Penultimate draft of article published in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2019, pp.

73-
102. Final published version: https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2019.1565316.

Scientism and Scientific Imperialism

Jonathan Beale

Science Unlimited? The Challenges of Scientism

Edited by Maarten Boudry and Massimo Pigliucci
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017. Pp. vi + 320. ISBN 9780226498003. $105.00
(hbk); $35.00 (pbk).

Scientific Imperialism: Exploring the Boundaries of Interdisciplinarity

Edted by Uskali Mäki, Adrian Walsh and Manuela Fernández Pinto
New York, NY: Routledge, 2018. Pp. x + 322. ISBN 9781138059344. £105.00 (hbk).

Science … has no limits. But this does not mean that there is nothing outside of
science and that it is all-inclusive. The total range of life has still many other
dimensions outside of science, but, within its dimension, science meets no barrier.
… When we say that scientific knowledge is not limited, we mean: there is no
question whose answer is in principle unattainable by science.
Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World 1

The term ‘scientism’ has appeared increasingly in philosophical debates in recent years. It is an
elusive concept yet a pertinent one in our time, especially in philosophy, which is not only a
common target of scientistic arguments but a place where scientism is, arguably, rife. It is usually
levelled as a term of criticism and those who level it often assume it to be quite obvious what it is
and that there is something wrong with being ‘scientistic’. But it is neither clear what it is nor what
is wrong with it. Definitions vary. Until recently it had not been the subject of detailed
examination by many philosophers; but the past few years it has gathered interest in philosophy
and among the general public. Testament to this is the two recently published volumes above, the
first of which is mostly pitched to a general audience.
In 2015 the first volume on scientism was published: Daniel Robinson and Richard
Williams’ Scientism: The New Orthodoxy (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). One of the foremost
writers on scientism, Susan Haack, recently published a monograph on the topic: Scientism and its
Discontents (Rounded Globe, 2017).2 Another collection on scientism has recently been published
and Routledge published a volume in 2017 on Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism.3 Prior to 2015, what
is perhaps still the principal monograph-length account and critique of scientism had been offered
by Tom Sorell (1991). The other main accounts and critiques have been offered by Richard G.
Olson (2008), Haack (2003), Joseph Margolis (2003), Mikael Stenmark (2001), Philip Kitcher
(1993), John James Wellmuth (1944), and F. A. von Hayek, whose seminal tripartite set of papers
on scientism, ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, were some of the earliest on the theme (Hayek
1942; 1943; 1944). There are also several philosophers, in addition to Wittgenstein, for whom
anti-scientism is a leitmotif in their work, such as Mary Midgley and the later Hilary Putnam.4
Kitcher and Sorell are among the contributors to Science Unlimited?.
Many definitions of ‘scientism’ have been offered, and its multifarious forms and features have
been articulated. But it remains unclear what, exactly, it is. Although the term is usually levelled
as a criticism, a growing number of authors are happy to bear it with pride.
So, what is scientism? What is the difference between scientism and ‘scientific imperialism’?
And what do each of these have to do with the limits of science? The following discussion addresses
these questions via the ways they are addressed in either or both of the above books. The central
uniting theme across both is the question of what the limits of science are; this is also perhaps the
most important issue concerning scientism, as accusations of scientism are most commonly made
in reaction to claims about the bounds of science. Science Unlimited? (‘SU’) will be the focus, since
it is explicitly concerned with scientism; the issues with which Scientific Imperialism (‘SI’) is
primarily focused do not concern scientism, but they are directly connected with it. An overview
is first offered of how scientism is usually defined and its connection with the limits of science,
through a discussion of the history of the concept.

1 Pejorative and Neutral Meanings of ‘Scientism’

In its short history, the word ‘scientism’ has been given neutral and pejorative uses. Coined in
roughly the mid-nineteenth century, its original meaning is neutral: ‘thought or expression
characteristic of scientists’. Less crudely, this means something to the effect of ‘the methods, mental
attitude, doctrines, or modes of expression … characteristic of scientists’.5 Now rare, this was its
only meaning until it gained a pejorative use in the early twentieth century, which is its common
use today. This could be crudely defined as excessive belief in the power or value of science. Used
this way, to describe a position or argument as ‘scientistic’ is an allegation, implying that the
accused has committed some (often unspecified) fallacy.6
Many take it to be obvious that there is something wrong with being scientistic and it has clear
force as an accusation. As Haack notes in her seminal paper on scientism, ‘Six Signs of Scientism’,
‘the pejorative connotations of “scientism” are now so thoroughly entrenched that defenders of the
autonomy of ethics, or of the legitimacy of religious knowledge, etc., sometimes think it sufficient
… to dismiss them in a word: “scientistic”’. The interesting question is not, it would seem, whether
scientism is bad – given that the term is pejorative, it is merely ‘a trivial verbal truth’, as Haack
puts it, ‘that scientism should be avoided’. What Haack calls the ‘substantial question’ concerning
scientism is, rather, ‘exactly what it is that is to be avoided’ (Haack 2013 [2009], 3).
One would think, then, that scientism is not something to which someone would willingly
subscribe. But this is not the case. In recent years, some have tried to subvert its pejorative force
by arguing in favour of views criticized for being scientistic or used as definitions of scientism. For
example, in the opening chapter to Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, entitled ‘In
Defence of Scientism’, Don Ross – a contributor to SU –, James Ladyman and David Spurrett
declare that they ‘admire science to the point of frank scientism’ (Ladyman et al. 2007, 61). And
Jerry Fodor writes:

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 I hold to a philosophical view that … is usually taken to be pejorative: Scientism.
Scientism claims … that the goals of scientific inquiry include the discovery of
objective empirical truths; and … that science comes pretty close to achieving this
goal at least from time to time. …
I’m inclined to think that scientism, so construed, is not just true but obviously
and certainly true; it’s something that nobody in the late twentieth century who has
a claim to an adequate education and minimum of common sense should doubt.
(Fodor 1998, 189; quoted in de Gaynesford 2004, 190-1)

Proud assents to scientism are also found outside philosophy. In a polemic article praising Stephen
Hawking as a ‘Shaman of Scientism’ who ‘command[s] our veneration’ in our present-day
‘scientism culture’, historian of science Michael Shermer writes:

What is it about Hawking that draws us to him as a scientific saint? He is … the

embodiment of a larger social phenomenon known as scientism. Scientism is a
scientific worldview that encompasses natural explanations for all phenomena,
eschews supernatural and paranormal speculations, and embraces empiricism and
reason as the twin pillars of a philosophy of life appropriate for an Age of Science.
… [S]cientism’s shamans … command our veneration. (Shermer 2002, 35)

Haack treats Shermer’s use of scientism as a ‘badge of honor’ as an ‘exception’ to its pejorative use
and does not take this to constitute a problem for treating the term pejoratively (Haack 2013
[2009], 3-4 n.11). But this is not an exception, as illustrated by the other quotes above, as well as
others. In Alex Rosenberg’s, contribution to SU, he writes that he is among those whom ‘embrace
scientism’ (SU 203), a view he has expressed elsewhere (e.g. Rosenberg 2011; see SU 4, 33).7 To
be sure, Fodor’s definition is idiosyncratic and Shermer’s is polemic. But, pace Haack, we cannot
assume that ‘scientism’ has a clear pejorative force, since a number of writers proudly assent to and
offer rigorous defences of views that have been labelled ‘scientistic’.
In the above cases, the views do not even look controversial. Fodor’s scientism would surely
only be denied by those endorsing an anti-realist metaphysics. The central tenet of scientism, on
Shermer’s definition, is the same as the central tenet of most forms of naturalism; the same goes
for other definitions of ‘scientism’, such as Simon Blackburn’s entry in the Oxford Dictionary of
Philosophy:

Pejorative term for the belief that the methods of natural science, or the categories
and things recognized in natural science, form the only proper elements in any
philosophical or other inquiry. (Blackburn 1994, 344)

All this reflects the fact that in recent times scientism has been given another neutral use, to denote
philosophical positions. This is a result of its appropriation as a neutral or honorific rubric to
denote the views of some of those accused of being scientistic. As one of the editors of SU, Maarten
Boudry, notes, ‘some ardent supporters of science have started to embrace the term as a defiant
nom de plume, as a way of pre-empting their critics’ (SU 33).
Elucidating the distinction between scientism’s pejorative and neutral uses is one of SU’s
central aims. The editors give an overview of its original meaning and pejorative use (SU 3). A

3
distinction is drawn between two approaches in the volume towards defining scientism. First, some
contributors treat it as pejorative by definition, as a kind of ‘intellectual sin’ denoting ‘too much
science, or science overreaching’ (SU 6). Contributors treating it this way clarify what it means for
science to ‘overreach’ and identify possible instances of scientism. Second, some adopt a ‘neutral
description of scientism as an ordinary philosophical position’ and articulate its features, in a
similar way to elucidating other elusive philosophical notions which take many forms, such as
naturalism (SU 5-6). In the sense that it denotes a view, ‘scientism’, the editors write, is similar to
‘reductionism’ and ‘fundamentalism’, in that it denotes a highly controversial position (SU 3) –
e.g., the view that the methods of the natural sciences can be applied to all areas of inquiry. Two
of the contributors taking the second approach – Ross and Rosenberg – happily endorse scientism.

