daughter, Soledad. Soledad is deaf-mute. Going in the direction pointed by Soledad, Yumul saw
her son Felipe on the ground wounded. Felipe died a few moments later. The same night, Bustos
presented himself to the municipal president with a wounded forehead, stating that he had been
stoned.
Mariano Castillo, the 8-year old borther of the deceased, testified that he saw his brother
pursued by a dagger-wielding Bustos and Macaspac, who was armed with a bolo. The prosecution also
presented Soledad, who was interpreted by a teacher from the deaf and dumb school who had never
taught the witness.

ISSUE
Whether or not Soledad, a deaf-mute, is qualified to be witness.

RULING
NO. The testimony given at the trial by a deaf-mute and interpreted by a teacher of deaf-mutes
is inadmissible as evidence when said interpreter has not had frequent contact with the deaf-mute
witness so as to enable her to understand the latter's signs.
This was shown in the present case, in which during the course of interpretation, there were
times when the interpreter could not make out what the witness meant by such signs as she uses, and
this is due to the fact that the deaf-mute had never been a pupil of the interpreter.
In view of this, it would not be prudent to admit the deaf-mute's testimony as interpreted by the
teacher. The evidence adduced at the trial conclusively establishes the fact Bustos and Macaspac, on
meeting Felipe del Castillo, they pursued him until they overtook him, inflicting several wounds upon
him as a result of which he died a few minutes later.
 Case Number 17
Alvarez v Ramirez
G.R. No. 143439, 14 October 14 2005
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

FACTS
Ramirez filed a complaint for arson against Maximo Alvarez, her brother-in-law, before RTC
Malabon. During trial, Esperanza, Maximo’s wife and Ramirez’ sister, was called to the witness stand.
Maximo and his counsel did not object. In the course of her testimony, Esperanza showed uncontrolled
emotions, prompting the judge to suspend the proceedings.
Maximo, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him,
citing the marital disqualification rule. The trial court issued an order disqualifying Esperanza from
further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. Upon appeal, the CA nullified and set
aside the order issued by the trial court.

ISSUE
Whether or not Esperanza can testify against her husband

RULING
YES. Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to
be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony
and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
In this case, the act of arson eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust,
confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
Also, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between Maximo and his wife was already
strained. Thus, the preservation of the marriage is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
 Case Number 18
People v Quidato
G.R. No. 117401, 1 October 1998
Romero, J.

FACTS
Bernardo Quidato Jr. was charged with the crime of parricide. Bernardo Quidato Sr. was
accompanied by his son and 2 hired hands, Reynaldo and Eddie Malita went to Davao City to sell copra.
On the evening of the next day, they killed Bernardo Sr., by hacking him on the nape and neck, with the
intention of stealing from him.
Bernardo Jr. was tried jointly with Reynaldo and Eddie Malita. However, Reynaldo and Eddie
withdrew their “not guilty” plea and were accordingly sentenced. During trial, the prosecution presented
Gina Quidato, Bernardo’s wife, as a witness. Bernardo objected to Gina’s testimony on the ground that
the same was prohibited by the marital disqualification rule, which the judge acknowledged.

ISSUE
Whether or not Gina’s testimony must be disregarded.

RULING
YES. Bernardo timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly
observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding
the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in
the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with Bernardo's case.
This testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the
guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital
disqualification rule.
Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and
Eddie's extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment
unfavorable to Bernardo.
 Case Number 19
People v Pansensoy
G.R. No. 1140634, 12 September 2002
Brion, J.

FACTS
Analie Pasensoy is the legal wife of Roberto Pansensoy. Hilario Reyes is Analie’s lover. On May
8, 1994, Roberto shot Hilario. The latter was hit on the forehead, causing his death. Analie alleged that
Roberto went to the house she and Hilario were renting. Roberto approached Hilario and asked him if
he really loves his wife. Hilario answered in the affirmative. He then asked Hilario if he was still single.
Hilario answered yes. Roberto counted one to three and at the count of three shot Hilario. Hilario was
hit on the forehead and sprawled on the ground.
Roberto, on the other hand, invoked self-defense. He and Hilario struggled for possession of a
gun owned by Hilario. He was able to twist Hilario's hand and to point the barrel of the gun towards the
latter. The gun suddenly went off. Hilario holding the trigger when the gun fired and hit him on the head,
still holding the gun when he fell to the floor.
The trial court found Roberto guilty with the crim of murder. It accorded full faith and credence
to the testimony of Analie and rejected the version of Roberto that he acted in self-defense.

ISSUE
Whether or not Analie’s testimony should be disregarded under the marital disqualification rule.

RULING
NO. Roberto failed to timely object to Analie’s competency to testify under the marital
disqualification rule. Under this rule, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants.
However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in a criminal
prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses generally. The objection
to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first offered as a witness.
In this case, the incompetency was waived by appellant's failure to make a timely objection to
the admission of Analie's testimony.
 Case Number 20
Zulueta v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 107383, 20 February 1996
Mendoza, J.

FACTS
Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Martin. On March 26, 1982, she entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use
in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine.
Dr. Martin brought an action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages. The
trial court declared that the documents and papers belong to Dr. Martin and ordered Zulueta to return
them and enjoined her from using them as evidence.

ISSUE
Whether or not the documents are admissible in evidence.

RULING
NO. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence
to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.
A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
 Case Number 21
U.S. v Antipolo
G.R. No. L-13109, 6 March 1918
Fisher, J.

