P

[TEAM CODE: TC-40]

RGNUL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

AT THE PEACE PALACE, THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

Case concerning Border Disputes and Sovereignty over Lamdo

THE STATE OF LOHKAS

&
THE STATE OF YAGISTAN
(Applicant)

V.

THE STATE OF SUMIYAN

(Respondent)

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE COMPANION JUDGES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

MEMORIAL FOR APPLICANTS

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-TABLE OF CONTENTS-

-TABLE OF CONTENTS-......................................................................................................I
-LIST OF ABBREVIATION................................................................................................III
-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES-................................................................................................V
-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION-.................................................................................IX
-STATEMENT OF FACTS-..................................................................................................X
-ISSUES RAISED-...............................................................................................................XII
-SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS-.....................................................................................XIII
-ARGUMENTS ADVANCED-...............................................................................................1

I. THAT THE ICJ HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CURRENT DISPUTE..........1

A. That there lies contentious jurisdiction as per Art. 36(1) of the ICJ statute........1

B. That the jurisdiction arises out of various treaties and agreements that are in
force 1

II. THAT THE TERRITORY OF LAMDO BELONGS TO THE STATE OF

LOHKAS.........................................................................................................................2

A. That the State of Lohkas Exercises Territorial Sovereignty in Lamdo................3

i. That the State of Lohkas has the intention and will to act as the sovereign in the
Lamdo area......................................................................................................................3

ii. That the State of Lohkas has displayed actual and continuous sovereign authority
in the Lamdo area............................................................................................................4

B. That the State of Sumiyan is bound by the Principle of Preclusion.....................5

C. That the 1918 Treaty of Attukas is not capable of transferring Lamdo to the
State of Sumiyan..............................................................................................................6

i. That the Treaty of Attukas is not binding on the State of Lohkas...........................6

ii. That the Treaty of Attukas violates the territorial integrity of the State of Lohkas.7

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iii. That the Imperialist Britain cannot transfer the possession of Lamdo’s territory to
the State of Sumiyan through a treaty.............................................................................7

III.THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE STATE OF SUMIYAN ARE A THREAT TO

AND VIOLATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE OF LOHKAS
AND THE STATE OF YAGISTAN.............................................................................8

A. That the State of Lohkas and State of Yagistan are fully sovereign and equal
States in international law possessing all rights and obligations..................................9

B. That the State of Sumiyan has raised illegal military structures in the Lamdo
Area by violating international law.................................................................................9

i. That the State of Sumiyan has violated the principle of Territorial Sovereignty. .10

ii. That the State of Sumiyan has used Coercion against the State of Lohkas...........11

C. That the State of Sumiyan has violated its Agreement of 2011 with State of
Yagistan..........................................................................................................................12

D. That the State of Yagistan has not violated International Law..........................13

IV.THAT THE STATE OF YAGISTAN IS A PARTY TO THE DISPUTE AND ITS

CLAIMS ARE VALID IN THE COURT OF LAW..................................................14

-PRAYER-...........................................................................................................................XIV

MEMORIAL for APPLICANTS T ABLE OF

CONTENTS
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-LIST OF ABBREVIATION

¶ Paragraph
& And
AJIL American Journal of International Law
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Belg. Belgium
BYIL British Yearbook of International Law
Ch. Chapter
Den. Denmark
Doc. Document
ed. Edition
EJIL European Journal of International Law
El. Sal El Salvador
Fr. France
G.A. General Assembly
Hond. Honduras
Ibid. Ibidem/Same place
ICJ International Court of Justice
Id. Idem
i.e. That is
ICGJ International Courts of General Jurisdiction
ICLQ International and Comparative Law Quarterly
ILC International Law Commission
ILR International Law Report
Int. International
L. Law
LNTS League of Nations Treaty Series
Neth. Netherlands
NILR Netherlands International Law Review
No. Number

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ABBREVIATIONS
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Nor. Norway
Ors. Others
para. Paragraph
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice
Pg. Page
Rep. Report
Res. Resolution
Rev. Review
RIAA Reports of International Arbitral Awards
S.C. Security Council
ser. Series
Sess. Session
Supp. Supplement
Supra Above
Tur. Turkey
UK United Kingdom
US United States of America
UN United Nations
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series
v. Versus
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatise
Vol. Volume

-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES-

CASES

Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, 1949 ICJ Rep 4 (Apr. 9
9)
Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Order on 10
Provisional Measures, 2013 ICJ Rep 354 (Nov. 22)
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. 5

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ABBREVIATIONS
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U.S.), Judgment, 1984 ICJ Rep 165 (Mar. 30)

East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, 1995 ICJ Rep 90 (Jun. 30) 7
Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, 1951 ICJ Rep 116 (Dec. 18) 5
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 ICJ Rep 554 (Dec. 22) 4, 14
Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), Award, 1928 II RIAA 829 2, 4, 7
(Apr. 4)
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Judgment, 2010 ICJ 15
(July 6)
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 5
Nigeria), Judgment, Preliminary Objections, 1998 ICJ Rep 275 (Jun. 11)
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), Judgment, 1989 4, 14
ICJ Rep. 162 (Dec. 13)
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 PCIJ (ser. 2, 3, 4
A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5)
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 4
(Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, 1994 ICJ Rep 112 (Jul. 1)
Minquiers and Ecrehos case (France v. United Kingdom), Judgment, 1953 ICJ 2, 3
Rep 47 (Nov. 17)
Rainbow Warrior Case (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, 82 I.L.R. 500 13
( 1990)
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) 2, 7
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), 3, 4
Judgment, 2002 ICJ Rep 625 (Dec. 17)
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment, 1962 ICJ Rep. 6 3, 5
(Jun. 15)
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, ICJ GL 14
No. 124 (Nov. 19)
Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea v. Yemen), Award, 3
XXII RIAA 211 (1998)
United States v. Matta, 937 F. 2d 567 (11th Cir. 1991) 7

