Acquittal of Lucila Valero in Murder Case
Acquittal of Lucila Valero in Murder Case
The surprising finding of the trial Judge goes far beyond mere
observation on the manner a witness testified, which admittedly may
be considered subjectively by the Judge in evaluating the credibility
of the witness. The surprising finding of the Judge relates not only to
the credibility of a witness but to the sanity of the defendant. Its aim
is not only to weigh the testimony of the witness but to establish a
motive for the crime charged.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra, in its 1. WON the court was correct in relying on the testimonies of
Criminal Case No. 626, finding the two appellants Juan Brioso and Bernal and Tumalip.
Mariano Taeza guilty of murder, and sentencing each to suffer life 2. WON the court was correct in not admitting the affidavit of
imprisonment and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Antonio for being hearsay.
Silvino Daria in the sum of P6,000.00 but without subsidiary Ruling:
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
1. Yes. The testimony of Bernal was corroborated by the
Facts: declaration of the victim himself, who told his wife that it
was Brioso and Taeza who shot him. The declaration is
Silvino Daria and his wife Susana Tumalip were in their house on
admissible under the rule on ante-mortem statements.
December 23 1966. Daria was making rope while Tumalip was
Judging from the nature and extent Daria’s wounds, he must
applying candle wax to a flat iron. Cecilia Bernal, their niece and have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be
neighbour, was alarmed by the barking of dogs. When she peeped safely inferred that he made such statements under the
through a crack in the wall of her house, she saw appellants Juan consciousness of an impending death.
Brioso and Mario Taeza walking in the direction of the spouses’
house with Brioso carrying a long gun and Taeza, a short weapon. 2. Yes. Antonio’s affidavit was properly rejected as hearsay
She testified that she saw appellants point the gun at the bamboo evidence. The said affidavit was neveridentified by the
wall of the house and fired two shots. Tumalip testified that right supposed affiant and there was no opportunity for
after Daria was shot, she rushed to his side and he told her it was prosecution to cross-examine him because he was not
Brioso and Taeza who shot him. He died one hour later. After a few presented during trial. As stated in the case of People v.
days, Tumalip and Bernal executed affidavits naming herein Mariquina affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial
appellants as the killers. proceedings as hearsay, unless the affidavits themselves are
placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
Affidavits are generally classified as hearsay evidence; they are objectionable on
hearsay grounds ; they are not admissible evidence of the facts they
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the sentence under appeal is affirmed, narrate. These affidavits must first be formally offered and admitted in evidence
with the sole modification that the amount of the indemnity is before the court may consider their contents.
increased to P12,000.00.
Thus, in People vs. Parayno (1968), 24 SCRA 3, 17, affidavits of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES prosecution witnesses and the record of the preliminary investigation
“were offered as exhibits” and “legally before the Court” and were
thus properly considered. And again, in People vs. Tarrayo, L-
vs
26489,April 21, 1969, a capital case, the transcript of stenographic
notes taken at the preliminary investigation was received in evidence
GAUDENCIO MONGADO, JILLY SEGADOR, and BELESANDE
after the accused pleaded guilty. It was thus also appropriately
SALAR
utilized by the court. The fundamental rule on this point is found in
Section 35, Rule 132, Rules of Court, which provides that “the court
Facts: GAUDENCIO MONGADO, JILLY SEGADOR, and shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.” It is the duty
BELESANDE SALAR were accused of robbery with double of the judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only
homicide and rape. The victims were the spouses Silvino Lacuna and and strictly upon the evidence adduced. 6Here, the affidavits of
Emilia Dalit who both died. The accused pleaded guilty during admission have not been formally offered, much less admitted, in
arraignment. The trial court, without taking any evidence, but taking evidence. They cannot be taken into account.
only the stock of the affidavits of admission of the three accused, as
attached to the record, found that the Commission of the crime
charged was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
ignominy, evident premeditation, dwelling and abuse of confidence
for all the three accused, and recidivism, all offset only by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty. The court,
accordingly, sentenced the three to suffer the penalty of death for the
crime of robbery with double homicide and rape, to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the plus the value of the things
taken by the accused but not recovered.
