1.
Haber v Walker (1963).
An example of a voluntary human action that could break the chain of causation for negligence may be where
a plaintiff who has suffered a minor leg injury due to the defendant’s negligence decides to jump off a roof,
breaking their leg. Here, the voluntary human action of the plaintiff would sever the connection between the
defendant’s actions and the harm now suffered. A voluntary human action by a third party could also break
the chain of causation – e.g. if the plaintiff with the minor leg injury was shot in the leg by a third party, that
would also sever the connection between the defendant’s actions and the harm now suffered.
2. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd,
commonly known as Wagon Mound (No. 1), is a landmark tort law case, which imposed a remoteness rule for
causation in negligence. The Privy Council[2] held that a party can be held liable only for loss that was
reasonably foreseeable. Contributory negligence on the part of the dock owners was also relevant in the
decision, and was essential to the outcome, although not central to this case's legal significance.
3. Donoghue v. Stevenson,
It is also known as the 'snail in the bottle case', is a significant case in Western law. The ruling in this
case established the civil law tort of negligence and obliged businesses to observe a duty of care towards their
customers. it established the general principle of the duty of care concept in law. The test was formulated by
Lord Atkin and it is generally referred to as the “neighbour test” or “neighbour principle”.
4. Wilkinson v Downton
Facts
Downton (D) made a joke to Mrs Wilkinson (W) that her husband, Thomas Wilkinson (T) had had an accident in
which both his legs were broken and that W should go to The Elms pub where T was lying to bring him home.
These statements were false but D intended them to be believed as true by W, who suffered a shock to her
nervous system as a result. W had no predisposition to nervous shock and the shock which caused her weeks
of suffering and incapacity was not a result of previous ill-health. W raised an action against D for
compensation for her illness and suffering due to the false representation made by D.
Issues
The issue in question was whether compensation could be made for a person’s illness and suffering following
the false representation made by the defendant, D.
Decision/Outcome
D had wilfully made a false representation to W intending to cause some physical harm to W, by infringing her
right to personal safety, with no justification for doing so. Although D did not intend the harm which was
caused, this ‘wilful injuria’ is malicious in law. The injury caused to W was not too remote and could have been
foreseen, and therefore taken to have been intented by D
5. Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (‘Hedley Byrne’
ISSUE
A negligent misstatement may give rise to an action for damages for economic loss. When a party seeking
information or advice from another – possessing a special skill – and trusts him to exercise due care, and that
party knew or ought to have known that the first party was relying on his skill and judgment, then a duty of
care will be implied.
Facts in Hedley Byrne
Hedley Byrne were advertising agents placing contracts on behalf of a client on credit terms. Hedley Byrne
would be personally liable should the client default. To protect themselves, Hedley Byrne asked their bankers
to obtain a credit reference from Heller & Partners (‘H&P’), the client’s bankers. The reference (given both
orally and then in writing) was given gratis and was favourable, but also contained an exclusion clause to the
effect that the information was given ‘without responsibility on the part of this Bank or its officials’. Hedley
Byrne relied upon this reference and subsequently suffered financial loss when the client went into liquidation.
Decision in Hedley Byrne
The court found that H&P’s disclaimer was sufficient to protect them from liability and Hedley Byrne’s claim
failed.
6. Ryland v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330
Liability under Rylands v Fletcher is regarded as a specific type of nuisance, a form of strict liability, where the
defendant may be liable without having been negligent.
In Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, the defendants employed independent contractors to construct a
reservoir on their land. The contractors found disused mines when digging but failed to seal them properly.
They filled the reservoir with water. As a result, water flooded through the mineshafts into the plaintiff’s mines
on the adjoining property. The plaintiff secured a verdict at Liverpool Assizes. The Court of Exchequer Chamber
held the defendant liable and the House of Lords affirmed their decision
This principle is that "the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. It requires non natural use of
land by the defendant and the escape of the things from his land which cause damages, is liable for
consequences of its escape even if he has not been negligent.
7. Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1968] an English tort law case that
applies the "but for" test of causation.[1][2]
Facts
After their night shift as night-watchmen, at about 8 am on 1 January 1966, three people went to
the emergency department of the hospital run by the Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee.
(They had already visited this hospital at about 4 am because an intruder had struck one of them in the head
with an iron bar.) They spoke to a nurse and told her that they had been vomiting since drinking tea at about
5 am. The casualty officer, Dr. Banerjee, did not see them. He advised the nurse, over the phone, that they
should go home and call their own doctors. One of them, Mr. Barnett, died about five hours later from arsenic
poisoning. Mrs. Barnett sued the hospital for negligence.