2 Scientism and the Natural Sciences

‘Science’ in the context of scientism almost always concerns the natural sciences. Around the mid-
nineteenth century ‘science’ acquired its narrower modern use, where it became synonymous with
‘natural and physical science’. This is its dominant sense in ordinary English usage today.8 Shortly
afterwards, ‘scientism’ was coined; shortly after that it gained a pejorative use. In the first of his
papers on scientism, Hayek traces the roots of the modern narrow use of ‘science’, noting that the
earliest example in dictionaries dates from 1867 but that John T. Merz ‘is probably right when he
suggests that “science” … acquired its present definite meaning about the time of the formation
of the British Association for the Advancement of Science’, in 1831.9 The earliest occurrence of
‘scientism’ cited by the OED is from 1877, in a polemic article on ‘Modern Prophets’ published
in a discontinued nineteenth century British general interest magazine, by the presumably
pseudonymous ‘Unus de Multis’:

Our age prides itself on being pretty-behaved, on having its manners thoroughly
mollified by culture; its dogmatism on the one hand, even in the furthest
ultramontane extent, and its ‘scientism’ on the other, even when most atheistic, are
tempered with mutual civility.10

A few decades later, in the early twentieth century, it acquired a negative connotation. It is not
clear whether the above quote is an example of neutral or pejorative: the contrast of ‘dogmatism’
with ‘scientism’ suggests neutral, but given the polemic tone of the passage and the article in
general, this may be pejorative, suggesting that this use occurred earlier than the twentieth century,
more closely concomitant with the coinage of ‘science’ in its narrower, modern use. Regardless of
specific dates, the birth of the narrower, modern use of ‘science’ was closely followed by ‘scientism’
acquiring a negative connotation, within a few years or decades.
It gained this connotation largely as a result of reactions against scientific imperialism – that
is, reactions against attempts to apply the methods of the natural sciences to other disciplines or to
expand their bounds. Some saw imperialism as overly ambitious and perceived dangers, such as
certain disciplines being seen as obsolete or impoverished by comparison with natural science. The
great success of the natural sciences in explaining phenomena and the attempt to extrapolate their
methods with the expectation that similar success might be enjoyed elsewhere has led to many

4
accusations of scientism. One way this is sometimes manifested is in attempts by some practitioners
of non-scientific disciplines – especially those sciences not classified within the natural sciences –
to imitate the natural sciences in their fields, for example by imitating their methods and
vocabulary (Haack 2013 [2009], 2-3; Beale 2017, 70).
Hayek treats this as definitive of the term: ‘we shall’, he writes, ‘wherever we are concerned …
with that slavish imitation of the method and language of Science, speak of “scientism” or the
“scientistic” prejudice’ (Hayek 1942, 269).11 This is one of the first explicit pejorative definitions.
Hayek offers a useful summary of how this ‘slavish imitation’ of science emerged:

During the first half of the nineteenth century a new attitude made its appearance.
The term science came more and more to be confined to the physical and biological
disciplines which at the same time began to claim for themselves a special
rigourousness and certainty which distinguished them from all others. Their
success was such that they soon began to exercise an extraordinary fascination on
those working in other fields, and who soon began to imitate their teaching and
vocabulary. Thus the tyranny commenced which the methods and technique of
the Sciences in the narrow sense of the term have ever since exercised over other
subjects. These became increasingly concerned to vindicate their equal status by
showing that their methods were the same as those of their brilliantly successful
sisters rather than by adapting their methods more and more to their own particular
problems. (Hayek 1942, 268)

If Hayek’s historical analysis is roughly correct, it is plausible to think that the success of the natural
sciences is largely what led to scientism’s focus on the natural sciences and its pejorative
connotation. Their success has led to some believing that their methods might enjoy further success
if extrapolated and to practitioners of other disciplines to imitate their methods. It has also led
some to think that the natural sciences are more valuable than other fields. This is important to
clarify, not least because scientism is often levelled against attempts to apply the methods of natural
science to non-natural sciences, such as the human or social sciences. Given its emphasis on the
natural sciences, in what follows ‘science’ denotes the natural sciences and ‘non-science’ (or ‘non-
scientific discipline’, etc.) is used widely, to cover non-scientific subjects, fields of inquiry or areas
of culture.

3 The Wider History of Scientism

There were, of course, instances of scientism before the coinage of the word. Putnam once
suggested that Julien Offray de La Mettrie’s 1747 book L’homme Machine might be the origin of
scientism in philosophy.12 While it seems correct to place its origins within the early modern
period, we can trace it back earlier than the mid-eighteenth century. Wellmuth suggests that we
can trace it to Descartes (Wellmuth 1944, 6). Sorell argues that it can be traced to Descartes and
Bacon (Sorell 1991, xi & ch. 2). One important factor in its possible origins in Cartesian
philosophy can be extracted from an excellent overview of historical issues related to these, by John
Cottingham: ‘the new scientific movement inaugurated by Descartes and Galileo … sought for
explanations of all the phenomena in the universe in terms of the precise quantifiable language of

5
mathematics’ (Cottingham 2005, 106).13 Kitcher suggests that the advent of scientism was
concomitant with the advent of modernity (Kitcher 1993, 390). Stenmark suggests that scientism
has ‘been around as long as science has existed’ (Stenmark 2003, 783). If Stenmark means that
scientism has been around since the articulation of the notion of science in the early-modern
period, going back to at least the seventeenth century, then this might be correct. It would be
difficult to identify anything deserving the label ‘scientism’ prior to the scientific revolution,
because before then there would not be a corresponding notion of ‘science’ in anything like the
sense in which we use it today. Scientia, the predecessor of ‘science’, has the broad meaning of
‘knowledge’; and we cannot make sense of the concept of scientism without a more specific concept
of science (Cottingham 2005, 107, n.12).
The origins of scientism are a subject of debate and SU offers useful perspectives on its history.
Sorell discusses how scientia has been radically reinterpreted since Descartes (SU 272). Boudry
discusses the role that Francis Bacon played in the history of scientism (SU 31). Russell Blackford
investigates the history of the concept of science in connection with the origins of scientism (SU
11-15), specifically in terms of the birth of the notion of a science and the word ‘scientist’, which
are important if we are to understand scientism in the terms he draws upon from the OED, as
‘excessive faith in science or scientists’ (SU 13-14). Kitcher discusses the history of the conflict
between the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften, going back at least two centuries
(SU 110). Mariam Thalos discusses a related distinction, between the ‘two cultures’ of the sciences
and the humanities (SU 294).
Kitcher’s discussion of the concept of Wissenschaft draws attention to the caveat that the
concept of scientism is limited, in some ways, to its connection with an Anglophone concept of
science. The meaning of ‘scientism’ will inevitably vary depending on how the concepts of science
and natural science are employed in the culture or language with which we are concerned. It would
be much more difficult to pin down what exactly ‘scientism’ is if we are concerned, for example,
with a possible connection to the concept of Wissenschaft, which is far broader than what is denoted
by ‘science’ in English. But just as scientism is concerned with the natural sciences when we are
speaking of the concepts in English, in German the concept of scientism should perhaps be limited
to excessive belief in the power or value of the Naturwissenschaften. That suggestion may well,
however, oversimplify a complex question. And even if it does not, such a distinction will not be
so readily available in various other languages; moreover, in various cultures, it would be far more
difficult to make sense of there being such a thing as ‘scientism’.

4 Scientism and ‘Scientific Expansionism’

Most forms of scientism make claims about the status of science: its nature, value or power. These
involve a variety of theses. For example, Putnam describes it as ‘the idea that science, and only
science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective’ (Putnam 1992, x).
Wellmuth describes it as ‘the belief that science … and the scientific method … afford the only
reliable natural means of acquiring such knowledge as may be available about whatever is real’
(Wellmuth 1944, 1-2). Whether defined as a view or levelled as an accusation, scientism most
often involves claims about the limits of science, or its lack of limits. Some dictionary definitions

6
define it as such, typically with an emphasis on its epistemological implications; for example, the
following, from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language:

A thesis that the methods of the natural sciences should be used in all areas of
investigation including philosophy, the humanities and the social sciences; a belief
that only such methods can be used in the pursuit of knowledge.

A common way of defining scientism is as what Stenmark calls ‘scientific expansionism’: the view
that ‘the boundaries of science (that is, typically the natural sciences) could and should be expanded
in such a way that something that has not previously been understood as science can now become
a part of science’ (Stenmark 2003, 783). This is roughly the form of scientism with which SU is
predominantly concerned.
There is a close relation between the concepts of scientific expansionism and imperialism.
Expansionism can be understood as a strong form of imperialism, in the sense that imperialism is
the process whereby a scientific discipline enters into a non-scientific domain, whereas
expansionism is the stronger view that a non-scientific domain should become part of natural
science. A central question addressed in SI is what, exactly, scientific imperialism is and what forms
it takes; this involves distinguishing it from expansionism. SI offers several definitions of scientific
imperialism; the tentative definition by the editors covers most: ‘a type of interdisciplinary relation
in which one scientific discipline occupies or enters into another discipline’s domain’ (SI 1).
Stenmark appears to hold that expansionism is a necessary feature of scientism such that ‘a
possible synonym’ for scientism is ‘scientific expansionism’ (Stenmark 2003, 783). This is
incorrect, because we can distinguish between expansionist and non-expansionist forms. The latter
includes instances where unwarranted evaluative claims are made about the value of the sciences
over non-scientific domains, but where no attempt is made to expand science’s limits. That is how
Sorell defines scientism in his book on the topic: ‘a matter of putting too high a value on science
in comparison with other branches of learning or culture’ (Sorell 1991, x; see also 9).
Instances of scientism, on Sorell’s definition, need not involve attempts to expand the limits of
science. The kinds of actions Hayek discusses also do not concern expanding science’s limits.
‘Scientism’, for Hayek, denotes imitation for science as a result of deference, with the danger that
scientific methods, vocabulary, etc. are imitated in areas where they are misplaced. We see this
when, for example, practitioners of pseudoscience imitate scientific methods to try to make their
discipline seem more respectable – e.g., creationism and astrology. Such imitation is among the
‘signs’ of scientism Haack identifies (Haack 2013 [2009], 5). But perhaps the most common,
pernicious and philosophically interesting type of scientism concerns attempts to expand the limits
of natural science. In this respect, there is a close relation between scientism and scientific
imperialism.

