ANASTACIO LAUREL VS.
ERIBERTO MISA
G. R. NO. L-409 JANUARY 30, 1947
FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel claiming that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving them aid and comfort during the Japanese era cannot be prosecuted for
the crime of treason as defined in Art. 114 of the RPC on the grounds that 1.) the sovereignty of the
government in the Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen is
suspended and 2.) there was a change of sovereignty.
ISSUE: 1. WON, the absolute allegiance of a Filipino citizen is suspended during the Japanese era
2. WON, the petitioner is criminally liable under Art. 114 of the RPC
HELD: NO. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government on the sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the
occupier. There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does
not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the
same government and same sovereign people.
Treason in Foreign Country and in Territory Under Military Occupation.—Just as a citizen or
subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a
foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the
enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort
Article 114 of Revised Penal Code, Applicability of.—Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, was
applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the
inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy
occupation.
PEOPLE VS. AGPANGAN,
79 PHIL. 334, NO. L-778 OCTOBER 10, 1947
Facts: The petitioner was accused of treason when two out of three witnesses testified that he
allegedly joined the Pampar, a military organization that supports Japanese military in Laguna where
he was seen doing guard duty in the Japanese garrison.
Issue: WON, the petitioner committed treason and meet the test under the two-witness rule to convict
him.
Held: NO. The first two witnesses for the prosecution testified that they had seen the accused doing
guard duty in the Japanese garrison in Siniloan "many times," more than "ten times," but neither of
them has mentioned any specific time, day and hour. They were able to mention only years and
months. These is no way of concluding that the two witnesses testified about the same overt act. The
case for the prosecution is further weakened by the fact that its first two witnesses are contradicted by
the third, who testified that appellant did guard duty "many times," more than "ten times," but in a
different location.
It was further known that petitioner was induced to guard because of fear for his life.
Treason; Evidence; Presumption of Innocence; Two Probabilities or Alternatives.—Where two
alternatives or probabilities arise from the evidence, and there is nothing in the record to show which is
correct, the alternative that is compatible with the presumption of innocence will be adopted.
Two-Witness Rule.—To meet the test under the two-witness rule, it is necessary that, at least, two
witnesses should testify as to the perpetration of the same treasonous overt act, and the sameness
must include not only identity of kind and nature of the act, but as to the precise one which has actually
been perpetrated. The treasonous overt act of doing guard duty in the Japanese garrison on one
specific date cannot be identified with the doing of guard duty in the same garrison guard duty in the
Japanese garrison on one specific date cannot be identified with the doing of guard in the same
garrison in a different date. Both overt acts, although of the same nature and character, are two distinct
and inconfusable acts, independent of each other, and either one, to serve as a ground for conviction
of an accused for treason, must be proved by two witnesses. That one witness should testify as to one,
and another as to the other, is not enough. Any number of witnesses may testify against an accused for
treason as to a long line of successive treasonous overt acts; but notwithstanding the seriousness of
the acts nor their number, not until two witnesses, at least, shall have testified as to the perpetration of
a single but the same and precise overt act, can conviction be entertained.
PEOPLE VS. PRIETO
NO. L-399 JANUARY 29, 1948
Facts: The accused was prosecuted with seven counts of treason to which he plead guilty to counts
1,2,3 and 7. He pleaded not guilty to 4, 5 and 6. Two witnesses testified on count 4 but their statements
do not coincide on any single detail. The first witness saw that they captured an American aviator in a
sled but the second witness only testified that he saw the American tied only without the sled. A third
witness mentioned that he only saw an American captured without the presence of the accused.
The lower court believes that the accused is “guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
treason complexed by murder and physical injuries”, with “the aggravating circumstances mentioned
above”. Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and physical injuries charged in the
information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances.
Issue: WON, the accused is guilty of treason on count 4 following the two-witness rule.
Held: No. It was not sufficiently complied. The witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions.
The two witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it.
we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in counts 1, 2, 3 and 7.
Criminal Law; Treason; Evidence; Two-Witness Principle.—Under the two-witness principle, it is
necessary that the two witnesses corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any
part of it.
Murder or Physical Injuries as Constitutive Ingredients of Treason.—Where murder or physical
injuries are charged as an element of treason, they become identified with the latter crime and can not
be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty
as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing
opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable
for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is
averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude the punishment
of murder or physical injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically
for those crimes instead of relying on them as an element of treason. It is where murder or physical
injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they cannot be regarded separately under their
general denomination.
PEOPLE VS. PEREZ,
83 PHIL., 315, NO. L-856 APRIL 18, 1949
FACTS: Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason and was sentenced to death by
electrocution. He was charged for recruiting, apprehending and commandeering numerous girls and
women against their will for the purpose of using them, to satisfy the sexual desire of the Japanese
officers.
ISSUE: Whether the acts of the accused constituted the crime of treason.
HELD: NO. The law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse
between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. What aid and comfort
constitute treason must depend upon their nature degree and purpose.
As a general rule, to be treasonous, the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to
render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in
furtherance of the enemies’ hostile designs.
His “commandeering” of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit.
Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war
efforts or to weaken the power of US. Whatever favorable effect the defendant’s collaboration with the
Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent
of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be
gathered from the nature and circumstance of each particular case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape as principal by direct participation. Without his
coordination in the manner above stated, these rapes could not have been committed.
Criminal Law; Treason; Adherence to the Enemy, Extent and Scope of.—In a broad sense, the law
of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse between the
belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants.
As a general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to
render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and, in addition, be directly in
furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an
enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is to
assist him as an individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him
money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's country
enhances his strength and by the same count injures the interest of the government of the giver. That
is treason.
Commandeering of women to Satisfy the Lust of the Enemy is not Treason.—"Commandeering"
of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainments held in their
honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainments helped to make life more pleas-
ant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves
would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the
entertainments. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to
improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United States.
US VS. BAUTISTA
6 PHIL. 581
FACTS: In 1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos in
Hongkong entitled Republica Universal Democratica Filipina, for the purpose of overthrowing the
government of the United States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and establishing a new
government heady by Prim Ruiz and Artemio Ricarte as chief of military forces.
Francisco Bautista (1), a close friend of the chief of military forces (of the conspirators) took part of
several meetings. Tomas Puzon (2) held several conferences whereat plans are made for the coming
insurrection; he was appointed Brigadier-General of the Signal Corps of the revolutionary forces.
Aniceto de Guzman (3) accepted some bonds from one of the conspirators.
The lower court convicted the three men of conspiracy. Bautista was sentenced to 4 years
imprisonment and a P3,000 fine; Puzon and De Guzman to 3 years imprisonment and P1,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of conspiracy?
RULING: Judgment for Bautista and Puzon CONFIRMED. Judgment for de Guzman REVERSED. Yes,
Bautista and Puzon are guilty of conspiracy. Bautista was fully aware of the purposes of the meetings
he participated in, and even gave an assurance to the chief of military forces that he is making the
necessary preparations. Puzon voluntarily accepted his appointment and in doing so assumed all the
obligations implied by such acceptance. This may be considered as an evidence of the criminal
connection of the accused with the conspiracy.
However, de Guzman is not guilty of conspiracy. He might have been helping the conspirators by
accepting bonds in the bundles, but he has not been aware of the contents nor does he was, in any
occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to those bonds.
Treason; Conspiracy; Insurrection.—The fact that one accused, of "conspiracy" to overthrow the
Government has actually and voluntarily accepted appointment by the conspirators as an officer of
armed forces, raised or to be raised for the furtherance of the designs of the conspirators, may be
taken into consideration as evidence of the. criminal connection of the accused with the conspiracy.