Judgment
The judge held that the hospital was not liable. Even if they were to have admitted Mr. Barnett, there would
have been little or no chance that the antidote would have been administered to him in time to prevent his
death.[2] Although the hospital had breached the standard of care, that breach was held to not be a cause of
Mr. Barnett's death.
A doctor’s refusal to treat a patient who appears before him after swallowing arsenic is not a cause of fact in
the patient’s subsequent death if it is established that even proper treatment would not have saved him.
However, if she did, the claim is nonetheless likely to fail due to a lack of proximity in time and space. This is
because she did not witness the accident involving Rhonda as she was setting out a picnic lunch and was
informed afterwards. Lord Ackner stated”it has been generally accepted that damages for merely being
informed of, or reading, or hearing about the accident are not recoverable. Accordingly, as Sherry neither
witnessed Rhonda’s accident nor the immediate aftermath it appears unlikely that her claim would succeed.
8. Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405
Law of Tort – Foreseeability – Negligence – Damages – Remoteness of Damage – Eggshell Skull Rule –
Causation
Facts
The complainant was employed as a galvaniser of steel for the defendants, Leech Brain & Co Ltd. He had been
working and operating a machine in the workplace, when a piece of molten metal burnt his lip, after he
stepped out from behind the protective shield. Although the burn was treated, he developed cancer and died
three years later. The complainant had a pre-cancerous condition, before the burn had taken place. When he
died, his widow brought a claim against Leech Brain & Co Ltd under the Fatal Accidents Act.
Issues
The issues in this case concerned whether the employers could be liable for the full extent of the burn and
cancer that had developed as a result or would a person’s predispositions matter in the award of damages.
Decision/Outcome
The defendants were held to be negligent and liable for damages to the complainant. The complainant burnt
his lip as a result of the defendant’s negligence in the workplace. The employers are liable for all of the
consequences of their negligence; thus, liable for the employee’s death. His predisposition to cancer did not
matter, nor did the results of the injury. The question of liability was whether the defendant could reasonable
foresee the injury. Lord Parker stated that the eggshell skull rule and taking the victim as you find them has
always been the established law and this was not affected by the ruling in the Wagon Mound case.
Judgement
It was held that the defendants had been negligent and were therefore liable for damages to the complainant.
Lord Parker stated:
If a man is negligently run over... it is no answer to the sufferer’s claim for damages that he would have
suffered less injury... if he had not had an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak heart [5]
The ratio decidendi is that a tortfeasor is liable for negligent damage, even when the claimant had a
predisposition that made that damage more severe than it otherwise would have been.
This strict liability approach in negligence now applies ONLY to personal injury;
To claim for damage to property, the claimant must now show that the loss is foreseeable.
Claiming for economic loss, typically an "assumption of responsibility" must be proven.
9. McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1
To satisfy causation, a claimant need only prove that the negligent behaviour most likely made a material
contribution to the injury.
Facts
The claimant, McGhee, contracted a skin condition (dermatitis) in the course of his employment with the
defendant, the National Coal Board. The defendant requested McGhee work with the brick kilns, but failed to
satisfy their statutory duty to provide a washing area to allow employees to remove the dust from the kilns at
the end of the day. Subsequently, employees could not wash off the dust till they returned home.
Two possible causes were identified for McGhee’s dermatitis: exposure to brick dust during the working day,
and the continued exposure received between the end of the day and being able to wash at home.
Issues
Could the defendant be found liable for the claimant’s injuries, or, as the defendant’s asserted, could the chief
relevant authority of Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 be distinguished on the grounds that it
could not be ascertained whether every skin abrasion of the claimant’s exposed to the brick dust was
responsible for his contracting dermatitis, whilst in Bonnington Castings it had been determined that all the
harmful silica breathed by the claimant had contributed to his injury.
Decision / Outcome
The House of Lords held that the instant case ought not be distinguished from Bonnington Castings; the
claimant did not need to prove that all of his abrasions and their exposure to brick dust had contributed to his
illness, but rather that the dust exposure stemming from the defendant’s negligent breach of statutory duty
had, on the balance of probabilities, materially increased the likelihood of him developing dermatitis( burden
of proof shifted from P to D)
10. Ward v Tesco Stores Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 810
Facts
The claimant was injured when they slipped on spilled yoghurt in the defendant’s store. The defendant
adduced evidence that they regularly inspected and cleaned the floors and had policies requiring staff to deal
with spillages as soon as they were detected. However, they gave no evidence on when that particular floor
had last been inspected or cleaned. The claimant sued the defendant in the tort of negligence.
