MIND, CODE AND

CONTEXT

Essays in Pragmatics

T. Given
University of Oregon

Ψ Psychology Press
Ρ5
Та)
Taylor & Francis Group
New York London
First Published by
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Giv6n, T., 1936-

Mind, code, and context : essays in pragmatics / T. Givan
p. em.
Bibliography: p.
Incl udes index.
ISBN 0-89859-607-6. ISBN 0-8058-0482-X(pbk.)
1. Pragmatics. I. TItle.
B831.5.G58 1989
121' .68--dc19 88-21298
elP

Publisher's Note
The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint
but points out that some imperfections in the original may be apparent.
To my parents, Victoria and Alexander Givan, who, by stranding me
early in life between their abundant love and unbounded expectations,
have inadvertently taught me the rudiments ofpragmatics.
This page intentionally left blank
Contents

Preface xvii

1. INTRODUCTION 1

1.1. Instead of definition 1

1.1.1. Context, frame and point of view 1
1.1.2. Systems and meta-levels: The two predicaments 2
1.2. The scope of pragmatics: Recurrent themes 5
1.2.1. Gradation, continuum and non-discreteness 5
1.2.2. Relevance and importance 6
1.2.3. Similarity and analogy 6
1.2.4. Kind vs. degree: The arbitrariness of taxonomy 6
1.2.5. Abductive inference and analogic reasoning 7
1.2.6. The semeiotic relation 8
1.2.7. Purpose, function explanation and understanding 8
1.2.8. Norm, ground, saliency, frequency and markedness 8
1.3. Early roots 9
1.3.1. The dialecticians 9
1.3.2. Socrates 10
1.3.3. Aristotle 10
[Link]. Non-discrete gradual change 11
[Link]. 'The mean' 11
[Link]. Aristotle's functionalism 12
[Link]. Abductive inference 13
1.4. Kant 14
1.4.1. Extreme reductionism in Western Epistemology 14
1.4.2. Kant's middle-ground alternative 16
1.5. Peirce and Pragmatism 20
1.5.1. Abductive inference 20
1.5.2. The interpretant as a third term in semeiotics 21
1.5.3. Non-Platonic categorization 21
[Link]. The multi-dimensionality of semantic space 21
[Link]. The non-discreteness of semantic dimensions 22
1.6. Ludwig Wittgenstein 23
1.6.1. The rejection of deductive logic as a means for transacting
new information 24
1.6.2. The attack on Platonic categorization 25

v
vi CONIENTS

1.7. Other strands of pragmatics 25

1.7.1. The language-and-culture tradition 25
1.7.2. Early functionalism: The communicative context 26
1.7.3. The Speech-act tradition: Purposive context 27
1.7.4. The presupposition tradition: Shared knowledge 28
1.7.5. Modal logic and possible worlds: The indexing of context 29
1.7.6. Ethnography of Speech: Social interaction as context 30
1.7.7. Developmental pragmatics 30
1.7.8. Pragmatics and machines: Plans, Goals, Scripts 31
1.7.9. Gestalt, prototypes and metaphors 31
1.7.10. Biology and evolution 31
1.8. Projections: Toward an integrated, pragmatics of organism,
mind and behavior 33

2. CATEGORIES AND PROTOTYPES: BETWEEN PLATO

AND WITTGENSTEIN 35

2.1. Discrete categories, fuzzy gradations and prototypes 35

2.1.1. Preamble 35
2.1.2. Extreme Platonic categorization 36
2.1.3. Extreme Wittgensteinean categorization 37
2.1.4. The prototype approach to categorization 38
2.1.5. Categorization and frequency distribution 40
2.2. Ludwig WiUgenstein and categorization 43
2.2.1. Preamble 43
2.2.2. The context-dependence of meaning 44
2.2.3. The non-discreteness of meaning 48
2.2.4. Exemplars, norms and prototypes 51
2.3. Prototypes and metaphoric extension 54
2.3.1. Preamble 54
2.3.2. Metaphoric induction into a lexical prototype 54
2.3.3. Metaphoric extension of a lexical prototype 56
2.3.4. Prototypes, metaphoric extension and grammaticalization 57
2.4. Metaphoric extension in the grammar of transitivity 59
2.5. The functional motivation for a hybrid system of categories 64
2.6. Closure 67
 CONIENfS vii

3. THE LINGUISTIC CODE AND THE ICONICITY OF

GRAMMAR 69

3.1. Preamble 69
3.2. The interpretant as context 70
3.2.1. Background 70
3.2.2. Steps to an ecology of contexts 73
3.3. 'Code' and 'designatum' 76
3.3.1. The designatum: Some background 76
3.3.2. Language as a complex coding system 81
3.3.3. Functional realms coded by language 82
3.3.4. In search of the designatum 84
[Link]. The lexical code 84
[Link]. The propositional code 86
[Link]. The discourse-pragmatic code 91
3.4. Iconicity and isomorphism in grammar 94
3.4.1. Background 94
3.4.2. Preliminaries 96
[Link]. Iconicity and isomorphism 96
[Link]. Motivation and explanation 97
[Link]. Degree of conscious access
to iconic code relations 98
3.4.3. Isomorphism, abstraction and prototypicality 99
3.4.4. Iconicity in syntax: Case studies 104
[Link]. Propositions and temporal order 104
[Link]. Quantity scales in the grammar of
referential identification 105
[Link]. The use of word-order in the grammar of referential
identification 107
[Link]. The grammatical coding of complement clauses 108
[Link]. Passivization and the coding of transitivity 112
[Link]. Antipassivization and the coding of transitivity 115
[Link]. Stereotypicality, predictability
and coding saliency 117
[Link]. Linear ordering, proximity and scope 118
3.4.5. Some meta-iconicity considerations 120
[Link]. Arbitrary grammatical norms vs.
natural iconic principles 120
[Link]. Conflicts between iconicity principles 121
viii CONIENfS

3.5. Some bio-adaptive considerations 122

3.5.1. The difference of Man 122
3.5.2. The biological basis of isomorphic coding 123
[Link]. Function, teleology and organisms 123
[Link].0ntogeny, phylogeny, language change and the
iconicity of language 124
[Link]. From icon to symbol 125

4. PROPOSITIONAL MODALITIES: TRUTH, CERTAINTY,

INTENT, AND INFORMATION 127

4.1. Propositions, sentences and information 127

4.2. Epistemic modalities: The logico-semantic tradition 128
4.3. Epistemic modalities and the communicative contract 129
4.3.1. Preamble: Epistemic vs. other modalities 129
4.3.2. The epistemic space and evidentiality 130
[Link]. The communicative contract 130
[Link]. Evidentiality and epistemic modes 131
[Link]. Subjective certainty 133
[Link]. Source of information and defensibility 135
[Link]. Rules of evidence 137
[Link]. Certainty, challenge and response 139
4.4. The continuum space of propositional modalities 141
4.4.1. Preliminaries 141
4.4.2. The non-discreteness of presupposition 142
[Link]. General considerations 142
[Link]. Truth, knowledge, belief or familiarity? 144
[Link]. Presupposition vs. backgroundedness 146
4.4.3. The non-discreteness of assertions 147
4.4.4. Epistemic modalities and manipulative speech-acts 148
[Link]. Preamble 148
[Link]. From irrealis to intent to power 148
[Link]. Subjunctives: From certainty to manipulation 149
4.4.5. The speech act continuum 151
[Link]. Preamble 151
[Link]. From imperative to interrogative 153
[Link]. From imperative to declarative 154
[Link]. From declarative to interrogative 155
4.5. The pragmatics of NEG-assertion 156
4.5.1. Preamble 156
4.5.2. Negation as a speech act 156
4.5.3. Explicit and implicit normative expectations 158
 CONIENfS ix

4.5.4. The ontology of negative states and events 159

[Link]. The pragmatic status of negative events 159
[Link]. The pragmatics of negative states 161
4.5.5. Negation and irrealis 162
4.6. Certainty, power and deference 164
4.6.1. Preamble 164
4.6.2. Certainty and authority 164
4.6.3. Authority, negation and politeness 165
4.6.4. Certainty, modesty and politeness 166
4.6.5. Knowledge, certainty, responsibility and blame 166
4.7. The hybrid nature of propositions: Between Tautology and
contradiction 167
4.8. The negotiation of modality 170

5. THE PRAGMATICS OF REFERENCE: EXISTENCE,

REFERENTIAL INTENT AND THEMATIC IMPORT 173

5.1. Reference and existence 173

5.1.1. The Real World vs. the Universe of Discourse 173
5.1.2. Reference vs. referential intent 174
5.2. The semantics of indefinite reference 175
5.2.1. Referential opacity 175
5.2.2. Reference and propositional modalities 177
5.2.3. The grammatical marking of indefinite reference 179
5.3. The pragmatics of reference: Denotation
vs. referential import 181
5.3.1. The numeral 'one' in Hebrew 181
5.3.2. Methodological preliminaries: The empirical measurement
of the importance of referents in discourse 183
5.3.3. The numeral 'one' in Krio 183
5.3.4. The numeral one in Mandarin Chinese 186
5.3.5. The unstressed indefinite 'this' in spoken English 189
5.4. Normative action and referential interpretation: The context-
sensitivity of referential intent 192
5.5. The non-discreteness of reference and definiteness 193
5.5.1. Preamble 193
5.5.2. Non-discreteness of reference: Vague speaker's intent 194
5.5.3. Gradation of referential intent 196
5.5.4. Scales of definiteness: Degree of specification 197
x CONIENTS

5.6. Coreference, topicality and evocation: The pragmatic grey

margins of Russell's Theory of Types 198
5.6.1. Preamble 198
5.6.2. The pragmatics of coreference 198
5.6.3. Coreference and a non-Platonic theory of types 202

6. THE PRAGMATICS OF ANAPHORIC REFERENCE:

DEFINITENESS AND TOPICALITY 205

6.1. Introduction: Definiteness, presupposition and knowing

other minds 205
6.2. Sources of definiteness: Grounds
for knowing other minds 206
6.3. Definiteness and topicality 208
6.3.1. Topic and theme 208
6.3.2. In search of the elusive topic 209
6.3.3. Interim summary: Searching for the cognitive base of
topicality 213
6.4. The measurement of topicality: Predictability, importance
and attention 214
6.4.1. Preliminaries: Anaphoric predictability and cataphoric im-
portance of topics in discourse 214
6.4.2. Predictability and the code-quantity scale 216
6.4.3. Code quantity and referential confusion 218
6.4.4. Code quantity and thematic predictability 219
6.4.5. Subject, object and transitivity: Referential predictability
and referential importance 220
[Link]. Preamble: Referential importance 220
[Link]. Subject and object 220
[Link]. Direct and indirect object 221
[Link]. Grammatical marking of important definites 222
6.4.6. Word-order and topicality 222
[Link]. The topic-comment ordering principle 222
[Link]. Word-order flexibility and referential
predictability 223
[Link]. Dislocated order and anaphoric predictability 225
6.4.7. Word order and topic importance 226
[Link]. Preamble 226
[Link]. Definiteness and word-order in Papago 226
[Link]. Word-order and topic persistence in Klamath 227
[Link]. Direct and indirect object 228
[Link]. Contrastive NPs and pre-posed order 228
 CONIENIS xi

