CHAPTER V.

NATURE OF CONFLICT RULES (4) the place where an act has been done, the
locus actus, such as the place where a contract
has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will
signed, or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS CA particularly important in contracts and torts;
GR NO. 122191 October 8, 1998 (5) the place where an act is intended to come
into effect, e.g., the place of performance of
contractual duties, or the place where a power of
FACTS: Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) hired Milagros
attorney is to be exercised;
Morada (Morada) as a Flight Attendant for its airlines
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the
based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a layover in
law that should govern their agreement, the lex
Jakarta, Indonesia, Thamer, a fellow crew member,
loci intentionis;
attempted to rape her. Then did she realize that the Saudi
(7) the place where judicial or administrative
court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for
proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori
what happened in Jakarta and found her guilty. Because
— the law of the forum — is particularly important
she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah
because, as we have seen earlier, matters of
dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave
"procedure" not going to the substance of the
Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was
claim involved are governed by it; and because
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being
the lex fori applies whenever the content of the
informed of the cause. Morada filed a Complaint for
otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded
damages against SAUDIA.
from application in a given case for the reason
SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must that it falls under one of the exceptions to the
be settled at the outset. It maintains that Morada’s claim applications of foreign law; and
for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of (8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is
Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign decisive of practically all legal relationships of
element qualifies the instant case for the application of the the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also
law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex covers contractual relationships, particularly
loci delicti commissi rule. contracts of affreightment.

On the other hand, Morada contends that since her Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of
Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious
domestic law. conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts
principle in the case of a conflict, we find that the
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine law governs Morada’s Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
damage suit? where the alleged tortious conduct took place).

RULING: Yes, the Philippine law applies to Morada’s This is because it is in the Philippines where SAUDIA
damage suit. Before a choice can be made, it is necessary allegedly deceived Morada, a Filipina residing and
for us to determine under what category a certain set of working here. According to her, she had honestly
facts or rules fall. This process is known as believed that SAUDIA would, in the exercise of its rights
"characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give
is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead,
to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule." The SAUDIA failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain
purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another
select the proper law. country is of no moment.

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, For in our view what is important here is the place where
but a factual situation, event, or operative fact. An the overall harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the
essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a person, reputation, social standing, and human rights of
"test" "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of- the complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff
law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not
as property right, or contract claim) and a connecting without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the
factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the alleged tort.
place of celebration, the place of performance, or the
place of wrongdoing.

Note that one or more circumstances may be present to CHAPTER VI. CHARACTERIZATION OF CONFLICT
serve as the possible test for the determination of the RULES
applicable law. These "test factors", "points of contact" or
"connecting factors" could be any of the following:
GIBBS vs. GOVT. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933
residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a
corporation; FACTS: Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a are both citizens of California and domiciled therein since
thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, their marriage in July 1906. There was no ante-nuptial
the lex situs is decisive when real rights are marriage contract between the parties and during the
existence of their marriage the spouses’ acquired lands in
involved;
the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property. On

Page 1 of 20
November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gibbs died, and in accordance the Philippine lands covered by certificates of title
with the law of California, the community property of Nos. 20880, 28336, and 28331, from the date of their
spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of acquisition to the date of her death.
the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs
absolutely to the surviving husband without The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the
administration. lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of
inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the
In intestate proceedings, Allison D. Gibbs, on September language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the
22, 1930, filed an ex parte petition. The court granted said Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. It
petition and entered a decree adjudicating the said is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order
Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of said of succession" or the "extent of the successional rights"
lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be regulated
California. When this decree was presented to the by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was
Register of Deeds of Manila and demanded the issuance in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.
of a Transfer Certificate of Title, it declined to accept as a
binding said decree of the court and refused to register
the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison
D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS CA
inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, Allison GR NO. 122191 October 8, 1998
filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the
said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles"
to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of FACTS: please page 1
any inheritance tax.
ISSUE: please page 1
ISSUE: Whether Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her
death is the owner of a descendible interest in the RULING: Yes, the Philippine law applies to Morada’s
Philippine lands. damage suit. The lex fori — the law of the forum — is
particularly important because, as we have seen earlier,
RULING: The second paragraph of Article 10 of the Civil
matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of the
Code provides:
claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable
respect to the order of succession as well as to the foreign law is excluded from application in a given case
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the the applications of foreign law.
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
property or the country in which it may be situated. involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of
contact" could be the place or places where the tortious
The second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts
legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the principle in the case of a conflict, we find that the
Philippines and in accordance with the law of the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
Philippine Islands, and the foreign law is consulted only in where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
regard to the order of succession or the extent of the
successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph This is because it is in the Philippines where SAUDIA
of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was allegedly deceived Morada, a Filipina residing and
vested with a descendible interest in property within the working here. According to her, she had honestly
jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands. believed that SAUDIA would, in the exercise of its rights
and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke, the court said:
her due and observe honesty and good faith."
It is a principle firmly established that to the law of the Instead, SAUDIA failed to protect her, she claimed. That
state in which the land is situated, we must look for certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in
the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and another country is of no moment. In our view what is
transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills
important here is the place where the overall harm or the
and other conveyances.
totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation,
This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph social standing, and human rights of Morada, had lodged,
of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal according to her. All told, it is not without basis to identify
property is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it
is situated.”
CADALIN, ET AL. V. POEA ADMINISTRATOR
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the
G.R. NOS. L-104776, 104911-14, and 105029-32,
title vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of
December 5, 1994
the community land here in question must be determined
in accordance with the lex rei sitae. It is admitted that the
Philippine lands here in question were acquired as
FACTS: Cadalin et al., were recruited by AIBC and
community property of the conjugal partnership of the
employed by BRII to work in several countries. Some of
appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine
Islands, she was vested with a title equal to that of her the petitioners were deployed to work in Bahrain. They
husband. It results that the wife of the appellee was, were prematurely terminated from their work and upon
by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a their return to the Philippines, they sued AIBC and BRII for
descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in illegal dismissal and monetary claims. Bahrain had a law

Page 2 of 20
governing the prescription of actions. Article 156 of Amiri Angelita became a naturalized German citizen. Angelita
Decree No. 23 of 1976 provided that "[a] claim arising out and her son left Germany to go home to the Philippines,
of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after where they planned to start over. Georg's wife divorced
the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the him, and so Georg felt free to come to the Philippines to
contract." meet Angelita's family in September 1987.

The POEA Administrator ruled that the prescriptive Angelita returned to Germany to file divorce proceedings
period for the filing of claims was 10 years. However, the against Reynaldo, and she obtained the divorce decree
NLRC reversed the ruling of the POEA Administrator and she sought in June 1988. Shortly thereafter, Angelita and
held that the prescriptive period for the filing of claims Georg got married in Germany on 30 August 1988.
was three years as provided under the Labor Code and Angelita gave birth in Germany to a daughter, whom they
not ten years under the Civil Code or one year under Amiri named Liselotte. However, Angelita stopped giving
Decree No. 23. Georg money in 1994 when she discovered that Georg
was having extramarital affairs.
ISSUE: Whether Amiri Decree No. 23 could be applied in
our jurisdiction. Angelita filed the instant petition for annulment of
marriage on the ground of Georg's alleged psychological
RULING: No, Amiri Decree No. 23 is contrary to our public incapacity. Georg opposed the petition, insisting that the
policy on the protection of labor. court should only issue a decree of legal separation with
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on the consequent division of their properties and
the prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. determination of Liselotte's custody. Angelita countered
23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on the prescription that that there were no properties to divide between them
shall be the governing law. because all the real properties that she acquired in the
Philippines belonged solely to her as a consequence of
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim the agreement for the complete separation of property
obnoxious to the forum's public policy. To enforce the that they previously executed in Germany in 1991.
one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976 as regards the claims in question would The CA observed that:
contravene the public policy on the protection to labor. 1. Angelita did not prove the allegations in her
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the complaint because she did not present the
1987 Constitution emphasized that: original of her divorce decree from Reynaldo
Macaraig, her first spouse;
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of 2. she did not also prove the German law that
national development. (Sec. 10) capacitated her to marry Georg;
3. in the eyes of the court, therefore, there could be
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic no annulment of the marriage between Angelita
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and and Georg to speak of because under Philippine
promote their welfare. (Sec. 18) law, Angelita had remained married to Reynaldo;
4. Angelita's evidence was insufficient to prove that
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the
either of the parties herein had been
1987 Constitution provides:
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
SEC. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, essential marital obligations inasmuch as anti-
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and social behavior did not equate to psychological
promote full employment and equality of incapacity; and
employment opportunities for all. 5. the properties of the couple exclusively
belonged to Angelita because Georg could not
own lands in the Philippines.

