0% found this document useful (0 votes)
171 views42 pagesAllport
Uploaded by
Gurusha RajCopyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
171 views42 pagesAllport
Uploaded by
Gurusha RajCopyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF or read online on Scribd
|
Gordon Allport
and the Individual
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT CHARACTERISTIC RESEARCH AND RESEARCH
PERSONAL HISTORY METHODS
THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS-OF PERSONALITY: [logzapaic Versus Nemothetic
Personality, Character, and Temperament, Direct:and:tedireet Measures of Personality
Trait Studies of Expressive Behavior
Intentions Letters from Jenny
‘The Proprium CURRENT RESRARCH
Functional Autonomy Interactiontem and the “Persoa-Situation
The Unity of Personality Poe Soot
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY eee reas
‘The Infant Aron foveeet
Transformation Of the Infant : _— cal
The Adult
Five
tie 80 most of the best minds In psychology were pushing relent- INTRODUCTION
ple ‘ard increasing rigor and quantification or else were earnestly seeking AND CONTEXT
Unconscious motives to their hidden lair. In the very midst of these 267 268 Chapter 77 Gordon Allport and the Individual
PERSONAL
AUSTORY
trends Gordon Allport serenely pursued his own way, advocating the
tance ofthe quailtative study ofthe Individual case and emphasizing coy.
motivation. This reluctance to swim with contemporary currents of scious
has resulted at times In Allport’s formulations seeming archaic or old fashy,
but on other occasions he has appeared to be the champion of new”
outrageously radical ideas. In spite of his iconoclasms, he represents, erhart
better than any other contemporary theorist, the synthesis of traditional
chological thought and personality theory. La
His systematic position represents a distillation and elaboration of deas
that are in part derived from such highly reputable sources as Gestalt peycho.
ogy, William Stern, William James, and William McDougall. From Gestalt
and Stern has come a distrust of the customary analytic techniques of natura)
science and a deep interest in the uniqueness of the individual, as well as the
congruence of his or her behavior. James is reflected not only in Allports
brilliant writing style, wide-ranging, relatively humanistic orlentation toward
human behavior, and an interest in the self butalso in certain doubts concerning
the ultimate power of psychological methods to represent adequately and to
understand completely the enlgma of human behavior. Similar to McDougalfs
position is Allport’s heavy emphasis upon the Importance of motivational var-
ables, his ready acceptance of the important role played by genetic or constta-
tional factors, and his prominent use of “ego” concepts. In addition to these
focal influences, it 1s clear from Allport's writings that he deeply respected
the message of the past and he consistently showed a full awareness of apd
sympathy for the classical problems that psychologists in and out of the labora
tory have struggled with during the past century.
Allport, one of four sons of a physician, was born in Indiana in 1897 but ere#
up In Cleveland, where he received his early education in public schools. He
completed his undergraduate work at Harvard University at the same eee
his older brother Floyd was a graduate student In psychology at the
university. After securing an A.B. in 1919 with a major In economics
philosophy, Allport spent a year at Robert College In Istanbul teaching:
and English. He then returned to Harvard and completed the Fequireme ef
the Ph.D. In psychology in 1922. During the next two years he stu
Berlin, Hamburg, and Cambridge, England, This extensive experience
‘academic settings must have played some part in developing the S10" Yigg
in international affairs that has been so evident in Allport’s sane one of
his long career. It also ted to Allport serving for a decade or more sn Burne
the chief interpreters of German psychology In America. Rewurning el
he accepted an appointment as Instructor in the Department of Sty pst
at Harvard University. Again there seems to be a continulty bet 270 chapter 7 / Gordon Aliport and the Individual
American teaching appointment and Allport’, persistent concern with proby,
imbued with soclal and ethical Implications. At the end of two years ‘he ace
an appointment as assistant professor.of psychology at Dartmouth Col, e |
was Invited to return to Harvard in 1930 where he remained unt his get
October 9, 1967, one month before his Seventleth birthday. The year prio; 0
his death he was appointed the first Richard Cabot Professor of Social Ethics,
Allport was one of t Te ene ree uetdlsciplinary movement at
led to the formation of the Department of Social!
in an attempt to effect a partial integration of Psychology, soclology, ang
anthropology. (For a brief autoblography see Allport, 1967).
Agalnst the background of these many years of college teaching it should
come as no surprise that In much of his professfonal writing Aiport dlsplayeg
a deliberate didactic intent. In contrast to most technical ‘writers, whose pri-
mary goal appears to be the construction of Irreproachable statements that
ely the efforts of the critic to find a tooth-hold, Allport seemed much mone
interested In expressing ssues In a sallent, provocative fashion. This sometimes
led to overstatement or else to focusing upon a particular issie.to the relative
exclusion of other pertinent questions. Thus, it might be sald that Allport's
one of the most hotly criticized of psychological theorists, but in the same
breath It should be mentioned that questions Allport raised have usually be
come matters of general concern to psychologists.
During his career Allport received virtually every professional honor that
Psychologists have to offer. He was elected president of the American Psycho-
logical Assoclation, president of the Eastern Psychological Association, and
President of the Soclety for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. In 1963
he was awarded the gold medal of the American Psychological Foundation,
and In 1964 he recelved the award of the American Psychological Associaton
for distinguished sclentifc contributions, The breadth ‘and diversity of his
Scholarly work are clearly evident in the dozen books and the, innumerable
‘monographs, articles, forewords, and reviews he wrote, often In ollaborallon
‘with other psychologists. He was also the coauthor of two widely used tests,
The A-S reaction study and A study of values. (Many of these publications are
sted in the bibliography. The complete list of his writings will be found In
The person in psychology, 1968.)