[Link]. Predictability, importance and pre-posed subject

pronouns 230
[Link]. Pre-posed indefinite subjects in verb-first lan-
guages: Where predictability and importance coin-
cide 231
[Link]. Cleft-focus constructions: Counter-expectancy and
word-order 232
[Link]. Word order and thematic predictability 233
6.5. Discussion 234
6.5.1. The pragmatic nature of definite reference 234
6.5.2. Task urgency, code quantity, linear order and attention 235

7. MODES OF KNOWLEDGE AND MODES OF

PROCESSING: THE ROUTINIZATION OF BEHAVIOR
AND INFORMATION 237

7.1. Introduction 237

7.2. The philosophical tradition: Modes of inference 238
7.2.1. Preamble 238
7.2.2. The 'early' Wittgenstein on induction and deduction 238
7.2.3. Peirce and abduction 242
[Link]. Abduction and hypothesis 242
[Link]. Abduction, causation and teleology 244
[Link]. Abduction, similarity and relevance 244
7.2.4. Interim summary 245
7.3. The linguistic tradition: Grammar and modes of information
processing 246
7.3.1. Grammatical vs. pre-grammatical speech 246
7.3.2. Pre-grammatical rules 247
7.3.3. Grammar and automated processing 248
7.3.4. Routinized processing and context 249
7.3.5. Interim summary 249
7.4. The psychological tradition: Attended vs.
automated processing 250
7.4.1. Preamble 250
7.4.2. Cognitive psychology: Perception,
memory and attention 251
[Link]. Consciousness vs. automation 251
[Link]. Levels of consciousness and automaticity 252
7.4.3. Kinesiology and motor skills 253
7.4.4. Neurological aspects of automated processing 254
[Link]. Routinization learning 254
[Link]. Genetically determined routinization 255
xii CONIENfS

7.5. The rise and function of automated processing 256

7.5.1. Properties of automated processing: Interim summary 256
7.5.2. The functional motivation for automated processing 257
[Link]. The adaptive tradeoff 257
[Link]. Task urgency, predictability and economy 258
[Link]. The automaticity continuum 258
7.5.3. Evolutionary aspects of automated processing 259
[Link]. Rise of consciousness vs. rise of automation 259
[Link]. Pre-conditions for routinization: Taxonomy
and frequency of experience 260
[Link]. Bottom-up routinization 260
[Link]. The biological unity of automation 261
[Link]. Linguistic parallelisms 261
7.6. Some experimental evidence of grammar as an automated lan-
guage processing mode 262

8. FACT, LOGIC AND METHOD: THE PRAGMATICS OF

SCIENCE 269

8.1. Introduction 269

8.1.1. Epistemology and organized science 269
8.1.2. The legacy of reductionism 270
8.1.3. What is an apt metaphor for behavioral and cognitive
science? 270
8.2. Reductionism in the philosophy of science 271
8.2.1. Theory vs. practice in science 271
8.2.2. Inductivism 273
[Link]. Extreme inductivism in philosophy 273
[Link]. Extreme inductivism in the behavioral sciences 277
8.2.3. Deductivism 279
[Link]. Popper and the Hypothetico-Deductive (HD)
method 279
[Link]. Pragmatic elements in Popper's method 281
[Link]. Deductivism in a social science 283
8.3. Pragmatic accounts of the scientific method 286
8.3.1. Preamble 286
8.3.2. The fact-driven nature of hypothesis formation 286
8.3.3. The status of 'observable' facts 289
8.3.4. The relevance of data 291
8.3.5. The impetus for an empirical cycle: Puzzling facts 293
8.3.6. Intermezzo: A case-study of an empirical cycle 293
 CONIENTS xiii

8.4. The pragmatics of explanation 300

8.4.1. Preamble 300
8.4.2. Deductivism: Generalization as explanation 301
8.4.3. Causal explanation: Co-occurrence, dependency and com-
plex patterns 304
[Link]. Preamble 304
[Link]. The context-dependent, theory-laden nature of
'cause' 304
[Link]. The multi-variable empirical environment 305
[Link]. The bio-ontology of causal reasoning 306
8.5. Functional explanation 308
8.5.1. Preamble 308
8.5.2. Structure and function in biology 310
8.5.3. Some features of bio-behavior 311
[Link]. Adaptive tasks and survival imperatives 311
[Link]. The law-governed behavior of bio-organisms: Unifor-
mity and adaptive choice 311
[Link]. Bio-organisms as interactive systems: Mutual de-
pendencies and cross-constraints 312
[Link]. Higher-level interaction governing bio-behavior 313
[Link]. Some examples of law-governed behavior
in bio-culture 314
8.5.4. The reductionist attack on functional explanation 317
[Link]. Motive as 'cause' in socia-behavior 317
[Link]. The denial of bio-teleology 319
8.6. Closure: Explanatory domains, ranges of facts and the
legacy of structuralism 320

9. LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND TRANSLATION 323

9.1. Introduction 323
9.2. Modern extreme reductionists 325
9.2.1. Preamble 325
9.2.2. The anti-universalism of modern empiricists 325
9.2.3. The anti-universalism of modern mentalists 327
9.2.4. The universalism of modern Rationalists 329
9.3. Grammar and translation 330
9.3.1. Serial verb constructions 331
9.3.2. Pre-posed adverbial dauses in strict
verb-final language 333
9.3.3. Verb complement structure 334
9.3.4. Co-Iexicalized complement-taking verbs 335
9.3.5. Non-embedded background clauses 336
xiv CONIENfS

9.3.6. The grammatical coding of evidentiality 337

9.3.7. Manipulative speech acts in Korean 338
9.4. Meaning, culture and translation 339
9.4.1. Preamble: Meaning, understanding and context 339
9.4.2. Translating across lexical gaps: Case studies 340
[Link]. The red herring of technological vocabulary 340
[Link]. Cosmology and the physical universe 342
[Link]. Spatial orientation in Guugu Yimidhirr 345
[Link]. Science and popular culture: Righteous food 349
[Link]. Sin, taboo and Christianity 350
[Link]. Ute leadership 351
[Link]. You 'owe', I 'pay': Obligation and exchange in
Melanesia 352
[Link]. Culture and grammar: Deference 354
9.5. The kinship controversy: An old battlefield revisited 355
9.5.1. Preamble 355
9.5.2. Kroeber's incipient structuralism 355
9.5.3. Malinowski and Leach: Naive ('biological') vs. complex
('socio-cultural') functionalism 357
9.5.4. Structural universalism: The kinship semantics of Scheffler
and Lounsbury 359
9.5.5. The crux of the matter: Kinship terms and translation 361
9.6. The methodological conundrum: Navigating between un-
tenable extremes 362
9.7. A pragmatic approach to translation 364
9.7.1. The mirage of reductionism 364
9.7.2. The illusion of perfect communication 364
9.7.3. The negotiation of 'shared' context 365
9.7.4. Relative overlap of contexts 365

10. ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR, GROUP VARIABILITY AND

THE GENETIC CODE: THE PRAGMATICS OF
BIO-EVOLUTION 369

10.1. Prospectus 369

10.2. Pre-evolutionary biology 371
10.3. The rise of evolutionary thinking: Biological diversity,
embryology and the fossil record 373
10.3.1. Preamble 373
10.3.2. Biological diversity 373
10.3.3. Embryonic development 374
10.3.4. The fossil record 375
 CONTENTS xv

10.4. Rear-guard defense of Platonism 376

10.4.1. Preamble 376
10.4.2. Naturphilosophie 377
10.4.3. Lamarck's adaptive functionalism 378
10.4.4. Darwin 379
10.5. The siren-call of Lamarckism 380
10.6. The transfer mechanism: Adaptive behavior, population
dynamics and species evolution 384
10.6.1. Preamble 384
10.6.2. The software of adaptive behavior: Skilled user
strategies 384
10.6.3. The adaptive advantage of skilled learning and
automated processing 386
10.7. Socia-cultural, transmitted learning and evolutionary
continuity 389
10.7.1. Background 389
10.7.2. The interaction between individual learning and group
transmission in evolution 391
[Link]. Role of the individual's routinized behavior in
gaining adaptive-selectional advantage 391
[Link]. The role of socia-cultural transmission in
accelerating the spread of favorable
genetic traits 392
10.7.3. Summary 392
10.8. The difference of mind and the difference it makes 393
10.8.1. The difference of Man 393
10.8.2. Darwin, Wallace and evolutionary contiguity 394
10.8.3. More rear guard skirmishes of Platonism: The abduction
of Gould's punctuated equilibrium 396
10.8.4. Modularity and the Platonization of mental faculties 399
10.9. Closure: The language parallels 400
10.9.1. Variation and change 400
10.9.2. History, diachrony and recapitulation 401
10.9.3. The evolution of communicative context 403
xvi CONTENTS

11. THE MYSTIC AS PRAGMATIST: LAO TSE AND

TAOISM 405

11.1. Introduction 405

11.2. Taoist metaphysics: Unity in diversity 406
11.2.1. The One 406
11.2.2. The Two 408
11.2.3. The circle: Tao as drift 412
11.3. Taoist epistemology 413
11.3.1. Two realities, two modes of knowledge 413
11.3.2. Yin and Yang: The context-dependence of categories
11.4. Taoist ethics 416
11.4.1. The ethics of entropy 416
11.4.2. Wu-Wei and Tao: The water metaphor 417
11.4.3. Wu-Wei as a utilitarian creed 419
11.4.4. The Code: Li vs. natural kinship 420
11.4.5. The doctrine of Straw Dogs 421
11.5. Closure 423

BIBLIOGRAPHY 425

INDEX 453
Preface

Pragmatics is an approach to description, to information processing, thus to

the construction, interpretation and comm unication of experience. At its core
lies the notion of context, and the axiom that reality and/or experience are not
absolute fixed entities, but rather frame-dependent, contingent upon the ob-
server's perspective.
Pragmatics traces its illustrious ancestry to the pre-Socratic Greek dialec-
ticians, then via Aristotle to Locke, Kant and Peirce, eventually to 19th Century
phenomenologists, and--Iast but not least--to Ludw ig Wittgenstein. In cogni-
tive psychology, pragmatics underlies figure-ground perception, primed
storage and maleable recall, attended ('context-scanning') information
processing, and flexible ('prototype') categorization. In linguistics, prag-
matics animates the study of contextual meaning and metaphoric extension,
frame semantics and the semeiotics of grammar-in-discourse, the sociology
of language, and the acquisition of communicative competence. In anthropol-
ogy, pragmatics is reflected in the exploration of cultural relativity, ethno-
methodology and cross-cultural cognition.
In spite of such exalted lineage and wide applicability, the academic study
of pragmatics remains narrow, insular and fractious. On the one hand,
various formal schools have undertaken to keep pragmatics firmly attached
to the very discipline which it purported to overthrow--formal deductive
logic. On the other hand, a plethora of informal schools have taken the
intoxicating freedom of contextual relativity as license for extreme
methodological nihilism, unfettered intuitionism, and an anything goes rejec-
tion of sensible em pirical constraints. What unites these extrem e in terpreta-
tions is, paradoxically, an antipragmatic faith in the Platonic excluded middle:
The lack oftotal order means a total lack oforder; the lack oftotal understanding is a
total lack of understanding. In this way, the very essence of pragmatics is
subverted by its most impassioned proponents.
Pragmatics, at its somewhat unadorned middle-ground best, closely reflects
the evolutionary compromise practiced by biological organisms. In adapting
to life in a less-than-ideal environment, bio-organisms have invariably opted
for the proposition that half a loaf is infinitely better than none; that life is
precariously suspended mid-way between absolute order and unmitigated
chaos; that while full determinism is a dangerous evolutionary trap, un-
bounded freedom is an unrealistic evolutionary mirage. In their h u mble
travail to adapt and survive, bio-organisms have recognized what contentious
XVll
xviii PREFACE

academics all too often ignore--that Goedel's observed limits on systems--

neither fully consistent, nor ever complete--sum up rather well the pragmatic
predicament of life and mind in a real environment.