Issues
To prove negligence, the claimant must show that the defendant breached their duty of care: that the
defendant failed to act as a reasonable person would in their position.
Where it is not possible for the claimant to prove what the accident’s cause was, the court will presume breach
1) if the defendant was in control of the situation and 2) the accident was not one which normally occurs
without carelessness. This is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The issue was whether these facts satisfied the requirement that the accident be one which does not normally
occur without negligence.
Decision / Outcome
The Court of Appeal held that this was an appropriate case for res ipsa loquitur. The second requirement is
made out whenever an event occurs which is unusual and (in the absence of a contrary explanation) is more
likely to be due to negligence than anything else.
Here, the area was under the defendant’s control and while it was unknown how long the spill had been there,
it was likely that it had been there long enough to be dealt with. As such, this accident was one which would
not normally occur without negligence. The burden of proving that it had not been there that long was
therefore on the defendant.
11. Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (1964) AC 465 (HL)
Introduction
In 1963 the House of Lords established that in limited circumstances – if a duty of care arose in the making of
statements – pure economic loss in tort could now be recoverable in English law.
Issues Raised by Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (‘Hedley Byrne’[1])
A negligent misstatement may give rise to an action for damages for economic loss. When a party seeking
information or advice from another – possessing a special skill – and trusts him to exercise due care, and that
party knew or ought to have known that the first party was relying on his skill and judgment, then a duty of
care will be implied.
Facts in Hedley Byrne
Hedley Byrne were advertising agents placing contracts on behalf of a client on credit terms. Hedley Byrne
would be personally liable should the client default. To protect themselves, Hedley Byrne asked their bankers
to obtain a credit reference from Heller & Partners (‘H&P’), the client’s bankers. The reference (given both
orally and then in writing) was given gratis and was favourable, but also contained an exclusion clause to the
effect that the information was given ‘without responsibility on the part of this Bank or its officials’. Hedley
Byrne relied upon this reference and subsequently suffered financial loss when the client went into liquidation.
Decision in Hedley Byrne
The court found that H&P’s disclaimer was sufficient to protect them from liability and Hedley Byrne’s claim
failed.
12. Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (1963)
Judgement
The mere fact that a man injured by another’s act give itself no cause of action; if the act is deliberate the
party injured will have no claim in law even though the injury is intentional, so long as the other party is
merely exercising a legal right : if the act involves lack of due care, again no case of actionable negligence
exists will arise unless the duty to be careful exists.
13. Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004;
Facts
Seven boys detained in a borstal – a type of youth detention centre, were working on an island under
them supervision of three officers. The borstal boys escaped from the island at night with the plaintiffs’
yacht and damaged it. The plaintiffs brought an action for damages against the Home Office which was in
control of the bostrals on grounds that the officers on the island were negligent as they failed to exercise
control and supervision over the boys. The Queen’s Bench held that the Home Office owed duty of care to
the plaintiffs, which was capable of giving rise to liability in damages. The Court of Appeal dismissed the
appeal by the Home Office.
Issue
(1) Does the Home Office owe duty of care to private persons with respect to persons undergoing
sentences of bostral training or the manner in which such persons were controlled while undergoing their
sentences?
Decision/Outcome
The appeal by the Home Office was dismissed.
(1) The borstal officers owe a duty to take such care as was reasonable in all the circumstances with the view
of preventing the persons under their control from causing damage if there is a manifest risk if this duty is
neglected.
(2) Public policy does not require that there should be immunity from action for borstal officers.
14. Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92
Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 (also titled Hay v Young) is a Scottish delict case, on the subject of how extensive
an individual's duty is to ensure others are not harmed by their activities
Facts
On 11 October 1938, Mr Young had been negligently riding a motorcycle along a road, and was involved in
a collision with a car, fatally injuring him. At the time of the crash, Mrs Bourhill was about to leave
a tram which she had been riding, around 50 ft from the scene of the accident. Mrs Bourhill heard the crash,
commenting "I just got in a pack of nerves, and I did not know whether I was going to get it or not." [1] Following
the removal of Mr Young's body from the road, she approached the scene of the accident, seeing the blood
remaining from the crash. Mrs Bourhill, at the time eight months pregnant, later gave birth to a stillborn child,
and claimed she had suffered nervous shock, stress and sustained loss due to Mr Young.
Judgement
In order to succeed in her claim, Mrs Bourhill had to establish a duty of care had been owed to her by Mr
Young. To find such a duty, the claimant must be foreseeable, or proximate to the scene of the accident.