CHAPTER VIII. NATIONAL THEORY ISSUE:

1. Did the CA err in sustaining the validity of the

SIMUNDAC-KEPPEL VS KEPPEL marriage of the parties?
GR NO. 202039, August 14, 2019
2. Are the lower courts correct in awarding all the
properties of the spouses in favor of Angelita?
FACTS: Angelita Simundac Keppel (Angelita) left the
Philippines to work in Germany as a nurse. She met RULING:
Reynaldo Macaraig (Reynaldo), also a nurse and fellow Did the CA err in sustaining the validity of the marriage of
Filipino who had become a naturalized German citizen. the parties? NO.
They fell in love and got married in Germany on 12 June
1976. Angelita and Reynaldo's union produced a son. Under the Nationality Principle, Angelita cannot invoke
Article 36 of the Family Code unless there is a German law
After a few years of marriage, Angelita became attracted that allows her to do so.
to another German nurse and co-employee, Georg
Keppel (Georg). Like Angelita, Georg was married to a A fundamental and obvious defect of Angelita's petition
Filipina nurse, with whom he had two children. Eventually, for annulment of marriage is that it seeks a relief improper
the attraction between Angelita and Georg developed under Philippine law in light of both Georg and Angelita
into an intimate affair. Not long after that, Reynaldo being German citizens, not Filipinos, at the time of the
discovered Angelita's infidelity and they separated. filing thereof.

Page 3 of 20
Based on the Nationality Principle, which is followed in relations between the spouses were governed by the
this jurisdiction, and pursuant to which laws relating to absolute community of property. This would then entitle
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and Georg to half of the personal property of the community
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the property. The personal properties of the parties are to be
Philippines, even though living abroad, it was the pertinent equally divided between them.
German law that governed. In short, Philippine law finds
no application herein as far as the family rights and
obligations of the parties who are foreign nationals are
KOOKOORITCHKIN VS. SOLICITOR GENERAL
concerned.
81 Phil. 435, No. L-1812 August 27, 1948
Firstly, what governs the marriage of the parties is
German, not Philippine, law, and this rendered it
FACTS: Eremes Kookooritchkin (Kookooritchkin) applies
incumbent upon Angelita to allege and prove the
for Philippine citizenship naturalization under the
applicable German law.
provisions of Commonwealth Act 473, as amended by Act
We reiterate that our courts do not take judicial notice of 535.
foreign laws; hence, the existence and contents of such
Kookooritchkin is a native-born Russian, having first seen
laws are regarded as questions of fact, and, as such, must
the light of day on November 4, 1897, in the Old City of
be alleged and proved like any other disputed fact.
St. Petersburg, Russia. He grew up as a citizen of the
Proof of the relevant German law may consist of any of the defunct Imperial Russian Government under the Czars.
following, namely:
When the revolution broke out in Russia in 1917, he joined
(1) official publications of the law; or
(2) copy attested to by the officer having legal the White Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought against
custody of the foreign law. the Bolsheviks until 1922 when the White Russian Army
was overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. As he refused to join
If the official record is not kept in the Philippines, the copy the Bolshevik regime, he fled by sea from Vladivostok to
must be: Shanghai, and from this Chinese port, he found his way to
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the Manila, arriving at this port as a member of a group of
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the White Russians under Admiral Stark in March 1923.
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept; and He stayed in Manila for about seven months, then moved
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Angelita to Olongapo, Zambales, where he resided for about a
did not comply with the requirements for year, and from this place, he went to Iriga, Camarines Sur,
pleading and proof of the relevant German law. where he established his permanent residence in May,
1925. He has remained a resident of this municipality,
And, secondly, Angelita overlooked that German and except for a brief period from 1942 to July 1945, when by
Philippine laws on the annulment of marriage might not reason of his underground activities he roamed the
be the same. In other words, the remedy of annulment of mountains of Caramoan as a guerrilla officer. After
the marriage due to psychological incapacity afforded by liberation, he returned to Iriga where again he resides up
Article 36 of the Family Code might not be available for to the present time.
her. In the absence of a showing of her right to this
remedy in accordance with German law, therefore, the Kookooritchkin is married to a Filipino by the name of
petition should be dismissed. Concepcion Segovia, with whom he has one son named
Ronald Kookooritchkin. Kookooritchkin speaks and writes
Are the lower courts correct in awarding all the properties English and the Bicol dialect. Socially he intermingles with
of the spouses in favor of Angelita? NO. the Filipinos, attending parties, dances and other social
Former Filipinos have the limited right to own public functions with his wife.
agricultural lands in the Philippines. ISSUE: Is Kookooritchkin a Russian citizen or a stateless?
Angelita did not allege and prove the German law that RULING: Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of
allowed her to enter into and adopt the regime of Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the present
complete separation of property through the Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a
"Matrimonial Property Agreement." In the absence of stateless refugee in this country, belonging to no State,
such allegation and proof, German law was presumed to much less to the present Government of the land of his
be the same as that of the Philippines. birth to which he is uncompromisingly opposed.
In this connection, we further point out that Article 77 of The lower court did not err in pronouncing
the Family Code declares that marriage settlements and Kookooritchkin stateless. Kookooritchkin’s testimony,
any modification thereof shall be made in writing and besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-
signed by the parties prior to the celebration of the known fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorships
marriage. Assuming that the relevant German law was has scattered throughout the world a large number of
similar to the Philippine law, the "Matrimonial Property stateless refugees or displaced persons, without a
Agreement," entered into by the parties in 1991, or a few country and without a flag. The tyrannical intolerance of
years after the celebration of their marriage on August 30, said dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to
1988, could not be enforced for being in contravention of resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps, and
a mandatory law. blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-so-
fortunate ones who were able to escape to foreign
Also, with the parties being married on August 30, 1988,
the provisions of the Family Code should govern. countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment
Pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code, the property to the hells which were formerly their fatherland’s.

Page 4 of 20
Kookooritchkin belongs to that group of stateless refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person
refugees. Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person
world ought to know, the history, nature, and character of in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well
the Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory
humanity and civilization, it would be technically must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases
fastidious to require further evidence of Kookooritchkin’s involving stateless persons.
claim that he is stateless than his testimony that he owes
no allegiance to the Russian Communist government and At any rate, the Supreme Court is convinced that the
because he has been at war with it, he fled from Russia to misunderstanding between Koh and Coloma has gone to
permanently reside in the Philippines. such an extent that it would not be surprising for Coloma
to be motivated by vengeance when he filed his action for
Attachment of the certificate of arrival is not essential to damages against Koh in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order
the validity of a declaration of intention to become a to get even with and impose all kinds of inconveniences
Filipino citizen, because section 5 of Commonwealth Act on Koh. Otherwise, it would have been easier and very
No. 473 merely uses the words “has been issued.” much more convenient for both parties if the civil action
for damages against Koh had been filed either in the C.F.I.
The undisputed fact that Kookooritchkin has been of Quezon City or Pasig, Rizal because both Koh and
continuously residing in the Philippines for about 25 Coloma are admittedly residing within the greater Manila
years, without having been molested by the authorities, area.
who are presumed to have been regularly performing
their duties and would have arrested Kookooritchkin if his
residence is illegal, as rightly contended by appellee, can
be taken as evidence that he is enjoying permanent SALUDO JR. VS AMERICAN EXPRESS
residence legally. INTERNATIONAL INC
GR NO. 159507 APRIL 19, 2006