ADVISORY OPINIONS

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 13

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Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276

(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep 16 (Jun. 21)
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 12
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ Rep 136 (Jul. 9)
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ 12
Rep 226 (Jul. 8)
Unilateral declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory opinion, 7
2010 ICGJ 423 (Jul. 22)

BOOKS

6 A. KISS, R´EPERTOIRE DE LA PRATIQUE FRAN¸CAISE EN MATI`ERE DE DROIT 8

INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1966)
CHARLES ROUSSEAU, PRINCIPES GÉNÉRAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5
149 (A. Pedone ed., 1944)
J. GRAHAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 13
(2004)
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF 6
CONTRACTS 1 (4th ed. 2001)
O Dörr, Use of Force, Prohibition of, THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 11
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 607 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012)
OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF 11
FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (Bloomsbury Publishing
ed., 2010)
R. Y. JENNINGS & A. D. WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 382 (9th 8
ed., 1992)
YEHUDA Z. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (1965) 5

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ABBREVIATIONS
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

G. A. Res. 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and 10

Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (Dec. 9, 1981)
G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law 8, 9, 10
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970)
G. A. Res. 37/10, Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of 8
International Disputes (Nov. 15, 1982)
G. A. Res. A/68/963, Handbook on accepting the jurisdiction of the 2
International Court of Justice (Aug. 19, 2014)
G. A. Res. A/73/10, Draft conclusions on identification of customary 6
international law (2018)
G. A. Res. A/RES/375, Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States with 9
commentaries (Dec. 6, 1949)
G. A. Res. Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp. IV. E. 1, Draft Articles on 10, 13
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (November, 2001)

RESEARCH ARTICLES

C. Gray, The Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission Oversteps Its Boundaries: A 10

Partial Award?, 17 EJIL 699, 699 (2006)
D. N. Hutchinson, Solidarity and Breaches of Multilateral Treaties, 59 BYIL 12
151, 151 (1988)
Deepak Raju & Blerina Jasari, Intervention before the International Court Of 14
Justice – A Critical Examination of the Court’s recent decision in Germany v.
Italy, 6 NUJS L. REV. 63 (2013)
H. Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 60 12
BYIL 4, 7 (1989)
L. Delbez, Du Territoire dans ses Rapports avec l’Etat, 39 REVUE G´EN´ERALE 8
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 46 (1932)
M. Roscini, Threats of Armed Force and Contemporary International Law, 54 10

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NILR 229, 229 (2007)

N. Schrijver, The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty, 70 BYIL 65,65 (1999) 8
R. Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AJIL 239, 239 (1988) 10

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

S. C. Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990) 14

S. C. Res. 752 (May 15, 1992) 11
S. C. Res. 757 (May 30, 1992) 11

INTERNATIONAL STATUTES

Charter of the United Nations (1945), 1 UNTS. XVI 1, 2, 3,

7, 9, 10,
11, 12,
13
Statute of the International Court of Justice, (1946), 33 UNTS. 993 1, 2, 14

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 2
LNTS 397
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 UNTS 331 6, 7, 12,
13

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-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION-

The Applicants humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under
Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter “ICJ Statute”).

The Article 36(1) states that:

“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters
specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in
force.”

MEMORIAL for APPLICANTS S TATEMENT OF

JURISDICTION
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-STATEMENT OF FACTS-

BACKGROUND
The State of Lohkas is a sovereign state. The present dispute has arisen between the State of
Sumiyan and State of Lohkas with regard to their claim over the Lamdo area which is a tri-
junction with Republic of Yagistan. The Republic of Yagistan supports the claim of Lohkas
and has no boundary dispute with Sumiyan or Lohkas in Lamdo Area.

SUMIYAN’S CLAIM AND LOHKAS’ FRIENDLY RELATIONS

The State of Sumiyan's claim on Lamdo is based on the 1918 Treaty of Attukas between
State of Sumiyan and imperialist Britain, which states that the boundary of Mikashi province
(now part of Yagistan) and Betim province (now part of Sumiyan) shall commence at Mount
Lamdo on the Lohkas frontier. In a treaty signed between Lohkas and Yagistan in 1999, both
parties agreed that they shall cooperate closely with each other on issues related to national
interest. Apart from Yagistan shall guide the diplomatic and defence affairs of Lohkas.
THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE IN LAMDO

On the other hand, Sumiyan’s maps started showing Lamdo area as a part of its territory in
the same year which led to the rise of tensions between Lohkas and Sumiyan. Although the
negotiations were initiated to resolve this boundary dispute but both the parties have failed to
create a consensus on the status of the Lamdo. In the meantime, the parties agreed to
encourage the peaceful means of settlement of the dispute.
SUMIYAN’S ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND THE RESULTANT PEACE PACT

In January 2019, Sumiyan’s move to build Pakka Bunkers and other permanent structures for
their army in the Lamdo area, bordering Yagistan was protested against by Lohkas because of
its own claim on Lamdo. It also provoked Yagistan which sent its troops at the site of
constructions to prevent the Sumiyan army as it considered this action of Sumiyan, a threat to
its sovereignty. Sumiyan has already encroached upon a huge chunk of Yagistan territory in
the hilly region of Meerak province and a big military conflict has taken place regarding the
possession of the said territory. Sumiyan protested against the Yagistan’s interference in its
territory and the situation converted in standoff between the armies of both nations. Lohkas
also protested against the action of Sumiyan after 10 days of the said standoff as it claims that
Lamdo belongs to Lohkas and such interference is illegal and a threat to its sovereignty. In
2011, Yagistan and Sumiyan also had an agreement in which they pledged not to raise any

MEMORIAL for APPLICANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
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structure on their respective sides within 5 kilometres of their common boundary and not to
use fire arms in case of any boundary conflict.

THE PRESENT SCENARIO

All the parties preferred negotiations with each other at military and diplomatic level but
could not solve the problem. Ultimately, Sumiyan, Yagistan and Lohkas agreed to resolve the
dispute through the International Court of Justice. Accordingly the case was filed and claims
were submitted by the parties.