How can we characterize Allport’ theoretical convictions? To begin with
‘hls writings reveal an unceasing attempt to do justice to the complexity and
unlqueness of individual human behavior In ere aie deeaion ear
of the individual, the maln trends In @ person's nature display an underlying
qeneruence or unity, Furthermore, for the normal individual at least, consclous
feterminants of behavior are of overwhelming importance. The congruence of
behavior and the Importance of consclous motives led Allport naturally ¥0 af
emphasis upon those phenomena often represented under the terms self aN
©89. Consistent with this emphasis upon rational factors Is Allpor's coaviclon yal ametvatta Kuma
elegieat suervevad queet OPPORTUN
ane individual IS more @ crealure of the present than the past, His concept
nat ional autonomy,” to be discussed later, Tepresents a deliberate attempt
tine theorist oF tnvestlgator froin unnecessary preoccupation with the
wy of the organism. 1 broad terms, (his ts a view of
dine, couscous elements of motivation are emphasized, and. behavior 1s
gg interually consistent and. determined by contemporary factors,
settee Alport there is a discontinully between normal and abnormal, child
and adult, animal and human. Theorles such as psychoanalysis may be highly
eet as representations of disordered or abnormal behavior: however, they
See of tie ullity i any attempt to account for normal behavior. In similar
‘ern tnearis that provide a perfectly adequate conceptualization ofthe infant
ryoung child are not adequate as representations of adult behavior. Allport
fonsistently opposed extensive borrowing from the natural sclences, He be-
teved that methods of study and theoretical models that have proved useful
inthe physical sciences may only be misleading in the study of complex human
tehavior. This conviction Is most clearly revealed in a discussion (Allport,
1947) of the various kinds of models currently popular in psychological theoriz~
ing, He considered the mechanical model, the animal model, and the model
ofthe child and concluded that none of these provides an adequate base from
which to construct a useful theory of human behavior. Consistent with this
distrust of borrowing was his belléf that prémature emphasis upon the Impor-
lance of operationism, a detailed concern for specifying the measurement
operations implied by each empirical concept, can serve to impede progress
In psychology. Positivism that leads to the conception of an empty organism
be found “merely absurd.” He was equally contemptuous of “intemperate em-
piricism” and was severely critical of factor-analytic studies of personality for
this reason,
Allport's emphases on rationality, unity of the personality, and discontinu-
les, as well as his repudiation of any mechanistic, natural science approach,
‘arky illustrate his departure from Freud, In many respects, his Is the: first
‘on-Freudian model of personality. The contrast will become even sharper
‘hen we encounter his rejection of childhood determinism in favor of future
{als and present concerns, as well as his focus on the psychologically mature
lndvidual For Allport, i was more a matter of our all being mature to some
‘tent rather than all being neurotic to some extent.
Allport old a story about himself to illustrate how foreign Freudlan depth
Reetology was to him. Allport was returning to the United States in 1920
‘he stopped in Vienna to visit his brother Fayette. As he tells It:
humans in which
With a callow forwardness characteristic of age twenty-two, | wrote to
‘ud announcing that 1 was in Vienna and Implied that no doubt he
uld be glad to make my aqualntance. I recelved a kind reply in his
handwriting insiting me to come to his office at a certain time. Soon
Now Ut Unddeney to
WCnie FUNCTION
Perwonal Wistors 271
ING 272 Chapter 7 / Gordon Allport and the Individual
after I had entered the famous red burlap room with Pletures of dre,
on the wall, he summoned me to his tnner office. He did not ‘Speak ‘on
but sat in expectant silence, for me to state my mission 1 Ko
prepared for silence and had to think fast to fnd a suitable conversa
gambit. | told him of an eplsode on the tram car on my way to his ome
A small boy about four years of age had displayed a conspicuovs an
phobia. He kept saying to his mother, “I don't want to sit there. . - don
{et that dirty man sit beside me.” To him everything was schmutzig ty)
His mother was a well-starched Haustrau, so dominant and purpose
looking that I thought the cause and effect apparent.
When I finished my story Freud fixed his kindly therapeutic eyes upon
me and said, “And was that litle boy you?” Flabbergasted and feeling a
bitguilty, I contrived to change the subject. While Freud's misunderstand.
ing of my motivation was amusing, It also started a deep train of thought.
1 realized that he was accustomed to neurotic defenses and that my
‘manifest motivation (a sort of rude curiosity and youthful ambition) es-
caped him. . . . This experience taught me that depth psychology, for
all its merits, may plunge too deep, and that psychologists would do well to
give full recognition to manifest motives before probing the unconscious.
(1967, pp 7-8)
Interestingly enough, a number of writers have suggested that Allport, ametice-
lous man, was like that little boy!
The application of psychological method and findings in an “action setting”
where an effort is made to bring about the amelioration of some undesirable
social condition, represented a deep and enduring interest for Allport. For
many years he struggled against encapsulating psychology within the walls of
the laboratory, and his work In the flelds of prejudice and international relations
are among the more fruitful examples of the application of psychology
social Issues. It Is Interesting to note that with many other theorists who have
emphasized strongly the uniqueness and Individuality of human behavior there
s an underlying pessimism on Allport’s part concerning the ultimate power
of psychological method and theory to unravel the mystery of human behavior.
