Case Digests
August 25, 2022
ARABIT, Emmanuel.
GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
Petition for certiorari brings up review whether the husband of a woman, who volunturarily procured her
abortion could recover damages from Physician who caused the same.
Petitioner: Antonio Geluz
Respondents: The Hon. Court of Appeals and Oscar Lazo
Date: July 20, 1961
Supreme court Manila
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parents, Nita Villanueva had herself aborted by the
respondent.
Pregnant once again with the Plaintiff after her marriage, She had herself aborted again by the
respondent as she was then employed in the Comission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient.
Less than two years later, She had herself again aborted. The Plaintiff was at this time in the province
of Cagayan, Campaigning for his election to the provincial board; did not know of, nor gave his
constent to the abortion.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner is entitled to an award of damages.
HELD
Despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or
pinpoint the causes thereof and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after
learning of the third abortion.
His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment,
since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees, an “indemnity” claim that, under
the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
RULING
The immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances
on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
SERMONIA v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
That Petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted. At least, is not expressly
denied.
Petitioner: Jose C. Sermonia
Respondents: The Hon. Court of Appeals
Date: June 14, 1994
Supreme court Manila
In an Information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Br.151, for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his
prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid.
ISSUE
Whether his prosecution for bigamy is already time-barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is
deemed to have taken place from the time the offended party actually knew of the second marriage or
from the time the document evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry
consistent with the rule on constructive notice
HELD
Prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the commission of the crime
but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may said to be open and of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and
those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage.
He knew that no priest or minister would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as this
would subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law.
He contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not know to be still a married person. And
such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery is rendered quite difficult and
would take time.
RULING
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be playing
right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary
deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the stability of marriage as an
inviolable social instituion, the preservation of which is a primary concern of our society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reserversible error in the questioned decision of the Court Appeals,
The same is AFFIRMED.
MARABLE vs. MARABLE
FACTS
Petitioner pray that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Petitioner: Rosalino L. Marable
Respondent: Myrna F. Marable
Date: January 17, 2011
Supreme Court Manila
In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nerdy L. Tayag, a clinical
psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health.
Dr. Tayag’s report stated that petitioner is suffering from “Antisocial Personal Disorder” characterized
by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness
and lack of remorse.
ISSUE
Is the petitioners claim to be psychologically incapacitated sufficient to declare the marriage null and void?
HELD
In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the
psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of marriage. These
are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning
and significance to the marriage he or she has contracted.
It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or
“neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned
party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an
Anti-social personality disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a
socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
The appeal has no merit.
RULING
The CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and subsisting. The
totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioners psychological incapacity to fulfill
his essential marital obligations.
Wherefore, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the court of appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
LAUREL vs. ABROGAR
FACTS
Brief background, petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 99-2425, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150. The Amended Information charged the accused with theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner: Luis Marcos P. Laurel
Respondent: Hon. Zeus C. Abrogar
Date: February 27, 2006
Supreme Court Manila
ISSUE
Is Luis Marcos P. Laurel guilty of theft by personal property?
HELD
Petitioner’s act constitute theft of respondent PLDT’s business and service, committed by means of the
unlawful use of the latter’s facilities.
As early as 1910, the Court declared in Genato that ownership over electricity (which an international
long distance call consists of) as well as telephone service, is protected by the provisions on theft of
the Penal Code. The pertinent provision of the Revised Ordinance of the city of Manila, which was
involved in the said case, read as follows:
No person shall, for any purpose whatsoever, use or enjoy the benefits of any device by means of
which he may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service; and
the existence in any building premises of any such device shall, in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, be deemed sufficient evidence of such use by the persons benefiting thereby.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property which
can be the object of theft, under Article 308 of the Revised Penal code.
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it
be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of “asportation” which is defined as “carrying
away” Jurisprudence is settled that to “take” under the theft provision of the penal code does not
require asportation or carrying away.
RULING
The case is remanded to the trial court and the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby DIRECTED to
amend the Amended Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services and
business of the private offended party.