MEMORIAL for APPLICANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
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-ISSUES RAISED-

ISSUE - 1

WHETHER THE ICJ HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CURRENT DISPUTE?

ISSUE - 2

WHETHER THE TERRITORY OF LAMBO BELONG TO THE STATE OF LOHKAS?

ISSUE - 3

WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF THE STATE OF SUMIYAN ARE A THREAT TO AND VIOLATION OF
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE OF LOHKAS AND THE STATE OF YAGISTAN?

ISSUE - 4

WHETHER THE STATE OF YAGISTAN A PARTY TO THE DISPUTE AND ITS CLAIMS ARE VALID IN
THE COURT OF LAW?

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-SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS-

I. THAT THE ICJ HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CURRENT DISPUTE

It is humbly submitted that ICJ can exercise its jurisdiction in the present case as the Article
36(1) of the ICJ Statute clearly provides for the court’s contentious jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of the court comprises all cases, which the parties refer to it, and all matters
specially provided for in the Charter of United Nations (hereinafter “UN Charter”) or in
treaties and conventions in force.

II. THAT THE TERRITORY OF LAMDO BELONGS TO THE STATE OF LOHKAS

It is humbly submitted that the territory of Lamdo belongs to the State of Lohkas as it has
shown intentional, actual and continuous exercise of territorial sovereignty in the Lamdo area
even before the year 1918 when the Treaty of Attukas was signed. It is also submitted that the
Treaty of Attukas is a mere paperwork which was signed in the absence of the State of
Lohkas and hence, did not result into an actual transfer of possession of Lamdo to the State of
Sumiyan.

III. THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE STATE OF SUMIYAN ARE A THREAT TO AND
VIOLATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE OF LOHKAS AND THE
STATE OF YAGISTAN

It is humbly submitted that the Actions of State of Sumiyan (namely, the construction of
military structures “Pakka Bunkers” in the Lamdo region) are a threat to and violation of the
sovereignty of States of Lohkas and Yagistan. Further, it is submitted that the State of
Sumiyan has violated its Agreement of 2011 with State of Yagistan by raising such illegal
constructions within 5 kilometres of the common boundary and lastly, that the State of
Yagistan has not violated principles of international law.

IV. THAT THE STATE OF YAGISTAN IS A PARTY TO THE DISPUTE AND ITS CLAIMS
ARE VALID IN THE COURT OF LAW

It is humbly submitted that the State of Yagistan is not a stranger to the present dispute as the
State of Yagistan has a legal interest in the current conflict and therefore, has the right to

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ARGUMENTS
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intervene in the matter before the Court under Article 62 of the Statute of the Court to
safeguard such interests.

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ARGUMENTS
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-ARGUMENTS ADVANCED-

[A] THAT THE ICJ HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CURRENT DISPUTE

1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the UN Charter has established the
ICJ as a principle vehicle for the settlement of disputes and the international community
has endorsed its use.1 In the instant case, the ICJ exercises jurisdiction because, (A) there
lies Contentious Jurisdiction as per Article 36(1) of the ICJ statute; and (B) Jurisdiction
arises out of various treaties and agreements that are in force.

A. THAT THERE LIES CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION AS PER ART. 36(1) OF THE ICJ
STATUTE

2. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the International Court of Justice
(hereinafter “ICJ”) is established with an objective to maintain international peace and
security and to settle international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of
the peace.2 The jurisdiction of the court comprises all matters specially provided for in the
UN Charter or in treaties and conventions in force.3
3. Contentious jurisdiction allows the courts to decide, in accordance with its statute and
international law, legal disputes submitted to it, which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of International peace and security.4 All the three parties to the dispute, i.e.,
State of Sumiyan, State of Lohkas and State of Yagistan are party to the United Nations
and ICJ statute5, thus, establishing forum contentious.

B. THAT THE JURISDICTION ARISES OUT OF VARIOUS TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS THAT
ARE IN FORCE

4. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the subject matter or “ratione
materiae” of the present dispute is covered by the 1918 Treaty of Attukas 6, 1999 Treaty
between State of Lohkas and State of Yagistan 7, and the 2011 Agreement between State

1
Charter of the United Nations (1945), 1 UNTS. XVI [hereinafter UN Charter], art. 33(1) & art. 36(3).
2
UN Charter art. 1(1).
3
Statute of the International Court of Justice, (1946), 33 UNTS. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute], art. 36(1).
4
UN Charter art. 35.
5
Moot Proposition, Note a.
6
Moot Proposition, ¶ 2.
7
Moot Proposition, ¶ 4.

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ADVANCED
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of Sumiyan and State of Yagistan8 as the factual and legal questions raised in the present
dispute are defined under the constitutive instrument. The ICJ has jurisdiction in all
matters specially stipulated in treaties that are in force on the date of proceedings.9
5. Similarly, all members of the United Nations are under an obligation to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state.10 State of Sumiyan's unprovoked and evident use of
force at the common border contravenes the basic purpose of United Nations, i.e., to
maintain International peace and security and to develop friendly relation among
nations.11
6. Henceforth, since all State parties to ICJ statute have access to the court 12 and all
members of UN are automatically parties to the court.13 In the present dispute, jurisdiction
of ICJ is treaty based.14 Thus, ICJ exercises jurisdiction in the present dispute.

