NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, ABUJA

COURSE GUIDE

COURSE CODE
PHL 201

COURSE TITLE
INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS

COURSE WRITER
ERIC OMAZU

COURSE EDITOR
 COURSE GUIDE FOR PHL 201
INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS

This course is written with one assumption in mind: that you are a stranger to metaphysics
and thus needs to have metaphysics introduced to you. The essence of introduction is
acquaintance. Essentially, the course acquaints you with the basic claims of metaphysics.
The idea of basic suggests that there is also a superstructure that lies on top of the basics.
You will encounter this later in a course entitled Advanced Metaphysics. Metaphysics has
such a superstructure but at the moment we are concerned with acquainting you with the
basics without which you will not be able to proceed with the superstructure.

This is an introduction to metaphysics. Metaphysics is philosophy and philosophy is

metaphysics. This is the understanding of a number of great philosophers who used the
term metaphysics and philosophy interchangeably. Heidegger is a very good example.
Metaphysics is traditionally a branch of philosophy. It is so fundamental a branch that
without it other branches of philosophy and indeed even the sciences will not have existed.
This is because metaphysics serves as grounding or, if you prefer, foundation to them all.
It examines their suppositions and even its own suppositions.

We attempt to settle the most basic arguments about anything at the level of metaphysics.
In philosophy it does not matter whether that is in the field of ethics, political philosophy,
philosophy of education, philosophy of mathematics, Logic, Aesthetics, etc. Even the great
sciences like Mathematics, Physics, Astronomy, and Chemistry, all look up to metaphysics
for some guide. The same is true with disciplines in the Arts and Social Sciences. Do not
be discouraged if during the study you discover that nothing is settled to the great shame
of metaphysics. At least be consoled that metaphysics always seeks the best possible
explanation.

But the essence of introducing you to philosophy and to metaphysics is to conscript you
into becoming part of the quest to settle the most basic arguments about anything. As you
turn the pages of this study material, you will encounter philosophical data generated by
thousands of years of hard work by philosophers. If the discipline of metaphysics exposes
you to them it is for two reasons: (1) to bring you up to date to the state of research in the
field; and (2) to acquaint you with the spirit and tool of research in philosophy and
metaphysics.

As a discipline in philosophy, the question metaphysics wants to answer is about what

constitutes the fundamental structure of reality. Thus, we ask the questions: what is? What
type of beings exist? And in what way do they exist? These are no small questions, as you
will discover yourself. The good thing is that you are now being inducted into the hall of
fame of truth seekers.

Welcome to Metaphysics.

Objectives of PHL 102: Introduction to Metaphysics

To achieve the primary aim of this course, the following objectives have been set:

To help you understand the meaning and nature of metaphysics.

To expose you to the fundamental ontological questions of metaphysics
To lead you to examine some critical topics in special metaphysics like theology,
cosmology, and philosophical anthropology
To show you the level of interaction/relationship that exists between metaphysics
and science

Working through this Course

For maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity in this course, you are required
to have a copy of the course guide, main course material, and other necessary materials
required for the course. The university has provided opportunities for interaction between
learners and facilitators. Thus, we shall also engage in eight weeks facilitation of this
course to enable you prepare for exams in the course. The invitation link and time of
facilitation will be sent to your personal portal before the facilitation begins. It will do you
a lot of good to participate in the facilitation exercise. To have the best of the facilitation,
read through the topics before the dates of their facilitation.

Study Modules and Units

This course has four modules of 5 units each making it a total of 20 study units. The
Modules and the Units are as follows:
Module 1: The Nature of Metaphysics
Unit 1: The Meaning of Metaphysics
Unit 2: The Divisions of Metaphysics
Unit 3: Methods of Metaphysics
Unit 4: Metaphysics and Other Branches of Philosophy
Unit 5: The Value of Metaphysics

Module 2: Ontological Issues in Metaphysics

Unit 1: The Problem of Being
Unit 2: Substance
Unit 2: Matter and Form
Unit 4: Universals and Particulars
Unit 5: Appearance and Reality

Module 3: Issues in Special Metaphysics

Unit 1: Necessary and Contingent Beings
Unit 2: Mind-Body Problem
Unit 3: Freedom and Determinism
Unit 4: Immortality
Unit 5: The Best Possible World

Module 4: Metaphysics and Science

Unit 1: Ontological Realism
Unit 2: Causality
Unit 3: The Problem of Induction
Unit 4: Space and Time
Unit 5: Metaphysical Foundation of Mathematics

References and Further Reading

Ando, T. (1974). Metaphysics: A critical survey of its meaning. Martinus Nijhoff

Benneth, K. (2016). There is no Special Problem with Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies:

An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 173(1), 21-37.

Carroll, J. W. & Markosian, N. (2010). An introduction to metaphysics. Cambridge:

University Press
Gracia, J E. (2014). The Fundamental Character of Metaphysics. American Philosophical
Quarterly, 51(4), 305-317.

Loux, M. J. (2006). Metaphysics: A contemporary introduction. Routledge.

Lowe, E. J. (2001). The Possibility of Metaphysics Substance, Identity, and Time. Oxford:
University Press

Reale, G. (1980). The concept of first philosophy and unity of metaphysics of Aristotle.
State University of New York Press.

Sarlemijn, A. (1975). Hegel’s Dialectics. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company

Smith, J. E. H. (2019). Irrationality: A history of the dark side of reason. Princeton

University Press.

The following links can be used to access philosophical materials online:

Voice of the Shuttle: Philosophy Page

Episteme Links
The Philosophers Magazine
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names
Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Dagobert D. Runes

Presentation Schedule
This course has two presentations; one at the middle of the semester and the other towards
the end of the semester. At the beginning of the semester, each student undertaking this
course will be assigned a topic by the course facilitator, which will be made available in
due time, for individual presentations during forum discussions. Each presenter has 15
minutes (10 minutes for presentation and 5 minutes for Question and Answer). On the other
hand, students will be divided by the course facilitator into different groups. Each group is
expected to come up with a topic to work on and to submit same topic to the facilitator via
the recommended medium. Both attract 5% of your total marks.

Note: Students are required to submit both papers via the recommended medium for further
examination and grading.

Assessment
In addition to the discussion forum presentations, two other papers are required in this
course. The paper should not exceed 6 pages and should not be less than 5 pages (including
references), typewritten in 12 fonts, double line spacing, and Times New Roman. The
preferred reference is APA 6th edition (you can download a copy online). The paper topics
will be made available in due time. Each carries 10% of the total marks.
To avoid plagiarism, students should use the followings links to test run their papers before
submission:

http://plagiarism.org/
http://www.library.arizona.edu/help/tutorials/plagiarism/index.html

Finally, all students taking this course MUST take the final exam which attracts 70% of
the total marks.

How to Get the Most Out of this Course

For students to get the most out of this course, she/he must:

Have 75% of attendance through active participations in both forum discussions and
facilitation;
Read each topic in the course materials before it is being treated in the class;
Submit every assignment as at when due; as failure to do so will attract a penalty;
Discuss and share ideas among his/her peers; this will help in understanding the
course more;
Download videos, podcasts and summary of group discussions for personal
consumption;
 Attempt each self-assessment exercises in the main course material;
Take the final exam;
Approach the course facilitator when having any challenge with the course.

Facilitation
This course operates a learner-centered online facilitation. To support the student’s
learning process, the course facilitator will, one, introduce each topic under discussion;
two, open floor for discussion. Each student is expected to read the course materials, as
well as other related literatures, and raise critical issues which she/he shall bring forth in
the forum discussion for further dissection; three, summarizes forum discussion; four,
upload materials, videos and podcasts to the forum; five, disseminate information via email
and SMS if need be.
 PHL 201: INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS

MODULE 1: THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

Unit 1: The Meaning of Metaphysics

Unit 2: The Divisions of Metaphysics
Unit 3: Methods of Metaphysics
Unit 4: Metaphysics and Other Branches of Philosophy
Unit 5: The Value of Metaphysics
UNIT 1: The Meaning of Metaphysics

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Intended Learning Outcomes
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Defining Metaphysics
3.1.1 Some Misconceptions About Metaphysics
3.1.2 Etymological Definition of Metaphysics
3.1.3 Philosophical Approaches to Defining Metaphysics
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA)
7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

Immanuel Kant, one of the big names you will discover in the course of your study,
regarded metaphysics as the queen of the sciences. In that light, I welcome you to your
first lecture on the queen of all sciences. This unit aims to introduce you to the nature of
metaphysics. It starts by exposing you to the various misconceptions about metaphysics.
It will also expose you to the etymological definition of metaphysics, as well as
philosophical attempt at defining the concept. The intended learning outcomes below
specify what you are expected to learn after going through this unit.

2.0 Intended Learning Outcomes (ILO)

By the end of this unit you would be able to:

1. Distinguish between metaphysics and non-metaphysics

2. Discuss the etymological meaning of metaphysics
3. Trace brief history of the development of idea of metaphysics
4. Give philosophical definition of metaphysics
3.0 Main Content

3.1 Defining Metaphysics

Before your admission to study philosophy, it is likely that you have heard about
metaphysics. At those times when you used the term or when you heard it used, what did
you understand it to mean? What imagery did it create in your mind? Compare that image
with the meaning of metaphysics that you learnt in the course, Introduction to Philosophy.
Did they match? Whatever your response is, the term, metaphysics does not enjoy a
generally accepted definition. Worse still, what non-philosophers regard as metaphysics is
unrecognizable from the branch of philosophy that goes by that name. In the same vein,
philosophers themselves do not agree on any generally acceptable definition of
metaphysics. One hundred philosophers will likely give one hundred definitions of the
term. There is also an argument that due to its nature, metaphysics cannot be defined. Click
here. For the purpose of this introductory course in metaphysics, we shall start by
identifying some misconceptions about metaphysics, then we shall trace the etymological
meaning of the term, and then end with few definitions of it as given by philosophers.

3.1.1 Misconceptions About Metaphysics

The need to highlight the misconceptions about metaphysics arises because many people
give the title of metaphysics to so many things that are not metaphysics. In this section we
will attempt to separate metaphysics from non-metaphysics. The only way of doing this is
by calling your attention to certain practices which are regarded as metaphysics even
though they are not metaphysics.

3.1.1.1 Occultism is not Metaphysics

A Philosopher, Frederick Nietzsche, a major critic of metaphysics, is reported to have
referred to metaphysics as otherworld, and metaphysicians as other-world-men. He implies
by this that metaphysicians are concerned with a world different from the one everybody
knows about, a hidden world. This hidden world is in essence, an occultic world. Many
non-philosophers, taking a cue from Nietzsche, assume wrongly that metaphysics is
occultism. And some known occultic associations regard themselves as metaphysical
associations. Occultism entails access to some secret knowledge hidden from everyone but
a select few of the initiated. The knowledge which the occults pursue is said to be
inaccessible to the ordinary senses. In this case metaphysicians are seen as no more than
epopts. Although this concern with realities that are hidden is a characteristic which
occultism shares with metaphysics, religion and even science. You must note immediately
that this shared characteristic does not mean that occultism is the same with them. Like
metaphysics, occultism involves knowledge of being but unlike metaphysics which deals
with beings whose knowledge is open to everyone, the beings which concern the occults
are unknown, their language is esoteric, and their methods are not open to scholarly
discourse. While metaphysics is propelled simply by the desire to know, occultism’s
interest in knowledge is power to control nature for the benefits of the occultic.

3.1.1.2 Magic is not Metaphysics

Another fallacy held about metaphysics is that it is a sort of magic. People who possess
magical powers can bring about extraordinary, at times, inexplicable things, through their
interaction with the supernatural. Metaphysics has no such ambition. Its interest is simply
to know things as they truly are without any recourse to supernaturalism. Non
metaphysicians who view metaphysics as magic think that those who study metaphysics
are deeply involved in a study of magic and are learning how to perform miracles, alter
nature or in the least control it.

3.1.1.3 Mind Reading is not Metaphysics

There is also another misconception of metaphysics as mind reading. Mind readers claim
to be able to decipher the thoughts of other people. They see through their bodies and
penetrate deep into their minds and soul to see the activities going on there. Many non-
metaphysicians think that metaphysicians have the capacity to read other people’s minds
and decipher not only their motives but also their actions even before they occur. This is
not true of metaphysics.

3.1.2 Etymology of Metaphysics

Understanding the etymology of the term, will help shed light on the meaning of
metaphysics. Also, you must always bear in mind that while undertaking the etymological
definition of any word or term you are expected to look out for the root or origin of that
word or term. This is necessary especially when a word is being used by a language or a
period different from the one it first emerged. Often, such words acquire meanings different
from the one they had in their places or times of origin. Thus, when we define a word by
its etymology we are simply studying “the origin of words and the way in which their
meanings have changed throughout history.” (Cf
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/etymology).

By popular claim, the term, metaphysics, came from two Greek words, Meta which means
“After” and Phusika which means “Physics”. The two words when put together in Greek
Language yielded a compound word Ta Meta ta phusika. Rendered in English as
Metaphysics, the term simply means “The one after the Physics.” or “the post-physical”

Philosophers do not agree on the meaning of the term metaphysics translated in English to
mean “the one after metaphysics.” That is, in which way, is metaphysics, the one after
physics? Three schools of meanings emerge on this. For the purpose of this lecture, we
shall proceed to name these schools as follows, the bibliographical school, the
transcendental school, and the fundamental school.

3.1.2.1 The Bibliographical School of Meaning: This school holds that the usage, “the
one after the Physics” was a consequence of an editorial process involving Aristotle’s
books. Aristotle had written so many books on many subjects. But two of these books are
of special importance to us here. One of the books he entitled Physics and it was supposed
to deal with issues that appear in nature. The other he left without a title. These books were
to be published in the 1st Century AD (about 300 to 400 years after Aristotle) in Alexandria.
According to the story, after publishing Physics, the editor, Andronicus of Rhodes, set to
work on the book without a name (Aristotle actually had some names for the book but he
seemed undecided on which one to choose; Wisdom, First Philosophy, Theology etc. were
titles being considered by Aristotle and they left the impression that Aristotle did not
complete the work before his death and therefore could not settle for any of the titles he
considered for the book). Thus, since Andronicus couldn’t publish a book without a name
and since he felt that none of the three titles proposed by Aristotle covered the topics
discussed in the book in its entirety, he decided to give it a new title Metaphysics, intending
it to mean a book published after publishing Physics (Carroll & Markosian, 2010). There
have been many oppositions to this. Ando (1974) writes emphatically that “the word
'metaphysics' did not originate from somebody's being at a loss as to what to call a book.”

3.1.2.2 The Transcendental School of Meaning: The school of meaning which we call
the transcendental school holds that the bibliographical school arose because of
misrepresentation. Its argument is that the origin of “the one after the physics” as described
by the bibliographical school was due to chance as it derived metaphysics from mere
editorial sequence. Philosophers who make this point hold that metaphysics is such an
important discipline to be left to the arbitrariness of chance. They reasoned that the usage
“the one after the Physics” was chosen by Andronicus to reflect the fact that the subjects
of Aristotle’s Metaphysics are beyond or transcend the physical things as discussed in
Aristotle’s Physics. In Physics we learn about things that appear in nature, about
experimental science, and things as perceived by the senses. But in metaphysics the
subjects of discussion are mostly transcendental, and they extend beyond the senses and
the physical.

3.1.2.3 The Fundamental School of Meaning

This school which is rooted in the Medieval era holds that “the one after the Physics” refers
to the order of knowledge or educational order. Prominent proponents of this school
include Avicenna, who translated Metaphysics into Arabic, and Averroes. They hold that
Metaphysics is so chosen as title for Aristotle’s book simply because it is expected that to
study the book in question one ought to have first studied Aristotle’s Physics.
3.1.2.4 From Book Title to Branch of Philosophy
It is important for you to always remember that the term, metaphysics, was not used by
Aristotle, the author whose book would later be called Metaphysics hundreds of years after
his death by Andronicus of Rhodes. During the Late medieval period philosophers felt that
the title given to Aristotle’s book would be suitable for a branch or discipline of philosophy.
You must also note that before Aristotle earlier philosophers had also considered the
fundamental topics which are considered in the Metaphysics. Worthy of mention are
important speculations of the earliest Greek Philosophers, namely, Thales, Anaximander,
Anaximenes, Protagoras, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato, and so on. This made
metaphysics the oldest branch of philosophy.

You should also remember that the etymological definition is no longer sufficient in
defining metaphysics. This is because metaphysics has grown beyond the book published
after Physics. It has become a name given to a certain branch of philosophy.

3.1.3 Philosophical Approaches to Defining Metaphysics

This section considers the fact that philosophers differ in their understanding of
metaphysics. In what follows we shall look at the various understanding of the term among
philosophers.

3.1.3.1 The Big Picture Approach

This approach defines metaphysics from the perspective of the commonality of the topics
which metaphysics deals with. The idea here is that metaphysical topics like identity,
universalism, freedom, determinism, etc. have something in common. Accordingly, the big
picture approach advances a definition that will take this commonality into account. An
example of the big picture approach definition is rendered thus: “metaphysics is the branch
of philosophy concerned with fundamental questions about the nature of reality.” (Carroll
& Markosian, 2010). A major critique of the big picture approach is that metaphysics is not
the only discipline interested in the nature of reality. Religion, biology, are examples of
other disciplines that consider the nature of reality. Essentially, this definition of
metaphysics is not able to distinguish metaphysics from them.

3.1.3.2 The First Philosophy Approach

This approach simply defines metaphysics as the first philosophy. Aristotle is responsible
for this approach as he used the term first philosophy many times in the Metaphysics, and
you must note that First Philosophy was one of the names Aristotle called the book we now
refer to as Aristotle’s Metaphysics. The other names include Theology; Wisdom; and First
Science. Metaphysics as first philosophy is understood in two ways and both capture the
meaning of metaphysics as understood by philosophers till today. Thus, Aristotle’s
conception of first philosophy, and therefore of metaphysics, is as follows:

1. “An inquiry into the principles and causes, or more precisely, an inquiry into the
causes that are more primary and the principles that are highest.” (Cf: Reale, 1980,
p.1). Scholars have approached this very definition from two perspectives, namely,
the logical and metaphysical perspectives (Gracia, 2014). Emphasis on the logical
perspective targets the discovery of what may be considered the highest principles.
And in your Logic class you would have read about these principles. Some of them
include the principle of identity, principle of noncontradiction, principle of excluded
middle and so on. Read about them here. These principles, also called Laws of
Logic, apply to every other field of study and they are necessary for the truth of
those disciplines. Thus, since the principles are fundamental to all other disciplines,
Metaphysics in discovering them is said to be fundamental to all other disciplines,
and is therefore, the first philosophy.

On the other hand, the metaphysical perspective focuses on discovering what the
first causes or fundamental causes are. By fundamental causes, Aristotle means
those from which things ultimately flow, their origins. You must note that a thing
has many origins. To trace the fundamental origin of anything, Aristotle insists we
must begin with our suppositions, our beliefs. That is, what do we believe, or think
is the cause of the object under consideration. We then proceed to match our belief
with the information provided to us by nature since nature holds more information
than we do. We can move further in exposing the causes until we get to the final
cause beyond which we cannot move. Take the shirt you are putting on as an
example. The tracing of the primary causes of the t-shirt will take note that your t-
shirt is made from knit fabrics. We take this to be your belief which may match or
not match with information available to nature. Let’s assume they match, in which
case the knit fabrics are the primary causes of the t-shirt, but there is another cause
that is primary to the knit fabrics, we may call this cotton. And we proceed further
to inquire into the cause that is first to cotton and so on. This search continues until
we get to the final cause beyond which we cannot deduce another cause. And since
Aristotle interprets the final cause of anything to be God, the uncaused cause, the
unmoved mover, this aspect of metaphysics is also described as the study of God or
theology. In the end, there is a single subject matter, God. Because of this,
metaphysicians view this aspect of metaphysics as specialized science whose
subject matter is God. From this perspective therefore, metaphysics is defined as “an
exploration beyond the scope of scientific observation and experiment, into the first
causes of scientifically observable phenomena.” (Smith, 2019, p.85).

