Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War Volume II

THE CANADIANS IN ITALY 1943-1945

NOTE In the writing of this volume the author has been given full access to relevant official documents in possession of the Department of National Defence; but the inferences drawn and the opinions expressed are those of the author himself, and the Department is in no way responsible for his reading or presentation of the facts as stated.

OFFICIAL HISTORY, OF THE CANADIAN ARMY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Volume II

THE CANADIANS IN ITALY 1943-1945

By

LT.-COL. G. W. L. NICHOLSON,
Deputy Director, Historical Section, General Staff

Maps drawn by

CAPTAIN C. C. J. BOND

Published by Authority of the Minister of National Defence EDMOND CLOUTIER, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., OTTAWA, 1956 QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY

INSERT PICTURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE I. THE ALLIED DECISION TO INVADE SICILY The Invitation for Canadian Participation in the Mediterranean Theatre ....................................................................................................... 3 The Casablanca Conference ................................................................................................................ 4 Early Planning for Operation Husky................................................................................................. 9 The Second Outline Plan ................................................................................................................... 15 Further Revision of the Plan .............................................................................................................. 16 The Final Plan of Attack ................................................................................................................... 19 The Background to Canadian Participation ....................................................................................... 20 II. THE 1sT DIVISION GOES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN After Long Waiting ........................................................................................................................... 27 The 1st Division "Takes Over" .......................................................................................................... 28 Canadian Planning Begins ................................................................................................................. 29 Training for the Assault ..................................................................................................................... 32 Administrative Preparations .............................................................................................................. 34 The Convoy Programme ................................................................................................................... 39 Embarkation and Sailing ................................................................................................................... 41 The Voyage to Sicily ......................................................................................................................... 43 In Mediterranean Waters ................................................................................................................... 45 III. THE INVASION OF SICILY, 10 JULY 1943 Sicily and its People .......................................................................................................................... 50 The Defences of the Island ................................................................................................................ 53 The German Garrison ........................................................................................................................ 58 The Allied Pattern of Assault ............................................................................................................ 62 The Role of the 1st Canadian Division .............................................................................................. 65 The Canadian Landings and the Capture of the First Objectives ....................................................... 67 How Canada Learned the News ........................................................................................................ 73 Early Allied Successes ...................................................................................................................... 75 The Advance Inland .......................................................................................................................... 78 IV. THE FIRST FIGHTING IN THE SICILIAN HILLS, 14-22 JULY 1943 Plans for Further Action .................................................................................................................... 85 The First Encounter with the Germans-Grammichele, 15 July .......................................................... 88 Piazza Armerina, 16 July .................................................................................................................. 93 The Fighting at Grottacalda and Valguarnera, 17-18 July ................................................................. 96 The By-Passing of Enna .................................................................................................................. 100 The 1st Brigade Takes Assoro, 20-22 July ...................................................................................... 103 The Capture of Leonforte by the 2nd Brigade, 21-22 July .............................................................. 107 V. THE BEGINNING OF THE EASTWARD DRIVE, 23-31 JULY 1943 The Conquest of Western Sicily ...................................................................................................... 113 Reinforcing the German Garrison ................................................................................................... 115 The Eighth Army's Change of Plan ................................................................................................. 118 The Opening of the Struggle for Agira, 23 July .............................................................................. 120 The Reverse at Nissoria, 24-25 July ................................................................................................ 122 The Winning of "Lion" and "Tiger" Ridges, 26 July ....................................................................... 127 v

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE The Capture of "Grizzly" and the Entry into Agira, 27-28 July ....................................................... 131 The 3rd Brigade in the Dittaino Valley ........................................................................................... 137 Preliminaries to Operation "Hardgate" The Catenanuova Bridgehead, 29-30 July .............................................................................. 139

VI. FINAL STAGES OF THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGN, 31 JULY-17 AUGUST 1943 The Capture of Regalbuto, 31 July-2 August .................................................................................. 146 The Fighting North of the Salso-Hill 736, 2-5 August .................................................................... 153 The Thrust Eastward from the Troina, 5 August ............................................................................. 157 Mount Revisotto and Mount Seggio, 5-6 August ............................................................................. 162 The Halt at the Simeto ..................................................................................................................... 164 The Army Tank Brigade's Part in "Husky" ..................................................................................... 166 The German Retreat from Sicily ..................................................................................................... 168 A Respite from Combat ................................................................................................................... 176 VII. THE INVASION OF THE ITALIAN MAINLAND, 3 SEPTEMBER 1943 Early Proposals for Post-Sicilian Operations ................................................................................... 180 The Decision to Mount Operation "Baytown".................................................................................. 186 Planning for "Baytown" .................................................................................................................. 189 Enemy Dispositions in Italy ............................................................................................................ 192 Prelude to Invasion .......................................................................................................................... 198 The Assault Across the Strait, 3 September .................................................................................... 202 Over the Aspromonte, 4-8 September ............................................................................................. 206 VIII. FROM CALABRIA TO THE FOGGIA PLAIN, SEPTEMBER 1943 The Capitulation of Italy ................................................................................................................. 213 The Battle of Salerno, 9-16 September ............................................................................................ 217 The Canadian Advance up the East Coast ....................................................................................... 220 The Drive to Potenza, 17-20 September .......................................................................................... 224 Patrols to the Ofanto ........................................................................................................................ 229 IX. THE FORTORE AND BIFERNO RIVERS, OCTOBER 1943 The Canadians Move Westward from Foggia ................................................................................. 234 The 1st Brigade's Advance from Motta to the Fortore, 2-6 October ................................................ 238 The Capture of Gambatesa by the 3rd Brigade, 7-8 October ........................................................... 241 The 2nd Brigade's Fighting on the Left Flank, 6-12 October .......................................................... 244 The Occupation of Campobasso, 13-14 October ............................................................................. 247 The Three Rivers Regiment at Termoli, 5-6 October ...................................................................... 251 Clearing the Right Bank of the Upper Biferno, 15-24 October ....................................................... 255 The Fighting West of the Biferno .................................................................................................... 258 The German Plans for the Winter Campaign ................................................................................... 264 X. THE UPPER SANGRO DIVERSION AND THE BATTLE OF THE MORO RIVER, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1943 The Allied Decision to Take Rome ................................................................................................. 270 The Allied Armies Reach 'the Winter Line ..................................................................................... 274 The 3rd Brigade's Demonstration on the Upper Sangro, 16-30 November ............................................................................................. 277 The Fighting for Point 1069, 23-24 November ............................................................................... 282 The Eighth Army Breaks the Bernhard Line ................................................................................... 288 The 1st Canadian Division at the Moro River ................................................................................. 289 The First Crossings and the Capture of Villa Rogatti, 6 December ................................................. 292 The Battle for San Leonardo, 8-9 December ................................................................................... 298