FACTS
Antipolo as charged with the murder of Dinal. One of the errors assigned is based upon the
refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of Dinal, to testify as a witness on behalf
of the defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations.
The fiscal objected to the testimony of the witness for the reason that she is incompetent
unless it be with the consent of her husband and as the husband is dead, the fiscal believes that the
wife is disqualified from testifying.
Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was competent, arguing that the disqualification
which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of the
parties to a proceeding is called to testify.

ISSUE
Whether or not Ezpeleta is a competent witness

RULING
YES. Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 reads as follows: "Except with the consent of both, or
except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband nor wife shall be a
competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall
be parties."
The purpose of Section 58 is to protect accused persons against statements made in the
confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such
confidential communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the
prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he
has suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the
communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made
for the express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities
concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.
The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending death,
concerning the circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a prosecution of the person
charged with killing the declarant.
Such dying declaration are admissible in favor of the defendant as well as against him. It has
been expressly held in several jurisdictions in the United States that the widow of the deceased may
testify regarding his dying declarations.
 Case Number 22
People of the Philippines v Carlos
G.R. No. 22948, 17 March 1925
Ostrand, J.

FACTS
Carlos was charged with the murder of Dr. Sityar. Dr. Sityar is the doctor of Carlos’ wife,
following his wife’s appendectomy. In one instance, Carlos also consulted with the deceased about his
lung trouble. Carlos later received a letter from Doctor Sityar asking for the immediate settlement of the
account for the professional services rendered his wife. He sought an interview with Doctor Sityar and
went to the latter's office several times without finding him in. In May 26, Carlos again went to the office
and found Dr. Sityar. He stabbed the doctor twice. Dr. Sityar made an effort to escape but was pursued
by Carlos, who stabbed him once. Dr. Sityar died within a few minutes.
The trial court found that the crime committed was murder because of premeditation. This was
sustained by a letter written by Carlos to his wife which was seized by the police in searching his
effects. Carlos’ counsel argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged communication and therefore
not admissible in evidence.

ISSUE
Whether or not the letter is admissible as evidence.

RULING
NO. Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a
third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the
spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent,
becomes admissible. If they were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still
be privileged, but if they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's consent, the
privilege should cease.
However, the letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial
the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-
stand and the letter was therefore not offered for the purpose. The letter is therefore nothing but pure
hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal
case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-
examine them.
 Case Number 23
Hilado v David
G.R. No. L-961, 21 September 1949
Tuason, J.

FACTS
Hilado brought an action against Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed by
Hilado’s now deceased husband. Atty. Dizon is the counsel of Hilado. Atty. Francisco is the counsel of
Assad. Atty. Dizon wrote to Atty. Francisco, urging him to discontinue representing the defendants on
the ground that Hilado had consulted with him about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she
turned over the papers" to Atty. Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. When he did not
receive an answer, Atty. Dizon filed a formal motion with the court. The complaint was dismissed.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the case

RULING
YES. There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms
from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but
such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions as provided in the Rules of Court.
Information so received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to permit it to be
used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the
element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security in, the relation of
attorney and client. The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from
accepting the opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was
received by him from his first client.
 Case Number 24
Regala v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 105938 & G.R. No. 108113, 20 September 1996
Kapunan, J.

FACTS
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987
before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers
acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
PCGG filed a motion to admit third amended complaint and third amended complaint which
excluded Roco from the complaint as party-defendant. Thereafter, petitioners filed their comment
and/or opposition with counter-motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
them. Sandiganbayan promulgated the resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of
petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case
No. 33 grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity
of his client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA
law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by
private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their
sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information
obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that,
under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from
revealing the identity of their client

RULING
YES. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under
this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not
invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client
relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process
considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. The
general rule is, however, qualified by some important exceptions:
 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing
the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
Information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the
client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of
the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance. The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal
service sought was duly established in the case, by no less than the PCGG itself.
Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in
the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth in the aforementioned corporations. Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of
the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where
none otherwise exists.
 Case Number 25
Lim v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 91114, 25 September 1992
Davide, Jr., J.

FACTS
Nelly Lim and Juan Sim are lawfully married to each other. Sim filed a petition for annulment of
such marriage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from schizophrenia. Sim
applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify. Lim's
counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privileged since the latter had examined her in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be
suffering from schizophrenia. The trial court allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. She neither revealed the
illness she examined and treated Lim for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the
medicines she had
prescribed.

ISSUE
Whether or not Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the physician-patient privilege.

RULING
NO. The rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the
witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the
community.
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made
to the physician's testimony. Lim failed to prove the presence of the requisites required.
In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. She did not
disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of Lim. Secondly,
it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado's testimony that the petitioner was never interviewed alone. Said
interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party. Third, nothing specific or concrete
was offered to show that indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken Lim's
character. Fourth, Lim makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any
question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege,
despite the trial court's advice that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony once it
becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication
rule.
 Case Number 26
Chan v Chan
G.R. No. 179786, 24 July 2013
Abad, J.

FACTS
Josielene Chan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Johnny Chan.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached
to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form
carried a physician's handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol
abuse." Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed
to Medical City, covering Johnny's medical records when he was confined. The request was
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces
tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege. Josielene claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the
"testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged.

ISSUE
Whether or not Johnny’s hospital records are covered by the privileged character of the
physician-patient communication.

RULING
YES. The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician
who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined
without the patient's consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter's reputation.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records would be
to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient's consent. Physician memorializes
all these information in the patient's records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling
the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the
latter's prior consent.
Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in
evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the
details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he
filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.
 Case Number 27
Krohn v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108854, 14 June 1994
Bellosillo, J.

