IV Review Essay
Tran Truong Thuy and Le Thuy Trang, Power, Law and Maritime Order in South
China Sea (New York: Lexington Books, 2015), pp. 378, US$115.00, ISBN:
9781498512770.
Monika Chansoria, China, Japan, and Senkaku Islands: Conflict in the East China
Sea amid an American Shadow (New Delhi: Knowledge World Publishers, 2017), pp.
260, `980, ISBN: 9789383649990.
To be a land or a naval power is the dilemma that China has faced for centuries. With
Russia, a continental power, in the west and Japan, a maritime power, in the east, the
question of allocation of resources for coastal or continental defence has constantly
occupied Chinese strategic thought. In 1964 Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, a Harvard-Yenching
scholar, wrote a brilliant article on the grand debates in Qing China on the issue
of protection of land frontiers vis-à-vis the coastline. Hsü narrates that in 1874 Li
Hongzhang, Governor-General of Zhili, was the chief advocate of maritime defence.
On the other hand, Zuo Zongtang, Governor-General of Shaanxi and Gansu, was
chief promoter of frontier defence and saw Russia and not Japan as the main threat
to China (Hsü 1964–65: 212).
Chinese strategic thought in the twenty-first century continues to grapple with the
maritime versus continental dilemma. However, the difference this time is that China
has gathered adequate resources to handle both fronts. Another change is that the USA
has replaced Britain as the region’s extra-territorial maritime power. While Russia or
Japan could cause problems for China on a single front, in the earlier period maritime
Britain, because of its control of the Indian subcontinent, triggered conflicts on both
the eastern as well western fronts. It challenged the Chinese littoral as well as caused
nuisance in Yunnan, Tibet and Xinjiang. This two-pronged attack of the British empire
was one of the major strategic challenges to China in the early twentieth century.
The US today is much stronger than Britain in the region because it has major
powers such as Japan, Korea, Australia and India as its strategic allies or friends that
CHINA REPORT 54 : 1 (2018): 137–140
Sage Publications Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore/Washington DC/
Melbourne
DOI: 10.1177/0009445517744411
138 China Report 54, 1 (2018): 137–140
regularly conduct joint naval exercises with it and that seek to erect a common front to
contain China. While Japan and the Philippines have been making efforts to block the
Chinese advances in the South China Sea, India is capable of engaging the Chinese on
its western and south-western frontiers. In addition, India is also a willing to partner
the USA’s and Japan’s challenges in the South and East China Sea.
China, on the other hand, is counting on Pakistan and Russia to help it secure
its western and north-western frontiers and thereby its connectivity to Central Asia.
China is spending billions of dollars to make its land frontiers engines of economic
progress rather than areas of conflict. It has also made vain efforts to placate India to
ensure that its land borders remain calm. This is primarily because Beijing intends to
focus more on the maritime domain. It is going all out in building its naval capabili-
ties to showcase its maritime strength. Chinese naval build up and the assertion of
its perceived rights over disputed islands is a part of its strategy to undermine the US
naval supremacy and hegemony in the region. This also displays China’s ability to
withstand the pressure exerted by the combined strength of the USA and its allies.
It is to understand these changing strategic dynamics in Asia that more and more
scholars are engaged in looking at the Chinese maritime aspirations and actions. The
two books under review in this essay are primarily focused on comprehending the
problems and solutions in the Indo-Pacific region. The two have adopted different
approaches to dealing with the conflicts in Chinese waters. If one book attempts to
understand the subject from a policy perspective, the other relies on scholarly work
to explore multiple dimensions of the problem in a more holistic way. The first is
limited by a partisan political agenda, while the other transcends these boundaries to
explore the subject in a more comprehensive manner.
The book by Monika Chansoria, a Senior Fellow at the prestigious Centre for Land
Warfare Studies, New Delhi, is focused on the Senkaku Island problem in the East
China Sea. According to Chansoria, the Chinese claims in the dispute are devoid of
respect for international law and norms. She sees the Chinese claim emanating from
its ‘revanchist view of the past—a shifting standpoint that distorts history to help
legitimize claims to territories long held by other countries’ (p. 212). The book also
deals with the US–Japan alliance and Chinese attempts to pierce it.
Chansoria’s work does not adopt a balanced approach in charting the contours of
a bilateral dispute. She takes a clear stand against Chinese behaviour, its expansionist
plans and its aggressive intent. The assessment of the Japanese position in the dispute
is viewed through the prism of victimhood. Such approaches to understanding China
are now common in the media, journals and books published either in the West or in
countries that are strategic partners of the USA. Chansoria’s narrative locates greater
truth in Japan’s arguments on the dispute. Her policy-oriented writing falls short of
prescribing new policies to deal with the problem. The author ends up reiterating
Japan’s stated position on the dispute, apportioning the entire blame on China.
