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 HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN:
THE UNIVERSALIST APPROACH
AND THE RELATIVIST RESPONSE

Women in Iran suffer human rights abuses at the hands of

their government every day. While the international community
has attempted to hold Iran accountable under international law,
those attempts have failed.' The Iranian government argues it is
not bound by international law because its culture and religion
permit Iran to treat women according to its own standards. This
Comment proposes a solution that incorporates aspects of both
universalism and relativism to lessen Iran's violations of
women's human rights.2 This solution, the grass roots method,

I A country's obligations under international law can arise from three sources: in-
ternational conventions, international custom, and general principles that the major legal
systems of the world recognize. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102
(1987); Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38, reprintedin INTERNATIONAL LAW (Louis Henkin et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1993) 51, 51-52. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), which decides inter-
national disputes once parties have consented to its jurisdiction, also looks to judicial
decisions and teachings as a subsidiary source of international law. Id. at 52. If the par-
ties agree, the ICJ can decide a case according to principles based on equity and con-
science. Id. There are several problems with making international law binding on Iran.
First, of the international treaties to which Iran is a party, Iran has entered reservations
to many human rights provisions. For those treaties, the extent and nature of its obliga-
tions must still be interpreted. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, State Responsibility Under
InternationalHuman Rights Law to Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 167, 168 (Rebecca J.
Cook ed., 1994). Second, customary international law is vague and difficult to establish.
Id. Even if customary international law were easily defined, it would be difficult to identi-
fy any principle prohibiting all forms of gender discrimination. Id. Third, the principles of
law and equity are based on universalist principles. After establishing that Iran violated
international human rights law, the international community must then enforce Iran's
conformity with international law. An-Na'im, supra at 170. However, the problem of
enforcement has not been resolved by the international community, in large part because
states are reluctant to submit to individual complaints. Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw:
Politics, Values, and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra at 640. The international
community has dealt with the enforcement problem in a couple of ways. First, the United
Nations created the ICJ. Second, each treaty provides for its own enforcement mecha-
nism, and such enforcement mechanisms include the ICJ and committees. For example,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights established a committee to ad-
dress disputes. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
41, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, GA. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 57, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPRI.
' Because many laws and practices in Iran subordinate women to men, applying
780 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

combines universalist ideals with relativist strategies in order to

give universalism cultural legitimacy in Iran.'
Historically, international law did not protect citizens from
human rights abuses committed by their own government.4
Questioning another state's treatment of its own citizens was
seen as violating the very premise upon which international law
was based: the sanctity of state sovereignty. However, after wit-
nessing horrible human rights violations during World War II,
the international community responded by including human
rights obligations in the U.N. Charter5 and the International
Bill of Rights.'

international standards to Iranian law would have an enormous impact on the legal sys-
tem. See Ann E. Mayer, Cultural Particularismas a Bar to Women's Rights: Reflections
on the Middle Eastern Experience, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS 176, 177 (Julie
Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
' It is difficult to verify reports of facts in Iran due to the government's refusal to
cooperate with non-governmental groups. Because the facts relied on in this Comment
could change, the grass roots theoretical model is a hypothesis which can conform to fur-
ther factual findings. In addition to verification problems, translation can be problematic.
This Comment seeks consistency in its translations, but it does not adopt one particular
style nor claim to be technically correct. While citing to the original Iranian Penal Code
would be ideal, original Iranian sources are difficult to acquire due to government censor-
ship. Additionally, even if such sources were available, translation problems exist. There-
fore, this Comment relies on credible secondary sources when necessary.
" Louis Henkin, The Internationalizationof Human Rights, 6 PRoc. GEN. EDUC.
SEMINAR 1 (1977), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 596.
Id. at 597.
6The International Bill of Rights is comprised of three instruments: the ICCPR, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2, U.N. GAOR 217A (III) (1948) [hereinafter
UDHR], and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, art. 41, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16 at 57, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1987) [hereinafter ICESCRI. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 599. The
ICCPR and the ICESCR are only binding upon signatories. Since Iran ratified the
ICCPR, it is bound. The UDHR is binding as customary law, but customary law is vague
and difficult to prove. An-Na'im, supra note 1, at 168. Consistent state conduct forms
customary international law; however, that conduct must be borne out of sense of obliga-
tion rather than political expediency. See Asylum Case (Colum. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266
(Nov. 20). Furthermore, a state can exempt itself from a law of custom by consistently
protesting the principle before it becomes accepted as customary law. See North Sea Con-
tinental Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.) (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). However, once
the law has become custom, a state's protest will not exempt that state from the law.
Despite the problems associated with customary law, this Comment will treat the UDHR
as binding.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 781

Two competing schools of thought, universalism and relativ-

ism, have attempted to address the implementation of interna-
tional human rights law. On the one hand, universalists believe
that the rights set forth by the international community are so
fundamental that no departure is excusable. The universalists
assert that customary international law, international agree-
ments, and the International Bill of Rights define the standard.!
Relativists, on the other hand, believe local custom and tradition
should define human rights standards. Consequently, relativists
dismiss universalism as an attempt to impose Western values on
non-Western cultures! While universalist and relativist theories
apply to human rights in general, this Comment focuses on
women's rights because human rights literature has not given
sufficient consideration to women's rights.'
The conflicting themes underlying the universalist and
relativist doctrines have manifested themselves in Iran in recent
history. Mohammed Reza Shah ° advocated bringing Iran in

INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 599.

8 For a discussion of the two theories, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Problems of
Universal CulturalLegitimacy for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 339-45 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990);
See also Ann E. Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights, 15 MICH. J. INTL L.
307, 315 (1994).
' Although feminist writers address the issue of women's rights, other writers exam-
ining human rights from a traditional approach have failed to focus enough attention on
the particular suffering experienced by women. Feminist legal theory has added a sense
of urgency and a new perspective to existing human rights principles. Hilary
Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to InternationalLaw, 85 AM. J. INTL L. 613
(1991). Feminist legal theorists argue that the international community fails to incorpo-
rate women's needs into its laws, resulting in disparate treatment of women. Id. at 614.
Feminists argue that international human rights law does not protect women because it
focuses on the male public sphere. The public sphere is comprised of state actors. The pri-
vate sphere, to which women are relegated, encompasses nonstate action. Feminist theo-
ry proposes to expand human rights to address the violations against women which occur
primarily in the private sphere by abolishing the public/private sphere distinction. Nancy
Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western
Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 49 (1993).
However, because abuses against women in Iran occur in both the public and private
spheres, this Comment focuses on state action.
10 Mohammad Reza Shah ruled Iran until 1978. Michael M. J. Fischer, Legal Postu-
lates in Flux: Justice, Wit, and Hierarchy in Iran, in LAW AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE
EAST, 115, 115 (Daisy Hilse Dwyer ed., 1990).
782 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
line with Western standards" and tried to implement a plan
that would have adapted Iranian culture to conform to Western
ideals.12 He believed that for Iran to compete as a world player,
the talents of all its citizens needed to be cultivated. As a result,
many legal barriers obstructing women's rights were dismantled.
For example, the Shah's regime issued laws such as the Iranian
Family Protection Act of 1967" and removed the prohibition on
women voting. 4 In addition, Islamic law did not determine
criminal law and procedure. 5 Punishments such as stoning
were illegal.16
This progress on the legal front did not lead to true emancipa-
tion in the long run because Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's
clerics simply overturned these laws after Khomeini's supporters
deposed the Shah." In fact, many women themselves did not
buy into the Shah's Westernization attempts because the women
were poorly educated, economically dependent on men, and deep-
ly religious. 8 These factors contributed to the Shah's downfall
because his programs lacked the cultural legitimacy among the
masses that they needed to succeed. Many people were suspi-
cious of the Shah because of his wealth, his allegiance to West-
ern culture, and his secular reforms. 9 These conditions set the

" Amir Arjomand, Shi'ite Jurisprudence and Constitution Making in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE: REMAKING POLITIES, ECONOMIES,
AND MILITANCE 88, 88 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993).
12 LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN 5 (1993) [hereinafter LAW. COMMITTEE].
3 Ann E. Mayer, The FundamentalistImpact on Law, Politics,and Constitutions in
Iran, Pakistan, and the Sudan, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE, REMAKING POLI-
TIES, ECONOMIES, AND MILITANCE, supra note 11, at 116.
14 Id.

" LAW. COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 5.

16 Id.
17 Id.
" Homa Nategh, Women: The Damned of the Iranian Revolution, in WOMEN IN
POLITICAL CONFLICT: PORTRAITS OF STRUGGLE IN TIMES OF CRISES 45, 47-48 (Rosemary
Ridd & Helen Callaway eds., 1987).
"' Women who pushed for the Shah's fall did so because they saw the family as being
corrupt, and because the Shah's attempts to break the Islamic tradition by rewriting his-
tory to connect modern-day Iran with its Persian roots threatened many fundamental be-
liefs. Interview with Shahin Taheri, President of Women for Social Justice, in Atlanta,
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 783

stage for his overthrow.

Iran's legal system changed dramatically in 1979 when Ayatol-
lah Ruhollah Khomeini's supporters overthrew Mohammed Reza
Shah. Khomeini gained prominence during the 1960s by criticiz-
ing the Shah's Westernization policies. The 1979 revolution that
toppled the Shah marked the end of government efforts to West-
ernize. The official disposition abruptly changed from conformity
with the West to compliance with religious directives issued by
the government. 0
Ayatollah Khomeini destroyed almost all laws favoring
women's rights, including the Family Protection Act.2' After the
1979 revolution, Khomeini's clerical followers supervised the
writing of the new constitution, which was issued in December
1979.22 The new constitution established Islam as the basis for
the legal system.' This change is significant because all laws
consequently became subject to interpretation by religious lead-
ers. In 1982, Khomeini ordered judges to disregard all pre-revo-
lution laws and instead rely on the 2,500 new laws that had
been passed since the revolution. If no law existed that would
settle an issue at trial, the judges were to look to Khomeini him-
self for guidance. 24 These new laws, guarded by religious doc-
trine, stifled the progress for women that had grown during the
Shah's regime.
Khomeini and his clerical followers gradually stripped women
of their most basic rights. First, he ordered women to wear Is-

Ga. (Oct. 31, 1995) [hereinafter Taheri Interview]. Because of the difficulty of gathering
Iranian women's opinions, their views are represented in this Comment only by Iranian
women living outside the country and by anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., Martha Shelley,
My SisterEnded Her Life as an Act of protest, ON THE ISSUES, Fall 1994, at 15-16; Lamis
Andoni, Iran'sNew Activists Seek Life for Women Beyond the Veil, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONI-
TOR, Mar. 28, 1995 at 1, 7 [hereinafter Iran's New Activists]; Lamis Andoni, President's
DaughterRallies For Women's Sports in Iran, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 28, 1995 at
7.
20 LAW. COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 6.
21 Mayer, supra note 13, at 120.
' LAw. CoMITI'rEE, supra note 12, at 6.
23 Id.
24 Id.
784 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

lamic dress at work.25 Next, women were fired from jobs in

which they might have contact with men.2 6 Government agents
physically attacked women to enforce compliance with the new
laws.2 7 The government carried out Khomeini's objectives with
the most extreme measures, including mass summary execu-
tions.2 8 As this Comment will illustrate, international standards
judge these and other practices to be violations of human rights.
When Khomeini died in 1989 he was replaced with Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, who now governs alongside President
Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.29 While
Khamenei, as the highest religious leader, could have changed
Khomeini's policies after his death, Khamenei has instead con-
tinued to rule Iran according to Khomeini's policies. Today,
Iran's government denies women many human rights widely
recognized as legally binding by the international community.
For example, women in Iran are flogged and fined for not cover-
ing themselves completely with the chador"° and are stoned to
death for adultery.3 ' These practices occur because under Ira-

