Section 32 Limitation Act
Section 32 LA 1953 Nothing in this Act shall affect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground
of acquiescence, laches or otherwise.
Alfred Templeton & Ors v Mount “Laches is an equitable defence implying lapse of time and delay in prosecuting a
Pleasure Corp Sdn Bhd (1989) 1 claim. A court of Equity refuses its aid to a stale demand where the plaintiff has slept
CLJ 693 upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. He is then said to be barred
by laches. In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches
the Court considers whether:
1. there has been acquiescence on the plaintiff’s part;and
2. any change of position that has occurred on the part of the defendant.”
Cheah Kim Tong & Anor v Taro Laches means definitely something more than a mere delay. It means such delay
Kaur [1989] 3 MLJ 252 amounting to acquiescence. Here, the word ‘acquiescence’ is not quite the same
acquiescence as used in equitable estoppel where the generally a plaintiff stands by
watching a violation of his right and keeping silent, but here, there is a complete
violation of a right and a plaintiff has become aware of it. He either assents to it or his
delay in asserting his right has been so long as to give rise to an inference of such
assent. Regard must be had to the change in a defendant’s position which has
resulted from a plaintiff’s delay in bringing an action.
Tan Hwa Ling @ Tan Siew Leng Elements of Laches:
& Ors v Tan Keng Yong @ Tang
Keng Hong & Anor [2020] MLJU - There are must be unreasonable delay in the commencement or prosecution of
373 proceedings.
- The consequences of delay must render the grant of relief unjust.
M Ratnavale v S Lourdenadin The Limitation Act is to determine the period after which the plaintiff should be barred
[1988] 2 MLJ 371 from instituting a proceeding. But delay and laches are factors which have to be
considered whether it would be proper for the court to exercise the discretionary
power to grant the remedy of specific performance. Section 32 of the LA 1953 clearly
provides that nothing in the Act shall affect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on
the grounds of acquiescence, laches or otherwise.
The doctrine of laches in the court of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
The discretion is founded on the principle that there may be circumstances when it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy of specific performance, for example
either because the party has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded
as a waiver or where by his conduct he has put the other party on a situation in which
it would be unreasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted.
Grand Tractor Parts Sdn Bhd v “An established rule of equity that a plaintiff in equity is bound to prosecute his claim
Grand Tractor & Auto Parts Sdn without undue delay. A court of equity would refuse its aid to stale demands, that is,
Bhd & 2 Ors [2019] 1 LNS 1844 where the plaintiff has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of time.
In the interest of justice, the court should apply the maxim – vigilantibus non
dormientibus, jura subveniunt (the court of equity has always refused its aid to stale
demands, when a party has slept on his rights and acquiesced for a great length of
time) vigorously against sleeping litigants.”
“In my view, the latest date the cause of action could have accrued is 26 May 2006 by
virtue of the demand made by SP1’s solicitors, and since the claim commenced on 21
February 2018 when the writ was filed, in my view, the Plaintiff Company had slept on
its right for an unreasonable delay of almost 12 years. By virtue of the laches, the
Plaintiff Company’s claim should be dismissed."
Saad Marwi v Chan Hwan Hua & “The respondent’s delay or laches of at least 19 months in bringing their claim was
Anor [2001] 3 CLJ 98 also sufficient ground to dismiss it. Section 32 of the LA 1953 speaks of the court’s
right to refuse relief on the ground of laches, and it must therefore follow that this
section permits the equitable defence of laches to defeat the common law remedy of
damages.”
Azinal Sdn Bhd v Abdul Ravuff “..We also agree with the defendants’ counsel that the plaintiffs were equally guilty of
bin Datuk A.S Dawood & 5 Ors laches. Section 32 of the Limitation Act provides that the court has the “ … equitable
[2018] 1 LNS 1656 jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence, laches or otherwise”. Even
if we were to ignore the year of the agreement and the year the winding up petition
was filed, there was simply no reason canvassed by the plaintiffs why they did not file
this action after this court delivered its decision on the winding up petition. This is
especially so when this court specifically held in the said judgment that since Dawood
did nothing to implement the agreement in the 8 years prior to his death, “… it could
be inferred that he had changed his mind in appointing the petitioner as a director of
the Company”. It is a statement that we could not help but agree with especially when
we bore in mind, as rightly raised by the defendants’ counsel in submission before us,
…clearly the plaintiffs were not acting with the promptitude that the situation demands.
It is of course trite law that laches and acquiescence are equitable doctrines which
could be raised to defeat stale demands and we say that these should be applied to
the detriment of the plaintiffs in this case.
Malaysian National Insurance “The equitable doctrine of laches is separate from the statutory defence of limitation
Sdn Bhd v Tan Kong Min [1997] and Section 32 of LA 1953 clearly provides that nothing in the Limitation Act shall
3 CLJ sup 121 effect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence, laches
or otherwise”
“The law of limitation is promulgated with the primary object of discouraging Plaintiffs
from sleeping on their actions and most importantly to bring an end to litigation. It is in
the public interest that there must be an end to litigation. Giving the plaintiff herein an
unbridled rein towards litigation would mean that an action for the recovery of the
balance after the sale by auction could take place many many years after the debt
had become due and owing. This cannot be the intent of the law”
Ibrahim bin Mohamad v Ketua Principle of Laches:
Polis Daerah Johor Bharu & 3 “The principles of laches should be vigorously applied in favour of the Defendants.
Ors [1996] 5 MLJ 15 The plaintiff acquiesced for a great length of time in prosecuting his claim. Since the
plaintiff knew that the purported dismissal was on 7 November 1990 as reflected in
encl2, he must be said to have knowledge, capacity and freedom to challenge the
defendants. Yet, he chose to procrastinate. The doctrine of estoppel too can be
invoked in favour of the defendants.