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CHAPTER PAGE XI. ORTONA, DECEMBER 1943 The Advance from the Moro, 10-11 December ............................................................................... 304 The Fight for the Gully .................................................................................................................... 306 Casa Berardi, 13-15 December ........................................................................................................ 310 The Capture of "Cider" Crossroads, 18-19 December ..................................................................... 315 The Approach to Ortona, 20 December ........................................................................................... 321 The 2nd Brigade's Struggle in the Streets ........................................................................................ 324 Christmas Day-and the End of the Battle ........................................................................................ 329 Clearing to the Riccio, 22 December-4 January .............................................................................. 333 The Offensive is Abandoned ........................................................................................................... 338 XII. THE ORTONA SALIENT, JANUARY-APRIL 1944 The Background of Operation "Timberwolf" .................................................................................. 340 Planning for the Movement ............................................................................................................. 344 The 1st Canadian Corps Arrives in Italy ......................................................................................... 351 Equipping the 5th Armoured Division ............................................................................................ 355 Vehicles and Guns for the Corps Troops ......................................................................................... 359 The "Arielli Show", 17 January ....................................................................................................... 362 The Anzio Landings and the German Reaction ............................................................................... 372 The Attack Along the Villa Grande-Tollo Road, 30-31 January ..................................................... 375 "The Adriatic Barricade" ................................................................................................................. 379 XIII. THE BATTLE FOR ROME BEGINS, MAY 1944 Allied Plans for the Spring Offensive .............................................................................................. 387 Outwitting the Enemy ..................................................................................................................... 391 The German Defences South of Rome ............................................................................................ 394 The Assault of the Gustav Line, 11 May ......................................................................................... 399 The Advance to the Hitler Line, 16-19 May .................................................................................... 407 Preliminaries to Operation "Chesterfield" ....................................................................................... 411 The Launching of the Assault, 23 May ........................................................................................... 417 The Hitler Line is Breached ............................................................................................................ 420 XIV. THE END OF THE BATTLE FOR ROME, 24 MAY-4 JUNE 1944 The Exploitation by the 5th Canadian Armoured Division ............................................................. 427 The Battle at the Melfa, 24-25 May ................................................................................................ 430 The Enemy's Plans for Retreat ........................................................................................................ 436 Bridgeheads Over the Liri, 26-28 May ............................................................................................ 439 Up the Sacco Valley to Frosinone, 29-31 May ................................................................................ 442 The Final Phase ............................................................................................................................... 447 The First Special Service Force in Italy .......................................................................................... 453 XV. THE ADVANCE TO FLORENCE, JUNE-AUGUST 1944 Enemy Intentions After the Fall of Rome ........................................................................................ 458 "Anvil" is Given Priority ................................................................................................................. 462 Canadian Tanks at the Trasimene Line, 21-28 June ........................................................................ 465 The Advance to the Arezzo Line, 29 June-16 July .......................................................................... 470 The Pursuit to the Arno, 16 July-5 August ...................................................................................... 473 The Organization of the 12th Brigade ............................................................................................. 478 The Red Patch at Florence, 5-6 August ........................................................................................... 481 Canadian Armour Across the Arno ................................................................................................. 485 XVI. THE BREAKING OF THE GOTHIC LINE, 25 AUGUST-2 SEPTEMBER 1944 The Enemy Bewildered ................................................................................................................... 487 The Allied Change of Plan .............................................................................................................. 491

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CHAPTER

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE The Gothic Line Defences ............................................................................................................... 494 Preparations for the Attack .............................................................................................................. 498 The Enemy Surprised ...................................................................................................................... 503 The Advance from the Metauro Bridgehead, 26-27 August ............................................................ 505 The Fighting at the Arzilla River Line, 28-29 August ..................................................................... 508 The Assault on the Gothic Line, 30-31 August ............................................................................... 510 The Capture of Point 253 and Tomba di Pesaro, 1 September ........................................................ 518 To the Conca and the Sea ................................................................................................................ 521

XVII. THE BATTLE OF THE RIMINI LINE, 3-22 SEPTEMBER 1944 The Offensive is Checked ............................................................................................................... 526 The Capture of Coriano Ridge, 13 September ................................................................................. 532 First Crossings Over the Marano, 14 September ............................................................................. 537 The 3rd Brigade Takes San Lorenzo in Correggiano, 15 September .......................................................................................................................... 540 The Reverse at San Martino in Monte l'Abate, 16-18 September .................................................... 544 The Fighting at the River Ausa, 17-19 September .......................................................................... 546 The Assault of San Fortunato Ridge, 19-20 September ................................................................... 551 Bridgeheads Over the Marecchia .................................................................................................... 557 The Greeks Occupy Rimini, 21 September ..................................................................................... 559 "A Great, Hard-Fought Victory" ..................................................................................................... 561 XVIII. INTO THE LOMBARD PLAIN, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1944 The 5th Armoured Division's Advance from the Marecchia ........................................................... 565 The German Decision Not to Withdraw .......................................................................................... 570 The Halt at the Fiumicino, 28 September-10 October ..................................................................... 574 The Crossing of the Pisciatello and the Advance to Cesena, 11-19 October ......................................................................................................................... 577 Cumberland Force on the Coastal Flank ......................................................................................... 583 The Savio Bridgeheads, 20-23 October ........................................................................................... 585 The Pursuit to the Ronco ................................................................................................................. 593 Allied Plans for the Winter Campaign ............................................................................................. 594 The Armoured Brigade in the Apennines ........................................................................................ 597 XIX. THE BATTLE OF THE RIVERS, DECEMBER 1944 The Canadian Corps in Reserve ...................................................................................................... 606 The Operations of Porterforce, 28 October-30 November ............................................................... 608 The Planning of Operation "Chuckle" ............................................................................................. 611 The 1st Division's Repulse at the Lamone, 2-5 December .............................................................. 613 The Capture of Ravenna, 4 December ............................................................................................. 619 The Corps Assault Across the Lamone, 10-11 December ............................................................... 622 The Naviglio Bridgeheads, 12-15 December .................................................................................. 628 The 1st Brigade's Fight South of Bagnacavallo, 16-18 December .................................................. 633 The Advance to the Senior, 19-21 December .................................................................................. 635 The Offensive Abandoned ............................................................................................................... 641 XX. THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1945 Clearing the Granarolo Salient, 3-5 January .................................................................................... 644 The 5th Armoured Division's Advance to the Valli di Comacchio, 2-6 January .............................................................................................................................. 646 Holding the Winter Line .................................................................................................................. 651 The Case for Reuniting the First Canadian Army ........................................................................... 656 Operation "Goldflake", the Move to North-West Europe ................................................................ 660 The 1st Special Service Battalion on the Riviera ............................................................................. 666 The Final Allied Offensive in Italy, 9 April-2 May ......................................................................... 671 From Pachino to the Senio-The Balance Sheet ................................................................................ 678