FACTS
Edgar Krohn and Ma. Paz Fernandez are married. However, their marriage developed into a
stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the martial strain.
Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court. In his
petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied. Edgar
took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation
Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication
between physician and patient.
Ma. Paz, invoking the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient, seeks to
enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the report. Edgar contends that the prohibition only
applies to a physician.

ISSUE
Whether or not the physician-client privilege applies in the case

RULING
NO. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to
testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the
claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who
examined the patient and executed the report.
Also, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his
right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
 Case Number 28
Eagleridge Development Corporation v Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.
G.R. No. 204700, 24 November 2014
Leonen, J.

FACTS
Eagleridge Development Corporation, Naval, and Oben are the defendants in a collection suit
initiated by Export and Industry Bank. By virtue of a Deed of Assignment, EIB transferred EDC's
outstanding loan obligations to respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. The terms
used in the Deed of Assignment which were not defined therein derive their meaning from the Loan
Sale and Purchase Agreement executed by the same parties.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement.
Cameron filed its comment alleging that petitioners have not shown "good cause" for the production of
the LSPA and that it is irrelevant to the case.
The RTC denied the motion. Its decision was affirmed by the CA. However, the SC reversed the
decision and required Cameron to produce the LSPA and its annexes. Cameron alleges that the
production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule.

ISSUE
Whether or not the LSPA is privileged and confidential in nature

RULING
NO. Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of privileged communication. These are
communication between or involving the following: (a) between husband and wife; (b) between attorney
and client; (c) between physician and patient; (d) between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers
and public interest. It has not been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under any of
the foregoing categories.
This court has previously cited other privileged matters such as the following: (a) editors may
not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to
disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; (d)
bank deposits; (e) national security matters and intelligence information; and (f) criminal matters.
Nonetheless, the LSPA does not fall within any of these classes of information. Moreover, the privilege
is not absolute, and the court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice.
At any rate, Cameron failed to discharge the burden of showing that the LSPA is a privileged
document. It did not present any law or regulation that considers bank documents such as the LSPA as
classified information.
 Case Number 29
Air Philippines Corporation v Pennswell, Inc.
G.R. No. 172835, 13 December 2007
Chico Nazario, J.

FACTS
Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air
transportation services. Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and
selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. On various dates, Pennswell delivered and
sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. For failure of Air Philippines to comply with its obligation under
said contracts, Pennswell filed a complaint for a sum of money.
Air Philippines contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. In
particular, it alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by Pennswell for its previous
sale of four items. Said items were misrepresented by Pennswell as belonging to a new line, but were in
truth and in fact, identical with products Air Philippines had previously purchased.
During the pendency of the trial, Air Philippines filed a Motion to Compel Pennswell to give a
detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of the following products, to wit:
(a) Contact Grease and Connector Grease;
(b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and
(c) Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound, which the court granted.
Pennswell sought reconsideration, contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the
chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what Air Philippines
endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge.

ISSUE
Whether or not trade secrets may be the subject of public disclosure in pursuit of civil
proceedings.

RULING
NO. A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to
its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends
to a secret formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in
compounding some article of trade having a commercial value. American jurisprudence has utilized the
following factors to determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
 (6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent
source.
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent's special lubricants are
trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is
beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords to trade secrets is evident in our laws.
Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value
from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.
 Case Number 30
Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS
The DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the
NBN Project. In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and
cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Neri, former Director General of NEDA, was among those
invited. When Neri testified, he disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve
Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to Neri, requiring him to appear
and testify. However, in a letter, Executive Secretary Ermita requested respondent Committees to
dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Neri failed to appear, and
when issued with a show cause letter, he responded that he thought the only remaining questions were
those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He was later cited in contempt.

ISSUE
Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject 3 questions were covered by
executive privilege.

RULING
YES. In U.S. v Nixon, the U.S. Court recognized a great public interest in preserving the
confidentiality of conversations that take place in the President's performance of his official duties. It
thus considered presidential communications as "presumptively privileged." Apparently, the
presumption is founded on the "President's generalized interest in confidentiality ." There are two kinds
of executive privilege: (1) presidential communications privilege; and (2) deliberative process privilege.
The former pertains to "communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential
decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential." It
applies to decision-making of the President. The presidential communications privilege applies to
documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative
ones.
 Deliberative process privilege includes “advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated." It applies
to the decision making of executive officials.
The elements of presidential communications privilege are:
1. The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power."
2. The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational
proximity" with the President.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important
evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Using the above elements, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered
by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President,
i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor
of the President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter. The Letter dated
November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal
claim of privilege. There he expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine
of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance.
 Case Number 31
Philippine National Bank v Gancayco
G.R. No. L-18343, 30 September 1965
Regala, J.

FACTS
Gancayco and Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required PNB to
produce at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto T. Jimenez, who was under
investigation for unexplained wealth. PNB declined, invoking R.A. No. 1405. The RTC rendered
judgment sustaining the power of the defendants to compel the disclosure of bank accounts of ACCFA
Administrator Jimenez. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not a bank can be compelled to disclose the records of accounts of a depositor who
is under investigation for unexplained wealth.

RULING
YES. Section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 by
providing an additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits. With regard to the
claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential, it is enough to
point out that while Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 declares bank deposits to be absolutely
confidential, it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances:
(1) Upon written permission of the depositor;
(2) In cases of impeachment;
(3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials;
(4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject of the litigation.
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason
is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential.
 Case Number 32
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v Purisima
G.R. No. 56429, 28 May 1988
Narvasa, J.