‘The enlgma posed by the complex Individual 1s too great to be completely
understood through the earth-bound methods and conceptions of the psycholo-
gist. Thus, although Allport accepted the Importance and inevitability of 2
experimental approach to psychological problems, he maintained reservations
concerning the eventual success of this effort. und tn
‘As we have Indicated, a basic consistency of viewpoint Is to be f0 tHe
Allport’s writing. However, he himself did not claim to be a systemaust
asserted that his work was orlented always toward empirical problems Ted
than toward the achievement of theoretical or methodological unity. He
for dn open personality theory rather than a closed or partially clos' The Structure and Dynamics of Personatity 273.
st considered himself tobe a systematic pluralist working toward a sys-
Hc ececlsm: "A plurals in psychology sa thinker who Will not exclude
nfbute of human nature that seems Important in Its own right" (1964,
arn 1966, Allport proposed an epistemological postion for research In
aly Una he labeled “heuristic reallsm.” This position “accepts the
mmor-sense assumption that persons are real belngs, that each has a real
criopsyehic organization, and that our Job Isto comprehend ths organtzation
evel as we can” (1966, p. 8). To him personality was a riddle to be solved
# ne most adequate way possible with the tools avallabie in the middle of
‘twentieth century. He adopted the same approach to the other problems
pe set for himself: rumor, radio, prejudice, the psychology of religion, the
nature of attitudes, and other topics of human interest. To all these problem
areas he applied concepts In an eclectic and pluralistic manner, striving for
hat to him seemed the most adequate account that can be achieved in our
present state of knowledge. Thus, questions of the formal adequacy of his
theory were of no great significance to him.
Inthe preceding chapters we have usually considered separately the structure THE STRUCTURE
of personality and the dynamics of personality. However, in the case of Allport’s AND DYNAMICS OF
theory, this distinction seems largely inapplicable. Personality structure is PERSONALITY
primarily represented In terms of tralts, and, at the same time, behavior Is.
motivated or driven by traits. Thus, structure and dynamics are, for the most
‘part, one and the same.
Allport published two major formulations of his viewpoint—the first in
Personality: A psychological Interpretation (1937); the second In Pattern and
growth In personality (1961). Between 1937 and 1961, Allport made a number
of conceptual and terminological changes In his theory. The present account
's based upon his 1961 volume whenever that differs from the 1937 book
and upon articles he published subsequent to 1961 that further modified or
¢laborated his theory,
Gordon Allport’s eclecticism Is nowhere better reflected than In the rich
Varlety of concepts he was willing to accept as playing some useful role In the
‘description of human behavior. He considered concepts as segmental as spe-
sil reflexes and as broad as cardinal traits or the proprium (self) Lo possess
are Importance in understanding behavior, and he saw the processes referred
oztbese concepts as operating within the organism in a hlerarchical fashion
the re the more general usually takes precedence over the more specific. In
a est “etalled statements of his theory, Allport (1937, 1961) suggested
habit a Of the following concepts possesses some utility: conditioned reflex,
' Wall, self, and personality. 274 Chapter 7 / Gordon Mlipurt and the Individual
Personality,
Character, and
‘Temperament
Although all of the above concepts are acknowledged and Concedeg
certain Importance, the major emphasis of the theory 1s upon traits, is
attitudes and Intentions glven an almost equivalent status. Indeed, Allport;
theory Is often referred to as a tralt psychology. Within this theory, traig
‘occupy the position of the major motivational construct. What the need way
to Murray and the instinct to Freud, the tralt was to Allport. Before proceeding
to a more detalled consideration of the trait concept, let us exarnine Allporrs
definition of personality.
For Allport definitions were not matters to be treated lightly. Before arr.
ing at his own definition of personality he listed and discussed half a hun.
dred proposals by various authorities in the field (1937). He classified these
in terms of whether they refer to (1) etymology or early history of the term;
(2) theological meanings: (3) philosophical meanings; (4) juristic meanings,
(8) sociological meanings; (6) external appearance; and (7) psychological
meanings. After this detailed summary and critique, Allport attempted to com-
bine the best elements of the previous definitions while avolding their major
shortcomings. First, he suggested that one might briefly define personality as
“what a man really is.” However, he agreed that this is too abbreviated to be
very helpful and proceeded to a better known definition: “Personality is the
dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems
that determine his unique adjustments to his environment” (1937, p 48).
Certain aspects of this definition merit special emphasis. The term “¢y-
namic organization” emphasizes the fact that personality is constantly develop-
ing and changing, although at the same time there Is an organization or system
that binds together and relates the various components of personality. The
lerm “psychophysical” reminds the reader that personality Is “nelther exclu-
sively mental or exclusively neural. The organization entails the operation of
both body and mind, inextricably fused into a personal unity” (1937, p. 48)
‘The word “determine” makes clear that personality is made up of determining
tendencies that play an active role In the individual's behavior: “Personality
Issomething and does something. . . . Its what Iles bebind specific acts and
within the Individual” (1937, p. 48).
What has been sald thus far makes It clear that for Allport personality
‘was not merely a construct of the observer or something that exists only when
there Is another person to react to It. Far from this, personality has a real
existence involving neural or physiological concomitants. The care and detall
with which Allport developed his definition of personality are reflected In the
frequency with which other theorists and investigators have borrowed from It
Although the terms personality and character have often been used inter
changeably, Allport showed that traditionally the word character has implied
some code of behavior in terms of which individuals or thelr acts are appraise.
‘Thus, In describing an individual's character the word “good or “bad” Is Ren The Structure and Dynamics of Personaity 273
Allport suggested that character Is an ethical conc
enpivel. fer to define character a8 personality evaluated, and personally
wt acter devaluated " (1961, p. 32}. :
Orem erament and personality have also frequently been confused. How-
cer, nere again there 18 clear basis for distinguishing between them In
’ of common usage. Temperament ordinarily refers to those dispositions
closely linked to biological or physiological determinants and that
consequently show relatively little modification with development. The role of
heredity IS naturally somewhat greater here than in the case of some other
aspects ‘of personality. ‘Temperament is the raw material along with intelligence
aa nssique out of which personality (s fashioned.