[B] THAT THE TERRITORY OF LAMDO BELONGS TO THE STATE OF

LOHKAS

7. It is humbly submitted that the territory of Lamdo belongs to the State of Lohkas. A
defined territory constitutes one of the four elements of a state apart from a government,
population and capacity to enter into relations with other states under International Law. 15
However, it is important to note that the understanding of the title to territory is relative
and not absolute under international law 16 and a territorial claim over a territory is
established on the basis of the varied circumstances and claims and conduct of the
contesting parties.17
8. Judge Huber has defined that sovereignty in relation to a portion of the surface of the
globe is the legal condition necessary for the inclusion of such portion in the territory of
any particular state.18 Notably, the principle of territorial sovereignty has risen to the level

8
Moot Proposition, ¶ 8.
9
ICJ statute art. 36 (1)
10
UN Charter art. 2(4).
11
UN Charter art. 1(1), art. 1(2).
12
ICJ Statute art. 35(1).
13
UN Charter art. 93(1).
14
G. A. Res. A/68/963, Handbook on accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, at 13 (Aug.
19, 2014).
15
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 LNTS 397 [hereinafter
Montevideo Convention].
16
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 53, ¶ 46 (Apr. 5).
17
Minquiers and Ecrehos (France v. U.K.), Judgment, 1953 ICJ 47 (Nov. 17).
18
Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), Award, 1928 II RIAA 829 (Apr. 4).

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ADVANCED
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of a "peremptory norm" because all States have consented to the right of States to
exercise exclusive territorial jurisdiction.19
9. In the present case, the Lamdo area is a part of the State of Lohkas’ territory because, (A)
the State of Lohkas exercises territorial sovereignty in Lamdo; (B) the State of Sumiyan is
bound by the Principle of Preclusion; and (C) the Treaty of Attukas has not resulted into
the actual transfer of Lamdo area to the State of Sumiyan.

A. THAT THE STATE OF LOHKAS EXERCISES TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY IN LAMDO

10. It is humbly submitted that the State of Lohkas has the right to exercise territorial
sovereignty in Lamdo which is a part of the State of Lohkas’ state territory without any
interference from other states.20 The International Court of Justice has stated that the two
elements namely: “the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or
display of such authority” must be fulfilled in case claim to sovereignty is based upon
continued display of authority.21 It is submitted that the State of Lohkas exercises
territorial sovereign over the Lamdo area because, (i) it has the intention and the will to
act as the sovereign; and (ii) it has displayed some actual exercise or display of such
authority.

i. That the State of Lohkas has the intention and will to act as the sovereign in the
Lamdo area

11. It is humbly submitted that the State of Lohkas has been exercising its sovereign authority
in Lamdo even before the year 1918 when the Treaty of Attukas was signed with the
intention to sustain it. The ICJ has stated that actions of a state take place pursuant to the
will of the state to acquire sovereignty.22
12. The modern international law of the acquisition of territory generally requires an
intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of
jurisdiction or State functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis.23
13. It has been emphasized that such activities in establishing a claim to territory must be
performed by the state in the exercise of sovereign powers24 or by individuals whose

19
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
20
UN Charter art. 2
21
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 53, ¶ 46 (Apr. 5).
22
Id.
23
Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea v. Yemen), Award, XXII RIAA 211 (1998).
24
Id.; See also Minquiers and Ecrehos case (France v. United Kingdom), Judgment, 1953 ICJ Rep 47 (Nov. 17).

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ADVANCED
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actions are subsequently ratified by their state.25 The State of Lohkas’ people have been
entering the Lamdo area for grazing their cattle since even before the year 1918 and it is
submitted that the State of Lohkas ratifies these acts.
14. Additionally, the State of Lohkas has been showing Lamdo as a part of its territory even
before the signing of Treaty of Attukas. The Hon’ble Court has regarded maps as primary
or at least highly significant evidentiary sources in various disputes related to territorial
claims26. It has been further reaffirmed that maps acquire legal force as they reflect the
physical expression of the will of a state to exercise its sovereignty. 27 Therefore, it is clear
that the State of Lohkas has the will and intention to act as the sovereign in the Lamdo
area.

ii. That the State of Lohkas has displayed actual and continuous sovereign authority
in the Lamdo area

15. It is humbly submitted that actual and continuous exercise of sovereign authority which is
a sound and natural criterion of territorial sovereignty and that such a display of territorial
sovereignty is as good as title.28 In the case of Palmas arbitration, it was declared that
Netherlands possessed the sovereignty over the disputed land on the basis of “the actual
continuous and peaceful display of state functions”.29
16. Further, the ICJ has given regard to the extent to which the state had exercised actual
control of the land.30 Here, it is important to note that the state succeeding in its claim for
sovereignty over terra nullius over the claims of other states will in most cases have
proved not an absolute title, but one relatively better than that maintained by competing
states.31
17. As mentioned earlier, various sovereign functions have been performed under the
purview of the State of Lohkas sovereignty in the Lamdo area even before the 1918. The
court has further been found to be satisfied with very little evidence in support of actual

25
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), Judgment, 2002 ICJ Rep 625
(Dec. 17).
26
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment, 1962 ICJ Rep. 6 (Jun. 15).
27
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 ICJ Rep 554 (Dec. 22).
28
Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), Award, 1928 II RIAA 829 (Apr. 4).
29
Id.
30
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), Judgment, 2002 ICJ Rep 625
(Dec. 17).
31
Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), Award, 1928 II RIAA 829 (Apr. 4).

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exercise of sovereignty given that the other state is unable to establish a superior claim 32
especially in cases of territorial dispute in a thinly populated area.33
18. The 1918 Treaty of Attukas is invalid and does clearly grant the territorial sovereignty of
the Lamdo area to the State of Sumiyan. It has been observed that the sovereign activities
reflect how the title to a territory is interpreted and must invariably be taken into
consideration where the legal title is not capable of exactly defining the relevant territorial
limits.34 Moreover, the claim of effective control plays the crucial role of defining how
the title to a territory is interpreted by a State 35 and thus, has been regarded as sine qua
non of a strong territorial claim.36.