The argument against this approach is that metaphysics is not the only discipline
concerned with studying fundamental reality. Other disciplines like Geology,
Biology, are equally interested in discovering the first causes. Despite this criticism,
metaphysicians hold that even though these other disciplines study the first causes
they do so from a limited lens (Biology, for example is concerned only with origin
of life) whereas metaphysics does so in a more general manner, having all reality
under it. And since it does this in a more general manner, metaphysics is able to
establish the unity that exists among all existing things.
 2. “A theory of being qua being.” (Cf: Reale, 1980, p.1). This definition understands
metaphysics as science of being; a study of being in its absolute sense. Here the
challenge is to discover what constitutes being; the essence of being. This challenge
rests on the fact that things are not exactly as they appear or as we perceive them
with our senses. Unlike in the other definition where metaphysics studies the first
causes or principles, which in the final analysis is God, the object of metaphysics as
being qua being is all reality, that is everything that exists. Nothing is outside of it
including God. And this gives metaphysics its reputation as a universal science.
Thus, when you say that a person is a child, metaphysics wants to know what
childhood consists. If you say that you are good, it also wants to know what
goodness means. Metaphysics does this by deciphering what properties or characters
its subject matters have that make them what they are (Loux, 2006). It establishes
the commonalities between a subject and other subjects as well as the differences
between it and others. Based on this, philosophers hold that it is the duty of
metaphysics to provide us with the map of all that exists. Metaphysics, understood
as this is regarded as ontology, a theory of being.

A major ground for criticizing this view stems from the fact that going behind
appearance to study reality is not an activity peculiar to philosophy. Science is
involved in the same activity as well as police, census takers, and insurance
appraisers (Benneth, 2016). As we noted earlier metaphysics derives its importance
in the general way it deals with issues which differs from the way others undertake
the same study.

3.1.3.3 Metaphysics as Critique of Knowledge

The view of metaphysics as critique of knowledge was championed by Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804). According to Kant the previous understanding of metaphysics as inquiry into
first causes and as study of being qua being arose because of man's inborn desire to gain
insight into God, world and soul (Sarlemijn, 1975). Kant holds that this type of knowledge
is impossible. We cannot know anything a priori (that is beyond what we can experience).
Take God for instance, Kant says we have no way of knowing about Him and so we cannot
say anything about Him. You must note that Kant is not saying that there is no such a being
like God, he is only saying that given our limited nature as finite beings we cannot have
knowledge of an infinite being like God. And since we cannot pursue knowledge of this
type, metaphysics as the study of the transcendental is impossible. Now a redefinition is
necessary and Kant offers it by calling metaphysics a critique of knowledge. And we can
say that the essence of this critique is to examine the conceptual system with which we
describe the world and guide us against wandering into the world of impossibilities.
4.0 Conclusion
We have attempted an understanding of the meaning of metaphysics. And as you might
have noticed, defining metaphysics is not an easy exercise. As a student of philosophy in
general and metaphysics in particular, you are now involved in the attempt to generate
meaning and definition for metaphysics.

5.0 Summary
In the unit, we have demonstrated the difficulty in defining the term metaphysics. You also
learnt about the various misconceptions people have about metaphysics. You equally
studied a brief history of the origin of metaphysics as well as the original meaning ascribed
to the term by the ancient Greeks who invented it. We equally looked at how philosophers
view metaphysics irrespective of misconceptions about it and the epistemological meaning
associated with it.

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA)

1. Is Metaphysics occultism? Give strong reasons for your answer

2. Metaphysics is “an inquiry into the principles and causes, or more precisely, an
inquiry into the causes that are more primary and the principles that are highest.”
Show your understanding of the logical and metaphysical implication of this
statement.

3. Differentiate between the transcendental and fundamental schools of meaning of

7.0 References/Suggestions for Further Readings

Ando, T. (1974). Metaphysics: A critical survey of its meaning. Martinus Nijhoff

Benneth, K. (2016). There is no Special Problem with Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies:

An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 173(1), 21-37.

Carroll, J. W. & Markosian, N. (2010). An introduction to metaphysics. Cambridge:

University Press

Gracia, J E. (2014). The Fundamental Character of Metaphysics. American Philosophical

Quarterly, 51(4), 305-317.

Loux, M. J. (2006). Metaphysics: A contemporary introduction. Routledge.

Lowe, E. J. (2001). The Possibility of Metaphysics Substance, Identity, and Time. Oxford:
University Press

Reale, G. (1980). The concept of first philosophy and unity of metaphysics of Aristotle.
State University of New York Press.

Sarlemijn, A. (1975). Hegel’s Dialectics. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company

Smith, J. E. H. (2019). Irrationality: A history of the dark side of reason. Princeton

University Press.
Unit 2: The Divisions of Metaphysics

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Intended Learning Outcome
3.0 Main Content
3.1 General Metaphysics
3.2 Special Metaphysics
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-marked assignment (TMA)
7.0 References and further reading

1.0 Introduction
The dominant division of metaphysics is the one undertaken by Christian Wolff (1679-
1754). According to this tradition, there are two main divisions of metaphysics; General
metaphysics and Special Metaphysics. While general metaphysics is also known as
ontology, the special metaphysics are further divided into three, namely; natural theology,
cosmology, and rational psychology (studied today under the heading of philosophical
anthropology).

Besides the Wolffian division there are other divisions of metaphysics undertaken by other
philosophers. For instance, Charles Sanders Pierce, the American pragmatist philosopher
divided metaphysics into three, namely ontology or general metaphysics, psychical or
religious metaphysics, and physical metaphysics. However, we consider all non-Wolffian
divisions as mere rehearsal or modification of the Wolffian paradigm.

2.0 Intended Learning Outcome

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
1. Learn about the divisions of metaphysics
2. Differentiate between general and special metaphysics
3. Explain the meaning and subject of ontology
4. Discuss the aspects of special metaphysics
3.0 Main Content

3.1 General Metaphysics (Ontology)

General metaphysics addresses the question of being in a broader, general, universal sense.
General metaphysics is said to include the object of all the sciences, and it is in regard to
this that it is said to be omni-science. (Jaroszyński, 2018). This is in line with Aristotle’s
conception of metaphysics. To aid with easier understanding of general metaphysics, we
shall treat it with its other name, ontology.

3.1.1 Etymology, History and Meaning of Ontology

Etymologically, ontology is derived from two Greek words; on and logos. While on means
“being” in English logos means “science”, “theory” or “study”. If we couple the two words
together, it will yield ontology and will mean science of being, theory of being or study of
being.

The term ontology was first encountered in the work of a German philosopher, Rudolf
Goclenius (1547-1620). Read about him here. Goclenius defined ontology to mean the
doctrine of being and treated it as a field of study different from metaphysics. Philosophers
after him used ontology interchangeably with metaphysics, regarding it instead as another
name for metaphysics (Bigaj, 2012). However, Christian Wolff pioneered the current view
of ontology as another name for general metaphysics and as a branch of metaphysics.

However, despite the varying relationship with metaphysics which philosophers assigned
to the term, its meaning has remained constant. As a science of being or theory of being,
ontology studies the general characteristics of being. Being is philosophers’ way of
depicting what is. Thus, ontology asks the general question about being; what is? What
does it mean to be? What are the modes of being? Can a being be and not be? Is there a
middle ground between being and nonbeing? Do beings become or are they eternal? If
beings become, from where do they become? If they are eternal, why do they die? Do every
being die? What sorts of beings exist?

3.1.2 Being as Being as the Object of Ontology

Parmenides first posed the question of being in Western Metaphysics. Aristotle toed the
same line if construing being as the major problem of western metaphysics. In the
Metaphysics, he posed the question of “being qua being” and writes that "there is one
science which considers being as being and the attributes which it has as such. This science
differs from all particular sciences." (Metaphysics IV. l. 1003a21). It studies being in its
absolute sense. Here the challenge is to discover what constitutes being; the essence of
being. This challenge rests on the fact that things are not exactly as they appear or as we
perceive them with our senses. The object of ontology as being qua being is all reality, that
is everything that exists. Nothing is outside of it including God. And this gives ontology its
reputation as general metaphysics. Ontology is different from special metaphysics only as
a result of the vast nature of its subject matter. Thus, while the special metaphysics seeks
knowledge of what it is for particular kinds of things to be, ontology asks what it is for
being to be. While they study the being of God, human person, the natural world, ontology
studies the being of beings. (White, 2019). The challenge here is to determine the universal
defining character of being.

Essentially, it can be said that the questions that ontology considers are those of general
existence. What exists? The answers metaphysicians have given to this question are as
varied as there are metaphysicians. Some metaphysicians say that what exists are only
spiritual objects. This is the view held by Berkeley. Others say that only physical objects
exist. The logical positivists hold this view. There are others who also hold that both
spiritual and physical objects exist? Arendt is of this view, and she holds further that both
physical and spiritual beings depend on each other for continuous existence. Some even
hold that only one single object exists in the world. This is the view of Leibnitz.

Again, If something exists, in what way does it exist? As a proposition? A fact? A state of
affairs? A number? A spiritual being? An ethical value? A purpose? Swarts (2020)
demonstrated how ontological study works especially in mapping out the category or nature
of being. He holds that at “one level of analysis, tables and chairs might be considered to
be distinct kinds of things; but for the purposes of ontology, tables and chairs are (usually
regarded as being) the same sort of ‘ thing ’, namely physical (or spatiotemporal) entities.”

3.1.3 The Senses of Being

Aristotle in Book 4 of the Metaphysics stated unequivocally that “Being is said in various
ways.” Frantz Brentano (1838-1917), a German philosopher, did the task of reducing the
various ways of being into four. They are (1) Accidental being (2) Potential and Actual
Being (3) Being true (4) Categories.

1. Accidental Being [on kata symbebekos]: Accidental being, rendered in Latin as on

kata symbebekos, is one of the senses of being. An accidental being is one that
derives its being from another being. It depends on a prior/primal being to exist and
the being upon which it is dependent upon can be or exist without it being regarded
as privation. A man can be without a hand but the absence of hand is a privation
since having a hand is necessary to man, part of his essence. A brain tumor grown
in the body of the same man can be said to be an accidental being. It depends on the
man to be and the man can be without it. However, the brain tumor disappears if the
man dies or undergoes successful surgery. Thus, accidental beings have dependent
existence. It exists mainly as attributes, and many of such attributes can be found in
one independent being. Your being a philosophy student is asccidental for there are
many other courses you could have registered for. And you can still be without being
a philosophy student. But you wouldn’t have been a philosophy student if you did
not exist. As described by Brentano, “something has accidental being by virtue of
the being of that with which it is accidentally conjoined. By contrast, independent
being has being because of its peculiar essence.” (Brentano, 1975, p.6). In terms of
 existence, the independent existence is prior for it must exist before the accidental
being can exist.

2. Potential (on energeia) and Actual Being (on dynamei): Aristotle introduces this
subject by highlighting the character of actual being. It is either pure form or is
actualised by form. It is what we might call a real being in action. The only reason
why the idea of actual being is introduced here is because it plays important role in
understanding potential being. The actual being is prior in both essence and
substance to potential being. This is because in actuality the range of capacities has
been established and realised. It is, therefore, important to understand the character
of actual being if one is to understand the character of potential being for potential
being possesses the capacity of becoming that which actual being is. Thus, the fact
of actuality (also used interchangeably with entelechy by Aristotle) is action, derived
from the verb to act. Thus, an actual being is a real being already in action whereas
a potential being is a real being capable of certain action but not yet acting in that
certain manner. A new born child has speech capacity but does not exercise that
capacity yet. Thus, in relation to speech we say that the newborn is a potential being.
On the other hand, the newborn’s father who exercises this capacity is termed an
actual being.

The idea of being by Parmenides simply holds that being is, non-being is not. The
character of Parmenides' being is such that it is immobile and unchanging. It always
is. Aristotle introduced the idea of potency to refute the Parmenidean notion of it.
He thought that this is important in order to account for change, for movement, for
becoming, and for death which we always witness. Parmenides wrongly thought that
movement would always entail moving from non-being to being which is
impossible. It is this impossibility that led him to deny the mobility of being. But a
being moves in the way described by Aristotle from potentiality to actuality.

3. Being in the Sense of Being True (on hos alethes): Being true, with Greek
translation given as on hos alethes, identifies the beings that are, that truly are. The
earliest expression of this is found in Parmenides who holds that being is and non-
being is not. Thus, the being true is contrasted with beings which are not, with non
being. The non-being is so because it is false. A dream, for instance is a non-being
because the impressions it creates are false, they do not exist. Statements can also
be true or false depending on whether it expresses state of affairs or not. If it
expresses state of affairs it is true. If it does not it is not.

4. Being According to the Figures of the Categories (to on kata ta schemata ton
kategorion): Aristotle identified ten categories of being, namely; (1) substance
(ousia), (2) quantity (poson), (3) quality (poion), (4) relation (pros ti), (5) place
(pou), (6) time (pote), (7) position (keisthai), (8) possession (echein), (9) action
 (poiein), and (10) passion (paschein). The categories are one of the ways in which a
being can be. As such it can be a substance (substantial being); or a quantity or a
quality or a passion and so on. (Metaphysics VII. 4. 1030b 11).

3.2 Special Metaphysics

The special metaphysics is a study of a specific kind of being. It is a restricted metaphysics
in the sense that it chooses a particular being and studies it in order to gain insight and
understand about it. Thus, while general metaphysics or ontology studies being as being,
that is, that by means of which anything called being is being, special metaphysics studies
the nature of particular beings. Its interest is in discovering that by which a particular being
is that kind of being. We regard it as a restricted metaphysics purely on account of its
subject matters.

Wolffian division recognises three aspects of special metaphysics which correspond strictly
to the three special beings it studies. They include (1) Natural theology (2) Cosmology, and
(3) Rational Psychology. Apart from these three divisions other philosophers have
expanded the aspects of special metaphysics. A major example of this is Immanuel Kant’s
metaphysics of morals. However, since this is an introductory course to metaphysics, we
shall

3.2.1 Natural Theology

This is one of the aspects of special metaphysics. We shall consider it in details in what
follows.

3.2.1.1 Etymology and History of Natural Theology

The term theology is an amalgam of two Greek words, namely; Theo meaning “God” and
Logos meaning “Science” or “Study”. When combined, the two words yield Theology
etymologically rendered as Science of God or Study of God. The theology with the
qualifier, natural, is a special kind of theology due mainly to its method and tool of inquiry.
As a way of definition, natural theology is a study of God through the instrument of reason.
It differs from supernatural or revealed theology which relies on sacred scripture and divine
revelation.

Ancient Greek philosophers regarded their philosophising about God as theology. Plato,
however, felt that theology properly speaking should be the concern of poets. He was led
to this conclusion by the fact that the writings of ancient Greek authors/poets, like Homer
and Hessiod, discussed the Olympian gods. Aristotle, on the other hand, equated the first
philosophy with theology. He problematized the ultimate question of metaphysics as being
qua being as having theological meaning and not just the ontological one. The ontological
implication as we examined in 3.1 above seeks to discover the character of being in general;
that is, that which constitutes being, by which a thing is said to be. In its theological
character, Aristotle’s being as being is also a reference to the being having the highest
distinction attributable to being (Grondin, 2012). In holding to this position, proponents
point to Aristotle’s reference to the being qua being as the “highest cause” and the “first
principle.” In the final analysis, the search for the first cause, the uncaused cause, terminates
in God. Indeed, Aristotle regards metaphysics as the first philosophy as such it must study
the first and the highest Being.

However, the emergence of Christianity in the 1st Century CE saw the adoption of the term
by Christian apologists who construed it as an instrument of defending their new religion
thereby giving theology a religious meaning. Read here. The Enlightenment era, reputed
for its opposition against religion and valorisation of reason, saw the restoration of theology
to the domain of philosophy. Christian Wolff, particularly, put up an argument that certain
truths about God and morality, can be attained rationally without reference to religion.
Wolff was exiled by the Prussian emperor in 1723 for holding this view and similar ones.
It was while in exile that Wolff wrote Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General
(1728) where he effectively distinguished natural theology from sacred theology. Natural
theology is rooted in the domain of philosophy, of metaphysics. Wolff’s motivation was
his conviction that a sound knowledge of God based on natural reason will provide a major
foundation for morality. (Corr, 1973). Today, a more recent field of philosophy known as
philosophy of religion studies in more detail those questions that were traditionally
entertained by natural theology.

3.2.1.2 The Subject Matter of Natural Theology

God or the Supreme Being is the ultimate subject matter of natural theology. In studying
God, the metaphysician is interested in establishing His existence, His attributes and
operations that are consequence of His attributes. Aristotle established the existence of the
Supreme Being following his quest for the cause of things. He is the necessary being
without whom nothing would have existed. Thus, all such quests terminate in God as the
first cause, the uncaused cause. From this point onwards, all subsequent metaphysicians
have proved the existence of God a priori by analysing the essence of a necessary being. It
is from this analysis that we arrive at the attributes of God.

A number of characters are listed as constituting God’s attributes. They include God’s
eternity, His omniscience, His benevolence, His omnipotence, His infinite, and His
absolute goodness. God is also above all things. He is the true substance on whom
everything depends without Him depending on anything.

3.2.2 Cosmology
As a special metaphysics, cosmology is simply a science of the universe. Its interest is in
discovering the nature, origin and neccesary structure of the universe.

3.2.2.1 Inquiry About the Origin of the World

The earliest response to the question of the origin of the universe was mythical in nature.
Individual ancient cultures around the world, trying to make sense of the world in which
they lived, came up with myths in order to explain their origins. All known such myths
made reference to a world created by a supernatural being.

Genesis, the first Book of the Holy Bible, also referred to a universe created by God.
According to the Book of Genesis 1:1: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the
earth.” The reference to how God created the heavens and earth is found in 2 Maccabees
7:28: “Look at the heaven and the earth and see everything that is in them, and recognize
that God did not make them out of things that existed.”

The Biblical account is called creationism. It views creation as the manifestation of God’s
omnipotence. The creative Being of the Bible is God who created the world out of nothing
- creatio ex nihilo. By this account, the creation of the universe was an event that happened
in time. As such, the Bible also anticipates that the universe would one day cease to exist
just like every other thing that emerged in time. This is also the view held by Muslims in
the kalām argument for the existence of God.

The Ionian philosophers championed the materialistic origin of the universe. Thales, for
instance, held that the universe, just like every other thing, originated from water; and that
the earth was floating on water. Seneca reports Thales’ point thus:

Thales' . . theory is . . . that the Earth was supported by water, and that
she was swimming on it like a vessel; and it is owing to the movability
of the water that she fluctuates when she is said to quake. (Seneca,
DK 11A15 as translated by Popper, 1998, pp. 57-58.)

Anaximander, a student of Thales and the first person to undertake critical philosophy,
disagreed with Thales’ notion of the world. First he agreed with Thales that the universe
was not created but held that Thales erred in holding that the earth was suspended by water.
His reason was that holding that the earth was held in its place by water would entail an
infinite regress where we must find something that would hold water and keep finding
something that must hold another (Popper, 1998). Anaximander, therefore, attributed the
origin of the world to the everlasting motion of that which has no limit, “the limitless or
the infinite.” (Seligman, 1962). He held that the:

Earth was (of drumlike shape, a short circular column; DK

12A10, 11) was not supported by anything: it was freely
suspended in the centre of things and kept there by a symmetrical
attraction exerted by all things, in empty or almost empty, infinite
space - somewhat like our ether or 'empty' space - which he called
the Apeiron {apeiron - 'infinite'). And he replaced Water as the
principle and origin of all things by this Apeiron (= the
Unbounded), an infinite fine substance that fills the entire infinite
space (with which it is, indeed, identical), that Apeiron which is
eternal and out of which all other substances emerge. (Popper,
 1998, p.36).

Popper excitedly called Anaximander the first inventor of a technical term. While his
contemporaries, Thales and Anaximenes, were describing the origin of the world with
familiar terms he invented apeiron as a technical word to explain his belief. If in more
recent times, certain philosophers have defined the task of philosophy as production of
concepts they are only extending the tradition inaugurated by Anaximander. Some other
ancient philosophers like Democritus (460-370 B.C).; Epicurus (341-270 BC) and
Lucretius (99-55 BC) with the exception of Parmenides (515 - 445 B.C.) held that the
universe was not created, is eternal and has neither a beginning nor an end.