Gren these Important distinctions, It is now possible to consider those
concepts that are more uniquely a part of Allport’s theory.
terms
that are
Innis 1937 statement, Allport differentiated between individual and common Trait
trails but included both of them under a single definition, This resulted In
some confusion and ambiguity, so in 1961 Allport made some terminological
alterations and provided separate definitions for what he had formerly called
individual and common traits. The term trait was reserved for common traits,
and a new term, personal disposition, was introduced to take the place of
individual trait. Allport also referred to personal dispositions as morpho-
genic traits.
‘Atrait is defined as a “neuropsychic ‘structure having the capacity to
render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide equivalent
(meaningfully consistent) forms of adaptive and expressive behavior” (1961.
».347).A personal disposition or morphogenic traits defined as a “generalized
neuropsychic structure (peculiar to the individual) with the capacity to render
many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and gulde consistent (equlv-
alent) forms of adaptive and stylistic behavior” (1961, p. 373).
Iwill be observed thal the only real difference between these two definl-
Lions is that traits, unlike personal dispositions, are not designated as being
Decullar to the individual. The Implication is that a tralt, may be shared by &
‘umber of individuals, Nevertheless, a traltJs just as much within an individual
8 a disposition Is. Both are neut Ic structures, both have the capacity
\orender many stiull functionally equivalent, and both gulde consistent forms
of behavior.
One may wonder then why it Is necessary to have two definitions. The
answer lies in the Implications for empirical research. With the concept of
Common traits, one may make what Allport calls comparative studies of the
{ate tat as expressed in diferent individual oF €ro¥ns of inaviduals, Wit
deter ZPt Of personal dispositions, the Investigator may study a person on
ne what Allport calls that person's “unique patterned Individual ly. 276 Chapter 7 / Gordon Allport and the Individual
One approach falls within the tradition of psychometrically oriented differentia,
psychology, the other within the tradition of clinical psychology. In Allport,
‘own research and that of his students both approaches have been employe,
‘Although traits and dispositions really exist In the person, they cannot be
observed directly but have to be inferred from behavior. Allport writes:
A specific act Is always the product of many determinants, not only of
lasting sets, but of momentary pressures In the person and In the situa.
tion. It is only the repeated occurrence of acts having the same signin.
cance (equivalence of response) following upon a definable range of
stimuli having the same personal significance (equivalence of stimuli)
that makes necessary the inference of traits and personal dispositions,
These tendencies are not at all times active, but are persistent even when
latent, and have relatively low thresholds of arousal. (1961, p. 374)
The above quotation suggests two important points about Allport’s trait
model. First, traits are loose “tendencies,” each expression of which is slightly
different because it occurs in the face of different “determining conditions.”
Second, traits are inferred from behavior, not directly observed. We make such
inferences based on the frequency with which a person exhibits a certain type
of behavior, the range of situations in which that behavior is exhibited, and
the intensity of the behavior when exhibited. For example, one might infer that
a person is sarcastic if he or she frequently makes sarcastic comments or
makes such comments in classroom discussions, social encounters, and polit-
cal discussion and/or if one or more comments made by the person are ex-
tremely sarcastic.
Allport (1961) provided the example of a “superpatriot” named McCarley
“who has a phobia against communism as one of his leading traits. Figure 7.1
illustrates Allport's conception of this trait. Notice how the trait is a generic
label for the linkage between a set of equivalent stimuli and a set of equivalent
responses. McCarley's communist phobia is not free-floating and pervasive;
rather, it only emerges in the face of certain stimuli and is only expressed
through a constrained set of responses. This formulation Is closely linked to
George Kelly's (Chapter 10) “range of convenience”: Personality tendencies
are only relevant to certain events. Figure 7.1 also is similar to what Skinner
(Chapter 12) will term stimulus generalization and response generalization:
that is, a behavior reinforced in one situation spreads to similar situations
and to similar responses. The differeace, of course, is that Allport regarded
the connection itself as Important, and he explained the groupings in terms
of the “equivalence of meaning” (1961, p. 323) of the elements, Allport went
on to explain that “transfer effects” (or “cross-situational consistency.” a8 It
has been termed ‘more recently), where a given behavior occurs in several
settings, occur not because of objectively “identical elements” in the two
settings, but because of the perceived equivalence of meaning. The Structure and Dynamics of Personaity 277
ee a a tat Th rf
Beneralty oF a alt, The range of a tra is determined
veipatence of slimull thal arouse It and by the equivalence
sponses akes. (Reprinted with
responses that it orovol Permission from Ally
1961. P- 322). ake
puss ating etter of protest
seeks by More Voting extreme ght wing
tack neighbors Joining the Ku Kise Kan
Jewish neighbors ‘Communist Calling names
regen hobia—a trait Citing the United Nations
nets Hostile comments
Liver organization Throwing stones
tempts to desegregate’ Ricting
is necessary not only to indicate what trait and disposition refer to but
also to distinguish them from related concepts. Habits are also determining
tendencies but traits or dispositions are more general both in the situations
appropriate to them and in the responses to which they lead. Acwally. the
trait, to a considerable extent, represents the outcome of combining or integrat-
ing two or more habits. Somewhat more difficult is the distinction between
ult or disposition and attitude. An attitude is also a predisposition; it too
may be unique: it may initiate or guide behavior; and itis the product of genetic
factors and learning. Nevertheless, there remain certain distinctions between
the concepts. First. the attitude is linked to a specific object or class of objects
While the trait or disposition is not. Thus, the generality of the trait is almost
always greater than that of the attitude. In fact, as the number of objects
Increases to which the attitude refers, It comes to resemble a traitor disposition
more and more. The attitude may vary in generality from highly specific to the
Telatively general, while the trait or disposition must always be general. Second,
the attitude usually implies evaluation (acceptance or rejection) of the object
loward which it is directed while the trait does not. In summarizing this.