The writing of this book was supported by anumber of generous sources. I

would like to take this opportunity and acknow ledge their help. In order: the
Office of Naval Research, research grant "Mechanisms of Cognitive Perfor-
mance" (with S. Keele and M. Posner)(1983-1985), the JohnSi1110n Guggenheim
Memoria/Foundation, through a fellowship, "The pragmatics of human lan-
guage" (1986); The Fulbright-Hays Exchange Program, through a visiting lec-
tureship "The American Indian: Past and Present" (Auckland, 1986); The
Nationa/EndowlnentfortheHtl1nanities, through research grants "Ute tradition-
al Narratives and the pragmatics of word-order change" (Ignacio, 1980-1985);
"Serial verbs and the mental reality of 'event': An empirical approach to the
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis" (Papua-New Guinea, 1985-1987; renewed 1988-
1990); and the DeutscheForschung Gemeinschaft, for a visiting fellowship "Lec-
tures on pragmatics" (Koln, 1987). To make the picture com plete, I would also
like to acknowledge the consistent non-support of the National Science Foun-
dation.

T. Giv6n
Eugene, Oregon
CHAPTER 7

INTRODUCTION

1,1, Instead of definition *

1.1.1. Context, frame and point of view

Pragmatics may be likened to a vast terrain whose boundaries are so

distant that we perceive them only dimly, given our less-than-exalted
vantage point. This is somewhat embarrassing for a discipline so intent-
ly focused upon the study of vantage points; although there is perhaps a
certain measure of poetic justice involved in the embarrassment. As a
serious empirical discipline, pragmatics is still in its infancy, clumsily at-
tempting to grasp for its own meaning. It would thus be presumptive,
and perhaps even alien to the very spirit of pragmatics, to saddle it
prematurely with a rigid definition. Still, if there is a unifying theme to
the entire enterprise, it must have at its very core the notion of context,
or frame, or point of view.
Pragmatics as a method may be first likened to the way one goes about
constructing a description. The reason why I've chosen 'description' as
my first metaphor for pragmatics may trace back to dimly recalled times
in military reconnaissance. When one was sent to draw a panoramic view
of some Godforsaken hill, the resulting sketch-cum-commentary had to
always specify the map coordinates of one's vantage point; that is
where one stood when drawing the picture. Your description -- pictorial-
cum-verbal, you were told -- was useless without those coordinates. The
first metaphor for pragmatics as a method may thus be given as:

(1) Description and point of view:

"The description of an entity is incomplete, indeed un-

interpretable, unless it specifies the point of view from whence
the description was undertaken".

*1 am indebted to T.K. Bikson, Hartmut Haberland, Fred Kroon, Dennis Robinson and Martin
Tweedale for many helpful suggestions concerning the early history of pragmatics. In revis-
ing this chapter, I benefitted great! y from having had the opportunity to present an earlier ver-
sion at the Philosophy Department Colloquium, Auckland University.
2 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

The very same idea may be re-phrased in terms of a 'picture and frame'
metaphor:

(2) Picture and frame:

itA picture is not fully specified unless its frame is also specified".

Pragmatics as a method may also be rendered in terms of the relation

between meaning and context:

(3) Meaning and context:

"The meaning of an expression cannot be fully understood

without understanding the context in which the expression is
used".

As revealing as the three metaphors above may be, there is still a more
general way of approaching the definition of pragmatics. Somewhat
surprising, one may trace it back to the work of an eminent logician,
Bertrand Russell.

1.1.2. Systems and meta-levels: The two predicaments

"...There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which
specified that a concern for one's own safety in the face of dangers
that were real and immediate was the process of a rational mind.
Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask;
and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would
have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more mis-
sions and sane if he didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly them.
If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he didn't
want to he was sane and had to..."

J. Heller Catch-22 (1962, p. 54)

The three core metaphors for the pragmatic method given above -- point
of view, frame, context -- may be further generalized via the notions of
systems and meta-levels. Let a system be, at its most general, a hierarchic
arrangement of parts and sub-parts. When one undertakes to specify
('describe') a system, it is desirable, from a purely practical point of view,
 Introduction 3

to impose some limit on the description, otherwise the descriptive task

may be infinite. This requirement is the one we call closure.
The system, as a hierarchic entity, is made out of a progression of
levels, each one acting as meta-level to the sub-levelts) embedded within
it. Each meta level is thus the context for the sub-levels embedded within
it. For purely practical reasons, if the system is to remain finite (i.e,
describable within finite time,space and means), the last -- highest --
meta-level must remain context-less; it lacks its own meta-level. In terms
of our picture metaphor, the last meta-level is the frame, yet itself remains
un-framed, therefore not fully specified. And here lies our first predica-
ment of pragmatics, that of completeness:

(4) The predicament of completeness:

"Solong as the system is fully specified, i.e, closed, it must remain

in principle incomplete".

Bertrand Russell in his Introduction toMathematical Philosophy (1919), dealt

with the second predicament, that of consistency. In his celebrated Theory
of Types, he observed that the classical logical paradoxes, such as theliar's
paradox ('I never tell the truth') are all instances of a more general
phenomenon, that of self inclusion. That is, within the same description,
one level acts as both the meta-level the sub-level. In other words, it
'includes itself,.1 When such self-inclusion -- or 'crossing of meta-levels'
-- is allowed, the system becomes inconsistent. And here lies the second
predicament of pragmatics:

(5) The predicament of consistence:

"So long as one is allowed to switch meta-levels -- or points of

view -- in the middle of a description, the description is logically
inconsistent".

Tobypass the predicament of inconsistency, Russell, in his Theory ofTypes,

resorted to legislation. Logical descriptions, he insisted, must remain
within the scope of one specified meta-level. In other words:

Russell formulated the general case of this paradox as: "The set of all the sets that don't in-
clude themselves; does it or doesn't it then include itself?"
4 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

(6) Russell's Constraint on systems:

itA self-consistent (though in an obvious sense incomplete) logi-

cal description can only operate within a fixed point of view, con-
text, meta-level".

In imposing his constraint, Russell, with one wave of his magic wand,
exorcised the specter of pragmatics out of deductive logic. This exorcism
yielded two results, the first intended, the second perhaps not altogether
obvious to the exorcist himself at the time:

(a) Deductive logic was rescued as a closed, internally-consistent, co-

herent system.

(b) The instrument of deductive logic was removed, once and for all, as
serious contender for modeling, describing or explaining human lan-
guage -- or mind.

Put another way, Russell indeed saved the instrument, by giving up its
original-- historic -- purpose.
Deductive logic for the moment aside, the pragmatically engendered
predicaments of closure and consistence continue to haunt any attempt
to describe language and mind. Neither language nor mind abides by the
requirement of closure, except perhaps temporarily, for limited tasks.
Both mind and language are necessarily open systems that constantly ex-
pand, add meta-levels, learn and modify themselves. Equally, both lan-
guage and mind are notoriously promiscuous in violating Russell's
constraint on self-inclusion and reflexivity. Consciousness is indeed
forever adjusting its frame, shifting meta-levels; it keeps re-framing and
reflexively framing itself. This propensity of consciousness is neither an
aberration nor an accident. Rather, it is a necessary, adaptively motivated
capacity; it stands at the very core of our perceptual and cognitive
processing mechanisms. It is a precondition for the mind's ability to
select, evaluate, file, contextualize and respond appropriately to moun-
tains of information.
The key notions here are 'select', 'evaluate', 'contextualize' and
'appropriately'. In the immense, Herculean task of natural-- biological-
- information processing, the bulk of the input is in fact blocked, i.e.
deemed -- in the appropriate context -- to be either irrelevant or not ur-
gent. Only small morsels of the input, judged to be either relevant or ur-
gent in context, are let through for further processing. The selective
exercise of the mind's contextual judgement -- the readjustment of the
frame for the particular occasion and task -- is the sinequa non of natural,
biological information processing, which is undertaken under severe
limits: Finite time, finite storage capacity, finite means.
 I ntroduction 5

As we shall see throughout, it is the mind's pragmatic flexibility and

open-endedness (i.e. 'incompleteness' and 'inconsistence'), its capacity to
re-frame and re-contextualize, that enables it to perform -- sometimes
concurrently, often selectively -- the multitude of its complex processing
tasks.

1.2. The scope of pragmatics: Recurrent themes

As noted above, at the core of pragmatics lies the notion of context.

Pragmatics is a context-dependent approach to analysis -- of behavior, of
tasks, of systems, of meaning. A number of recurrent themes have been
traditionally associated with pragmatics. All of them are mediated by--
or founded upon -- the core notion of context. In this section I will brief-
ly survey pragmatics' most common leitmotifs.

1.2.1. Gradation. continuum and non-discreteness

As we shall see in Chapter 2, below, non-pragmatic approaches to
description, thus to sub-levels within a hierarchic system, have always
assumed that categories are discrete. In other words, membership in a
category is governed by the strict rule of theexcluded middle. A major fea-
ture of pragmatics has been, ever since its inception, that categories are
not fully discrete, but may display shades and gradations. Not all ex-
ponents of non-discreteness have explicitly related it to the central notion
of context. I would like to argue here that context is indeed the crucial
mediator that makes non-discreteness both possible and necessary. The ar-
gument runs roughly as follows:

(a) The point of view -- being itself outside the picture -- cannot be con-
strained by the frame-internal system of discrete categories. Outside
the upper meta-level of the system the context -- frame -- is undifferen-
tiated.

(b) In principle, therefore, any adjustment in the ultimate point-of-view

is bound to be non-discrete, it may be made gradually, without sharp
categorial breaks.

(c) In principle, then, the system inside the frame will display the conse-
quences of non-discrete adjustments of the frame.
6 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

This necessary connection between context and non-discreteness can

only be broken by discretizing the notion of context. This has been at-
tempted repeatedly in formal logic in the last four decades (see discus-
sion in sections [Link] 1.7.5.,below). However, the minute such gambit
is accomplished, the erstwhile context ceases to be context. The erstwhile
frame merely joins the system/picture on the inside. And on the outside
-- mutatis mutandis -- there remains context, the last meta-level, open-
ended, non-discrete, and as disdainful as ever of logic's slights of hand.