Issue: WON the affidavits constitute hearsay evidence?
Issue
WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or
loss of his criminal records.
Held
Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy
Feria vs CA, GR No. 122954 and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and
as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It
Facts secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention
After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue
of the judgment, was lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful
the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a
Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or
continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void
violative of his constitutional right to due process. as to such excess. Petitioner’s claim is anchored on the first ground
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the considering, as he claims, that his continued detention,
records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction,
nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy is violative of his constitutional right to due process.Based on the
would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is
filed with the court which rendered the decision. sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of
petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the
copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other
words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He
sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?".
detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and Eulalia held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying
prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away.
process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public
authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the
validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to Issue:
show that the restraint is illegal. WON the dying declaration made by the victim sufficient to convict
When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party the accused.
who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus.
Held:
A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To
be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite
everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his
statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full
expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in
People v. de Joya,
respect of such fact. The statement as offered must not be merely a
203 SCRA 343 (1991)
part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be
complete as far it goes. It is immaterial how much of the whole affair
of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the
Facts:
declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption
The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together
cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which
with their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia
the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not
Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are living together.
receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole
Both spouses are teachers by profession.in the afternoon of January
might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if
31, 1978, Herminia left for school to teach. Her mother was then
the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no
sittingat their sofa watching the television set. Alvin likewise left for
objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been
school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his
able to tell. Since the declarant was prevented from saying all that he
classes were dismissed and he proceeded home. At around 3:00
wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the
o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses Valencia's
statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete
neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend,
declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness
went out of the former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard,
which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are
Gloria Capulong looked back to the direction of the Valencia's
received.
house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding
a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's. When Alvin reached home, he
saw his grandmother lying down prostrate and drenched with her
In this case, the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was The events are as follows:
incomplete. The words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a o Katherine Montes, Maylin Montes, a certain Flory
sensible sentence. The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related (insignificant), and MARILYN slept at a resthouse
to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's owned by an Atty. Andrade. The parents of the
question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?" The deceased Monteses slept at the house of Atty. Andrade.
was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible o The resthouse was 8 meters away from the house of
communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by Andrade.
uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name her o They slept at around 7PM.
killer. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate o Apparently, they were suddenly roused at 3AM, and
what the rest of her communication might have been had death not Maylin allegedly saw Dunig stabbing MARILYN
interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a in the neck three times, and after, all of them ran to
dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody the house 8 meters away. MARILYN collapsed at
deed. the door to the house.
o Katherine corroborated Maylin’s version, and also
Escolin: Justices Relova and Francisco and I disagree with this claimed she saw Dunig running away after she
decision. Under the context, what else could have “Si Paqui” meant heard MARILYN screaming. She ran to the house
other than that he was responsible for the crime? ahead of MARILYN and heard MARILYN say
“Nanay, Nanay, sinaksak ako ni Pico.” [Pico is
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PACIFICO DUNIG Y Dunig’s nickname]
RODRIGUEZ o Teresita Montes declared that at about 9 o'clock in
GR 101799 | November 6, 1992 the morning of April 4, 1990, she saw Pico and her
niece MARILYN quarreling. At about 3 o'clock the
Ponente: J. CRUZ following morning, she was awakened when
Marilyn knocked at her door. Marilyn's neck was
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari bleeding, and she cried to her: "Nanay, nanay,
assailing the RTC decision. (automatic review) (OSG appealed) bigyan ninyo ako ng katarungan dahil sinaksak ako
ni Pico." A minute later, she died. Behind Marilyn
FACTS: were Maylin, Katherine and Flory.