Allport suggested:
Both attitude andtralt are indispensable concepts In psychology. Between
em tbe ‘disposition with which the psychol-
Y cover the principal types Of dispostion Na aint out that
°8Y of personality deals. In passing. however.
Since attitude has to do wath people's orientations to definite oe a
the environment (including people, culture, and soctety). It's the we are
Concept in social psychology. In the feld of personality, hows\®". We
Interested in the structure of the person, and hence tralt becom
» favored concept, (1961, p. 348) 278
Chapter 7-1 Gordon Mort and the tna
Finally, \port distingulshed between traits (or personal dispositions) ang
types in terms of the extent to which they are tallored to the individuat 4
person can be sald to possess a trall but NOt a type. Types are dealivey
constructions of the observer, and the individual can be fitted to them, byt
only at the loss of his or her distinctive identity. The personal disposition can
represent the uniqueness of the person whereas the type must conceal
‘Thus, for Mlporl, types represent artificial distinctions that bear no cloge
resemblance to reality, and tralls are true reflections of what actually exists
Mlport acknowledged, however, that the postulation of types may stimulate
research although the end of such research is the specification of comple,
trails
Cardinal. Gentral, and Secondary Dispositions. _ As we have indicated, personal
dispositions represent generalized predispositions to behavior. There remains
the question of whether all dispositions possess roughly the same degree of
generality. and if not, how to distinguish between the varying degrees. Allport
suggested a distinction between cardinal, central, and secondary personal
dispositions. A cardinal disposition is so general that almost every act of a
person who possesses one seems traceable to its influence. This variety of
disposition is relatively unusual and not to be observed in many People. More
ypical are the central dispositions, which represent tendencies highly charac-
teristic of the individual, are often called into play, and are very easy to infer.
Allport suggested that the number of central dispositions by which a personality
‘can be fairly accurately known is surprisingly few—perhaps five to ten. The
secondary disposition is more limited in its occurrence, less cructal to a
description of the personality, and more focalized in the responses It leads to
‘as well as the stimuli to which it is appropriate.
Allport discussed other crucial questions regarding tralts and dispositions.
Do they serve to gulde or direct behavior only, or do they also have a role in
initiating or instigating behavior? There is no simple answer to this question.
Some traits are clearly more impelling, have a more crucial motivational role,
than others. Thus, among traits there is considerable variation In the extent
to which they exert driving influences upon the individual. Further, we may
reason thal in one sense there Is always a previous stimulation that Is related
\w the activation of the trait; for example, an external stimulus or an internal
state of Some sort must always precede the operation of the tralt, However.
ifs clear that most tralts are not pallid reflectors of external stimull. In fact,
‘he individual actively seeks stimuli that make appropriate the operation of
the trait. The person with a marked: disposition toward soclability does not
Wall for a suitable situation In which to express this tralt; rather he or she
Creates situations In which to interact with people.
\ lurther consideration is the independence of traits (dispositions). TO
what extent do they exist as systems of behavior that operate without regard ‘The Structure and Dynamics of Personainy 279
ams? Is the operation of a particular tralt alw
her eC juner traits and their state? Ally.crt argued Uat the eae
ai wa ot by its rigid Independence but rather by its focal malig. Te ‘8
jl center around which ils influence operates, but the behavior
tends ig clearly Influenced simultaneously by other tralts. There is if
t ndary that delimits one tralt from another. "Ths intertwining ofthe
sta vis also accounts in part for the fact that Is not possible to devise
variety saisfactory methods for classifying traits
nee car that the inferences Involved in Identifying a trait imply consis-
vos, Tus. by deinon, @ disposition ' known only by vitue of certain
tales oF consistencies (n the manner in which an individual behaves,
iiport was quick LO point out that his theory of traits does not necessitate a
‘apete consistency. Te Mere fact that there are multiple, overlapping tralis
conhtaneously active suggests that-apparent inconsistencies in the organism's
arson may be expected relatively frequently. Further, the fact that disposi
tions-are uniquely and individually organized implies that they may include
tlements that would appear inconsistent when viewed from a normative or
external viewpoint. Thus, we may observe apparent inconsistency in behavior
that actualy reflects a uniquely organized internal consistency. It is less the
ahservance of exact correspondence or consistency in behavior that is implied
ty Allport's theory than It is the existence of a subtle congruence that unites,
frequently ina fashion difficult to detect, the various behavioral manifestations
of the individual. It is not implied that every (or any) personality is perfectly
integrated. Dissociation and repression may exist in every life. But there Is
ordinarily more consistency than the customary methods of psychological in-
vestigation are equipped to discover.
An interesting and useful outgrowth of Allport’s interest in traits Is his
painstaking categorization of roughly eighteen thousand terms taken from an.