1.2.2. Relevance and importance

The two partly related notions of importance and relevance surface
wherever one traffics in pragmatics. Both are a matter of degree, rather
than of discrete choice. Both involve contextual judgement that can be
captured neither by deductive nor inductive logic. Rather, the judgement
involved in both is abductive.' reference must be made to the context
relative to which something is judged to be either important or relevant.

1.2.3. Similarity and analogy

Much like importance and relevance, the notions of similarity and

analogy are in principle impervious to deductive or inductive reasoning.
Equally, they are non-discrete, a matter of degree. In principle, anything
can be similar to anything else, and anything may be viewed by analogy
to anything else -- provided the appropriate context, frame, or point of
view is construed. And construing the appropriateness of context is, in
principle, a purely abductive enterprise.

1.2.4. Kind vs. degree: The arbitrariness of taxonomy

Somewhat related to the question of non-discreteness of categories is
the issue of supra-categories, meta-levels and thus -- in the universe of
individual tokens -- the hierarchy of types. Typically, in a non-pragmatic
('Platonic') approach to the taxonomy of types and sub-types, one always
assumes -- often implicitly 3 -- that it is somehow possible to tell a 'major'
from a 'minor' property of individual tokens within a population by some
algorithmic means. Individuals that differ from each other by only
'minor' properties are then said to differ only by degree; they therefore
belong to the same type. In contrast, individuals that differ from each

2 See discussion directly below.

3 See for example Russell (1919).
 Introduction 7

other by a 'major' property are said to be different in kind; they belong

to different types. We may illustrate this diagrammatically as follows:

(7) Difference in kind and difference in degree

The fundamental distinction between'degree' and 'kind' is the basis for

all taxonomies -- pragmatic and non-pragmatic alike. The difference be-
tween the two approaches lies in their attitude toward the absoluteness
of such a distinction. To the non-pragmatist, it is somehow a rigid, prin-
cipled distinction that yields absolute categorial boundaries. The prag-
matist merely points out the obvious, namely that the distinction between
'major' and 'minor' properties -- and thus between 'difference in kind'
and 'difference in degree' -- is in principle arbitrary; it cannot be made
on either deductive or inductive grounds. It is typically a matter of ab-
ductive judgement about the context -- often the purpose -- of the
taxonomy. Only relative to that context can some properties or distinc-
tions be deemed important, and others less so.

1.2.5. Abductive inference and analogic reasoning

The non-pragmatic tradition speaks of two modes of knowledge -- or

modes of inference -- deductive and inductive. The first proceeds from
the general rule to its specific instances. The second presumably proceeds
from specific instances to the general rule. Pragmatically-based abduc-
tive inference4 -- concerning appropriateness of context, importance,
relevance, similarity or explanation -- is in principle a different kind of
reasoning. It proceeds by hypothesis, guesswork or intuition, often by
analogy. It is thus, in principle, unconstrained.

4 See discussion of Peirce, further below, as well as in Chapter 7, below.

8 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

1.2.6. The semeiotic relation

The discussion of the relation between a sign and its designatum al-
most always drags in pragmatics by either the front or the back door. This
is due to the presence of the third term in the semeiotic equation, the silent
partner -- the interpretant. The interpretant, as will be argued below,S
turns out to involve the perceived context, within which the semeiotic
relation holds for its perceiver. The semeiotic relation, of even the most
abstract symbol, is thus in principle a context dependent entity, i.e. a mat-
ter of pragmatics.

1.2.7. Purpose, function explanation and understanding

As will be suggested further below.'' intent is already a crypto-prag-

matic notion, involving the mind of the intender as context for a proposi-
tion. In addition, the teleological notions of purpose and function -- in
the philosophy of science as well as in the behavior of organisms -- are in
principle pragmatic entities that cannot be captured by deductive or in-
ductive means. They involve an abductive, analogical, context-depend-
ent judgement. Further, these teleological entities often form the bulk of
the context within which cognition, behavior and communication must
be understood or explained. And 'explanation' is itself a pragmatic no-
tion, since it involves relating an entity to its wider frame, its context.

1.2.8. Norm, ground, saliency, frequency and markedness

In the study of perception, cognition and communication, the notion

of norm ('ground'), vis-a-vis which information (the 'figure') is salient, is
a core notion. But 'norm' is itself a prime pragmatic construct: The norm
in information processing is merely the context vis-a-vis which informa-
tion is salient. As we shall see at a number of junctures below (in par-
ticular Chapters 2, 4 and 6), the notion of norm is inherently
distributional; it is based on a certain skewing in the relative frequency
of the 'figure' and the 'ground': The ground ('norm') is relatively fre-
quent, while the figure ('counter-norm') is relatively rare. As we shall see
later on, the substantive sense of markedness in natural language, per-
ception and cognition is grounded in the pragmatics of norm vs. counter-
norm and their skewed relative frequency.

5 See Chapter 3, below.

6 See Chapter 5, below.
 Introduction 9

1.3. Early roots

Any philosophical doctrine that should be completely new
tI •••

could hardly fail to prove completely false; but the rivulets at the
head of the river of pragmatism are easily tracked back to almost
any desired antiquity. Socrates bathed in these waters. Aristotle
rejoiced when he could find them. They run, where one would
least suspect them, beneath the dry rubbish-heaps of Spinoza.
Those clean definitions that strew the pages of Essay Concerning
Humane Understanding (I refuse to reform the spelling) had been
washed out in these same pure springs. It was this medium, and
not tar-water, that gave health and strength to Berkeley's earlier
work... From it the general views of Kant derive such clearness as
they have..."

C. S. Peirce, "Pragmatism in Retrospect:

The Last Formulation" [1940, p. 269]

1.3.1. The dialecticians

In these somewhat catty yet generous words, the founder of modem

Pragmatism pays homage to his antecedents. These antecedents in fact
go further back, to the pre-Socratic Dialecticians. Allen (1966) charac-
terizes Anaximander's dialectics as follows:

The world, like a pendulum, maintains equilibrium through the al-

tI •••

ternation of its extremes... [1966, p. 3]

tI

And Diogenes Laertius ascribes to Heraclitus the following observation:

AII things come into being by conflict of opposites, and the sum of
tt •••

things flows like a stream... [1925, vol. II, p. 415]

tt

The classical dictum also attributed to Heraclitus: You never step twice
tI •••

into the same river... is also essentially pragmatic, presumably pointing

tI

out to the ever-changing context -- time, the river, the self. Similarly, in
the anonymous manuscript Divided Logi, ascribed to the Protagoran tradi-
tion, we find the following observation: 7

.If we sat in a row and said 'I am an initiate', we would all say the
tt ••

same thing, but only I would speak the truth, since I really am one..."

7 Cited from Haberland (1985)after Diels (1969, vol. II).

10 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

A much fuller dialectic-pragmatic approach, apparently ignored by

Peirce, is of course found in mystic Oriental philosophers, most succint-
ly in Lao Tse's Tao Teh Ching. 8 The mystic's route indeed remained an ever-
present alternative to the two non-pragmatic reductionist schools --
empiricism and rationalism -- in the history of Western philosophy. But
the mystics were easy to ignore in Western philosophy; they were in-
herently non-analytic; they also rejected the major tenet of Western epis-
temology -- the separation of Mind from World.

1.3.2. Socrates
The inclusion of Socrates in the roots of Pragmatism is at first surpris-
ing, given our largely Platonic access to his philosophy. However, in Hip-
pias Major Socrates (or was it Plato?) adopts a Pragmatic -- indeed
Wittgensteinean--approach in discussing the context relativity of the
meaning of adjectives such as 'fine' and 'foul'. Indeed, Socrates invokes
Heraclitus for that purpose:

"...Don't you know that what Heraclitus said holds good: The finest of
monkeys is foul when put together with another class, and the finest of
pots is foul when put together with the class of girls...If you put the class
of girls together with the class of gods, won't the same thing happen as
happened when the class of pots was put together with that of girls?
Won't the finest girl be seen to be foul? And didn't Heraclitus (whom you
bring in) say the same thing too, that 'the wisest of men is seen to be a
monkey compared to god in wisdom and fineness and everything
else'? .." [Woodruff, 1982, pp. 10-11]

1.3.3. Aristotle

Also somewhat surprising is Peirce's inclusion of Aristotle in the Prag-

matist family tree. Surprising first because of Aristotle's extreme em-
piricist view of the source of mental categories, or 'forms'. According to
Aristotle, 'forms' contain the entire categorial array (i.e. 'meaning') of
perceived objects -- minus their existence. Aristotle's 'forms' -- though
objective-external in origin, are just as fixed, absolute and universal as
Plato's innate categories.' Like Plato, Aristotle views categories as dis-
crete, requiring necessary-and-sufficient membership criteria. I O Further,
contrary to Morris's (1938) attribution, Aristotle's semeiotics shows no

8 Dealt with in some detail in Chapter II, below.

9 See discussion of Aristotle's 'forms' as given in his Metaphysics in Tweedale (1986).
10 See Aristotle's Categories, in Ackrill (tr.& ed.,1963).
 Introduction 11

trace of Peirce's 'interpretant' .11 Nonetheless, in four distinct areas Aris-

totle may be indeed shown to be an early exponent of pragmatics. We will
take them up in order.

[Link]. Non-discrete gradual change

This topic recurs in many of Aristotle's work, but is perhaps most clear-
ly developed in the Metaphysics. The problem that necessitated a prag-
matic departure for Aristotle arose from the inability of his absolute
'forms' to account for gradual change, such as 'coming-into-being' or
'passing away'. Aristotle rushed to the rescue of his 'forms' with the con-
cept of synolon. As Tweedale (1986)observes:

"...The synolon is Aristotle's concession to the Heraclitean flux. It

manages an existence of sorts even while it is coming-to-be or passing
away. This is because it contains matter, the sinequa non for anything that
undergoes a process of change..."[1986, p. 5]12

[Link]. 'The mean'

Aristotle's 'mean' (or 'the intermediate') in the Ethics may be inter-
preted as the pragmatist's Golden Mean, whereby the extreme, pure cases
are to be eschewed in favor of the delicately balanced, hard to grasp thin
line in-between. 13 Thus consider the following passage from the Ethics
(McKeon, ed., 1941):

"...In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take

more, less or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself
or relative to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and
defect. By the intermediate in theobject I mean that which is equidistant
from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all men; by in-
termediate relative to us, that which is neither too much nor too little --
and this is not one, nor the same for all. For instance, if ten is many and
two is few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object... But the
intermediate relative to us is not to be taken so; if ten pounds is too much

11 See discussion in Chapter 3, below.

12 While forms are presumably immutable, absolute and undergo no flux. lowe my frail un-
derstanding of these issues to Martin Tweedale (in personal communication); see also
Tweedale (1986).
13 I am again indebted to Martin Tweedale (in personal communication) for suggesting this
area of Aristotle's pragmatism to me.
12 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the
trainer will order six pounds..." [1941, pp. 957-958]

Aristotle is confronting here the problem of graded continuum, and also

implicitly the problem of context, especially in making the intermediate
'relative to us' a contingent notion. This is even clearer in the next pas-
sage:

"...both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in
general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and
in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right time, with reference to
the right objects, toward the right people, with the right motive, and in
the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, .." [McKeon, ed., 1941,
p.958]

Aristotle thus enumerates the various elements of context upon which

'the intermediate for us' is contingent: time, object, participants, motive,
manner. And while this is pragmatics in the realm of ethics, it is classi-
cal pragmatics nonetheless.