25 Mayer, supra note 13, at 116-17.

26 Taheri Interview, supra note 19.
27 Id.; Iran, Human Rights Developments, HUMAN RTS. WATCH WORLD REP., 1990,
(Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), 1990, at 437, 441 [hereinafter HUM. RTS. WATCH
1990]. The majority of Iranian men did not protest Khomeini's sexist policies. Instead,
they pressured female family members to comply with the new laws for fear of embar-
rassment of having a relative in the Morality Squad's custody. Mahin Hassibi, Sexual
Apartheid In Iran, ON THE ISSUES, Fall 1994, at 17.
2' SISTERHOOD IS GLOBAL: THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S MOVEMENT ANTHOLOGY 329
(Robyn Morgan ed., 1984). The government shot 50 schoolgirls and arrested thousands of
other girls and women without trials for "anti-Islamic" activity. By 1983, 20,000 women
had been executed, including girls, pregnant women, and elderly women. Id. at 329.
29 LAW. COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 5.
" Penal Code § 2 (Iran). The chador is Islamic dress worn by women. It must cover
the woman's entire body, including all of her hair, except for her hands and face.
"1 Iran Human Rights Practices, DISPATCH (U.S. Dep't of State/Bureau of Public
Affairs, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 1995, available in LEXIS, GENFED Library, DSTATE File
[hereinafter U.S. Dep't of State]. Although this periodical is published by the U.S. gov-
ernment and therefore is regarded as biased by some, independent human rights organi-
zations regard it as a credible source. See CHARLES HUMANA, WORLD HUMAN RIGHTS
GUIDE 3 (3d ed. 1992); see also JACK TOBIN, GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH 12
(1994). For additional reports of stoning women, see Jacquie Miller, FeministRefugee Can
Stay: Strong Message to Decision Makers, THE OVIOWA CITIZEN, Jan. 30, 1993, available
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 785

nian law, "Islamic criteria" qualify human rights. 2

The universalist and relativist theories have not had the prac-
tical effect of improving women's human rights in Iran. The
traditional approach used by universalists will not succeed in a
country like Iran because universalist values lack cultural legiti-
macy."3 Some relativists argue that a single universal standard
will not take hold in cultures with strong non-Western tradi-
tions.34 Government officials who embrace relativist ideals re-
ject the notion of allowing institutions or individuals to define
human rights because they believe that only God grants those
rights.3 5 This Comment offers an alternate hybrid approach
which would accomplish universalist objectives using relativist
strategies. This hybrid approach recognizes that elements of each
theory have validity. Thus, by combining aspects of each theory,
the international community can improve human rights for wom-
en in Iran.
This Comment examines the dichotomy between the universal-
ist and relativist positions and explores ways to bring human
rights to the women of Iran by reconciling these two theoretical
frameworks.3 6 After explaining the two theories and discussing

in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ALLMDE File; Dianne Rinehart, CanadianFeminists Blast

Canada'sRecord, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 5, 1995, availablein LEXIS, MDEAFR Library,
ALLMDE File. See also Nategh, supra note 18, at 52; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAN,
AMNESTY INVL REP. 120 (1991), microformed on Amnesty International Country Dossiers
1991, Fiche 685 (Egypt-Iraq E61 Middle East No. 76) 1, 2. While both men and women
are theoretically subject to the punishment of stoning for adultery, in practice women
suffer disproportionately because decision makers in the patriarchal legal system more
often believe women's male accusers.
LAW. COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 12.
" See generally An-Na'im, supra note 1, at 167-85.
James C. N. Paul, Islam and the State: The Problems of EstablishingLegitimacy
and Human Rights, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1057, 1069 (1991).
' See, e.g., InternationalHuman Rights Incompatible with Iran's Legal System,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File
(reporting Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi's comments); Iran's Khamene'i Ad-
dresses Islamic Ideology Conference (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 31, 1989),
availablein LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File; Rafsanjani News Conference: Relations
with USA, Arab State, Defence Budget (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 2,
1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File.
' Other theorists and human rights advocates debate the impact of government
 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

the status of Iranian women, this Comment examines the prof-

fered justifications of universalism and relativism. After assess-
ing the effectiveness of attempts to improve human rights in
Iran, this Comment provides a strategy to reconcile some of the
differences between the universalist and relativist positions. The
strategy proposes using grass roots methods to gain popular sup-
port for international human rights standards by ensuring that
those ideals will gain cultural legitimacy. This grass roots ap-
proach is essential because external attempts to implement uni-
versalist ideals without internal assistance will continue to fail.

I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Universalist and relativist theories exist together on a spec-

trum. At one extreme is the radical form of universalism that
excludes relativism, and at the other extreme is the radical form
of relativism that tolerates no universalism. 7 There are also
more moderate formulations of each theory along the spec-
trum. 8 Each theory has been embodied in different institutions
in practice, has a different source, and has been criticized for dif-
ferent reasons.

A. Universalist Theory

Universalism, embodied in international human rights law,

rests on the proposition that the human condition is unique, and
that all human beings possess certain inalienable rights." The
international community claims the right to judge states by
international standards.4" The international community thus

practices on the rights of women. Those theorists and advocates may not label themselves
"universalists" or "relativists," but they are concerned with similar issues. This Comment
focuses on the universalist and relativist theories, but acknowledges that other views
exist.
31 JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 109-10
(1989).
3 Id.
Kim, supra note 9, at 63-64.
Mayer, supra note 2, at 176.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 787

attempts to hold governments to the human rights standards

enumerated in the International Bill of Rights.
Theorists explain the concept of universal human rights by
referring to the meanings of the term "universal" and by examin-
ing the history behind universalist theory. Human rights theorist
Jack Donnelly views human rights as "universal" in three mean-
ings of the word.4' First, all human beings hold human rights
universally by virtue of their humanity." Therefore, a person's
rights cannot be conditioned on attributes such as gender or
national origin.'3 Second, human rights exist universally among
all persons and institutions as the highest moral rights." An
individual's rights cannot be subordinated to another person's,
such as a husband, or to an institution, such as the state. Thus,
a husband or a religious leader cannot take a woman's rights
from her because her rights as an individual are superior to any
rights a third party may claim. Third, human rights are becom-
ing more universally accepted as ideal standards by the interna-
tional community.45 International agreements and conferences
facilitated by the United Nations show more widespread recogni-
tion of human rights over time." This growing acceptance
means that universalism is not just a fleeting idea soon to be
extinguished. Generally, Donnelly interprets "universal" to mean
that no institution or person anywhere may take away another
person's human rights. Enforcing those rights, however, is anoth-
er matter.
In addition to looking at the meaning of "universalism," it is
useful to examine the theory's foundations to better understand
the rationale of international standards. Universalists offer two

41 DONNELLY, supra note 37, at 1.

42 Id.
See UDHR, supra note 6, art. 2.
DONNELLY, supra note 37, at 1.
45 Id. at 1-2.
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 611-15 (listing international agree-
ments and covenants). It is important to note that despite widespread recognition of
human rights, many nations (including the United States) have rejected such standards,
either by refusing to sign human rights agreements or by ratifing them with numerous
reservations.
788 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

very different bases for their doctrine. On the one hand, they
look to natural law which uses nature, God, and reason to identi-
fy certain basic rights that exist everywhere and apply to all
human beings.47 Under this formulation rights exist without
any further action. Therefore, rights are inherent and do not
need to be granted separately by the international community or
national legal systems. Positivism, on the other hand, sets forth
the principle that states, in choosing to become states, agree to
be bound by the set of rules that international law embodies.'
The premise of positivism is that a state sovereign cannot be
bound against its will. The one exception to the inability to bind
states against their will is customary international law.49 While
these two bases differ, each establishes that certain rights are
immutable by any state, institution, or individual. While the
theoretical foundation is important to explain the basis of uni-
versalism, in reality, theory means very little without the
protections of the rights claimed.
In addition to the different roots of universalism, universalism
comes in several forms. In different countries, for example, vary-
ing doses of relativist influence dilute universalism. Indeed, uni-
versalism actually comes in different measures. Only by recog-
nizing this can one accept that universalist ideals can be
achieved when mixed with relativism. The universal-
ism/relativism spectrum illustrates the concept that elements of
the two theories can co-exist in the middle of the spectrum by
adopting elements of each theory. Both radical universalism and
radical relativism exclude useful aspects of the other theory.
Opponents of radical universalism point to the fact that non-
Western nations did not participate in drafting the International
Bill of Rights as evidence that non-Western nations are being
persecuted under the pretext of human rights for the benefit of
the imperialist West.5"

47 Kim, supra note 9, at 64.

48 id.
4' See INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 617.
o See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 8, at 315-16.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 789

Radical universalism ignores the value of self-determination

for ethnic and religious minorities and rejects the argument that
peoples should be able to live according to their own customs and
traditions.5 Because universalist ideals are not part of all cul-
tures, opponents argue that subjecting all groups to one set of
standards would constitute oppression by Western culture.52
Furthermore, adversaries argue that universalism ignores cul-
tural diversity and lessens a person's choice of government, so-
cial institutions, and ethical norms.53

B. Relativist Theory

In response to universalists, relativists argue that outsiders

should not judge others' moral rules and social institutions.'
They argue that condemnation of one culture by members of
another society is inherently invalid because there are no legiti-
mate cross-cultural standards. 5 Governments pressed by uni-
versalists to conform to universalist notions of human rights
have responded that their culture and religion are just as valid
as universalist standards." Cultural relativism is the core of
the Iranian government's argument against allowing universal-
ists to impose their definition of human rights on Iran.57
Anthropology provides the basis for cultural relativism." At
its foundation are the dual premises that the observer's knowl-
edge of a culture is limited by the observer's own cultural up-
bringing, and that all cultures are "equally valid."5 9 Cultural
relativism recognizes the value of different community practices
and stresses tolerance of conventions different from one's own."

" See DONNELLY, supra note 37, at 110-11.

82 Id at 109-11.
53 Id.
Id. at 109.
Mayer, supra note 2, at 176.
Mayer, supra note 8, at 315 (quoting Iran's U.N. Ambassador m 1983).
" See id.
Kim, supra note 9, at 56.
g Id.
o Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works: The Science of CulturalAnthropology,
790 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

This means that one state cannot judge another state's practices
by the first state's norms because all traditions are equally valid.
There is an inverse relationship between various forms of
relativism and their compatibility with universalist thinking. At
one end of the spectrum, radical relativism explains culture as
the "sole source of the validity of a moral right or rule."6 This
view completely excludes universalist theory. Near the middle of
the spectrum, strong relativism acknowledges universalism and
explains culture as the "principalsource of the validity of a mor-
al right or rule."62 Near the other end of the spectrum, weak
relativism says that culture may be an "important source of the
validity of a moral right or rule."" This position has a greater
amount of universalist thinking than the strong relativist posi-
tions.
Critics argue that relativism allows countries to violate inter-
national human rights standards by using culture to justify their
departure from universalist norms."4 Generally, women have
not taken a large part in defining the culture because, tradition-
ally, male activities set the standard.65 In fact, violence against
women seems to be common in many cultures.66 Thus, in reject-
ing the aspirational character of universalism, relativism merely
perpetuates traditional practice. Because all cultures, including
Western cultures, are defined using a predominantly male stan-
dard, any justification for treatment of women based on existing
cultural practice rather than on a universalist ideal denies wom-
en their basic rights as human beings.

in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 340.

61 DONNELLY, supra note 37, at 109-10.
62 Id. at 109.
6 Id. at 110.
Mayer, supra note 2, at 177.
Kim, supra note 9, at 90.
Hearings on International Human Rights Abuses Against Women: Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organization of the House Comm. on
ForeignAffairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1990) (statement of Rep. Pat Schroeder); Anina
Wadud-Muhsin, Sisters in Islam: Effective Against All Odds, in SILENT VOICES 117, 120
(Doug A. Newsom & Bob J. Carrell eds., 1995).
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN

In addition to the potentially static-rather than

aspirational-nature of radical relativism, another worrisome
implication for women is that their source of rights is dependent
upon their membership in groups within a particular society.
Radical relativist theory does not automatically grant an individ-
ual rights which are equal to the rights of all other individuals,
but acknowledges the validity of cultural differences between
groups.67 This has been used to justify practices, such as the
caste system and slavery, that virtually all modern societies re-
ject. 68

II. THE UNIVERSALIST VIEW OF IRAN

Universalists claim that Iran has violated both customary

international law and international agreements, namely the
UDHR, which is accepted as customary law, 69 and the ICCPR,
which Iran signed.7 ° Despite the standards enumerated in these
agreements, holding any state, including Iran, to customary law
is difficult because of the amorphous nature of customary law.
Arguably, women's rights have not yet reached the level of cus-
tomary international law. Nonetheless, Iran is clearly bound by
the concept of nondiscrimination articulated in UDHR Article
2.7" Iran did not begin protesting the principle of nondiscrimina-

e7 DONNELLY, supra note 37, at 112.