KOH VS CA
GR NO. L-40428 December 17, 1976 FACTS: Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for
damages against American Express International, Inc.
(AMEX). Saludo is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a
FACTS: Francisco T. Koh (Koh) filed before the Municipal member of the House of Representatives and a resident
Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, a complaint of Forcible Entry of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the
and Detainer against Jose Coloma (Coloma). To avert the other hand, AMEX, Inc. is a corporation doing business in
ejectment, Coloma and Koh entered into a compromise the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other
settlement in court whereby Coloma will pay Koh the credit facilities and allied services.
amount of P3,125.00 but certainly beyond the control,
Coloma failed to deposit the required amount on the date The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the
due, so Koh forcibly evicted Coloma and his family from alleged wrongful dishonor of Saludo's AMEX credit card
their aforecited residence the following day. and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The
first dishonor happened when Saludo's daughter used
However, Coloma filed a Complaint for damages against her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the
Koh in CFI of Ilocos Norte. Koh filed a Manifestation United States sometime in April 2000. The second
before the lower court apprising it that the copy of the dishonor occurred when Saludo used his principal credit
Motion to Dismiss sent to Coloma was returned unserved card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo,
by the Bureau of Post for the reason that he was unknown Japan while he was there with other delegates from the
in the said address. Counsel of Coloma did not specify any Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in
address in the Complaint other than his alleged address honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.
in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Coloma convinced the trial
court, although he admitted is presently residing at No. Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience,
57 K-6th Street, Kamias, Quezon City, that he could be wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment,
considered a legal resident domiciled at San Nicolas, humiliation and besmirched political and professional
Ilocos Norte because he was born and grew up there. standing as a result of respondents' acts which were
committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in a
ISSUE: Where should personal action commence or be wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed
tried? that AMEX is adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally,
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's
RULING: All other actions may be commenced and tried fees.
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs AMEX alleged that Saludo was not a resident of Southern
resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his
complaint, Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as
It is fundamental in the law governing the venue of actions evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate,
(Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real which was presented when he executed the complaint's
and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was
greatest convenience possible to the parties’ litigants by issued at Pasay City.
taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to
them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that The appellate court in holding that Saludo is not a
the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. It referred to his
contemplation with the term residence, for it is an community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's
established principle in the Conflict of Laws that domicile

Page 5 of 20
verification and certification of non-forum shopping,
which was issued at Pasay City.
ELLIS VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
ISSUE: whether the appellate court committed reversible G.R. No. L-16922. April 30, 1963
error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the
court a quo because not one of the parties, including
Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern FACTS: Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco,
Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint. California, is 28 years of age. He married Gloria G. Ellis.
Both are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born
RULING: The appellate court committed reversible error on September 26, 1959, at the Caloocan Maternity
in finding that Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left
at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently her with the Heart of Mary Villa — an institution for unwed
held that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. mothers and their babies — stating that she (the mother)
could not take of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her
Saludo's complaint for damages against AMEX before the
(the mother's family.)
court a quo is a personal action. The choice of venue for
personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition for the adoption of the
but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is aforementioned baby. Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had
regulated by the Rules of Court. The rule on venue, like been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he is assigned
other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and thereto as a staff sergeant in the United States Air Force
orderly administration of justice or the impartial and Base, in Angeles, Pampanga where both lived at that time.
evenhanded determination of every action and They had been in the Philippines before, or, to be exact,
proceeding. The option of plaintiff in personal actions in 1953.
cognizable by the RTC is either the place where
defendant resides or may be found, or the place where ISSUE: Whether spouse Ellis is qualified to adopt Baby
plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited Rose for not being a permanent resident in the Philippines
to that place.
RULING: Not being permanent residents, they cannot
There is no dispute that Saludo was the congressman or adopt in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 335 of the
the representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that non-
the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. residents cannot adopt.
Even the appellate court admits this fact as it states that "it
Adoption proceedings being in rem, no court may
may be conceded that Saludo ever so often travels to
entertain them unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the
Maasin City, Southern Leyte because he is its
subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also,
representative in the lower house.
over the res, which is the personal status not only of the
Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" person to be adopted but also of the adopting parents.
imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
The Civil Code of the Philippines (Art. 15) adheres to the
also a personal presence in that place, coupled with
theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person
conduct indicative of such intention. When parsed,
is determined by his nationality. Pursuant thereto, the
therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements:
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the status of an
(1) intention to reside in the particular place; and alien petitioner in adoption proceedings. The political law
(2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled of system, which adopts the view that personal status, in
with conduct indicative of such intention. general is determine by and/or subject to the jurisdiction
of the domiciliary law.
As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually
or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no Hence, under either the nationality theory or the
matter where he may be found at any given time, domiciliary theory, the Philippine courts cannot assume
eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, an exercise jurisdiction over the status of petitioners, who
is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of are not domiciled in the Philippines, and, hence, non-
residence for the purposes of election law." resident aliens.

In the instant case, since Saludo has a house in Makati City

for the purpose of exercising his profession or doing
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS VS. GO
business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern
CALLANO
Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political
25 SCRA 890, No. L-24530 October 31, 1968
purposes where he also lives or stays physically,
personally and actually then he can have residences in
these two places. Because it would then be preposterous FACTS: Private respondents Beato Go Callano, Manuel
to acknowledge and recognize Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as Go Callano, Gonzalo Go Callano, and Julio Go Callano
congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing were the children of Go Chiao Lin, Chinese citizen, and
him as actually, personally and physically residing thereat, Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen. In 1946, the private
when a such residence is required by law. respondents and their parents went to Amoy, China, for a
vacation. Unfortunately, Go Chiao Lin died while
The fact then that Saludo's community tax certificate was
vacationing in China. Their mother subsequently returned
issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting
to the Philippines, leaving the private respondents
arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein,
behind.
the same does not preclude his having a residence in
Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but On December 26, 1961, private respondents returned to
one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, the Philippines. At the airport, the Immigration Inspector
but he may have numerous places of residence.

Page 6 of 20
referred them to Board of Special Inquiry No. 2, which were all minors when they were brought to China in
promulgated a decision finding the private respondents 1946. They were without the legal capacity to renounce
to be the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino their status. Upon their return to the Philippines, only
citizen, and entitled to admission as Filipino citizens. Beato Go Callano had attained the age of majority, but
Subsequently, however, the Board of Immigration even as to him there could not have been renunciation
Commissioners, exercising its power of review, issued an because he did not manifest by direct and appropriate
order reversing the decision of the Board of Special language that he was disclaiming Philippine citizenship.
Inquiry and ordered their exclusion as aliens not properly On the contrary, after he has attained the age of majority,
documented for admission. he applied for registration as a Philippine citizen and
sought entry into this country, which are clear indicia of his
The Board of Immigration Commissioners maintained intent to continue his former status.
that even if the private respondents were considered to
be Filipino citizens when they left the Philippines in 1946, The foregoing shows that the petitioners have not lost
they lost that citizenship, firstly, by staying in China for a their Philippine citizenship."
period of fifteen years, and secondly, because they have
become citizens of the Republic of China in accordance
with the Chinese Nationality Law, arising from the
TECSON VS COMELEC
recognition accorded them by their common-law father.
GR NO. 161434 March 3, 2004
The signatures of former Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Felixberto M. Serrano, on certain documents, amongst
FACTS: Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
them cable authorization No. 2230-V (File No. 23617)
Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of
authorizing the documentation of Beato Go Callano and
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of
others, were not authentic. Thereupon, the Department
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
declared several documents—among them the cable
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections.
authorization just mentioned—to be null, void and of no
In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to
effect, and the documentation made by the Philippine
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his
Consulate General at Hongkong pursuant to said cable
name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date
authorization consisting of the certificates of registration
of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be
and identity issued to Beato Go Callano and his brothers
Manila.
Manuel, Gonzalo, and Julio for travel to the Philippines
were cancelled. All this was done without previous notice In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and
served nor hearing granted to said parties. to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJ’s
certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a
ISSUE: Does Go Callano lost their Philippine citizenship?
material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen)
RULING: The children were born in the Philippines to a before the COMELEC.
Chinese mother and a Chinese father, however, were not
ISSUE: Whether the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, would
married to their mother, and are citizens of the
have been a Filipino citizen in order to the alleged
Philippines, having acquired their Philippine citizenship
illegitimacy of FPJ prevents him from taking after the
by birth and their blood relationship with their mother.
Filipino citizenship of his putative father?
A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by:
RULING: The concept of citizenship had undergone
(1) naturalization in a foreign country; changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the
(2) express renunciation of citizenship; concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship,
(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support which established the rights necessary for individual
the constitution or laws of a foreign country; freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty, and
(4) rendering service to, or accepting a commission justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to
in, the armed forces of a foreign country; include political citizenship, which encompassed the
(5) cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; right to participate in the exercise of political power. The
(6) declaration by competent authority that he is a 20th century saw the next stage of the development of
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the
war; citizen to economic well-being and social security. The
(7) in the case of a woman, by marriage to a idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern
foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An
husband's country, she acquires his nationality. ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with
Recognition of illegitimate children by their alien the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the
father is not among the grounds for losing internationalization of citizenship.
Philippine citizenship under the law.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
Renunciation of Philippine citizenship to be recognized as could only be drawn from the presumption that having
a ground for loss of citizenship should be expressed and died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
must be made known distinctly and explicitly and not born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
left to inference or implication; a renunciation, under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
manifested by direct and appropriate language as place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would
The import of the foregoing pronouncement is that of have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
itself a protracted stay in a foreign country does not Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
amount to renunciation. Moreover, herein petitioners