‘abridged dictionary, In collaboration with Odbert (1936) these terms were
classifed primarily in terms of whether they represented authentic tralts of
Dersonality, present activities (temporary states), or evaluative terms. Blghteen
Sa terms obviously are unmanageable as a taxonomy of personality. In
sepon, Allport was not interested in developing @ set of common tralts to
plied across individuals. Interestingly. these terms, plus the underlying
jalumplion that the ways in which Individuals can differ will be Indexed in the
ue of the culture, provided the bases for Raymond Cattell and others to
°P formal taxonomies (see Chapter 8).
past or the history ‘of the Intentions:
dual intends or Is striving
irations, and plans of the
on, and here one
M
a onan than all of the searching into the
trim the tu the simple question of what the indivi
evan nut. The hopes, wishes, ambitions, asp
all represented under this general heading of inten 280 Chapter 77 Gordon Miport anil the Individual
The Proprium
of the characteristic differences between Allport and most other Contempor;
Personality Leorists Is manifested. It is the contention of thig, “heory that wha
the individual Is trying to do (and by and large it's accepted that the person
can tell us what he or she is trying to do) Is the most Important Key t hoy
the person wil! behave in the present. Whereas other theorist turned t ip
Past for the key that would unlock the riddle of present behavior, Allport tumeq
‘o the intended future. In this respect, he showed a strong Similarity to certain
Views of Alfred Adler and Carl Jung, although there is no Feason t0 belieye
that there was any direct influence from these sources,
Although Allport has been called an “ego” or even a “self”
characterization is only partially accurate. In 1943 (The
peyehology) and agaln in 1955 (Becoming: Basic considerations fon
ay OF personality) he reviewed the many meanings of
€20 and of self in
psychological writings. In his earlier basic text (1937) he largely avoided the
broblems raised by these concepts: but he finally came to ash directly the
of self necessary?” His answer was,
and special connotations of these terms, he
functions that have been described be
“the proprium.” It is in this region of Personality that we find the root of the
Consistency that marks attitudes, int
tentions, and evaluations, The Proprium
4s not innate but develops in time.
Allport Identified seven aspects in the
4 develops the self-awareness that it can cope with its
ight. During adolescence, Intentions,
long-range purposes, and distant goals
emerge. These are called propriate
strivings. These seven aspects of Selfhood constitute the proprium., The Structure
d ego may be used as adjectives to indi
sete total sphere of personality (many tuntiong anomie functions
merely opportunistic’) but he believed that nelther term needs, et riate but
psubstamlive, There is no ego or sel that acts as an entity datine joes
remainder of personality. The sense of self is present “whenever rom the
tates are viewed as ‘peculiarly mine" (1961, p, 137). A final Indi e
the Importance of the proprium is the role Allport assigned to it in a ation of
the mature generic consclence. The childhood must conscience ls wenvane
yery Freudian terms as the internalization of parental and cultural i a
Gradually, as the self-image emerges and propriate sttivings devtlog. ne
must conscience evolves Into a generic should conscience governed rot te
extemal prohibitions or fear of punishment but by the positive structure of
the propriate strivings. As in a number of other models (e.g... Carl Rogers and
Albert Bandura), maturity for Allport entails an increasing reliance on personal
or internal standards of behavior.
In approaching the complex and controversial problem of human motivation,
Allport specified what he felt were the requirements for an adequate theory.
First, such a theory will acknowledge the contemporaneity of human motives.
‘Whatever it is that moves us to think or act moves us now. Second, it will be
a pluralistic theory, allowing for motives of many types. Allport definitely was
not a reductionist who sought to reduce all motives to a few organic drives.
Third, it will invest cognitive processes such as planning and intention, with
dynamic force. And finally the theory will allow for the concrete uniqueness
of motives within an individual (1961, Chapter 10).
Such a theory, Allport believed, Is contained in the concept of functional
autonomy. This is easily the most controversial of the concepts introduced by
Allport. In many respects it stands at the center of his system, for a number
of the distinctive features of his theory derive quite naturally from this eect
The principle simply staves that a glven activity or form of behavior may become
an end or goal in Itself, in spite of the fact that It was originally engoge®
for some other reason, Any behavior, complex or simple, ae capable
originally have derived from organle or segmental tensions. mat 7 Cot
of sustaining itself indefinitely in the absence of any bioleical retnonn nT
The formal statement of the concept Is a8 follows: Loa systems,
eards adult motives as varied, and as self-gustalning Inependent of them
toe’ out of antecedent systems, but functionally
1, p, 227), 1 autonomy
The reader should carefull dstingush te principle of toed for a mole
ftom the common notion that a glven behavior may De
jor; for example.
Ainerent trom the one originally giving rse 10 the Pen rag ihe nunter
hunter initially hunts in order to eat, but when there
cand Donates of te
"onal
Functional
Autonomy
281 282 chapter 7 / Gordon Allport and the Individual
hunts to express Inborn aggression. This formulation still refers the beh
back to a more primitive or preexisting motive, which Is just what Aj
wished to avold. Functional antonomy implies that the hunter would cony
to hunt even in the absence of all instrumental significance, that is,
there were no aggression or other more basic needs served by thig
hunter may simply “like” hunting.
In presenting this view. Allport (1937, 1961) indicated that It echoey
certain earlier formulations; for example, Woodworth’s (1918) welt
dictum that mechanisms may be transformed into drives, Stern's (1935) asser.
ion that phenomotives may become genomotives, and Tolman’s (1935)
lion that “means-objects” may “set up in their own right.” One might
that such formulations as Harlow et al.'s (1950) “manipulation drive” and
“partial irreversibility” as proposed by Solomon and Wynne (1954) are intended
to account for phenomena quite similar to those that played an important role
in leading to the concept of functional autonomy.
In justification of the concept, Allport pointed to observations from a
number of areas, all of which suggest a tendency on the part of an organism
to persist in a particular response even though the original reason for engaging
in the response is no longer present. He pointed to the circularity of child
behavior and of neurotic behavior among adults, the repetitive elements in the
Zeigarnik effect (the observation that incompleted tasks tend to be remembered
better than completed tasks), the frequently observed temporal regularities
orrhythms in the behavior of both animals and humans, the motivating power of
acquired interests and values that appear to have no anchoring in fundamental
motives. There Is also some evidence drawn from comparative psychology. A
study by Olson (1929) revealed that when an irritant was placed on the ears of
rats they scratched continuously in an attempt to remove the forelgn substance.