SId.
Id. at 24-25. Iran voted for the UDHR in the General Assembly in 1948. Human
Rights in Iran:Testimony on behalfof Amnesty Internationalby Brian Wrobel: Before the
Subcommittee on InternationalOrganizationsof the Committee on InternationalRelations
12 (1978) [hereinafter Wrobel Testimony], microformed on Iran, Amnesty Ipternational
Country Reports 1991, Fiche 686 (H-2612 v.1 Iran 1878, no. 1).
" Wrobel Testimony, supra note 69, at 12. In addition, Iran acknowledged its com-
mitment to international human rights standards in December 1990 when it committed
itself to a U.N. resolution calling on Iran
to intensify its efforts to investigate and rectify the human rights issues raised
by the Special Representative in his observations, in particular as regards the
administration of justice and due process of law in order to comply with inter-
national instruments on human rights.... and to ensure that all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, including religious groups, en-
joy the rights recognized in these instruments.
HUM. RTS. WATCH 1990, supra note 27, at 442-43.
", UDHR Article 2 states that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
792 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

tion until the 1980s, well after the principle became customary
law. Similarly, holding Iran to the terms of the ICCPR is com-
plicated because the extent and nature of Iran's obligations must
be determined under the rules of the international law of trea-
ties.72 Furthermore, once the international community deter-
mines Iran's obligations under international law, it must resolve
the manner by which they may enforce those responsibilities.73
Therefore, the ideals in the UDHR and ICCPR may be difficult
to achieve even when violations are established. Despite these
challenges, universalists believe human rights must be protected
despite the complexities of international law and its various
enforcement mechanisms.
The Iranian government sanctions human rights abuses
through its constitution, statutes, judicial decisions, and acquies-
cence to common practices. Such actions necessarily violate inter-
national law when they deviate from the norms established in
the UDHR and ICCPR. The government incorporated its own
policies into the Iranian Constitution, enacted in 1979 and
amended in 1989. 7" Several provisions in the Iranian constitu-
tion illustrate the government's official unequal treatment of
women. For example, the section of the constitution that guaran-
tees equality omits gender equality.75 Iran's Constitution pro-
vides equality to women only if Islamic law is observed.7 ' By
qualifying women's equality, the government fails to grant its
female citizens the right of equality pursuant to UDHR Article 2.

set forth in this Declaration, without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex...."
72 An-Na'im, supra note 1, at 168-69.
7 Who will take up the issue of Iran's failure to comply with its ICCPR obligations?
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has been interpreted to mean that only
treaty members may challenge another party's treaty obligations. Therefore, a woman or
a NGO must find another state signatory to take up the cause. This makes the enforce-
ment issue difficult because state self-interest normally does not encompass human
rights issues in other states. Id. at 169.
74 LAW. COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 10.
" IRAN CONST. art. 19, translated in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 25 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1992).
76 Id.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 793

Article 26 of the Iranian Constitution allows freedom of associ-

ation unless that association violates "the criteria of Islam, or
the basis of the Islamic Republic."7 The government interprets
Islam as forbidding the social integration of men and women.
This restriction on freedom of association violates ICCPR, Article
22"8 and UDHR, Article 20-1."9 For instance, in August 1994,
the militia attacked women after a soccer match who socialized
with men." The government could argue that the restrictions it
places on these freedoms are "necessary," thereby bringing them
within the protection of ICCPR Article 22-2, but "necessary re-
strictions" are defined using the standards of a democratic soci-
ety. Iran may claim it is a democratic society, but this proclama-
tion alone does not set the standard by which a country is
judged. The standard of what is deemed "necessary" in a demo-
cratic society is one which applies equally, so it is unlikely that
Iran's version of "democracy" would fall within this protection."'
These two examples, the failure of Iran's Constitution to guar-
antee equality and restrictions on association, disproportionately
affect women.82 This unequal' effect is a result of "the criteria of
Islam" requirement in Article 26 of the Constitution as interpret-

LAW. COMMITrEE, supra note 12, at 12.

78 ICCPR, Article 22-1 states that "[elveryone shall have the right to freedom of asso-
ciation with others." ICCPR, Article 22-2 provides that "[n]o restrictions may be placed on
the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are nec-
essary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public
order.., the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others." ICCPR, supra note 1.
" UDHR, Article 20-1 guarantees that "[elveryone has the right to freedom of peace-
ful assembly and association." UDHR, supra note 6.
's Iran, Human Rights Developments, HUMAN RTS. WATCH WORLD REP., 1995 (Hu-
man Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), 1995, at 269, 271 [hereinafter HUM. [Link]
1995]. The Revolutionary Guards were officially merged into the army or municipal police
forces, but maintain some autonomy in practice. Iran,Human Rights Developments, Hu-
MAN RTS. WATCH WORLD REP., 1991 (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), 1991, at
622 [hereinafter HuM. RTS. WATCH 1991]. While it can be argued that the militia's au-
tonomy allows the government to disclaim responsibility for their actions, that the gov-
ernment condones their behavior makes the government ultimately responsible.
s' See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 22-2.
s For additional examples of practices that disproportionately affect women, see
WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT & ASIA WATCH, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: POLICE ABUSE -OF WOMEN
IN PAKISTAN, 47-56 (1992).
794 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

ed and applied by the government. To determine the "criteria of

Islam," one must first look at the Qur'an, then the Sunna (tradi-
tions of the Prophet), and finally ijma and qiyas (consensus and
reasoning by analogy, respectively).8 3 While some argue that
nothing in the Qur'an or Islamic law justifies any violation of
human rights, 4 the government is able to use the Shari'ah" 5 to
8 6
accomplish its own objectives. The Iranian government, unlike
many other governments of predominantly Muslim nations,
adopted the Shi'i interpretation of Islam rather than the main-
stream Sunni law. 7 Because Iran has taken a separate course,
its interpretation of the Shari'ah is also different. The govern-
ment justifies depriving women of equality and freedom of asso-
ciation by this interpretation of the "criteria of Islam."
In addition to restricting gender equality in its Constitution,
the Iranian government has enacted the Islamic Penal Code and
enforced its interpretation of the Shari'ah. The impact of these
two sets of laws is that men and women are treated differently,
resulting in human rights abuses that disproportionately affect
women. Under the Iranian Penal Code, death by stoning is a
method of punishment for adultery and other sexual offenses.88
While men and women are subject to the same punishments,
this Penal Code provision discriminates against women because
in Iran women are more readily accused and convicted of adul-
tery because of the patriarchal culture and sexist legal system.89

ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOwARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES,

HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1990).
See, e.g., S. H. AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 106 (1985).
The Shari'ah is the canon law of Islam. ASGHAR ALI ENGINEER, THE RIGHTS OF
WOMEN IN ISLAM 6 (1992). The Shari'ah delineates personal law, family law, ritual, and
religious observance.
' See AN-NA'IM, supra note 83, at 67-68 (pointing to the need for overcoming the
"heresy" barrier in debating the Shari'ahin order to formulate a nonsecular alternative).
See also Mayer, supra note 13, at 117 (describing the state as treating political opposition
as anti-Islamic).
87 DAVID PEARL, A TEXTBOOK ON MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW 17 (2d ed. 1987).
" Penal Code (Iran); HUM. RTS. WATCH 1990, supra note 27, at 440-41 (reporting
stoning for prohibited sexual acts); HUM. RTS. WATCH 1991, supra note 80, at 621 (report-
ing stoning as method of execution); HUM. RTS. WATCH 1995, supra note 80, at 273 (list-
ing corporal punishment of women for adultery and prostitution).
" This is also true in Pakistan. For example, in order to prove rape, a woman must
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 795

The patriarchal culture makes women more vulnerable to prose-

cution because women occupy fewer decision-making positions
than men. 0 Additionally, Islamic law itself makes women more
likely to be convicted because evidentiary rules decline to give
weight to a woman's testimony."' This is particularly troubling
since trials in Iran are often deemed unfair by the standards set
forth in Articles 6 and 14 of the ICCPR,92 and Articles 10 and
11-1 of the UDHR, s and even by standards set forth in the Ira-
nian Constitution.94 Thus, execution by stoning especially when
carried out after an inadequate trial, offends basic human rights
principles and the ideals espoused by the United Nations Char-
ter.95

have the testimony of four men. Her testimony is not sufficient. If she alleges rape but
cannot prove it was nonconsensual, she can be convicted of the capital crime of Zina
(fornication or adultery) under the Islamic penal law Hudood. The punishment, which
cannot be altered, is death by stoning. The burden of proof also works against women.
While a woman must prove rape beyond a reasonable doubt, a woman's rape allegation,
once disproved, serves as prima facie evidence of adultery or fornication. Men, however,
are given the benefit of the doubt when accused of rape. WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT &
ASIA WATCH, supra note 82, at 47-56.
' AN-NA'IM, supra note 83, at 123.
91 Id.
' ICCPR, Article 6-1 states that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."
Section 2 establishes that the "sentence of death may be imposed only for the most se-
rious crimes .... This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement
rendered by a competent court." Article 14-1 provides that "[a]ll persons shall be equal
before the courts and tribunals .... [Elveryone shall be entitled to a fair and public
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal .... " Article 14-2 states
that "[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty... ."Article 14-3(b) provides that after being charged with a
crime, the accused shall be entitled "[tlo have adequate time and facilities for the prepa-
ration of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing." Article 14-3
guarantees the right to examine adverse witnesses. Article 14-5 establishes the right to
review by a higher court. ICCPR, supra note 1.
' UDHR, Article 10 guarantees that "[elveryone is entitled in full equality to a fair
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal ... ." Article 11-1 states
that "[elveryone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees
necessary for his defence." UDHR, supra note 6.
IRAN CONST. (1979) art. 14, 34, 35, 37, translated in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, 22-30 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1992).
Many trials are not held in public, the accused are not given the opportunity to consult
with a defense attorney prior to trial, and in practice the accused are not presumed inno-
cent. LAW. COMNiTTEE, supra note 12, at 40-41.
g' The Preamble states one of the purposes of establishing the United Nations is "to
796 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

A second example of human rights abuses against women

under the Islamic Penal Code is the Code's valuation of a
woman's worth as only half that of a man's." For example, a
woman's testimony in court is given half the weight of a man's
testimony;97 women inherit half of what men inherit;"8 and
compensation paid to the family of a female murder victim is
half of what a male murder victim's family would receive. 9 This
unequal valuation of worth violates UDHR Article 7,"° which
states that all people are equal before the law, and ICCPR Arti-
cle 3, guaranteeing men and women equal civil and political
0
1
rights. '
In addition to valuing a woman's worth as half of a man's, the
Penal Code provides punishments for women who violate the
dress code, a policy defined by the government.0 2 Police units
patrol the streets in search of violations.' 3 If an agent of the
state observes a woman with a strand of hair showing, makeup,
or clothes that do not conceal the shape of her body, the state

reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights .... U. N. CHARTER pmbl.

Akram Mirhosseini, After the Revolution: Violations of Women's Human Rights in
Iran, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS 72, 72 (1995). The law that declares a woman
to be "half a man" is the lex [Link], supra note 18, at 51.
97 SISTERHOOD IS GLOBAL, supra note 28, at 324.

" Mahin Hassibi, Sexual Apartheid in Iran, ON THE ISSUES, Fall 1994, at 17-19;
Mirhosseini, supra note 96, at 72; SISTERHOOD IS GLOBAL, supra note 28, at 325.
Mirhosseini, supra note 96, at 72.
10 UDHR Article 7 states that "[alli are equal before the law .... " UDHR, supra note
6. A similar provision in the ICCPR is Article 26. ICCPR, supra note 1.
10' ICCPR, supra note 1.
10 Iran, Human Rights Development, HUMAN RTS. WATCH WORLD REP., 1992, (Hu-
man Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.) 1992, at 300-01 [hereinafter HUM. RTS. WATCH
1992]; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 31. See also Mirhosseini, supra note 96, at
74-75 (giving examples of violations and enforcement of the dress code); Rinaldo Galindo
Pohl, Special Representative of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, at U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1992/34 (1992) [hereinafter Special Representative Report] (citing allegations of
women's human rights violations); HUM. RTS. WATCH 1995, supra note 80, at 271 (dis-
cussing zero tolerance of dress code violations and reporting fines and flogging for violat-
ing dress code); HUM. RTS. WATCH 1992, supra at 301 (reporting more stringent dress
code standards with imprisonment, fines, or flogging on the street for violations).
"o HUM. RTS. WATCH 1992, supra note 102, at 301.
19961 HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 797

can arrest, fine, or flog the violating woman.' This enforce-

ment of the dress code violates UDHR and ICCPR provisions
prohibiting degrading treatment, guaranteeing freedom of ex-
pression, and upholding personal security."5 Flogging, fining,
or arresting a woman for having a strand of hair out of place
clearly degrades that woman. Similarly, forbidding women from
choosing how to present themselves stifles their ability to ex-
press themselves through their appearance. Likewise, arresting
or flogging a woman for the drape of her clothes seems to violate
her personal security because a woman could leave her house
believing she is in compliance with the dress code, yet find her-
self stopped by the police if they view her appearance as
violating the dress code. Further, application of the dress code
contributes to the disparate treatment of men and women be-
cause Iranian men are not subject to similar restrictions.
The Shari'ah is also a source of contention in the universal-
ist/relativist debate. The observance of the Shari'ah in practice
has been strongest in family law and inheritance." 6 Universal-
ists claim that the Shari'ah family law as applied discriminates
against women and justifies its human rights abuses against
women." 7 Based on the idea of the male as guardian over the
female,' the Shari'ah provides the grounds for numerous laws
that disable women economically and socially via restrictions on
women's activities and forms of expression.' 9 For example,
while a husband may forbid his wife from working or traveling

1 04 I d .
"05UDHR Article 5 and ICCPR Article 7 prohibit "degrading treatment." UDHR Arti-
cle 19 and ICCPR Article 19-2 guarantee the right to freedom of expression. ICCPR Arti-
cle 9-1 and UDHR Article 3 uphold the right to "security of person." UDHR, supra note 6;
ICCPR, supra note 1.
"0 AN-NA'iM, supranote 83, at 32.
"o Debbie J. Gerner, Roles in Transition: The Evolving Position of Women in Arab-
Islamic Countries, in MUSLIM WOMEN 71, 74 (Freda Hussain ed., 1984) (arguing that the
Shari'ahmakes it difficult for women to move constructively toward changing their situa-
tion).
'08 An-Na'im, supra note 1, at 181. See also ABUL A. A MAUDUDI, PURDAH AND THE
STATUS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM (Ai-Ash'Ari trans., Islamic Publications 4th ed. 1979).
109 See JAMAL NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS (2d ed. 1990) (describing
personal status laws).
798 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

abroad," ° no such permission is required for husbands to work

or travel. This restriction violates UHDR Article 13-2, which
grants all individuals the right to leave the country, as well as
UHDR Articles 23-1 and other international provisions that
guarantee the right to work."'
In addition to the Shari'ah principles, Iran has a unique prin-
ciple: the Mut'a (temporary marriage)."' Mut'a allows a Mus-
lim man to contract an unlimited number of temporary marriag-
es."' These temporary marriages are in addition to his perma-
nent marriages, of which he is allowed up to four at one
time."4 Women may contract only one marriage at one
time." 5 Further, women must abstain from sexual activity for
forty-five days after a temporary marriage ends."' Men have
no such requirements. This Mut'a provision violates UDHR Arti-
cle 16-1 and ICCPR Article 23-4."' Because Mut'a (and polyga-
my, a general Shari'ah principle) is a male prerogative, it de-

"' Mirhosseini, supra note 96, at 73.