5 Science Unlimited? The Challenges of Scientism

Maarten Boudry and Massimo Pigliucci’s excellent co-edited volume is concerned with what
scientism is and what is wrong with it. Its focus, as the title suggests, is with the kind of scientism
that some argue occurs when scientific imperialism goes too far – for example, controversial

7
attempts to apply the methods of the natural sciences to non-scientific domains, or cases of
scientific expansionism. Any debate concerning scientism or the limits of science raises the question
of what science is. The book is concerned with the nature of science insofar as this helps demarcate
science from other areas of inquiry, with the aim of elucidating science’s limits and identifying
where accusations of scientism are warranted (SU 2).
Demarcation projects are usually concerned with demarcating science from pseudoscience,
following Karl Popper’s original treatment of the demarcation problem, where he proposed
falsifiability as the criterion for demarcation (Popper 1963, 36-7; SU 185-7). SU is concerned with
another demarcation problem: demarcating science from other areas of inquiry with their own
distinctive epistemic aims, and thereby articulating some of science’s limits. Demarcating science
from pseudoscience distinguishes bona fide science from bogus science; the ‘problem with
scientism’, the editors write, is identifying ‘an excess of science’ (SU 3). The two books share a
concern with the latter problem.
The two overarching questions of SU are ‘What is scientism?’ and ‘What are the boundaries
of science?’. The book investigates whether scientism has a value in identifying ‘forms of (excessive)
science enthusiasm’ (SU 2). The chapters address this by exploring ‘the limits and nature of science’
and ‘the territorial disputes arising from scientific progress’ (SU 5), through investigations into the
relationship between science and other ‘ways of knowing’. ‘Science Unlimited’ is the name the
editors give to the view that science has no limits (SU 2). This is the strongest form of scientism
with which this book is concerned.

5.1 ‘Science unlimited’

It is hard to find examples of ‘science unlimited’; but a possible example emerges in SU. Several
contributors argue that science has very few limits but no matter how far its boundaries are
expanded, it cannot provide an objective basis for morality. The most often cited argumentative
target of someone who thinks it can is Sam Harris (SU 22; 44; 123; 189). Harris’ The Moral
Landscape (2010) proffers what the editors describe as ‘a form of analytic moral naturalism’ (SU
22), which holds, Pigliucci writes, that ‘science can determine human values’ (SU 189; see also 44).
According to Harris, we can derive ‘should’ and ‘ought’ from facts (SU 97). Other representatives
of this view criticized in SU are Shermer (SU 97-101; 106; 189) and Richard Carrier (SU 44).
Against this view, a third of the chapters appeal to Hume’s argument that we cannot derive
‘ought’ from ‘is’ (those by Boudry, Justin Kalef, Stephen Law, Thomas Nickles, and Michael Ruse).
A different challenge is raised by Kitcher, who argues that value judgements are inseparable from
scientific practice and cannot be reduced to factual judgements, so scientism is untenable if it
entails reducing all inquiry to scientific inquiry (SU 118). This echoes Putnam’s work on the
‘fact/value dichotomy’, which Putnam also used to argue against scientism.14
Kalef offers the most charitable case for and strongest objections against Harris’ arguments (SU
96-101). Kalef outlines what he takes to be Harris’ ‘clearest articulation’ of bridging the gap
between ought and is (SU 97). This is Harris’ argument that certain prescriptive and descriptive
terms are synonymous. One of Harris’ examples is, ‘“You shouldn’t lie” (prescriptive) is
synonymous with “Lying needlessly complicates people’s lives, destroys reputations, and

8
undermines trust” (descriptive)’ (SU 97, 100; Harris 2014). To show that evaluative terms such as
‘good’ can be reduced to descriptive terms, Harris holds that we need to posit a space of possible
experiences – part of a ‘moral landscape’ – to illustrate synonymy between prescriptions and
descriptions.
Two of Kalef’s objections are especially important. First, Harris ‘owes us a plausible account
of synonymy according to which this could be arrived at in a genuinely scientific manner’. Second,
Kalef offers the following counterexample: “You shouldn’t expose the diabolical plot of this corrupt
public figure” is, by the same lights as Harris’ example, synonymous with “Exposing the diabolical
plot of this corrupt public figure would needlessly complicate people’s lives, destroy reputations,
and undermine trust” (SU 100).
SU successfully meets its objectives of defining scientism and adumbrating the limits of science.
But the approach towards these questions feels repetitive at times, because several of the chapters
defend roughly the same position – that establishing an objective basis for morality lies beyond
science’s limits – primarily by employing the same argument, from Hume. But this position
perhaps merits such extensive scrutiny, since SU makes it clear that this is perhaps the only
relatively uncontroversial use of ‘scientism’ to denote a philosophical position and the best
candidate for ‘science unlimited’.

5.2 Definitions of Scientism

A panoply of definitions of ‘scientism’ emerge from this book. Useful overviews of definitions are
provided by Thalos (SU 290-1), who outlines six definitions to illustrate its pejorative uses, and
Rik Peels, who provides an overview of ‘epistemological scientism’, which he takes to be its most
common definition – the view that ‘only natural science can reliably deliver knowledge’ (SU 165;
167). Similar definitions are used by Blackford, Kitcher and Law and epistemological scientism is
defended against criticisms by Rosenberg and Kalef. Some contributors, such as Pigliucci, offer an
account of the distinction between scientism’s neutral and pejorative uses (SU 188). Taner Edis
usefully distinguishes between ‘harmful’ and ‘harmless’ types of scientism (SU 89). Novel forms
are coined, such as Edis’ ‘philistine scientism’: the ‘dismissal of what superficially looks woolly and
non-scientific without a proper appreciation of how a discipline might produce genuine
knowledge’ (SU 89).
‘Scientism’ is most often defined in SU as a type of scientific imperialism. What Thomas
Nickles calls ‘The scientism question’ is that of ‘whether science overreaches its legitimate
boundaries’ (SU 145). Edis describes scientism as ‘a kind of institutional imperialism, with the
aims and practices of natural science taking over other institutions’ (SU 83; see also 88). Pigliucci
usefully distinguishes between scientific imperialism and ‘scientistic imperialism’ (SU 198), to
distinguish healthy and unhealthy interdisciplinary relations between scientific and non-scientific
disciplines (SU 190). Ross also defines a pejorative form of scientific imperialism, inviting us to
‘imagine an imperialist scientism that aims to promote the value of science at the expense of other
human activities that have quite distinct purposes, such as art’ (SU 225). When scientism is
manifest as a kind of imperialism it often takes an epistemological form; Boudry, for example,
defines scientism as ‘that which pushes science beyond its epistemological limits’ (SU 33). Kitcher

9
treats ‘natural scientific imperialism’ synonymously with scientism, by which he appears to mean
scientific expansionism (SU 110). A distinction is not usually drawn between imperialism and
expansionism in SU, so sometimes what is called ‘imperialism’ might be better called
‘expansionism’; but since the latter can be understood as a strong form of the former, it should be
generally clear to the reader when the contributors are concerned with expansionism rather than
imperialism.
A recurrent theme is outlining criteria for identifying scientism. To this end, Haack’s ‘Six Signs
of Scientism’ is frequently drawn upon (e.g. SU 12; 188; 191-6; 287-9). The editors articulate five
typical prima facie characteristics of scientism, based on the term’s current usage, which are useful
for identifying possible instances of scientism (SU 2). A useful feature of this book is that some
chapters draw upon and develop accounts of scientism and arguments against scientism offered in
other chapters.
The manifold definitions of ‘scientism’ and disagreements over its use result in some
contributors endorsing a relativist or what we could call an ‘eliminativist’ approach to scientism.
Ross, for example, argues that there ‘is no fact of the matter about what scientism is, only facts
about what different sets of people take scientism to be; and … there is much disagreement across
these sets’ (SU 225). Blackford argues that we should eliminate the term altogether. While
acknowledging that ‘we need a vocabulary … to scrutinize unfortunate intellectual trends and their
possible connections’, Blackford argues that scientism should not be part of it (SU 28).