TABLE OF CONTENTS APPENDICES

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PAGE

"A" Allied Order of Battle-Allied Armies in Italy, 25 August 1944 ...................................................................... 685 "B" Enemy Order of Battle-Army Group "C", 12 August 1944 ............................................................................. 686 "C" Canadian Army Units in Italy (19 August 1944) ............................................................................................. 687 "D" Persons Holding Principal Appointments in the Canadian Army in the Italian Theatre, 1943-1945 .................................................................................................................... 690 ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................................................... 693 THE PRONUNCIATION OF ITALIAN GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES ................................................................. 697 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................................... 699 INDEX ................................................................................................................................................................... 767 MAPS (in Colour) Southern Italy, 10 July 1943 - 9 June 1944 .............................................................................. (front end-paper) 1. Sicily, 10 July - 17 August 1943 ...................................................................................................................... 64 2. South-Eastern Sicily, 10-12 July 1943 ............................................................................................................. 82 3. Giarratana to Valguarnera, 14-18 July 1943 .................................................................................................. 100 4. The Fighting for Agira, 24-28 July 1943 ....................................................................................................... 128 5. Valguarnera to the Simeto, 19 July-7 August 1943 ........................................................................................ 164 6. The Landings in Southern Italy, 3-5 September 1943 .................................................................................... 190 7. Out of the Aspromonte, 6-8 September 1943 ................................................................................................. 210 8. The Advance to the Foggia Plain, 8 September - 1 October 1943 ................................................................. 232 9. The Fighting on the Upper Fortore and Biferno, 1 October - 6 November 1943 ............................................................................................................... 264 10. The Upper Sangro, 5-26 November 1943 ...................................................................................................... 278 11. The Adriatic Sector, 28 November 1943 - 4 January 1944 ............................................................................ 338 12. The Italian Front, 11 May 1944 ..................................................................................................................... 398 13. The Breaking of the Gustav and Hitler Lines, 11-23 May 1944 .................................................................... 424 14. The Breakout from the Hitler Line, 24-28 May 1944 .................................................................................... 442 15. The Battle for Rome, 11 May - 4 June 1944 ................................................................................................... 450 16. Operations of First Special Service Force, 2 December 1943 17 January 1944 ..................................................................................................................................... 454 17. The Advance to the Arno, 21 June-5 August 1944 ........................................................................................ 478 18. The Advance to the Gothic Line, 26-29 August 1944 .................................................................................... 524 19. The Breaking of the Gothic Line, 30 August - 3 September 1944 ................................................................. 524 20. The Advance to Rimini, 3-22 September 1944 .............................................................................................. 560 21. Into the Romagna, 22 September-20 October 1944 ....................................................................................... 584 22. The Crossing of the Savio, 21-28 October 1944 ............................................................................................ 588 23. The Advance Towards Bologna, September 1944-January 1945 ................................................................... 598 24. Operations of Porterforce, 28 October-28 November 1944 ........................................................................... 608 25. From the Montone to the Senio, 2 December 1944 - 5 January 1945 ............................................................ 652 Northern Italy, 10 June 1944 - 25 February 1945 ............................................................. (back end-paper) SKETCHES (in Black and White) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Operation "Husky", The Progress of Planning ................................................................................................. 13 The Capture of Regalbuto, 30 July-2 August 1943 ........................................................................................ 148 The Fighting at Termoli, 6 October 1943 ....................................................................................................... 252 The Adriatic Front, 26 December 1943 ......................................................................................................... 322 The Attack Towards the Arielli, 17 January 1944 .......................................................................................... 365 Villa Grande-Tollo Road, 30-31 January 1944 .............................................................................................. 377

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7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE German Dispositions, Hitler Line, 23 May 1944 ........................................................................................... 415 Operations, Florence Area, 6 August - 1 September 1944 ............................................................................. 483 Plans for Attack on the Gothic Line ............................................................................................................... 489 The Italian Front, 8 October 1944 .................................................................................................................. 581 1st Brigade's Attack at the Lamone, 5 December 1944 .................................................................................. 618 The Italian Front, 31 December 1944 ............................................................................................................ 642 First Special Service Force on the Riviera, 15 August - 9 September 1944.................................................... 668 Final Offensive in Italy, 9 April - 2 May 1945 ............................................................................................... 673 ILLUSTRATIONS