Page 7 of 20
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his RULING: In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA
son, Allan F. Poe, father of FPJ. 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime FPJ has seen constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers citizenship. Ong did more than merely exercise his right
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
are legitimate or illegitimate. Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of Ong who
The fact of the matter—perhaps the most significant cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they
consideration—is that the 1935 Constitution, the were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month, and year Ong was born in the outlying rural town of Samar where
of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. Ong
than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied
Constitution states that among the citizens of the for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He
Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive
Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent justification to government agency. His profession requires citizenship
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has
are none provided. participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has
always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is
nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace
CO VS. HRET Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any
199 SCRA 692, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, G.R. Nos. 92202-03 tinge of alienness, no acts to show that this country is not
July 30, 1991 his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are fully aware of Mr. Ong’s parentage. They should
know him better than any member of this Court will ever
FACTS: Ong’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the know him.
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence
in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him
bought from the fruits of hard work. represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since
childhood, they have considered him a Filipino. The filing
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship.
administration. The father of Ong, Jose Ong Chuan was For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came
born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be
Samar in the year 1915. less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos,
serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification,
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of
voting during election time, running for public office, and
Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring
other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves
relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy
formal manifestations of choice for these persons. An
assimilation into the community.
election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful
community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt
values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As in this case about Mr. Ong’s being a Filipino when he
the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born- turned twenty-one (21). We repeat that any election of
Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and respondent would not only have been superfluous but it
practice. would also have resulted in an absurdity.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is Ong who How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
was born in 1948. In 1984, Ong married a Filipina named HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected
Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose citizenship. It observed that “when protestee was only
Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a
and correspondingly, voted there during those elections. naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly,
natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine
Northern Samar for voting purposes. Ong was citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such.
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar. The petitioners question the citizenship of the father
through a collateral approach. This cannot be done. In our
The petitioners filed election protests against the private jurisdiction, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only
respondent premised on the following grounds: be done through a direct action for its nullity.

(1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural-born citizen of the To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
Philippines; and citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run
(2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has
district of Northern Samar. already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair
opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak.
ISSUE: Is Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural-born citizen of the To quote the words of the HRET, Ong Chuan’s lips have
Philippines long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and

Page 8 of 20
obviously, he could not rise beyond where his mortal Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who
made a central issue in this case. lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
It has also been settled that absence from residence to originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does status as a natural-born Filipino.
not constitute loss of residence. As previously stated, the
private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino
finishing his studies and later practicing his profession. citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
There was no intention to abandon the residence in Forces of the United States. However, he
Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
made to his home province reveal that he always had the R. A. No. 2630, which provides:
animus revertendi.
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
BENGSON III VS. HRET States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001 the United States, acquired United States citizenship,
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
FACTS: On April 27, 1960, private respondent Teodoro
and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in
Cruz was born to Filipino parents in San Clemente, Tarlac.
the place where he resides or last resided in the
In 1985, he joined the U.S. Marine Corps, and took an oath
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
of allegiance to the United States. Under Commonwealth
a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Act No. 63, the rendering of service to, or the acceptance
of a commission in the armed forces of a foreign country, Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
is an expatriating act. Subsequently, Cruz naturalized as a Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
citizen of the United States on June 5, 1990. On March 17, Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
1994, Cruz subsequently reacquired his Filipino the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. have recovered his original status as a natural-born
2630. citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation
In the 1995 congressional elections, Cruz ran and won as
allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan,
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
beating the reelectionist, petitioner Antonio Bengson, by
26,671 votes. Only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
Bengson filed a Petition for Quo Warranto with the House
citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"). He alleged
two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural- born and
that Cruz did not possess the requisite natural- born
(2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
citizenship required by Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution. However, the HRET dismissed the petition A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e. did not have
and declared Cruz the duly elected representative of the to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Second District of Pangasinan. Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration
ISSUE: Whether private respondent Cruz is a natural-
of a separate category for persons who, after losing
born citizen of the Philippines.
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it.
RULING: Yes, private respondent Cruz is a natural-born
The reason therefore is clear: as to such persons, they
citizen of the Philippines.
would either be natural- born or naturalized depending on
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode
and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire
who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be
elected as member of the House of Representatives.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born
citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
FOUNDLINGS ARE NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS
Philippine citizenship."
Foundlings, or those abandoned children with no known
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who
natural parents, are natural-born citizens because they are
have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
not an excluded class under the Constitution. In addition,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
domestic laws and international laws accord them that
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which the former
status. Furthermore, so long as there is a HIGH
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act
PROBABILITY that the foundling's parents are Filipinos,
No. 530, repealed
that person will be considered natural-born. The
Philippines does not discriminate against foundlings and
acknowledges their Philippine citizenship in accord with

Page 9 of 20
human rights treaties and conventions. It is also state were also granted by the COMELEC. Petitioner then went
policy as seen in adoption laws to accord them the status to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
of natural- born citizens.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.

POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC RULING: Yes, the fact is that petitioner's blood

G.R. Nos. 221697-221700, March 8, 2016 relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.

FACTS: When Grace Poe-Llamanzares was an infant, her The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the
natural parents abandoned her at the Parish Church of Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to
Jaro, Iloilo. She was found by Edgardo Militar and was 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
given to the custody and care of Emiliano Militar and his Philippines was 15,986, while the total number of Filipinos
wife. She was registered as a foundling with the local civil born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical
registry. She was subsequently adopted by Fernando probability that any child born in the Philippines in that
Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces. decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part,
petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province
Grace married Fil-American Brian Llamanzares in 1991. for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there
She joined her husband in the United States where she were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the
naturalized as a citizen in 2001. In 2004, she returned to province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In
the Philippines to be with her ailing father, who 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304
subsequently died in early 2005. Grace remained in the foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for
Philippines until February 3, 2005. the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were
230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
Her father's untimely demise made them decide to return or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino
to the Philippines. She claims to have returned to the males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were
Philippines on May 24, 2005 to settle here for good. For 270,299 Filipino females versus 1,190 female aliens, or
this purpose, she and her husband purchased a 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino
condominium unit and enrolled her children in Philippine males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%.
schools. She made a quick trip to the United States in
February 2006 to dispose of their properties then Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of
promptly returned to the Philippines in March 2006. petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned
as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City She
In the process of settling here, they sold their house in the also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge
United States and informed the US Postal Service of the straight black hair almond shaped eyes, and an oval face.
abandonment of their US address. Her husband resigned
from his job in the United States and started working for a All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical
Philippine company. They bought a lot in Corinthian Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a
Gardens and built their house therein. municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more
Grace applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would
9225 and took her oath of allegiance to the Philippines on be a Filipino would indicate more than ample probability
July 7, 2006. if not statistical certainty that petitioner's parents are
Filipinos
Grace was appointed as MTRCB Chair on October 6,
2010. Before taking her oath of office, she executed an As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
States of America and Renunciation of American silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
October 20, 2010. She stopped using her US passport
from that time on. She subsequently executed an Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the
United States" before the U.S. Embassy. intent of the framers. As pointed out by petitioner as well
as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
On October 2, 2012, she filed her certificate of candidacy Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended
for Senator for the 2013 elections. In her answer to the foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
question "Period of residence in the Philippines before
May 13, 2013," she answered "6 years and 6 months." She We find no such intent or language permitting
won as a Senator of the Philippines in that election. discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
On October 15, 2015, she filed her certificate of protection of the laws.
candidacy for President for the 2016 elections. She
declared in her Certificate of Candidacy ("COC") that she Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that she is a foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
resident of the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee Rather,
from May 24, 2005. the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
adopted.
A petition to deny due course or cancel COC was filed
against her for material misrepresentation concerning her Recent legislation is more direct. R. A. No. 8043 entitled
natural-born status and residency. Finding merit in the "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country
petition, the COMELEC granted the petition to deny due Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes"
course or cancel COC of petitioner. Two other petitions (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of
questioning the citizenship and residency qualifications of 1995"), R. A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the
petitioner to become President were filed. These petitions Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children