Moreover, long after the irritant was removed and when there was no longer
any evidence of skin irritation, they continued to scratch and with no apparent
reduction in rate. Thus, the scratch began as a functional attempt to cope with
a physical state, but with sufficient repetition it appeared to become an integral
Part of the organism's behavior in spite of the fact that it no longer served a
biological function. Some of the Important research conducted by Selye (1952)
and his collaborators suggests similarly that adaptive responses may set UP
in their own right even to the detriment of the organism. Similar to this are
studies by Anderson (1941a-d) of what he called “externalization of drive.”
In these studles rats were taught to navigate runways at high rates of speed
under strong hunger drive and rewarded with food at the end of the runway.
Aller a very large number of reinforced trials, the rats did not appear to show
ordinary extinction of the response when placed In the same situation under
low drive or in a satiated state: that is, even though they were no longer hungry.
they continued to travel through the runways at the same rapid rate. Thus. We
again have the spectacle of an organism performing an act for clear biological
act. 4 ‘he Structure and Psnumee of Persona 283
g.and yet when these reasons are removed,
sea aparent Interruption. Anderson would reaso,
wl
m the fact that aspects of the stimulus situation ha
sri secondary reward; Allport would say, according ine prc
vont uncional autonomy, that the behavlor fs continued simply beceure it
14 been repeated so often that It became an end or motive in self, a part
srune rat's “style of life.
Following Aliport’s original statement of this principle (1937), he was
vigorously attacked by Bertoccl (1940), who ralsed several serious questions.
risofall asked Bertoccl, is it in fact true that any form of behavior if repeated
aen enough will become autonomous? Are there no limits or conditions to
te placed on this generalization? Second, If any form of behavior Is potentially
capable of becoming an enduring motive, what Is to prevent the individual from
developing a kind of psychological anarchy in which conflicting and antithetical
rnolives are bullt into the organism and tear the individual asunder?
Such questions led Allport to clarify and expand his position. He recognized
‘wolevels of functional autonomy; one he called perseverative, the other propri-
ate, Perseverative functional autonomy includes addictions, circular mecha-
nisms, repetitious acts, and routines. Their perseveration is accounted for in
such terms as delayed extinction, self-maintaining circults in the nervous
stem, partial reinforcement, and the coexistence of multiple determinants.
Proprlate functional autonomy refers to acquired interests, values, sentiments,
Intentions, master motives, personal dispositions, self-Image, and life style.
Allport admitted that It 1s not easy to explain how this type of functional
autonomy comes about.
He offered three principles to account for the origins of propriate functional
autonomy. Firsts the principle of organizing the energy level. Allport suggested
that healthy people need activities to absorb the energy left over after thelr
pportunisuc needs have been gratified: “There must be motives to consume
One's avallable energles; and If existing motives do not suffice, new ones will
develop” (1961. p. 250). Second, Allport cited Robert White (see Chapter 5)
and Abraham Maslow (see Chapter 11) in support of the principles of mastery
and competence. These principles suggest that motives that lead to feelings of
competence tend to become self-sustaining. Finally, the principle of propriate
Palterning suggests that those motives most consistent with or expressive of
the self become autonomous. In other words: “the sell-structure demands I"
‘or example:
the behavior continues
m that this Phenomenon
4 soung man intends to become a physician, a man of the world, 2
Polican ora hermit. None ofthese ambions f nna. They areal
‘cdulred interests, We contend they do not exist now because of remote
irittorcements, Rather, they exist because a sel-Image, oa
formed, demands this particular motivational focus. (1961. P. 252) 284 chapter 7 / Gordon Allport and the Individual
jected the positions that the “self” explains propriate funcy;
Cee aie it implies that some “little man within the breast” =
one’s motives. Allport took a strong stand against explanations In terms of
separate self because it smacks too much of the idea of a “soul” that Buldes
n's destiny.
Pe ihat then is responsible for propriate motives and for their Organization
Into a coherent and consistent pattern? Allport’s answer was that it is the
essential nature of humans for motives to change and grow In the course of
life and for them to become unified. Readers may find in this answer an echo
of Jung's unity archetype.
‘The fact that the proprium Is a developmental phenomenon, derived from
primitive states and past experience, does seem to Imply a direct link with
the past, in spite of functional autonomy. As the forms of behavior that will
become autonomous are determined by an organization that owes much to
the past‘ of the organism, it appears that the past retains a central role. In
the end, however, the most Important issue here seems to be whether or not
‘mature, adult motivations retain a functional tle to thelr origins in infancy ot
biology. Whatever ambiguity may exist concerning the exact status of the
concept of functional autonomy, it is clear that Allport argued strongly that
for most adult motives there Is no longer any functional relation to the historical
roots of the motive.
A further question that is often asked of this principle is whether all adult
motives are functionally autonomous. Allport sald not. There are drives such
as hunger, breathing, and elimination, reflex actions, constitutional equipment
such as bodily strength, habits that are not motivational at all but are merely
instrumental acts, infanuilisms and fixations, some neuroses and psychoses,
and sublimations. Moreover, many adult activities need continuing primary
‘elnforcement for their preseveration. However, the extent to which an individu-
al's motivations are autonomous is a measure of the maturity of the individual.