FOLLOWING PAGE Ortona, by Major C. F. Comfort (in colour) Frontispiece Off to Sicily .............................................................................................................................................................. 80 The Pachino Beaches ............................................................................................................................................... 80 The Approach to Leonforte ...................................................................................................................................... 80 Canadian Artillery in Sicily ...................................................................................................................................... 80 Agira from the West ............................................................................................................................................... 112 Nissoria from the South-West ................................................................................................................................ 112 The Ruins of Regalbuto .......................................................................................................................................... 112 A Mule Train in Sicily ........................................................................................................................................... 112 The Canadian Army Commander in Sicily ............................................................................................................ 208 Embarkation for Operation "Baytown" .................................................................................................................. 208 Canadian Armour Lands in Italy ............................................................................................................................ 208 Canadian Sappers Assist the Advance .................................................................................................................... 208 Potenza from across the Basento Valley ................................................................................................................ 240 Overlooking the Fortore Valley ............................................................................................................................. 240 The Approach to Campobasso ............................................................................................................................... 240 The Clearing of Campochiaro ................................................................................................................................ 256 The Pipes Play in "Maple Leaf City ..................................................................................................................... 256 The Biferno Valley from Oratino ........................................................................................................................... 256 San Pietro, 26 November 1943 ............................................................................................................................... 272 "Rail-Rooting", November 1943 ............................................................................................................................ 272 Visit of the Minister of National Defence .............................................................................................................. 272 G.O.C.'s Orders ...................................................................................................................................................... 272 The Moro Valley looking North-West ................................................................................................................... 304 The C.I.G.S. Visits the 1st Canadian Division ....................................................................................................... 304 Ortona .................................................................................................................................................................... 304 Entry into Ortona ................................................................................................................................................... 336 Fighting in an Ortona Alley ................................................................................................................................... 336 Canadian Tanks in Ortona ...................................................................................................................................... 336 A Hit by German Mortars ...................................................................................................................................... 336 A Company Headquarters in the Ortona Salient .................................................................................................... 368 With the Canadian Provost Corps in Italy .............................................................................................................. 368 Tanks in an Artillery Role ...................................................................................................................................... 368 Change of Command, 1st Canadian Corps ............................................................................................................. 368 Canadian Artillery at Castelfrentano ...................................................................................................................... 400 Visit by the Eighth Army Commander ................................................................................................................... 400 Junction of the Liri and the Rapido ........................................................................................................................ 400 Canadian Troops Relieve Indians in the Liri Valley .............................................................................................. 416 Supplies to the Front .............................................................................................................................................. 416 The Liri Valley from Piedimonte ........................................................................................................................... 416 A German Anti-Tank Position in the Hitler Line ................................................................................................... 416 Canadian Gunners View a German Weapon .......................................................................................................... 416 Pontecorvo, 24 May 1944 ...................................................................................................................................... 416 Patrol in Blackface on the Anzio Beachhead ......................................................................................................... 416

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FOLLOWING PAGE Arrival of C.W.A.C. in Italy ................................................................................................................................... 544 San Fortunato Ridge from San Lorenzo in Correggiano ........................................................................................ 544 Canadian Armour at the Uso .................................................................................................................................. 624 Action at Cesena, 20 October 1944 ........................................................................................................................ 624 German Anti-Tank Defences along the Adriatic .................................................................................................... 624 The Lamone River ................................................................................................................................................. 624 Distinguished Visitors at Corps Headquarters ........................................................................................................ 656 Commanders Discuss the Move to France ............................................................................................................. 656 improvised Winter Quarters in the Apennines ....................................................................................................... 656 Operation "Goldflake"............................................................................................................................................. 656

FOREWORD
HIS volume, written by Lt.-Col. G. W. L. Nicholson, Deputy Director, Historical Section, General Staff, is the second volume of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. The first, written by the Director, covered the Army's organization, training and operations in Canada, Britain and the Pacific during the whole period of the war. The third, dealing with the campaign in North-West Europe in 194445, is in preparation. The present volume describes in some detail the Canadian Army's part in the Italian campaign-the operations which began with the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 and, developing into an arduous advance up the Italian peninsula, ended with the German capitulation in May 1945. In this campaign soldiers from Canada fought a series of hard and bloody battles over some of the most historic ground in Europe. This account of it is more exhaustive, and based upon more complete investigation, than that included in the preliminary Official Historical Summary, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, which was published in May 1948. The general principles upon which this History has been planned are stated in the Preface to Volume I. It is directed primarily to the general reader, and particularly to the Canadian reader who wishes to know what the Canadian Army accomplished and why its operations took the course they did. The practice with respect to documentation, and the reasons for it, are likewise described in Volume I. Since many of the documents cited in references are still "classified", the fact that they are so cited does not necessarily imply that they are available for public examination. Officers and men are designated in the text by the ranks they held at the time of the events described. Decorations have not been appended to personal names in the text, but "final" ranks and decorations are given with the names of individuals in the Index. In the event of readers observing errors or important omissions in this volume, they are asked to write to the Director, Historical Section, General Staff, Army Headquarters, Ottawa. C. P. STACEY, Colonel, Director Historical Section.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

HIS is the story of the Canadian Army's share in the Allied campaign in Italy during the Second World War. It is primarily an account of field operations and the planning and preparations which preceded them. Questions of organization and administration of the Army as a whole were discussed in Volume I, and in general are only introduced here in so far as they present problems peculiar to the Italian theatre. While the activities of the Canadian forces in Italy form the main theme, these are presented at all times against the background of the whole Allied effort in the campaign. The author has attempted wherever possible to round out his story by showing the enemy side of the picture. This History is primarily based upon the Canadian contemporary records of the campaign-the war diaries of participating formations and units, planning papers, orders, reports of operations, departmental and headquarters files and a multiplicity of other documents of various kinds. The task of assembling and organizing this voluminous material was begun by the Canadian Army's Historical Section while the war was still in progress. Valuable work in securing and recording first hand information in the, theatre of operations was done by the Field Historical Sections; an Historical Officer served with each Canadian division engaged in the campaign. The author has also consulted British and Allied records extensively. During and after the Second World War a vast quantity of German military records, written mostly within hours or days of the events, fell into Allied hands. In the preparation of the present volume full use has been made of this fortunate circumstance. While the available source material, which consists in the main of the war diaries of the enemy's army and corps headquarters, is by no means complete-the greatest shortages exist with respect to the Sicilian phase, Ortona, and the period from November 1944 to the termination of the Canadian operations in Italy-it covers well the battles for the Gustav, Hitler and Gothic defence lines. Narratives written after the war by German senior commanders have also proved useful in providing an insight into the background of enemy operations. In the autumn of 1948 the writer spent ten weeks in Italy studying the ground over which the Canadians fought. He travelled the entire route of the Canadian forces from the Pachino beaches in south-eastern Sicily to the Senio River in Northern Italy, visiting the scene of every action in which Canadian soldiers were engaged, and taking upwards of 2000 photographs.