5.3 Scientism as an immunizing strategy

Blackford’s eliminativism is a response to a way in which ‘scientism’ has been employed by some
in attempts to immunize domains – typically religion – from scientific criticism or expansion (SU
13, 27). This has led to scientism gaining the connotation of anti-science; for this reason, some
argue that we should abandon the term. The editors write that ‘some argue that the usage of
scientism as a cloak for antiscience is now so pervasive that the term can no longer be salvaged’ (SU
4). Blackford argues that scientism should be eliminated because it carries too much ‘theological
baggage’ (SU 28).
Boudry, Edis and Law also criticise this use of scientism but do not go as far as endorsing
Blackford’s eliminativism (SU, 46; 81; 89; 121-2; 141). Law argues that scientism ‘has become a
convenient, immunizing factoid that can be wheeled out whenever a scientific threat to [religious]
belief rears its head’ (SU 141). Edis gives examples of this use by proponents of alternative healing
methods against criticisms from practitioners of evidence-based medicine (SU 81).
Anti-science is dangerous, so it is good to see the use of ‘scientism’ as a cloak for anti-science
subjected to detailed criticism. In recent years, the Trump administration have demonstrated the
scale of this danger. The most telling example has been their denial that climate change is genuine,
a denial which has sometimes taken the form of a conspiracy theory, the danger of which has been
most clearly illustrated in their pledge to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.15 Their stance on
climate change has led Noam Chomsky to describe the Republican party as the ‘most dangerous
organization on Earth’.16 Another example is their attempt to interfere with how science is
practised, such that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is effectively banned from using

10
research that relies on private medical records to support proposals for rules to limit environmental
pollution (Meyer 2018). A recent article in the New York Times outlined almost eighty
environmental rules on the way out under Trump’s presidency (Popovich et al 2018). The word
‘scientism’ has not been used publicly by the Trump administration in their defensive strategies
against science. But the same underlying issue motivating its use as an immunizing strategy is
evident in Trump’s attitude toward various environmental issues: hostility towards science.
Although scientism carries anti-scientific baggage, Blackford’s eliminativist proposal seems
excessive; ‘scientism’ can surely be recovered, but not univocally. Nonetheless, Blackford’s proposal
is perhaps commensurate with the caveat generated by using scientism as an immunizing strategy.
Putnam once described scientism as ‘one of the most dangerous contemporary intellectual
tendencies’ (Putnam 1982, 147). Anti-science could be described in the same way. Anti-science is
at least as dangerous as excessive science enthusiasm; and if scientism is a means for cloaking anti-
science, so much the worse for scientism.

5.4 Scientism Beyond the Academy

The chapters raise problems with scientism which are helpful for identifying what is wrong with
some of its forms. Some of these are only adumbrated; but this is understandable, given the
volume’s laudable and rare aim of being pitched towards a general readership. ‘A number of
chapters may require some technical background in philosophy of language …, economics …, and
epistemology’, the editors write, ‘but most are accessible without prior knowledge in philosophy’
(SU 7-8). This is true, with the exception of the chapters mentioned by the editors (by Filip
Buekens, Ross, and Sorell). The chapters by Nickles, Peels, Rosenberg and Thalos are also less
accessible to a general audience.
Since scientism is of wide interest beyond the academy, it is good to see a volume of high-
quality essays on the theme which are mostly accessible to a wider audience. As the editors write,
‘discussions of scientism are not just academic but very much relevant to the education, and
ultimately the lives, of millions of students worldwide’ (SU 5). The editors and contributors hope
the book can provide ‘guidance to academics, policy makers, and the public at large about the
nature of the debate [concerning scientism] and its many implications’ (SU 7). A number of articles
have been published for a general readership in recent years concerning scientism, one of which is
re-printed in SU – Kitcher’s excellent chapter, originally published in the New Republic in 2012.
Arguments put forward by influential public intellectuals such as Harris, Shermer and Richard
Dawkins are addressed throughout the chapters, as well as controversial positions endorsed by
religious apologists and defenders of pseudoscience. One might read the treatment of such figures
or positions as targeting straw men; but since these figures and some of the movements discussed
exert a strong influence in the public sphere and the book is generally targeted at a wider audience,
and given the dangers of scientism, it is good to see philosophers critically engaging with such
positions and figures.

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 5.5 Three Options for Scientism: Relativism, Eliminativism, or a Cluster Concept
Notwithstanding the obstacles towards defining scientism, we can at least give a crude definition
of its pejorative use. Several are offered in the volume. The editors’ definition is ‘to be overly
deferential toward science, to unfairly disparage other disciplines like the humanities or philosophy,
or to have an inordinate confidence in the future successes of science’ (SU 3) – perhaps a version
of what Edis calls ‘science as ideology’ (SU 76). The danger of crude definitions is that they often
‘boil down’, as Boudry notes, ‘to “science I don’t like”’ (SU 33). Ross offers a less crude definition
related to scientific imperialism: ‘scientism is used to refer to attempts to impose what are taken to
be norms that govern scientific practice on domains where the norms in question did not formerly
apply’ (SU 231). Perhaps the most plausible crude definition we could offer of its pejorative use is
excessive belief in the power or value of science, which develops Sorell’s definition in his book on
the topic, by adding a disjunct to include ‘power’. This needs to be added, since some forms of
scientism make claims about the explanatory power of science without this being accompanied by
an evaluative claim about the value of science over non-science.
The many criteria for identifying scientism and its manifold uses support the view that defining
scientism as a cluster concept might be the best recourse – e.g., one united by family resemblance.17
This possibility deserves detailed consideration but is not given much in the book. Blackford would
reject the claim that scientism is a cluster concept; he is sceptical whether there is ‘a good umbrella
term’ for issues often described as ‘scientistic’ (SU 27). It seems that none of the other contributors
in SU except perhaps Rosenberg would reject the claim that scientism is a cluster concept, but it
also seems that none endorses it. Pigliucci puts forward something related: science and
pseudoscience should be treated as family resemblance concepts (SU 187). Demarcating between
science and pseudoscience, or science and non-science, Pigliucci writes, ‘in all interesting cases …
will take the form of a cluster concept, Wittgenstein-style’ (SU 197; cf. 192). The view that science
is a family resemblance concept has been proposed by John Dupré, who endorses a pluralistic
conception of science (SU 16-17). Dupré’s work is often cited (SU 11-12; 14; 20; 228).
Consistent with defining scientism as a cluster concept is the useful endeavour undertaken in
SU of clearly defining forms of scientism and their features, some of which are shared across forms.
The signs of scientism identified by Boudry and Pigliucci, and elsewhere by Haack, are several
through which we can identify many forms; but no one of those features is sufficient for identifying
all instances of the concept. But that does not make the concept redundant; the concept needs a
more detailed map. A conceptual map of scientism has recently been published by Peels (Peels
2018).
Since the book’s focus is the relation between scientism and the limits of science, it is
understandable that SU is generally focused on the kind of scientism that allegedly arises when
attempts are made to extend science’s limits. But since scientism takes important forms that do
not concern science’s limits, its non-imperialistic forms also merit a more detailed analysis than
SU offers.

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 5.6 Thematic connections
The chapters are organised alphabetically, by the surnames of authors. The editors explain that this
is because ‘there is no particular order of exposition’ to them (SU 7). While this seems correct, it
does not suffice to explain why the chapters have not been structured in some kind of order,
especially given the following thematic connections. The chapters by Boudry, Buekens, and
Nickles are linked in their arguments that some forms of knowledge or sources of belief are not
reducible to scientific knowledge. The chapters by Kitcher, Pigliucci, and Ruse also argue against
scientific reductionism; their chapters are also linked in their concerns with either identifying the
limits of science or problems concerning demarcation, or both. The chapters by Blackford, Edis,
Kalef, and Law also sketch the limits of science; Blackford, Edis and Law criticize scientism’s use
as an immunizing strategy; and Kalef and Law argue that we cannot reduce philosophical questions
to scientific questions. The chapters by Ross, Sorell, and Thalos use case studies to address
problems concerning scientism, in economics (Ross), experimental philosophy (Sorell), and
sociobiology (Thalos). Ross and Thalos both argue that reductionism is the main problem with
scientism. The chapters by Peels and Rosenberg put forward what each author argues is the
fundamental problem with scientism. These are two distinct problems, but both concern the main
obstacle facing scientific reductionism. Peels argues that scientism cannot overcome the problem
he raises. Rosenberg argues that scientism can overcome the problem he identifies.
These thematic groupings can be expanded, in order, as follows. Boudry (ch. 2) defines
scientism as ‘that which pushes science beyond its epistemological limits’ (SU 33) and outlines
those limits. He endorses a ‘naturalistic (holistic) conception of the web of human knowledge,
according to which science is interwoven with everyday knowledge, philosophy, and other
academic disciplines’. ‘From this holistic point of view’, he writes, ‘the notion of limits to science
becomes difficult to defend’ (SU 33). But this holism entails that scientism is untenable when it
requires a firm separation between scientific and non-scientific knowledge (SU 38).
Boudry considers two domains commonly claimed to lie beyond science’s reach, the
supernatural and the moral, and argues that science is only limited by the latter (SU 34). This is
because, he argues, moral realism is untenable (SU 46). Even if one were a moral realist, it is
‘unclear why you would need neuroscience or other specialized sciences to establish moral facts’, a
position he describes as a form of scientism – a ‘misplaced confidence in the deliverances of
(neuro)science’ (SU 45). While many will agree with Boudry’s arguments concerning the limits of
neuroscience, many will also find his quick dismissal of moral realism contentious.
Buekens (ch. 3) argues for a non-reductive monism that holds that physical facts fix all facts
and all facts are supervenient upon physical ones. He argues that this is not scientistic because it is
consistent to be a conceptual anti-reductionist yet hold that all facts supervene upon physical facts
(SU 54).
Nickles (ch. 8) argues that strong scientific realism is untenable and can be understood as a
type of scientism (SU 145). He outlines seven fascinating ‘cognitive illusions’ that ‘make scientific
realism seem much more attractive than it “really” is’ (SU 153). Nickles uses these to argue that
‘strong realism produces scientistic claims that go beyond what evidence and argument entitle us