.. UDHR Article 23-1 reads, "[elveryone has the right to work, to free choice of em-
ployment...." UDHR, supra note 6. A similar provision is Article 6-1 of the Interna-
tional Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: "The States Parties to the
present covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the
opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take
appropriate steps to safeguard this right." ICESCR, supra note 6, at 50. The government
also interferes with women's right to work. For example, before the Revolution 13% of
women were employed; after the Revolution only half of these women were employed.
Mirhosseini, supra note 96, at 73. The government fired many women because their sup-
posed physical and mental weakness made them incapable of performing certain jobs. Id.
See also Special Representative Report, supra note 102.
11 Shahla Haeri, Divorce in Contemporary Iran:A Male Prerogativein Self-Will, in
ISLAMIC FAMILY LAw 55, 60 (Chibli Mallet & Jane Conners eds., 1990). Mut'a literally
means "enjoyment, use." ASEF A.A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAw 177 (4th ed.
1974).
11 Haeri, supra note 112, at 60.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 UDHR Article 16-1 reads "[men and women of full age, without any limitation

due to race, nationality, or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They
are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage, and at its dissolution."
UDHR, supra note 6. ICCPR provides "[sitate parties to the present Covenant shall take
appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to mar-
riage, during marriage, and at its dissolution." ICCPR, supra note 1.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 799

prives women of equal rights during marriage and at its disso-

lution.
Universalists argue that restrictions placed upon women by
the Shari'ah and Iran's Penal Code are significant not only be-
cause they are breaches of international human rights stan-
dards, but also because they are directed wholly at women. The
application of the Shari'ah in Iran points to the need to examine
human rights abuses inflicted solely upon women. The Iranian
government sanctions human rights abuses against women not
only in its Constitution and statutory laws, but in its judicial
system as well. The judiciary is problematic for women because
judicial power is exclusively under clerical control." 8 The
state's interpretation of Islam influences the outcome of all dis-
putes."' Since this interpretation includes the Shari'ah, which
is criticized for placing great importance on male sexual gratifi-
cation, 20 one can expect judicial decisions to reflect these bias-
es. The patriarchal system has more easily convicted women
than men, due in large part to skewed evidentiary rules'' and
the prohibition of women judges. 22 This prohibition alone vio-
lates UDHR Article 23-1, which guarantees the free choice of
employment.i Aside from the Article 23-1 violation, excluding
women from the judiciary ensures that decisions are made from
a male perspective. While this alone is not a human rights viola-
tion," these two factors combined ensure that women's views
are excluded from the judicial process, decreasing their chances
for a fair trial. This violates UDHR Articles 10 and 11, which
guarantee the right to a fair hearing and the right to be pre-
sumed innocent."

118 Aijomand, supra note 11, at 94.

, Id. at 93.
120 Haen, supra note 112, at 69.
121 See WOMEN's RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 82, at 47-56.
122 Iran'sNew Activists, supra note 19, at 7.
12 UHDR Article 23-1 reads [elveryone has the right to work, to free choice of em-

ployment. ." UDHR, supra note 6.

124 Underrepresentation of women in decision-making positions is common even in the
countries espousing universalism. The difference is that Iran has no means of giving
women's voices equal weight.
"2 Article 10 states that "[elveryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public
800 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

Not only does the government impede women's chances for a

fair trial, it also acquiesces to widespread abusive practices. This
acquiescence amounts to human rights abuse when the govern-
ment does not intervene to prohibit systemic violations.'2 6 In
some cases government practices contravene written laws. For
example, Article 26 of the Iranian Constitution allows for politi-
cal associations not contrary to Islam, yet in practice the govern-
ment punishes those who speak against it' 2 7 and refuses to reg-
ister non-clerical political groups. 28 The government justifies
outlawing political opposition by equating the government posi-
tion with Islam. ICCPR Article 3 guarantees that men and wom-
en enjoy the same civil and political rights. 1 29 Because women
are underrepresented in government and systemic procedures
prohibit women from participating in government on an equal
basis, 3' state practice denies women an adequate voice in their
government and virtually guarantees a male-biased outcome.
These examples of human rights violations by the government
of Iran in the form of constitutional provisions, statutory laws,
the judicial system, and acquiescence to common abrasive prac-
tices substantiate the universalist view that Iran's treatment of
women does not meet international human rights standards as
set forth in the UDHR and ICCPR.

III. RELATMST RESPONSES

The Iranian government approaches universalist criticism in

two ways. In some cases, Iran denies accusations that it violated

hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal .... ."Article 11 guarantees "[e]veryone

charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty ... ." UDHR, supra note 6.
126 An-Na'im, supra note 1, at 167.
127 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 31, at 120 (reporting that approxi-

mately 100 women allegedly connected with two left-wing political parties have been
imprisoned for terms over seven years, some without charge or trial).
'28 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GUARDIANS OF THOUGHT: LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF EXPREs-
SION IN IRAN 113 (1993).
129 ICCPR, supra note 1.
,so Hassibi, supra note 27, at 18; HuM. RTS. WATCH 1995, supra note 80, at 270-71.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN

international human rights standards. In other cases, it justifies

its actions as permissible under its own culture and religion.
When defending its actions, the government tends to offer three
justifications for its treatment of women. First, Iran justifies its
separate treatment of women through its own interpretation of
Islamic tenets. Second, it rejects universalist arguments as based
on notions of Western cultural supremacy. Finally, Iran charac-
terizes international attacks on its conduct as politically motivat-
ed.
Iran's primary justification for eschewing the universal human
rights standard is Islam. 3 ' The government draws upon Islam
as an ideology and program for action in legal, political, and
other fields, and proclaims a duty to bring pure Islam to all
Muslims." 2 In one instance, when a U.N. investigator reported
alleged Iranian human rights abuses, the government first called
the report false but later called on the U.N. representative to
study the issue further. Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad
Mohammadi stated that if the U.N. representative studied the
issue of inequality between men and women thoroughly, "he
would admit that the moral and material rights of women in
iran [sic] are being much better respected according to the
islamic [sic] law than that of the west [sic]." 3
Iran's Constitution requires that Islamic principles govern all

...AMIN, supra note 84, at 105-06.

" Iran's Iamene'iAddresses Islamic Ideology Conference (BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Jan. 31, 1989), available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File.
'" Iran Denies Indirect Talks With Israel, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Feb. 22, 1995,
available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ALLMDE File. While the Iranian government
uses Islam to justify its actions, some schools of jurisprudence interpret the Shari'ah
differently from the government. This is partly because the Shari'ah evolved over the
course of several centuries and was never static. ENGINEER, supra note 85, at 6-17. Some
scholars argue that because the Shari'ahis transcendental law, it must be applied differ-
ently as circumstances change. Id. at 9. Thus, while the Qur'an contains discriminatory
passages that do not change over time, the Shari'ah'sinterpretations may change accord-
ing to the culture of the time. The Qur'an, too, has been examined for guidance on
women's human rights. Scholars have pointed to sections of the Qur'an that indicate men
and women have equal status. Id. at 10. However, since official interpretations are done
by government religious leaders, the interpretations point to those sections that support
discrimination. Id.
802 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

laws and regulations in the country.' The primary sources of

Islamic law are the Qur'an and the Sunna as interpreted accord-
ing to the Shi'a tradition in Iran.'35 If the Qur'an gives no guid-
ance on an issue, then secondary sources of law may be consult-
ed."'6 The government defends some specific violations of
human rights standards with its Constitution.1 37 For example,
Article 26 of the Constitution qualifies the ICCPR Article 22
right to freedom of association with a provision that such asso-
ciations may not contravene "the criteria of Islam or the basis of
the Islamic Republic."3 8 In Iran's view, because the Qur'an is
supreme, it must be followed, rather than international law. The
Shari'ah,formulated primarily from the Qur'an and the Sunna,
details how to comply with Islamic laws.'39 For example, the
Qur'an requires that women dress in a dignified manner."
The Iranian government interprets the Shari'ah to mean that
women must cover all but their hands and face, wear thick
stockings, show no hair, and wear no visible cosmetics.'
In addition to specific domestic laws supporting Iran's treat-
ment of women, Iran regards Islam as a legal system separate
from that of the West and Western claims to be the basis of
universalism.'11 According to this view, Islam provides immuta-
ble fundamental rights.' Human rights in Islam are granted
by God.'" Therefore, this rationale provides that no individual

134 IRAN CONST. art. 4 (1979) translatedin CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE

WORLD, 18 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1992); LAW. COMMITTEE,
supra note 12, at 8.
' LAW. COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 8. See MAUDUDI, supra note 108, at 23-24
(detailing rights of citizens in an Islamic state as emanating from the Qur'an).
136 LAw. COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 9.

137 See id.

13 Id.
39 ENGINEER, supra note85, at 13. The judiciary derives its authority from the
Shari'[Link] A'LA MAWDUDI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM 13 (1986).
40 Qur'an 24:31; ENGINEER, supra note 85, at 14.
1 See HUM. RTS. WATCH 1990, supra note 27, at 441.
142 See generally MOHAMMAD TALAAT AL GHUNAIMI, THE MUSLIM CONCEPTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE WESTERN APPROACH 1-5 (1968).
1 MAWDUDI, supra note 139, at 11.
...Id. at 15.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 803

or institution may revoke those divine rights.'45

Iran's cultural argument takes Islamic justifications one step
further. While Iran cites Islam as creating separate human
rights standards, it relies on its unique culture to assert its right
to self-determination, theorizing that Iranian citizens should be
able to live according to their own customs and traditions. Islam,
a central part of Iranian culture, thus becomes an element of the
government's cultural argument. Furthermore, as a sovereign,
the Iranian state claims the right to rule however it sees fit,
regardless of Western standards. It sees any attempt to impose
universalist standards as Western cultural supremacy.
One example of the government's position can be seen in its
reaction to attempts by the United Nations to monitor human
rights in Iran. In anticipation of a fact-finding report by the
United Nations, a government-endorsed commentary decried the
application of Western standards to Iranian actions. 46 In addi-
tion, the government has blocked independent human rights
monitors.'47 In a news conference, President Rafsanjani reject-
ed the notion that Iran should submit to another country's stan-
dards, arguing that "the West must respect the Islamic world's
public opinion and leave them alone so that they can choose
their destiny on the basis of their own beliefs."' Rafsanjani's
comments regarding women's rights follow the same line of argu-
ment as the Iranian rejection of the universal standard. He de-
scribes Iran's policy as one which "restor[es] the dignity of our
society's women and the extensive presence of women in educa-
tion and training and higher educational centres proves that
very point. We want to remove any kind of injustice and discrim-

145Id.
'4 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1990, supra note 27, at 445.
'4 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1995, supra note 80,at 270.
14s Rafsanjani News Conference (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 2, 1993),
available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File. While "Western" and "universal" are
not necessarily synonymous, they are used interchangeably by the Iranian government
since the government sees universalism as a Western concept. See, e.g., Mayer, supra
note 13, at 117-18 (depicting Iranian characterization of the United States as an enemy of
Islam).
804 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

ination against the people of our society." 149 These statements

are claims of sovereignty arguing that, by establishing and en-
forcing Islamic ideals, Iran is furthering the human rights of
women. 150
To accomplish its objective of being judged by Islamic human
rights principles, rather than those of the West, the government
has established human rights committees in the Majlis (Parlia-
ment).'5 1 These committees are given the task of ensuring that
human rights are respected by Iran's law-making body. However,
most observers believe that these committees cannot effectively
judge the government, even by Islamic standards, because they
lack independence.15 2 The human rights committees adhere to
the same ideology as the President and the judiciary. Thus,
while the government appears to check itself through the separa-
tion of its powers, all branches are dominated by one ideolo-
gy.'53 The definition of culture, then, is dominated by the clerks
in control of the government. It is this group that defines and
monitors human rights.
In addition to justifying its deviation from international hu-
man rights norms through its culture and religion, Iran dis-
counts universalist claims of human rights abuses by labeling
such claims as politically motivated attacks formulated by "cul-
tural imperial[ists]." 5 4 Because only God can grant human
rights privileges,'5 5 any Western attempts to impose such stan-
dards are inherently divisive. The government thus believes that
it is not accountable to the West.