xiii

AUTHOR'S PREFACE With the general reader in mind the author has attempted to avoid detailed treatment of such specialized subjects as the activities of the technical arms and the services. The reader will understand that in a history of this scope considerations of space and proportion place restrictions on the amount of attention that can be devoted to operations at the unit level; for fuller treatment of these he must consult the various regimental histories. The author wishes to acknowledge the generous assistance given by numerous organizations and individuals in making their records available and helping in other ways. He has had unrestricted access to documents in the hands of the Government of Canada, and has had the privilege of consulting the private papers of General A. G. L. McNaughton and General H. D. G. Crerar. As was the case with the preceding volume of the Official History, this book has benefited from the constant and indispensable aid accorded by the Historical Branch of the Cabinet Office in London and by the Air Historical Branch of the Air Ministry and the Historical Section of the Admiralty. Official historians in New Zealand, South Africa and India and Pakistan have given their help freely. The author would especially acknowledge his indebtedness to the Office of the Chief of Military History and to the Captured Records Section in the United States Department of the Army. In Canada grateful acknowledgement is made to the Director of War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, whose office provided most of the Canadian Army statistics included in this volume. Finally the writer would express his sincere thanks to the many participants in the events described who have read the volume in draft, in whole or in part, and have given him the benefit of their comments. Space does not allow the author to thank adequately all the personnel, past and present, of the Canadian Army's Historical Section who have contributed directly or indirectly to the production of this book. The Director, Colonel C. P. Stacey, has unsparingly given most helpful and sympathetic guidance at all stages. Lt.-Col. C. J. Lynn-Grant, Executive Officer, has assisted greatly with publication arrangements. The writer is indebted to Lt.-Col. W. E. C. Harrison (who served in Italy as Historical Officer, 1st Canadian Corps), Major D. H. Cunningham, Captain F. R. McGuire and Captain J. A. Porter (all veterans of the campaign) for the preliminary drafts of Chapters VII-X and XVI-XIX. These were subsequently revised by the writer, who drafted all the remaining chapters. He takes full responsibility for the entire volume as now presented. The expert assistance given by Mr. A. G. Steiger in his study of German documents has been invaluable. Thanks are due also to Captain J. R. Madden and Captain F. R. McGuire for their work as research assistants. The volume owes much to the maps

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE drawn by Captain C. C. J. Bond and his staff. Finally, a word of gratitude to Q.M.S. (W.O. 2) M. R. Lemay and Staff Sergeants J. W. Taylor and W. H. Woollam for their patience and efficiency in typing the many successive drafts. G.W.L.N. Historical Section (G.S.), Army Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada.

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THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

1943-1945

BLANK PAGE

CHAPTER 1

THE ALLIED DECISION TO INVADE SICILY

The Invitation for Canadian Participation in the Mediterranean Theatre
N THE late afternoon of 23 April 1943, Lieut.-General A. G. L. McNaughton, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, First Canadian Army, was called to the War Office for discussions with General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. General Brooke immediately put forward a proposal of the highest import to Canada and the Canadian Army. For two hours General McNaughton examined the various aspects of the proposition, discussing these first with Sir Alan and then in turn with various highranking officers of the General Staff. When he left Whitehall, it was to go to Canadian Military Headquarters, in Trafalgar Square, where he transmitted to Ottawa the terms of the following formal written request which he had received.1
Lieutenant-General A. G. L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, First Canadian Army. A decision has been reached by the War Cabinet to undertake certain operations based on Tunisia. The Prime Minister has instructed me to enquire whether you will agree to Canadian forces participating, to the extent of one Canadian infantry division and one tank brigade together with the necessary ancillary troops. As soon as you have obtained agreement of the Canadian Government for the employment of these forces will you please let me know. Full details of the requirement can then be worked out in consultation between your Headquarters and the War Office. With respect to the command and control of Canadian troops participating in these operations I must make it clear that arrangements will be the same as those for the British formations which they are replacing. A. F. BROOKE, C.I.G.S.

National Defence Headquarters acted promptly, and within forty-eight hours of receiving General Brooke's invitation General McNaughton had formally replied that he had been authorized by the Canadian Government"2 to undertake the operation in question. He detailed for the purpose

THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade, and certain ancillary units. Thus was set in motion the train of events which eleven weeks later was to lead to a landing by Canadian soldiers on the beaches of Sicily in the first major operation by forces of the United Nations to open a breach in the European fortress.

The Casablanca Conference

The Allied decision to undertake "operations based on Tunisia" had been reached at Casablanca three months earlier. When, in mid-January, the Combined Chiefs of Staff met with Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt ,at Anfa Camp on the outskirts of the French Moroccan town to review the conduct of the war and determine basic strategy for the coming year, they were faced with the problem of how to employ Allied armies after the completion of the Tunisian campaign. A perceptibly brightening picture from the war fronts of the world gave evidence that the initiative was passing into Allied hands. During late October and early November in three momentous weeks the tide of Axis advances had been turned in as many sectors of the global struggle. The Russians had triumphed in the epic of Stalingrad and the Red Army was on the offensive; the British Eighth Army's brilliant victory at El Alamein had driven the German and Italian Armies into their final retreat across the African desert; in the Pacific Axis aggression had been stemmed as Australian and American forces joined hands on New Guinea, and with Marine and Army lines holding on Guadalcanal a crushing Japanese defeat in adjacent waters blasted the enemy's hopes of retaining that strategic island. On the north-west coast of Africa Allied forces had successfully carried out the greatest landing operation in history. It would appear that there were indeed good grounds for Mr. Churchill's cautious message of encouragement, "It is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."3 At Casablanca, two months after El Alamein and the North African landings, there seemed assured the successful termination of the converging operations by General Sir Harold Alexander's Middle East Forces and the formations under General Dwight D. Eisenhower's command.* Allied troops of three nations were closing in for the kill. To the east General Sir Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army, after a spectacular drive which in
* General Sir H. R. L. G. Alexander succeeded General Sir Claude Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief Middle East Forces on 15 August 1942. On 14 August 1942 the Combined Chiefs of Staff appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Force, to undertake the "combined military operations . . . against Africa".4