Page 10 of 20
and for Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's found.
Administrative Matter No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Current legislation reveals the adherence of the
Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
include foundlings as among Filipino children who may international law. In particular, R. A. No. 8552, R. A. No.
be adopted. 8042, and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer
to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among
It has been argued that the process to determine that the the Filipino children who could be adopted.
child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling
certificate under these laws and the issuance of said The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings
certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine stems from the presumption that their parents are
citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data
Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Section 2, Article provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more
IV "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first The COMELEC also ruled that petitioner's repatriation in
personally done by the citizen. means that the act must July 2006 under the provisions of R. A. No. 9225 did not
be. result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The
COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform
In this instance, the determination of foundling status is an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship
done not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent
child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in
naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine general and of R. A. No. 9225 in particular.
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born
of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 In the seminal case of Bengson III v. HRET, repatriation was
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it. explained as follows:

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the
Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can original nationality. This means that a naturalized
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
transformation or incorporation. The transformation prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
method requires that an international law be transformed other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally restored to his former status as a natural-born
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the Filipino.
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty R. A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been
obligations. described as such in several cases. They include
Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC where we described it as
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's
to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth Filipino citizenship xxx" Also included is Parreno v.
and ensure that no child is stateless. Commission on Audit, which cited Tabasa v. Court of
Appeals, where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the
The principles found in two conventions, while yet former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted citizenship." Parreno Commission on Audit is categorical
principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under
1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to R. A. No. 9225), he will recover his natural-born
the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is citizenship."
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born
born of citizens of the country where he is found, citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted
contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations and continuous from birth." R. A. No. 9225 was obviously
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to
determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship
Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not
of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress'
not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the determination.
1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born
effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague status must be continuous was already rejected in
Convention Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the
"gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an
Petitioner's evidence shows that at least sixty countries in act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson Ill
Asia, North and South America, and Europe have passed v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two
legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. These types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution; natural-
circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third
countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of category for repatriated citizens.
international law to presume foundlings as having been

Page 11 of 20
Justice Antonio Carpio wrote a vigorous dissent to the Certain rights also flow from citizenship. For example,
majority opinion. In unequivocal terms, he opined that derivative citizenship is a benefit derived from being the
Grace Poe-Llamanzares, being a foundling, could not be child or spouse of a citizen of a state. Also, the alien wife
a natural-born Filipino citizen. He stated that the "letter or alien child of a citizen may enjoy certain privileges not
and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded ordinarily enjoyed by foreigners in the
foundlings from being considered natural-born Filipino country, like the right to work or stay in the Philippines.
citizens since the framers voted to reject the proposal to
include foundlings as citizens of the Philippines. He added
that "there is no treaty, customary international law or a NGO BURCA VS REPUBLIC
general principle of international law granting GR NO. L-24252 January 30, 1967
automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at
birth."
FACTS: Zita Ngo - also known as Zita Ngo Burca married
It may be added that a plain reading of the 1935 Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real
Constitution does not confer natural-born citizenship to St., Ormoc City; before her marriage, she was a Chinese
foundlings. Citizenship is a matter of supreme importance citizen, subject of Nationalist China, with ACR No. A-
that there is a need to restrict the benefits of citizenship to 148054; that she was born on March 30, 1933, in
only the classes mentioned in the Constitution. A liberal or Gigaquit, Surigao, and holder of Native-Born Certificate
non-restrictive interpretation would open the floodgates of Residence No. 46333. After making a number of other
to individuals to gain the benefits of Filipino citizenship
allegations and setting forth certain denials, she manifests
without being so entitled. And since the constitutional
that "she has all the qualifications required under Section
provision is clear, there is no need to utilize aids in
statutory interpretation. The legislative records should 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of
only be considered if there is ambiguity in the law. Commonwealth Act No. 473"
Otherwise, it is improper to look at the legislative debates
The Solicitor General opposed and moved to dismiss the
to support an idea or a proposition that will materially alter
petition for the application for Philippine citizenship. The
the meaning of the law. Hence, while there is support in
the legislative records of an intent to include foundlings as petition is fatally defective for failure to contain or mention
natural-born citizens, the same intent was not expressed the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the
when the constitutional provision was finally enacted. It is Naturalization Law, such as, among others, Zita's former
an error to use the legislative records to vary the meaning places of residence, and the absence of the affidavits of at
of the law. The growing tendency to rely on legislative least two supporting witnesses. The trial was held and the
debates to support an idea not expressed in the enacted sole witness was Zita, herself.
law should be avoided in view of the dangerous tendency
of the law being amended or modified through parol ISSUE: May an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may acquire
proof. the status of a citizen of the Philippines? No.

The majority decision all the more support a growing RULING: If an alien woman married to a Filipino does not
(international) state policy of diminishing the significance become ipso facto a citizen, then she must have to file a
of citizenship. The value of unitary citizenship has been "petition for citizenship" in order that she may acquire the
greatly diminished by state practice of allowing dual or status of a Filipino citizen. Authority for this view is Section
multiple citizenships. With the Poe decision, there is all the 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law in which the plain
more reason to believe that citizenship is no longer the lang-uage is: "Any person desiring to acquire Philippine
valued ideal that once prodded our heroes and patriots citizenship, shall file with the competent court" a petition
to die for country The rules on citizenship have been so for the purpose. And this is because such an alien woman
liberalized that the element of exclusivity that citizenship
is not a citizen, and she desires to acquire it. The proper
once occupied is already gone. Hence, we join a group of
forum, Section 8 of the same law points out, is the Court of
nations willing to give multiple citizenships to their citizens
First Instance of the province where the petitioner has
and subjects.
resided "at least one year immediately preceding the filing
of the petition".
IMPORTANCE OF CITIZENSHIP
The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be
Citizenship is important because it is a source of rights. It overlooked. It is important to know who those witnesses
is a source of benefits as some rights are only available to are. The State should not be denied the opportunity to
the citizens of a country. For example, citizens have full check on their background to ascertain whether they are
political rights, while foreigners have limited political of good standing in the community, whose word may be
rights in a foreign country. Citizenship is also a source of taken on its face value, and who could serve as "good
duties and obligations. Citizens owe full allegiance to their warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner". These
country and must abide by the rules specified in their witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are
country's laws and constitution. With respect to military reliable insurers of the character of Zita. Short of this, the
service, generally, only citizens are allowed to serve in the petition must fail.
army of a state. This is so because of questions of loyalty
and allegiance. One cannot expect a person to defend a Indeed, the political privilege of citizenship should not be
country of which he is not a citizen. handed out blindly to any alien woman on the sole basis
of her marriage to a Filipino - "irrespective of moral
Citizenship also defines voting rights and the right to hold character, ideological beliefs, and identification with
public office. The right of suffrage is only available to Filipino ideals, customs, and traditions"
Filipino citizens and only Filipino citizens may be elected
or appointed to public office. For those with dual
nationalities, they are even required to make some form
of renunciation before they can hold public office. MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION
GR No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292

Page 12 of 20
 citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of
the disqualifications under said Section 4.
FACTS: Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as
1961. Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required
to go through a naturalization proceeding, in order to be
In the interrogation made in connection with her considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same
Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at privilege.
Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
uncle, Lau Ching Ping. evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13
March 1961 for a period of one month. As the laws of our country, both substantive and
procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the
the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her
said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the own citizenship settled and established so that she may
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized not have to be called upon to prove it every time she has
period of stay in this country or within the period as in his to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no
authorized representative might properly allow. proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as
to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains
even as to native-born Filipinos.
On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy
Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Every time the citizenship of a person is material or
Filipino citizen. indispensable in a judicial or administrative case.

Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner Whatever the corresponding court or administrative
of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to
her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand.
At the hearing which took place one and a half years after
her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino
write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim
few words. Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
January 1962.
She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino
name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of
her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
LEE VS COMMISSIONER
As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the GR NO, L-23446 December 20, 1971
prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau
Yuen Yeung appealed.
FACTS: Felisa Lee, a Chinese citizen, was married on June
ISSUE: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a 22, 1958 to Jackson Barra, a Filipino citizen by birth. She
Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. possessed all the qualifications to become a Filipino
YES. citizen by naturalization and was not otherwise
disqualified by law for that purpose. Pursuant to the
RULING: Section 15 of the Naturalization Law has been provisions of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
taken directly, copied and adopted from its American she became a Filipino citizen as of June 22, 1958 by
counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is reason of her marriage to her Filipino husband. She filed
nothing less than a reenactment of the American a petition dated May 4, 1961 for the cancellation of her
provision. It is in the best interest of all concerned that alien registry with the Bureau of Immigration but the
Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the petition was turned down. She had "no other recourse to
same way as it was understood and construed when the have her citizenship status determined and her alien
phrase “who may be lawfully naturalized,” found in the registration cancelled except the present proceeding."
American statute from which it was borrowed and copied
verbatim, was applied by the American courts and She, therefore, prayed that after due notice and hearing
administrative authorities. as provided by law the petitioner be adjudged to have
acquired the citizenship of her husband, Jackson Barra,
Thus, under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an who is a Filipino and to order the respondent to cancel
alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or her alien papers.
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines The Solicitor General moved to dismiss the petition on the
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the case,
woman married to an alien who is subsequently alleging that "under Section 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act of
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of 1948, a Court of First Instance cannot issue a writ of
her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino

Page 13 of 20
mandamus to compel performance of an act outside the status Djumantan was changed from temporary visitor to
judicial district." that of permanent resident and she was issued an alien
certificate of registration.
Opposing the motion, Lee contended that her petition
was not one for mandamus but an ordinary action seeking Djumantan became the "guest" of Banez's Filipino wife
a judicial determination as to whether she possessed all upon Banez's representation that Djumantan was a family
the qualifications to be herself lawfully naturalized, in friend. Banez's Filipino wife later found out about their
order to "be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" pursuant relationship and her eldest son subsequently filed a
to paragraph 1 of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. complaint with the Ombudsman which referred the
473. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. complaint to the Commission on Immigration and
Commissioner of Immigration appealed. Deportation ("CID"). Deportation proceedings were
initiated against petitioner.
ISSUE: Does the ruling of Moy Ya Lim Yao applies? Is
there a proceeding for judicial declaration of the The CID found the second marriage of Banez to
citizenship of an individual? NO. Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws
of the Philippines. It then revoked the Section 13(a) visa
RULING: This Court, rejecting the view that an alien previously granted to Djumantan. She contends that
woman who marries a Filipino citizen should undergo being the spouse of a Filipino citizen, she was entitled to
naturalization proceeding in order to acquire the be admitted and granted permanent residency in the
citizenship of her husband, while at the same time Philippines.
maintaining its previous ruling that a petition for judicial
declaration of her citizenship such as the remedy applied ISSUE: Whether the marriage of the petitioner, a
for in this case is not allowed either by law or by the Rules foreigner, to a Filipino citizen entitled her to be admitted
of Court, in effect sanctioned the procedure originally and to permanent residency in the Philippines.
resorted to by the appellee before the Commissioner.
RULING: No, the marriage of petitioner to a Filipino
The appeal should be upheld. The petition of the citizen did not automatically bestow upon her the
appellee in the court a quo is really one for declaratory privilege to enter and to stay in the Philippines.
relief, considering the prayer therein that she "be
adjudged to have acquired the citizenship of her There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino
husband, Jackson Barra, who is a Filipino”. In a long line citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given
of decisions, this Court has repeatedly held that there is no permanent residency, in the Philippines.
proceeding established by law, or the rules, for the judicial The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. withdraw her from the operation of the immigration
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens.
woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband
Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and
Bureau of Immigration is as follows: does not excuse her from her failure to depart from
the country upon the expiration of her extended stay
1. The alien woman must file a petition for the here as an alien.
cancellation of her alien certificate of registration
alleging, among other things, that she is married Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not
to a Filipino citizen and that she is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for
disqualified from acquiring her husband’s a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien
citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a
2. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be change of status and "may be admitted" as a permanent
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for
of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the permanent residency is the wife or husband of a
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any Philippine citizen. (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]).
of the groups disqualified by the cited section The entry of aliens into the country and their
from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even
(please see attached CEB Form 1) if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
3. The Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its
order or decision granting or denying the
petition. OH HEK HOW VS REPUBLIC
GR NO. L-27429 August 27, 1969

DJUMANTAN V. DOMINGO FACTS: Oh Hek How, a Chinese citizen, applied for

G.R. No. 99358, January 30, 1995 naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. Oh Hek How
filed a motion alleging that he had complied with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he
FACTS: Petitioner Djumantan, an Indonesian national and
be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a such citizen
Bernard Banez, a Filipino working in Indonesia, were
and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization.
married in Islamic rites in Indonesia. Banez and
Upon Oh Hek How’s testimony, the CFI of Zamboanga del
Djumantan arrived in the Philippines and Djumantan was
Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the taking of
admitted as a temporary visitor under Section 9(a) of the
the said oath. On that same date, Oh Hek How took it and
Immigration Act of 1940. Subsequently, the immigration
the certificate of naturalization was issued to him.

Page 14 of 20
The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention In this petition, Biana sought the correction of entries in
to appeal said order and moved to cancel Oh Hek How's the Civil Registry of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, relating to his
certificate of naturalization. citizenship and the citizenship of his legitimate parents, as
appearing in his Certificate of Birth.
ISSUE: Should the certificate of naturalization issue to Oh
Hek How be declared null and void? Yes. ISSUE: Is Ramon Biana Jr. a Filipino? YES. Should the
petition be granted? YES.
RULING: The obvious purpose of this requirement is to
divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring RULING: It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter
Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that, nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial
pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be
citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American
countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced
Philippine citizenship if the law of that country grants the and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate
same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that
upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
country from which citizenship is acquired." corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
The question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact,
that status is necessarily governed — pursuant to Articles the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20,
15 and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of China, not by 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil
those of the Philippines. As a consequence, a Chinese Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the admits that 'the entries sought to be corrected should be
Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of threshed out in an appropriate proceeding.
Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its
Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality. Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a
proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction
Where the oath of allegiance was taken after the trial court of an entry in the civil register are—
had already lost its jurisdiction over the case because of
the timely appeal by the Government, the certificate of (1) the civil registrar, and
naturalization issued pursuant thereto is null and void. (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby.

Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the

court to—
REPUBLIC VS. SAYO,
188 SCRA 634 G.R. No. 61565 August 20, 1990 (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the
hearing of the petition, and
(2) cause the order for hearing to be published once
What is meant by 'appropriate adversary proceeding?' a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
Black's Law Dictionary defines 'adversary proceeding' as newspaper of general circulation in the province.
follows: 'One having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition
the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the (1) the civil registrar, and
other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to (2) any person having or claiming any interest under
contest it Excludes an adoption proceeding. the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought.