149 Rafsanjani News Conference, supra note 148.

'' MAWDUDI, supra note 139, at 11-12.
U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31. While Iran's Constitution calls for the separa-
tion of governmental powers, President Rafsanjani controlled the process of selecting
candidates for the most recent Majlis election. HUM. RTS. WATCH 1992, supra note 102,
at 300.
152 U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.
15 The Council of Guardians, composed of Shi'a clerics who enforce compliance with
the Constitution, ensures that the government consistently applies one ideology.
Arjomand, supra note 11, at 91.
'u Mayer, supra note 2, at 176.
15 Kim, supra note 9, at 58-59.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 805

In countering negative human rights reports by Western gov-

ernments and international organizations, Iranian government
officials have referred to such reports as Western "political
tool[s]. 56 In an address to seminary and theological students in
Iran, Khomeini stated that the superpowers use widespread
propaganda disguised as human rights reports to further their
own objectives.'57 According to Khomeini, these Western objec-
tives involve toppling the Iranian regime or at least confining
Islam to Iran.'68 In explaining the objectives of Western gov-
ernments, Khomeini stated: "It is not a question of humanity as
far as they are concerned. They intend to achieve their own ends.
What they intend to do is bring Iran into disrepute." 59 In an-
other instance, government-owned Iranian radio described Am-
nesty International ("Amnesty") and the International Human
Rights Commission as "enemies of the revolution." 60 The
broadcast explained that Paris welcomes these organizations "so
it can use them as a club with which to strike at the destitute
people of the world."' 6 '
Arguably the United States unfairly condemns certain coun-
tries for their human rights practices while continuing to support
them economically. For example, while the United States con-
demns Iran on human rights grounds,'62 and advocates isolat-
ing Iran's economy from the world economy," it remains Iran's
largest trading partner.' The arbitrary enforcement of West-
ern human rights standards lies at the core of Iran's reasons for
rejecting these same standards. After the United Nations Human
Rights Commission condemned Iran for human rights abuses,

" Iran Says Team in Geneva to Refute U.N. Report (Reuters World Service, Feb. 21,
1994), available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ALLMDE File.
157 Khomeyni on the Objectives of the Superpowers (BBC Summary of World Broad-
casts, Sept. 8,1983), available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, BBCSWB File.
158 Id.
159 Id.
'" French Socialism "Responsible for Crimes Committed in Iran" (BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, March 3, 1982), available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
'e' Id.
16 Wrobel Testimony, supra note 69.
' HUM. RTS. WATCH 1995, supra note 80, at 274.
16 Id.
806 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

including its persecution of women, Foreign Ministry spokesman

Mohammad Mohammadi said that the UDHR "must be revised
and used correctly" because it "no longer corresponds to the
needs of people today ... [and] is just used to further political
aims by putting pressure on countries." 6 '
To counter universalist attempts to implement international
human rights standards, the Iranian government uses the media
to promote its own views and to exclude the views of others. The
government controls most publications and owns all broadcasting
facilities." Consequently, the media effectively constitutes the
voice of the government, rather than an independent source of
information.16 7 For example, while hundreds of executions oc-
cur annually,"6 the domestic press stopped reporting most exe-
cutions in 1992.169
These examples of Iran's attempts to counter Western political
views demonstrate Iran's relativist responses to universalist
claims. Iran's three relativist responses to universalists
claims-Islam, culture, and charges of politically-motivated re-
ports--each have merit from a relativist standpoint, but fail
when considered from a universalist perspective. The next sec-
tion analyzes the thrust of universalist and relativist arguments
in light of human rights in Iran.

IV. EVALUATION OF UNIVERSALIST CLAIMS AND RELATIVIST

RESPONSES

While the claims of both universalists and relativists have

16 U.N. Commission Accuses Iran of Flagrant Human Rights Abuses, AGENCE

FRANCE PRESSE, March 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File.
' U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.
, While the "Voice of America," for example, is also a mouthpiece of the West, Iran
forbids other opinions, unlike the West. Interview with Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Pro-
fessor of Law at Emory University School of Law, Atlanta, Ga. (Jan. 30, 1996) [hereinaf-
ter An-Na'im Interview].
'68 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 31, at 120; Wrobel Testimony, supra note 69,
at 11.
69 U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 807

merit, neither side has been effective at improving human rights

for women in Iran. Given the contradictory nature of the posi-
tions, some middle ground must be reached to improve the hu-
man rights situation in Iran.
Universalism has failed the women of Iran because it has
failed to hurdle two obstacles-government resistance through
its laws and practices and the dominance of popular views. Gov-
ernment opposition is not impossible to overcome, as the follow-
ing section will demonstrate. Similarly, ideals foreign to a cul-
ture can gain acceptance if presented properly. Universalism, as
any ideal, must gain cultural legitimacy before people will adopt
it.170 Because the universalists have attempted to implement
universalist ideals using Western methods in a non-Western
culture, their ideals have not gained sufficient support among
the masses to overcome government obstacles.

A. UniversalistApproach Evaluated

Efforts to apply universalism in Iran have not rectified the

situation for women. Outside nations, nongovernmental organi-
zations, the United Nations, social forces, and academics have all
failed to improve the observance of the universalist standard of
human rights. This section illustrates that the international
community's traditional methods of improving human rights
have failed because they are opposed by the Iranian government
and have not gained sufficient popular support.

1. Geo-PoliticalForce

International economic pressure is commonly viewed as an

effective tool to force governments to comply with international
human rights standards.'' World powers have used economic

170 An-Na'im, supra note 1, at 171.

"" Melanie Oliviero, Human Needs and Human Rights: Which Afe More Fundamen-
tal2, 40 EMORY L.J. 911, 923 (1991). For example, it is commonly accepted that sanctions
worked in South Africa. It is important that the international community draw lessons
from South Africa to determine what factors enable sanctions to work. Two differences
808 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

and social pressure in an attempt to curb human rights abuses

in Iran.'72 For example, the United States has sought human
rights improvements through economic sanctions.17 In a policy
statement, John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of Affairs for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated that the United States
would only reduce economic sanctions when Iran changed its
conduct.' The strategy of applying sanctions to improve hu-
man rights has had limited success for two reasons. First, wom-
en are often the first to suffer when the international community
uses economic pressure to force governments to change their
policies. Second, while the United States said it would loosen
sanctions only after human rights conditions for women im-
proved, it authorized a World Bank loan to Iran in 1990,'7 re-
leased Iran's frozen assets that same year,'76 and became Iran's
largest trading partner by 1994.' While human rights im-
proved in Iran, the United States economic policy toward Iran
during 1991 and 1992 correlated more closely with international
events and trade than with human rights concerns.'78 It is true

between South Africa and Iran may help explain why they worked in South Africa but
not in Iran. First, the abuses in South Africa were visible and heinous enough that the
international community unanimously condemned them. International opinion changed
from accepting racism to rejecting it, but the international community apparently does
not yet feel as strongly about women's rights. This may be attributable to the fact that
many African states had black male leaders who could advocate their position, while
countries that deny women human rights do not have female government leaders. Sec-
ond, several African states were vocal enough in decrying racism that Western govern-
ments could not ignore the situation. The African states made the political stakes high
enough that Western states were forced to act. Apparently, the political stakes are not
high enough to force Western governments to eradicate human rights abuses against
women. While these are possible reasons why sanctions worked for South Africa but not
Iran, the issue warrants further study. An-Na'im Interview, supra note 167. See also IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 365-69, 811-84 (Henry
J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996).
172 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1995, supra note 80,
at 274.
173 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1990, supra note 27, at 445.
174 Id. at 444-45.
,' Id. at 444. This loan coincided with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, when Iran's poten-
tial as a U.S. ally against Iraq became apparent. Id.
176 Id.
177 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1995, supra note 80, at 274.
178 The one year improvement in human rights roughly coincided with Ayatollah

Khomeini's death and President Rafsanjani's Presidency, and ended with the results of
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 809

that foreign policy often has competing, if not conflicting, objec-

tives, but tying two possibly competing objectives together can
weaken the effect of appeals to improve human rights. If imple-
mented in this way, sanctions are meaningless because they are
a facade for economic goals. The United States loses credibility
by ignoring human rights violations by regimes they support
while accusing other countries of breaching the very internation-
al standards ignored by the United States elsewhere.
In addition to exerting financial pressure on Iran, Western
nations have attempted to organize agencies and official organi-
zations to address human rights abuses against women. For
example, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights
began holding hearings to address gender-based abuses in
1990."' The House of Representatives and the Senate have
placed special emphasis on human rights abuses against women
by proposing a new full-time position in the Bureau of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to address women's issues. 8 '
At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993,
the U.S. delegation worked with nongovernmental women's
rights groups to develop the substantive plan of action that was
adopted in the Vienna Declaration.''
Another step in enforcing human rights standards is for
ICCPR signatories to take issue with Iran's treaty violations.
Already, the U.S. government and the British government,
among others, publish periodic reports of human rights abuses in
Iran. Great Britain issues the British Parliament Report annual-
ly, and the U.S. Department of State publishes an annual coun-
try report on human rights abuses in Iran. ' 2

the Parliamentary elections. HUM. RTS. WATCH 1992, supra note 102, at 300-01.
,' Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck,
Violations of Women's Human Rights, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee (Sept. 29, 1993), in DISPATCH (U.S. Dep't of State/Bureau of Public
Affairs, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 11, 1993, at 708-10 [hereinafter Shattuck Remarks].
' Id at 708.
Yd.
I'
,8 See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31. While the Department of State report in-
810 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

While these government efforts are highly visible in the uni-

versalist realm outside Iran, they have not translated into action
within Iran. Governments espousing universal human rights
standards must learn that sanctions, internal government agen-
cy reorganization, hearings, and their presence at U.N. confer-
ences may be perceived as mere rhetoric unless those actions
actually have an impact on human rights. The United States, in
particular, fails in this regard. The United States has one of the
worst records of ratifying human rights treaties.1" Nations
such as the United States need to improve their own human
rights record to lend credibility to their efforts. Only then can
efforts begin to focus on internal reform in Iran.
In sum, efforts by Western governments such as the United
States have not improved conditions in nations like Iran where,
allegedly, the worst violations occur. A large factor in the failure
of the geo-political force strategy is that statements and actions
by Western powers lack credibility in Iran. As a result, Iran
perceives the United States as applying a double standard and
therefore is not compelled to adopt U.S. policies.

2. United Nations

By virtue of its international stature and resources, the United

Nations remains a focal point of women's human rights."8 In

cludes a section that focuses exclusively on women's rights, its other sections fail to ana-
lyze thoroughly the effect of human rights abuses on women. For example, the report in-
cludes a section on freedom of movement in Iran, but it only discusses the impact on men
and religious minorities with no mention of women's severe travel restrictions. However,
the section addressing human rights abuses against women is more thorough in the 1995
report than in previous reports. See id.
1" HUMANA, supra note 31, at 350. The United States failure to ratify more human
rights treaties can only be seen as a poor human rights record. Because the United States
has not ratified more treaties, its actual human rights record cannot be verified; it can
only claim to have a good record. Furthermore, the United States sees economic and
social rights as a product of civil and political rights, and claims it is not bound by inter-
national human rights standards. Thus, if the United States assumes a relativist stand-
point with regard to economic and social rights because of its capitalist ideology, then
Iran can use its Islamic ideology to justify its relativist standpoint with regard to the
rights of women.
1" The United Nations began a separate women's rights agenda with the U.N. De-
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 811

order to facilitate implementation of universal human rights

standards, the United Nations has hosted several conventions
and conferences, including the Vienna Human Rights Convention
of 1993, the Cairo Population Conference of 1994, and the 1995
International Women's Conference in Beijing.'85 The United
Nations has also drafted and adopted the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), an international agreement designed to improve the
human rights of women."' Irans role in these conferences,
while far short of universalist ideals, illustrates the possibility of
bridging the universalist/relativist gap. Two U.N. efforts, the
UDHR and ICCPR, have resulted in binding international law