[Link]. Aristotle's functionalism

Aristotle's approach to biology is suffused with functionalist teleol-
ogy. His arguments are constructed first against an earlier structuralist
tradition, manifest in the works of pre-Socratic materialists such as Em-
pedocles. These materialist sought to describe and explain the nature of
organisms in the same way as they described the nature of inorganic
physical objects -- by reference to their component elements, or in the
case of Democritus to their component structures. Aristotle begins his ar-
gument in De Partibus Animalium by advocating a move from
Empedocles' elemental description to structural description, i.e. descrip-
tion in terms of the histology and anatomy of organs:

"...But if men and animals are natural phenomena, then natural

philosophers must take into consideration not merely the ultimate sub-
stances of which they are made, but also flesh, bone, blood and all the
other homogeneous parts; not only these but also the heterogenous parts,
such as face, hand, foot..." [McKeon, ed., 1941, p. 647].

He then proceeds to argue that even such structuralist approach, such as

that of Democritus, won't do:

"...Does, then, configuration and color constitute the essence of the

various animals and their several parts? For if so, what Democritus says
 Introduction 13

will be strictly correct. .. no hand of bronze or wood or constituted in any

but the appropriate way can possibly be a hand in more than name. For
like a physician in a painting, or like a flute in a sculpture, it will be un-
able to do theoffice which that name implies..." (ibid, p. 647; emphases are
mine; TG)
Next, a teleological approach to biology is outlined, using the analogy of
usable artifacts:
What, however, I would ask, are the forces by which the hand or the
tI •••

body was fashioned into its shape? The woodcarver will perhaps say, by
the axe or the auger; the physiologist, by air and by earth. Of these two
answers the artrificer's is the better, but it is nevertheless insufficient. For
it is not enough for him to say that by the stroke of his tool this part was
formed into a concavity, that into a flat surface; but he must state the
reasons why he struck his blow in such a way as to affect this, and what
hisfinal object was..." [ibid, pp. 647-648; emphases are mine; TG]
The need for form-function correlation is now driven home, again by
using the analogy of tools:
"...if a piece of wood is to be split with an axe, the axe must of neces-
sity be hard; and, if hard, must of necessity be made of bronze or iron.
Now exactly in the same way the body, which like the axe is an instru-
ment -- for both the body as a whole and its several parts individually
have definite operations for which they are made; just in the same way,
I say, the body if it is to do its work, must of necessity be of such and such
character..." [ibid, p. 650]
In outlining his functionalist argument, Aristotle rejects two extremist
views of biology: The structuralist's anti-teleology, and Plato's abstract
super-teleology (whereby all purposive phenomena -- in the inorganic
and organic universe alike -- are attributed to some higher purposive in-
telligence). While not addressing himself specifically to language,
Aristotle's functionalism in biology indeed presages an important in-
gredient of modern pragmatics.

[Link]. Abductive inference

Hanson (1958) points out that Peirce's abductive inference, the 'third
mode' of knowledge, was first described by Aristotle:

Aristotle lists the types of inferences. These are deductive, induc-

tI •••

tive and one other called apagoge. This is translated as 'reduction'. Peirce
translates it as 'abduction' or 'retroduction'. What distinguishes this kind
of argument for Aristotle is that the relation of the middle to the last term
is uncertain, though equally or more probable than the conclusion; or
14 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

again an argument in which the terms intermediate between the last term
and the middle are few. For in any of these cases it turns out that we ap-
proach more nearly to knowledge... since we have taken a new term..."
(1958, p. 85; cited from Aristotle's Prior Analytic, tr. by Jenkinson, ed. by
Ross, Oxford, vol. II, p. 25)
In another reference, in the Posterior Analytic, Aristotle characterizes the
mode of abduction as follows:
"...The particular facts are not merely brought together but there is a
new element added to the combination by the very act of thought by
which they are combined... The pearls are there, but they will not hang
together till someone provides the string..." (Posterior Analytic, vol. II, p.
19; cf. Whewell, Organum Renovatum, pp. 72-73).
We will return to discuss the modes of inference, and abduction in par-
ticular, in Chapters 7 and 8, below.

1.4. Kant

1.4.1. Extreme reductionism in Western Epistemology

The nature of the categories of human mind, their origin, and what ex-
actly they stand for, are persistent questions that have been with us since
the dawn of Western thought. What is the source of all those entities that
inhabit our mind? How did they get there? What do they stand for? Do
we experience the world in a certain way because our mind is so pre-cast,
chock-full of concepts that have been placed there by the Deity (as Des-
cartes would have it)? Are those innate ideas there because of that latter-
day deity, Genetics or 'the Bio-Program' (as Chomsky, 1966, 1968 or
Bickerton, 1981, would)? Or do we, alternatively, owe our mental
categories to experience? Has some real or perceived outside world been
imprinted on our passive mind via sensory perception?
Ever since post-Socratic Greek philosophy began to contemplate the
puzzle of mind vs. world (or 'in [Link]', or 'subject vs. object'), and until
the latter part of the 18th Century, only two extreme answers to this eter-
nal puzzle had been seriously contemplated in Western philosophy.
Rationalists, from Plato down, had opted for the primacy of innate
categories of the mind. Empiricists, from Aristotle onward, had argued
for the primacy of experience, whether attributed to some putative Real
World (the 'objectivist' option) or to the vagaries of our senses (the
'subjectivist' option).
It is perhaps not altogether an accident that the two extreme reduc-
tionist schools of Western epistemology, Rationalism and Empiricism,
 Introduction 15

turn out nonetheless to share two of their most fundamental assumptions

about the nature of mind:
(a) Separateness of mind from world: The mind and the world
-- internal and external--are distinct and separate entities, al-
lowing no direct access from one to the other.
(b) Absoluteness of mental categories: Categories of the mind
-- be they Plato's innate ideas or Aristotle's perceived forms
-- are discrete, universal and absolute, with membership ad-
judicated by rigid -- necessary and/ or sufficient -- criteria,
which members either do or do not possess.
With the first assumption (a), Western analytic philosophy detached it-
self from its old antecedence in the mystic tradition. 14 The second as-
sumption (b) characterizes equally well rationalists from Plato to St.
Augustine to Descartes to Chomsky, as it does empiricists from Aristotle
to St. Thomas Aquinas to Hume to Skinner or Bloomfield. Its roots are
presumably found in the logical doctrine of the excluded middle. 15
The motivation for assumption (b) is both legitimate and, I believe, of
some interest. Kant has alluded to it in his discussion of the potential in-
finity of the 'manifold multiplicity of intuitions' (i.e, 'sensations' of the
outside world; see further below). Both Plato and Aristotle had to reckon
with the very same problem. If reality is in principle unconstrained, non-
discrete and multifarious, and if the senses do not rigidly pre-select and
constrain that multiplicity, then the understanding ('cognition') cannot
match that unconstrained multifarious continuum without itself being
infinite and unconstrained. Kant's solu tion to this dilemma was, I believe,
the right one: Disengage 'the thing for itself' from 'the thing for us', by
invoking the -- potentially discretizing -- transcendental schema. That
schema is pre-condition to both perception and cognition. Plato, on the
other hand, chose to ascribe the discretizing role to the innate categories
of the mind.
Aristotle's position remains somewhat ambiguous. At first, glance he
seems to have refused to acknowledge the problem. His mental categories
-- the perceived 'forms' -- were said to correspond to actual objects in all
detail -- except for actual existence. Presumably, if the world (or at least
the world in process of change) is graduated and unconstrained, the
'forms' should be likewise. Thus, consider the following from De Anima
(McKeon, ed., 1941):

14 See Chapter II, below for an illustration of that tradition, though from a non-Western
source.
15 See Haberland (1985, p. 379) for a discussion of the history of the law of the excluded mid-
dle.
16 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

"...Actual knowledge is identical with its object... the mind which is ac-
tively thinking is the object which it thinks..." [pp. 593; 595]

If Aristotle had identified the dilemma, only two elegant ways out would
have remained for him:

(a) Allow the mind an infinite capacity; or

(b) Construe the world itself as constrained, categorial, discrete.

Aristotle's way of scotching the problem was, as we have seen above, by

postulating the synolon, which would account for the mind's ability to
reflect the world's unconstrained flux. In terms of elegance, this is admit-
tedly somewhat of a fudge.

1.4.2. Kant's middle-ground alternative

There are three main reasons, I believe, for considering Kant a pioneer
of modern pragmatics. At issue are three major aspects of his epistemol-
ogy. I will survey them in order.

1.4.2. 1. The source of mentalcategories

Kant was clearly the first modern analytic philosopher to elucidate the
middle ground, pragmatic alternative to the two extreme, reductionist
schools of Western epistemology. I quote here from Kemp (1968), a
rigorous interpreter:

"...Human knowledge arises through the joint functioning of intuition

(the product of sensibility) 16 and concept (the product of understanding).
Sensibility is a passive receptivity, the power of receiving representations
of the objects by which understanding is an active spontaneity, the power
of exercising thought over objects given us in sensible intuition. Neither
by itself gives us knowledge: 'Thoughts without contents are empty', says

16 Kemp notes that Kant's Anchaaung means 'immediate apprehension' and is often trans-
lated as 'perception'. However, it subsumes not only 'sensory perception', but also 'pure
intuition'. For this reason, Kemp prefers to render Anchaaung as 'intuition'. I personally
feel that such a rendition is bound to be even more confusing, in that it suggests the ex-
clusion of sensory perception from the meaning of the term.
 Introduction 17

Kant in a famous phrase (KRV AS1 B7S), 'intuitions without concepts are
blind'..."[1968, p. 16] 17

Kant's middle-ground epistemology stresses the interactive, mutually-

dependent ('dialectic') relation between percepts and concepts. Concepts
and percepts thus form the respective context for each other, a context
within which each receives its respective interpretation. None is by itself
a viable prime.18 Kant's contribution thus lies in his attempt to do away
with the artificial mind-vs.-world dilemma, via his constructivist inter-
pretation of 'reality'. To quote Kemp again:

"...We do not find them [our sense impressions of the worlds; TG] al-
ready organized... but rather organize them ourselves..." [1968, p. 23]

And further:

"...'the order and regularity in the appearance, which we entitle na-

ture, we introduce ourselves. We could never find them in appearance,
had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there'
(A12S)..." [1968, p. 32]

And finally:

Our empirical knowledge has two sources, sensibility and under-

tt •••

standing. If our mind consisted of nothing but the passive ability to

receive sensations, we should have a manifold multiplicity of intuitions,
but no knowledge of what the manifold contained..." [1968, p. 23] 19