B. THAT THE STATE OF SUMIYAN IS BOUND BY THE PRINCIPLE OF PRECLUSION

19. It is humbly submitted that the State of Sumiyan is bound by the principle of preclusion
on the basis of its conduct which clearly consents to the State of Lohkas’ territorial
sovereignty in Lamdo i.e. Estoppel. The Doctrine of Estoppel states that a party which
has made or consented to a particular statement upon which another party relies in
subsequent activity to its detriment or the other’s benefit cannot thereupon change its
position.37
20. The principle of preclusion operates to prevent a State contesting before the Court a
situation contrary to a clear and unequivocal representation previously made by it to
another State, either expressly or impliedly and as a result that other State has been
prejudiced or the State making it has secured some benefit or advantage for itself.38
21. It is submitted that the State of Sumiyan did not raise any objection to the State of
Lohkasis people entering the Lamdo area and the State of Lohkas’ act of showing Lamdo
as a part of its territory in its maps since even before the year 1918, which amounts to
acquiescence. Acquiescence has been defined as “equivalent to tacit recognition
manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent”.39

32
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 53, ¶ 46 (Apr. 5).
33
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment,
1994 ICJ Rep 112 (Jul. 1); Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia),
Judgment, 2002 ICJ Rep 625 (Dec. 17).
34
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali), Judgment, 1986 ICJ Rep 554 (Dec. 22); Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), Judgment, 1989 ICJ Rep. 162 (Dec. 13).
35
Id.
36
YEHUDA Z. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (1965).
37
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment, 1962 ICJ Rep. 6 (Jun. 15); Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Judgment, Preliminary Objections, 1998 ICJ
Rep 275 (Jun. 11).
38
Id.

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22. In the present case, the State of Sumiyan has stayed silent in circumstances in which
failure to protest was tantamount to acquiescence it has been observed that protest is
necessary in such cases.40 It is important to note that the ICJ has observed that peaceful
possession coupled with acts of administration may in the absence of protest found the
basis of title by way of “historical consolidation”.41 Therefore, the State of Sumiyan
cannot raise an objection against the State of Lohkas’ territorial sovereignty in the Lamdo
area.

C. THAT THE 1918 TREATY OF ATTUKAS IS NOT CAPABLE OF TRANSFERRING LAMDO TO

THE STATE OF SUMIYAN

23. It is humbly submitted that the 1918 Treaty of Attukas was signed between the Imperialist
Britain and State of Sumiyan only provides for the demarcation of the boundary between
the state of Yagistan and the State of Sumiyan. It cannot result into an actual transfer of
Lamdo to the State of Sumiyan because, (i) the Treaty of Attukas is not binding on the
State of Lohkas; (ii) the Treaty of Attukas violates territorial integrity of the State of
Lohkas; and (iii) the Imperialist Britain cannot transfer the possession of Lamdo’s
territory to the State of Sumiyan through a treaty.

i. That the Treaty of Attukas is not binding on the State of Lohkas

24. It is humbly submitted that according to Article 242 of the VCLT, A treaty is international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law 43
and a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its
consent.44 The parties to a treaty i.e. the State of Sumiyan and Britain are obliged to rely
on the provisions in carrying out their own affairs, because they entered into the
agreement voluntarily and with a view to “structuring their relationship in the way that
best suits their interests.”45

39
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 ICJ Rep
165 (Mar. 30).
40
CHARLES ROUSSEAU, PRINCIPES GÉNÉRAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 149 (A. Pedone ed., 1944).
41
Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, 1951 ICJ Rep 116 (Dec. 18).
42
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter Vienna Convention], art. 2, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 UNTS
331.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1 (4th ed. 2001).

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25. In the present case, the State of Lohkas is not a party to the treaty and the State of
Sumiyan did not convey the intention to create any obligation on the State of Lohkas
through this treaty.
26. The State of the State of Sumiyan has stated that the State of Lohkas has not challenged
the Treaty of Attukas and hence, such silence amounts to acceptance in its claims to the
ICJ. However, the International Law Commission has stated that “silence by a party shall
not be presumed to constitute subsequent practice under Article 3146, paragraph 3 (b) of
the VCLT, accepting an interpretation of a treaty”.47
27. According to the ILC’s commentaries, “the State in question needs to be conscious of
refraining from acting in a given situation, and it cannot simply be assumed that
abstention from acting is deliberate.”48
28. It has been clearly upheld that the concerned State must have had knowledge of the
practice and where a state did not or could not have been expected to know of a certain
practice, inaction cannot be attributed to an acknowledgment that such practice was
permitted.49 Therefore, the State of Lohkas is not legally obliged to transfer the territorial
sovereignty of Lamdo to the State of Sumiyan.

ii. That the Treaty of Attukas violates the territorial integrity of the State of Lohkas

29. It is humbly submitted that protection of the territorial integrity of every state is a
peremptory norm of International Law and according to the Article 53 of the VCLT, a
treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law.50 Peremptory norms are accepted and recognized by the
international community of States from which no derogation is permitted and they enjoy
the highest status within customary international law and cannot be pre-empted by any
treaty’.51
30. The Article 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter clearly prohibit the states from violating the
territorial integrity and interfering in a state’s territorial sovereignty. 52 The ICJ has stated

46
Vienna Convention art. 31.
47
G. A. Res. A/73/10, Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law (2018).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Vienna Convention art. 53.
51
United States v. Matta, 937 F. 2d 567 (11th Cir. 1991).
52
UN Charter art. 2(4), art. 2(7).