On April 4, 1990, MARILYN Canatoy, 14 years old, from o Dr. Cruz informed the court that Marilyn died of
multiple stab wounds to the neck. An Information was filed hemorrhage due to multiple stab and incised wounds
charging Pacifico Dunig with murder, said attack being in the neck. He opined uncertainly that the victim
coupled with treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of might or might not have been able to speak or
superior strength. run to the house after the stabbing.
The Prosecution presented 3 witnesses, plus the doctor who Dunig interposed the defense of denial and alibi, claiming he
testified on the cause of death: one Katherine Montes, one was alone in a nipa hut in Matinbubong, San Ildefonso,
Maylin Montes, and their mother Teresita Montes. Bulacan, where he went to sleep at 9 p.m. and awoke the
following morning at 6 o'clock. He swore he was not in the looked like a shadow" and concluded it was Dunig. Assuming the
resthouse where, and at the time, Marilyn was killed. sisters did wake up when MARILYN screamed, it would have taken
RTC disbelieved and convicted Dunig. some time before their eyes could get accustomed to the darkness.
The OSG appealed and asked for reversal of the RTC Yet both said they immediately recognized the accused-appellant.
conviction.
During the direct examination of Maylin, she agreed it was
“so dark”, no lights from the resthouse, nor from outside (not
ISSUE: Whether or not the dying declaration can sustain the even from the moon), and that she couldn’t even see anyone
conviction. who would enter the resthouse. Even the judge asked how
she could have seen if it was dark.
HELD: No sufficient basis to convict. Pacifico Dunig is o When asked how she could be sure it was Dunig, she
ACQUITTED. claimed it was because Dunig was already at the
resthouse that afternoon seated at the pavement.
RULING:
To be sure, the defense of DENIAL is a weak defense. For it to During the direct examination of Katherine, she claimed “it
prosper, (1) it must be proved he was not in the actual place where was not too dark”. When asked how it was pitch dark inside,
the crime happened, AND (2) that it was physically impossible for she claimed it was not too dark “and a shadow passed by
him to be at the site at the time. Alibi is unquestionably a weak me”. [she could only see a shadow!] and that it was a person.
defense, and it is clearly so in the case at bar. Dunig has not o When asked how she could be sure it was Dunig, she
presented a single witness to corroborate him, and his alibi placed merely claimed because she saw the shadow, and
him at the nipa hut which was only ONE kilometer away from the immediately concluded it was Dunig.
resthouse.
As regards the mother’s testimony, the import of it lies in the
HOWEVER, it has been repeatedly stressed that a person's supposed dying declaration of MARILYN.
conviction must rest not on the weakness of his defense but on the
strength of the prosecution. The accused can rely on the If it is true that the victim did make the statement before she died, it
constitutional presumption of his innocence. It is for the prosecution should qualify as a dying declaration and so can be considered an
to overcome that presumption with convincing proof that the exception to the hearsay rule. Nonetheless, it cannot be
accused is guilty; otherwise, he must be absolved. In the case at bar, automatically accepted as a truthful accusation and is still subject
the prosecution has not proved its case. to the test of credibility. A dying declaration is entitled to the highest
credence on the theory that a person who knows he is on the verge of
The testimonies of the two alleged eyewitnesses to the killing are not death is not likely to make a false accusation. However, the
believable. While insisting that she saw Dunig stab MARILYN, declaration, albeit presumably in good faith, may still be based on an
Maylin also admitted that it was pitch dark when they awoke and erroneous identification of the declarant's killer.
there was not a single light in the resthouse or nearby. (Or from the
moon either, for that matter.) Katherine said she only saw "what
In the case at bar, it has been established by the testimonies of the conviction of the accused-appellant could add another victim in this
Montes sisters that the resthouse was dark, if not, indeed, completely case.
dark. Like the other there girls who were sleeping with her, Marilyn
could not possibly have seen the person who was attacking her. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: the appealed decision is REVERSED
At best, she could probably only surmise it was Dunig, but that was a and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and
most uncertain identification. A surmise is not evidence. A man's must be released immediately. It is so ordered.
honor and liberty cannot be forfeited because the victim supposedly
pointed to him as her killer although she could not possibly have
seen the person who was stabbing her in the dark.
