Despite the fact that the term “mens rea” does not appear in the IPC, its

essence is reflected in almost all of its provisions. In some form or another,

every offence created under the IPC virtually imports the concept of criminal
intent or mens rea. In the end, Chapter IV on General Exceptions
enumerates the situations that appear irreconcilable with the existence of the
needed guilty mentality or mens rea, therefore absolving the perpetrators of
criminal liability. A crime committed by a person under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, or by a child under the age of seven, or by a mentally ill
person, for example, does not constitute an offence since the mental
element, or mens rea, is lacking. Thus, the chapter on General Exceptions
acknowledges the common law doctrine of mens rea, although indirectly. 

The Supreme Court declared in Ravule Hariprasada Rao v State (1951) that

unless legislation expressly or by essential inference excludes mens rea as a
component ingredient of a crime, a person should not be judged guilty of an
offence unless he possessed a guilty mind at the time of the conduct. It was
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v Mayer Hans
George(1964), in which it was declared, among other things, that the
common law notion of mens rea does not apply to statutory offences in
India. As a result, there is a presumption that mens rea is a necessary
component of a statutory offence.

It can be rebutted, however, by the exact words of the statute that created
the offence or by necessary inference. Following that, in Nathulal v State of
Madhya Pradesh(1965) and Kartar Singh v State of Punjab(1961), Justice K
Subbarao, sitting for the Supreme Court, emphasised that the element of
mens rea must be read into statutory criminal provisions unless a statute
expressly or by necessary inference throws it out.

Concurrence of actus reus and mens rea  

A criminal purpose must exist at the same time as a criminal act, according
to the concept of chronological concurrence. There must be a concurrence
between the Mens rea and the actus reus.

What happens if D possesses the mens rea for a certain crime at some point
and then does an act that meets the physical prerequisites for that crime,
but the mental state was not present at the time the act was committed? For
instance, D stabs his victim with the intent of killing him, but only wounds
him, and then tosses the corpse into a river, believing the victim is dead. Is
drowning the true cause of death? You mistakenly grab someone’s umbrella
from a restaurant, discover it’s not yours after 5 minutes, and decide to keep
it. Have you ever committed theft, which is defined as the stealing of another
person’s property with the aim to deprive him of it? The following are the
important points in this regard.
  The fact that he later acquired the requisite mental state is
irrelevant.
 Concurrence must be with the act rather than the outcome.
 A change of mind will not make the crime go away.
 Concurrence can apply to any act that causes legal injury.
 The act must be caused by a mental condition. There are a few
exceptions which include insanity, involuntary intoxication, mistake
of fact and Offence by a minor.
What happens if the D has the essential mens rea for one crime but his act
fulfils the criteria for another? For example, suppose D plans to perform a
simple assault on his victim, but the victim turns out to be a haemophiliac
and bleeds to death unpredictably? At least in the case of crimes
characterised in terms of undesirable outcomes, there must be an agreement
between the mens rea and the adverse result. (For example, homicide, rape,
and so on)

Thus, if the harm that really occurs is completely different from what the D
intended, resulting in a different, more heinous crime, the D will not be found
guilty of the more serious crime. The general idea is that if the actual injury
is greater and connected to the desired result, there is no liability for the
greater harm. If the actual harm is less severe than that intended and of the
same broad nature but is related to a different and less serious crime, the D
is accountable for the less serious crime.

In Mohindar Singh vs The State (1959), the Court held that the offence is
determined by the existence of both mens rea and an actus reus. Both parts
of the crime must be present, and proof of guilty purpose without the overt
Act, or proof of a deed not prompted by any criminal intent, will not result in
a conviction. The prosecution must prove both parts of the crime by
demonstrating that the accused did anything that, in law, would constitute an
intention to commit an offence and that in doing so, he was motivated by a
desire to achieve a clear objective, which constituted the specific crime.

In Fowler v. Padget(1798), the Court held that Actus reus and mens rea are
both required for the commission of a crime. Lord Kenyon stated, “Actus non
facit reum nisi mens sit rea is a tenet of natural justice and our law.” To be a
crime, both the intent and the act must be present. This was a bankruptcy-
related case.