FACTS: Private respondent Ramon Tan Biana, Jr. was The Court considers that the procedure followed in the
born on 9 January 1952 in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, as the case at bar satisfied the requirements of "appropriate
fifth legitimate child of the spouses Ramon Tan Biana and adversary pro-proceedings."
Tiu Muy. His birth was registered on the same day in the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya, by the nurse who attended the parturition of BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS V. GO
Ramon's mother. BIana claims that, in the process, the CALLANO
attending nurse erroneously reported to the Local Civil 25 SCRA 890 (1968)
Registrar that Ramon's citizenship, and the citizenship of
his parents, as "Chinese" instead of "Filipino". Biana
claims that his "true and real citizenship", and that of his FACTS: page 6-7
parents, is Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether prolonged stay from the Philippines and
Biana filed a petition before the then Court of First recognition by an alien father are expatriating acts
Instance of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 1, entitled
RULING: No, they are not expatriating acts. The Supreme
"In the Matter of the Correction of the Birth Certificate of
Court, quoting the decision of the Court of Appeals, held
Ramon Tan Biana, Jr., Ramon Tan Biana, Jr., Petitioner v.
as follows:
The Civil Registrar of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, Respondent"
The question, whether petitioners [private respondents)
who are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth subsequently

Page 15 of 20
acquired Chinese citizenship under the Chinese Law of Indeed, as the Supreme Court held in U.S. Ong
Nationality by reason of recognition or a prolonged stay Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, a case for deportation, where
in China, is a fit subject for the Chinese law and the Ong, a natural child of a Filipino mother and a
Chinese court to determine, which cannot be resolved by Chinese father, born in the Philippines, was brought
a Philippine court without encroaching on the legal by his parents to China when he was four years old,
system of China. where he remained for 18 or 19 years, returning to
the Philippines at 25 years of age. "The fact that a
For, the settled rule of international law, affirmed by the minor child in those conditions was taken to China
Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of April and remained there for several years is not
12, 1930 and by the International Court of Justice, is that sufficient ground upon which to hold that he has
"Any question as to whether a person possesses the changed his nationality, when, after reaching his
nationality of a particular state should be determined in majority, he did not express his desire to choose
accordance with laws of that state." (quoted in Salonga, the nationality of his father." The import of the
Private International Law, 1957 Ed., p. 112) foregoing pronouncement is that of itself a
There was no necessity of deciding that question because protracted stay in a foreign country does not
so far as concerns the petitioners [private respondents] amount to renunciation.
status, the only question in this proceeding is: Did Moreover, herein petitioners [private respondents]
petitioners [private respondents lose their Philippine were all minors when they were brought to China in
citizenship upon the performance of certain acts or the [1946]. They were without legal capacity to renounce
happening of certain events in China? In deciding this their status. Upon their return to the Philippines only
question no foreign law can be applied. The petitioners Beato Go Callano had attained the age of majority,
[private respondents] are admittedly Filipino citizens at but even as to him there could not have been
birth, and their status must be governed by Philippine law renunciation because he did not manifest by direct
wherever they may be, in conformity with Article 15 and appropriate language that he was disclaiming
(formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which provides as Philippine citizenship. On the contrary, after he has
follows: "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the attained the age of majority, he applied for
status, conditions and legal capacity of persons are registration as a Philippine citizen and sought entry
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though into this country, which are clear indicia of his intent
living abroad. Under Section 2, Article IV of the Philippine to continue his former status. The foregoing shows
Constitution, "Philippine citizenship may be lost or that the petitioners (private respondents) have
reacquired in the manner provided by law," which implies not lost their Philippine citizenship.
that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his
Philippine citizenship shall be determined by no other
than the Philippine law.
WILLIE YU V. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO ET
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by AL.,
Republic Act No. 106, provides that a Filipino citizen G.R. No. L-83882 January 24,1989
may lose his citizenship by:

1. naturalization in a foreign country; FACTS: Petitioner Willie Yu is a Portuguese National

2. express renunciation of citizenship; who acquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization
3. subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support on February 10,1978. Despite his naturalization, he
the constitution or laws of a foreign country, applied for and was issued a renewed Portuguese
rendering service to, or accepting a commission Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese
in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that
4. cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; his Portuguese passport expired on July 20, 1986.
5. declaration by competent authority that he is a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of Being a naturalized Filipino, he signed commercial
war, in the case of a woman by marriage to a documents stating his citizenship as Portuguese
foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her without the authentication of an appropriate
husband's country, she acquires his nationality. Philippine consul. He was then detained by the CID
for obtaining a foreign passport while having a
Recognition of the petitioners (private Filipino citizenship.
respondents) by their alien father is not among
the ground[s] for losing Philippine citizenship Yu then filed a petition for habeas corpus. The Court
under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that en Banc denied the petition. He then filed a motion
the petitioners (private respondents) lost their for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order
former status by reason of such recognition. About but it was denied. After denial, he filed a motion for
the only mode of losing Philippine citizenship which clarification with prayer for restraining order.
closely bears on the petitioners (private respondents)
On December 7,1988, the temporary Restraining
is renunciation. But even renunciation cannot be Order (TRO) was issued. The respondent filed a
cited in support of the conclusion that petitioners lost
motion to lift the said TRO, contending that Yu was in
their Philippine citizenship because the late requires
full knowledge and Legal capacity when he applied
an express renunciation which means a renunciation
for Philippine citizenship through naturalization he
that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not
consequently recognizes, identifies and agrees to the
left to inference or implication; a renunciation
oath taken which states to renounce “absolutely and
manifested by direct and appropriate language, as
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
distinguished from that which is inferred from
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty” and pledged
conduct.
to maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic

Page 16 of 20
 of the Philippines. Hence, petitioner then knows the COMELEC 2nd Division found merit in the petition of
limitations or restrictions once solemnizing said oath Alvarez on the ground that coquille misrepresented that
and its succeeding consequences should they be he has been a resident of Oras Eastern Samar for 2 years
violated. when the truth was that he only resided therein for 6
months counted from the day that he took his oath as a
ISSUE: Was the petitioner’s act constituted a renunciation Philippine citizen.
of his Philippine citizenship?
ISSUE: Is Coquilla a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for at
RULING: YES, Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, least one year prior to the May 14, 2001 elections?
is not a commodity or ware to be displayed when required
and suppressed when convenient. RULING: No, he lacks the requisite residency
requirement. In the case at bar, Coquilla lost his domicile
Petitioner’s own compliance reveals that he was originally of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting
issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for five (5) in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until
years and renewed for the same period upon November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
presentment before the proper Portuguese consular citizenship, Coquilla was an alien without any right to
officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may
10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 Serial No.
1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized
Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, Coquilla
While still a citizen of the Philippine who had renounced, did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
upon his naturalization, “absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, Hence, Coquilla can only be held to have waived his status
state or sovereignty” and pledged to “maintain true faith as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10,
and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,” he 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to
documents he signed, specifically, the Companies qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
Registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong
sometime in April 1980.

To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered REPUBLIC VS DELA ROSA
together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner’s GR NO. 104654 June 6, 1994
Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization.