It was not until the 20th century that a clearer idea about the origin of the world emerged.
This followed the discovery by a Catholic Priest and astrophysicist, Georges Lemaître
(1894-1966). He posited that the world came about as a result of the explosion of a primeval
atom. One of the critics of the explosion argument, in the 1950s during an interview,
sarcastically referred to the explosion hypothesis as “the Big Bang.” And it is the name
with which we refer to the phenomenon (Holt, 2012). The Big Bang is dated 13-15 billion
years ago. An important conclusion of Lemaitre’s discovery is the claim that the universe
was continually expanding and increasing in size. At the end, Lemaitre’s finding can be
said to have drawn from all theories of the universe starting from the myths of different
peoples to arrive at his conclusions.

3.2.2.2 The Nature of the Universe

Xenophanes, a student of Anaximander, was among the earliest Greeks to contemplate the
nature of the universe. He held that the universe and god are one, and was the first to put
up an argument that the earth was spherical. This theory would finally be proven right by
the works of Galileo Galilei.

The geocentric (earth-centred) theory of the universe propagated by Ptolemy (85-165 AD)
claimed that the earth is at the centre of the universe with the sun and the moon revolving
around it. This was also the position believed by Aristotle before him. At the time of
Ptolemy, only six planets (Mercury, Erath, Venus, Saturn, Mars and Jupiter) had been
discovered and all the others were believed by Ptolemy to revolve around the earth.

Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543), pioneered a rejection of the geocentric theory of the

universe. He postulated that rather than the earth, the sun was at the centre of the universe
and that the earth and other planets revolve around the sun. This view is called the
heliocentric theory of the universe and it was hugely opposed by both Catholic and
protestant authorities at the time. It brought about what is called scientific revolution since
it brought a total change to the way we view the world. Copernicus arrived at his position
by the power of human reason alone. The empirical proof in support of his conclusion came
many years after his death when Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), with the aid of a telescope
demonstrated that Copernicus was right whereas Aristotle and Ptolemy were wrong. The
sun is at the centre of the universe.

3.2.3 Philosophical Anthropology (Rational Psychology )

Rational Psychology was a term used by Christian Wolff in the 17th Century to describe
an aspect of special metaphysics whose subject matter is the human soul or the human mind
(De Psyche in Greek). As etymologically conceived, psychology means science of the
mind. However, the 20th century saw to the change of name and broadening of the subject
matter of this special metaphysics. Thus, instead of rational psychology we now call the
subject philosophical anthropology. It is under this current name that we will treat this
special metaphysics.

Etymologically, the term anthropology emerged from two Greek words anthropos meaning
man or human; and logos meaning science or study. The adjective “philosophical” attached
to the term is intended only to differentiate it from the other disciplines which also study
anthropology. For instance there is psychological anthropology, sociological anthropology
and theological anthropology, among others. (Darowski, 2014).

Philosophical anthropology, on the other hand, reflects upon man

in order to understand him in his entirety, grasping the fundamental
principles of his existence in the world and his behavior (Lombo &
Russo, 2017, p.).

Philosophical anthropology is a metaphysical study of the human person. In all the other
aspects of special metaphysics other beings were the object of study whereas the study is
undertaken by the human person. However, in philosophical anthropology both the object
of study and the subject of study correspond. Thus, it is about the human person studying
himself using the tools of philosophy. Darowski (2014, p.10) lists some of the questions
which philosophical anthropology tackles to include:

● What is the nature and essence of man and his mode of existence?
● What place, and position does a man take among other existing beings?
● What is the reason for a man to take such a position in the world – what creates it,
what constitutes it and what is its final condition going to be?

It is in the type of question it asks that philosophical anthropology distinguishes itself from
other forms of anthropology and indeed from scientific anthropology. Its major concern is
the who and the why of the human person.

4.0 Conclusion
The divisions of metaphysics is about the subjects which metaphysics studies. While other
subjects and sciences may be interested in these subjects, they lack the tool and the method
to study them in the deepest manner in which metaphysics does. While other sciences
employ empirical tools, limited as they are in penetrating the inner recesses of being,
metaphysics by means of speculation arrives at knowledge of reality as it is.

5.0 Summary
In this unit, we have examined the divisions of metaphysics. We learnt that the two broad
divisions are general metaphysics and special metaphysics. We learnt also that being qua
being is the object of general metaphysics. We examined the senses of being according to
Aristotle. We considered the various aspects of special metaphysics. They include, natural
theology, cosmology and philosophical anthropology.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1. Highlight the core reason that differentiates general metaphysics from special
metaphysics.
2. Discuss the idea of accidental being
3. In what way can a being be said to be in potency?
4. Demonstrate your understanding of the subject of natural theology
5. Show the major difference between the heliocentric and geocentric theories of the
universe

7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Readings.

Bigaj, T. (2012). Metaphysics: A Guided Tour for Beginners. Independent Publishing
Platform.

Brentano, F. (1975). On the Senses of Being in Aristotle. Berkeley: University of California

Press

Corr, C. A. (1973). “The Existence of God, Natural Theology and Christian Wolff.” In
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol.4. No.2. pp. 105-118

Darowski,R. (2014). Philosophical Anthropology: Outline of Fundamental Problems.

Krakow: Publishing House WAM.

Grondin, J. (2012). Introduction to Metaphysics: From Parmenides to Levinas. Columbia:

University Press.

Holt, J. (2012). Why Does the World Exist?: An Existential Detective Story. New York:
Liveright Publishing Corporation

Jaroszyński, P. (2018). Metaphysics or Ontology. London: Brill Rodopi (translated by

Hugh McDonald)
Lombo, J. A. & Russo, F. (2017). Philosophical Anthropology: An Introduction. Illinois:
MTF

Popper, K. R. (1998). The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment

London & New York: Routledge

Seligman, P. (1962). The Apeiron of Anaximander: A Study in the Origin and Function of
Metaphysical Ideas. London: The Athlone Press

Swartz, N. (2001). Beyond Experience: Metaphysical Theories and Philosophical

Constraint.

White, A. (2019). Methods of Metaphysics. New York: Croom Helm

Thomasson, A. L. (2015). Ontology Made Easy. Oxford: University Press.

Unit 3: Methods of Metaphysics

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Intended Learning Outcome
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Aporetic Method
3.2 A priori Method
3.3 A posteriori Method
3.4 Analogy of Being
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-marked assignment (TMA)
7.0 References and further reading

1.0 Introduction
I like viewing method as a toolbox. Recall the toolbox which you see in your local
mechanic’s workshop or in your local carpenter’s workshop. In the carpenter’s toolbox, for
instance, you would find such things as nails, chisel, saw, hammer, etc. It is with these tools
that the carpenter does his job of making and repairing furniture. In the same way,
metaphysicians have toolboxes with which they do their job.

By way of simple definition, let us say that the method of metaphysics is a procedure for
pursuing and discovering metaphysical knowledge. Non-metaphysicians and indeed non-
philosophers find it difficult to understand how philosophers do their job and arrive at
knowledge of reality. This unit is devoted to exposing you to some of the methods of
metaphysics.

Before proceeding, you must note that other branches of philosophy, even non-
philosophical disciplines, in one way or the other, also employ the methods which we shall
discuss below. Thus, the methods are in no way exclusive to metaphysics.

2.0 Intended Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you would be able to:

1. Discuss some methods of metaphysics

2. Differentiate a priori and a posteriori metaphysics
3. Apply the various methods of metaphysics in your study
4. Determine the type of methods suitable for your metaphysical inquiry
3.0 Main Content

3.1 The Aporetic Method

This is one of the oldest methods of metaphysics. It could be found in the metaphysics of
Zeno, Heraclitus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus among other ancient
philosophers. As a term, aporetic is derived from a simpler word, apory. Apory on the other
hand, is an English rendition of the Greek word, aporia. The English words closest in
meaning to Greek aporia include, culdesac, impasse, trapped, blockage, among others. In
English, an apory is a difficult situation, person etc. By way of definition “an apory is a
collection of contentions that are individually plausible but collectively inconsistent.”
(Rescher, !987, p.283). When used in philosophy, it also means a problematic issue, a
perplexity (Rescher, 2009). In philosophy, therefore, apory is a state of mind; a state of
being perplexed or puzzled. It is also the object and cause of the state of mind, of cause of
perplexity. The two meanings correspond to what can be regarded as subjective apory and
objective apory, respectively (Karamanolis & Polis, 2018). Book Beta of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics is said to contain 15 aporias.

The aporetic method in metaphysics entails generating puzzles and resolving them through
philosophising. The method has to do with clearing seeming confusion that exists between
related concepts, ideas, or situations. The aim is to solve a metaphysical problem. In using
the aporetic method, the metaphysician generates a state of aporia by introducing
philosophical situations. These philosophical situations are some sorts of hypotheses.
Aristotle, holds that to qualify as aporia the philosophical situations which are resolved by
aporetic must be opposites that are equal or apparently equal in strength. This equal
opposites, the philosophical situation is what constitutes philosophical problems to be
resolved by metaphysics.

Aporetic method highlights the two equal opposites, drawing out the strength and the
weakness of both of them and finally arriving at conclusion. A modern aporia situation was
created by Bertrand Russell who intended it as a proof that appearance is deceitful; that the
senses cannot always be trusted. It was recast as follows by Rescher (2009):

1. What the sight of our eyes tells us is to be believed.

2. Sight tells us the stick is bent.
3. What the touch of our hands tells us is to be believed.
4. Touch tells us the stick is straight.

The philosophical situation presented above captures what happens when a stick is meant
to stand in a stream. The stick cannot be bent and straight at the same time. It is a
contradiction to hold that it is so. The aporai situation is that the two positions are both
strongly recommended by the senses. This type of situation perplexes the mind. At first
sight it knows not what to do. This is a situation of aporai. If you are an empiricist who
holds that sensory data provides ground for certain knowledge, you will notice that there is
no way of choosing the two positions at the same time without being trapped in
contradiction. Both of them are grounded by sensory experience. Faced with this type of
aporia, people say nothing; they are at a loss about what to say. They become numb and
trapped.

The metaphysician, on the other hand, seeks to escape from this entrapment. His
philosophising is indeed an attempt to escape the aporia. Aporetic aids the metaphysician’s
escape. It cures his mind of this numbness, this perplexity by arguing through the
contradictory positions in order to select the most plausible position. It was in this regard
that Arthur Schopenhauer (2012) regards the aporia (wonder) as the mother of
Metaphysics. The entire outline of the aporetic method is laid by Aristotle thus:

For those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is advantageous to state the
difficulties well; for the subsequent free play of thought implies the
solution of the previous difficulties, and it is not possible to untie a knot
which one does not know. But the difficulty of our thinking points to a knot
in the object; for in so far as our thought is in difficulties, it is in like case
with those who are tied up; for in either case it is impossible to go forward.
Therefore one should have surveyed all the difficulties beforehand, both
for the reasons we have stated and because people who inquire without first
stating the difficulties are like those who do not know where they have to
go; besides, a man does not otherwise know even whether he has found
what he is looking for or not; for the end is not clear to such a man, while
to him who has first discussed the difficulties it is clear. (Metaphysics,
Book Beta, 995a 27-995b 2).

Thus, the condition set by Aristotle above is first to state the problem you are faced with.
A proper statement of the problem is an important step for it demonstrates one’s knowledge
of subject matter and issues relating to it. After this one begins to untie the knot (resolving
the contradictions) which proper definition has made clear. At the end one of the positions
is choosing whereas the others are abandoned. The aporetic method therefore pushes the
metaphysician into a forced choice. He or she must choose between the options.

3.2 The A priori Method

The a priori method is the method through which metaphysics gain knowledge of reality
without reference to experience. Aristotle would have set the stage for the use of the a
priori method in metaphysics when he holds that philosophy like poetry captures the realm
of the plausible, that is the realm of what may happen “according to the laws of probability
or necessity.” (SMith, 2016, p.5). This is against the physical and natural sciences which
capture the realm of what has happened. Truths of Mathematics, Logic, Moral propositions
and epistemic principles are all discoverable through the a priori method.

The adoption of the a priori method in metaphysics is due to the nature of the subject matter
of metaphysics which has been said to include universal reality and production of concepts.
As a science of being in general, metaphysics considers reality in all ramifications. It
considers both the actual and potential being. With regard to potential being, they cannot
be studied by empirical tools since they are inaccessible to the senses. Spiritual entities like
God, the mind, beauty, happiness are also studied through the a priori method. We can refer
to these spiritual entities as the concepts we also saddle metaphysics with the responsibility
of producing. Rene Descartes for instance arrived at the knowledge of God by means of a
priori method alone. In his methodic doubt, he established the existence of God as a
necessary Being. Descartes distrusted ideas that arose from his senses. Only the existence
of God whose nature would not allow him to be deceived by his senses would permit him
to rely on knowledge gotten through the senses. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) also
established certain moral codes, example of which is the categorical imperative, through a
priori method without any appeal to experience. Kant’s categorical imperative is rendered
thus: “Act as you would want all other people to act towards all other people.” This is
an a priori universal command which all rational men will recognise. It is axiomatic and
cannot be contradicted by any experience or evidence. Click here to learn more about
Categorical Imperative.

Thinking and intuition play important roles in a priori method. It is by means of the two
that a priori knowledge is obtained. The two faculties, thinking and intuition, are innate in
man. In gaining knowledge through the a priori method one goes inward into oneself and
tasks these two faculties to provide answers to questions that cannot be answered by
reference to mere experience. Hannah Arendt (1978, p.162) describes the process in which
thinking grasps a priori knowledge thus:

Thinking leaves the world of appearances. Only because thinking

implies withdrawal can it be used as an instrument of escape. Moreover,
as has already been emphasized, thinking implies an unawareness of the
body and of the self and puts in their place the experience of sheer
activity, more gratifying, according to Aristotle, than the satisfaction of
all the other desires, since for every other pleasure we depend on
something or somebody else." Thinking is the only activity that needs
nothing but itself for its exercise.

Empirical methods yield knowledge of beings that are particular and contingent, a priori
method yields knowledge of universals, and necessary beings. It is suited for discovering
what Atrendt again gave different names as “Kantian thing-in-itself, the Being behind the
appearances, the world's "inmost nature," its "core,* of which "the objective world . . . [is]
merely the outward side.” (1978, p.20).

3.3 A Posteriori Method

The a posteriori method of metaphysics is always contrasted to a priori method. And it
refers to the empirical method which we referred to earlier. It relies on the senses to arrive
at knowledge of reality. While a priori method looks inward the person to gain knowledge
of reality, the a posteriori looks outside the person for knowledge. Also, when knowledge
is gotten through the a posteriori method such knowledge can be said to be probable,
contingent, accidental, hypothetical, and usualy confirmed by empirical data.

The method of metaphysics of pre-Socratic Greek philosophers was mainly a posteriori.

Their concern was knowledge about what occurs in nature.( Lutz & Tuboly, 2021, p.7).
The metaphysics of Thales, Anaximander, Democritus, Leucipus, Heraclitus, Anaximenes,
and so on were all a posteriori in nature. They were interested in discovering knowledge
about the natural world. Thales’ water, Anaximander’s boundless stuff, and Anaximenes’
air were all grounded in a posteriori method.

Unlike in the a priori method where intuition and reasoning (thinking) play important roles
in gaining knowledge, the a posteriori method relies on the human senses. You must
remember the five senses you learnt in your elementary science. They are very important
in gaining knowledge a posteriori. Thus, a posteriori method is about empirical realities;
that is, realities that can be touched, smelled, heard, seen, and tasted; in a word things that
can be perceived. In a posteriori method, metaphysics pursues knowledge that can be
verified. One who, for example, wants to confirm whether the water in a bucket is hot or
cold can simply feel the cup by touching it. The act of feeling the cup alone tells one
immediately that the water is either hot or cold. This knowledge is obtained through a
posteriori method.

3.4 Analogy of Being (Analogia Entis)

Analogy of being is one of the earliest methods of western metaphysics. This can be found
in the philosophy of ancient philosophers like Permenides, Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle
among others. Philosophers deploy analogy in order to express the idea of likeness in
difference, that is, to show some relatedness between things that seemingly differ. Click
here to read more about apologia entis.

A German Catholic Philosopher, Eric Przywara (1889-1972) used the expression analogy
of being in his attempt to reconcile the difference between the thoughts of two giant Church
fathers, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas who were identified philosophically as
Platonist and Aristotlean respectively. He demonstrated that the method of analogia entis
was not a new philosophical method since even the Greek thoughts can be said to have
been analogical haven considered the question of unity in view of the patent diversity of
being as expressed in the problem of the One and the Many.

In further demonstration of the method Przywara created a bridge between the realm of
worldly existence as projected by Aristotle and the realm of Being in its fullness and purity
as championed by Plato. His analogy of being resolves the tension that exists between
existence and essence, between immanence and transcendence, and between two giants of
ancient Greek philosophy. Also, Przywara was the first to call attention to the manner in
which metaphysical concepts are formed by means of analogy of being (analogia entis).
Even metaphysics as a term, when understood as transphysics (beyond physics) was an
analogical invention where metaphysics is derived from physics.

Supersensory reality, the being-qua-being which we hold is the subject of metaphysics is

only reachable by means of analogy. And this entails abstracting from the qualities of
particular beings. Thus, we access the scope of the real by means of analogy. Even the
notion of God as an infinite and omnipotent Being derives from analogy. What is given
directly to us by the our senses is the man as a living being, in flesh and blood. It is by
means of analogy that metaphysics transcends the sensory data to establish the idea of the
supreme Being. This also applies to other metaphysical concepts like Beauty, Happiness,
Death, etc. We are not able to see any of these concepts rather what we see are instances
of them. For instance, we see beautiful people but no one can claim to have encountered
Beauty. It is from this sight of beautiful people that we arrive at the conecpt of Beauty
through analogy.

4.0 Conclusion
The methods of metaphysics are about the tools which metaphysicians employ in their
pursuit of knowledge. It is with these tools that they pursue their study of reality. The
methods may not be entirely peculiar to metaphysics but they nevertheless form the core
of the method of metaphysics. There is no doubt that some of the methods discussed above
may be simultaneously applied in one study.

5.0 Summary
In this unit we studied some of the different methods of metaphysics. The aporetic method
is employed in the treatment of aporia, that is in resolving perplexity. The a priori method
is deployed in the course of studying non-material, non-experiential objects. The a
posteriori method is deployed to study sensible objects.

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignments

1. Differentiate between a priori and a posteriori method
2. What do you understand by aporia?
3. In which method of metaphysics will you assign roles to reasoning? Discuss the
role.
4. Discuss the manner in which metaphysics attain knowledge through analogia entis

7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Reading

Karamanolis, G. & Politis, V. (2018). “Introduction.” Karamanolis, G. & Politis, V. (Eds.).
The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge: University Press
Lutz, S. & Tuboly, A. T. (2021). “introduction.” In Logical Empiricism and the Physical
Sciences: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Science. Pp. 1. 18. New York:
Routledge

Palmer, J. (2018). “Contradiction and Aporia in Early Greek Philosophy.” Karamanolis, G.

& Politis, V. (Eds.). The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge: University
Press.

Rescher, N. (1987). “Aporetic Method in Philosophy.” In The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.

41, No. 2, pp. 283-297

Rescher, N. (2009). Aporetics: Rational Deliberation in the Face of Inconsistency.

Pittsburg: University Press

Schopenhauer, A (2012). The World as Will and Representation. New York: Dover
Publications

Smith, J.E.H. (2016). The Philosopher: A History in Six Types. Oxford: University Press
Unit 4: Metaphysics and Other Branches of Philosophy

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Intended Learning Outcome
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Relationship Between Metaphysics and Axiology
3.2 Relationship Between Metaphysics and Epistemology
3.3 Relationship Between Metaphysics and Logic
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-marked Assignment (TMA)
7.0 References and Further Reading

1.0 Introduction
Axiology, Logic, Epistemology, and Metaphysics are the four major branches of
philosophy. There are also sub-branches of philosophy like Political Philosophy,
Philosophical Anthropology, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Gender, Philosophy of
Science, Philosophy of Development, and so on. These sub-fields can be studied under one
of the major branches. Political Philosophy, for instance, is assumed by many Philosophers
to be a sub-field of Ethics which in its own is a sub-field of axiology. Aristotle warns us
that the various divisions of philosophy are related. This could also explain why Plato made
no effort to distinguish between the branches of philosophy. It is in their relationship with
metaphysics that this relatedness of branches of philosophy is most visible. In what follows
we shall consider the nature of this relationship.