FACTS
Manuel Caturla was charged with a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In the
course of the preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Banco
Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, commanding its representative to appear and furnish them with duly
certified copies of the records in all its branches and extension offices, of the loans, savings and time
deposits and other banking transactions, appearing in the names of Caturla, his wife, their children, and
Pedro Escuyos.
Caturla moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum, arguing that compliance would result in a
violation of Sections 2 and 3 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits. Then Tanodbayan Ericta not only
denied the motion for lack of merit, and directed compliance with the subpoena, but also expanded its
scope through a second subpoena duces tecum.
BF Bank took over from Caturla in the effort to nullify the subpoenae, filing a complaint for
declaratory relief. The court denied the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits precludes the production of the
subpoenae.

HELD
NO. The inquiry into illegally acquired property, or property not legitimately acquired, extends to
cases where such property is concealed by being held by or recorded in the name of other persons.
This proposition is made clear by R.A. No. 3019 which categorically states that the term, "legitimately
acquired property of a public officer or employee shall not include property unlawfully acquired by the
respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by,
respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives or any other persons."
To sustain the petitioner's theory, and restrict the inquiry only to property held by or in the name
of the government official or employee, or his spouse and unmarried children is unwarranted in the light
of the provisions of the statutes in question, and would make available to persons in government who
illegally acquire property an easy and fool-proof means of evading investigation and prosecution; all
they would have to do would be to simply place the property in the possession or name of persons
other than their spouse and unmarried children. This is an absurdity that we will not ascribe to the
lawmakers.
 Case Number 1
People v Tena
G.R. No. 100909, 21 October 1992
Narvasa, C.J.

FACTS
Alfredo Altamarino Sr. was found dead in his house. Suspicion fell on the caretakers but
investigation yielded no evidence to warrant the filing of charges. Later, suspicion as to the authorship
of the crime had shifted to a syndicate operating in Lucena City and nearby municipalities. Adelberto
Camota was a member of the syndicate who was in detention at the time. He was then interrogated by
the NBI.
After being confronted with the results of a polygraph test, Camota executed an extra-judicial
confession in the presence of Atty. Albert Siquijor, admitting participation in the robbery-killing of
Alfredo Altamarino, Sr. and pointing to Conde, de Jesus, Solito Tena, and an unidentified person as his
companions in the crime.
All of them were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and were sentenced to a prison term of
20 years. Later, to correct what he described as a typographical error, the trial judge issued an amended
judgment changing the number of years of the penalty imposed from twenty to thirty years. Tena
appealed.

ISSUE
Whether or not the extra-judicial admission of Camota may be used against Tena

RULING
The issue of Tena’s guilt or innocence may be resolved by application of the doctrine, "res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet." The use of Camota's extrajudicial confession is precluded by Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
The reason for the rule is that— on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's
own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations.
Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by
the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
Thus, the extrajudicial confession of Camota being inadmissible against his co-accused, and
there being no other evidence pointing to the alleged conspiracy between the accused, Tena is found by
the court not guilty of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
 Case Number 2
Naguiat v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118375, 3 October 2003
Tinga, J.

FACTS
Queaño applied for a loan in the amount of P200,000.00 with Naguiat, which was granted.
Naguiat gave 2 checks to Queaño, the proceeds of which were to constitute the loan granted by
Naguiat to Queaño. To secure the loan, Queaño executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
Naguiat. When the mortgage deed was notarized, Queaño issued to Naguiat a promissory note and a
Security Bank and Trust Company check.
Upon presentment on its maturity date, the Security Bank check was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. Queaño requested Security Bank to stop payment of her postdated check, but
the bank rejected the request pursuant to its policy not to honor such requests if the check is drawn
against insufficient funds. Naguiat applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC
rendered judgment, declaring the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage null and void, and ordering Naguiat to
return to Queaño the owner's duplicates of her titles to the mortgaged lots.
Naguiat questions the admissibility of various representations and pronouncements of
Ruebenfeldt, invoking the rule on the non-binding effect of the admissions of third persons on the
ground that they could not bind her following the res inter alia acta alteri nocere non debet rule.

ISSUE
Whether or not the representations mad by Ruebenfeld binds Naguiat.

RULING
YES. The existence of an agency relationship between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt is supported by
ample evidence. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Ruebenfeldt was not a stranger or an
unauthorized person. Naguiat instructed Ruebenfeldt to withhold from Queaño the checks she issued
or indorsed to Queaño, pending delivery by the latter of additional collateral.
The Court of Appeals recognized the existence of an agency by estoppel citing Article 1873 of
the Civil Code. Apparently, it considered that at the very least, as a consequence of the interaction
between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt, Queaño got the impression that Ruebenfeldt was the agent of
Naguiat, but Naguiat did nothing to correct Queaño's impression. In that situation, the rule is clear. One
who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent, and holds him out to the public as such,
cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of
innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith, and in the honest belief that he is what he
appears to be. The Court of Appeals is correct in invoking the said rule on agency by estoppel.
 Case Number 3
Estrada v Desierto
G.R. No. 146710-15 & G.R. No. 146738, 2 March 2001
Puno, J.

FACTS
Joseph Estrada was elected president in 1998. In 2000, he was accused of receiving millions of
pesos from jueteng lords and that he took P70 million in excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos
Sur. Later that same year, impeachment proceedings against him had begun and People Power 2 had
occurred. Estrada then agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a
candidate. The first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at
Malacañang and thereafter, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines. After this, several cases filed against him in the Office of Ombudman were
set in motion.
Estrada filed with the SC a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings or
in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, prayed for judgment
"confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.
Estrada denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence,
he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.
In determining whether or not the petitioner resigned, the Supreme Court considered “The
Angara Diary” which revealed an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. Petitioner
contends that the use of the Angara Diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Angara Diary is inadmissible as evidence.