In Board of Immigration Commissioners, us. Go Gallano, FACTS: Frivaldo alleged that because of the precarious
express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that political atmosphere in the Philippines during martial law,
is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to he was compelled to seek a political asylum in the United
inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, States and to eventually renounce his citizenship. He
and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese claimed that his petition for naturalization was his only
citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen available remedy for his reacquisition of Filipino
resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizenship, but he was informed that this applied only to
citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport Filipino women who married foreigners. Meanwhile, his
and represented himself as such in official documents request for Congressional sponsorship allowing him to
even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize.
Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese So, he sought the remedy of the Revised Naturalization
citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his Law.
maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
Naturalization

On September 20, 1991, Juan Frivaldo filed for

COQUILLA VS COMELEC naturalization. In an order dated October 7, 1991, the
GR NO. 151914 July 31, 2002 judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992. He
further directed the following: (1) publication of the said
order of petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper
of general circulation for three consecutive weeks, and (2)
FACTS: Teodulo Coquilla (Coquilla) was born and the posting of a copy of the order and the petition in a
resided in Oras, Eastern Samar until he joined the US Navy conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of
in 1965. He subsequently naturalized as a citizen of the the RTC in Manila.
United States. He returned to the Philippines in 1998 and
applied for repatriation under RA No. 8171. His His petition for naturalization lacks several allegations
application was approved and he took his oath as a citizen required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization
on November 10, 2000. Coquilla applied for registration Law. This includes the following:
as a voter and the application was approved on January
1. That the petitioner is of good moral character
12, 2001. He subsequently filed his certificate of
2. That he has resided continuously in the Philippines
candidacy, claiming that he had been a resident of Oras,
for at least 10 years
Eastern Samar for two years.
3. That he is able to speak and write English and any
Coquilla obtained the highest number of votes on May 14, of the principal dialects
2001 election and was proclaimed as mayor. However,

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 4. That he will reside continuously in the Philippines (3) Frivaldo was allowed to take his oath of allegiance
from the date of the filing of the petition until his before the finality of the judgment
admission to Philippine citizenship (4) Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance without the
5. That he has filed a declaration of intention or id he two-year waiting period
is excused from said filing, the justification thereof
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final
On January 14, 1992, Frivaldo filed a Motion to Set only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as
Hearing Ahead of Schedule, where he manifested his the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted
intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision.
The motion was granted, and the hearing proceeded on
February 21, 1992. Six days after the hearing, the judge The Court ruled that Frivaldo is NOT a Filipino citizen and
rendered the decision that stated Frivaldo has been therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as
readmitted as a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization, governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
vesting upon him all rights and privileges of a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC
Petitions
GR No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
On March 16, Quiterio Hermo alleged that the
proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects. On
FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon
May 22, 1992, Frivaldo was proclaimed as the winner. Raul
again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He
Lee also filed a petition to seek for the annulment of the
then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree
proclamation of Frivaldo as Governor-elect of Sorsogon.
No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a
He contended that Frivaldo was still an American citizen
Philippine citizen.
in 1987 when he registered as voter.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court
had already ruled based on his previous attempts to run
ISSUE: Is Frivaldo a citizen of the Philippines at the time of as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed
the elections? Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the
newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.

ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid.

RULING: No. Frivaldo, opting to reacquire Philippine
citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised RULING: The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure legal and because of the curative nature of Presidential
prescribed by the said law. It is not for applicant to decide Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of
for himself and to select the requirements which he the filing of his application to run for governor.
believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and
The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by
discard those which he believes are inconvenient or
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are:
merely of nuisance value.
(1) filing the application;
Frivaldo failed to comply with the requirements of CA 473
(2) action by the committee; and
(Revised Naturalization Law) because of the following:
(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application
(1) He did not comply with Section 9 which provides is approved.
that both the petition for naturalization and the
It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the
order setting it for hearing must be published once
applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired
a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official
Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation.
taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the
Compliance therewith is jurisdictional.
application, then it should not have explicitly provided
(2) Frivaldo’s petition for naturalization lacked the
otherwise.
allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of CA 473.
This absence is fatal to the petition. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
(3) The petition is also not supported by the affidavit construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the
of at least two credible persons who vouched for Local Government Code speaks of “Qualifications” of
the good moral character of Frivaldo as required “ELECTIVE OFFICIALS,” not of candidates. Why then
by Section 7 of CA 473. should such qualification be required at the time of
(4) He also did not attach a copy of his certificate of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications—
CA 473. unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of
age and residence—should thus be possessed when the
In terms of the proceedings of the trial court, the following
“elective [or elected] official” begins to govern, i.e., at
irregularities were found:
the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term—in
(1) The hearing of the petition was set ahead of the this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court’s
scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the
the order advancing the date of hearing and the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that
petition itself our people and country do not end up being governed
(2) The petition was heard within six months from the by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation,
last publication of the petition that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead
achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as

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applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-
and at the start of his term. acquisition and retention.

The repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign
filing of his application on August 17, 1994. He is country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their
therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to C. A. 63,
Sorsogon. under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of
the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As
its title declares, R. A. 9225 amends C. A. 63 by doing
away with the provision in the old law which takes away
DAVID VS. AGBAY
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
become naturalized citizens of other countries and
allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the
FACTS: Petitioner Renato David migrated to Canada and procedure for re- acquiring and retaining Philippine
became a Canadian citizen by naturalization in 1974. citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign
David ang his spouse returned to the Philippines and citizens after R. A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain
bought a 600 sq. m. lot in 2000. Unfortunately, the lot they Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
bought turned and his out to be public land and part of citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance
the salvage zone. under the new law.

On April 12, 2007, David applied for a Miscellaneous Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-
Lease Application ("MLA") with the Department of acquisition and retention in R. A. 9225. He asserts that in
Environment and Natural Resources at the Community criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors
Environment and Natural Resources Office. David the accused is preferred because it is consistent with the
indicated in his application that he was a Filipino citizen. constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case
He subsequently reacquired his Philippine citizenship it becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult
under Republic Act No. 9225 on October 11, 2007 question of law is expected to have been understood by
the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the MLA on commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the
the ground that David was a Canadian citizen and was letter-reply dated January 31, 2011 of the Bureau of
disqualified to own land. In addition, she also sued David Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a
for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of natural-born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.
the Revised Penal Code. A. 9225.
ISSUE: Whether David is liable for falsification for claiming As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.
in the MLA that he was Filipino. A. 9225 without any reference to Section 3 on the
particular application of reacquisition and retention to
RULING: Yes, petitioner is liable for falsification for at the
Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
time of filing the MLA, petitioner has not yet reacquired
effectivity of R. A. 9225.
his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's plea to adopt the interpretation most
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos
favorable to the accused is likewise misplaced. Courts
who have become citizens of another country shall be
adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused
deemed "not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,"
following the time-honored principle that penal statutes
such is qualified by the phrase "under the conditions of
are construed strictly against the State and liberally in
this Act." Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
favor of the accused. R. A. 9225, however, is not a penal
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first
law.
and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are
those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a
by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second Canadian citizen. Under C. A. 63, the governing law at the
paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization
became foreign citizens after R. A. 9225 took effect, who in a foreign country was among those ways by which a
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While
same oath. he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R. A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a consummated
The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both
act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his
categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became
dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore
citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is
did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of
different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for
public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-

born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and CABALLERO VS COMELEC
after the effectivity of R. A. 9225. Although the heading of GR NO. 209835 September 22, 2015
Section 3 is "Retention of Philippine Citizenship," the
authors of the law intentionally employed the terms "re-
acquire" and "retain" to describe the legal effect of taking FACTS: Rogelio Caballero (Caballero) was a Canadian
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. citizen who was a beneficiary of Republic Act No. 9225.
He took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the

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Philippines on October 3, 2012, and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his Canadian citizenship on October 1,
2012.

In the May 13, 2013 elections, Caballero and respondent

Jonathan Nanud (Nanud) were candidates for the position
of mayor in Uyugan, Batanes. Nanud sought to disqualify
Caballero by filing a petition to deny due course to or
cancellation of Caballero’s certificate of candidacy on the
ground that the latter made a false representation by
declaring that he was eligible to run for mayor despite
being a Canadian citizen and not being a resident therein.
The COMELEC First Division granted Nanud's petition on
the ground that Caballero lacked the one-year residency
requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code.

Caballero claimed that he did not abandon his Philippine

domicile because he merely left Uyugan temporarily to
pursue greener pastures for his family overseas and that
he also regularly returned to his hometown.

ISSUE: Whether Caballero had abandoned his domicile

in Uyugan, Batanes?

RULING: Yes, Caballero has abandoned his domicile in

Uyugan, Batanes. The COMELEC found that Caballero
failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was
able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period
of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013
elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his
Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on
September 13, 2012, that Caballero can rightfully claim
that he re-established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if
such was accompanied by physical presence thereat,
coupled with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile
there. However, the period from September 13, 2012, to
May 12, 2013, was even less than the one-year residency
required by law.

Caballero's retention of his Philippine citizenship under

RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his
residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that
after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13,
2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new
domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time, he
made it as such.

Hence, Caballero had effectively abandoned his domicile

in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice to
Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his
vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as a
waiver of such abandonment.

***

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