cade for Women (1976-1985). HLIKKA PEITILA & JEANNE vICKERS, MAKING WOMEN MAT-
TER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 94 (1990). This effort corresponds with the inclu-
sion of women's human rights in government and NGO agendas. Within the United Na-
tions, there are several intergovernmental organs designed to implement the universal
human rights standard, which includes women's human rights. Id- at 96. For example,
the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women ("Women's Commission") monitors and
facilitates the implementation of international agreements on women's rights. Kim, supra
note 9, at 77. The Human Rights Commission investigates and acts on complaints of
human rights abuses. Id. The Women's Commission is not as effective as it could be be-
cause of limited access to information obtained from governments and because of weak
and non-specific resolutions. Id. The Human Rights Commission, on the other hand, is
more effective because of NGO assistance in issuing specific recommendations. Id. at 78.
The United Nations needs to give the Women's Commission the tools necessary to be
more effective, and it needs to hold human rights abuses specifically against women in
the same regard as it does human rights abuses in general. Id. at 79.
...The first International Women's Conference was the Mexico City Conference in
1975, and the second was the Nairobi Conference in 1985.
"MConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980)
[hereinafter CEDAW]. Since Iran has not ratified the CEDAW, and the laws expressed
within CEDAW are not accepted as customary law, Iran is not bound by the agreement's
terms. For more information about the CEDAW, see PEITILA, supra note 184, at 123-25.
For a discussion on the impact of reservations to the CEDAW, see INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 457-59. See also Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on
Elimination ofAll Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643 (1990).
The CEDAW is arguably the most important conference concerning the status of women.
PIETILA, supra note 184, at 123. The CEDAW includes provisions from previous conven-
tions aimed at eliminating discrimination against women, as well as provisions address-
ing issues not covered in other conventions. For example, it includes the principle enunci-
ated in the U.N. Charter preamble reaffirming "faith in fundamental human rights ... in
the equal rights of men and women."
812 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

concerning Iran, but their effectiveness in Iran is constrained by

the realities of international enforcement capabilities. Despite an
ongoing commitment to improve the human rights of women,
many of the U.N. efforts have resulted in limited measurable
improvement for women in Iran.
The CEDAW provisions aspire to rectify specific wrongs
against women, but they have not been implemented as hoped.
Three factors contributed to this limited success: frustrated mon-
itoring efforts,18 7 inadequate implementation mechanisms, 8
and textual compromises made at the convention." 8 In the case
of Iran, elements similar to those hindering CEDAW's success
have also interfered with human rights efforts at subsequent
conferences.
Recent human rights conferences are marked by a pattern of
limited impact. For example, the Declaration from the Vienna
Human Rights Convention of 1993 calls for integrating women's
issues into human rights agendas, training U.N. personnel about
gender-based discrimination, and promoting women in U.N.
organizations.1 9 ° The first objective, which calls for human
rights agendas to include women's concerns, illustrates the prob-
lems with implementation enumerated in the previous para-
graph. While Iran has incorporated women's issues into human
rights agendas, it has done so from an Islamic perspective.'
Islamic fundamentalism is incompatible with the principles of
the United Nations. 92 The Islamic view holds that only God

187 Monitoring has been frustrated in CEDAW member nations. Since Iran is not

bound by the CEDAW, the international community has no authority to monitor Iran's
compliance with CEDAW provisions. However, monitoring other human rights abuses
remains a large obstacle in Iran. HUM. RTS. WATCH 1995, supra note 80, at 273.
1' Kim, supra note 9, at 82.
...The CEDAW was diluted in order to obtain the requisite number of state
ratifications for it to enter into force. Critics argue that the CEDAW proponents should
have pushed harder for a consensus on a convention. Professor J. D. van der Vyver, Lec-
ture at Emory University School of Law (Sept. 15, 1995).
198 Shattuck Remarks, supra note 179, at 710.
191 Critics describe the Iranian government's human rights committee as merely an

arm of the government. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31, at 13. Therefore, it is not
likely that human rights issues resolutions will conform to universalist ideals.
" Charles Clover, Battle to Curb Global Baby Boom: World Population Conference,
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 813

grants individual rights. Iran emphasizes women's rights, but

only within a religious context. It is unlikely that Iran will draft
documents with universalist ideals given its relativist perspec-
tive in women's human rights issues. The second Vienna objec-
tives relate to internal United Nations workings, which does not
touch the lives of Iranian women.
Despite the slim chance that the Vienna Declaration will, im-
prove human rights for women in Iran, Iran's role in the Conven-
tion was encouraging. Iranian women attended the conference to
expose the gender gap in the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms,'93 and Iran chaired the drafting com-
mittee for the joint statement prepared before the conference.
Iran's role as chair may not help individual women in Iran im-
mediately, but it indicates Iran's willingness to participate in
drafting human rights standards.
Iran's participation in the Cairo Population Conference of 1994
("Cairo Conference") was encouraging for the same reasons its
role at the Vienna Convention was encouraging, yet it also illus-
trates an ideological conflict. While other Muslim countries boy-
cotted the Cairo Conference because they believed it to be "un-
Islamic,"94 Iran attended the conference in an attempt to
"adapt the final document to incorporate religious ethics."' 95
Concerned that the Western countries were trying to use human
rights to impose their viewpoints on the rest of the world,'
Mohammad Ali Taskhiri, the Iranian delegation leader, called on
other Islamic countries to "fulfill their historic duty and propose
religious and morale [sic] values."'97 Thus, Iran attempted to
incorporate its relativist perspective into the universalist docu-

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 5, 1994, at 4, available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library,

ALLMDE File.
" U.N. Rights Conference, THE OTTowA CrrIZEN, June 29, 1993, available in LEXIS,
MDEAFR Library, ALLMDE File; See OURS BY RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN
RIGHTS (Joanna Kerr ed., 1993).
' Clover, supra note 192.
195 Id.
196 Id.
" Iran Urges to ConsolidateIslamic Positionsat ICPD, Xinhua News Agency, Sept.
3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File.
814 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

ment. This is analogous to Western nations that also attend in

order to make certain their agendas are addressed. In fact, rep-
resentation, participation, and compromise combine to create a
truly universal standard.
Another illustration of Iran's reaction to universalist ideals is
the Beijing International Women's Conference of 1995 ("Beijing
Conference"). Iran's role in the Beijing Conference is a positive
sign for several reasons. First, Iran's presence lessened the im-
pact of earlier anti-U.N. statements by government leaders.
Second, the fact that Iran negotiated and signed a document
setting forth women's rights standards shows that, while Iran
rejects what it perceives as Western universalist standards, it is
willing to participate in defining and adopting truly universal
human rights standards. However, Iran's participation at Beijing
may have merely sidestepped human rights issues, thus under-
mining the codification of women's human rights.198 For exam-
ple, Iran rejected the notion of equality for men and women as
defined in the Beijing Platform for Action.199 Iran interpreted
equality to mean that the different roles of women

underline the necessity for an equitable system of rights,

where the particular priorities and requirements of the
woman in her multiple roles are accounted for. The Islamic
Republic of Iran affirms its commitment to the implementa-
tion of the platform for action with full respect to Islam and
ethical values of the society.00

This statement illustrates the tension underlying the universal-

ist/relativist debate because it takes the universalist concept of
equality and redefines it in religious terms.

,98Evelyn Leopold, U.N. Expert Warns Women's Conference on Human Rights,

Reuters World Service, July 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ALLMDE
File.
' Islamic Issues; Iranian Delegation Makes Waves, Repels Negative Notions (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 18, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-
US File.
m Id.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 815

CEDAW, the Vienna Convention, the Cairo Conference, and

the Beijing Conference show that the United Nations has made
progress advancing human rights goals. However, women in Iran
have not felt the impact of those efforts due to the tension be-
tween the universalist position of the United Nations and the
relativist position of Iran. While each conference has taken the
human rights of women one step further,"0 ' the sum of the U.N.
efforts has resulted in much sound and fury with little effect for
women in Iran. While the difficulty in measuring human rights
improvements can be attributed in part to Iran's refusal to allow
the U.N. Special Representative to visit Iran for the purpose of
monitoring compliance "with international standards,2 2 sources
indicate that human rights abuses remain common in Iran.20 3
However, limited success should not discourage U.N. aspirations
from improving the situation in Iran; rather, it should evoke the
question of how the United Nations should tailor its approach.
To overcome the difficulties encountered in drafting, monitor-
ing, and implementing human rights, the United Nations should
focus on what has worked with respect to Iran. In particular, it
needs to encourage Iran to continue participating in similar
conferences by acknowledging the validity of some of Iran's
relativist positions. Only with ongoing participation can dialogue
lead to progress on the human rights front. Absent dialogue, the
two positions will remain on opposite ends of the spectrum.

" Since the United Nations began the International Women's Conferences in 1975, it
has resisted allowing governments to dictate its position. This has been accomplished by
incorporating the work of NGOs into each document. Karin Ryan, Panel Discussion on
the Fourth U.N. Conference on Women at Emory University Law School (Oct. 30, 1995)
[hereinafter Ryan Comments]. Documents from the Beijing Conference contain the prod-
uct of dialogue started at the Cairo Conference. Dazon Dixon, Panel Discussion on the
Fourth U.N. Conference on Women at Emory University Law School (Oct. 30, 1995)
[hereinafter Dixon Comments]. Karin Ryan is the Assistant Director of the Human
Rights Project at The Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia. Dazon Dixon is the founder and
president of Sisterlove, Atlanta Women's AIDS Project. Karin Ryan and Dazon Dixon
attended the Beijing Conference.
2 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1992, supra note 102, at 304.

2w Numerous newspaper and NGO reports indicate continuing widespread human

rights abuses in Iran. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.
816 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

3. Nongovernmental Organizations

Nongovernmental organizations have played a major role in

reducing human rights abuses worldwide." 4 Each NGO has a
unique composition, enabling different NGOs to appeal to differ-
ent groups. For example, NGOs with international stature0 5
would appeal more effectively to the government, while NGOs
comprised of Muslim women may prove more effective among
women whose faith is central to their lives. Such specialization
enables each NGO to gain legitimacy. 6
NGOs can play a number of roles to reduce human rights
abuses in Iran. First, NGOs can conduct independent assess-
ments of Iran's human rights compliance. Since these investiga-
tions would be independent of any particular government, they
would be less likely to be perceived as political tools. Second,
NGOs can publicize the results of their investigations to the
international community, enabling other governments to act
based on those results.2 7 Third, NGOs can appeal directly to
the Iranian government to refrain from certain activities. Final-
ly, at U.N. conferences, NGOs can push for human rights plat-
forms that governments alone may be hesitant to advocate for
fear of impacting national policy concerns.20 8

2"4 Ryan Comments, supra note 201. Some of the most vocal and well-respected NGOs
fighting to abolish human rights abuses against women in Iran include Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch. Other NGOs that focus on human rights abuses against
women in Iran include the League of Iranian Women, the Organization of Human Rights
and Basic Freedoms in Iran, the Foundation for Iranian Studies, the Organization of
Iranian Women for the Defence of Human Rights and Democracy, Women Living Under
Muslim Laws, and the Sisterhood is Global Institute.
"o For example, the reports of Amnesty and Human Rights Watch are referenced by
members of the international community because these organizations are considered
NGOs with international stature. See infra text accompanying notes 209-17.
' One example of specialization amongst NGOs is Sisters in Islam, a NGO with a
strategic pro-faith agenda. Amina Wadud-Muhsin, Sisters in Islam: Effective Against All
Odds, in SILENT VOICES 117, 118 (Doug A. Newsom & Bob J. Carrell eds., 1995).
...For example, organizations such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch make
their statistics available to governments. Since these are reputable organizations, govern-
ments can rely on their information in deciding policy. See infra text accompanying notes
209-17.
20 For example, at the Beijing Conference, NGOs from the United States advocated
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 817

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty are two groups that have
persisted in advocating international human rights. Since 1990,
when Human Rights Watch/Middle East began monitoring hu-
man rights violations in Iran, efforts to communicate with the
Iranian government to bring about compliance with the ICCPR
have been frustrated." 9 In response to appeals concerning spe-
cific cases, the Iranian government has repeated assurances that
violations would not occur. However, the government has refused
to allow Human Rights Watch to conduct a long sought after
onsite investigation in Iran.21 Nevertheless, Human Rights
Watch/Middle East has monitored conditions from abroad,"1
reported suspicious deaths,212 protested imprisonment,213 and
maintained contact with activists and scholars inside and outside
Iran.214 Although these actions further universalist ideals, it is
unclear how these efforts have affected women's lives in Iran.
The guiding principle of Amnesty states that "the protection of
human rights is a universal responsibility, transcending the
boundaries of nation, race and belief."1 5 Amnesty's reporting of
women in Iran flogged for dress code violations,216 stoned to
death after being convicted of adultery,2" and discriminated
against in court 1 8 helped bring the treatment of women in Iran
to the attention of the international community.
Unfortunately, while the efforts of Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty are visible to the international community, it is nearly

progress on issues in which the U.S. government has declined to take an active role.
Dixon Comments, supranote 201.
' HUM. RTS. WATCH 1990, supra note 27, at 447; HuM. RTS. WATCH 1995, supra note
80, at 274-75.
210 HUAI. [Link] 1992, supra note 102, at 304.
211 Id.
212 HuM. RTS. WATCH 1995, supra note 80, at 274.
213 Id
214 Id- at 275.
215 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAN: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL BRIEFING, cover (1990).
Amnesty bases its work on the UDHR. Id.
216 Id. at 11.
217 Id- at 2-3.
218 Id. at 8.
818 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

impossible to assess NGO influence within Iran because of gov-

ernment restraints on speech and free association. The difficulty
of gaining access to information regarding women's status in
Iran illustrates the need to revise attempts to improve human
rights by taking into account cultural traditions. If NGOs had
cultural legitimacy within Iran, their efforts to secure ongoing
monitoring rights might be successful. International organiza-
tions such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch are useful, but
the lack of significant cooperation from Iran stiffies progress.