The instances where mens rea is not

considered
In modern times, a large number of criminal offences have been developed
in which no indication of intent or other mental condition is required. The
absence of mens rea has traditionally been associated with a few crimes,
such as statutory rape, in which knowledge that the victim is under the age
of consent is not required for liability, and bigamy, in which the parties
believe they are free to marry in good faith. A number of regulations
regulating economic or other actions usually known as public welfare
offences with low fines do not need mens rea to be demonstrated.

Strict liability
 A number of offences are considered under strict liability, even if they are
committed without the presence of a guilty mind. Actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea  has a couple of exceptions.

 Criminal libel
 Public nuisance (Hicklin Test) 
 Contempt of court 
 Abduction/Kidnapping 
 Bigamy 
 Waging war
 Sexual harassment
 Rape
 Selling of obscene books
 Essential Commodities Act, 1955
 Motor Vehicles Act,1988
The Supreme Court distinguished between taking and allowing a minor in the
case of S.Varadrajan v. State of Madras (1964). According to the Court, just
having a role in assisting the girl’s fulfilment of her objective does not
constitute taking. That component falls short of inducing the minor to flee
her authorised guardian’s custody and, as a result, is not equal to taking.

The two terms are not interchangeable. There are distinctions between the
two. In this case, the accused did not remove her from the custody of her
legal guardian. In a case such as this, the accused individual must establish
some kind of incentive or active participation in the creation of the minor’s
intention to leave the guardian’s house. She willingly accompanied him, and
the law did not place any obligation on him to return her to her father’s
house or even to tell her not to. There was no taking in this case. S.
Varadrajan was found not guilty.

Mens rea and actus reus : a distinction 

Mens rea and actus reus were inherently connected in common law doctrine.
Liability necessitated a guilty mind as well as a wrong act. However, it’s
questionable whether this most fundamental organising distinction is
consistent and effective in defining offence requirements. 

 The requirements for actus reus do not all have to be ‘acts’ or even
objective in character. For example, a circumstance element of a
crime could be completely abstract, such as “being married” in
bigamy or “without licence” in trespassing. Indeed, actus reus
aspects might include simply subjective mental states, such as the
need to instil “fear” in theft or the absence of “consent” in rape.
 The mens rea theories aren’t all “state of mind” criteria, nor are
they even subjective. The mens rea part of negligence, for example,
is a failure to fulfill an objective norm of attentiveness rather than
being subjective or a state of mind.
 Furthermore, the mens rea and actus reus criteria serve no separate
functions. Many aspects of the actus reus, including the
voluntariness portion of the voluntary act requirement in
commission offences, the physical capacity requirement in omission
offences, and the possession offence requirement that the person
has possession for a period sufficient to terminate possession, all
contribute to determining whether a violation is blameworthy.
 While many components of the actus reus define a criminal activity,
such as the conduct and circumstance elements of the offence
definition, some features of mens rea, such as the culpability criteria
in inchoate offences, serve the same purpose of defining banned
conduct.
 The mens rea refers to factors that need the defendant to be in a
certain state of mind or to be negligent, while the actus rea refers to
all other crime requirements, which are typically divided into
behaviour, circumstances, and results.
In R v. Tolson(1889), Mrs. Tolson was married in 1890. In December 1881,
her spouse went missing. He had been on a ship that had gone missing at
sea, she was told. She also enquired about her husband’s older brother. She
married another six years later, assuming her spouse had died. The second
husband was completely aware of the circumstances. Her husband returned
11 months after their wedding date. Under Section 57 of the Offences
Against Persons Act, 1861, she was charged with bigamy. The reason for this
was that she had married for the second time in less than seven years. She
did so with the best of intentions. This part was devoid of any mention of the
guilty mind. She was given the benefit of the doubt defence because it was
reasonable to believe her husband was deceased in the circumstances. She
was found not guilty. Honest and reasonable error is on the same level as the
absence of the thinking faculty in childhood and the maintenance of that
faculty in madness. Unless expressly excluded or by necessary inference,
these exclusions apply equally to statutory offences. The  actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea  was applied by the Court.