At that, we cannot even be certain that the dying Marilyn really made
that declaration against Dunig. It must also be noted that the doctor
who autopsied the victim's body was not sure if Marilyn would have
been able to speak at all after she was stabbed because of the severity
and location of her wounds. Significantly, the statement she
supposedly made to Teresita was strenuously long for a person who
died a minute later. Teresita makes much of the quarrels of Marilyn
and Pico to bolster her belief that Dunig is the girl's killer. Such
quarrels, if true, may be evidence of motive but not necessarily of
murder. In fact, Katherine said that the day before Marilyn was
killed, Dunig was in the resthouse and apparently in good spirits, as
he was strumming his guitar and singing.
A life has been taken and justice demands that the wrong be
redressed. But the same justice that calls for retribution cannot
convict the prisoner at bar whose guilt has not been proved. Justitia
est duplec, viz., severe puniens et vere praeveniens.1 Even as this
Court may punish, so too must it protect. Conceivably, the
1
Justice is two-fold; severely punishing and truly preventing
These postulates are explained in the Courts adjudication of this
appeal from the Decision dated November 19, 1992 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bais City convicting Accused Edelciano Amaca of
murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Facts:
On December 17, 1990, an Information was filed by Bais City
Prosecutor Epifanio E. Liberal, Jr. against Appellant Amaca and one
known only by his alias Ogang, charging them with murder.
A warrant for the arrest of accused-appellant was issued on January
16, 1991. However, this was returned unserved on two different
occasions for the reason that the subject had already changed address
and his whereabouts [were] unknown.
Jurisdiction over the person of appellant was acquired by the said
court only on July 1, 1991 when he was arrested by police
authorities.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Thereafter, reinvestigation was conducted but the prosecutor,
EDELCIANO AMACA @ EDDIE and JOHN DOE @ OGANG,
reiterating his prima facie findings, resolved to continue the
accused, EDELCIANO AMACA @ EDDIE, accused-appellant.
prosecution of the accused.
G.R. No. 110129. August 12, 1997
Arraigned on September 25, 1991, the accused-appellant, assisted by
PANGANIBAN, J.: Atty. Ondoy, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued in due
course.
Topic: Rule: 130 Sec. 36 - Dying Declaration
Upon trial the court discovered the following:
The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to identify
the assailant in the case at hand. However, the accused cannot be To prove the injuries sustained by the victim, Wilson Vergara, and
convicted of murder attended by treachery, because the his cause of death, the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar P. Pialago, a
Information charged him with murder qualified only by evident resident physician of the Guihulngan District Hospital, Guihulngan,
premeditation. Statement of the Case Negros Oriental.
Procedural History: Upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw the victim already
on board a Ford Fiera pick up ready for transport to the hospital. He
inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former answered
he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was case where the declarants death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the
shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he was shot. declaration is complete in itself. All these concur in the present case.
Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim said that he was
The appellant contends that had he survived, the declarant would not
about to die. (TSN, p. 22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked, the
have been a competent witness to identify his assailant. He
victim identified himself as Nelson (sic) Vergara. He was able to
emphasizes that the victim was shot twice at the back at nighttime
reduce into writing the declaration of victim Vergara, and have the
and that x x x the witness/victim based on the foregoing
latter affixed (sic) his thumbmark with the use of his own blood in
circumstance was not able to see the alleged assailants x x x.
the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor.
We are not persuaded. True, the victim, Wilson Vergara, was hit at
The trial court rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty of
the back by two bullets. But as the prosecution clearly showed by
murder.
other evidence, Wilson did not lose consciousness upon being
Issue: shot. In fact, his ante mortem statement clearly indicates that he
was able to see and recognize who shot him. In this light, appellant
Whether the dying declaration was sufficient to identify and convict
is assailing the credibility, not the competency, of the victim.
the accused.
Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum ability to
Held: observe, record, recollect and recount as well as an
understanding of the duty to tell the truth. Appellant does not
Yes. The appeal is partially granted. The appellant is guilty only of dispute that the victim was capable of observing and recounting the
homicide, not murder, and civil indemnity shall not be awarded to occurrences around him; appellant merely questions whether the
the heirs of the deceased. victim, under the circumstances of this case, could have seen his
Dying Declaration Sufficient to Identify Assailant assailant. In effect, appellant challenges merely the credibility of the
victims ante mortem statement.
A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly
unthinkable for one who is aware of his impending death to accuse We hold that the serious nature of the victim’s injuries did not affect
falsely or even carelessly anyone of being responsible for his his credibility as a witness since said injuries, as previously
foreseeable demise. Indeed, when a person is at the point of death, mentioned, did not cause the immediate loss of his ability to perceive
every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the and to identify his shooter.
most powerful consideration to speak the truth. This is the rationale The defense attempts to cast doubt on the genuineness of the dying
for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 declaration by suggesting that since the relationship between
of the Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the CAFGU and the PNP is marred by jealousy, suspicion and general
deceased made the declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) dislike for one another, Police Officer Mangubat had enough
the declarant would have been a competent witness had he survived; motive to falsely implicate appellant who was a CAFGU
(3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances member. The defense also asks: Why was the alleged dying
of the declarant’s death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal declaration of the victim merely thumbmark (sic) when in fact he
was still coherent, conscious and very capable of writing his name at could have been called to the witness stand by accused-appellant.
that time? Additionally, the defense questions why Wagner Cardenas Besides, it is the prosecutor’s prerogative to choose his own
who signed the ante mortem statement as witness was not presented witnesses to prove the Peoples cause.
as such by the prosecution.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Courts conscience rests easy
The foregoing ulterior-motive theory is thoroughly unconvincing. with the moral certainty that indeed accused-appellant committed the
Clearly, it does not destroy the genuineness of the ante mortem crime charged. His pretense at innocence is futile in view of the
statement. Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under the law to overwhelming evidence presented against him. Even his flight --
have regularly performed his duty. There is nothing in the eluding the police for almost six months after the issue of the warrant
circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which for his arrest -- clearly bespeaks his guilt.
shows any semblance of irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned Decision is
frame Appellant Amaca. As aptly noted by the trial court, even
hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Edelciano Amaca is found
appellant testified that he had no previous misunderstanding
GUILTY of homicide and SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty
with Police Officer Mangubat and knew no reason why the latter
of ten years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
would falsely testify against him. This dismal failure of the defense
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. No civil
to show any ill motive on the part of said police officer adds
indemnity is awarded. No costs.
credence to Mangubats testimony.
SO ORDERED
Moreover, that the declarant attested to his ante mortem statement
through his thumbmark in his own blood is sufficient to sustain the
genuineness and veracity thereof. This manner of authentication is
understandable in view of the necessity and urgency required by the
attendant extreme circumstances. It cannot be indicative of any
ulterior motive on the part of Police Officer Mangubat. We have
clearly ruled that an ante mortem statement may be authenticated
through the declarants thumbmark imprinted with his own blood, and
serve as evidence in the form of a dying declaration in a criminal
case involving his death. Verily, such declaration need not even be in
writing and may be proven by testimony of witnesses who heard it.
Finally, the non-presentation of Wagner Cardenas as witness during
the trial is not fatal, as his testimony would have been merely
corroborative of Mangubats. In addition, the presumption that
evidence omitted by a party would be adverse if presented does not
obtain in this case, since Wagner Cardenas is also available and
the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latter’s mother of the
abduction.
On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-
pusher arrested by the police on August 5, 1991, and hence, was
never kidnapped.
Respondent Amaca and Ogang are accussed of conspiring with each other resulting to the death of a
certain Wilson Vergara.
That the respondents have mutually helped one another and with evident premeditation and at nigh time
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a use of firearm the
victim who as a result thereof suffered a fatal gunshot wound which immediately caused his death.