2.0 Intended Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:
1. Discuss the relationship between Metaphysics and Axiology.
2. Differentiate between Metaphysics and Epistemology.
3. Explain the interconnection between Metaphysics and Logic.
4. Discuss the relationship between Metaphysics and Ethics.
3. 0 Main Contents

3.1 Metaphysics and Axiology

We have so far established the meaning of metaphysics as the study of reality. In studying
reality, you must have learnt, entails seeking knowledge of what exists. What does it mean
to exist? What are the kinds of things that exist? Are there levels of existence? Why do
things exist? Does nothing exist? Are things that exist the only things that could exist or
could other things have existed? These are some of the questions that interest metaphysics.

Axiology on the other hand, is a branch of philosophy that studies values. Click here to
learn more. Though the invention of the term, axiology, is a recent one, appearing for the
first time in 1902 in the writings of Paul Lapie and in 1908 in the writing of E. von
Hartmann, the philosophical study of values is as old as ancient Greek philosophy. Both
Plato and Aristotle were engaged in the study of values. Values are described as things of
worth or things that are good. Thus, the ultimate axiological question is: Can we know the
good? Socrates attached great importance to this question believing that ignorance of the
good accounts for why people engage in evil activities. From Socrates’ point of view, evil
is a result of value misjudgement. The evil doer misjudges a bad act to be good and engages
in it.

The relationship between axiology and metaphysics can be said to be mutually

complementary. There is a claim that:

The quest for values, for things and events which are conducive to
survival and the enhancement of life, engendered the quest for
knowledge of reality. By his very nature, man has been primarily
interested in how things and events administer to- his basic and
derivative needs, how they satisfy or frustrate him, how to
preserve and promote the good things of life and curtail and erase
objects which stifle his zest for living.” (Hart, 1971, p.29).

From the quote above, metaphysics, understood as knowledge of the fundamental structure
of reality, owes its origin to axiology. Man needed to discover in nature the things that are
good for his survival and continuous thriving on earth. Knowledge of good, of course goes
hand in hand with knowledge of evil or the harmful. While he may need to cultivate and
maximise the good, he must also work to eliminate or avoid the evil on discovering them
if he would succeed.

3.1.2 Metaphysics and Branches of Axiology

Philosophers distinguish between two branches of axiology, namely, Ethics and Aesthetics.
We shall take a look at the individual relationship which metaphysics holds with the two
branches of axiology.
 A. Metaphysics and Ethics
As a branch of axiology ethics is also called moral philosophy. It is concerned with
determining good and bad conducts, separating rightful behaviours from wrongful ones and
demanding that the right acts are performed while we avoid the wrong ones. Metaphysics,
on the other hand, is concerned with being qua being; with the ultimate aim of discovering
the nature of reality.

Philosophers have demonstrated that there is a crucial relationship between metaphysics

and ethics (MacIntyre, 2009). This is firstly visible in the ancient works of Plato. In Plato’s
philosophy, metaphysics cannot be imagined without ethics and ethics can never be
imagined without metaphysics. (Rowe, 2007). Thus, Plato’s metaphysics of the world of
Form, provided a solid foundation for the erection of his ethical theory. Apart from
providing a general theory about the structure of the world, the theory of world of Form
also discussed certain Forms necessary for upholding the ideal world. If those ideal Forms
like Justice could sustain the World of Forms they can also sustain the physical world.
Thus, the human person as a being in the world must strive to cultivate them. He does this
by ensuring that individual behaviour and actions conform to the ideal forms as revealed in
the theory of the Forms. According to Palato still, the world is an ordered whole where
individuals have specific roles. The just ensures strict adherence to this division of labour
and therefore maintains a good and orderly world.

Essentially, ethics is meant for the human person as a being in the world. Thus, any ethical
discussion presupposes knowledge of the world and knowledge of the human person. It
also presupposes knowledge of certain ethical ideals that are only discoverable by
metaphysics. It is at the level of metaphysics that we determine what it means to be in the
universe, to be a human person and to be a moral agent. The treatment to be meted out to
the human person, the nature of the relationship to enter with him, the expectations to be
made of him all would rest on this determination of his being. This takes into account the
nature of the human person. Who is he and what is he? What are his capabilities and
limitations? What is the source of morality? And why should we obey moral injunctions?
Socrates posed a question like this in The Euthyphro Dilemma.

Thus, we can say that metaphysics serves as a foundation to ethics. It demarcates the range
of being to which ethical responsibility can be attributed. It also establishes the limit of the
universe in which human persons act as ethical beings. Ethics, on the other hand, guarantees
the care of the universe and seeing to its continuous well-being. It does this by prescribing
the right course of action in relation to the universe, to human persons, to the environment
and to individuals.

B. Metaphysics and Aesthetics

Aesthetics is a sub-division of axiology and it is concerned with beauty and taste. It is
simply a science of the beautiful. Read more about aesthetics here. The various fields of
Arts (painting, photography, drawing, architecture, etc) are the grounds of aesthetics. It
examines the arts in order to discover the condition by which what is said to be beautiful is
truly beautiful. What is the source of beauty identified in a beautiful object? Is beauty truly
in the eyes of the beholder, as they say? Or is it a thing in the mind? Or is it in the object
being admired? Do we mean the same thing when we say that a piece of drawing and a
book are beautiful? The question is about whether the beautiful is visual or mental or both.

Aesthetics is all about philosophical interpretation of the arts. This exercise is metaphysical
in nature. Philosophers, since Plato, go beyond the facade of the visible beautiful things to
discover Beauty itself. According to Plato, Beauty is an ideal form living in the world of
form. Thus, particular beautiful things as in the arts mirror Beauty existing in the world of
forms. The beautiful things can be defaced, destroyed, and even die, but Beauty is an
eternal, unchanging being. The human Soul is acquainted with Beauty having existed with
it in the world of forms (the soul is also a form) before being united with the body.

Art interpretation is a subjective experience (Hein, 1996). However, it is metaphysics that

sets the objective criteria of what constitutes Arts and the reality which Arts interprete. The
importance of Aesthetics derives from the fact that Arts which it studies is a representation
of reality which is of fundamental importance to man in the sense that it has importance to
man’s ultimate destiny (Kuhn, 1950). It is the role of metaphysics to delineate what
constitutes human destiny and to determine what reality is. Arts, as we said earlier, is
representational. What does it represent? It could be a man. It could be God. It could be
man’s relationship with God. Whatever it is, these are issues that are of fundamental
importance to man. Thus, Arts represents man’s conception of himself as a being in the
world as well as all that this being in the world entails. This conception is engendered by
metaphysics; and metaphysics in some sense is also engendered by the representation
which the Arts make. Thus, we can adduce a symbiotic relationship between Aesthetics
and Metaphysics where “we sometimes allow our idea of reality, reached intellectually, to
dictate our interpretation of beauty and, then, sometimes allow our experience of beauty to
rule our understanding of reality.” (Chaudhury, 1965, p191). According to Chaudhury the
two approaches correspond to the Western and Indian approaches to the relationship
between metaphysics and aesthetics. In the Western approach, metaphysics precedes
aesthetics whereas metaphysics flows from aesthetics in the Indian approach.

3.2 Metaphysics and Epistemology

Epistemology as a branch of philosophy is also known as theory of knowledge. Its concern
is the nature and scope of human knowledge (Carter & LittleJohn, 2021). Questions to
which epistemology is interested in include: what is knowledge? What can we know? How
do we know? How do we know that we know? Can we know everything?

On the other hand Metaphysics, as we have shown many times, is concerned with the nature
of ultimate reality. It tells us:

About the metaphysical nature of our world: under what

 conditions composition occurs; how objects persist
through time; whether properties are universals or tropes,
and so on. It is widely held that these kinds of first-order
metaphysical truths are not just truths about our world, but
are truths about every world: they are metaphysically
necessary (Miller, 2009, p.29).

Thus, if epistemology is concerned about knowledge, metaphysics establishes the object

that is to be known, Being.

We may illustrate this with an example from the philosophy of Immanue Kant. The
metaphysics of Immanuel Kant establishes two worlds that constitute reality. First he talks
about the world of phenomenon which corresponds to the physical and experiential world
as known to us. He also discusses the transcendental world which he called the world of
noumenon. This world is the abode of the spiritual entities, it is the world of things as they
truly are. In Kant’s metaphysics, the world of phenomenon, the experiential world is
knowable to man. It is the world of the senses and sensual beings. We possess the capacity
to know about it and about the beings in it. However, the world of noumenon, the
transcendental world, is unknowable to us. We lack the capacity to gain any knowledge
about it even though metaphysics has established its existence.

In a nutshell, we may say that while Metaphysics is concerned with establishing what
constitutes reality, epistemology is concerned with how to know reality. It asks deep
questions about what it also means to know reality. It also offers the method of
metaphysics. For instance, the method of metaphysics which we studied in unit 2 are all
epistemological topics detailing how we arrive at metaphysical knowledge.

3.3 Metaphysics and Logic

Logic as a branch of philosophy is defined as science of right reasoning. According to
Bencivenga (2014). “A logic is a theory of the logos, of meaningful discourse: a theory of
how discourse acquires the meaning it does.” The concern of logic is correct reasoning. It
insists that whatever can be said about anything should be said in a meaningful manner
devoid of ambiguity. In this sense, it sets out rules and principles which must govern human
reasoning. These rules are not always available to the ordinary man and their absence
accounts for why the ordinary man always finds himself falling into fallacies. Fallacies are
injurious errors of thought and logic assumes the responsibility of safeguarding our
thoughts from them. The philosopher to whom thought is the major instrument of his trade
does not have the liberty of the ordinary man to fall into fallacies. This explains why logic
is of importance to him.

Some 20th century philosophers, including W. V. O. Quine, Rudolf Carnap, Bertrand

Russell, Ludwig Witgenstein, etc perpetuated a claim which denied any connection
between metaphysics and logic. Logic, they hold, operates independent of metaphysics and
cannot make metaphysical assumptions. And that metaphysics has a superior standing in
relation to logic. (Harris, 1983). The major ground of their argument is that metaphysical
truths cannot be proven. But the proponents have since been shown to be wrong having
been found to be confusing provability with truth. Kurt Godel, the Logician who once sat
at meetings with the Vienna Circle, an organized association of intellectuals led by Rudolf
Carnap, successfully demonstrated to them that mathematical numbers, we can say the
same of metaphysical truths, though true cannot be proven. Godel’s conclusion that all the
truths of mathematics cannot be captured by any logical system led to a new theorem called
the first incompleteness theorem. (Holt, 2018). Metaphysicians have since argued that the
same thing is applicable to metaphysics.

However, the fact that not all truths of metaphysics can be captured by logic does not mean
that no relationship exists between the two branches of philosophy. Aristotle’s Metaphysics
was the first to draw attention to a relationship between Metaphysics and Logic. In this
relationship, Aristotle assigns to Metaphysics the task of discovering the laws of Logic like
that of contradiction, excluded middle, and so on. The laws are discovered a priori purely
by human reasoning unaided by experience. They exist at the level accessible to
metaphysics alone and they foreground all logical thinking.

Thousands of years after Aristotle, Frederick Hegel, the German idealist philosopher, also
held at one time that logic is nothing but an introduction to metaphysics. At other times,
especially in his later years, he viewed logic as metaphysics (Pippin, 2019) and declared
that Being is the starting point of logic. Recall here that Being is the subject matter of
metaphysics. And in saying that logic will begin with Being, Hegel does not mean that
logic will rediscover Being rather he means that logic will proceed in its work using the
discoveries made by metaphysics on the subject of Being. In this sense, metaphysics can
be said to be a foundation for logic and provide logic with its first subject matter. It is from
this subject matter that logic will start before digressing into others.

The relationship cannot be said to be one-sided in any way. Logic also plays an important
role for metaphysics serving as a light for the queen of all sciences. In this guise, logic is
the tool for ensuring the validity of metaphysical statements. Every metaphysical statement
is a claim about reality, and most of the reality about which metaphysics make claims are
not directly verifiable by the senses. It is only by means of logic, through logical inferences,
that such statements are verified. Thus, the arguments about metaphysical claims must also
be logically valid and must contain good premises. The demonstration of this can be found
in the category of beings which we term logical entities. A good example of this can be
found in metaphysics’ postulation of necessary beings. The existence of such beings cannot
be verified by any empirical method. But it can be verified logically by examining the
thought process through which we arrive at them.
 4.0 Conclusion
As the queen of all sciences, metaphysics has relationships with all the branches of
philosophy. It is a mutually influencing relationship whereby metaphysics positively affect
the other branches of philosophy and they in turn influence metaphysics. In most of the
relationships, metaphysics provides the grounding for the other branches of philosophy. It
supplies them the basic preposition of their being and their relevance.

5.0 Summary
In this unit, we have been able to establish the relationship which metaphysics shares with
other branches of metaphysics. Starting from the two subdivisions of axiology (ethics and
aesthetics) to epistemology and to logic, metaphysics has proven to run a long thread across
the branches.

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment (TMA)

1. Explain how axiological reasons led to the emergence of metaphysics
2. Discuss how western philosophy differ from Indian philosophy in terms of the
relationship between aesthetics and metaphysics
3. Disprove the claim that metaphysical truths cannot be proven logically.

7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Reading

Bencivenga, E. (2014). “Logic and Worlds.” In Rush, P. (ed.). The Metaphysics of Logic.
Cambridge: University Press

Carter, J. A. & LittleJohn, C. (2021). This is Epistemology: An Introduction. New Jersey:

WIley Blackwell

Hart, S. L. (1971). “Axiology--Theory of Values.” In Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research , Vol. 32, No. 1. , pp. 29-41.

Hein, H. (1996). “What is Public Art?: Time, Place and Meaning.” In The Journal of
Aesthetics and Arts Criticism, Vol. 54, No. 1. , pp. 1-7.

Holt, J. (2018). When Einstein Walked with Godel: Excursion to the Edge of Thought. New
York: Macmillan

Kuhn, H. (1950). “On the Indispensability of Metaphysical Principles in Aesthetics.” In

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 128-133

MacIntyre, A. (2009). God, philosophy, universities: A Selective History of the Catholic

Philosophical Tradition. Lanham: A Sheed & Ward Books
Miller, K. (2009). “Defending Contingentism in Metaphysics.” Dialectica, Vol. 63, No. 1,
pp. 23-49

Pippin, R. B. (2019). Hegel’s Realm of Shadows: Logic as Metaphysics in the Science of

Logic. Chicago: University Press

Rowe, C. (2007). “The Form of the Good and the Good in Plato’s Republic.” In Cairns, D.,
Herrmann, F. & Penner, T. (Eds.). Pursuing the Good: Ethics and Metaphysics in Plato’s
Republic. Edinburgh: University Press
 Unit 5: The Values of Metaphysics

Contents
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Intended Learning Outcome
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Some Major Arguments Against Metaphysics
3.2 Some Importance of Metaphysics
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-marked assignment (TMA)
7.0 References and further reading

1.0 Introduction
What is the importance of the hair splitting discussions about metaphysics? Why do you
need to worry about particulars and universals, for instance? Why is it important to study
about beings? As observed by Hofwebber, there is a “long history of worrying about
whether or not metaphysics is a legitimate philosophical discipline” (2009, p.260). At the
core of this worry are the questions of meaning and truth of metaphysical propositions; that
is, do statements about metaphysical reality mean anything? And, can we really know
anything about metaphysical reality? Questions like this were initially asked by non-
philosophers. However, it took centre stage once philosophers started questioning the
legitimacy of metaphysics regarded as the foundation of philosophy itself. While the
questioning of metaphysics has lost its attractiveness and metaphysics having taken center
stage once again, it is still important to emphasise for you the importance of metaphysics.
We shall do so in this unit. We shall start with the position of critiques of metaphysics who
thought that metaphysics is of no importance. Afterwards, we shall also take a look at what
we consider as the importance of metaphysics.

2.0 Intended Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you would be able to:
1. Evaluate some of the major arguments against metaphysics
2. Discuss the importance of metaphysics; and
3. Assess the values of metaphysics
3.0 Main Contents

3.1 Some Major Arguments Against Metaphysics

The history of attack against metaphysics is long. Even in ancient Greek, schools of
metaphysics were closed for challenging received religious, moral and epistemological
dogmas. In fact, Socrates, the earliest teacher of metaphysics of morals before Kant was
killed because of his teaching. Even Medieval Islamic monks undertook a ferocious attack
against metaphysics by persecuting great Islamic philosophers that metaphysics’ only
savior was its reintroduction into Christian Europe through the works of Aristotle. Christian
Europe was no different. Christian Wolff, the great German Enlightenment philosopher,
was exiled on the behest of Church authorities for his metaphysical claims that morality
can be derived by means of reason alone without any reference to Christianity. Up to this
point, the attack against metaphysics was driven by powerful religious men and theological
authorities.

The Enlightenment philosophers themselves would later take over the attack in a suicidal
attempt to bury metaphysics. Their onslaught was so ferocious that, as Adorno (2002, p.1)
observed, metaphysics especially in non-German speaking societies was “used … as a term
of abuse, a synonym for idle speculation, and mere non-sense”. Such attacks on
metaphysics stem from questions about its usefulness and relevance in the world. In what
follows, we are going to expose some of the criticism/arguments which philosophers have
presented against metaphysics.

3.1.1 Relativism
The relativist argument against metaphysics upholds the impossibility of metaphysics. It
argues that metaphysics wastes its time in the search for objective truth which exists
nowhere. In traditional metaphysical context an objective, universal truth exists. It is not
constrained by time and space as its origin and existence extend beyond the world of
appearance. In Plato’s philosophy, this objective truth exists in the world of forms.
Relativists argue against this notion of a universal and objective truth. They hold that truth
is a culture-construct. As such each society creates its own truth, its own reality and they
all exist to serve some purposes in those societies they are created. Relativism in this way
denies the possibility of any standard rationality against which truth can be measured.
Jacque Derrida invented the idea of deconstruction just to prove that metaphysical truths
were a social construct discoverable through a deconstructive effort which involves the
unbundling of the construct. It is left for the deconstructionists to demonstrate how, for
example, the principle of contradiction is a construct of Greek society and does not submit
to any universal rationality and purpose.

3.1.2 David Hume’s Critique of Metaphysics

Hume was a 17th century English philosopher. He is often regarded as the father of
empiricism. This is because he inaugurated the empirical method of study which scientists
use today in their studies. A major component of Hume’s empiricism was his critique of
metaphysics. He argued that what exists is only what can be observed. No new knowledge
can be gained through reason as claimed by metaphysics. Hume holds that what
metaphysics regards as ideas are nothing but reflections of impressions. He holds that
impressions are real and not ideas as propounded by early Philosophers like Plato. To
demonstrate this, Hume claims that the blind man has no impression of colour or of light.
Consequently, he has no idea of light or of color in his head. Hume’s argument, therefore,
is that if ideas are real, the blind man who has no impression of colour will have an idea of
colour. But the fact that he lacks this idea means that impression is what is real. Thus, only
things that can be felt by the senses can be said to exist. And since metaphysics deals mainly
with entities that are beyond the senses, Hume regards it as a waste of time.

Again, Hume attacks the metaphysical ideas of cause and effect holding that there is no
proof to show that a thing is caused by another. What we regard as cause and effect are
mere regularity occasioned by the fact that we see one action following another. Hume’s
argument is that we need to observe one event causing the other to truly believe in the idea
of cause and effect.

3.1.3 The Neo-Kantian Critique of Metaphysics

This takes its origin from the German Philosopher, Immanuel Kant, who offered strong
criticism of metaphysics. Kant’s critique of metaphysics is divided into two phases: the
preciritical and the critical Kant (Arendt, 1978). At the precritical phase, Kant though still
an admirer of metaphysics, regards it as possessing a “bottomless pit”, a “slippery ground”,
as ‘utopian “land of milk and honey” where the “Dreamers of reason dwell” as though in
an “airship'' so that “there exists no folly which could not be brought to agree with a
groundless wisdom.” (Cf Arendt, 1978, p.9). By describing metaphysics in these words,
Kant demonstrated the uselessness of metaphysics.