[3]
The House of Lords denied that Mrs Bourhill had been foreseeable to Mr Young, at the time of the
accident. Lord Russell stated:
Can it be said that John Young could reasonably have anticipated that a person, situated as was the appellant,
would be affected by his proceeding towards Colinton at the speed at which he was travelling? I think not. His
road was clear of pedestrians. The appellant was not within his vision, but was standing behind the solid
barrier of the tramcar. His speed in no way endangered her. In these circumstances I am unable to see how he
could reasonably anticipate that, if he came into collision with a vehicle coming across the tramcar into
Glenlockhart Road, the resultant noise would cause physical injury by shock to a person standing behind the
tramcar. In my opinion, he owed no duty to the appellant, and was, therefore, not guilty of any negligence in
relation to her.
Leonard Duty of Care-Laura clearly owes Leonard a common-law duty of care on the same basis upon which
15. Re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co Ltd [1921] 3 KB 560
The extent of liability where the injuries resultant from tortious negligence are entirely unforeseeable.
Facts
Employees of the defendant had been loading cargo into the underhold of a ship when they negligently
dropped a large plank of wood. As it fell, the wood knocked against something else, which created a spark
which served to ignite the surrounding petrol fumes, ultimately resulting in the substantial destruction of
the ship. At first instance (arbitration), it was held that the reasonable unforeseeability of the outcome
meant that the defendant was not liable for the cost of the ship.
Issues
Can a defendant be held liable for outcome of events entirely caused by their (or their agents’) actions, but
which could not have been foreseen by either the party in question or any other reasonable party.
Decision / Outcome
The Court of Appeal adopted a strict liability approach to causation and assessing liability here and
subsequently held that the defendant was liable for all of the consequences that had resulted from their
negligent actions. The fact that the extent of these consequences was neither subjectively appreciated nor
objectively foreseeable was deemed irrelevant to such a determination. Notably, this authority would go on to
be replaced in the case of Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon
Mound) (No. 1) [1961] AC 388, however it has never been officially overturned in English law and theoretically
remains ‘good case law’, despite its lack of application.
16. Wagon mound 2(overseas tankship v miller steamship)
Brief Fact Summary. The defendants negligently caused oil to spill into the Port of Sydney. This spill did
minimal damage to the plaintiff’s ships. The oil subsequently caused a fire when molten metal dropped into
the water and ignited cotton waste floating in the port. The fire destroyed the ships.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. If a party did nothing to prevent the injury, he is liable for the foreseeable
consequences of his actions, even if the consequences are remote.
Facts. The defendants are the owners of the vessel Wagon Mound, which was moored 600 feet from a wharf.
The plaintiffs are owners of ships docked at the wharf. Due to the defendant’s negligence, furnace oil was
discharged into the bay causing minor injury to the plaintiff’s ships. However, the oil was then ignited when
molten metal dropped from the wharf and came into contact with cotton waste floating on the water’s
surface. The fire that resulted seriously damaged the wharf and two of the plaintiff’s ships.
Issue. Whether the fire, which was found to be foreseeable to the reasonable man, was reasonably
foreseeable to the extent liability attaches.
Held.
If a reasonable man can foresee and prevent the risk, then he is liable for the foreseeable damages.
Discussion
. Based on the trial court’s findings, it is true that the Wagon Mound’s operators would have foreseen that oil
spilling into the harbor had a possibility of causing a fire, but would have only a very low probability. A fire
could only result under exceptional circumstances. However, because the risk of fire was foreseeable, the
defendants bore a duty to prevent the risk, even if the risk was a remote possibility.
17. Wagon Mound 1 ( Overseas tankship ltd v morts dock engineering co ltd
Brief Fact Summary. The defendants negligently caused oil to spill into the Port of Sydney and do minimal
damage to the plaintiff’s wharf. The oil subsequently caused a fire when molten metal dropped into the water
and ignited cotton waste floating in the port.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The natural consequences rule is overruled and reasonable foreseeability test is
adopted.
Facts. The Plaintiff, Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. (Plaintiff), operated a dock in the Port of Sydney. The
Defendants were the owners of the vessel Wagon Mound (Defendants). Wagon Mound was moored 600 feet
from the Plaintiff’s wharf when, due the Defendant’s negligence, she discharged furnace oil into the bay
causing minor injury to the Plaintiff’s property. However, the oil was ignited when molten metal dropped from
the wharf and came into contact with cotton waste floating on the water’s surface. The fire seriously damaged
the wharf and two ships docked there.
Issue.
Whether the fire that destroyed the Plaintiff’s wharf was a foreseeable consequence of the Defendant’s
negligence.
Held. The injury to Plaintiff’s property, though a direct result of the defendant’s negligence, was an
unforeseeable consequence and liability does not attach.