The Trial Court found the accused Amaca guilty of the crime of Murder
The decision of the trial court was based on the testimonies that the prosecution has presented.
One of the witness was Mangubat, a member of the PNP Canlaon City, who testified that after the
shooting incident, he was able to inquire with the victim when it was in the hospital regarding who shot
him and the victim responded that he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang, and that he did not know the
reason why he was shot. When asked of his condition he responded that he was about to die.
The victim was able to reduce his declaration in writing and affixed his thumb mark with the use of his
blood on the same.
Through the ante-mortem statement of the victim, the department of justice was able to find a prima
facie case against the accused.
Issue:
W/N the ante mortem statement of the victim can be considered as part of the res gestae even if the same
was considered to be as a dying declaration?
Ruling: Yes it can be considered and recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule for being a res gestae.
The Ante mortem statement can be admitted in evidence when considered as part of the res gestae which
is another recognized exception to the hearsay rule provided specifically under Rule 30 Section 36 of the
rules of court.
Below are the requisites for the admissibility of statements as part of the res gestae
o The statement is spontaneous
o It is immediately before, during or after a startling occurrence
o It relates to the circumstances of such occurrence
The above requisites are fulfilled and met in the case at bar where the statement subject of the discussion
was made immediately after the shooting incident and more importantly the victim had no time to
fabricate.
The Ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as a dying declaration and as part of the res
gestae, this dual admissibility is not redundant and has the advantage of ensuring the statement’s
appreciation by the courts, particularly where the absence of one or more elements in one of the said
exceptions may be raised in issue. In this manner the identification of the culprit is assured.
Accused is found be guilty of homicide.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
1. Accused-appellant was charged for violation of Presidential Decree 1866, (possession, custody and control
one .38 cal. revolver, marked Squires Bingham with SN 180169 with three live ammunitions without
authority of law), which firearm was used with treachery and evident premeditation in shooting one
Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which caused death. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
2. The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery.
3. Accused-appellant filed a motion to reconsider the decision which, however, was denied.
4. The facts as found by the court a quo are as follows: That in the evening of February 24, 1989, while
Rosalina and her husband (Leonardo Bolima) were sleeping inside their house, they were awakened by the
loud knocks on their door; Her husband opened the door and they saw that the person who was knocking
was their "Pareng Troping", accused herein; her husband invited the accused, who appeared to be very
drunk, to come inside their house; she saw the accused showing a gun to her husband and the latter even
toyed with it; she took a few steps away from the two, however, when she looked back to the place where
her husband and the accused was, she found out that the two had already left; five minutes later and/or after
she had heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their door and at the same time
informing her that he accidentally shoot (sic) her husband, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko
sinasadya"; accused extended his help by helping them in carrying the victim towards the main road,
however, after a few steps, he changed his mind and put down the victim; accused reasoned out that the
victim was already dead; she pushed the accused and even without the latter's help, they were able to reach
the main road; thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest of the accused.
5. The version of the defense: That while passing infront of the house of Nardo, his Pareng Nardo called him
up; when he was about to enter the door of the house of the victim, the latter, poked a gun at him; he grabbed
the gun from his Pareng Nardo and at that instance, Rosalina Bolima emerging from her room, saw him
holding the gun; he returned the gun to his Pareng Nardo and the latter tucked it in his waistline; accused
was left behind to answer the call of nature; while in the act of urinating, he heard two successive gunshots;
he followed the victim and he saw the latter already sprawled on the ground; he inquired from his Pareng
Nardo as to what had happened to him, "Pareng Nardo, ano ang nangyari sa iyo? and the victim's replied
(sic) was "Pare, binaril ako",
6. In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the court a quo relied on circumstantial evidence
because the prosecution failed to present an eyewitness who could give an account as to the actual shooting
incident. It considered seven circumstances, including the following:
6) The testimony of the wife that accused, immediately after the shooting incident took place admitted to
her having accidentally shoot (sic) the victim is admissible evidence against the accused declarant since
this is covered by the rule on res gestae or one of an exception to the hearsay rule.