The critical Kant is seen in the book The Critique of Pure Reason. He is said to have
discovered the scandal of reason in this book. The scandal of reason is expressed in the idea
that the human mind possesses not adequate and verifiable knowledge about the ultimate
questions which confront us; about God, freedom, the soul, immortality and so on. Thus,
Kant’s criticism, therefore, stems from his argument that metaphysics errs in claiming to
pursue knowledge that goes beyond sensory experience. We cannot know anything about
things as it is in itself. About God. We also cannot know anything about the soul, about
freedom and so on. Kant hinges his argument on the ontological difference between these
entities and the human person. Whereas they are infinite beings, the human person is finite
and is limited by time and space. He equally lacks the proper concepts to describe such
entities. The type of metaphysics Kant proposes is one that will only concern itself with the
study of phenomena, the noumena are way beyond human reach.

3.1.4 Fredrich Nietzsche’s Criticism of Metaphysics

Nietzsche takes off his critique of metaphysics with the claim that metaphysics is a product
of “passion, error and self-deception.” (HH, 5). He ascribed the emergence of metaphysics
to man’s tendency to import the content of his dream into the real world. Thereafter, man
assumes that the images encountered in his dream exist elsewhere, in the ideal world
different from the sensory world. And he goes ahead to elevate this dream world far above
the real world. (HH, 5). Thus, Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics rests on metaphysics’
focus on supersensory reality and the otherworldly.

Accordingly, Nietzsche holds that metaphysical claims are deceitful. He argues that
everything relating to man-in-the-world, be it values, ideas, and so on emerged in time. As
a product of time they would also cease to exist in time. He critiques metaphysics for
presenting these ideas and values as infinite ideals that exist in a world different from our
world, a backworld regarded by metaphysicians as better and more real than the world of
phenomena. For the Christian and Muslim this other world or in Nietzsche’s word, this
backworld (Hinterwelt in German) is heaven and it is assumed to be an eternal abode of
the eternal values. (Houlgate, 1987). This is against the run of Nieszche’s thought. Nothing
is eternal, he argues. Everything in the world will pass away. It is the trick of metaphysics
that made us believe that certain things will last forever and are as such essential or
substantial to man.

Take for instance, the human soul which philosophers argue is an essential aspect of the
human person, and is therefore unchanging and eternal. Given their conception of the soul
metaphysicians hold that man does not become. He is and his origin has nothing to do with
time. His source is in an eternal world controlled by an eternal being. His appearance in the
world only masks his true source which is the hidden God, “the being-in-itself”. Nietzsche
protests the metaphysicians’ projection of the otherworld, the eternal world as the true
world and the physical world as we know it as ephemeral and unreal world. This is the truth
turned upside down, he argues. According to Nietzsche the truth is that what is real, what
exists, and what is true is the physical world as known to man. And this includes becoming.
There is no world beyond time, and no Being beside the beings we experience in the world.
All reality is about this world and nothing to do with the world beyond this. The
metaphysicians invented the fictional idea of the world beyond our world, the non-temporal
world in order to protect us from the suffering which temporal existence causes.
Essentially, he submits that there is no spiritual dimension to man, to the world and to
reality. Such words as soul, spirit, free will, ego, conceived by metaphysicians as spiritual
entities have no meanings. If the soul, for instance, exists it must be as a physical entity
like one’s heart or even the eyes. He claims to possess not an immortal soul but many
mortal souls in him.

3.1.5 Logical Positivists

The logical positivists also known as logical empiricists were a group of Western
philosophers who regarded all metaphysical knowledge as nonsense and meaningless.
Rudolph Carnap, one of the most prominent logical positivists, holds that what we call
metaphysics arises from the distortion of language by philosophers. There are three ways
in which philosophers do this. First, Carnap holds, they introduce new words into the
lexicon without supplying clear meanings to them thereby introducing confusion which
they now regard as metaphysics. “Ego”, “emanation”, “existence” are some of the
philosophical terms introduced by philosophers which, according to Carnap, are
meaningless. Secondly, philosophers take a word with a clear meaning and assign it
ambiguous meaning. Third, philosophers combine words in such a way that sentences they
compose with those words lack meaning. A statement made by Martin Heideger in a 1929
lecture is taken by Carnap as a perfect exemplification of this. And it goes thus: “Das
Nichts selbst nichtet” (translated into English to mean “The nothing itself nothings.”).
While Heideger held that the above statement is true, Carnap ridicules it as a meaningless
statement that exemplifies the third point above. Click here to read further
https://blog.oup.com/2015/10/nothing-nothings-philosophy/

Thus, the logical positivists hold that to be regarded as meaningful or true, a statement must
be verifiable. To say that a statement is verifiable is to say that there is evidence which can
be used to show that the statement is true. (Creath, 1982). The character of evidence sought
by the positivists is observational. Thus, the evidence must be observed. Metaphysical
statements are not verifiable in this sense, and are therefore considered meaningless.
Carnap, therefore, concludes that a logical analysis of language will successfully eliminate
metaphysics.

Of course, logical positivism has since been discredited. The proponents were found to
have erred in confusing provability with truth. They assume that whatever cannot be proved
is not true. The converse is always the case. Kurt Godel, the Mathematician who once sat
at meetings with the Vienna Circle, an organised association of intellectuals promoting
logical positivism, successfully demonstrated to them that mathematical numbers, we can
say the same of metaphysical truths, though true cannot be proven. Godel’s conclusion that
all the truths of mathematics cannot be captured by any logical system led to a new theorem
called the first incompleteness theorem. His second conclusion that no logical system for
mathematics can be shown to be free from inconsistency, is known as the second
incompleteness theorem. (Holt, 2018).

3.2 The Importance of Metaphysics

Despite his harsh criticism of metaphysics, Immanuel Kant at the twilight of his life
prophesied that mankind would still “return to metaphysics as one returns to one’s mistress
after a quarrel.” (Arendt, 1978, p.9). Kant has been proven right as all efforts to dismantle
metaphysics, bring it into disrepute, bring an end to it, have only succeeded in strengthening
it. Indeed, the conclusion today is that “‘dismantling of metaphysics’ is no simple
operation, because inherited philosophical categories continue to determine the way in
which we see the world in fundamental ways.” (Swift, 2009, p.19). Also, logical positivism,
which had dismissed metaphysics as nonsensical, became “defunct by the 1960s, a victim
of its own inability to arrive at a workable distinction between sense and nonsense. In its
wake, metaphysics—the project of characterizing reality as a whole—has seen a revival.”
(Holt, 2012).

All these alert us to the importance of metaphysics in today’s world. The following are
some of the reasons why metaphysics is of great importance.

3.2.1 Extension of Knowledge

What do we know about reality? Are things as shown to us by the senses or even as captured
by the sciences a true picture of the world? Historically, the senses have been shown to err
in mapping out spheres of reality. A good example is Anaximander’s ancient metaphysics
which rightly holds that the earth floats in the universe unsupported by water, stone or any
other thing. The prevailing thought at the time was that the earth rests on water.
Anaximdaer’s questioning extended knowledge about the nature of the earth. In the light
of this example, we can argue with Kolakowski that one of the most important functions of
metaphysics is not to:

“Deliver truth but to build the spirit of truth, and this means: never to let the inquisitive
energy of the mind go to sleep, never to stop questioning what appears to be obvious and
definitive, always to defy the seemingly intact resources of common sense, always to
suspect that there might be "another side" in what is taken for granted, and never to allow
us to forget that there are questions that lie beyond the legitimate horizon of science and
are nonetheless crucially important to the survival of humanity as we know it.”
(Kolakowski, 1984, p.234).

Thus, there is no gainsaying that the scientific and philosophical progress recorded in the
world would not have been possible without the critical contribution of metaphysics. As
far as metaphysics is concerned no question is settled, everything is under question in order
to discover the reality behind them.

3.2.2 Establishing the Fundamental Structure of Reality

Another importance of metaphysics is that it offers us “the systematic study of the most
fundamental structure of reality.” (Lowe, 2001, p.2). This function without stating it makes
a general distinction between metaphysics and other disciplines. We shall demonstrate this
with a building, a house. Thus, if reality is to be a house, other disciplines can be said to
study the visible parts of it. While a particular discipline would be interested in studying
the roof, another would study the raw materials used to construct the building and so forth,
another would study the painting, etc. Metaphysics, on its own is interested in studying the
foundation of reality, of the building. Like in building, the foundation of everything is
always hidden from our eyes but it is the most important aspect of the structure for without
it no structure will be erected and it is the foundation that holds the structure together.

Thus, as a systematic study of the most fundamental structure of reality, metaphysics is

said to be the foundation of all other disciplines as they rest on some metaphysical
presuppositions. It is the duty of metaphysics to clarify the meanings of those other
disciplines. It sets their boundaries to them and equally determines their various methods.

3.2.3 Satisfying Human Curiosity

The human person is a curious being. He desires to know, as observed by Aristotle in his
Metaphysics. Man is astonished by so many things around him; about the world and about
himself. Imagine wondering why the innocent suffer. This sense of astonishment often
leaves the human heart restless and forces him to seek to make sense of the perplexing
situations around him. The role of metaphysics in the face of this perplexity is curative and
is focused on “bringing being from a perplexing and equivocal indeterminacy toward more
and more univocal determination…...The end of metaphysics seems to lie in the absolute
determinability of being, and with this the dissolution of the original astonishment.”
(Desmond, 2020, p.17). Essentially, metaphysics gives us answers to those nutty questions
whose answers no other science can provide. Arthur Schopenhauer makes a distinction
between the way metaphysics and physical sciences approach this question of
astonishment. According to him, the physical sciences “marvel only at selected and rare
phenomena” whereas metaphysics marvel at “commonplace thing of daily occurrence,
whereby we are induced to make the universal of the phenomenon our problem.”

3.2.4 Necessary for Human Development

One of the most important questions of metaphysics is the question of our identity as human
persons: who am I? This question has no satisfactory answer outside metaphysics. And it
is very important that it be answered in order to chart a proper part for human development.
Thus, knowing who we are will play an important role in fathoming our purpose in life. No
other discipline answers this question apart from metaphysics.

3.2.5 Knowledge of Principles Guiding Human Actions

Immanuel Kant once asked why the metaphysics of morals is “indispensable”. The answer
provided by Kant is not only relevant to metaphysics of morals but also to other
metaphysics. The first reason given by Kant is that metaphysics provides us with a source
for the principles that guide our actions and thoughts. Consider for instance the principle
of contradiction, of excluded middle without which logic and certain sciences would not
be possible.

4.0 Conclusion
Metaphysics is of great importance in today’s world. Its importance has contributed to its
survival in the face of massive attacks unleashed on it across the centuries. Rather than
diminish metaphysics the centuries of attacks have strengthened it. Indeed, some of the
critiques of the discipline have formed major parts of its canon. A student of philosophy
who pays special attention to the importance of metaphysics will discover in it powerful
guides of action and intellectual development.
5.0 Summary
In this unit, we examined the value of metaphysics. We did this by taking a look first at the
various criticisms/arguments against metaphysics. We demonstrate that metaphysics
remains undiminished today and still waxes stronger than ever. We equally considered
some of the importance of metaphysics.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1. Discuss Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics
2. What are the core arguments of relativist thinkers against metaphysics
3. Demonstrate your understanding of the manner in which metaphysics study
fundamental structure of reality

7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Readings

Adorno, T. W. (2002). Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems

Arendt, H. (1978). The Life of the Mind. New York: Harcourt Inc.

Creath, R. (1982). “Was Carnap a Complete Verificationist in the Aufbau?” Proceedings

of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1982, Volume One:
Contributed Papers, pp. 384-393

Desmond, W. (2020). The Voiding of Being: The Doing and Undoing of Metaphysics in
Modernity. Washington: Catholic University of America Press

Hofwebber, T. (2009). “Ambitious, yet Modest, Metaphysics.” In Chalmers, D., Manley,

D., and Wasserman, R. (eds). Metametaphysics New Essays on the Foundations of
Ontology. (pp.260-289). Oxford: University Press.

Holt, J. (2018). When Einstein Walked with Godel: Excursion to the Edge of Thought. New
York: Macmillan

Houlgate, S. (1986). Hegel, Nietszche and the Criticism of Metaphysics. Cambridge:

University Press.

Kolakowski, L (1982). "The Death of Utopia Reconsidered.” In McMurrin, S. M. (ed). The

Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 3. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

Nietzsche, F (2015). Human, All too Human. London: The Big Nest

Schopenhauer, A (2012). The World as Will and Representation. New York: Dover
Publications

Swift, S. (2009). Hannah Arendt. London & New York: Routledge.

 MODULE 2: ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES IN METAPHYSICS

In Module 1 we attempted to define metaphysics. The essence is to understand the subject

which we set out to study. Having done that, we are going to examine some of the
unresolved issues in metaphysics in this module. Our concern here is basically ontological
issues. The following topics shall be considered.

Unit 1: The Problem of Being

Unit 2: Substance
Unit 3: Matter and Form
Unit 4: Universals and Particulars
Unit 5: Appearance and Reality
Unit 1: The Problem of Being

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Intended Learning Outcome
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Problematising the Problem
3.2 Parmenides’ Permanent One
3.3 Aristotle Substantiates the Problem
3.5 Heidegger’s Dasein as Route to Being
3.6 Quine’s Predicament
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment (TMA)
7.0 References and Suggestion for Further Reading

1.0 Introduction
Earlier in unit 1 of module 1 we defined metaphysics as science of being qua being. What
do you understand as being qua being? Bravo, if you answered that it means being as being.
But the question is still not settled. The unsolved question is: what is Being? This is no easy
question. And metaphysicians recognise it as the most important question in philosophy
and in science. This is because it is a question that captures the entire universe as Being is
one word that defines the universe. Now that you know this, can you attempt an answer
from your head about the meaning of Being? Philosophers have offered different answers
to this question. In what follows we shall examine the various answers given by
philosophers on the question of what is being.

2.0 Intended Learning Outcomes

At the end of this unit, you will be able to
1. Articulate the problem of Being
2. Discuss Parmenides’ notion of Being
3. Compare Aristotle and Heidegger’s notion of Being
4. Explain Quine’s position on What is.
3. 0 Main Content
3.1 Problematizing the Question: What is Being?
The first place to begin to answer this question is to look inward of oneself. You are a
human being. The next question will now follow: What is a human being? Can we separate
the idea of human from being? That is, does the idea of human always invoke the idea of
being? Philosophically, the two ideas of human and being can be separated. When we do
this separation, we will be able to determine what makes you human in the first instance.
We will also be able to determine what makes you being in the second instance. In the third
instance, we will now return to our original question: what is a human being which will
entail merging solutions to the questions in first and second instances.

In the first instance, we seek to know that which makes a human human. Whatever this is,
we must be able to find it in all entities which we call human. You may be shocked to
discover that this includes corpses, skeletons, and remains of former human beings, thus
human corpses, human remains, human skeletons. The same is true in answering the second
instance question. Here, we discover that any taxonomy of being will also include God,
stones, mathematical formulas, trees, UFOs, cups, screwdrivers, insects, even faeces, and
so on. We share the quality of being with them. The special addition of “being” to human
is probably a special advantage due to the fact that we are the naming agents. Were stones
to name, they would probably have called themselves stone beings. And that’s what they
are, instances of being, just like human beings.

The problem of Being has to do with finding a common characteristic which all the kinds
we call being share. This problem is exacerbated by our common sense which tends to see
a wide gap between two instances of Being. Faeces and human beings, God and stones,
elephants and quadratic formulas; how on earth could common sense be wrong if it sees
them as widely different? Thus, the problem of Being is the question of unity of Being, of
one and the many. Philosophers over the years have tackled this question and it is what has
come to be known as the problem of Being. So, we still return to our original question:
what is Being. Martin Heidegger offers a direct answer to the question. According to him,
Being is “that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are
already understood.” (Heidegger, 1962, p.17).

Heidegger has not answered our question. He rather gave us what to look out for whenever
we are considering the question of Being; that which makes being being. The importance
of Heidegge’s definition lies in the fact that it alerts us to the difficulty in defining Being.
But the difficulty has not deterred Western Philosophers. In what follows, we shall take a
look at the various responses to the question of being offered by Philosophers across the
ages.

3.2 Parmenides’ Permanent One

The problem of Being was of utmost importance to ancient Greek philosophers. It is said
that this question of being was the origin of western philosophical and scientific thought.
They also considered the question of Being as the most universal, and therefore the most
rational of all inquiries. (Grondin, 2012). In this section, we shall consider the ontology of
Parmenides.

Parmenides of Elea was responsible for the problematising of Being in Western

Philosophy. His definition of Being was in two words; “Being is.” He distinguishes this
Being which is, from non-Being by holding that Non-Being is not. He characterised Being
as one, permanent, and unchanging. Non-Being on the other hand is many and always
becoming. Parmenides states this point as follows:

Listen! And carry away my message when you have grasped it!
Note the only two ways of inquiry that can be thought of: One is
the way that it is\ and that non-being cannot be king. That is the
path of Persuasion, Truth's handmaid; now to the other! This path
is that it is not\ and that it may not be being. That path - take it from
me! - is a path that just cannot be thought of. For you can't know
what is not: it can't be done; nor can you say it. (The Two Ways of
Parmenides as translated by Popper, 1998, p.71)

Being in Parmenides is materialistic in nature and we derive this view from the
characteristics which he attributes to Being. They include: “'taking up space' or 'filling
space'; 'impenetrable'; 'capable of stopping anything that touches it'; therefore it is
unmovable in bulk, unchanging, uncoloured, limited, spherical, hard, dense…” full, and
lacking in space, motion and change (Popper, 1998, pp.57 & 86).

How did Parmenides arrive at this knowledge of Being? As was traditional with the age,
Parmenides distinguished between real knowledge (alethia) and opinion (doxa). Whereas
real knowledge, a divine property is domiciled in the abode of the gods, and is revealed by
the gods to whoever they wish (in Parmenides’ case it was a goddess that revealed this truth
of Being to him), opinion, the property of the mortals, exists in the physical world and
reaches us through sensation. The creator made the Non-Being to imitate Being; What is
not, to imitate what is. Thus, true knowledge consists in knowing Being while false
knowledge consists in knowing the Non-Being. Therefore, we gain knowledge of true
Being by means of reason alone which comes as a sort of revelation from the gods. (Plato's
Timaeus, 27e-50c). The ultimate example for Parmenides was the waxing and the waning
of the moon. In his time, the dominant belief was that the moon moves and changes as
shown by its observed waning and waxing. Parmenides held that men were deceived by
appearance into believing this. What was real was that the moon does not move and does
not change but that the light and darkness which we associate with it derive from the play
of reflection of the sun which impacts on it.

Parmenides’ idea of Being is often said to be a response to Heraclitus (no convincing proof
of this has ever been offered by anyone) who had earlier held that flux is all that is. Of
course, common sense shows us that things change when they move. We also see them
change their quality. Everything we experience seems to conform to this idea. Parmenides
did not argue that things did not change. He knew that they did. His argument is that the
changing objects are not Being. They merely imitate Being in the sense of your many
pictures imitating the real you. Non-Being does not change. It is. And by Being, it is
permanent, One, unchanging and immutable. The things in the world are changing and are
many but they are only an imitation of the One.

3.3 Aristotle Substantiates the Problem

Aristotle assigned the problem of Being - being qua being - a pride of place in his
philosophy. He designates it as the subject of a new branch of philosophy which he
proposed and labeled First Philosophy. This is because he considers Being as the most
fundamental discourse and the discipline that studies Being studies the underlying principle
of all that is. (Grondin, 2012). Plato, whose student Aristotle was, identified the Forms as
the underlying principle of all that is. Platonic Forms has the character of Parmenides’
Being despite major differences about them. They are both created, both are immutable,
immobile, and are considered by both men as true reality. However, the true reality is One
in Parmenides whereas they (the Forms) are many in Plato as there is a different Form that
corresponds with the different types of objects we see in the world.
Aristotle is famous for rejecting the position of his teacher on the nature of Being which he
describes as being qua being. The term being qua being captures all sorts of beings in so
far as they are beings. It differs from the particular beings captured by special sciences or
special metaphysics. It examines everything that is. (Shields, 2012). Here there is no
distinction between types of beings. Everything in so far as it is being is studied by First
Philosophy.