13
to believe’ (SU 159). ‘The scientism question’ is defined by Nickles as one concerning scientific
imperialism: the question of ‘whether science overreaches its legitimate boundaries’ (SU 145).
The core problem with scientism, according to Kitcher (ch. 6), is that ‘culture appears to be at
some level autonomous and in some sense irreducible, and this is what scientism cannot grasp’ (SU
117). Kitcher argues that various disciplines are inextricably linked, such that a full reduction of
certain areas to natural science is impossible; for example, values cannot be entirely reduced to
facts. Kitcher employs ‘scientific imperialism’ synonymously with scientism, where this means the
attempt to expand natural science into non-scientific domains and reduce the latter such that the
only methods of inquiry needed are those of natural science (SU 110). ‘Scientism’ here means the
stronger form of scientific imperialism, scientific expansionism.
Demarcation projects are explored in most detail by Pigliucci (ch. 10). Pigliucci writes that
‘scientistic thinking often originates from scientists who overstep epistemic boundaries … if not
of their discipline, certainly of their own expertise, and often of both’ (SU 190). The whole debate
concerning scientism, according to Pigliucci, ‘is an exercise in demarcation’ (SU 196); but ‘the
scientistic strategy’ is ‘one of expansionism, not demarcation’ (SU 192). Pigliucci does not endorse
a strict definition of science, non-science or pseudoscience; he suggests that science and
pseudoscience should be treated as family resemblance concepts (SU 187).
Ruse (ch. 13) argues that by the very nature of what science is, it has limits; he then tries to
show what these are (SU 245). Ruse argues that there are four domains where science cannot
answer questions: the nature of existence; morality; the hard problem of consciousness; and the
meaning of existence (SU 255-8). He also offers an extremely interesting account of the role of
metaphors in scientific inquiry.
Blackford (ch. 1) gives two reasons for endorsing eliminativism about scientism (SU 13; 27).
The first was discussed above; the second is that scientism is sometimes used as a term to glorify
techno-science, but techno-science is not always bad (SU 27). Blackford adumbrates ways that the
sciences and humanities can work harmoniously to address questions (SU 22).
Edis (ch. 4) argues for an ‘ambitious conception of science’ which holds that ‘scientific,
philosophical, and humanistic forms of knowledge are continuous, and a broadly naturalistic
description of our world centered on natural science is correct’ (SU 76; 80). But Edis argues that
‘Not all forms of intellectual life can be assimilated into science, however broadly understood’,
because we ‘have other intellectual purposes besides investigation and explanation’ (SU 76). Edis
focuses on a version of ‘epistemological scientism’: ‘science sets the standards for knowledge’ (SU
74).
Kalef (ch. 5) also defines scientism epistemologically: ‘the view that the only facts are those
that could in principle be learned exclusively from the natural and social sciences, empirical
observations, mathematics, and logic’. On this view, ‘any beliefs that can be justified only in some
other way are merely sham knowledge’. Kalef however notes that, obviously, ‘adherents of
scientism often speak and act as though we ought to do things’, and since it’s fallacious to derive
ought from is, ‘these devotees of scientism are in trouble’ (SU 95).
Kalef argues that this kind of scientism needs to respond to the naturalistic fallacy and to the
problem of how ethical reasoning can be reduced such that it is simply a matter for scientific
investigation (SU 101). Kalef writes that the attempts made by the likes of Harris and Shermer to

14
‘completely replace philosophical reasoning with scientific investigations in morality seem hopeless,
since that project implicitly relies on at least as many philosophical assumptions as it seeks to
replace’ (SU 106). This connects with problems facing strong scientific reductionism outlined by
contributors such as Kitcher.
Law (ch. 7) criticizes the use of scientism as an immunizing strategy by those trying to protect
religion and the supernatural. Various religious and supernatural beliefs are not immune to
scientific refutation, Law argues, because they sometimes involve logical contradictions or
conceptual problems, or are empirically refutable. Conversely, it is scientistic to claim that all
supernatural and religious claims can be addressed by science (SU 131-4).
Law invokes Hume’s argument to try to show that it is untenable to hold that questions about
we ought to act are a matter for scientific explanation (SU 122-3). Like Kalef, he argues that
philosophical questions are beyond the reach of science, given their conceptual nature (SU 123).
Law suggests that scientism is most common in imperialistic scientific moves. Scientism, Law
writes, ‘typically involves the thought that critics have crossed a line or boundary demarcating
those topics or subjects that are the proper province of science, and those that are beyond its
capacity to adjudicate’ (SU 121).
Ross (ch. 12) uses a case study in economics to argue that ‘fussing over scientism is not merely
harmless but pointless distraction, because it can encourage scientists to adopt wrong-headed
philosophies of science in self-defense’ (SU 233). Ross offers an interesting overview of allegations
of scientism in economics, the history of this debate and the state of economics today (SU 232-
33). Ross argues that scientism only has force against the kinds of moves in economics he considers
if one doubts that economics is a form of empirical inquiry (SU 240). He clarifies that when he
and Ladyman proudly asserted that they ‘admire science to the point of frank scientism’ (Ladyman
et al 2007, 61), their intended point was that ‘insofar as science has methods, they are merely those
that apply to all empirical inquiry’ (SU 240). This is also the conclusion of his chapter.
Sorell (ch. 14) questions whether experimental philosophy’s findings concerning folk
intuitions are ‘a valuable corrective to traditional philosophical appeals to intuition, or whether
they are a distraction motivated in part by scientism’ (SU 264). He describes experimental
philosophy as ‘occasionally scientistic’ in its ‘tendency’ to treat ‘natural science as the preferred
body of results and methods for intellectual work of every kind’ (SU 265). Sorell makes the
following diagnosis about this tendency: ‘Experimental philosophers think that if they do not
themselves bring empirical methods to the study of intuitions, there will be nothing, or nothing
much, to link philosophy to natural science, and they believe that the link to natural science is a
lifeline’. Sorell argues that a common attitude within experimental philosophy is that we need to
apply empirical methods to the study of intuitions, for fear that otherwise ‘there will be nothing,
or nothing much, to link philosophy to natural science’ – a link that experimental philosophy treats
as a ‘lifeline’. Sorell argues that experimental philosophers think that the alternative for philosophy
as a discipline ‘linked methodologically to science … is a moribund discipline endlessly debating
semantic questions’ (SU 279). Experimental philosophy does not, however, need ‘to be parasitic
on … natural science’ (SU 279). This is the same form of scientism Sorell criticized in his book on
the topic.

15
 Thalos (ch. 15) tries to show that certain attempts to reduce non-scientific disciplines such
that they lie within the bounds of science rest upon what she calls the ‘fallacy of reductionism’ (SU
286-7): the unwarranted attempt to reduce a non-scientific discipline to a scientific one. She uses
attempts to fully explain human behaviour in sociobiology as a case study to illustrate this fallacy
(SU 292). What is scientistic, she argues, is fallacious scientific reductionism – ‘reduction via bad
argumentation’. She claims that science enthusiasm only goes too far if one believes that science is
infallible (SU 288).
Peels (ch. 9) outlines what he calls the ‘fundamental problem’ for scientism, understood as the
epistemological thesis that we can only reliably gain knowledge from natural science (SU 165;
167). Peels argues that natural science requires non-scientific sources of belief: ‘the fundament of
natural science itself consists of the deliverances on nonscientific sources of belief … so that if we
claim that we should discard any nonscientific sources of belief, we make an untenable claim’ (SU
166). Scientism is indefensible, Peels argues, when it takes the form of stating that non-scientific
beliefs cannot count as knowledge, since certain non-scientific sources of belief have to be
presupposed as known in order for science to function. Examples of such sources include auditory
perception, memory and logical intuition (SU 166).
Rosenberg (ch. 11) contributes one of the most controversial chapters, stating that he endorses
scientism, where this entails that the supposed irreducibility of intentionality does not pose a
problem for a full explanation of mental states using neuroscience. Rosenberg focuses on
epistemological challenges to scientism because ‘challenges to scientism are almost always
epistemic’ (SU 204). Rosenberg outlines the ‘demands on and constraints facing an epistemology
for scientism’ and tries to ‘wield them into tentative suggestions for how it can meet its most serious
challenges’ (SU 205).
Rosenberg does an excellent job of outlining some of the most severe problems facing scientism
when it tries to accommodate epistemology (SU 205-10), mathematics (SU 210-4), and, most
problematically, intentionality (SU 214-19). Scientism has to accept that there is ‘no original
intentionality’, which leads to there being ‘no derived intentionality’ and consequently ‘no
meaning, in particular no linguistic meaning, no semantic values, no truth or falsity’ (SU 218).
Scientism looks like it cannot get off the ground; it ‘cannot even express itself as a set of claims
about anything’, because if it rejects that there’s any intentionality, ‘there is no such thing as about’
(SU 218).
In response, Rosenberg argues that future developments in the brain could ‘represent’ reality
as an isomorphic relation between the brain’s neural network and physical reality (SU 218-221).
Rosenberg appeals to the use of ‘representation’ in neuroscience, ‘to identify the neural circuits’
encoding of inputs from the peripheral nervous system in … the lateral geniculate nucleus or the
visual cortex’ (SU 218). ‘Representation’ is not used here in a sense that implies intentionality, but
in a sense where the representations function ‘in terms of structures or neural axonal discharges
that are physically isomorphic to the inputs that cause them’ (SU 218). This physical isomorphism
does not, Rosenberg argues, imply or assume intentionality (SU 219).
The possibility Rosenberg promises for the future of neural networks is difficult to fathom.
One might respond by arguing that Rosenberg’s arguments fall foul of what Juliet Floyd has called
‘promissory scientism’, where an insufficiently grounded claim is made about the future course of