17 lowe T.K. Bikson (in personal communication) an alternative -- and to my mind preferable
-- rendition of Kant's dictum: "Concepts without percepts are empty, percepts without con-
cepts are blind".
18 In much the same way, neither the chicken nor the egg, neither nature nor nurture, neither
environment nor behavior, are independent primes. The Western intellectual tradition is
replete with reductionist pseudo-puzzles.
19 Kant makes matters more complicated yet by observing that there must exist a mediating
schema for matching categories of the understanding with sensible appearance, given that
there is no guaran tee that the two would be otherwise 'homogenous' -- i.e, isomorphic.
This mediating function is presumably part of Kant's apriori synthetic, involving our
space-time grid. Kant's transcendental schema is thus a precondition for matching con-
cepts with percepts. To quote Kemp once again:
"...Now since there is no homogeneity between category and appearance, and since never-
theless the appearance has in the end to be subsumed under the category, there must, Kant
says, be some third thing which is homogenous both with the category and with the ap-
pearance, and which mediates between the two; this third thing, which must clearly be in
one respect intelligible and in another sensible, consists in what Kant calls the transcen-
dental schema. The key to this is the notion of time ..." [1968,p. 30].
For a somewhat compatible view, see Givan (l979a, Ch. 8).
18 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

[Link]. Kant's analytic and apriori-synthetic

First, Kant introduces the concept of analytic knowledge; that is,
knowledge that comes to us by knowing the definitions of terms, the rules
of logic, or the rules of games. Such knowledge is thus in principle
tautoiogica1. 20 Analytic knowledge is in some sense thus presupposed,
being true by convention.
Second, Kant introduces the notion of apriori-synthetic knowledge;
that is, knowledge of facts that are always true of this world -- but not by
analytic necessity. The latter is Kant's transcendental schema of space
and time. That schema underlies our perceptual/conceptual apparatus
itself as pre-condition to all possible experience of this world. Possible
experience presupposes such a schema, rather than comprises it. Thus,
consider the following passage from the Critique of Pure Reason of Pure
Reason (Smith, 1929):

"...the representation of space must be presupposed. The representation

of space cannot, therefore, be empirically obtained from the relations of
outer appearance. On the contrary, this outer experience is itself possible
at all only through that representation..." [po 68]

It is possible to argue -- as I shall indeed argue later on 21 -- that Kant's

analytic and apriori-synthetic are both early precursors of the pragmatic
notion of presupposition, or shared background.

[Link]. The transcendental schema as a relative point-of-view

In his discussion of the apriori-synthetic transcendental schema of
space, Kant observes (Smith, 1929):

"....It is, therefore, only from the human standpoint that we can speak
of space, of extended things etc. If we depart from the subjective condition
under which we alone can have outer intuition...the representation of
space stands for nothing whatsoever..." [po 71; emphases are mine; TGl

Our point of view vis-a-vis the outside world is thus relative. Again, con-
sider (Smith, 1929):

20 See discussion of Wittgenstein's Tractatus further below.

21 See further discussion in Chapter 4, below.
 Introduction 19

we cannot judge in regard to the intuitions of other thinking beings,

ft •••

whether they are bound by the same conditions as those which limit our
intuition and which for us are universally valid. If we add to the concept
of the subject of a judgement the limitation under which the judgement is
made, the judgement is then unconditionally valid... [po 72] ft

In other words, a judgement -- knowledge, description -- is only uncon-

ditionally valid ('fully characterized') if the subject making it and his
point of view -- or context -- are taken into account. This is certainly a
clear articulation of a pragmatic, context-dependent theory of descrip-
tion.

[Link]. The world for us vs. the world for itself

Given the discussion above, it is thus possible to view Kant's caution
about the low likelihood of our ever coming to know 'the thing for itself'
(as distinct from 'the thing for us') not as a mere species of healthy skep-
ticism, but rather as an early precursor of the pragmatics of gestalt and
point of view. Kant is willing to concede that there must be 'something
out there' to stimulate our sensory perception. For a constructionist, that
is a fairly safe abduction from the mere existence of experience, fine
details notwithstanding. 'The thing for itself', however, remains unavail-
able to us, given our limited, relative point of view. Thus, in Kemp's dis-
cussion of Kant's Transcendental Analytic we find:

'the most the understanding can achieve a priori is to anticipate the

ft •••

form of a possible experience in general' (A246 B303). It does not give us

knowledge of things as they are in themselves, but only of things as they
appear to us ..." [1968, p. 38]

I think we are entitled to read Kant as suggesting that it is our limited

point of view -- the frame -- that determines the form of reality as it ap-
pears to us. Therefore, to discuss the nature of reality outside that frame
-- or outside any frame (i.e, 'the thing for itself') -- really makes little sense.
Kant thus anticipated the central theme of modern pragmatics. 22

22 I am indebted to T. K. Bikson and Fred Kroon (in personal communication; but see also
Kroon, 1981)for pointing out to mehow Kant's 'transcendental schema','apriori synthetic'
and' the world for us' indeed presage a pragmatic approach to mind and meaning.
20 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

[Link]. Kant the Platonist

There is no evidence in Kant's work to suggest a pragmatic approach
to the formal nature of categories of the mind, i.e. a rejection of
Platonic/Aristotelian discreteness and rigid criteria. For this, one must
await Peirce or, more explicitly, Wittgenstein.

1.5. Peirce and Pragmatism

We tum now to consider, not for the last time, the acknowledged God-
father of modern pragmatics, Charles Sanders Peirce. His multiple in-
sights range over major landmarks of the pragmatic agenda, often
without being acknowledged by latter-day practitioners. At this point we
will survey, rather briefly, the main areas of his contribution to prag-
matics. 23 The first two -- abductive inference and semeiotics -- will be
covered in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 7 below, respectively.

1.5.1. Abductive inference

The dichotomy between the two extreme schools of Western epistemol-

ogy, empiricist and rationalist, was later echoed in the Philosophy of
Science (see Chapter 8, below), in the discussion of modes of knowledge
('modes of inference'). Empiricists traditionally tended to emphasize in-
duction as the prime mode of knowledge, while rationalists, quite pre-
dictably, have tended to emphasize deduction. Echoing Kant's rejection
of both reductionist extremes, Peirce resuscitated Aristotle's third mode,
which he rechristened abduction. This mode of hypothesis often invol-
ves analogical reasoning, and thus the pragmatic, context-dependent no-
tions of similarity and relevance. As suggested earlier above, neither
analogy nor similarity nor relevance may be characterized by inductive
or dedutive means. All three also involve shades and gradations, again a
characteristic feature of pragmatics. 24

23 Such a short survey is both inadequate and presumptuous, given the enormous range of
subjects Peirce had covered, his voluminous written output, and last but not least the con-
siderable difficulty one experiences in penetrating his prose. I will thus not be surprised if
in some dark corner of Peirce's writings further invaluable gems of pragmatic insight still
lurk, waiting to be discovered. My own access to Peirce owes much to personal contact
with a number of bona fide Peirceans, most particularly T. K. Bikson, Raimo Anttila, John
Haiman and Michael Shapiro. The latter's book TheSenseof Grammar (1983)was particular-
ly helpful to me in my attempt to understand Peirce's semeiotics.
24 Deductive, inductive and abductive inference are further discussed in Chapters 7 and 8,
below.
 Introduction 21

1.5.2. The interpretant as a third term in semeiotics

Peirce is responsible for introducing the notion of interpretant as the

third term in the semeiotic relation, the term that binds the sign to its
designatum in the minds of the interpreter. As will be suggested in Chap-
ter 3, below, the interpretant is merely a stand-in for perceived context.
Peirce thus took the non-pragmatic semeiotics that had prevailed since
Aristotle and pointed out to its necessary pragmatic dimension.

1.5.3. Non-Platonic categorization

Peirce's well documented penchant for discrete trichotomies leaves off

a distinct Platonic flavor. Nonetheless, in his explicit treatment of a num-
ber of sub-areas of pragmatics, he comes down -- in the final analysis --
on the side of non-discrete, context-dependent categorization.
Consider first Peirce's discussion of iconic signs (pictures, diagrams,
metaphors), which hinges upon the concept of 'similarity'. In order for
objects to resemble each other, the categories underlying them must be -
- in principle -- non-Platonic. This is so because of two inherent features
associated with 'resemblance':

(a) It may be infinitely and non-discretely graded; and

(b) it must be contextually mediated.

Implicitly, then, Peirce's semeiotics is founded upon non-Platonic

categorization.
In two other respects, Peirce's discussion of categories goes con-
siderably beyond Kant's Platonism, often presaging Wittgenstein. We
will discuss the two in order.

[Link]. The multi-dimensionality of semantic space

Peirce considered most natural (thus also linguistic) signs to be a mix-

ture of three types of signs -- symbol, index, and icon. The three pure
types are merely extreme facets of complex, multi-dimensional signs. Im-
plicitly, Peirce thus pioneered the notion of 'impure categories',
categories that are distributed along a multi-dimensional space.
22 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

[Link].The non-discreteness of semantic dimensions

Peirce's three types of icons -~ picture diagram, and metaphor -- are

clearly three points along a continuum.25 Whether we are fully entitled
to interpret Peirce as an explicit non-Platonic categorizer remains to some
degree a matter of conjecture. Buchler's interpretation seems to suggest
contextually-mediate meaning:

A term has meaning, in other words, if it is definable by other terms

tt •••

describing sensible properties. The way in which, generally speaking,

these other terms, which may not be in turn thus defined, acquire mean-
ing, is by being associated or correlated in their usage, according to empiri-
cal conventions... [1939, p. 113;emphases are mine; TGl
tt

The reference to conventions and usage is decidedly Wittgensteinean.

Further:

Peirce's emphasis on 'percept' and 'operation' is in effect an em-

tt •••

phasis that meaning is something public.- We properly explain the mean-

ing of a term to someone not by eloquently attempting to evoke familiar
images in his mind, but by prescribing how he can gain perceptual ac-
quaintance with the word denoted. The appeal is not primarily to im-
agination but to tests that can be undertaken by everybody... [1939, p.
tt

115].

With sufficient leeway, one may read here a rendition of post-Wit-

tgenstein Philosophy of Ordinary Language.
Further suggestions that Peirce may have considered categorial space
to be scalar flow naturally from two key components upon which, he
believed, meaning was founded -- circumstances and habit. Peirce clear-
ly considers both to be graded and non-discrete. Thus:

Mill says that it means that if in all circumstances attending two

tt •••

phenomena are the same, they will be alike. But taken strictly this means
absolutely nothing, since no two phenomena ever can happen in cir-
tt
cumstances precisely alike, nor are two phenomena precisely alike ...
[Peirce, 1940, p. 221]

And further:

"...Habits have grades of strength varying for complete dissociation

to inseparable association. These grades are mixtures of promptitudes of

25 See further discussion in Chapter 3, below.

 Introduction 23

action, say excitability and other ingredients Habit change oftenconsists

of raising or lowering the strength of habit. " [Peirce, 1940, pp. 277-278]

Consider next Peirce's discussion of vagueness:

Logicians have too much neglected the study of vagueness, not

ft •••

suspecting the important part it plays in mathematical thought...