Aristotle is also interested in identifying a feature of being which constitutes being qua
being or according to our usage so far, Being. He identifies substance (ousia) as that aspect
of Being that is definitive of Being. He writes about it thus:

Indeed, what was sought of old and is sought at present and always,
and what is always a matter of difficulty, namely what is being? (ti
to on) is this: what is substance? (tis hê ousia) (Met. 1028b2–4).

The allusion to substance entails the baring of Being. The substance is not predicated on
any other thing as it does not need any other thing to exist and it is the property of particular
beings. It is the immediacy. (Adorno, 1965). It is just like what remains when a person
undresses. Before the undressing, one who points at the person will still regard him as the
person with all the clothes, all the trinkets, all the hairs and make ups. But when all these
external additions are removed, the real person stands before you, naked. The substance
has this type of life in relation to Being. It is Being in itself without any qualification. It is
a quality which must belong to any existent thing. (Barnes, 1982).

According to Aristotle, knowledge of anything is knowledge of its causes. In this light he

identifies the cause of substance as that which is changeless and self-subsistent the study
of which he termed theology. Theology studies the unmoved mover, the primary substance.
So in the final analysis Aristotle’s quest for knowledge of Being terminates in the discovery
of God as the unmoved mover and as the primary substance. Indeed, by arriving at God as
the ultimate Being, Aristotle merely re-echoed his teacher Plato who taught in his Phaedo
that Being is the same thing with the being with “the most real Being and the principle of
all that is.” (Grondin, 2012, p209).

Historically, some criticisms have been made against Aristotle’s notion of substance as
Being. Adorno (1965) notes some of these criticisms. (1) Hegel for instance, criticises the
notion of the substance as the immediacy. He holds that there is no unmediated immediacy.
We may deduce the truth of this from the fact that the substances which are said to be
immediate need particular things to exist. (2) Hume also argues that Being, constituted as
a thing-in-itself, does not exist. What exists are particular things. (3) Kant, deriving from
Hume, holds that the substance is a mere creation of the human mind which the mind
produces in particular objects.

3.4 Heidegger’s Dasein as the Route to Being

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was influenced by Aristotle in conceiving his idea of Being.
He regretted that the question of Being, the most important question in philosophy, has
been forgotten since Aristotle. Thus, we assume that we know the meaning of Being
whereas we lack all understanding about it. The blame for this is placed at the feet of
Medieval philosophers who promoted dogmatic metaphysics controlled by ecclesiastical
theology. Thus, Heidegger’s great book, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), among his other
writings were intended to revive the question of Being and to end the problem of being
once and for all. The goal of Heidegger’s book is to demonstrate how being is presented to
the conscious being. (Jaroszyński, 2018).

His concern was not with beings which refer to individual particular things. His interest
was with Being which he holds is indefinable. Thus, Being can only be understood by
understanding Human Being - Dasein. (Heidegger, 1962). The human being, therefore, is
the starting point of any inquiry about Being. Heidegger thinks that this is so since the
human being is the only being that poses the question - What is Being? He is also the only
being capable of grasping Being. Thus, we arrive at the answer to the question of what is
Being by merely reflecting on what it is to be a human being, a Dasein.

Only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an

understanding of being is ontically possible), ‘is there’ being.
When Dasein does not exist … even entities within-the-world
can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot
be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not.
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 255/212).

Heidegger’s method of inquiry is phenomenology. In phenomenology, objects of inquiry

are allowed to open up themselves. They sort of speak to the inquirer. In answering the
question - what is Being? - beings open up themselves to the inquirer (Tombra, 2019). Now
disposed to transcend the revelation of particular beings the inquirer is now able to grasp
Being which is a unity of all the beings. This knowledge of unity of beings is labelled
ontological awareness by Heidegger and is peculiar to humans alone. It differs from ontic
awareness, described by Heidegger as awareness of particular beings. A camera for
instance can have this type of awareness. An animal can also have it in so far as it recognises
that a particular being is in front of it. However, both camera and the animal lack the
capacity to aggregate particular beings into Being. Only Dasein is capable of this.

The Dasein is a being-in-the-world. By this Heidegger means that Dasein exists in the
midst of other beings and encounters them. However, the relationship of these other beings
with the world differs from the human being’s relationship with the world. Heidegger
makes this distinction thus:

What about the other beings which, like man, are also part of
the world: the animals and plants, the material things like the
stone, for example? Are they merely parts of the world, as
distinct from man who in addition has world? Or does the
animal too have world, and if so, in what way? In the same way
as man, or in some other way? And how would we grasp this
otherness? And what about the stone? However crudely,
certain distinctions immediately manifest themselves here. We
can formulate these distinctions in the following three theses:
[1.] the stone (material object) is worldless; [2.] the animal is
poor in world; [3.] man is world-forming. (Heidegger, 1962,
p.177).

The grasping of Being is made possible by attunement. Humans attune themselves to Being
through their moods. In a number of his writings Heidegger lists the moods to include joy,
boredom, anger, anxiety, etc. What finally is the Being grasped by Dasein? Heidegger
holds that It is the ‘“transcendent’ pure amd simple”. (Grondin, 2012, p.

You must note that time plays an important role in Heidegger’s ontology, hence the title of
his book Being and Time. In Heidegger’s estimation, earlier philosophers have presented
Being as something in opposition to time. Remember that Aristotle’s substance, Plato’s
Forms and Parmenides’ One are all eternal and permanent. This attitude to time and
clinging to eternity, Heidegger regards as fight from self, from its mortality and flight from
time. Dasein runs away from temporality which is its nature. (Grondin, 2012). He is scared
of death and projects an eternity for himself. This is the origin of the idea that Being is
permanent and it arises from Dasein inauthentic relation with its temporality. It is as it flees
from its temporality that it forgets about its Being.

According to Heidegger, Dasein is aware of its finitude, of its death and prepares itself for
it. The project of Care for its own Being which Dasein engages shows a being that is aware
of its own finitude. It knows the end stares directly at him. Thus, Dasein is a being-towards-
Death.

3.5 W. V. O. Quine’s Predicament

We shall conclude this unit with Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000). Quine is
important because he exposes the challenges associated with the type of investigation we
have undertaken in this unit. Quine went back to the heart of Parmenides' ontology: “What
is there?” He provides a simple answer to his own question; “Everything.” (Quine, 1948).
But what is everything? Does it also include imaginary beings like flying horses? While
the proponent of an imaginary flying horse may be able to defend her argument that it is,
the opponent would not be able to do so. This is because, to formulate her answer she must
first of all articulate the issue she is opposing. In doing so she also helps to perpetuate the
existence of a flying horse. Quine therefore holds that in attempting to disagree over
ontological issues opponents find themselves in a predicament.

Ontological problems arise due to this predicament. Quine hold that proponents of ontology
hide under it to propound the existence of some non-existing beings. “It is some such line
of thought that leads philosophers … to impute being where they might otherwise be quite
content to recognize that there is nothing.” (Quine, 1948, p.22). Another cause of the
problem is also our tendency to assume that naming and meaning correspond; that anything
that has meaning names something. A flying horse has a meaning but in reality it names
nothing.

What Quine attacks is the tendency of metaphysicians to introduce non-physical entities

like substance (Aristotle), soul (Thales, he even said magnets have souls which move them
to attraction), forms (Plato) and possible entities and so on and argue that they exist.
Metaphysicians, in doing this, misuse the word to exist and in doing so overpopulate the
world. Thus, only physical entities can exist and not mental ones. To eliminate non-physical
entities from our language, Quine adopted Bertrand Russell’s theory of description and
proposed a descriptive approach to the identity of beings. We must be able to describe a
particular flying horse and identify it and not just lump the general idea of flying horse
together. This is the only way to overcome the predicament and arrive at ontological
commitment. Quine’s ontological commitment, holds that “expressions other than singular
terms, such as predicates and functional expressions, are not … vehicles of reference, so
that their use imports no commitment to properties (or attributes, as he usually calls them),
relations, or functions.” (Hale, 2020, p.59). With this, Quine declares that “to be is to be
the value of a variable.” (Hale, ibid.).

4.0 Conclusion
The problem of Being is a major problem in Western Metaphysics. The fact that
philosophers of all ages have pursued the question of Being alerts of its importance. Its
importance stems from the fact that as an ontological issue it grounds all other sciences as
it pursues what constitutes the fundamental reality of all beings.

5.0 Summary
The problem of Being is a major topic in the history of Western Metaphysics. We have
been able to establish what constitutes this problem. It is essentially the problem of how to
answer the question of One and the many. We have undertaken a historical route to the
question by presenting the views of philosophers on the meaning of Being. The views of
Parmenides, Aristotle, Heidegger and Quine were presented. However, they are in no way
exhaustive. There are many other philosophers who considered the question of Being but
whose works we did not consider due to space. You may do well to check their views out.

6. 0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1. Discuss the characteristics of Being in Parmenides.
2. What is Aristotle’s conception of Being
3. Explain the role which Heidegger assigned to flight from temporality in Western
Metaphysics
4. Discuss Quine’s predicament.
7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Readings
Adorno, T. W. (1965). Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems. Translated by Jephcot, E.
Stanford, california: Stanford University Press

Barnes, J. (1982). The Pre-Socratic Philosophers. London & New York: Routledge

Grondin, J. (2012). Introduction to Metaphysics: From Parmenides to Levinas. Columbia:

University Press

Hale, B. (2020). Essence and Existence: Selected Essays. Oxford: University Press

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Heidegger, M. (1995). The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude,

Solitude.Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Janos, D. (2020). Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity: . Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.

Jaroszyński, P. (2018). Metaphysics or Ontology, translated by McDonald, H. Leiden: Brill

Rodopi

Quine, W.V. (1948). “On What There Is.” In The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 2, No. 5, pp.
21-38

Shields, C. (2012). “Being qua being.” In Shields, C. Oxford Handbook of Aristotle.

Oxford: university Press

Tombra, C. (2019). Discourse Ontology: Body and the Construction of a World, From
Heidegger through Lacan. London: Macmillan Palgrave
 Unit 2: Substance

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Intended Learning Outcome
3.0 Main Content
3.1 The Nature of Substance
3.2 Aristotle’s Ideas of Substance
3.3 Divisions of Substance
3.4 Characteristics of Substance
3.5 Attack on the Idea of Substance
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment (TMA)
7.0 References and Suggestion for Further Reading

1.0 Introduction
In unit 1 of module 2 we took a look at the problem of Being. We particularly examined
the various ways in which western metaphysicians have considered the question of Being.
There we encountered Aristotle who designated substance as Being. This would have
alerted you to the importance of substance in philosophy. What did you understand as
substance in the last unit? In this unit, we are going to provide answers to the question. We
are also going to consider the various dimensions of substance.

2.0 Intended Learning Outcome

At the end of this unit, you will be able to;
1. Explain the meaning of substance
2. Distinguish between types of substances
3. State the characteristics of substances
3.0 Main Contents
3.1 The Nature of Substance
Substance is said to be so important in philosophy that Immanue Kant holds it is impossible
for human beings to conceive of any reality without substance. We trace the origin of the
term substance (ousia) to Aristotle. The Latin attempt to translate the Greek word, ousia
gave rise to the Latin word, substantia. The English, substance, was a translation of the
Latin form. More and more philosophers have argued that the Latin and the English
translations do not capture the kernel of Aristotle’s word ousia. However, for want of a
widely accepted alternative we shall stick to substance. You saw in the previous unit that
Substance (ousia) is used by Aristotle to designate Being in his metaphysics. Ever since,
philosophers have attempted to study and understand the meaning of substance. We shall
examine just two of the many definitions of the term offered by philosophers.

For a start, a substance is defined as “that which has qualities and is related, without being
itself either a quality or a relation, or having qualities or relations among its parts.
(McTaggart, 1924, p.254). What is McTaggart saying? He is saying the following: (1) That
a substance is something that exists. And I think that this is the only thing that can be said
directly about a substance without reference to other things, that it exists or that it is. (2)
That substance has qualities and differs from these qualities. Thus, in defining a substance
the qualities are extracted and what remains is just bare substance. A car as a substance can
take many qualities. This includes colour, in which case we can say that it is red, blue,
black, yellow etc. We can also look at its size as another quality which it possesses in which
case we can say that it is big, small, medium-sized, and so on. We can also look at its
motion as another quality which it possesses in which case we can say that it is fast-paced,
slow-paced and even stationary. The point is that the car remains a car in spite of any of
these qualities. The stationary car is no less a car than the fast-paced one. And the yellow
car is not said to be the same thing with a yellow house for example simply because they
share yellowness. Thus, our car remains a car irrespective of any quality it has at any point
in time. (3) That a substance has relation and that it differs from the relation it has. Our car
does not cease to be a car simply because it is parked in a neighbour’s house or because the
colour has changed from blue to red. It also does not cease to be a car when it is hanging
on a tree as opposed to standing on its tires. (4). That the substance cannot be related to
qualities even though those qualities can relate to it. The sense of this can easily be seen in
the way in which the qualities are predicated to the substances in our speech. In this way
we say (1) (2) Socrates is dead. The table is neat. Here qualities of death and neatness are
predicated on Socrates and table at the same time. However, we cannot predicate the table
on anything, the same is true of Socrates. Thus, we cannot say, (1) Death is Socrates (2)
Neat is table.

From this we go to another definition of substance, one which views it as “a particular

which does not depend for its identity upon—or 'owe' its identity to—the identity of
anything other than itself.” (Lowe, 2001, p.158). This definition entails that a substance is
(1) something (2) self-identifying (3) self-contained. Thus, it is that on account of which a
thing is said to be that thing. In another word, substance is what a thing is.

3.2 Aristotle’s Ideas of Substance

We noted earlier that Aristotle was the first person to use the term ousia. Aristotle’s ousia
is what has been given the English name, substance. However, there is an argument that
the word substance does not capture the full meaning of Aristotelian ousia.
Perhaps the closest English counterpart to ousia is ‘being’. One can talk
about a being or beings; one can talk about beings that are the basic
constituents of the world; and one can talk about the being of certain
things, including that of the various things that have then thought to be
basic constituents or the being of things. (Dahl, 2020, p.6)

You must bear this in mind as we study Aristotle’s idea of substance. We believe that a
good way of understanding the meaning of substance is to return to the source; to go back
to Aristotle. That is what we shall do in this section. Metaphysicians identify three
meanings of substance in Aristotles’ usage of substance.

A. Substance as a Basic or Fundamental Constituent of the World

Here Aristotle views reality as resting on substance. It is foundational to anything in the
world and everything depends on it to exist. Thus, we can say that the relationship between
substance and other things in the world is the fact that they inhere or perch on the substance.
“This is the use Aristotle employs at Categories 2b5–6 where he says that if primary
substances didn’t exist it would be impossible for anything else to exist. He also employs
it in Meta Z.6 1031a29–31 where he speaks of substances to which no substances or natures
are prior, as some think Platonic Forms are.” (Dahl, 2020, p.5).
 B. Substance as the Essence of a Thing
The idea of substance as the essence of a thing was used by Aristotle in his book De Anima
II.1 412a8–9 and II.1 412b10–17. Essence is understood to be the heart or the soul of a
thing. It is what a thing is. To understand what substance means in this sense we must
invoke the idea of change and say that substance is what remains after the changes have
taken place. It is that which never changes and which remains when all the changes have
taken place and makes it possible for us to still recognise an object as what it is after
undergoing numerous instances of change. When a thing is defined it is the substance that
is targeted.

Let’s illustrate this with an example. You were named at birth by your parents. At your
current age you have changed tremendously from that child named by your parents. Let us
assume your name is Umar. One looking at Umar of 2021 would no doubt know
immediately that a great change has taken place; that the Umar of today looks too different
from the Umar that was named many years ago. In spite of the changes, it is still the same
Umar we are dealing with. The substance is what makes it possible for Umar to remain
Umar in spite of the temporal changes that have taken place in him.

C. Substance as Matter, Form and Composite of Matter and Form

The view that matter, form and composite of matter and form are substances is expressed
by Aristotle in De Anima II.1 412a6–9, II.2 414a14–16, and Meta H.1 1042a26–32
1028b8–13, and H.1 1042a6–11. We shall offer little explanation of this point. (1) Matter
refers to anything that has weight and occupies space. Example of this is your computer.
Your computer is matter, and because we say that all matter is substance, your computer is
a substance. (2) The Forms are non-material substances. Saying that the forms are non-
materials tells us immediately that they differ from matter. We take Plato’s definition of
forms as unchanging, eternal, and non-physical, spiritual entities that exist in an
extraterrestrial territory (World of Forms) as our guide. The soul, for instance, is a form
and if Forms are substances, it means the soul is a substance. (3) Composite of matter and
form refers to unity of matter and form in an entity. A human person is a perfect example
of this. He or she is made up of matter (body) and form (soul). Thus, as a composite of
body and soul, the human person can therefore be said to a substance. A substance can
also be a composite of two or more matters without the forms.
3.3 Characteristics of Substance
Aristotle discussed some of the characteristics of substance. They are as follows:
1. Ability to Persist through Change
By this, Aristotle means that a substance can withstand all changes that take place around
it without being changed, remaining the same throughout the periods of change and after
the periods of change. Thus, a substance is constant and unchanging. Aristotle expresses
this point as follows:

It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the
same is able to receive contraries. In no other case could one bring forward
anything, numerically one, which is able to receive contraries. (Categories,
1:7).

You may have noted at once that even the act of receiving contraries implies change in the
condition of the substance. I can be sick as well as healthy. These are contrary dispositions
and they appear in me taken as an example of a substance. To escape from this argument
we may put up another argument that Aristotle only meant that substance is able to
withstand change without being affected intrinsically. The change, which my being sick
entails is peripheral and temporal. It does not define me permanently.

2. Never Said of a Subject Nor in a Subject

The second characteristic of a substance according to Aristotle is that it is that which is
never said of a subject nor in a subject. This point is made in the Categories as follows:

A substance—that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and

most of all—is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, for
example, the individual man or the individual horse.

To understand Aristotle here, we must go back to the categories which we studied in unit
2 of module 1. There we listed the categories of being, namely; (1) substance (ousia), (2)
quantity (poson), (3) quality (poion), (4) relation (pros ti), (5) place (pou), (6) time (pote),
(7) position (keisthai), (8) possession (echein), (9) action (poiein), and (10) passion
(paschein). You must note that substance is topmost on the list of the ways in which a being
can be. In saying that a substance is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject,
Aristotle is demonstrating the nature of substance’s relationship with the other categories.
Thus while the other categories can say something of or in the substance, the substance
cannot say anything of or in them. Let’s demonstrate this with one of the categories;
passion. Example of passion is anger, while an example of a substance is Chinenye. While
it can be said that Chinenye is angry, it will be out of place to say that angry is Chinenye.
Thus, in a logical sense, the substance cannot serve as predicate to the other categories. The
other categories also depend on the substance to exist. There cannot be anger if there is no
man to be angry.

3.4 Divisions of Substance

Aristotle identified two types of substances. They are (1) primary substance and (2)
secondary substance. In what follows, we shall examine the two divisions.

1. Primary Substances
Aristotle conceives the primary substances in three ways. And we may have to examine
two of his books, the Categories and the Metaphysics, to have a glimpse of the three ways
. In the Categories, Aristotle identified individual entities in so far as they are natural kinds
and not man-made as primary substances. This includes Socrates, Mutar, Stephen, Uche,
Gboyega, etc. in so far as they are names of concrete individuals. It also includes Prado
(my dog) and your individual horses, cows, goats, etc. One of the characteristics of primary
substances conceived in this way by Aristotle is their equality. According to this, the
individual man, say, Socrates has no more primary substance than an individual dog, say
Prado, and Prado has no substance than an individual rock (say Zuma rock). Another
characteristic is that the primary substances cannot serve as predicates.

The other two ways of conceiving primary substances are found in Aristotle’s the
Metaphysics. The first of these conceive the fundamental or basic being as the primary
substance. We have earlier identified God as the basic being in our search for the final
cause of all reality. God is the unmoved mover who constitutes all that is, and He persists
eternally. He is “a substance par excellence, the ground of all being” (Rea, 2021, p.103).