Part of the res gestae — Statement made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior tor (sic) subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstance thereof, may be given in
evidence as a part of res gestae . . . (Sec. 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, as amended).
(d) The testimony of the wife of the victim that after hearing two successive gunshots accused-appellant
went back to her house and informed her that he accidentally shot her husband, should not have been
considered by the trial court as part of the res gestae.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim immediately after the
shooting incident that he accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae
HELD:
No. The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court were duly established and constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellant, and no other else,
shot and killed the victim. We do not, however, agree with the additional observation of the trial court, in respect
to the sixth circumstance, that the statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim immediately
after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae. This is a
misapplication of the rule in the instant case. Statements as part of the res gestae are among the exceptions to the
hearsay rule. The rule is that a witness "can testify only to those facts which he knows of or his own knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perceptions. 17 Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as to what he heard
other persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are,
however, exceptions to this rule. One of them is statements as part of the res gestae under Section 36 of Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact hearsay; but it is
to be admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements may be deemed as part of the res gestae if
they are made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto
with respect to the circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue and
giving it a legal significance may also be received as part of the res gestae.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is not hearsay. She testified on
what the accused-appellant told her, not what any other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The
accused-appellant's statement was an "oral confession", not a part of res gestae, which he can easily deny if it
were not true, which he did in this case.
In People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107,116-117, We declared that a statement allegedly made by one of the
accused to Natalia Macaraeg that "we killed him" (referring to himself and his co-accused) and which Natalia
repeated in her testimony in open court was merely an "oral confession" and not part of the res gestae.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the alleged statement of the accused-
appellant is hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning its admission due to his failure to object thereto at the
time the testimony was given.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the subject decision of the trial court, and as
Modified, FINDING the accused-appellant EUTROPIO TIOZON Y ACID guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of
the crime of HOMICIDE, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code… be given full
credit for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
Facts: in the evening of April 27, 1997 at Province of Cotabato, accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones
and Anthony Baltazar Palmones with intent to kill, armed with a gun, unlawfully, feloniously and with
treachery, attack, assault, and shot the person of SPO2 ASIM MAMANSAL, thereby hitting and inflicting upon
the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body which is the cause of the death thereafter. Both accused
were arraigned and both pleaded not guilty.
Prosecution first presented Sonny Boy Redovan, a 28 year-old farmer who was the nephew of the
victim. He testified that at around 10:00 in the evening of April 27, 1997, his mother and elder brother informed
him that something had happened to his uncle SP02 Asim Mamansal. They then rushed to the Kidapawan
Doctors Hospital and proceeded to the emergency room. Upon seeing his uncle, the witness went near him and
asked him what had happened to him. His uncle answered that he had been waylaid. The witness then asked the
victim who the perpetrators were and the victim answered that it was Juany and Tony Palmones.
He claimed that while he was talking with his uncle, there were attendants, nurses, and other bystanders
whom he did not know present inside the emergency room. A few minutes after he talked with the victim, a
certain Dr. Aguayo arrived and examined the wounds of his uncle. About and hour later, he saw Police Inspector
Alexander Tagum arrive and he heard him ask his uncle who had shot him. The witness then heard his uncle
positively answer the policeman that his assailants were Juany and Tony Palmones.
On cross-examination, he testified that he was able to talk with his uncle for about one hour and that the
most important part of their conversation was the identification of his uncles assailants. He stated that it did not
occur to his mind to immediately report to the police what his uncle had told him as his mind was troubled at
that time. It was only after the burial of his uncle on April 28, 1997 that he told Insp. Tagum that it was Tony
and Juany Palmores who had shot his uncle.
The prosecution next presented Dr. Hazel Mark Aguayo who testified that he was the surgeon-on-
duty. He stated that before he operated on the victim, he interviewed Mamansal and one of the questions he
asked is whether the victim had known who had shot him. He claimed that Mamansal told him that he did not
know who had shot him. He did not pursue this line of questioning further as he was told by a companion of the
victim that the area where the victim was shot was dark.