16
science (Floyd 2010, 334). Since Rosenberg appears to hold that there is no such thing as scientism,
an objection along such lines is unlikely to worry him. Rosenberg’s ambitious argument represents
an example of the kind of difficult argumentative target to which an opponent of scientism needs
to respond in order to make a convincing argument against scientism.
In a recent review of SU, John Dupré writes that he was ‘not convinced’ that the theme of SU
is ‘sufficiently coherent to make a very satisfying collection’, which could be ‘ameliorated … by
imposing a little structure on the volume’ (Dupré 2018). While the volume would be improved
with a thematic structure, its focus on what scientism is, primarily in connection with the limits of
science and demarcation issues, makes this a theme not overly broad. Moreover, since scientism is
a loose concept in need of a clearer definition and it affects a wide range of disciplines and areas of
culture, a broad study of its dimensions is useful to give an overview of a loose theme to lay the
ground for a more targeted investigation.

6 Scientific Imperialism: Exploring the Boundaries of Interdisciplinarity

Uskali Mäki, Adrian Walsh and Manuela Fernández Pinto’s impressive co-edited collection is not
primarily concerned with scientism, but rather with scientific imperialism (henceforth,
‘imperialism’), another concept which is both difficult to define and takes many forms. The
tentative definition of imperialism offered by the editors – ‘a type of interdisciplinary relation in
which one scientific discipline occupies or enters into another discipline’s domain’ (SI 1) – implies
a connection between imperialism and scientism on at least two levels. First, scientific imperialism
is always at least implicitly concerned with the limits of science. Second, constructing a definition
of imperialism faces some of the same methodological difficulties encountered when defining
scientism, such as how to distinguish its pejorative and neutral uses. This tentative definition leaves
open the possibility of imperialism involving a scientific discipline entering into the domain of
another science (e.g. the natural sciences venturing into the human or social sciences).
A study of imperialism is bound up with issues concerning interdisciplinarity. SI aims to
provide a better understanding of the boundaries of interdisciplinarity through a detailed study of
imperialism. The volume is concerned with the concepts of imperialism and interdisciplinarity and
the relation between them, primarily in terms of which interdisciplinary relations are possible
between scientific and non-scientific areas of inquiry. SI addresses the question of what the limits
are to such relations – i.e., where imperialism goes from being a healthy to an unhealthy
interdisciplinary relation between scientific and non-scientific disciplines. It is perhaps at this
juncture that scientific imperialism becomes scientistic, in the pejorative sense.
The volume’s focus is on ‘a type of cross-disciplinary relation’, where the relations between
scientific and non-scientific disciplines is ‘asymmetrical’ rather than egalitarian (SI, 2) – i.e., the
interdisciplinary collaboration is weighted more towards either science or the disciplines with
which it is collaboratively engaged. Cases of imperialism are described as falling somewhere in the
middle of a spectrum of interdisciplinary relations, with disciplines remaining intact at one end,
to radical cases where ‘disciplinary boundaries are completely erased’ at the other (SI 2).
Imperialism occurs when ‘a substantial interaction is taking place between two disciplines, where
the disciplines do not remain intact … but where disciplinary boundaries remain’ (SI 2).

17
 The volume has two aims. First, ‘to understand the nature of the interdisciplinary relations
that emerge from the incursion of one scientific discipline into one or more other disciplines’.
Second, ‘to explore ways of distinguishing imperialistic from non-imperialistic interactions
between disciplines and research fields’ (SI 1). These aims are also important for reaching a more
nuanced understanding of scientism. The volume meets both of these very well, through detailed
consideration of philosophical issues concerning scientific imperialism (Part I, chs. 1-4), the history
of the debate, with particular attention to its place within economics (Part II, chs. 5-8), and case
studies in biology (ch. 9), neuroscience (ch. 10), evolutionary biology and the social sciences (ch.
11), psychology (ch. 12), law (ch. 13), naturalized epistemology (ch. 14), and physics (ch. 15) (Part
III, chs. 9-15). The wide breadth of these case studies is useful for illustrating the various ways in
which imperialism is manifested.
The volume’s detailed introduction raises important questions concerning scientific
imperialism which are addressed over the chapters. Some of these are of concern to debates
concerning scientism. For example, the volume questions whether the broadness of a scientific
discipline is an epistemic virtue, ‘by uncovering cases in which the expansion of one scientific
discipline into another does not necessarily contribute to epistemic success’ (SI 1). There is a
twofold connection with scientism here: first, in the notion of the expansion of science; second,
when the breadth of science goes from being epistemically virtuous to vicious. The question of
whether scientism is epistemically vicious is addressed in SU through discussion of the distinction
between the term’s neutral and pejorative uses.18
The scope of SI is limited, as the editors acknowledge, to ‘intra-academic interdisciplinary’
relations. But the research in this volume can be extrapolated to interdisciplinary relations in
general. For example, cases of ‘extra-academic imperialism’, ‘where academic disciplines seek to
explain phenomena that have been traditionally in the domain of culture, religion, or other non-
academic approaches to understanding the world’ (SI 2).
The wider concern of extra-academic imperialism, insofar as this becomes problematic such
that it might become scientistic, is addressed in SU. For example, in the chapters that discuss
whether science can address questions concerning religion and the supernatural (the chapters by
Blackford, Boudry and Law). A case of extra-academic imperialism to which almost all contributors
to SU will agree is scientistic is the view that science can provide an objective basis for morality.
Defining imperialism is one of the five ‘core issues’ the volume aims to address, along with (2)
categorizing its forms, (3) articulating its mechanisms, (4) identifying its instances, and (5)
evaluating whether a particular instance of imperialism is virtuous or vicious (SI 3-6). Each has at
least as important a place in investigations concerning the form of scientism related to imperialism.

6.1 Defining Scientific Imperialism

Several chapters in SI address questions about how to distinguish imperialism from associated
notions such as scientific ‘colonialism’, ‘expansionism’ and ‘collaboration’, investigations into
which bear upon all four of the other issues (SI 3). ‘Colonialism’ is used to denote the imperialistic
process of natural science entering into another discipline such that it occupies a permanent place
there. Each of these notions could perhaps be understood along a spectrum of imperialistic

18
positions, with expansionism as the greatest form of imperialism, collaboration as the weakest
form, and colonialism somewhere in the middle.
The volume is not primarily concerned with the kind of scientific imperialism more literally
termed ‘imperialism’ and literally related to colonialism. That denotes the allegation sometimes
made against scientists working in high- or upper middle-income countries who obtain knowledge
or techniques from communities in low-income countries and patent their discoveries without
giving legal or financial recognition to the community from which the discoveries are made.
‘Scientific imperialism’ then denotes actions where scientists ‘take advantage of the asymmetrical
power relations’ between nations of different economic statuses ‘so as to obtain knowledge and
resources that they would otherwise not be able to obtain’ (SI 28, n.5). This form of scientific
imperialism is not the book’s focus; but it is used to elucidate what is meant by imperialism in the
sense with which the volume is primarily concerned. ‘The political connotations remain in the
background’, the editors write, ‘even under the descriptive definition of scientific imperialism’;
and the editors question whether we can ‘shed any light on the question about the proper
boundaries between … disciplines through the use of the political metaphor of imperialism’ (SI
3). Even when detached from its political connotations, the idea of a purely neutral use of
‘imperialism’ is odd.
Similarly to debates concerning scientism, the central debate concerning the definition of
scientific imperialism is whether to define it neutrally or pejoratively (SI 3). SI distinguishes
between these. The neutral denotes a healthy interdisciplinary extension of science, where, for
example, the non-scientific discipline with which science is engaged is not reduced to part of
science. The pejorative denotes its use as a criticism, indicating unwarranted extensions of scientific
disciplines into non-scientific domains. This is where imperialism might become scientistic – or
perhaps where it becomes ‘scientistic imperialism’, to employ Pigliucci’s term (SU 198). The
pejorative definition of imperialism in SI follows Dupré’s definition (Dupré 1995; SI 3).
We have seen that this same distinction and the reason for it is one of the most important
methodological issues faced when offering an account of scientism. Some attempts to define
imperialism in SI address the question of whether the core issue facing imperialism in some cases
is scientism, and what distinction can be drawn between imperialism and scientism (SI 4). The
main discussions of scientism take place in the chapters by Adrian Walsh and Sandy Boucher (ch.
1) and Manuela Fernández Pinto (ch. 14).
Walsh and Boucher address the questions of when disciplinary expansion is unwarranted and
how we can determine what the proper boundaries of disciplines are. They emphasise the
importance of not confusing imperialism with scientism, the latter of which they define as ‘the
tendency to extend the range of intellectual problems that science and the scientific method should
and can solve’, the most extreme form being ‘the claim that science has solved all such problems’
(SI 14). Like the notion of ‘science unlimited’, it’s hard to think of anyone who would endorse
this; but, again, two of the closest possible examples, Harris and Rosenberg, are cited by Walsh
and Boucher as proponents (SI 27, n.3).
Walsh and Boucher outline two other ways that claims concerning imperialism might be
scientistic. First, the ‘suggestion that science has a solution to all possible intellectual problems’;
second, the ‘demand that scientific method be applied to all areas of human intellectual endeavour’