THE ALLIED DECISION TO INVADE SICILY

three months had carried it 1400 miles from El Alamein, was at the gates of Tripoli. In the west, although the flow of Axis reinforcements and supplies across the Sicilian bridge from Southern Italy continued, the British First Army under Lieut.-General K. A. N. Anderson (whose command included the United States 2nd and the French 19th Corps) had entered Tunisia from Algeria and was holding a stabilized line which restricted General Juergen von Arnim's Fifth Panzer Army to the sixty-mile wide coastal corridor.5 Field-Marshal Rommel was on the run across Tripolitania and, while the inevitable junction of his Afrika Korps with von Arnim's command portended no ready relinquishment of the Axis' Tunisian bridgehead, it was calculated that the end of April would see the end of. enemy resistance on the African continent.6 There was not immediate agreement between the British and American Chiefs of Staff as to where and when the next blow should be struck. "It still would have been preferable", wrote General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, "to close immediately with the German enemy in Western Europe or even in Southern France had that been possible of achievement with the resources then available to General Eisenhower. It was not."7 When in July 1942 the British and American Chiefs of Staff had decided in London, at the prompting of both the Prime Minister and the President, to launch an attack against French North Africa as the only operation that could be undertaken that year with fair hope of success, they virtually accepted the fact that the demands of "Torch" (as the proposed assault was called) would so interrupt the build-up programme which was then in progress for a cross-Channel assault (Operation "Roundup") as to postpone any invasion of North-West Europe until 1944 at the. earliest.8 The decision was a momentous one, for not only did it disappoint the hopes of the United States War Department of developing at an early date an operation in what it considered the only decisive sector of the strategic front,9 but the introduction of American forces into the Mediterranean was to invite their full-scale commitment to the subsequent protracted operations in that theatre, which only ended north of the Po with the complete surrender of the German armies. The British Chiefs of Staff, while agreeing that eventually Germany must be attacked across the Channel, pressed the argument that in view of the exceedingly doubtful prospects for a successful launching of -"Roundup" in the summer of 1943, the logical scene of action was the Mediterranean, where conditions were, propitious for immediate operations. An offensive in this theatre could not be expected, it is true, materially to relieve German pressure on Russia. But neither might this be achieved otherwise. The arguments of the previous July retained their cogency, for the Allies were still in no

THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

position to commit to a Second Front a force large enough (as requested by Mr. Molotov) to draw off 40 divisions from the Eastern battle front.10 Furthermore, the favourable turn of events after Stalingrad made direct aid to Russia no longer so pressing a consideration. Mr. Churchill reiterated the opinion expressed to President Roosevelt in the previous November:
The paramount task before us is first, to secure the African shores of the Mediterranean and set up there the naval and air installations which are necessary to open an effective passage through it for military traffic; and, secondly, using the bases on the African shore to strike at the under-belly of the Axis in effective strength and in the shortest time.11

In support of their case the British Chiefs of Staff pointed out that Axisdominated territory in the Mediterranean presented so many potential targets for an Allied offensive that with proper deceptive measures it should be possible to worry the enemy into a widespread dispersal of his forces to meet threats against Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, the Dodecanese Islands and the coasts of Italy and Greece. Furthermore, once Italy had been knocked out of the war-for it was the British contention that this must be the prime objective of Mediterranean operations*-Germany would be forced to assume the defence of the Italian peninsula as well as to replace the Italian troops who were garrisoning the Balkans. Finally there was the possibility that a successful campaign in the Mediterranean might provide a strong inducement to Turkey to enter the war and so open the Black Sea supply route to Russia and provide the Allies with a base for operations against the Rumanian oilfields. To the American Chiefs of Staff the British advocacy of an early offensive was convincing enough from a tactical standpoint, but General Marshall emphasized that such an exploitation of victory in Africa would at best be a temporary expedient, not to be considered as a change in the general strategy, previously agreed to by the Combined Chiefs, of defeating Germany by opening a Second Front in Northern France.13 Having made this point the Americans bowed to the demands of expediency in maintaining the momentum of the war against Germany, and agreed to the mounting of a Mediterranean operation. They reached this decision because, in General Marshall's words, "we will have in North Africa a large number of troops available and because it will effect an economy in tonnage which is the major consideration."14 He again emphasized that the American viewpoint regarding general strategy remained unchanged, declaring that "he was most anxious not to become committed to interminable operations in the Mediterranean. He
* On 24 November 1942 Mr. Churchill had cabled the President: "Our Mediterranean operations following on 'Torch' may drive Italy out of the war. Widespread demoralisation may set in among the Germans, and we must be ready to profit by any opportunity which offers."12

THE ALLIED DECISION TO INVADE SICILY

wished Northern France to be the scene of the main effort against Germany -that had always been his conception."15 A similar interpretation of the American attitude has been given by General Eisenhower, who sets forth two reasons for the Casablanca decision to undertake the Sicilian operation: the opening of the Mediterranean sea routes, and the fact that "because of the relatively small size of the island its occupation after capture would not absorb unforeseen amounts of Allied strength in the event that the enemy should undertake any large-scale counteraction."16 Having reached agreement as to the theatre in which operations would be launched, the Conference turned to the selection of the immediate objectives. Offensive action in the Western Mediterranean might be taken either directly against the mainland of Italy, or against one or more of the intervening islands of Sicily or Sardinia or Corsica. Decision on the invasion of Italy was deferred and the relative attractiveness of the three island targets was considered. Tentative planning of an assault against Sardinia as a sequel to Operation "Torch" had already engaged the attention of General Eisenhower's staff,17 and in mid-November Mr. Churchill had directed the British Chiefs of Staff to consider the necessity or desirability of occupying the island "for the re-opening of the Mediterranean to military traffic and/or for bringing on the big air battle which is our aim."18 The occupation of Sardinia and Corsica (it was considered that "the capture of Sardinia would have had a profound effect in the Mediterranean only if coupled with the immediate capture of Corsica")19 would furnish an advantageous base from which to threaten the Italian peninsula along its entire western flank. On the other hand the possession of these northern islands without Sicily would not free to Allied use the Mediterranean passage, Axis control of which lengthened the convoy route to the Middle East by an enforced 12,000-mile detour around the Cape of Good Hope. (At a conference in Rome on 13 May 1943, Mussolini was to tell Admiral Dnitz that Sicily was in a greater danger of attack than Sardinia, and support his contention "by referring to the British press which had repeatedly stated that a free route through the Mediterranean would mean a gain of 2,000,000 tons of cargo space for the Allies.")20 After an exhaustive examination of the respective claims of Sicily and Sardinia a firm decision was reached. On 19 January the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed "that after Africa had been finally cleared of the enemy the island of Sicily should be assaulted and captured as a base for operations against Southern Europe and to open the Mediterranean to the shipping of the United Nations."21 Four days later they furnished General Eisenhower with a directive which appointed him Supreme Commander and General Alexander his deputy. Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham was to be the

THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

Naval Commander and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.* The operation (which was code-named "Husky") was to have as its target date the period of the favourable July moon.22 Canada was not represented at the Casablanca Conference. The first official information concerning the proceedings there came to Prime Minister Mackenzie King on 30 January in a message from Mr. Churchill which enclosed "an account of the principal conclusions reached". "I earnestly hope", wrote the British Prime Minister from Cairo, "you will feel that we have acted wisely in holding this conference and that its general conclusions will commend themselves to you." Mr. Churchill did not conceal his satisfaction at the decision to continue active operations in the Mediterranean.
Without wishing to indulge in any complacency I cannot help feeling that things are quite definitely better than when I was last in Cairo, when [the] enemy was less than 70 miles away. If we should succeed in retaining the initiative on all theatres, as does not seem impossible and if we can sincerely feel we have brought every possible division of soldiers or fighting unit of our forces into closest and most continuous contact with the enemy from now on, we might well regard the world situation as by no means devoid of favourable features. Without the cohesion and unity of advance of the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations through periods of desperate peril and forlorn outlook, the freedom and decencies of civilised mankind might well have sunk for ever into the abyss.23

Sicily was not named in either Mr. Churchill's covering note or in the accompanying summary, which was prepared by the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Clement Attlee; for it was "most important that exact targets and dates should not be known until nearer the time". The message from Mr. Attlee alluded in only very guarded terms to the decision to mount Operation "Husky":
Operations in the Mediterranean with the object of forcing Italy out of the war, and imposing greatest possible dispersal of German Forces will include (a) clearance of Axis forces out of North Africa at the earliest possible moment, (b) in due course further amphibious offensive operations on a large scale, (c) bomber offensive from North Africa.24

In recording Mr. Churchill's gratification that the invasion of Sicily had been agreed upon, it may be noted that some fifteen months before the Anfa meetings he had been a strong proponent of such a project. In the autumn of 1941, when there were high hopes that the impending offensive by . the Eighth Army might drive Rommel back through Libya and Tripolitanin, the British Chiefs of Staff were considering a plan - they
* Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, promoted to Admiral of the Fleet on 21 January 1943, was appointed Commander-inChief Mediterranean on 20 February 1943, in command of all Allied naval forces in the Western Mediterranean (including Malta). An A.F.H.Q. General Order of 17 February 1943 designated Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder as Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean; his command comprised the Middle East Air Command (R.A.F.), R.A.F. Malta Air Command, and Northwest African Air Forces (U.S.).

THE ALLIED DECISION TO INVADE SICILY

called it "Whipcord" - for exploiting victory in the Western Desert by an assault upon Sicily. For this purpose a force of one armoured and three field divisions was available in the United Kingdom, and in order that the defence of Great Britain might not suffer by the withdrawal of these formations, Mr. Churchill had gone so far as to request President Roosevelt "to place a United States Army Corps and Armoured Division, with all the air force possible, in the North of Ireland".25 The Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, however, setting a higher priority upon the defence of the vital area between the Nile delta and the Persian Gulf, considered an invasion of Sicily at that time neither practicable nor necessary. Accordingly, "Whipcord" had been abandoned.26

Early Planning for Operation "Husky"

General Eisenhower lost no time in acting upon the directive from the Chiefs of Staff, and on 12 February a planning staff composed of American and British members and organized on the British staff system (since the operation was to be executed under a British commander) set to work under Major-General C. H. Gairdner (who was later succeeded by MajorGeneral A. A. Richardson) as Chief of Staff.27 As there was no accommodation available at the overcrowded Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers, the planners at their initial meeting selected the Ecole Normale in Bouzarea, just outside the Algerian capital. The number of the hotel room in which the first meeting was held gave the planning organization the name adopted as a security measure - Headquarters "Force 141".28 It will be appreciated that this delegation of the control of planning operations to a special staff was made necessary by the full preoccupation of both the Supreme Commander and his deputy with the direction of the campaign that was still continuing in North Africa. Indeed, at this time General Alexander held a dual appointment, for in addition to having been designated Commander-in-Chief of the group of armies entrusted with the Sicilian operation, he was Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in North Africa and Commander of the 18th Army Group, the headquarters established by the Anfa Conference to co-ordinate the command of the British First and Eighth Armies in the Tunisia area.29 In reaching their decision at Casablanca the Combined Chiefs of Staff had considered a tentative outline plan for the invasion of Sicily which had been produced by a Joint Planning Staff in London, and later supplemented at Anfa.30 This was given to the Force 141 planners as a basis on which to work, and from it there emerged, after a series of modifications which