Aristotle’s metaphysics also considered forms or essences as primary substances. Here you
will notice a big departure from the position held in the Categories where primary
substance denotes particular individual entities. These particular individual entities are
now described as composite beings. They are said to be composed of matter and form. Why
did Aristotle vary his identification of primary substances?. “This supposed change of
doctrine is sometimes put down to the need to provide a satisfactory account of change,
one that is consistent with the belief that nothing is ever either created from nothing or
wholly annihilated.” (Lowe, 2001, p.190).

2. Secondary Substance
Secondary substances depend on the primary substances for their existence. But more
importantly, they are definitive of primary substances and therefore are what the primary
substances are said to be. President Buhari is an individual man. Any definition of president
Buhari will say that he is a man (species) and will also say that as a man he is an animal
since all men belong to the genus called animal. Thus, species and genera which primary
substances belong to are what is called secondary substance. This represents a movement
from individual entities to their aggregates. This point is aptly captured by Aristotle thus:

It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera
alone among other things should be called secondary substances
(δεύτεραιοὐσίαι). For [iv] only they, of things predicated, reveal the primary
substance ( ). For if one is to say of the individual man what he is, it will be
in place (οTκείως) to give the species or the genus (though more informative
[γνωριμώτερον] to give man than animal); but to give any of the other things
would be out of place (ἀλλοτρίως)—for example, to say ‘white’ or ‘runs’ or
anything like that. So it is reasonable that these should be the only other things
called substances. Further, [v] it is because primary substances are subjects
for everything else that they are called substances most strictly (κυριώτατα
οὐσίαι λέγονται). But [vi] [a] as the primary substances stand to everything
else, so the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest:
〈for〉 [b] all the rest are predicated of these. For [c] should you call the
individual man grammatical, it follows that you call both a man and an animal
grammatical; and similarly in other cases. (2b293a6, following Ackrill)

We can demonstrate this further with an example thus:

Miss Sherifat is an individual woman = primary substance.

Miss Sherifat belongs to a species called man = secondary substance
 Man belongs to a genus called animal = secondary substance.

In the example that we have given above, both man (species) and animal (genus) are
secondary substances. They are both abstractions definitive of a particular individual
woman (Sherifat). But there is also a gradation of them according to their relation or
closeness to the primary substance. In this case, Aristotle holds that the species possesses
more substance than the genus.

Of the secondary substances the species is more a substance than the genus,
since it is nearer to the primary substance. For if one is to say of the primary
substance :what it is, it will be more informative and apt to give the species
than the genus. For example, it would be more informative to say of the
individual man that he is a man than that he is an animal (since the one is
more distinctive of the individual man while the other is more general) ; and
more informative to say of the individual tree that it is a tree than that it is a
plant. Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects for all the
other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them,
that they are called substances most of all. But as the primary substances
stand to the other things, so the species stands to the genus: the species is a
subject for the genus (for the genera are predicated of the species but the
species are not predicated reciprocally of the genera) . Hence (or this reason
too the species is more a substance than the genus. (Cat. 2b7 following
Ackrill).

3.5 Attack on the Idea of Substance

A number of philosophers have criticized the idea of substance. The first in the list is David
Hume. According to Hume, substances do not exist. What exists are nonsubstances whose
clusters or bundles are erroneously referred to as substances. (Hoffman & Rosenkrantz,
1997). Hume rooted this theory in experience and writes as follows:

As our idea of any body, a peach, for instance, is only that of a particular taste,
odor, figure, size, consistency, etc., so our idea of any mind is only that of
particular perceptions without the notion of anything we call substance, either
simple or compound. (Hume, 1955, p.194).
Accordingly, Hume gives pride of place to qualities which Aristotle regarded as dependent
on substance. He holds that these are what we experience and not any substance
whatsoever. This view of Hume is called the bundle theory of substance.

Also, Martin Heidegger attacks the notion of substance. He holds that substance viewed as
an entity understood by reference to no other other than itself can only apply to God.
Besides God, other substances cannot be understood by reference to them alone. See other
critiques of substance here.

4.0 Conclusion
The idea of substance occupies a pride of place in Western philosophy. It is one of
Aristotle’s major contributions to metaphysics. It extends the discussion about the quest for
the fundamental structure of reality, examining in detail what it means to be and weeding
off competing ideas in the study of being.

5.0 Summary
In this unit we have examined the nature of substance. We have also examined the
characteristics of substance, the divisions of substances, Aristotle's view of substance and
few criticisms of the idea of substance.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1. A substance is that which has qualities and is related, without being itself either a
quality or a relation, or having qualities or relations among its parts. Discuss
2. A substance is that which is never said of a subject nor in a subject. Explain.
3. Distinguish between primary substances and secondary substances

7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Readings

Aristotle. (1984). “Categories”. Translated by Ackrill, J in The Complete Works of
Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1:7

Bunge, M. (1977). Treatise on Basic Philosophy: ontology 1: The Structure of the World.
Dordrecht & Boston: D Reidel Publishing Company

Dahl, N. O. (2019). Substance in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Zeta. Cham, Switzerland:

Palgrave Macmillan
Hoffman, J. & Rosenkrantz, G. S. (1997). Substance: Its Nature and Existence. New York:
Routledge.

Hume, D. (1955). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Liberal Arts
Press.

Lowe, E. J. (2001). The Possibility of Metaphysics Substance, Identity, and Time. Oxford:
University Press

McTaggart, J.M.E. (1924). “An Ontological Idealism,” in Muirhead, J. H. (ed.). London:

George Allen & Unwin.

Unit 3: Hylomorphism (Matter and Form).

CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 The Etymological Meaning of Hylomorphism
3.2 Aristotle’s Understanding of Hylomorphism
3.3 The Aristotelian Scholastics’ Understanding of Hylomorphism
3.4 Rene Descartes’ Understanding of Hylomorphism
3.5 Rene Le Bosu Reconciles Aristotle and Descartes
3.6 Non-Hylomorphic Ideas About the Composition of the World
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA)
7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

In unit 2 above, we encountered two new terms; matter and form. What do you understand
about them? Well, we merely learnt in that unit that Aristotle holds particular individual
entities as composites of matter and form. The scholastic philosophers, following
Aristotle’s lead, were also said to have seen everything hylomorphically. In this unit, we
are going to have a more detailed discussion on matter and form. Yes, matter and form;
that is what hylomorphism is all about.

2.0 Intended Learning Objectives

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:
1. Give the epistemological meaning of hylomorphism
2. Differentiate between traditions of hylomorphism
3. Describe the difficulty involved in defining matter
4. Establish the characteristics of matter and form
5. Discuss the idea of materialism
6. Explain physicalism

3.0 Main Content

3.1 The Etymological Meaning of Hylomorphism
The term, hylomorphism (also spelt as hylemorphism), arose in the 19th century as a new
name to an old problem. The old problem being referred to here is ancient western
philosophers’ search for the constitutive principles of nature. Recall that in PHL 102 you
learnt about their various answers to the question. Thales, for instance, posited water and
Anaximander posited the apeiron as the constitutive principles of the universe. Aristotle
continued this quest in his Physics and he posited that the world is constituted by two
principles, matter and form.

Etymologically, the term hylomorphism is a combination of two Greek words; Hyle

meaning Matter and Morphe meaning Form in English. By way of simple definition,
hylomorphism is the philosophical belief that particular existing entities in the physical
world are made up of matter and form. The use of the term, hylomorphism to indicate that
the universe is composite of matter and form was first found in the work of German Jesuit
priest, Tilman Pesch. (Manning, 2013). Ever since the term has stuck both among
philosophers and scientists as an explanation about the composition of the physical world.

3.2 Aristotle’s Understanding of Hylomorphism

However, despite the newness of the term that describes the theory of matter and form, the
question of hylomorphism is an ancient one. Aristotle ignited it when he wanted to account
for the phenomenon of change in the natural or physical world. Things change and still
remain the same. Something must account for this. Thus, Aristotle states that there are three
principles of natural things, matter, form and privation. Privation, since it is an accidental
principle, was dropped along the line even by Aristotle. Thomas Aquinas re-echoes the
existence of the principles thus: "There are two per se principles of the being and becoming
of natural things, namely form and matter, and one per accidens principle, namely
privation.” (Aquinas, 1995, p.59). There are two major issues of hylomorphism; (1) the
nature of the relationship between the two per se principles, matter and form. (2) the
properties of the two per se principles, matter and form.

To understand the nature of the relationship between matter and form, we turn to the
physical world. The world in which you and I live is what is regarded as the physical world.
It is also the world where we can find other entities like goat, sheep, insect, table, ball,
book, magnet, oil, etc. Hylomorphism holds that these objects, and indeed other countless
ones I couldn't mention, are composed of matter and form. To put it in real philosophical
terms, worldly things are composites of two essential principles, one material and the other
substantial form. Nothing can exist in the world if it does not contain these principles. Thus,
all reality of the world is said to be an informed matter. (Ariew & Marjorie, 1997).

The essential point being made, and it is worth repeating in as many words as possible, is
that all physical reality is composed of matter and form. Every physical reality is said to be
made of parts and that the parts in themselves are made up of matter and form and the parts
are also in turn made of other parts. (Sharma, 2015). To understand this, let us take a human
person as an example of an existent entity in the world. Here we construe him or her as a
composite of matter and form. But he has parts like his right hand, his head, his legs, etc.
When taken individually, these parts are also made of other parts which are equally made
of other parts and so on. The important claim here is that each of the parts is made of matter
and form; is an entity in itself. With this view in sight, every physical object is a unity, a
conglomeration of entities. Another important point conveyed by hylomorphism is the fact
that neither matter nor form has the capacity of separate existence in the physical universe.
Thus, reality as we experience them in the world is in the form of the composite. Click here
to read more

3.2.1 The Nature of Matter in Aristotle

The reality of matter seems so obvious. As I write this study material I have my
chromebook placed on the table. On the same table is an empty can of water, a phone and
a remote control. These are material objects. We seem so sure of this. But our problem
starts when we want to discover what constitutes the materiality of the material objects,
that is, when we raise the question, what is matter? The question is made difficult by the
fact that, according to our theory of hylomorphism, material objects are made up of matter
and form. This means that the objects you see are already composites. Thus, despite what
common sense tells us about matter and its concreteness, the reality is that matter is a
metaphysical construct that cannot be proven scientifically (Gabriel, 2015). Even
scientists’ claim that quark is the fundamental building block of matter is a position arrived
at rationally without any empirical proof as quarks have defied empirical verification. Read
more about quarks here.

Does this mean that matter is non-existent? No. It rather means that the quest to pinpoint
and isolate it in the universe continues. Both philosophers and scientists are united in this
quest. To attempt what looks like an understanding of matter we shall follow Lowe’s (2001)
example in discussing the three senses of it which he holds are derivable from Aristotle’s
works. According to Lowe, Matter is understood in the following three ways.

1. Proximate Matter: This understands matter as something a thing is immediately

made of. It is like saying that my table is made of wood. Here it is possible to
distinguish between the project from the material it is made of.

2. Matter as Kind of Stuff: This understands matter as a space-filling material which

has separable parts capable of filling different parts of space. Lowe holds that the
parts could be of the same material (homoiomerous) or of different materials
(heteromerous). While Aristotle believed that some material reality like water is
homoiomerous modern science has proven that water is actually a compound of
H20, and therefore not made of the same stuff. So far what we have are heteromerous
stuffs. A gold for instance is made of gold particles (stuff) which consists of
neutrons, electrons and protons -- particles of gold. The meaning here tends to
overlap with the first one, but we must note the difference. In proximate matter a
thing is made of another thing but in matter as kind of stuff a thing is made of
certain stuff.

3. Matter as Material Substratum: Here matter is seen as a thing that provides

ontological support for an entity's properties. It is on matter that the properties of
things inhere. Thus, to say that the ball is red is to say that the property of redness
inheres in the matter of the ball. Thus, properties, seen as other categories identified
by Aristotle, depend on matter for their existence. Lowe holds that the problem with
this idea of matter is that is that it presupposes a featureless matter which he
considered an impossibility.

The above points are efforts to capture the nature of matter. Our doubt about the nature of
matter did not affect our understanding of its properties. To begin from our elementary
knowledge, we say that matter has weight and occupies space. Aristotle tells us that matter
cannot be generated and can also not be destroyed. Matter is shapeless and this accounts
for its ability to malleability and ability to receive any shape we give to it. This act of
receiving shape is another way of saying that matter receives form. Though we say that
matter has weight, it does not retain the same weight all time. It can change in weight and
volume. Matter has a potential existence and is only actualised by form. Accordingly,
Aristotle holds that matter has no essences since it is not determined prior to its contact
with form. While matter accounts for individual particular things form accounts for
universals. Later philosophers have countered Aristotle’s position that matter has no
essence, for if this were to be true we would not be able to identify the properties of it which
we just listed (Cf Bostock, 2006).

3.2.2 The Nature of Form in Aristotle

Also called substantial form, form is said to be the principle of actuality as it actualises the
potentiality in matter. (Rea, 2021). The form of anything is said to be what that thing is, its
essence or its nature. Essentially, the form of a thing is the meaning which we target when
we define a thing.

The nature or essence of a thing, in the Aristotelian tradition, is very roughly, a

complex property which explains a large number of scientifically interesting
features of the objects that have it—i.e., features of their outward appearance,
behavior, natural development, and so on—and provides a basis for classifying
those objects together as members of a kind. (Rea, 2021, p.114).

Just like matter, pure forms do not exist in the physical universe. Rather the forms unite
with matter to form concrete individual entities. However, since form is also said to be
potentiality, it is a pointer that pure form subsists. The forms are also said to determine the
type of object an entity is. Thus, it is the form of humanity which inheres in matter that
makes Socrates the human person that he is instead of a dog. In De Anima, Aristotle holds
that the soul is the form of a human being. It is the soul uniting with matter that causes a
human being to emerge. In the same vein, it is the form of caninity of Prado (my dog) that
makes her the dog she is. Therefore we can regard the form as the principle of identity. It
is responsible for all the functions which we (per)form. Without form matter is docile, and
is not actualised even though it has potentiality.

The relationship between form and matter is dissolved at the moment of death. This means
that neither matter nor form is present. Physical entities are said to be made up of parts, and
the form as principle of unity is said to hold the parts together. Also, the forms are said to
be: “indivisible, not capable of more or less, and not possessing contraries, and thus they
cannot be acquired successively and piecemeal.” (Ariew & Marjorie, 1997, p.301).

3.1.2 The Aristotelian Scholastics’ Understanding of Hylomorphism

The scholastic Aristotelians accepted the existence of matter and form but had major
disagreements regarding their properties. These disagreements led to the multiplicity of
the concept of hylomorphism. For instance, Aquinas held that the substantiality of forms
entails their capacity to exist without matter. The human soul is cited as the perfect example
of a form existing without matter.

Duns Scotus, on the other hand, does not deny the capacity of form to have independent
existence, rather he believed that matter -understood as prime matter- also exists outside
the composite and is a formless and undifferentiated condition for change. (Manning,
2013). Scotus’ position is said to have been informed by his quest to preserve God’s
omnipotence:

Every absolute thing that God produces among creatures by the interme- diary
of a second cause, he can create without this second cause, which is not part
of the effect. Now, the form that confers existence on matter is a second cause
and is not part of the essence of matter insofar as it is mat- ter. Hence God can
create the matter without the form. (Scotus as cited in Ariew & Marjorie,
1997, p.303).

The argument was long and other scholastic thinkers took sides. However, Dupleix who
tended to support Scotus’ claim of the existence of a prime matter did so for a different
reason. His argument goes as follows:

Form is not only that which gives being to things, but also that which diver-
sifies and distinguishes them from one another. Thus, nature, which is pleased
with diversity and variety, cannot allow there to be a form common to all
matter, as there is a matter common to all forms; if there were only a single
form, as there is a single matter, all things would not only be similar, but also
uniform and even unitary. Dupleix, 1990, p.135).

Dupleix inverted Aristotle. While matter was the principle of individuation for Aristotle,
Dupleix transfers that role to the form. This he did to account for plurality and
diversification of objects in the world. For instance, matter as a principle of individuation
cannot explain the existence of non-material beings like the human soul and angels.
3.1.3 Rene Descartes’ Understanding of Matter and Form Relationship
The contribution of Rene Descartes, the 17th Century French philosopher is epochal. Of
course, he is not called the father of modern science for no reason. Influenced by the
scholastics who initiated another way of looking at hylomorphism, he rejected
hylomorphism by denying that matter and form are present in all things found in the
physical world. Descartes begins by holding that there are three substances. Among the
substances is matter regarded now by Descartes as a full fledged finite substance not
needing form to exist. Matter becomes the body in Descartes. He calls the body res extensa-
extended substance - signifying its property to stretch indefinitely though not infinitely. By
extension Descartes means that the only properties of matter are to occupy space, the
capacity for motion and the capacity to be divided into parts.

The second substance, according to Descartes, is the finite thinking substance - the mind.
The third is the infinite spiritual substance, God. Note Descartes' use of terminologies and
observe that body replaced matter and mind replaced soul as substances. The human being
provides the only instance of unity of mind and body and they operate as two separate
substances forming a complex substance, the human being. Outside human beings, there is
no unity of body and mind. Matter exists independently in the world as res extensa not
needing any form as proposed by Aristotle. Descartes finds a new meaning for the term
form, holding that it only means shape, size and arrangement of parts of inanimate bodies.
The form, understood as shape, size and arrangement of parts of matter, must accord to the
law of motion decreed by God - the spiritual substance.

3.1.4 Rene Le Bossu Reconciles Descartes and Aristotle

Do you think that Descartes has solved the problem of hylomorphism especially as regards
the delineation of matter, and the nature of interaction between matter and form? Fr. Rene
Le Bossu (16 March 1631 – 14 March 1680) was surprised that philosophers could view
Descartes’ position as in disagreement with Aristotles’. He holds that the two giants were
in agreement. He begins by showing that the teaching of Aristotle and Descartes were
influenced by their audiences. While Aristotle taught beginners, Descartes' audience were
advanced philosophers. Thus, as a teacher of beginners, Aristotle could refer to proximate
matter as what a thing is made of. What is the statue made of? Bronze, Aristotle taught.
What is a table made of? Wood, he would also have said? However, Descartes did not need
to point out proximate matter; he only needed to move straight to what is common of all
proximate matter be it bronze, wood, cotton, etc., and this is the fact of their extension due
to the advanced level of his audience. From this point, Le Bossu demonstrates that the
principles are not different in Aristotle and Descartes. Aristotle recognised three principles
- matter, form, and privation- as we showed earlier in this unit. According to Le Bossu,
privation is what happens when one peels off form in order to directly get at matter (Ariew
& Marjorie, 1997). This is exactly the strategy of Descartes.

3.4 Non-Hylomorphic Ideas About the Composition of the World

Descartes seems to have set the stage for major critique and rejection of hylomorphism.
Despite his efforts, scholars believe, as demonstrated by Fr Le Bossu, that Descartes’ theory
is in some sense a form of Aristotelianism. Others hold that Aristotle is a Cartesian of some
sort. The point made is that Descartes’ is not a complete departure from Aristotle’s theory
of hylomorphism. However, some totally different ideas about the composition of the world
have been offered. We shall consider materialism and physicalism as representatives of
these competing theories about the composition of the world.

1. Materialism
This is the belief that all existing things are solely made of matter. Thus, matter is all that
exists. Democritus and Leucipus were the earliest philosophers to hold this view.
According to them, atoms and the void surrounding are the only things that exist. In the
materialist world, even memories and images are material in nature and are regarded as
brain states. However, critiques of materialism point out immediately that by accepting the
existence of brain states which are different from the brain itself, materialists affirm the
existence of non-material reality.

2. Physicalism
Physicalism is the claim that the physical universe contains all existing reality. Tim Crane
expresses the central belief of physicalism thus: “Physicalists might differ in their. . .
metaphysical commitments. . . But common to all forms of physicalism is the view that
whatever exists is in some sense physical” (Crane, 1994: p.479). As such all existing reality
can be captured by the laws of physics. Anything that does not exist cannot be captured.
Physicalists admit that not all the existing things have been captured by these laws but
believe that future laws will be able to capture what has not been captured. Thus, what
physicalism is protesting against is the existence of matter, form or any other spiritual
substance as understood by Aristotle. In rejecting physicalism, hylomorphists argue that
physicalists err in assuming that all reality is explainable by physical laws. They hold that
even at the scientific levels some realities yield biological and psychological explanations
and not physical ones. (Jaworski, 2016).