RULING
NO. An exception to the re inter alios acta rule is Section 29 of Rule 130 as regards admissions
by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little
President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days
before he abandoned Malacañang Palace. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by
Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the
petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently,
petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the
principal (Estrada). Jones very well explains the reasons for the rule, viz: "What is done, by agent, is
done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent,
either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any
act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the
particular
contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet
opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and admissible in evidence against such principal."
 Case Number 4
Gardiner v Magsalin
G.R. No. L-48185, August 18, 1941
Ozaeta, J.

FACTS
Gardiner, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, filed an information against Catalino
Fernandez and respondents Pedro Yalung, Eugenio Villegas, Maximo Manlapid, Magno Icban, and
Rufino Maun, charging them with having conspired together to kill, and that they did kill, Gaudencio
Vivar, with evident premeditation.
Upon arraignment Fernandez pleaded guilty and his five co-accused, not guilty. At the trial of the
latter, Fernandez was called by the fiscal as his first witness, to testify to the alleged conspiracy. Upon
objection of counsel for the defense, Judge Magsalin did not permit Fernandez to testify against his co-
accused, on the ground that he being a conspirator, his act or declaration is not admissible against his
co-conspirators until the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

ISSUE
Whether or not Fernandez should be admitted to testify against his co-conspirators.

RULING
YES. Admission by a co-conspirator is one of the exceptions to the "res inter alios" rule. It refers
to an extrajudicial declaration of a conspirator, not to his testimony by way of direct evidence.
After proof of a conspiracy, the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
may be given in evidence. The evidence adduced in court by the co-conspirators as witnesses are not
declarations of conspirators, but directly testimony to the facts to which they testify. Aside from the
discredit which attaches to them as accomplices, their evidence is entirely competent to establish the
facts to which they testify. The rule for which counsel contends is applicable only when it sought to
introduce extrajudicial declarations and statements of co-conspirators.
There is no rule requiring the prosecution to establish a conspiracy in order to permit a witness
to testify what one or all of several accused persons did; and evidence adduced by co-conspirators as
witnesses, which is direct evidence of the facts to which they testify, is not within the rule requiring a
conspiracy to be shown as a prerequisite to its admissibility.
 Case Number 5
People of the Philippines v Palijon
G.R. No. 123545, 18 October 2000
Quisumbing, J.

FACTS
Palijon, Decena, and Mercene entered the house of Spouses Reyes. Decena kicked and boxed
Mrs. Reyes and struck Mr. Reyes with a steel-edged stool several times. Then, they ransacked the
house and escaped.
The accused were arraigned before the RTC and pleaded not guilty. The counsel for accused
Decena and Mercene moved that the two be allowed to withdraw their earlier plea of not guilty and be
re-arraigned to allow them to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. The prosecution
raised no opposition and the motion was granted. Decena and Mercene were then reindicted for
homicide and, with assistance of counsel.
Trial then proceeded against the remaining co-accused Rodelo Palijon and Myra Pria. The
prosecution's case was propelled in the main by the testimony of Mercene, who gave evidence against
said co-accused. The court found Palijon and Pria guilty.
Palijon denies he conspired with the others. He says the trial court erred in convicting him on
the basis of the testimonies of his alleged conspirators. Their testimonies could not be taken against
him under the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.

ISSUE
Whether or not the testimonies of Decena and Mercene are admissible, being co-conspirators in
the crime.

RULING
YES. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial
confession is admissible against the declarant's co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to
cross-examine the former.
Section 30 applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where
the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercene's admission
implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against
appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the
testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.
 Case Number 6
People of the Philippines v Surigawan
G.R. No. 83215, 15 December 1993
Puno, J.

FACTS
Surigawan, Aperdo, Bahayon, and Uayan were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
With Uayon's confession, Pat. Enguio then Iled a complaint against the four accused in the municipal
court. All 4 accused pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution’s witnesses testified, accused Aperso,
Buhaynon and Uayon changed their plea to guilty, however Surigawan continued to maintain his
innocence and proceeded with his defense.
In his defense, Surigawan declared that the statement he signed admitting his guilt was already
prepared by the police. He said the police did not read the same to him before he signed it. He also
averred that he signed the statement without the assistance of a lawyer due to the promise of the
police that he would be released upon its signing. He was also threatened that something would
happen to him if he refused to sign the statement. He advanced alibi to exculpate himself. He said that
on the date and time in question, he was sleeping in his house with his wife and children.
It premised the conviction on two grounds: (1) accused- appellant's extra judicial statement
admitting his guilt, and (2) accused- appellant's implication to the crime made in the extra-judicial
statements of his co-accused.

ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confessions of the
accused.

RULING
YES. In the case at bar, the alleged conspiracy among the accused was not priorly established
by separate and independent evidence. Nor was it shown that the extra- judicial confessions of the
other accused were made while they were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. In truth, the
confessions were made after the conspiracy has ended and after the consummation of the crime.
These confessions cannot be used against the accused-appellant without doing violence against his
constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to cross examine them.
Without the uncounselled confession of the accused-appellant and the extra-judicial
confessions of the other accused, no shred of evidence remains to establish the guilt of accused-
appellant Surigawan beyond reasonable doubt.
 Case Number 7
Bordalba v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112443, 25 January 2002
Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS
The instant controversy stemmed a lot with an area of 1,853 square meters and located at
Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and
Margarita Espina de Jayme. Bordalba filed an application seeking seeking the issuance of a Free Patent
over the same lot subject of the aborted application of her mother, Elena Jayme. The application was
granted and Bordalba caused the subdivision and titling of the land. Respondents prayed that the free
patent be declared void and ordered cancelled.
The trial court found that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining the free patent and it
was declared null and void. Both the petitioner and private respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision. Petitioner now contends that testimonies given by the witnesses
for private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not
have admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s statute.