In sharp contrast, the second book under review is more broad-based and
comprehensive in its approach as well as in terms of its segmentation and structure.
Review Essay 139
Tran and Le’s edited volume brings out the significance of the South China Sea dispute
and the ways it can be handled for the greater benefit of parties involved. Power, Law
and Maritime Order in South China brings to us varied views from a group of well-
known experts and scholars. The book examines the legality of the dispute and the
possibilities of conflict resolution and management within the framework of existing
international laws. It is a positive effort towards enriching the debate on the dispute.
One interesting chapter by Nguyen Dang Thang, an accomplished legal expert
from Vietnam, discusses in detail possible joint development in the South China Sea.
This is an important chapter because realist literature generally obscures such conflict
mitigation possibilities. Thang gives the details of Chinese efforts in promoting the
idea of joint development and exploitation of economic assets in the disputed area.
Since 1970s the Chinese have toyed with the idea of joint development in the Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands. Deng Xiaoping had also supported joint development proposals for
the Spratly group of islands. The idea of joint development makes more economic
sense than wasting money on building security fences and unholy alliances with extra-
territorial powers to guard some tiny clusters of islands.
Another noteworthy chapter in the book presents a comparative analysis of China–
Philippines and China–Vietnam in terms of approaches for managing tensions in the
South China Sea. China and Vietnam have well established dialogue mechanisms
to deal with their tensions over disputed territories. The Philippines, an erstwhile
American colony, has been unable to evolve tension-reduction mechanisms with
China. Both these articles, in their own ways, help a discerning reader to understand
the strategic games being played in the region.
On the western land frontiers, the unsettled boundary with India continues to
pose a problem for China. The disagreements with India endanger the viability and
longevity of China’s connectivity projects with Central Asia. However, on the eastern
seaboard China is relying more on defiance of the status quo, through huge investments
in naval platforms and weapon systems. Therefore, one observes that in managing its
land frontiers China is depending more on soft power, and for the protection of its
coastline and territorial waters it is making use of hardpower. However, this assess-
ment may need relooking in the light of the Doklam standoff between China and
India in the middle of 2017.
The establishment of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti, coupled with access to
Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan, has provided fresh openings to
China in the Indian Ocean. These maritime developments directly impinge on US
interests in the region and also their control of global trade flows on the seas. In order
to restrict the Chinese movements within and beyond the ‘first island chain’, the
USA is encouraging India, Japan and Australia to develop interoperable maritime
capabilities. The Indian Navy, actively engaged in meeting the Chinese challenge in
the Indian Ocean, is also making forays in the Indo-Pacific theatre by holding joint
naval exercises with Japan and the USA. India is also enhancing its engagement with
Vietnam through military sales.
China Report 54, 1 (2018): 137–140
140 China Report 54, 1 (2018): 137–140
However, Indian maritime infrastructure—ports and cargo handling capabilities—
are way behind China. It is reported that over ‘Over 1 billion tonnes of cargo was
handled across Indian ports in Financial Year FY 2015–16. Projected cargo volume
by 2025 is estimated to be over 2.5 billion tonnes—this massive increase calls for
substantial capacity augmentation of the existing ports and building of new ports
in the next 10 years’ (Make in India 2017). In comparison, China has leapfrogged
into a different league. According to The Economist, China ‘is now the world’s largest
shipbuilder; has the third-largest merchant marine, and by far the largest number of
vessels flying its own flag; and boasts a 695,000-strong fishing fleet. It accounts for
about a quarter of the world’s container trade. And almost all the steel boxes shipped
on the world’s oceans are made in China, too’ (‘Maritime Power—Your Rules or
Mine?’ The Economist, 15 November 2014). China has the requisite naval power, as
well commercial power in the marine sector. This effectively means that China is fast
approaching the status of a complete sea power. Unfortunately, because of lack of more
substantial commercial maritime content, India is merely a naval power.
References
Hsü, Immanuel C. Y. 1964–65. ‘The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense Vs. Frontier
Defense’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 25, pp. 212–28.
Make in India. 2017. ‘Developing Ports: Sagarmala Project’, [Link]
developing-ports-sagarmala-project (accessed on 15 August 2017).
Atul Bhardwaj
Adjunct Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, India
[Link]@[Link]