4.0 Conclusion
Hylomorphism is a philosophical discourse on the composition of the world. The positions
taken by philosophers on this are as many as there are philosophers. We have taken note of
a few of them. In general, hylomorphism has provided ideas to philosophers and scientists
alike on how to view the world.

5.0 Summary
In this unit, we have attempted to understand hylomorphism. We looked at the etymological
meaning of the term. We also discussed Aristotle’s understanding of it and the complexities
involved in it, especially in understanding matter. We also examined the scholastic and
modern understanding of the term. We concluded by taking a look at two of the most
prominent arguments against hylomorphism.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1. Describe the three senses of matter in Aristotle
2. Show your understanding of the major point of disagreement among scholastics
thinkers on hylomorphism
3. Discuss Descartes position on the nature and the relationship between matter and
form
4. Demonstrate your knowledge of Aristotle’s conception of hylomorphism

7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Reading

Aquinas, T. (1995). Commentary on Aristotle's Physics. Notra Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox
Books

Ariew, R. & Marjorie, G. (1997). “The Cartesian Destiny of Form and Matter.” In Early
Science and Medicine, Vol. 2, No. 3, The Fate of Hylomorphism. "Matter" and "Form" in
Early Modern Science, pp. 300-325

Bostock, D. (2006). Space, Time, Matter, and Form Essays on Aristotle’s Physics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press
Crane, Tim. 1994. “Physicalism (2): Against Physicalism.” In A Companion to the
Philosophy of Mind, Guttenplan, S. (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 479–
484.

Dupleix, S. (1990). La Physique. Translated in Ariew, R. & G. Marjorie, G. (1997).

Paris: Fayard

Gabriel, M. (2015). Why the World Does Not Exist. New York: Polity.

Jaworski, W. (2016). Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind: How Hylomorphism Solves
the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford: University Press

Le Bossu, R. (1981), Parallele des Principes de la Physique d'Aristote et de celle de Rene

Descartes. (Translated in Ariew, R. & Marjorie, G. 1997) Paris: Publishers unknown

Lowe, E. J. (2001). The Possibility of Metaphysics Substance, Identity, and Time. Oxford:
University Press

Manning, G. (2013). “The History of ‘Hylomorphism’”. In Journal of the History of Ideas,

Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 173-187

Rea, M. (2021). Metaphysics: The Basics. New York: Routledge

Sharma, R. K. (2015). J. M. E. McTaggart: Substance, Self, and Immortality. Lanham,

Maryland: Lexington Books

Unit 4: Universals and Particulars

CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Intended Learning Outcomes
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Problematising the Question of Universals and Particulars
3.2 The Ancient Origin of Problem of Universals and Particulars
3.3 Making Sense of Particulars
3.4 Making Sense of Universals
3.5 Disagreements About the Universals and Particulars
3.6 The Nominalism of John Locke in the Modern Era
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA)
7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Reading

1.0 Introduction
In the previous unit, we studied the theory of hylomorphism. We exposed you to important
terms like matter and form. These two terms as we understood them from the previous unit,
gave rise to the problem of particulars and universals. In this unit we are going to examine
the nature of universals and particulars. Our real target is their ontological status. That is,
we would examine issues concerning their being and their existence.

2.0 Intended Learning Objectives

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:
1. Articulate the problem of universals and particulars
2. Discuss the various philosophical positions about the existence of universals and
particulars
3. Take a personal philosophical position about the existence of universals and
particulars.

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Problematising the Question of Universals and Particulars
What exists? This two word question is at the heart of what we regard as the problem of
universals and particulars. It was not just from Plato and Aristotle that we learned that
individual particular entities exist. Even common sense teaches us this too. Thus, nobody
needs an Aristotle or a Plato to know that he exists as an entity in the world or that a
particular tree exists. We experience these as we make our way through the world. But
philosophy is so distrustful of the senses. It stands in perpetual interrogation of the senses.
Thus, Aristotle alerted us that besides the particular individual entities (primary substances)
that we know that there are species and genera which he classified as secondary substances.
Thus, while the primary substances as described above are particulars, the species and the
genera which constitute the secondary substances are regarded as the universals and
according to Aristotle can be predicated on the particular individual entities/objects.

Our topic is at the intersection of metaphysics and epistemology. When we know a thing
for instance, is it the universal that we know or the particular? I can sit in my office and say
that I know what an aeroplane is? When I say this, am I referring to a particular aeroplane
or the idea of aeroplane? If I am referring to a particular aeroplane, probably the only one
I have seen, does it not seem that I may not be able to recognise another aeroplane when I
see it? But thankfully, my mind was able to extract “aeroplaness” (universal) from that
single aeroplane I have seen such that I would be able to carry along with me an idea of
“aeroplaness”. Thus, even if the one aeroplane I have seen is no more, I still have the ideas
of aeroplane with me such that once I see another aeroplane of different size, colour, model,
and so on, I would still be able to say, this is an aeroplane. The problem of particular and
universal is the problem of establishing which of the two instances of aeroplanes qualify as
the real aeroplane. Which knowledge of the aeroplane that I have qualifies as true
knowledge?

In a way, philosophers conceive the universals as properties of the objects (particulars). In

another way they tend to claim that the properties have more ontological existence than the
objects. But this is against common sense. Therefore, the problem of universals and
particulars “first is a problem about the ontology of properties; the second is a problem
related to explaining something about having properties.” (Hofweber, 2016). It is about
the nature of the universals and the particulars, on the relationship between universals and
the particulars, and the ontological status of universals and particulars. We may couch our
concern as questions thus: Are universals real? If yes, are universals the only real? Are
particulars real? If yes, are the particulars the only real? Are particulars and universals real
at the same time? If both are real what is the true relationship between them? The answers
which philosophers have given to these questions may surprise you. It is another
battleground for philosophical ideas.

3.2 The Ancient Origin of the Problem of Particulars and Universals

Plato is said to have originated the problem of universals and particulars. It arose following
Plato’s attempt to delineate the meaning of everyday words we use. Particularly, Plato was
concerned with the meaning of words like Justice, Beautiful, Goodness. He would want to
know what constitutes goodness, for example. Accordingly, Plato holds that the first place
to begin with is to identify individual objects, acts, persons and so on that can be said to be
good. We can then abstract the qualities by which they are said to be good, that is, that
which make the good object good, the good act good, and the good person good. This
abstracted common good by virtue of which all the things said to be good are good is
regarded by Plato as goodness. This goodness is regarded as the essence of all the good
things.

Plato regards such essences of things as ideas or forms. He holds that they live in the world
of forms and that they are the real whereas particular objects participate in them. “It is
something other than particular things, which particular things partake of. Not being
particular, it cannot itself exist in the world of sense. Moreover it is not fleeting or
changeable like the things of sense: it is eternally itself, immutable and indestructible.”
(Russell, 2008, p.43).

However, it was Aristotle who coined the term, universals. He goes ahead to offer the first
ever definition of it thus: “By the term ‘universal’ I mean that which is of such a nature as
to be predicated of many subjects, by ‘individual’ that which is not thus predicated.” Cf
Mumford 2003, p.145). It was from this definition that the understanding of universals as
properties of particulars emerged. The terms which are regarded as universal, according to
Aristotle cannot serve as subjects in a sentence.He holds further that universals are not
substances.

It is a “such”, not a “this” , a kind, not an individual thing. “It seems

impossible”, he says, “that any universal term should be the name of a
substance. For … the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar to it,
 which does not belong to anything else; but the universal is common, since
that is called universal which is such as to belong to more than one thing”.
(Cf.Mumford, 2003, p.145).

Aristotle’s idea of universals differs substantially from Plato’s. Plato believed that
universals exist in the world of forms and that particulars take their existence from the
universals. Aristotle on the other hand, believes that universals derive their existence from
particulars.

3.3 Making Sense of the Particulars

Bertrand Russell is famous, among other things, for offering us the operative definition of
particulars and universals. Every other definition of the terms is a mere modification of
Russell’s efforts as we shall show immediately with the example of the definition offered
by Fraser MacBride according to which “Particulars are entities whose embodiment is
restricted to a single location at any one time.” (MacBride, 2005, p.567). The definition
above emphasises the nature of the relationship which an entity holds with space and time
as definitive elements of particulars. And given that the elements are also descriptive of
matter, it is easy to see that particular refers to material objects that exist in the physical
world. Bertrand Russell, in making a distinction between universals and particulars, holds
that particulars are concerned with percepts, that is with the objects of acts of perception.
Thus, the particulars are what we perceive with the senses; the objects of sense experience.

One who wants to make a list of particulars will include in his or her list, names of ordinary
objects and things we see in the world. There would be a table, spoon, plate, book, pot, car,
chalk, soup, water, tissue, curtain, and so on. These constitute material objects in the
physical world. These objects can only be in one place at a time. It has the capacity to be
in another place different from where it currently is but at a different time. Thus, I can take
my chair to my office today. This chair which I sit as I write can only be in one place at a
time.

3.4 Making Sense of the Universals

Universals are defined as “entities unrestricted in the number of distinct locations at which
they may be simultaneously and wholly present.” (MacBride, 2005, p.567). Again
relational disposition towards space and time plays a role in the definition of universals.
This definition which emphasises relation with space and time can suffice if only we are
considering universals as properties of objects. Like when I say: the spoon is white. The
property of white can be said to exist on many other objects and at the same time. Thus we
can at the same time say: the spoon is white; the phone is white; the computer is white; the
car is white; the cup is black and so on. Notice that the quality or property of whiteness can
be in the various particular objects listed at the same time. However, this fact is not true of
the other type of universals - relations. It was Bertrand Russell who first held that universals
also appear as relations between two objects. We may give an example of this thus: Abuja
is the capital of Nigeria. The expression, capital of, connects Abuja and Nigeria. It is what
Nigeria and Abuja share. Relations as universals exists nowhere and at no time because it
transcends space and time. In the example we gave capital is no known location. The same
is true when I say: Paul is taller than Peter. The relational proposition, taller than, does not
exist anywhere in the world, or in the mind.

Russell, in making a distinction between universals and particulars, holds that universals
are concerned with concepts, that is with the objects of acts of conception. Thus, the
universals are what we conceive as opposed to the percepts, what we perceive with the
senses. Bertrand Russell is also interested in finding the universals as they appear in our
everyday speech. He holds that a sentence cannot be made which does not contain at least
one universal. He opines that proper names are particulars while pronouns are ambiguous
particulars. Other parts of speech like verbs, common nouns, adjectives, adverbs,
propositions, and so on are universals. Russell demonstrates that in speech adjectives and
common nouns express properties whereas prepositions and verbs express relations among
things (Russell, 2008).

The universals are opposed to particulars in so many ways. The universal has the capacity
of being shared by so many particulars at the same time. Remember the example of
goodness we gave earlier. Many objects, acts and even people can share in it. Let’s take the
colour black which can also be shared by many particulars as an example. Thus we can
speak of a black phone, a black man, a black board, a black car, a black bag, and so on. All
the particular items mentioned share in one universal blackness. It is universal that we
target when we give definitions of terms. In definitions we identify universal which
particular circumstances, acts or objects will partake in.

Particulars exist in the physical world, in the world of senses. Where do the universals
exist? One may say that they have their residence in the mind but Russell offers a strong
argument that dissuades this point. To say that they reside in the mind or are mental means
that they depend on thought for their existence. And if this were to be the case it may not
be possible for two persons to have the same thought about the same universals. They
appear in the mind only as objects of our thinking. What this means is that the universals
have existence outside of the mind, and outside of the physical world. However, it is with
the mind that universals are grasped. Universals persist. According to Russell, existence is
temporal in nature, things that exist do so in time. We can point at a time when they begin
to exist and in most cases when they cease to exist. The same thing cannot be said of
universals. So we do not say that universal exists. They persist and the place they persist is
in the world of beings. It is in this same world that numbers as you know them exist. “The
world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful to the mathematician, the logician,
the builder of metaphysical systems, and all who love perfection more than life.” (Russell,
2008, p.47).

3.5 Disagreements About the Universals and Particulars Among Medievals

Medieval philosophers introduced a major divide concerning the status of universals and
particulars. This divide is captured as the realist and nominalist schools of thought. The
realist school of thought upheld the reality of universals. In doing this they hold that
universals are the only things that exist. The most prominent realists was Avicenna.
According to Avicenna, particulars are not real. He hinged their unreality to their changing
nature. If the changing things are real we may not be able to know anything about anything.
Avicenna also held that the universals were what God created. Essentially, God knows the
universals and could not in any way have known the particulars. His argument is that the
universals do not change and given the nature of God as an unchanging being it would be
a contradiction for God to know things which change, for if God were to know changing
things it would also mean that God himself has changed. This is because God would have
to adjust himself to conform to the new change of particular things. (Adamson, 2005).

Nominalists on the other hand hold that universals are unnecessary. They derive their name,
nominalists, from the Latin word nomen- meaning name in English and accounts for their
belief. The nominalists believe that universals exist only in Language, in the words we say,
like goat, man, horse, tree, and so on. In real life, they hold that universals do not exist.
(marenbon, 2016). Among the most important nominalists was William of Ockam. He held
that by invoking the concept of universals, philosophers were unnecessarily introducing
useless concepts. Thus, a saying that emerged from his position is famously referred to as
Ockam’s razor which simply states that one should not multiply entities unnecessarily.
Read more about nominalism here.

3.6 The Nominalism of John Locke in the Modern Era

The modern era is reputed for its self-acclaimed break with the medieval era, and rejection
of Aristotlian and Ptolemic explanations about the world. Locke rejected the independent
existence of universals. He presented an argument that cast the universals as a creation of
human understanding in efforts to grasp truth. “It is plain [ ... ] that general and universal
belong not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the
understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas.”
(Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III, iii, 11).

Locke affirms particulars as the things that exist. When we use words that tend to suggest
universalism they merely reference particular things. For Locke, therefore, universalism
exists as ideas and has no life outside the mind. What is real must be able to exist outside
the mind, independent of it.

4.0 Conclusion
The problem of universals and particulars is one of the oldest problems of western
philosophy. Its essence is to delineate the zone of the real and to determine for us what
exists and in what sense it exists. Philosophers are content to argue that things exist as
universals and particulars, highlighting the manner in which they exist as such.

5.0 Summary
In this unit we have considered the problem of universals and particulars. We started by
stating the nature of the problem which is of concern to us. We also studied the ancient
origin of the problem in Plato and Aristotle by examining their views about the problem.
We also attempted an understanding of Particulars and universals. We also took a very
short look at the manner in which the medieval and modern philosophers considered the
idea of universal.

6.0 Tutor Marked Assignments

1. Discuss the problem of universal
 2. Compare and contrast Aristotle’s and Plato’s notion of universals
3. Distinguish between particulars and universals
4. Explain what led to Ockam’s position that entities should not be multiplied
unnecessarily

7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Reading

Adamson, P. (2005). “On Knowledge of Particulars.” In Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society, New Series, Vol. 105, pp. 257-278

Hayner, P. (1969). “Knowledge by Acquaintance.” In Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 423-431

Locke, J. (). Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III, iii, 11

Hofweber, T. (2016). Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics. Oxford: University

Press.

MacBride, F. (2005). “The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?”

In Mind, New Series, Vol. 114, No. 455, pp. 565-614.

Marenbon, J. (2016). Medieval Philosophy: A Short Introduction. Oxford: oxford

University Press

Russell, B. (2008). The Problems of Philosophy. Maryland: Arc Manor Books

Mumford, S. (eds). (2008). Russell on Metaphysics: Selections from the Writings of

Bertrand Russell. London & New York: Routledge

Unit 5: Appearance and Reality

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Intended Learning Outcomes
3.0 Main Content
3.1 The History of the Problem of Appearance and Reality
3.2 The Ancient Origin of Problem of Universals and Particulars
3.3 Making Sense of Particulars
3.4 Making Sense of Universals
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA)
7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Reading

1.0 Introduction
In the previous unit we studied the problem of universals. We told you that the problem of
universals is essentially about the problem of what exists. The discussion was whether what
exists is universal or particulars. One problem that would have struck you in considering
the problem of universals and particulars is the fact that you lost confidence about whether
you know what is real from what appears. You are not alone. In considering the question
of appearance and reality we shall operate at the intersection of metaphysics, epistemology
and natural philosophy (known today as physics). So tighten your belt for a very interesting
trip. In what follows we shall take a brief look at the problem of appearance and reality in
Western Philosophy.

2.0 Intended Learning Objectives

At the end of this unit, you will be able to
1. Trace the history of problem of appearance and reality

3.0 Main Content

3.1 The History of the Problem of Appearance and Reality
We first encountered the problem of appearance and reality in Unit 1 of Module 2 of this
course. If you recall it was introduced in our discussion of Parmenides’ notion of Being.
Thus, Parmenides could be said to have originated the philosophical idea that things are
not really as they appear. His take off point was the waxing and waning of the moon. The
moon appears to us to be waxing and waning at different times where the waxing generates
light which we see and the waning dims the light and therefore brings darkness. Parmenides
was the first person to reason that the moon, though it appears to wax and wane at different
times, does not change in reality. Indeed, the moon has no light in it but it appears to us as
if it gives out light.

So all reality, all being, the All, the real world is unchanging: the firm, the
lasting, the everlasting, hard firm matter. But what about appearance? It is
unreal, it is nothing: it is no thing. It is, like a shadow, both light and night: a
mere contrast, rather than a thing. And indeed, the waxing and waning of the
Moon is exactly a shadow - a play of shadows of 'light and night', as Parmenides
says again and again. Everybody knows that a shadow is unreal, deceptive,
untrue. And if this is what a shadow is, then light must also be untrue. (Popper,
1998, p.100)

As a result, Parmenides holds that true knowledge of reality which is unchanging and
eternal is gained only by reason whereas sensation only delivers opinion to us. The Greeks
of Parmenides’ era believed that only the gods possessed true knowledge whereas men
possessed false knowledge which he also called opinion. The consequence of regarding
men’s knowledge as false is the origin of philosophy’s distrust of experiential knowledge.
Plato, who regarded Parmenides highly, would later secure his philosophy firmly beyond
the reach of the senses in the world of forms. For Plato, reality cannot be found in things
as they appear in this world. The ancients’ concern with appearance and reality intensified
with Aristotle who disagreed with Parmenides and Plato. For Aristotle, the world of the
senses is the real world and not the world of ideas as promoted by Plato.

There are also modern examples to this. Matter provides a ready example to us. In unit 3
of Module 4 above we treated matter as an existing reality of a sort and a large chunk of
science is built on the belief that matter is real. In the mid 19th Century, Michael Faraday,
working in the field of physics, held that matter could only be recognized by the forces
acting on it and is not perceptible as initially thought by Descartes. On the basis of this,
Faraday argued that no reason exists to believe that matter exists. The Physical reality on
which we have rested our belief on the existence of matter does not consist of matter but
rather what he called fields which are mathematical structures defined by points and
numbers. (Holt, 2012). Thus, in the face of the role mathematical numbers play in
delineating reality, Frank Tipler holds that “at the most basic ontological level, the physical
universe is a concept.” (Tipler, 1997, p.209)

Distinguishing what is real from what appears, you will learn, is a serious philosophical
business. It is necessary if we must build our knowledge on a solid foundation.

References and Suggestions for Further Reading

Holt, J. (2012). Why Does the World Exist?: An Existential Detective Story. New York:
Liveright Publishing Corporation.

Tipler, F. (1997). The Physics of Immortality. New York: Anchor Books.

MODULE 3: ISSUES IN SPECIAL METAPHYSICS
Unit 1: Necessary and Contingent Beings
Unit 2: Mind-Body Problem
Unit 3: Freedom and Determinism
Unit 4: Immortality
Unit 5: The Best Possible World

MODULE 4: METAPHYSICS AND SCIENCE

Unit 1: Ontological Realism
Unit 2: Causality
Unit 3: The Problem of Induction
Unit 4: Space and Time
Unit 5: Metaphysical Foundation of Mathematics