4. Social Forces Within Iran

Social groups located in Iran experience the same constraints

that the government imposes on the United Nations. Iran's Con-
stitution forbids assemblies and marches that violate principles
of Islam and prohibits groups that challenge the principles of
"independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, or
the basis of the Islamic Republic."219 This provision allows the
government to label the actions of any group seeking to advance
human rights in violation of the Constitution. Despite these re-
strictions, the government faces some opposition in Iran. Several
groups are attempting to undermine the government's hold,
including the Organization of Human Rights and Basic Free-
doms for Iran, the Flag of Freedom Organization of Iran, and the
League of Iranian Women.2 These groups try to spread their
critical message in various ways, including coordinating with the
international community to broadcast from neighboring coun-
tries. They focus on government policies and actions in their
attempts to improve human rights because it is the government
that commits the majority of abuses. The serious consequences of
stepping out of government-prescribed roles force individuals in

219 IRAN CONsT. art. 26, translated in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, 27 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1992); U. S. Dep't of State,
supra note 31.
o Voice of Human Rights and Freedom ForIran:Pro-WesternOppositionRadio Clos-
es Down (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 6, 1995), available in LEXIS, News
Library, NON-US File.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 819

Iran to limit their antigovernment actions.22 '

Groups within Iran need support from the international com-
munity to improve existing conditions. The role of the interna-
tional community ranges from offering asylum to individuals
persecuted by the government, to creating conditions for a revo-
lution in order to overthrow the government and replace it with
a secular government. Several scholars have argued that foster-
ing revolution is permissible within international law.22 Some
even interpret the UDHR as implicitly recognizing it as a
tool.2" Revolution, however, may be too extreme a measure.
Reality forces human rights advocates to work with the Iranian
government, not against it, considering the possible repercus-
sions of a revolution.
Groups located in Iran are critical in the implementation of
universal human rights standards for women because such
groups have national legitimacy-a key characteristic that other
Western universalist groups lack. To succeed at improving hu-
man rights for women in Iran, universalists must engage Islamic
culture through cross-cultural discourse in order to form an effec-
tive approach. This can be accomplished by utilizing culturally
accepted mechanisms for improving the human rights of women
in Iran.

5. Academics

The Iranian government has also frustrated attempts by aca-

demics to further universalist ideals in Iran. The primary prob-
lem encountered by academics is censorship. Even though re-
strictions on academic freedom have lessened since the 1979
Revolution, academic censorship persists, both within schools
and throughout society.224 On university campuses, thoughts

"' Wadud-Muhsin, supra note 206, at 132.

See INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 945-62 (presenting positions by legal
scholars).
21' Id. at 950.
' HUM. RTS. WATCH 1995, supra note 80, at 621-22; HUM. RTS. WATCH 1992, supra
note 102, at 301; U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31; HUMANA, supra note 31, at 148.
820 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

perceived as un-Islamic by government informants are pun-

ished.225 To be admitted to a university an applicant must pass
a "character test" to ensure that the applicant supports govern-
ment ideology.226 For a tenure award, a professor must cooper-
ate with the government for several years.2 2 This systemic reli-
gious indoctrination means that students will not learn that
universalist views exist, thus ensuring that universalism will not
grow within Iran.
The work of other Iranian scholars is also censored. Intellectu-
als risk persecution if they express views that do not conform
with Islam.22 This oppression is particularly difficult for those
who believe that universalism and Islam are compatible.2 29 Be-
cause of the government's stranglehold on scholars in Iran, aca-
demics outside the country are the only advocates who can pro-
vide further discourse on the issue without risking their lives.
While the government can attempt to keep out divergent views,
it is impossible to exclude all ideas.
The Khamenei regime recognizes that Iran needs the technical
expertise of intellectuals in order to compete economically.
Therefore, the government tolerates the views of necessary ex-
perts.23 ° Legal scholars' attempts to identify legally-sanctioned
inequalities help raise consciousness and point to areas in which
the introduction of new laws can be beneficial. 1 The role of
Muslim academics in interpreting the Qur'an and Shari'ah from
a female perspective is crucial since non-Islamic sources are
rejected by authorities and much of the population. 2 If human

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 128, at 120; U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.
226 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 128, at 118; U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.
2 U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.
The penalty for apostasy is death. Salman Rushdie, who wrote The Satanic Verses,
has been in hiding for seven years since Iran issued a fatwa (death threat). For a reflec-
tion on his views of the Iranian government and his faith since the fatwa, see Salman
Rushdie, Trapped Inside a Metaphone, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Dec. 16, 1991, at B3.
See Paul, supra note 34, at 1057.
230 See Country's Elite (Org. for Hum. Rts. and Fundamental Freedoms for Iran, Par-
is, France) Feb. 10, 1995. These academics can seed the grass roots approach.
1 Hassibi, supra note 98, at 18.
232 Wadud-Muhsin, supra note 206, at 121.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN

rights scholars gain influence in Iran, perhaps other interpreta-

tions of Islam may become more acceptable. Scholars can influ-
ence public opinion by appealing to the population through val-
ued cultural and religious institutions. For example, one factor
that contributed to the Shah's downfall and Khomeini's success
was the difference in their approach to devout Muslims."' The
Shah was irreverent while Khomeini showed great respect to-
wards the faithful. Scholars can use this lesson and emphasize,
by using accepted methods of persuasion and argument, that
their goal is to become better Muslims.' Muslim scholars, who
can gain legitimacy in Iran more easily than Western scholars,
can serve as a foundation for the alternate grass roots approach
to improving human rights for women in Iran.
The attempts by universalists, in the form of the United Na-
tions, NGOs, groups within Iran, and academia, to implement
human rights standards as set forth in the UDHR and ICCPR
have had limited success because they have not appealed to Ira-
nians or their government through culturally legitimate means.
Each of these universalist methods of improving human rights is
curtailed by the Iranian government because of the impasse
between universalist claims and the states relativist response.
Only by bridging the two sides can the deadlock be broken and
human rights for women be improved.

B. Relativist Responses Evaluated

One of the main reasons the universalist approach has been

ineffective in Iran is the relativist response evoked. Iran's three
main responses to universalist critici'sm-separate Islamic stan-
dards, Iran's unique culture, and human rights as a Western
political tool-serve as obstacles to the human rights of women
in Iran. These responses are likely motivated more by the
mullah's self-interest than by true concern for Iranian culture or

See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.

' See AN-NA'IM, supra note 83, at 67, 186 (advocating the value of debating ideas to
Muslims).
822 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

the preservation of Islam. If this were not the case, the govern-
ment would not need to rule by force nor stifle non-conforming
views. Instead, people would, on their own, dismiss Western
ideas and live according to their own cultural and religious
norms without the need of government intervention.
Islam is not as monolithic as the Iranian government would
have people believe.235 There is no single Muslim view of
women's position in society. 236 The Iranian government claims
that Islam creates a "separate" standard for women which takes
precedence over the status of "equal," guaranteed by internation-
al law.237 Rather than creating a separate standard for women,
the "Islamic" justification given by the government oppresses
women by virtue of its sexist interpretation. This sexism is seen
in Iran's Constitution, Penal Code, judicial interpretation of the
Shari'ah, and acquiescence to common practices. Treating wom-
en separately results in inequities that violate international
human right standards.
In a speech to the seventh conference of Islamic ideology,
Khamenei explained why the official comments of the govern-
ment are so extreme. He stated, "Islam considers propaganda a
reflection of thoughts" and "propaganda is like war."" s With
fundamentalism guiding its official position, the government
would have trouble making any conciliatory statements without
offending Islam or sacrificing sovereignty. If the government ac-
knowledged a nonsecular alternative to fundamentalism, perhaps
it could accept some of the universalist points without appearing
to repudiate Islam. If the government were concerned with im-
proving compliance with Islam, it would seem appropriate to
welcome scholarly debate and attempt to reinterpret the laws to
better comply with Islamic principles. However, it is unlikely

Mayer, supra note 2, at 180.

2 Id.
"7 This is remimscent of the "separate but equal" argument used by segregatiomsts
in response to the American civil rights movement. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). This argument has been discredited in American civil rights jurisprudence. See
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
' Iran's Kamene'i Addresses Islamic Ideology Conference, supra note 35.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 823

that the government will accept an alternative to fundamental-

ism so long as quashing dissent best serves its interest. If Islam
really dictated the government's treatment of women, the gov-
ernment would not need to use authoritarian measures to force
its citizens, many of whom are devout Muslims, to comply.
In addition to their argument that Islam justifies the separate
treatment of women, the government argues that culture in Iran
is different from the Western culture. Therefore, disparate treat-
ment of women is justified by culture. While it is true that the
culture in Iran is different from Western culture, oppression of
women does not dominate Iranian history. Under the Shah, the
law guaranteed women's rights." For most of the twentieth
century generations of citizens in Iran have seen their culture
progressively Westernized. The definition of culture offered by
the undemocratic government of Iran ignores aspects of the actu-
al culture that do not correspond to that proffered by the elite
male jurists.2 " If the state definition of culture actually repre-
sented the authentic cultural variations, then the means used by
the government to enforce the status quo would not be neces-
sary."' If the status quo were really as the government claims,
women would voluntarily follow the cultural norms without the
government needing to enforce these norms through laws and
punishments."
Resistance to extending human rights ideals to women is not
unique to Middle Eastern culture." Western cultures resisted
these objectives initially, but over time adapted their cultures to
reflect modern human rights norms." Culture is not static. It
changes to reflect modern norms.245 To accept the notion that

While guaranteed by law, human rights for women were not fully implemented
under the Shah. This indicates that legal reform in Iran is possible because it already
happened within Iran's religious and cultural construct, but the laws must be accompa-
nied by state practice in order to comply with international human rights standards.
240 Mayer, supra note 2, at 182.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 183.
24 Id at 182-83.
245 Id.
824 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

culture in Iran cannot adapt to incorporate women's equality is

to affirm that those citizens cannot aspire to see their human
rights evolve in Iran. This repudiation of the aspirational charac-
teristic of human rights contradicts notions of human rights in
the Qur'an.246 It is unlikely that the concept of aspirational hu-
man rights is truly foreign to a culture heavily influenced by the
Qur'an.
In addition to the government's hollow arguments that Islam
and Iranian culture justify shunning universalist ideals, its con-
tention that human rights are a Western political tool is also
without merit. This argument fails by virtue of the fact that Iran
voted for the UDHR, which is customary international law gen-
erally accepted by all nations of the world. In addition, Iran
ratified the ICCPR. Since these documents are so widely accept-
ed, it cannot be said that the standards are invented by the West
just to force Iran to submit. Iran, in fact, reaffirmed its commit-
ment to international human rights ideals in 1990.247 Iran's ar-
gument that the International Bill of Rights is biased because
Westerners drafted it is without merit. While it is true that
Westerners drafted those documents, Muslim governments' ap-
proach to international human rights principles is virtually the
same as the Western approach.248 Furthermore, Iran has had
opportunities to contribute to the development of human rights
standards. For these reasons Iran is precluded from asserting
that universalists are imposing their standards without giving
Iran any opportunity to develop the standards it will follow.

246 Examples of aspirational human provisions in the Qur'an include the right to life
(5:32), taking of life only through due process of the law (6:151), safety of life (5:32), a
basic standard of life (51:12), the right to justice (5:8), equality of human beings (49:13),
protection of honor (49:11, 49:12), and security of private life (49:12, 24:27). ABUL ALA
MAWDUDI, supra note 139, at 17-25. While Mawdudi is not a shi'i interpreter of the
Qur'an, this interpretation illustrates that the Qur'an can be interpreted to incorporate
human rights. Id. It is important to recognize, however, that these provisions do not
necessarily correspond to international human rights documents. They illustrate that the
Qur'an is mindful of aspirational human rights, and that interpretation of a holy text to
further government objectives can be problematic.
241 HUM. RTs. WATCH 1990, supra note 27, at 442-43.
248 ANN E. MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 13 (1991).
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 825

By taking such an absolute relativist position, the government

puts itself in 'a defensive stance, thereby inviting attack by uni-
versalists. The Iranian government could improve its treatment
of women without sacrificing Iran's religion or culture. Because
current laws do not reflect actual Iranian culture, there is a
possibility of a return to more authentic cultural norms that the
government is suppressing. Suppression would not be needed if
people were allowed to live according to their cultural traditions.
The thrust of the universalist criticism would be blunted if the
government allowed authentic norms to surface.
Thus, neither the universalist approach nor the relativist re-
sponse has improved human rights of women in Iran. The uni-
versalist approach uses methods which lack cultural legitimacy
in Iran, and is unlikely to succeed. The relativist response rejects
the notion of conforming to universalist ideals because those
allegedly politically motivated standards contradict the
government's version of Islam and Iranian culture. To succeed,
universalists must present their ideas in ways that do not ap-
pear to be politically motivated and do not offend Iranian culture
and Islamic ideals.