ISSUE
Whether or not the dead man’s statute was violated.

RULING
NO. The rule does not apply in this case. The dead man's statute does not operate to close the
mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through
personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case
is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on
dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted
by the trial court.
 Case Number 8
Gevero v Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 77029, 30 August 1990
Paras, J.

FACTS
Ricardo Gevero, his mother Teodorica, and his five other siblings were co-owners pro indiviso of
an undivided lot. After the death of their mother, Ricardo sold his share in the property to Luis Lancero.
Lancero, on the other hand, sold it to Del Monte Development Corporation. Years after Lancero sold the
property to Del Monte, it appeared that the signature of Ricardo in the Deed of Absolute Sale
transferring the property from Ricardo to Lancero was forged. To settle the issue, Lancero signed a
document entitled “Settlement to Avoid Litigation”.
In 1966, the heirs of Teodorica executed an extra-judicial settlement and partition, including the
subject lot. Del Monte filed an action to quiet title and/or annul partition. In support of its action, Del
Monte averred that it bought the land from Lancero, its predecessor in interest, in good faith and for
value.
Herein petitioners opposed the action. They argued that Del Monte may not be considered in
good faith since Lancero had already admitted the fatal defect in the deed of sale between him and
Ricardo when he signed the “Settlement to Avoid Litigation”.

ISSUE
Whether or not the settlement to avoid litigation is binding to Del Monte.

RULING
NO. It is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. This particular rule is embodied in the maxim `res inter alias acta
alteri ' non debet.' Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property
is evidence against the former."
It is however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a property must have been
made while he was the owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the present
owner. Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on
Del Monte, the ownership of the land having passed to Del Monte in 1964.
 Case Number 8
People of the Philippines v Ciobal y Pabrua
G.R. No. 86220, 20 April 1990
Gancayco, J.

FACTS
Petitioners allegedly pilfered gas in the gasoline station of their employer, Benjamin Galvez. An
information was filed charging the accused of the crime of qualified theft. During trial, the defense filed
a demurrer to evidence which was denied. Hence, the case was deemed submitted for decision. On 8
April 1998, the RTC of San Fernando, La Union rendered a decision convicting them. They were each
sentenced to life imprisonment for qualified theft. The decision was based on the sole uncorroborated
testimony of Galvez. According to Galvez, Ciobal admitted that all of them, referring to the appellants,
have been receiving their respective shares from the money realized by them from the adjustments of
the meter reading and that it was accused Francisco Escala who had been adjusting the meter. Galvez
called for Ester Pajimola and asked her about the truth of the statement of Ciobal and Pajimola
answered that they were true. Ebreo likewise admitted having received part of the money realized by
the group from the adjustments of the meter reading. Because of these admissions, Galvez brought all
the accused to the police station for investigation, except Zaldy Cariño who ran away and since then
had not been reporting for work anymore. Reynaldo Dyquiangco, auditor of the gas station hired by
Galvez, found out that the station had incurred a loss totalling P118,855.21.

ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified theft.

RULING
YES. Galvez had not established through his testimony that the requisites of an admission by
silence were present. The prosecution said that the admissions are admissible against the other
appellants as an admission by silence. To be admissible as an admission by silence the following
requisites must concur as correctly stated by the prosecution:
(a) He must have heard or observed the act or declaration of the other person;
(b) He must have had the opportunity to deny it
(c) He must have understood the statement
(d) He must have an interest to object as he would naturally have done if the statement was not
true;
(e) The facts are within his knowledge; and
(f) The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence is material to the issue.
Galvez had not established through his testimony that all these requisites are present. He did
not state that the other appellants were present and heard the admissions against them; that they had
the opportunity to deny the same; that they must have understood the statement; and that the facts are
within their knowledge. Indeed, even appellant Ciobal who allegedly admitted his participation denied
the alleged imputation of appellant Lim that he placed gasoline in 2 containers. Absent such evidence
an admission by silence cannot be attributed to the other appellants.
Case Number 9
Villanueva v Balaguer
G.R. No. 180197, 23 June 2009
Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS
Villanueva, then Assistant Manager for Operations of IBC-13 was dismissed from employment
on the ground of loss of confidence for purportedly selling forged certificates of performance.
Contesting his termination, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. During the
pendency of the labor case, news articles about irregularities in IBC-13 were published. Balaguer, then
President of IBC-13, was quoted to have said that he uncovered various anomalies in IBC-13 during his
tenure which led to the dismissal of an operations executive for selling forged certificates of
performance.
In a letter, Villanueva urged respondents to confirm or deny if he was the person alluded to in
the news article. None of the respondents replied to the letter. Villanueva filed a complaint for damages
with the RTC. The RTC rendered a decision in his favor.

ISSUE
Whether or not the failure to respond to the letter constitute an admission

RULING
NO. The rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was
carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party would have immediately reacted
by a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt response can generally not
be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply.
In the same manner, we also cannot assume an admission by silence on the part of Balaguer by
virtue of his failure to protest or disclaim the attribution to him by the newspapers that he is the source
of the articles. As explained above, the rule on admission by silence is relaxed when the statement is
not made orally in one’s presence or when one still has to resort to a written reply, or when there is no
mutual correspondence between the parties.
 Case Number 10
Uyguanco v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76873, 26 October 1989
Cruz, J.