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that “the duty to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity is a legal obligation
stemming from peremptory norms of international law.”53
31. As mentioned earlier, the State of Lohkas is a sovereign state and the territorial
sovereignty of the Lamdo area lies with the State of Lohkas. The 1918 Treaty of Attukas
provides for the transfer of a land which belongs to the State of Lohkas and hence,
violates the territorial integrity of the State of Lohkas by interfering in its territorial
sovereignty.

iii. That the Imperialist Britain cannot transfer the possession of Lamdo’s territory to
the State of Sumiyan through a treaty

32. It is humbly submitted that the territorial sovereignty of Lamdo lies with the State of
Lohkas. According to the principle of territorial sovereignty, a State exercises full and
exclusive authority over its territory.54 The ICJ has stated that the rights of the territorial
sovereign are derived from a previous sovereign, who cannot dispose of more than it had
and a state cannot thereby convey to the other state greater rights than it itself possessed.55
33. The Imperialist Britain has tried to transfer a territory to the State of Sumiyan which it did
not possess in the first place. Moreover, it has been observed that no state can dispose of a
territorial title, even by international treaty with one or more States.56
34. Especially in the present case, the imperialist British never had territorial sovereignty in
the Lamdo area and the actual possession has never been transferred to the State of
Sumiyan as the State of Lohkas has been carrying out state functions in Lamdo since
before the signing of the treaty in 1918 without any restraint. Therefore, this treaty cannot
dispose of the State of Lohkas’ territorial title over Lamdo and transfer its possession to
the State of Sumiyan.

[C] THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE STATE OF SUMIYAN ARE A THREAT TO

AND VIOLATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE OF LOHKAS
AND THE STATE OF YAGISTAN

35. It is humbly submitted that the State is the foundation of International law, and in turn,
sovereignty is the foundation for the State. Sovereignty expresses internally, the
53
Unilateral declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory opinion, 2010 ICGJ 423 (Jul. 22).
54
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
55
Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), Award, 1928 II RIAA 829 (Apr. 4).
56
East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, 1995 ICJ Rep 90 (Jun. 30).

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supremacy of governmental agencies and externally, the supremacy of the State as a legal
person57. Sovereignty58 or Independence is a fundamental right59 guaranteed to all States
and is the virtue that sustains a global order. Henceforth, it is inarguable that the principle
of territorial integrity is the linchpin of the international order and its violation threatens
the system itself60.
36. In the present case, it is argued that the Actions of State of Sumiyan are a Threat to and
Violation of the Sovereignty of States of Lohkas and Yagistan because, (A) the State of
Lohkas and State of Yagistan are fully sovereign and equal States in international law
possessing all rights and obligations; (B) the State of Sumiyan has raised illegal military
structures in the Lamdo Area by violating international law; (C) the State of Sumiyan has
violated its Agreement of 2011 with State of Yagistan; and (D) the State of Yagistan has
not violated International Law.

A. THAT THE STATE OF LOHKAS AND STATE OF YAGISTAN ARE FULLY SOVEREIGN AND
EQUAL STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW POSSESSING ALL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

37. It is humbly submitted that International law upholds the crucial notion of legal equality
between all States. The UN Charter safeguards the Right to Sovereign Equality in Article
2 (1)61 and bases the organization itself on this principle. The principle of equality in
States is also recognized in the Declaration on Principles of International Law, 1970 62 and
the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 198263.
38. Hence, sovereign equality solidifies the legal obligations regarding the principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention. In the present case, the State of Lohkas and State of
Yagistan are fully functioning, sovereign and equal States in the eyes of international law
and thereby possess all rights and obligations extended to States. Henceforth, a violation
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States of Lohkas and Yagistan amounts to a
violation of International law.

57
R. Y. JENNINGS & A. D. WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 382 (9th ed., 1992).
58
N. Schrijver, The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty, 70 BYIL 65,65 (1999).
59
6 A. KISS, R´EPERTOIRE DE LA PRATIQUE FRAN¸CAISE EN MATI`ERE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
(1966).
60
L. Delbez, Du Territoire dans ses Rapports avec l’Etat, 39 REVUE G´EN´ERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 46 (1932).
61
UN Charter art. 2(1).
62
G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).
63
G. A. Res. 37/10, Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (Nov. 15, 1982).

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B. THAT THE STATE OF SUMIYAN HAS RAISED ILLEGAL MILITARY STRUCTURES IN THE
LAMDO AREA BY VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW

39. It is humbly submitted that the principle of Territorial Sovereignty is firmly embedded in
International law. The Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States prepared in
194964 by the International Law Commission enshrined the right of sovereignty in Article
165 and in Article 266. The aforementioned instrument also places a duty on States to
respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of other States
through Article 967.
40. This duty was reaffirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States adopted in October 1970,
UNGA68.The Honourable Court has itself stated in the Corfu Channel case that, “…
between independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation
of international relations”69.
41. Therefore, the actions done by the State of Sumiyan has violated International Law
because, (i) the State of Sumiyan has violated the principle of Territorial Sovereignty; and
(ii) the State of Sumiyan caused Coercion against the State of Lohkas.

i. That the State of Sumiyan has violated the principle of Territorial Sovereignty

42. It is humbly submitted that in the present case, the construction of military structures 70
(namely, Pakka Bunkers) by State of Sumiyan in the territory of State of Lohkas (namely,
Lamdo) is a grave violation of the territorial sovereignty of the State of Lohkas. The
concerned construction is also illegal in accordance with the principles of international
law and constitutes threat of force. The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles
on State Responsibility, 200171 categorizes the “unlawful occupation of part of the
territory of another state or stationing armed forces in another state without its consent”
as an international wrongdoing.

64
G. A. Res. A/RES/375, Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States with commentaries (Dec. 6, 1949).
65
Id., art. 1.
66
Id., art. 2.
67
Id., art. 9.
68
G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).
69
Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, 1949 ICJ Rep 4 (Apr. 9).
70
Factual Matrix, ¶ 6.
71
G. A. Res. Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp. IV. E. 1, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (November, 2001).