19
(SI 14-15). Unlike scientism, Walsh and Boucher write that imperialism ‘is not [concerned] with
the proper range of science nor with whether science represents the only legitimate method of
inquiry … but rather with the relationship between distinct scientific disciplines’ (SI 15). Their
chapter is concerned with imperialism, defined this way.
Pinto (ch. 14) considers imperialism in the context of the relation between philosophy and the
sciences via a study of naturalized epistemology. She raises limitations concerning the naturalistic
turn in epistemology. One limitation is that naturalized epistemology faces the problem that in
the co-operation between epistemologists and scientists, certain background assumptions have to
be taken for granted by practitioners on both sides of the interdisciplinary programme.
Background assumptions ‘frequently include epistemological assumptions needed for scientific
inquiry’ and ‘epistemologists must be overtly aware of the assumptions they are importing from
other scientific disciplines’ (SI 285). ‘The danger’ for the philosophers engaged in naturalized
epistemology is, Pinto writes, ‘accepting active cooperation strategies without the appropriate
scientific expertise, in which case scientific imperialism turns into a sort of scientism’ (SI 285). This
type of scientism involves endorsing a scientific approach without adequate justification; it occurs
when ‘scientific approaches to the study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge are
adopted just for the sake of being scientific, without the appropriate venues for effective criticism
needed for the discussion and revision of such approaches’ (SI 285). Pinto proposes four ways
active co-operation between philosophers and scientists can overcome this worry (SI 286).

6.2 Benefits and Harms of Interdisciplinarity

SI identifies benefits and harms of interdisciplinary engagement. Using imperialism as the subject
matter for engaging in a wider investigation into the nature of interdisciplinarity, the volume
explores ‘what have been taken as the indisputable benefits of fomenting interdisciplinary relations
within the academy’ (SI 1). The book assesses the benefits and harms of interdisciplinary relations
through case studies.
Concerning the first aim of SI – ‘to understand the nature of the interdisciplinary relations
that emerge from the incursion of one scientific discipline into one or more other disciplines’– the
editors’ examples include the imposition of ‘conventions and procedures’ from a scientific field
upon other fields, or cases where a scientific discipline ‘seeks to explain phenomena that are
traditionally considered properly part of another discipline’s domain’ (SI 1). The question of when
such imposition becomes problematic could be characterized partly as the question of when the
imposition of the natural sciences on other fields becomes scientistic.

6.3 Categorizing Scientific Imperialism

Within the second issue, ‘categorization’, a useful distinction is drawn between what the editors
call ‘externally’ and ‘internally driven imperialism’ (SI 4). The former takes place ‘when members
of the imperializing discipline are responsible for the expansion’, the latter ‘when members of the
target discipline import the foreign [scientific] theory or methodology’ (SI 4).

20
 A similar distinction could be drawn between forms of scientism. What we might call
‘externally driven scientism’ occurs when an unwarranted expansion of science is made by
practitioners of natural science. We could give the name ‘internally driven scientism’ to the action
where members of a non-scientific discipline employ or imitate scientific methods or theories
within their discipline without good reason. For internal, consider branches of pseudoscience
where the proponents try to turn a non-scientific area of inquiry into a scientific one in order to
make it seem more intellectually respectable, in the process importing scientific methodology into
a domain where it is misplaced. For example, creation science, which Sorell offers as an example
of the kind of scientism brought about by trying to turn a subject into a science and thereby gain
a higher status (Sorell 1991, 2). Its use of ‘science’ is honorific, attempting to masquerade
pseudoscience as bona fide science. This is pseudoscience generated by what we might call
‘internally driven scientism’.
Internally driven imperialism is increasingly common in philosophy. Pinto gives naturalized
epistemology as an example in her chapter. For other examples over the past century, consider
logical positivism, eliminative materialism, experimental philosophy or scientific naturalism.
Whether any of these also count as cases of internally driven scientism would need to be shown.
Logical positivism and scientific naturalism are often accused of being scientistic. In SU, Thalos
considers whether logical positivism was scientistic (SU 284); Sorell argues that a certain approach
to experimental philosophy is scientistic (SU ch. 14).
SI asks what should happen to a discipline after science has ‘colonized’ it. A spectrum of options
concerning interdisciplinarity are offered, ranging from interdisciplinary engagement between
disciplines such that a pluralistic cooperation emerges but little, if anything, within the structure
of the respective disciplines change, through to the elimination of a discipline as a result of scientific
expansion. Such expansion would surely only be scientistic when there’s insufficient justification
for it. The question of when expansion becomes problematic is among the concerns addressed in
the fifth issue, ‘evaluation’.

6.4 The Mechanisms of Scientific Imperialism, and Identifying and Evaluating It

Concerning the third issue, ‘mechanisms’, the volume addresses several areas of historical interest
concerning the emergence of imperialism. Interesting perspectives are offered on its possible future
demise – something difficult to fathom. Observations are made about the epistemic aims
underpinning imperialism, including the theoretical desiderata motivating the expansion of science
into other disciplines, such as reductionism, unification, scientific progress and problem-solving
(SI 5). The chapters address questions concerning the extent to which imperialism is driven by
such epistemic aims, as well as whether it is driven by social aims.
The fourth issue concerns how we identify cases of imperialism. SI offers a clearer means for
identifying and distinguishing between instances of imperialism, on the one hand, and types of
interdisciplinary imperialistic engagement, on the other, the latter of which might not be
considered imperialistic, in the pejorative sense (SI 5).
The final issue is evaluating whether a particular instance of imperialism is appropriate. Among
the questions addressed is when imperialism becomes epistemically vicious. If imperialism is

21
defined pejoratively, the question does not arise; if it is defined neutrally, ‘further assessment of the
imperialism at hand is required’ (SI 5-6). Here the question can be raised, ‘How can we distinguish
appropriate from inappropriate imperialistic moves?’ (SI 6). This is addressed in several chapters,
usually through case studies examining interdisciplinary engagement between scientific and non-
scientific disciplines.

6.5 Thematic overview

The fifteen chapters are thematically divided into three parts: (I) ‘A philosophical framing for
scientific imperialism’ (chs. 1-4); (II) ‘Historical origins of scientific imperialism debate’ [sic.] (chs.
5-8); and (III) ‘A selection of case studies on scientific imperialism’ (chs. 9-15). Very brief outlines
of the chapters not yet discussed are offered below.
Within (I), Mikko Salmela and Mäki (ch. 2) address the question of when certain emotional
reactions to imperialism are justified – e.g., anger or frustration from those within the ‘colonized’
discipline. They argue that assessing whether emotional reactions are justified depends on the
adaptability of their emotions towards fostering ‘epistemically acceptable cross-disciplinary
explanatory unification’ (SI 6). Kristina Rolin (ch. 3) argues that imperialism is ethically
unjustifiable when there is a discrepancy between credibility and contributed expertise, as this can
precipitate a form of epistemic injustice that consists in inegalitarian distributions of credibility
between those engaged in interdisciplinary co-operation on the basis of the expertise contributed.
Patricia Marino (ch. 4) investigates the ethics of scientific imperialism in the context of economic
reasoning, when such reasoning is applied to two areas of human life: first, love and caring; second,
sexuality.
Within (II), Steven G. Medema (ch. 5) offers an example of internally driven imperialism in a
historical case study of an interdisciplinary exchange between law and economics, to distinguish
between interdisciplinary boundary crossing and imperialism (see also SI 4). Through a historical
study of the interdisciplinary relations between economics and political science after the Second
World War, Nicolas Guilhot and Alain Marciano (ch. 6) argue that economics and political science
were ‘jointly transformed’ by the new approaches towards decision-making developed by
practitioners of each discipline in the postwar period. They offer a reinterpretation of the rise of
rational choice theory during this time (SI 118). S. M. Amadae (ch. 7) argues that ‘economics
imperialism’ is better understood as ‘rational choice imperialism’ and that the increasing power of
this form of imperialism is ‘derivational’, in the sense that rational choice theory offers ‘derivational
unification’ (SI 150). Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche (ch. 8) outlines three forms of imperialistic
interaction: ‘intra-disciplinary’; ‘theoretical’; and ‘empirical’.
In the case studies in (III), Miles MacLeod (ch. 9) describes and evaluates the interdisciplinary
relationship between molecular biology and modern computational systems biology. He describes
this relationship as one of ‘scientific subordination’, a type of imperialism in which ‘a discipline or
field co-opts the explanatory and empirical practices of another discipline (and its researchers) to
service its own, on its view, more explanatory or predictive theories’ (SI 187; see also 8).
Roberto Fumagalli (ch. 10) considers two cases of imperialism concerning neuroscience: the
first concerns the economic modelling of choice; the second concerns free agency. By critically