The third witness for the prosecution was Police Inspector Alexander Camilon-Tagum. After
conducting an initial investigation of the crime scene, he sent his men towards different directions to look for
suspects. He then proceeded to the hospital together with another witness, Alice Villamor. On the way to the
hospital, Alice Villamor pointed to a passing motorcycle and told him that it was the motorcycle the assailants
were riding. He chased the motorcycle but he was not able to catch up with them as his car ran out of gas. On
cross-examination, he testified that he was able to speak with Alice Villamor about the incident but that she told
him that she was not able to identify the assailant even though she was right beside the victim because of
darkness.
The next witness for the prosecution was Mila Arimao Mamansal, the wife of the victim, who testified
mainly on the expenses she incurred because of the death of her husband. She also stated that she was able to
talk with witness Sonny Boy Redovan at the hospital but the latter did not tell her anything about the alleged
assailants of her husband.
The prosecution next presented Asmyra Mamansal, the daughter of the victim. She testified that on the
night of the incident, she was at her aunts house where she was informed about the shooting of her father. She
immediately proceeded to the hospital where she saw her father lying on a bed calling her name. Her father then
told her to take down the name Alice Villamor whom she knew as the name of her fathers mistress.
The accused-appellants presented ten (10) witnesses to support their case.
Office of the Solicitor General Recommendations: The accused-appellants be acquitted of the crime charged
against them. The identity of the assailants was not sufficiently established by the evidence of the prosecution
and that the trial court erred in admitting the alleged dying declaration of the victim as an exception to the
hearsay rule.
Issue: Whether or not the statement of the deceased Mamansal considered as a dying declaration or part of a res
gestae and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. NO and NO
Ruling:
AS TO DYING DECLARATION
Generally, a dying declaration is hearsay, and is inadmissible as evidence. There are several exceptions however
to the rule of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, the first one of which is the admissibility of dying declarations
given under the circumstances specified in Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 31. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of
the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death
As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) it must concern the
crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) at the time it was made, the
declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness;
and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder, murder or parricide in which the
decedent was the victim.
While it is true that the law does not require that the declarant explicitly state his perception that he has
given up the hope of life, the circumstances surrounding his declaration must justify the conclusion that he was
conscious of his impending death. In the instant case, it was not proven that the victim was ever aware of the
seriousness of his condition. As testified to by Dr. Mark Aguayo, the vital signs of the victim, prior to his
operation, were quite stable. Moreover, from the time the victim was brought to the hospital at 10:30 p.m. until
his operation at 12:00 midnight, he was still able to talk intelligently with at least four (4) other persons on
various matters. The fact that his vital signs were strong and that he still had strength to converse with these four
(4) witnesses belie the conclusion that the victim was under the consciousness of death by reason of the gravity
of his wounds.
AS TO RES GESTAE
Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the res gestae. Res
gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. The
following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part
of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the
declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence
and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
When Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of time had
already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered
the statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these statements
not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the
scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the victim
opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly
uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the res gestae.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE
[G.R. No. 119005. December 2, 1996.]
REGALADO, J p:
Facts:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr.
Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much
to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband’s lifeless while a man took her
husband’s gun and left hurriedly. She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water
pump while two (2) other men ran away but she did not seen their faces. The police came and found one of the
perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim’s house. He was identified as
Amado Ponce.
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the
perpetrators of the crime.
Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however, and before
he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail. Upon the other hand, appellants relied on
alibi as their defense and presented witnesses to support their alibi.
The trial court rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentenced them accordingly.
Issue: WON the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence
positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime?
Ruling: Yes.
Ratio: A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the prosecution failed to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein
appellants in, the crime charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband as base from his
testimonies.
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as the
culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-
perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court
and he has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless
these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the
latter’s extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly
the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission
of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-
accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts
are binding upon him, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only
be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be
used as evidence against him.
This extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation
without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case.
While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. These
rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants
Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.