FACTS
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children,
and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. Claiming to be an illegitimate son
of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate,
Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners.
In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an admission
from Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the
illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. The petitioners thereupon moved for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the
applicable
provisions of the Civil Code. The motion to dismiss was denied.

ISSUE
Whether or not Graciano should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his
claimed father, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil
Code.

RULING
NO. While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents mentioned,
he insists that he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child," which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation.
It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation
by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting
his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his
alleged father's death in 1975. It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this
time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child
or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws.
The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the
claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.
 Case Number 11
People of the Philippines v Roa
G.R. Nos. 138195-96, 10 July 2003
Carpio-Morales, J.

FACTS
Ma. Nina de la Cruz was sleeping in her room when she was awakened by Roa, who had resided
with the de la Cruzes since 1976, being one of the workers in the family metal craft business. Roa,
armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly entered her room and raped her. More than 2 months later, Roa
did the same act to Nina. Nina's mother, after confirming from Nina herself that she was pregnant,
confronted appellant about the incidents but he remained silent.
During trial, Roa denied that he raped Nina. He also assails the credibility of the testimony of
Nina and that while Nina attributed her pregnancy to appellant, she nevertheless admitted that she was
already pregnant before she was raped. The RTC found Roa guilty of two counts of rape.

ISSUE
Whether or not Roa was deemed to have admitted the charges by his silence.

RULING
YES. Section 32 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that:
SECTION 32. Admission by silence. — An act or declaration made in the presence and
within the hearing observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper
and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
Roa’s admitted silence when Nina's mother confronted and even cursed him by his claim,
betrays his guilt just as his passivity does when he was allegedly maltreated and haled into jail by
Nina's father on account of the incidents. For an innocent man would certainly strongly protest and
deny a false accusation and do something positive to spare himself of punishment. But he did not.
 Case Number 12
Unites States v Bay
G.R. No. L-9341, 14 August 1914
Carson, J.

FACTS
Servando Bay was charged with the crime of rape. Bay, upon accidentally meeting Alcones, did
maliciously and criminally drag her toward a place covered with underbrush, and there by means of
force and intimidation did lie with her against her will.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution show that a party who was passing near the
place where the crime was committed heard Alcones’ cries, and put into shore; that one of the party
stepped ashore, and seeing the accused get up from the place where the woman claims the crime was
committed, asked "What's this?;" that the accused made no explanation of his conduct or his presence
there, and left the place forthwith; that immediately thereafter the woman, accompanied by some of the
party from the boat, went to the councilman of the barrio and made complaint; that the accused, having
been brought before the councilman and asked had he committed the crime of which he was charged,
admitted that he had.
Counsel for appellant lays great stress upon certain apparent contradictions and
inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the witnesses for the prosecution, and vigorously contends
that the trial court erred in accepting as true the testimony of the complaining witness and of the
witness called by the prosecution to corroborate her.

ISSUE
Whether or not the unexplained silence of the accused be considered as an evidence tending to
establish his guilt of the crime thus charged.

RULING
YES. There is a direct conflict in the testimony as to whether the accused, when the complaint
was made to the councilman of the barrio, did or did not admit his guilt, and this evidence is so
contradictory that it would be difficult if not impossible to make an express finding on this point. But
whatever be the truth as to these alleged admissions of his guilt, the evidence leaves no room for doubt
that neither at the moment when the party in the boat came upon him in company with his victim nor
when he appeared before the councilman upon her complaint did he claim, as he does now, that her
charge that he had assaulted her was a pure fabrication, invented for the purpose of wreaking
vengeance upon him. There can be no possible doubt that he was present when the party on board the
boat were attracted to the place where she raised her outcry charging him with the assault, and that he
was present later on when she presented her complaint to the councilman of the barrio. Under such
circumstances, we are convinced that an innocent man would instantly and indignantly repudiate such
a charge, and attempt there and then to establish his innocence, explaining how he came to be there
present with the woman, and the conditions under which she had made the false charge.
 Case Number 12
People of the Philippines v Paragsa
G.R. No. L-44060, 20 July 1978
Makasiar, J.

FACTS
Mirasol Magallanes, who was a little over twelve and a half, was alone in her parent’s house
when Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house, and raped her. Mirasol had to
reveal the incident of July 13 to her mother only when her mother asked her about it. Thereafter,
Mirasol's mother filed the corresponding complaint against the accused.
Paragsa admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, but he stoutly denied that he did so by
employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and Mirasol were sweethearts. The trial
court found Paragsa guilty of the crime of rape, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE
Whether or not the failure of Mirasol to rebut defendant’s testimony constitutes admission by
silence.

RULING
YES. The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of
the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party
can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear:
(1) that he heard and understood the statement
(2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial
(3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then
interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer
(4) that the facts were within his knowledge
(5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the
issue
These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of
Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an
admission of the truth of such assertion.
 Case Number 13
People of the Philippines v Dadles
G.R. Nos. 118620-21, 1 September 1997
Francisco, J.

FACTS
Alipio Tehidor and Salvador Alipan and their respective sons, Dionisio and Antonio were
kidnapped from their homes. Dadles, along with several accused were charged in two separate
informations. Dadles pleaded not guilty to both counts of kidnapping.
Upon joint manifestation of the Public Prosecutor and the defense counsel, both cases were
ordered consolidated and were jointly tried. On the abduction of the victims Alipio and Dionisio Tehidor,
prosecution witnesses Francisca and Danilo Tehidor testified, while prosecution witnesses Luzviminda
and Vicente Alipan narrated the alleged kidnapping of Salvador and Antonio Alipan.
Appellant denied the charges against him and interposed alibi. Finding the alibi of the appellant
insu;cient to controvert his positive identi9cation by the prosecution witnesses, the RTC of
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental rendered a decision convicting the appellant of two counts of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

ISSUE
Whether or not the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses fail to make out a case of
kidnapping.