22
assessing these, Fumagalli raises two problems for ‘neuroscience imperialism’: first, that the
evidential and explanatory relevance of neuroscience in these cases is often exaggerated; second,
that it leads to a reductionism which is untenable because it ‘rests on unsupported empirical and
normative presuppositions’ (SI 218; see also 8).
Stephen M. Downes (ch. 11) assesses what exactly imperialism is and whether the relationship
between evolutionary biology, on the one hand, and the social and behavioural sciences, on the
other, amounts to a case of imperialism. In assessing the relation between these two disciplinary
areas, Downes focuses on the cases of evolutionary psychology and evolutionary linguistics. He
argues that evolutionary linguistics amounts to a case of imperialism but evolutionary psychology
does not (SI 224).
Frederique Janssen-Lauret (ch. 12) argues that a paradigmatic and especially pernicious
example of imperialism is a physicalist reductionist approach towards psychology, because it
undermines psychology’s explanatory power. She argues that first-person methods in
contemporary psychology provide an obstacle towards a physicalist reductionist approach (SI 237).
This argument could be useful to enrich the arguments against scientific reductionism put forward
by several authors in SU.
Magdalena Malecka and Robert Lepenies (ch. 13) offer an account of imperialism that holds
that whether an interdisciplinary interaction is imperialistic should be based on our conception of
scientific progress. They consider case studies in legal and policy sciences as targets of what they
call ‘behavioural imperialism’ (SI 254), by which they mean 'the contemporary approach to law
and policy based on the latest findings in the behavioral sciences' (SI 256). Finally, Genco Guralp
(ch. 15) investigates what imperialism is through discussion of interdisciplinary cooperation
between particle physicists and astronomers, within the context of a specific experimental episode
that culminated in the discovery of dark energy (SI 291).

7 Concluding remarks
These books should be of wide interest, particularly to historians of and philosophers of science;
to researchers engaged in collaborative endeavours between the natural sciences and other
disciplines; to researchers in the relatively new field of ‘philosophy of interdisciplinarity’; and to
researchers in areas where questions about the boundaries of science, or the nature and limits of
interdisciplinary relations between scientific and non-scientific subjects, are pertinent. Around half
the chapters in SU are accessible to a general audience. Several of the chapters in SI will be of
interest to philosophers of economics.
A consideration of scientism often requires a consideration of the nature of science; and on the
many occasions where scientism concerns philosophy, it requires consideration of the nature of
philosophy and the relationship between science and philosophy. Scientism and scientific
imperialism should thus be of interest to anyone interested in what science is, what science’s limits
are; and to anyone interested in what the relation is between philosophy and science.
SI is not primarily concerned with scientism; but the themes addressed therein generally impact
on questions concerning scientism. SI illustrates that the philosophy of interdisciplinarity is a rich
field for further investigation. With the ongoing research from and creation of interdisciplinary

23
research centres, the philosophy of interdisciplinarity may become an increasingly important field.
SU makes important observations about and raises important criticisms of scientism, which will
undoubtedly be explored in future research on the theme. One such specific avenue for
investigation emerges from comparing these two books: a comparative study of scientism and
scientific imperialism, using each notion to elucidate the other and the problems each raises.
SI will likely be of more interest to scientists than SU, given its concern with the extent to
which and how exactly the sciences can work in a mutually beneficial way with other fields. SU
will undoubtedly be of greater interest to the wider public, given its pitch, topic and the wider
scope of its theme to concerns shared by many, such as the practical worries of scientism. SI is
pitched to an academic audience, but a wide one, given its scope. The theme of SI is certainly of
interest to the wider public.
Three main criticisms have been raised of SU. First, the possibility that scientism is a cluster
concept, such as one united by family resemblance, deserves much more attention. Second, forms
of scientism that are not concerned with the limits of science merit further consideration. Third,
some of the chapters in the volume are repetitive in their focus on Hume’s argument that we
cannot derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’ against what is outlined as the strongest form of scientism, ‘science
unlimited’.
To return to the three questions outlined at the start, do these books help to make clearer what
scientism is, what the difference is between scientism and scientific imperialism, or what the limits
of science are? To each, yes. SI does not engage in a detailed examination of scientism; but its in-
depth study of the nature of scientific imperialism and the boundaries of interdisciplinarity
between scientific and non-scientific disciplines implicitly offers much useful research into
scientism, insofar as scientism concerns the limits of science. Both volumes shed much light on the
difficult question of what science’s limits are. SU is concerned with this insofar as it is concerned
with elucidating where accusations of scientism are warranted in response to attempts to widen the
limits of science; SI is concerned with this in terms of what constitutes effective interdisciplinary
relations between scientific and non-scientific disciplines.
What is the difference between scientism and scientific imperialism? Scientism takes many
forms; perhaps its most common and problematic form is the pejorative term for unwarranted
scientific imperialism, which we might call, following Pigliucci, ‘scientistic imperialism’ (SU 198).
The question of when scientific imperialism is unwarranted is complex and the subject of quite
some debate, as these books illustrate. Both books offer detailed responses to the question of when
it is unwarranted. SU illustrates that the only relatively uncontroversial case of scientistic
imperialism is the claim that science can provide an objective basis for morality.
Various questions concerning scientism can be better addressed through addressing questions
concerning scientific imperialism, and vice versa. In this way, these excellent volumes are mutually
beneficial, as well as being important contributions to debates concerning scientism and scientific
imperialism.19

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1
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, translated by Rolf A. George. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1967 [1928], 290.
2
Available free online from the publisher: <https://roundedglobe.com/books/1b42f98a-13b1-
4784-9054-f243cd49b809/Scientism%20and%20its%20Discontents/>.
3
Jereon de Ridder, Rik Peels and Rene van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and
Problems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Jonathan Beale and Ian James Kidd (eds.),
Wittgenstein and Scientism (London: Routledge, 2017).
4
On Midgley’s anti-scientism, see, inter alia, Midgley 2011, 2002, 2001; for an overview of
Midgley on scientism, see Kidd 2015. On Putnam’s anti-scientism, see, for example, Putnam
2012b, 65; 2011, 482; 2008, 108; 2004b, 21-2; 2004c, 111; 2000, 9; 1992, x; 1982, 147.
5
The first is the primary definition in the New Oxford American Dictionary; the second is the
primary definition in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language. The
primary definition in the OED is ‘the habit or mode of expression of a man of science’.
6
On scientism as a fallacy, see Peterson 2003 and Maffie 1995.
7
Stenmark, Rosenberg, and Ladyman are among the contributors to the recently published volume
on scientism (de Ridder, Peels and van Woudenberg 2018).
8
As defined under sense 5b in the OED: ‘In modern use, often treated as synonymous with
‘Natural and Physical Science’, and thus restricted to those branches of study that relate to the
phenomena of the material universe and their laws, sometimes with implied exclusion of pure
mathematics’.
9
Hayek 1942, 267 n.2; cf. Merz 1896, 89; see also Haack 2009, 2 n.6.
10
Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country, New Series, Vol. XVI (September 1877) (London:
Longmans, Green, and Co.), 274.
11
Hayek refers to the narrower, modern use of science with the capitalized ‘Science’. In discussion
of the quoted passage from Hayek, Karl Popper misleadingly writes that ‘The term “scientism”
meant originally “the slavish imitation of the method and language of [natural] science”, especially
by social scientists; it was introduced in this sense by Hayek … ’ (Popper 1972, 185 n.35). Hayek
may well have introduced this sense of the term; but Popper is incorrect that this is what ‘scientism’
meant originally. It is one of the earliest pejorative uses of scientism; but there were instances of it
prior to Hayek. For example, the following, in the Preface to George Bernard Shaw’s 1921 play
Back to Methuselah: ‘It is not that science is free from legends, witchcraft, miracles, biographic
boostings of quacks as heroes and saints, and of barren scoundrels as explorers and discoverers. On
the contrary, the iconography and hagiology of Scientism are as copious as they are mostly squalid’
(Shaw 1921, 541). For further discussion, see Beale 2017, 76-77, n.26.
12
See de La Mettrie 1994 [1747]. Putnam said this to me in conversation in April 2012.
13
See Cottingham 2005, 106-9. This section draws upon Beale 2017, 76-77.
14
See Putnam 2012b, 2011 and 2004a.
15
An article published in 2016 by Business Insider (Campbell 2016) gave an overview of nineteen
tweets Trump posted between 2011 and 2014 that rejected scientific claims about the climate,
including multiple assertions that global warming is a ‘hoax’; that climate change and global

28
warming are ‘nonsense’; that those who endorse the existence of climate change and global
warming are ‘con artists’; that scientists working on global warming are behind a total con job’;
that global warming is ‘nonexistent’; and that the term ‘global warming’ was changed to ‘climate
change’ because the former ‘wasn’t working’.
16
BBC interview between Noam Chomsky and Evan Davies, 11 May 2017:
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-us-canada-39879374/chomsky-republican-party-most-
dangerous-organisation-on-earth>.
17
The approach of treating scientism as a family resemblance concept is adopted by the editors in
Beale and Kidd 2017, 1-2.
18
It is also explored by Ian James Kidd in Kidd 2018.
19
Many thanks to Ian James Kidd and James O’Shea for comments. Some sections of this article
develop points in my review of Science Unlimited? in Metascience (Beale 2019); I am grateful to the
editors of Metascience for permission to draw upon that material.

29