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43. Further, Article 2 (4)72 of the UN Charter prohibits threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State. The same notion is reaffirmed
by The 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States73 which emphasized that “no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.”
44. Further, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law 74 also stresses on the
paramount obligation on States to refrain from the threat or use of force and clearly states
that:
“Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate
the existing international boundaries of another State or as a means of
solving international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems
concerning frontiers of States”.
45. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that the threat of force itself constitutes a breach 75 of
Article 2(4)76 of the UN Charter, as has been stated by the Hon’ble Court in the Advisory
Opinion to the General Assembly on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons wherein the Court specified that a “signalled intention to use force if certain
events occur” would also constitute breach of the provision, where the envisaged use of
force would itself be unlawful.
46. Moreover, the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission has noted that recourse to force even
on disputed territory would be a violation of international law, stating that:
“Border disputes between states are so frequent that any exception to the
threat or use of force for territory that is allegedly occupied unlawfully
would create a large and dangerous hole in a fundamental rule of
international law”77.
47. It is also relevant to note the separate opinion of Judge Robinson in the Nicaragua Case 78
when deliberating whether Nicaragua had used force against Costa Rica, “[n]o shots need
be fired, no heavy armaments need be used and certainly no one need be killed before a
state can be said to have violated the prohibition”. He opined that the “intention and

72
UN Charter art. 2(4).
73
G. A. Res. 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal
Affairs of States (Dec. 9, 1981).
74
G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).
75
M. Roscini, Threats of Armed Force and Contemporary International Law, 54 NILR 229, 229 (2007); R.
Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AJIL 239, 239 (1988).
76
UN Charter art. 2(4).
77
C. Gray, The Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission Oversteps Its Boundaries: A Partial Award?, 17 EJIL 699,
699 (2006).
78
Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Order on Provisional Measures, 2013 ICJ Rep
354 (Nov. 22).

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purpose” and the “motivations” of the intruding state are amongst the relevant factors that
may be considered when judging whether an unlawful incursion in the disputed area, even
when not accompanied by an actual armed confrontation, falls within the scope of Article
2(4)79.
48. In relation to the military conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council
restated the inadmissibility of the alteration of international boundaries through the use
force80. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission also stressed that “the use of armed
force was not acceptable as a means of addressing territorial disputes or changing
circumstances on the ground81.”
49. Therefore, it is established that the legal status of the territory in question (delimited or
unlimited, demarcated or not clearly demarcated, disputed or not subject to a dispute)
does not affect the characterization of a certain conduct as a threat or use of force in the
sense of Article 2(4)82.
50. In the present case, the State of Sumiyan is attempting to use force to aggressively change
the status quo in the region of Lamdo and is resultantly, in breach of the principle of
prohibition of force and has therefore, violated the norm of territorial sovereignty.

ii. That the State of Sumiyan has used Coercion against the State of Lohkas

51. It is humbly submitted that “Coercion” is the core criteria by which the actions of a state
can be deemed to be in violation of the prohibition on the use of force in international
law, as laid out in Article 2(4)83 and the essential feature which characterizes the
prohibition of the use of force is the “application of military force as a means of
coercion”. Coercion reflects the objectively discernible aim or effect of “forcing the will
of another state” to accept a new status quo84.
52. Notably, in “bloodless invasions” or the use of non-violent force, the deployment of
military forces in the disputed territory by one claimant is likely to create a fait accompli
that coerces the other claimants into accepting the new situation on the ground that

79
UN Charter art. 2(4).
80
S. C. Res. 752 (May 15, 1992).
81
S. C. Res. 757 (May 30, 1992).
82
UN Charter art. 2(4).
83
Id.
84
O Dörr, Use of Force, Prohibition of, THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
607 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012).

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“makes it materially impossible for other claimants to restore the status quo ante without
risking human injury or damage to property”85.
53. In its 2004 advisory opinion on the Israeli Wall case 86, the ICJ reiterated this notion by
stating that the construction of the wall by Israel “in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including in and around East Jerusalem” was an acquisition of territory through force, in
contravention of Article 2(4)87 of the UN Charter.
54. Henceforth, in the present case, the actions of State of Sumiyan- unilateral land
reclamation activities and continuous military build-up in the Lamdo region necessarily
create a fait accompli on the ground and coerce the other claimant parties into accepting
the new status quo. This use of force in territorial disputes aims to terrorize and bully its
neighbours into quite submission and threatens peaceful co-existence in the region.
Henceforth, the conduct of State of Sumiyan is also a severe breach of Article 2(3)88 of
the UN Charter, which mandates peaceful dispute settlement.

C. THAT THE STATE OF SUMIYAN HAS VIOLATED ITS AGREEMENT OF 2011 WITH STATE
OF YAGISTAN

55. It is humbly submitted that a treaty is defined under Article 289 of the VCLT. The
fundamental principle of treaty law is undoubtedly the proposition that treaties are
binding upon the parties to them and must be performed in good faith 90 (“pacta sunt
servanda”) and this principle is reaffirmed in Article 26 of the VCLT91.
56. In the present case, the State of Yagistan and State of Sumiyan had signed an agreement
in 201192 wherein they pledged, “not to raise any structure on their respective sides,
within 5 kms of their common boundary and also not to use fire arms in case of a
situation arises from their boundary dispute”.
57. Therefore, the consequent action of State of Sumiyan (namely, the construction of Pakka
Bunkers in the Lamdo region) within 5 kilometres of the common boundary, is a blatant

85
OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (Bloomsbury Publishing ed., 2010).
86
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 ICJ Rep 136 (Jul. 9).
87
UN Charter art. 2(4).
88
UN Charter art. 2(3).
89
Vienna Convention art 2.
90
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Rep 226 (Jul. 8) ; H.
Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 60 BYIL 4, 7 (1989).
91
Vienna Convention art 26.
92
Factual Matrix, ¶ 8.

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violation of the agreement and constitutes a Material Breach as defined under Article
60(3) of the VCLT93.
58. A Material Breach of a treaty consists in either a repudiation of the treaty not permitted
by the Vienna Convention or the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment
of the object or purpose of the treaty 94. In case of the latter, where such a breach occurs in
a bilateral treaty, then under Article 60(1)95 the innocent party may invoke that breach as
a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part as was
the case in the Rainbow Warrior case96.
59. Therefore, in the present case, the State of Sumiyan has committed a material breach and
thereby, the State of Yagistan has the right to invoke said breach as ground for
termination of the treaty itself.