Wherever degree or any other possibility of continuous variation sub-
sists, absolute precision is impossible. Much else must be vague, because
no man's interpretation of words is based on exactly the same experience
as any other man's... [Peirce, 1940, pp. 294-295]
ft

If one reads'experience' to mean'context', then a clearly Wittgensteinean

theory of meaning indeed emerges.
Finally, in his discussion of natural categories (such as biological clas-
sification), Peirce anticipates rather prophetically the current discussion
of prototype semantics (see Chapter 2, below). The crucial ingredient is
his observation on the role of frequency distribution and the clustering
of populations around some normative mean:

.It may be quite impossible to draw a sharp line of demarkation be-

ft ••

tween two classes, although they are real and natural classes in strict
truth. Namely, this will happen when the form about which the in-
dividuals of one class cluster is not so unlike the form about which the
individuals of another class cluster, but the variations from each middling
form may not precisely agree. In such a case, we may know in regard to
any intermediate form what proportion of the objects of that form has one
purpose and what proportion the other; but unless we have some sup-
plementary information we cannot tell which one had one purpose and
which one the other..." [Peirce, 1931, pp. 87-88; emphases are mine; TGl

1.6. Ludwig Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein's pragmatic approach to semantic categories will be dis-

cussed in considerable detail in Chapter 2, below. His flexible, non-dis-
crete, context-dependent approach to meaning has had an enormous
impact on the cognitive sciences -- in particular psychology, anthropol-
ogy and linguistics. 26 In the space below I will merely summarize the
two major points that constitute the core of Wittgenstein's contribution
to the modern pragmatic agenda. One of those has been consistently ig-

26 Paradoxically, after two short decades of intense excitement, the interest in Wittgenstein
within Philosophy seems to have degenerated into, largely, textual exegesis and cultish in-
sularity.
24 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

nored, presumably because of its association with the 'early' Wit-

tgenstein.

1.6.1. The rejection of deductive logic as a means for transacting

new information

In his Tractatus (1918), a book often -- and to my mind mistakenly --

lumped together with Logical Positivism, Wittgenstein observes that the
propositions of deductive logic can be all reduced to either tautologies or
contradictions. Neither, he points out, could possibly serve to transact
new knowledge. In rejecting deductive logic as possible model for com-
munication, Wittgenstein--probably unintentionally-- came tantalizingly
close to defining two major parameters of the pragmatics of communica-
tion, both anathemas to formal logic:

(a) The use of Language in communication is not a matter of truth

or falsity of atomic propositions, but rather a process of trans-
ferring information from one mind to another.

(b) In communication, totally old (thus tautological to the

receiver) information and totally new (thus incoherent to the
receiver) information are equally useless. This is so because:

(i) Information that is totally old is totally redundant, it offers

no motivation for the receiver to participate in the com-
municative transaction; and

(ii) Information that is totally new is totally incoherent, it of-

fers no overlap with the receiver's existing knowledge, it
thus cannot be integrated with it.

In order for information to be processed by some receiver -- i.e. integrated

coherently into the receiver's pre-existing knowledge -- it must lie some-
where between these two extreme poles. Implicitly thus, the crucial role
of the receiver in information processing, and thus of the receiver's back-
ground knowledge, which forms an important part of the transmitter's
discourse context, is anticipated in the 'early' Wittgenstein. We will
return to discuss this subject in Chapter 4, below.
One may argue, I think legitimately, that deductive logic, in setting up
the notions of tautology and contradiction, has already made an in-
cipient, covert move toward the pragmatics of context. This is so because
tautology and contradiction are not properties of an atomic proposition,
but rather of a proposition vis-a-vis another proposition. That other
proposition may be considered the context. In the embryonic discourse
 Introduction 25

called 'logical proof', the premisels) is equivalent to our pragmatic no-

tion of context. Deductive logic has thus been dealing with context im-
plicitly -- surreptitiously -- all along. But the 'logical' context has always
remained rigidly constrained, or closed. In the pragmatics of natural lan-
guage, and thus of mind, context is, forever open ended.

1.6.2. The attack on Platonic categorization

Wittgenstein's contribution to pragmatics is of course much more in-

timately associated with his Philosophical Investigations (1953). Here one
may observe three interlocking themes:

(a) The context-dependence of meaning;

(b) The flexibility, non-discreteness and scalarity of semantic

dimensions; and

(c) The 'family resemblance' -- thus non-criterial -- nature of

semantic categories.

We will return to discuss these three themes in considerable detail in

Chapter 2, below.

1.7. Other strands of pragmatics

The pragmatic agenda in the second half of the 20th Century reminds
one, in retrospect, of a dam burst. Many of the streams feeding into the
swollen river, to borrow Peirce's metaphor, had been meandering, slug-
gishly and unobtrusively, for a long time. They had accumulated, slow-
ly, leisurely, behind the dam of deductive logic. Somewhere along the
way, the flow began to quicken, the tempo picked up. And all of a sud-
den the entire dam is threatened. In the space below I will briefly recount
what seem to me to be some of the more obvious components of this prag-
matic dam burst.

1.7. 1. The language-and-culture tradition

With illustrious antecedents in philosophy, such as Kant, Peirce and
Wittgenstein, it is easy to forget that other cognitive disciplines -- in their
own way and within their own peculiar methodologies and preoccupa-
tions -- have also participated in the growth of modern pragmatics. At
the intersection of linguistics and anthropology stands one such contribu-
tion, arising from the comparative study of cultures. The shared
26 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

('generic') cultural world view indeed constitutes the bulk of the back-
ground knowledge -- context -- vis-a-vis which inter-personal behavior
and communication take place.
The balance between universality and specificity of human mind and
human language easily translates into the question of how universal-- or
how group-specific -- human culture is. Aristotle had already occupied
himself with this issue, setting up the agenda for later work on univer-
sals. 27

But the bulk of substantive contributions came from pioneer cross-cul-

tural investigators, such as Whitney, von Humboldt, Boaz, Kroeber,
Malinowski, Sapir and Whorf. The profound functionalism that per-
meated the work of these illustrious scholars is already, by definition, a
brand of pragmatics (see section 1.7.2./below). Their consciousness of the
intertwined nature of the language-and-culture complex enriched our
understanding of culture as the ever-present context. Finally, their inves-
tigation into the balance between linguistic-cultural universality and
specificity defined the agenda for a yet ongoing debate. We will return to
discuss these issues in Chapter 9/ below.

1.7.2. Early functionalism: The communicative context

The description of any structured instrument can be approached from

two distinct points of view. It may be described purely in terms of its
structure. In biology, this would amount to describing the anatomy of the
various organs. Alternatively, the mere structural description of an in-
strument may be supplemented by a description of its correlated func-
tion. In biology, this would amount to describing the physiology of the
organs. In biology, purely structural description, without seeking corre-
lated functionts), has not been seriously entertained since Aristotle. In-
deed, what would be the point? Likewise in the early history of
linguistics, an implicit functionalism prevailed, beginning with the
semantically motivated categories of Aristotle and the medieval Modis-
tae, continuing with the implicit cognitive assumptions of the Cartesians,

27 In his De Interpretatione, Aristotle makes the following brief observation concerning the
non-universal nature of the relation between language and mind, as compared with the
universal relation between mind and world:
"...Now spoken sounds are symbols of affectations of the soul, and written marks sym-
bols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are
spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of -- affectations of the soul- are
the same for all; and what these affectations are likenesses of -- actual things -- are also the
same..." [Ackrill, tr. & ed., 1963, p. 43].
 Introduction 27

and following with the mentalism of late 19th Century German Roman-
tics such as von Humboldt and Paul. Even the more structure-conscious
linguistic traditions, such as the 19th Century's Neo-Grammarians, or the
so-called 'Traditional Grammarians' such as Jespersen,28 were profound-
ly functionalist in their interpretation of linguistic structure. Only in the
early 20th century, under the impact of behaviorism -- that extreme brand
of empiricism -- did explicit, unvarnished structuralism emerge upon the
linguistic scene, in the forceful person of Leonard Bloomfield. 29
Bloomfield's extreme position, closely bound to his naive, dogmatic
empiricism, proclaimed that the instrument -- language -- may be
described without reference to its function -- meaning or communicative
use. It is indeed curious that the other modern school of linguistic struc-
turalism, Generative Grammar, somehow contrives to trace its
philosophical roots to the philosophical rationalism of Descartes. 3D
The work of all 20th Century functionalist schools, from Jespersen and
Sapir onward,31 falls squarely within the scope of pragmatics, insofar as
they have all insisted that the structure of language can only be under-
stood and explained (rather than merely described) in the context of its
communicative use, i.e. its function. We will return to discuss some of
these issues in Chapters 7 and la, below.

1.7.3. The Speech-act tradition: Purposive context

The 'late' Wittgenstein (1953) left behind as legacy the distinct British
school of Ordinary Language Philosophy. A sub-tradition of that school,
clustering around 'performative', 'speech-act' or 'illocutionary force'
analysis, has contributed massively to the recent pragmatic agenda,
beginning with Austin (1962) and continuing with Searle (1970), Grice
(1968/1975) and a veritable avalanche that came in their wake. This sub-
tradition occupies itself primarily with one important aspect of context -
- the goal or purpose of verbal acts. Still, many works within this tradition
branched out into the study of other important themes in pragmatics.32
We will return to this topic in more detail in Chapter 4, below.

28 See Jespersen's Philosophy of Grammar (1924).

29 See Bloomfield's LAnguage (1933), as well as further discussion in Chapter 8,below.
3D This tracing back of antecedence was accomplished somewhat post-hoc in Chomsky (1966).
Chomsky trained in linguistics under Z. Harris, a leading Bloomfieldian structuralist. His
training in formal logic was also within a purely structuralist tradition, which his early
book, Syntactic Structures (1957), clearly reflects.
31 One may list here at least the Prague School, Kenneth Pike, Dwight Bolinger and Michael
Halliday.
32 See in particular Cole (ed., 1981).
28 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

1.7.4. The presupposition tradition: Shared knowledge

Formal logic, from its very inception a non-pragmatic, atomistic, con-
text-free mode of semantic analysis, has been forced to gradually accom-
modate the pragmatic facts of life, as it wrestled with the complexities of
natural language interpretation. The concept of presupposition, itself at
least as old as Kant, was pressed into service to account for a range of
context-related phenomena. The need for this arose from what was seen
initially as a -- slight but disturbing -- 'distortion' in the interpretation of
propositions of natural language. Some propositions -- or sometimes por-
tions within them -- seemed to not be 'asserted' as true or false. Rather,
they seemed to be 'presupposed', as preconditions for the meaningful-
ness (in logic truth or falsity) of other propositions.
The intuitive connection between 'logical' presupposition and the
pragmatics of discourse context, communicative intent and speech act is
of course obvious. Formal logicians from Strawson (1950) onward,
however, have fought valiantly to constrain presupposition as a proper-
ty of atomic propositions. They thus attempted to gloss over the obvious
ontology of presupposition in the speaker's communicative intent, and
in his/her context-bound assumptions about the hearer's communica-
tive intent. This purging of speaker and hearer from the description of
meaning is only a natural consequence of Russell's (1919) injunctions. It
was transferred into linguistics beginning with Keenan (1969), thereby
precipitating a litany of presuppositional literature in the 1970s and
1980's.33 The main thrust of that literature has been, to this day, an at-
tempt to sub-divide context on its multifarious shades and varieties into
neat, discrete categories. The entire package is then to be grafted into a
truth-conditional logic.34In this way, from having begun initially as an
important opening toward pragmatics and the study of language in con-
text, presuppositional analysis soon degenerated into a rear-guard action,
purporting to reinforce the claim of a non-pragmatic instrument -- deduc-
tive logic -- on the semantic analysis of natural language. We will return
to discuss these issues in Chapters 4 and 6, below.