RULING
NO. True it is that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time." However, "it
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom
or usage, and the like."
The general rule is that evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the
accused in a criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on
trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of
showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged in the indictment to permit proof of other
crimes would naturally predispose the minds of the jurors against the defendant. One who commits
one
crime may be more likely to commit another; yet logically, one crime does not prove another, nor tend
to prove another, unless there is such a relation between them that proof of one tends to prove the
other."
Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received
of other similar acts committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal
intent of the accused.
 Case Number 14
People of the Philippines v Pineda
G.R. No. 141644, 27 May 2004
Carpio, J.

FACTS
Pineda, Sison, Colet, Jacob, John Doe and Peter Doe, allegedly staged a hold-up while on board
a bus. They pulled out their respective firearms and poke the same against everybody and they started
to take and rob cash and personal belongings of all. And on the occasion of said robbery in order to
instill more fear among passengers, they shot SPO1 Fuensalida. The police later arrested Pineda based
on an out-of-court identification by Ferrer, the bus driver. Ferrer first identified Pineda and Sison through
mug shots the police presented to them. The RTC found Pineda guilty of robbery with homicide. It also
found the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos “positive, spontaneous and forthright” and observed that
they “remained steadfast and convincing despite the rigid cross-examination by defense counsel and
the clarificatory questions” of the trial court judge.

ISSUE
Whether or not the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant.

RULING
YES. A conviction for a crime rests on two bases: (1) credible and convincing testimony
establishes the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime; and (2) the prosecution proves
beyond reasonable doubt that all elements of the crime are attributable to the accused. The trial court’s
conviction of Pineda fails in both bases. In resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors:
(1) the witness’ opportunity to view the perpetrator of the crime
(2) the witness’ degree of attention at the time
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness
(4) the level of certainty shown by the witness of his identification
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the established methods of identifying
criminals, the procedure used in this case is unacceptable. The first rule in proper photographic
identification procedure is that a series of photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the
suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement
and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect. In the present
case, there was impermissible suggestion because the photographs were only of appellant and Sison,
focusing attention on the two accused. The police obviously suggested the identity of the accused by
showing only appellant and Sison’s photographs to Ferrer and Ramos. The testimonies of Ferrer and
Ramos show that their identification of appellant fails the totality of circumstances test. The out-of-
court identification of appellant casts doubt on the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos in court.
 Case Number 15
People of the Philippines v Magpayo
G.R. Nos. 92961-64, 1 September 1993
Bidin, J.

FACTS
Magpayo was charged with the following before RTC Malabon: 1.) rape of Lilibeth Bobis; 2.)
robbery of Lilibeth Bobis; 3.) robbery with hold-up of Jacquiline Jaime; and 4.) forcible abduction with
rape of Mara Chico. The victims Lilibeth, Mara and Jacquiline were able to positively identify Magpayo
as the perpetrator of the crimes when the latter was arrested by the police and brought to the police
station. Upon arraignment, Magpayo entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges. He vehemently
questions the trial court's decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution
witnesses allegedly failed to positively identify him. After trial, he was found guilty of all the offenses
charged in a joint decision rendered by the trial court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the application of the doctrine of re inter alios acta was proper

RULING
YES. As a rule, evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a
criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not
competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he
committed the crime charged in the complaint or information.
An exception to this rule is when such evidence tends directly to establish the particular crime,
and it is usually competent to prove the motive, the intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a
common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other
that proof of one tends to establish the other, or the identity of the person charged with the
commission of the crime on trial.
In the case at bar, evidence was introduced in Criminal Case No. 6443 (Forcible Abduction with
Rape) committed by appellant against 11-year old Mara N. Chico on November 20, 1987, not as
evidence of similar acts to prove that on April 10, 1988, the said appellant also committed a similar act
of rape (and robbery) against the person of 10-year old Lilibeth Bobis (Criminal Case No. 6436). These
offenses are separate crimes and are the subject of separate complaints and proofs though jointly
tried. Hence, the evidence in one was not offered and admitted to prove the other but only to show the
plan, scheme or modus operandi of the offender.
 Case Number 15
People of the Philippines v Acosta
G.R. No. 126351, 18 February 2000
Quisumbing, J.

FACTS
On February 27, 1996, Montesclaros, in the belief that Acosta and his wife were the ones hiding
his live-in partner from him, stormed the house of Acosta and burned their clothes, furniture, and
appliances. Later the same day, Acosta was seen inside Montesclaros’ house. He poured kerosene on
the bed and lighted it with cigarette lighter. The fire was easily put off by Acosta’s wife who arrived at
the place. In the morning of February 28, Montesclaros’ house was burning. Acosta was seen inside the
house, watching the blaze and not doing anything to contain it.
Acosta was charged with the crime of arson. He entered a plea of not guilty. The trial court
rendered a decision convicting Acosta of arson.

ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Acosta guilty.

RULING
NO. While it is true that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time," it may be
received "to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage,
and the like."
Acosta’s intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed
inside the same house which was burned later in the night. While it was not the fire charged in the
information and does not by any means amount to direct evidence against the accused, it was
competent to prove the intent of the accused in setting the fire which was charged in the information.
Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received
of other similar acts, committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal
intent of the accused.