V. A STRATEGY

Despite claims that a universal human rights standard should

not or cannot be implemented, the efforts of universalists appear
to have succeeded in improving human rights in some non-West-
ern cultures.249 To avoid the rejection of universalism by a cul-
ture, universalists should appeal to the same authority upon
which that culture bases its laws.50 Universalists must recog-
nize that while one standard for human rights exists, various
cultures express those rights differently.25 ' The universalist ap-
proach needs to focus on the commonalties of human experience

"' Paul, supra note 34, at 1069.

'0 An-Na'im, supra note 1, at 178.
251 Oliviero, supra note 171, at 930.
826 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
rather than the differences.252 While the human rights contri-
butions of governments, the United Nations, NGOs, and academ-
ics are important, their impact for women in Iran is limited be-
cause they lack legitimacy and sufficient influence over Iran's
internal policies. Human Rights groups need to assist groups
within Iran to accomplish their goals.
Some successful models for persuading a culture to adopt for-
eign concepts using indigenous methods include those used by
the Peace Corps, Christian missionaries, and human rights
groups in Muslim countries such as Tunisia. The missionaries
and the Peace Corps have influenced peoples within diverse
cultures by addressing those peoples' basic needs and not direct-
ly challenging their belief system. In addition, Islam itself en-
courages persuasion and argument. 53 Because of the impor-
tance of cultural legitimacy, the Islamic model is relevant to this
discussion. Tunisia provides an Islamic model with parallels to
Iran.

A. A Grass Roots Model

Tunisia and Iran are both Muslim countries, yet human rights
for women have improved in Tunisia.2" This success proves
that Iran cannot validly reject the improvement of women's
rights solely because it is a Muslim country. 55 Legal reform
combined with NGO activity enabled the status of women in

252 Id.
's Qur'an 16:1-5, 18:28; AN-NA'IM, supra note 83, at 53-54.
See generally Norma Salem, Islam and the Status of Women in Tunisia, in MUSLIM
WOMEN 141, 141-68 (Freda Hussain ed., 1984). Unfortunately, the overall human rights
situation is not as good as universalists had hoped after Ben Ali persecuted some human
rights organizations, despite his verbal commitment to improve human rights. This Com-
ment does not claim Tunisia is a human rights paradise, but simply shows that the com-
bination of legal reform and NGO activity that this Comment advocates for Iran has
improved the situation for women elsewhere.
' In fact, several other Muslim countries have improved their human rights record
towards women. These countries include Somalia, Syria, Morocco, and Iraq. J. ANDERSON,
LAw REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 34-85 (1993). While these countries still have seri-
ous problems complying with many human rights norms, they have undertaken reforms
with respect to the issues addressed in this Comment. Id.
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 827

Tunisia to improve, while the status of women in Iran has

not.5 6 Women's rights groups in Tunisia worked at a grass
roots level to change attitudes about women,257 enabling legal
reform to occur and to be effective once enacted. The interplay
between human rights groups and an authoritarian government
is illustrated in Tunisia's history.
Under Tunisia's former President, Habib Bourghiba, the Per-
sonal Status Code gave women greater rights than previous
Islamic laws.258 According to these laws women had several
rights: couples had to consent to marriage, polygamy was pro-
hibited, men had to follow a civil procedure to obtain divorce,
women could initiate divorce proceedings, adoption was made
legal, women obtained the right to work, and inheritance rights
improved for women.259 When Ben Ali took over in 1987, he al-
so made a verbal commitment to human rights."6 While Tuni-
sia does not have a perfect human rights record, it has initiated
reforms that many other nations, including Iran, have not under-
taken.26' Success in Tunisia is due, in part, to groups organized
by the general population.
The manner by which these groups gained enough strength to
lead movements for human rights despite government obstacles
is worth examining." 2 The organizational method used by a

2u KEVIN DWYER, ARAB VOICES: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
151, 193 (1991). While the government cannot claim credit for the work of human rights
organizations in Tunisia, it is important to illustrate that it is possible to improve human
rights without government leadership. This is crucial to understanding how the hybrid
approach to the universalist/relativist debate can succeed in Iran. These groups succeed-
ed in accomplishing universalist aims using relativist strategies in order to achieve legiti-
macy.
2' Id. at 192-93.
2u Id. at 154.
' Id.; see also AN-NA'IM, supra note 83, at 44-45 (describing Muslim countries' rein-
terpretation of the Shariah as an effort to reform Shari'ahinheritance and family law).
2W DWYER, supra note 256, at 154.
21' For example, the Tunisian Law of 1956 that forbade polygamy in any form was a
more drastic measure than similar laws in other countries. AN-NA'IM, supra note 83, at
45. In addition, Tunisia ratified the CEDAW, unlike many other nations. It did, however,
register many reservations. Mayer, supra note 2, at 178.
22 See generally Wadud-Muhsin, supra note 206, at 117-38 (describing the methods
828 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

Tunisian women's group dedicated to addressing human rights

violations against women could be applied to Iran. These women
first met as an informal nonpolitical women's club.2" As mem-
bership increased, the group organized more formally and began
debating serious issues. 2' The group eventually focused on
studying the conditions of women.265 They organized colloquia
and invited women from other countries..2 " They demonstrated
against the government practices.267 Finally, as part of the
strategy to bring women together, the group published a journal
addressing methods for improving the plight of women.26 The
evolution of this group illustrates how a force for social change
through collective actions can emerge from nothing more than
private discussions of women's issues.269 Women in Iran can
use this strategy to begin addressing human rights abuses
against women. The international community's role in facilitat-
ing this type of grass roots organization can be as simple as
raising individual women's awareness of human rights issues.
Tunisia is an important example for several reasons. First, it
shows that even in the presence of state domination, groups
within a country can make strides for human rights. Second, by
looking at how these groups organized their efforts, individuals
can apply similar techniques in Iran. Finally, the shortcomings
of the human rights movement in Tunisia can be noted and
corrected in Iran. The case of Tunisia illustrates that achieving
universalist ideals using relativist methods is possible. This
grass roots approach succeeds because it rejects both radical uni-
versalism and radical relativism. As the previous sections assess-

used by a Malaysian women's group).

26 DWYER, supra note 256, at 194.
24 Id. at 195-96.
26 Id. at 196-97.
266 Id. at 198.
267 Id. at 200.
26 Id. at 201. However, the journal is no longer published because of problems faced
by the group, many of which were the result of women's role in society. Id. at 206.
2 See generally Helen Callaway, Survival and Support: Women's Forms of Political
Action, in WOMEN AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 214-30 (Rosemary Ridd & Helen Callaway
eds., 1987) (discussing how women as a group can gain strength in political conflicts).
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 829

ing the claims of each group indicate, neither approach has been
effective at improving the condition of women in Iran. Universal-
ism has had limited success due to its lack of cultural legitimacy,
Iran's suspicion of purely political motives, and a universalist
refusal to respect Islam as the central force in Iran. Because in
Iran it is believed that only God grants human rights, other
groups' and individuals' definitions of rights are irrelevant. Con-
sequently, when judged by international standards, relativism
has not improved human rights.
The grass roots method does, however, incorporate essential
elements of both universalism and relativism. It retains the ideal
of a single set of human rights standards while valuing the
rights of groups to self-determination and to live according to
their own values and practices. This method's premise is that
Iranian values and practices are not reflected in current Iranian
laws and state practice. If current law were actually a norm no
oppression would be needed to induce compliance. The grass
roots approach can serve as a catalyst for incremental domestic
change through education and response to people's needs. Uni-
versalist ideals will gain legitimacy by working within the cul-
ture, rather than against it.
The grass roots method is likely to encounter difficulties of its
own. Even if the grass roots method is accepted by intellectuals
as a workable theory, it will need to be applied by enough people
to make it effective. Implementing the grass roots method will be
a long process, and will require people from different cultures to
respect each others' positions. Despite these and other potential
obstacles, the grass roots method provides a framework for ad-
dressing the problems that challenge current approaches.

B. Conclusion

Iran is not meeting its international legal obligations in its

treatment of women. While the status of women in Iran has
fluctuated throughout history, women were at least guaranteed
some legal rights under the Shah. Currently women do not even
have similar "official" legal rights because the government inter-
830 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

prets Islam as creating a separate standard for women. The

international community has attempted to enforce compliance
with universalist ideals that are embodied in international law,
but has not succeeded due to Iran's relativist response. Despite
these failed attempts, attaining universalist goals is possible.
Indeed, universalist ideals have a constituency in Iran, but are
suppressed by the clerics.
Iran has been ruled by leaders advocating elements of each
theory. The Shah emphasized conformity with Western stan-
dards, whereas Khomeini dictated religious compliance. Thus, it
is possible that sympathizers for each view exist in Iran today.
Groups advocating conformity with Western standards, if further
educated along universalist ideals, can be the catalyst to improve
human rights for women in Iran. Because such a group compris-
es part of the general population in Iran, it can lend legitimacy
to universalist ideals. Just as the Shah fell because his ideas
never gained cultural legitimacy, efforts to implement universal-
ism will fail if the theory lacks support from the general popula-
tion in Iran.
Universalism and relativism exist together on a spectrum. The
radical versions of each theory, holding respective ends of the
spectrum, have only interfered with the realization of human
rights for women in Iran. Only by diluting each theory with a
measure of the other can this theoretical framework succeed in
practice. Each theory has valid points. The universalist principle
that all individuals have certain immutable human rights must
not be sacrificed. Similarly, the relativist perspective recognizing
the validity of all cultures is equally important. By adopting a
hybrid version of the two theories, it is possible to preserve the
essential elements of each, both in theory and in practice.
The status of women in Iran has deteriorated since the 1979
Revolution. The revolution, in part, was possible because many
supposed legal guarantees, such as those concerned with
women's rights, were seen by the population as lacking legitima-
cy and never fully adopted. Lack of secure popular support for
ideals helped Khomeini topple the Shah. The current require-
ment that all rights conform to Islamic criteria enables the gov-
1996] HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN 831

eminent to limit fundamental human rights through its interpre-

tation of Islam. Universalists claim that the government's quali-
fications of women's human rights violates international law.
Iran is bound by the UDHR and ICCPR, yet its Constitution,
statutes, interpretation of the Shari'ah, judicial system, and
acquiescence to common practices all contravene these universal
standards.
Iran's position is that its laws do not breach its international
legal obligations. According to the government in Iran, Islam
requires a separate standard for women. Furthermore, Iran's
unique culture entitles its people to live according to their own
customs and traditions. Finally, the government labels efforts to
induce compliance with international law as politically motivated
attacks. Unfortunately, the universalist approach, in the form of
the United Nations, NGO activity, internal social forces, and
academia, has failed to bring human rights to women in Iran
because these methods incite government opposition and have
not gained popular support.
Iran's relativist responses to universalist accusations seem
hollow and possibly motivated by government leaders' self inter-
est. The government alone defines the "criteria of Islam" used to
justify state practices. Islam, however, is not monolithic and is
subject to varying interpretations. Similar to its treatment of
Islam, the government enforces its version of culture. If the cul-
ture really were as monolithic as the government claims, women
would follow such norms without government oppression. In
addition to using Islam and culture as justifications for its treat-
ment of women, the government claims international human
rights standards are products of Western imperialism. However,
Iran signed the UDHR, bound itself to the ICCPR, then re-af-
firmed its international obligations in 1990. Government resis-
tance has frustrated universalist efforts to improve the status of
women in Iran.
The grass roots method proposed in this Comment resolves the
difficulties experienced by universalists in enforcing Iran's com-
pliance with international human rights standards. By combin-
ing elements of both universalism and relativism in a hybrid
 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10

theoretical model, necessary aspects of each are preserved. Uni-

versalist ideals can survive while respecting the relativist claim
to self-determination. To improve the status of women, both the
laws and the belief system in Iran must embrace universalist
ideals. The grass roots method meets these requirements by
accepting Iran's culture and religion, while separating politics
from ideology by appealing to the Iranian government through
NGOs rather than through Western political channels. It applies
lessons from women's human rights improvements in Tunisia to
Iran. To gain popular acceptance by the government and pop-
ulation, the grass roots method emphasizes the commonalities of
human experience, rather than confrontation.
The hybrid theoretical model, upon which the grass roots ap-
proach is based, does not compromise universalist ideals even
though it embraces aspects of the relativist argument. Rather, it
tailors the universalist approach to the people and government of
Iran. It gives universalist ideals a chance to take root in Iran.
Universalists can help improve the status of women in Iran only
by employing a theory that actually works in the real world.

KRISTIN J. MILLER*

* Notes & Comments Editor, Emory InternationalLaw Review; Candidate for J.D.,
Emory University School of Law (1997); B.A., Diplomacy and World Affairs, Occidental
College (1991). The author would like to express her sincere appreciation to everyone
who helped with this Comment. Special thanks to Abdullahi An-Na'im and Shahin
Taheri, who gave generously of themselves.