33 See e.g. Fillmore (1971),Horn (1972), Karttunen (1974), interalia. The seminal paper which
triggered the linguistic world's interest in presupposition was actually rather detached
from logic, Kiparski and Kiparski (1968).
34 See e.g. Keenan (1971),Gazdar (1979), Oh and Dinneen (eds, 1979),or Sperber and Wilson
(1985), interalia. The fatal attraction of the siren song of deductive logic to otherwise sober
linguists, in the face of recurrent frustration and a veritable mountain of recalcitrant data,
remains a great mystery.
 Introduction 29

1.7.5. Modal logic and possible worlds: The indexing of context

Modal logic began as a rather modest attempt to deal formally with

non-fact propositional modalities such as 'possible' and 'future', with
'intended states' and 'tense', and most particularly with the problem of
reference under the scope of such modalities. 35 Soon, however, possible
worlds logic was pressed into service to deal wholesale with the problem
of context. Consider, for example, the following lines from Montague
(1970):

To interpret a pragmatic language L we must specify several things.

tI •••

In the first place, we must determine the set of all possible contexts of use
-- or rather, of all complexes of relevant aspects of possible contexts of use;
we may call such complexes indices, or to borrow Dana Scott's term, points
of reference..." Ip. 144; first two emphases are mine; TG]

As possible candidates for 'indices' only the indexical '1' is explicitly men-
tioned, although in outlining the problem of context earlier, Montague
refers to indexical expressions in general (i.e. person, time, place). The in-
tractability of this list-approach, and the open endedness of 'possible
contexts' and 'relevant aspects', somehow never seemed to daunt the late
Montague. In his wake, others began to move in the obvious direction
and enlarge the list of indices. Lewis (1972),for example listed eight types
of context; so that a fully specified 'index' is now:

any octuple of which the first coordinate is a possible world, the

t1 •••

second coordinate is a moment of time, the third coordinate is a place, the

fourth coordinate is a set of persons (or other creatures capable of being
aspeaker), the fifth coordinate is a set of person (or other creatures capable
of being anaudience), the sixth coordinate is a set (possibly empty) of con-
crete things capable of being pointed at, the seventh coordinate is a segment
of discourse, and the eighth coordinate an infinite sequence of things..."
[1972, p. 176; emphases are mine; TG]

The considerable futility of such an enterprise -- the instability and open-

endcdness of each 'indexed' element of the context -- was glossed over at
the time. In a later work, Lewis (1979) acknowledges the problem more
explicitly, with detailed illustrations from a more realistic sample ap-

35 See e.g. Kripke (1963, 1972), Cocchiarella (1965), Hinttika (1967), Purtill (1968) or Scott
(1970), inter alia.
30 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

proximating natural conversation. Similar misgivings were expressed

earlier by Creswell (1972):

"...Writers who, like David Lewisl l l ], do try to give a bit more body to
these notions, talk about time, place, speakers, hearers,...etc. and then go
through agonies of conscience in trying to decide whether they have
taken account of enough..." [p. 8] 36

The logicians, again in Russell's well-motivated tradition, thus attempt

to sanitize, constrain -- and sweep under the neat rug of a closed deduc-
tive system -- the intractable problem of context.

1.7.6. Ethnography of Speech: Social interaction as context

An important strand in modern pragmatics comes to us from the in-
terface of sociology, anthropology and linguistics, via the works of Labov,
Gumperz, Goffman, Sachs and Schegloff, Geerz, Garfinkel, Brown and
Levinson, and many others, under various labels.3 7 These works probe
into the social, interactional and inter-personal context of communication
and the face-to-face speech situation. Notions such as power, status
gradients, politeness and deference, and control of the floor during com-
munication (i.e. 'turn-taking') have been studied and elaborated. Many
of those intersect rather naturally with the earlier pragmatic tradition of
speech-act analysis. We will return to discuss a number of these topics in
Chapter 4, below.

1.7.7. Developmental pragmatics

An important recent addition to the pragmatic agenda is the com-

municatively oriented study of child language acquisition. 38 An earlier
rationalist-structuralist dogma39 had held that the human language
capacity is largely innate, and that therefore the role of linguistic input
-- and thus of the communicative interaction and context -- in the acquisi-

36 Cresswell (1972)goes on to suggest -- tongue in cheek -- that in interpreting the bar-room

poem line 'Just fetch your Jim another quart' one might perhaps need to index "...a 'previous
drinks' context. ..".
37 Sub-strands of this tradition have been called at one time or another 'Ethnolinguistics'
(Gumperz, 1977,1982), 'Conversational Analysis' (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974;
Brown and Levinson, 1978, 1979), 'Ethnomethodology' (Goffman, 1974, 1976; Garfinkel,
1972; Geertz, 1972), or'Sociolinguistics' (Labov, 1972a, 1972b; Ochs, 1979a).
38 See for example Scollon (1974), Bates (1976), Keenan and Schieffelin (1976), Ochs (1979b),
Ochs and Schieffelin (eds, 1979), interalia.
39 As in, e.g., Chomsky (1968) and the long list of structuralist acquisition studies inspired
thereby.
 Introduction 31

tion of language is minimal. Developmental pragmatics has evolved as

an empirically-motivated reaction to that early dogma, endeavoring to
study the acquisition of language in its natural, functional, communica-
tive context.

1.7.8. Pragmatics and machines: Plans, Goals, Scripts

Within Artificial Intelligence (AI) there emerged a small but persistent

pragmatic tradition, beginning with Winograd's (1970) attempt to incor-
porate speech-act notions into the algorithm, and continuing more recent-
ly with the scripts-plans-and-goals approach of Schank and Abelson
(1977) or Levy (1979), inter alia. Since in principle pragmatics cannot be
constrained within a closed algorithm without ceasing to be pragmatics,
the various pragmatic moves within the AI community represent at least
a tacit admission of the limits of the deductive algorithm as model for
natural language, communication and behavior.

1.7.9. Gestalt, prototypes and metaphors

One must also note that pragmatics has had a vigorous presence
within post-Behaviorist cognitive psychology, in the areas of gestalt and
cognitive priming (see discussion in Chapter 3, below), and similarly in
the psychology of perception (Attneave, 1959). More recently, a conver-
gence has taken place between several disciplines looking at the nature
of human categorization and metaphoric meaning, spanning Goguen's
(1969) work on fuzzy sets logic, Rosch's (1973a, 1973b) work on natural
categories in cognitive psychology, Ortonyi's (ed., 1979) work in the
psychology of communication, Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) linguistic
work on metaphor, and Johnson's (ed., 1981) work on metaphor in
philosophy. This inter-disciplinary convergence, ascribed by some to
'late' Wittgensteinean influence, will be discussed in considerable detail
in Chapter 2, below.

1.7.10. Biology and evolution

In the history of the study of the diversity of life forms, a certain paral-
lel can be seen wi th the history of Western epistemology, wi th the balance
32 MIND, CODE AND CONTEXT

shifting periodically between non-pragmatic and pragmatic schools of

thought. Thus, creationist pre-evolutionary schools considered all extant
biological species to be rigidly fixed -- much like Platonic/ Aristotelian
categories. In contrast, a dynamic, evolutionary, flux-like view of species
is by itself already crypto-pragmatic.
Within the evolutionary camp itself, innatist non-pragmatic schools
first predominated, expounding upon the wonders of pre-ordained
speciation. The agent of such pre-ordination was the Deity itself, which
mandated life to evolve toward some spiritual apex, and for the glory of
God. (In the pinch, more recently, the secular deity of molecular genetics
can also be pressed into the service of pre-determinism). An early version
of this approach can be seen in Charles Bonnet's preformation.f" which
proposed to view all development as already present in the embryo (for
ontogenesis), or in the earlier species (for phylogenesis). In somewhat the
same vein, the late 18th Century German school of Naturphilosophie en-
visioned a universal, transcendental order governing evolution toward
aesthetically and ethically higher peaks.41
A true, potentially pragmatic transformation eventually took place,
first with Lamarck underlying interactive functionalism, later with
Darwin's recognition of the role of the environment -- i.e., context -- in
shaping the evolution of organisms. Here once again, one soon observes
a familiar philosophical split. On the one hand there is what Gould
(1980) characterizes as the extreme Neo-Darwinian approach, according
to which the role of environmental selection is fully deterministic, with
the organism's purposive behavior having no role. This school is rather
reminiscent of extreme philosophical empiricism. At the other extreme
one finds naive Lamarckians,42 according to whom the organism's pur-
posive behavior is paramount in directing its own evolution. This school
may be likened to extreme philosophical rationalism. As Gould (1980)
points out, neither extreme is likely to be tenable. A more realistic ap-
proach is likely to be, once again, an interactionist -- thus pragmatic --
middle-ground. We will return to explore these issue in Chapter 10,
below.

40 See discussion of Bonnet (1764) in Gould (1977, Ch. 2).

41 With august literary figures such as Schelling and Goethe, but also eminent biologists such
as Kielmeyer and Meckel; for discussion again see Gould (1977, ch. 2) as well as Chapter
10, below.
42 Gould (1980) mentions in particular Koestler (1972).
 I ntroduction 33

1.8. Projections: Toward an integrated, pragmatics of

organism, mind and behavior

In this book I will attempt to emulate pragmatics itself in one crucial

respect: I will let the book remain unabashedly open-ended and incom-
plete. This flows rather naturally from my conviction that many of
pragmatics' most profound ramifications have yet to be discovered, un-
derstood and articulated. It is, in addition, my suspicion that pragmatics
-- as a method -- may hold the key to an integrated understanding of be-
havior and cognition, thus ultimately to an understanding of the evolu-
tion of biological organisms. Within this general context, pragmatics also
hold the key to our understanding of language and mind. To the extent
that so-called Cognitive Science is ever to become more than a political
catch phrase, a passing fad, I suspect that pragmatics also holds the key
to this yet-to-be unified field. Lastly, to the extent that the humanities
have a realistic hope of becoming amenable to systematic investigation
by some science-like method, pragmatics may hold the key to that as
well. 43

43 Feyerabend's (1975) wholesale rejection of all method, essentially on the grounds that no
method by itself is 100% effective, is an unnecessarily extremist construction of science, in
that it implicitly concedes the reductionists' passion for ell-or-nothing solutions. In con-
trast, a pragmatic middle-ground of methodological pluralism has been taken for granted
in the more 'messy' sciences such as biology and cognitive psychology (and, if Hanson
(1958)is to be believed, also in physics). Indeed, earlier on, Feyerabend (1970)himself had
advocated such pluralism. By 1975, Feyerabend had apparently opted for throwing the
baby out with the bath water, presumably on the theory that if one cannot have complete
order, one might as well embrace total chaos. If cognizing and behaving organisms were
to adopt the same methodological purism, their path to swift evolutionary extinction
would be assured. These topics will be discussed at considerable length in chapters 7 and
8, below.
This page intentionally left blank
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