Clearly the most Important question that can be asked of any concept Is
‘what It will do for the person who utilizes It. The consequences of functional
autonomy are clear, and itis in terms of these that psychologists should decide
whether they wish to embrace the concept or not. Most Important Is the fact
that 1t permits a relative divorce from the past of the organism. Ifthe ongolng
motives do not depend completely upon more basic or primary motives for
thelr continuance, then the Investigator may legitimately turn away from te
Past of the individual and focus upon the present and the future. The history
of the individual becomes a matter of relative indifference if he or she 1s at
present driven by desires and Intentions independent of what motivated the
Individual at earller periods. A further significant consequence of this principle
{s that It makes more or less Inevitable the great, dazzling, unique
that Is so much emphasized In Allport’s theory. If potentally any form of
Instrumental behavior can become an end In itself, we know that there 's The Development of Perwmaity 285
lent heterogeneity of behavior and environmental demand to lead to a
sreildering complexity and uniqueness In motives, Insofar as the individual's
ill motivational structure Is freed from whatever communality may have
ised at birth, we can expect that the motives of different individuale wit
Show title similarity.
Having decomposed psychological humans Into a set of
of aultudes and habits, of values, intentions, and motives, one Is faced with
the task of putting Humpty Dumpty together again. Allport, while acknowledging
that this Is a very difficult task, sought a solution with his usual doggedness
and perspicacity. There are, In fact, a number of unifying concepts. In early
Infancy there is a high degree of dynamical unity that gradually gives way to
dferentiation. Differentiation is then offset by the learned process of integra-
tion. Allport called this “the dialectic of dividing and uniting.” Homeostatic
mechanisms with which the organism Is furnished preserve unity, or at least
equilibrium, of a fundamental though static nongrowth kind. The mobilization
of energies for carrying out an integrated course of conduct (the principle of
convergence) Is a form of unification, although it is usually transient and
focalized. Cardinal dispositions by definition confer unity on the personality,
48 does the recognition that traits and dispositions are nterdependent: “They
Inverlace like a tapestry.” While acknowledging the contribution that each of
these principles makes to the unification of personality, Allport ascribed the
chlef unifying role to the propriate functions.
Wralts and dispositions, The Unity of
Personality
‘Thus far we have seen what personality Is composed of and have examined in THE DEVELOPMENT
broad terms the dispositions that set behavior in action. In this section we are OF PERSONALITY
Concerned with the way in which these structures emerge and the differences in
the manner in which the individual is represented at various developmental
tlages. Its already clear from our discussion of functional autonomy that this
theory proposes Important changes between Infancy and adulthood.
‘et us begin with the individual at birth. Where Allport was a radical when ‘The Infant
(Calng with adult behavior, he was an arch-conservative when discussing
Infant behavior. in fact, until the child has lived the first two or three years
Arts life, Allpor’s formulations have litle inthe way of surprise value. It Is
uth the development of self-identity that things begin Lo assume a new
ts pu’XPected appearance. This Is getting ahead of our story. however:
Tetum to the neonate as seen by this theory. 286 chapter 7 / Gordon Alport and the individual
‘Transformation of
the Infant
Allport considered the newborn infant almost altogether a creature
heredity, primitive drive, and reflex existence. It has not yet devlopca
distinctive, attributes that will appear later as a result of transactions with the
environment. ‘Significantly, Allport did not consider the neonate to .
Personality. At birth the Infant Is innately endowed with certain Physique
and temperament potentialities, although fulNiiment of these must wat Upon
growth and maturation. In addition, it Is able to respond with some high
Specific reflexes, such as sucking and swallowing, to rather clearly deimgny
Kinds of stimulation. Finally, It displays mass action or grose Uundifferentiateg
responses in which most or all ofthe individual's muscular apparatus seneg
to be involved.
Given this equipment, how is the child set Into action or motivated? in
Allport assumed that there exists a general stream of activity that isthe original
Source of motivated behavior. At this point in development, the child is largely
a creature of segmental tensions and pleasure-pain feelings. A biologied
model of behavior or a theory that rests heavily upon the Importance of
the law of effect, or the pleasure principle, Is perfectly acceptable as a guide
for the earllest years of life. Thus, motivated by the need to minimize pain and
to maximize pleasure and with these conditions determined largely by the
reduction of visceral, segmental tensions, the child proceeds to develop.
{In spite of the fact that the individual at birth lacks the distinctive qualties
that later will go to make up its personality, this state Is altered very early
and In a gradual manner. Even in the first year of life, Allport considered that
the infant begins to show distinctive qualities, for example, differences in
motility and emotional expression, that tend to persist and merge into the
more mature modes of adjustment learned later. Thus, some of the infant's
behavior Is recognizable as a forerunner of subsequent patterns of personally.
Allport concluded that at least by the second half of the first year the infant
's definitely beginning to show distinctive qualities that presumably represent
enduring personality attributes. Nonetheless, he maintained that “in a sense
the first year is the least important year for Personality assuming that serious
{injuries to health do not occur” (1961, p. 78).
The process of development takes Place along multiple lines. A wide variety
of mechanisms or principles is considered appropriate by Allport to describe
the changes that take place between infancy and adulthood, He discussed
Specifically differentiation, integration, maturation, imitation, learning, func-
Uonal autonomy, and extension of self. He even accepted the explanatory role
of psychoanalytic mechanisms and trauma, although these processes do not
have a central theoretical role in what he called normal personality.
In respect to learning theory, Allport was completely eclectic. He held that
all the myriad observations that investigators have made, all the conclusions The Development of Personaty 287
eached. and all the resulting theories of learnt
: ae ‘and toa degree. Thus, conditioning, reinforcement theory cra cad
nase ns 5 ory. and habit
rareny are valld principles, especially when applied to animal. infant, and
hierar" istic learning. They are inadequate to account for propriate learning.
onperequires such principles as identification, closure, cognitive Insight,
image, and subsidiation to active ego-systems. Allport himself made no
gqystematic ‘contribution to the theory of learning. Rather he proposed functional
Sronomy as 2 basic fact in human motivation that must eventually be ac-
antated for in terms of principles of learning that have not yet been adequately
SGordinated into a sufficiently broad theoretical scheme. Perhaps his chief