D. THAT THE STATE OF YAGISTAN HAS NOT VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW

60. It is humbly submitted that as elucidated in the previous argument, the Material Breach
committed by the State of Sumiyan has resulted in the termination of the treaty between
the two States. Therefore, the consequent actions of State of Yagistan (namely, restraining
the military construction of State of Sumiyan in the Lamdo area 97) are not subject to the
Agreement of 2011. Thereby, aforementioned actions cannot be said to have violated
International Law, particularly the VCLT.
61. Further, the actions of State of Yagistan fall very well within ambit of the Right to Self
Defence as provided under Article 51 of the UN Charter98 which states that, “Nothing in
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations...”
62. Article 21 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility,
200199 also reaffirms this right. Notably, the Right to Self Defence must be exercised with
extreme caution “since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited
by that necessity, and kept clearly within it”. To this effect, the State of Yagistan has

93
D. N. Hutchinson, Solidarity and Breaches of Multilateral Treaties, 59 BYIL 151, 151 (1988).
94
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep 16 (Jun. 21).
95
Vienna Convention art 60(1).
96
Rainbow Warrior Case (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, 82 I.L.R. 500 ( 1990).
97
Factual Matrix, ¶ 6.
98
UN Charter art. 51.
99
G. A. Res. Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (Nov. 2001), art. 21.

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exercised its right to self-defence in complete conformity with the principles of

proportionality and necessity100.
63. Furthermore, the actions of State of Yagistan are also mandated by the Treaty of 1999101,
signed with the State of Lohkas that authorize the intervention by either parties to guide
and co-operate in issues of diplomatic or military importance. In accordance with this
treaty, as State of Lohkas faces eminent threat to its territorial sovereignty in the Lamdo
region, the actions to restrain the illegal construction of State of Sumiyan are authorized
under the treaty. The Right to Collective Self Defence has also been upheld by the ICJ 102
and UN Security Resolutions103.
64. Moreover, as the State of Sumiyan attempts to bully and intimidate its neighbours with its
military might, such restraint is necessary to safeguard the sovereignty, equality of States
and maintain peace in the region. Conclusively, it is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble
Court that the Actions of State of Sumiyan are a Threat to and Violation of the
Sovereignty of States of Lohkas and Yagistan.

[D] THAT THE STATE OF YAGISTAN IS A PARTY TO THE DISPUTE AND

ITS CLAIMS ARE VALID IN THE COURT OF LAW

65. It is humbly submitted that Article 62 of the ICJ Statute104 provides for intervention of
third parties and the criteria for the test to be satisfied by a state seeking to intervene in a
matter is two-fold – first, whether it has an interest of a legal nature; second, whether that
interest is likely to be affected by the decision in the case 105. The Court has held that the
demonstration of an “interest” requires a lower threshold than that of a “right”106.
66. However, the exact scope and determining formula of a “legal interest” remains
ambiguous and thereby, one must rely on the Hon’ble court’s past decisions in this regard
and discern the way “interest” has been deemed to exist or not exist. In Case Concerning
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute: El Salvador v. Honduras 107, Nicaragua
claimed a right to intervene on the ground that the decision of the Court would impact its

100
J. GRAHAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (2004).
101
Factual Matrix, ¶ 5.
102
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 ICJ Rep 554 (Dec. 22).
103
S. C. Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
104
ICJ Statute art. 62.
105
Deepak Raju & Blerina Jasari, Intervention before the International Court Of Justice – A Critical
Examination of the Court’s recent decision in Germany v. Italy, 6 NUJS L. REV. 63 (2013).
106
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, ICJ GL No. 124 (Nov. 19).
107
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), Judgment, 1989 ICJ Rep. 162 (Dec. 13).

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own claims of sovereignty in the islands and maritime spaces and the Hon’ble Court
accepted the right to intervene.
67. Similarly, in the Case Concerning Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria: Cameroon v. Nigeria108, the Court granted to Equatorial Guinea the right to
intervention on the basis of its application wherein its sovereign rights and jurisdiction
were being affected and therefore, the interest was of a “legal nature”. Therefore, if the
sovereignty of a State is being threatened, this would fall under the ambit of a legal
interest- as maintained by the Hon’ble Court in aforementioned judgements.
68. Further, in the recent case of The Jurisdictional Immunities of the State: Germany v.
Italy109, the Court granted Greece the right to intervene on the basis that its legal interests
and rights could be potentially impacted. In the present case, it is inarguable that the State
of Yagistan will face a direct impact of the current conflict between States of Lohkas and
Sumiyan.
69. Henceforth, it is humbly submitted that the State of Yagistan has a legal interest in the
current conflict and therefore, has the right to intervene in the matter before the Court
under Article 62 of the Statute of the Court to safeguard such interests.

108
Id.
109
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Judgment, 2010 ICJ (July 6).

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-PRAYER-

Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is most
humbly prayed and implored before the International Court of Justice, that it may be
graciously pleased to adjudge and declare that:

1. the ICJ has jurisdiction over the current dispute,

2. the territory of Lamdo belongs to the State of Lohkas and therefore, Sumiyan must
immediately cease all unlawful activities in the region and guarantee non-repetition,
3. that the actions of the State Of Sumiyan are a threat to and violation of the
Sovereignty of the State Of Lohkas and the State of Yagistan;
4. the State of Yagistan is a party to the dispute and its claims are valid in the court of
law.

Further, adjudge the State of Sumiyan guilty for:

1. Violation of the United Nations Charter, Vienna Convention of Law of Treaties and
Customary Principles of International Law.
2. Violation of its Agreement of 2011 with State of Yagistan.

And therefore, liable to pay damages to States of Lohkas and Yagistan.

Also, pass any other order that it may deem fit in the favour of the APPLICANTS to meet the
ends of equity, justice and good conscience.

For this act of kindness, the Applicants shall duty bound forever pray.

Place: s/d

Dated: Counsels on behalf of the Applicants.

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MEMORIAL for APPLICANTS

PRAYER