10

THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

culminated in a major recasting, the pattern on which Operation "Husky" was finally mounted. Certain elements of the projected undertaking as set forth in the Casablanca Outline Plan were accepted as fundamental, and remained constant throughout all stages of the subsequent planning. The directive to the Supreme Commander had indicated that "Husky" would require the employment of two task forces, one British and one United States, each of army size. Early in February General Montgomery and [Link] George S. Patton Jr., who had led the American landings at Casablanca in November, were appointed to the respective commands of these assault forces. It was a logical assumption that the American share of the operation would be based upon the French North African ports; it followed that the British task force must be mounted mainly from the Middle East Command. Sicily, "a jagged arrowhead with the broken point to the west", is an island admirably suited by position and terrain for defence against invasion from anywhere except Italy. Separated from the Italian peninsula by the Strait of Messina, which at its narrowest is only two miles wide, the island had long provided a natural springboard for the projection of Axis troops into Tunisia - for Cape Bon on the African mainland is but ninety miles from Sicily's western tip. In the event of an Allied assault upon the island, enemy reinforcements could be expected to pour in from the toe of Italy - by sea ferry from the Calabrian ports or by transport aircraft from the airfields of Naples and Brindisi.* To stem the flow of this traffic and then reverse it in defeat would be no easy task, for Sicily's topography would overwhelmingly favour its defenders. Almost the whole surface of the island is covered with hills and mountains, which fall either directly to the sea or to restricted coastal plains or terraces. The only extensive flat ground is the east central plain of Catania, above which towers the massive cone of Mount Etna; more limited low-lying areas are to be found along the south-eastern seaboard and at the western extremity of the island. Once attacking forces had penetrated into the mountainous areas of the interior, their lines of advance would be restricted to the few existing roads, and their rate of progress conditioned by the enemy's well-known skill in mining and demolition. The early stages of planning were concerned chiefly with the selection of the points at which the main assaults would be made. Messina, at the north-eastern tip of the island, was regarded as the most important objective, for this strategically situated port might be expected to furnish initially the means of entry of Axis reinforcements from the mainland and, when the progress of the campaign should reach its expected climax, to
* For a note on the pronunciation of Italian geographical names see p. 697.

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11

afford an escape route to the island's defenders.* Possession of Messina would allow the Allied forces to dominate the Strait and provide them with a base for further operations into Italy. A direct assault on the port or its vicinity could not be contemplated, however, for the Strait of Messina was completely closed to Allied shipping by mines and coast defence batteries, and was beyond the effective range of Allied fighter cover based on Malta and Tunisia. It was therefore necessary to look elsewhere for invasion sites through which operations could be developed to overrun the island. The main strategic factors to be considered may be reduced to a relatively few prime requirements. Geography must first furnish suitable beaches close enough to Alliedcontrolled airfields for the landings to be given fighter protection. Consideration of logistics dictated a second demand, thus defined by General Alexander:
It was still an essential element of the doctrine of amphibious warfare that sufficient major ports must be captured within a very short time of the initial landings to maintain all the forces required for the attainment of the objectives; beach maintenance could only be relied on as a very temporary measure. The experiences of Operation "Torch", the North African landing, though difficult to interpret in view of the special circumstances of that operation, were held to confirm this view.33

Along the 600-mile coastline that forms the perimeter of the Sicilian triangle, more than ninety stretches of beach were reported by Allied Intelligence as topographically satisfying the requirements for landing operations. These ranged from less than one hundred yards to many miles in length and, although offshore gradients were in several cases unfavourably shallow and the beaches themselves of unpromising soft sand, most of them gave reasonably convenient access to the narrow coastal strip encompassing the island. Only in two sectors, however, could disembarkation be covered by land-based Allied fighter craft. These were the beaches in the southeastern corner of the island, between the Gulf of Noto and Gela, which were within range of the Malta airfields, and those in the south-west, between Sciacca and Marinella, which could be reached from airfields in Tunisia. Neither of these areas contained any of the major ports the early possession of one or more of which was deemed essential for providing unloading facilities for the assaulting armies. These ports were, in order of size, Messina, Palermo in the north-west, and Catania on the east coast. Against an enemy garrison whose strength was expected to be eight divisions
* It was estimated that the train ferries at Messina could move up to 40,000 men, or 7500 men and 750 vehicles, in twenty-four hours.31 In the "Torch" landings, which were made against relatively light enemy opposition, the loss in landing craft destroyed or damaged on the different surf-swept beaches had varied from 34 to 40 per cent.32

12

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the planners considered approximately ten divisions would be necessary to take the island. Maintenance requirements for a division, including the build-up of reserves, were calculated at 500 tons a day; thirty tons a day were needed for a squadron of the Royal Air Force .34 It was estimated that the daily clearance capacity of the larger ports, when due allowance was made for damage that might be caused by our bombardment and the enemy's demolitions, would be between four and five thousand tons for Messina, about 2000 for Palermo, and 1800 for Catania. There were lesser harbours* on the island - but an early decision was reached that the points of assault must be directly related to the location of one or more of the three major seaports. With Messina out of the question as an immediate objective, consideration was given to securing Catania and Palermo in the early stages of operations. Catania alone would not provide facilities for the maintenance of a sufficient number of Allied divisions for the reduction of the whole island; Palermo would do so - if the enemy allowed enough time for a satisfactory build-up - but an assault directed solely against that area would leave the Axis forces free to reinforce through the eastern ports. A third factor thus entered the planning - the need for early seizure of Sicilian airfields, both to deny their use to Axis aircraft and to provide the invading forces with the means of air support in their operations against the required ports. The disposition of those airfields was governed less by tactical considerations than by the limitations which the mountainous nature of the country imposed. They were to be found in three main clusters, all within fifteen miles of the coast (see Sketch 1). Most important of these was the Catania-Gerbini group in the eastern plain, for it gave cover to the Strait of Messina. Within supporting reach of this group, on the low ground behind Gela was the south-eastern concentration, comprising the Comiso, Biscari and Ponte Olivo airfields. The third group lay along the narrow coastal plain at the western tip of the island, extending from Castelvetrano to Trapani and affording air cover to Palermo. These last fields were beyond fighter range of either the eastern or south-eastern groups. It thus became apparent that the immediate objective of the assault forces must be the airfields both in the south-east and the west, in order to provide the extension of air cover required for the capture of the ports of Catania and Palermo. Accordingly the original Casablanca Outline Plan proposed simultaneous landings by the Eastern and Western Task Forces. British forces would assault the south-east corner of the island with three
* Syracuse on the east coast had an estimated capacity of 1000 tons a day, and Augusta, also on the east coast, Licata and Porto Empedocle (see p. 697) on the south, and Trapani (p. 697) on the west coast could each handle about 600 tons daily.35 See p. 697.

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divisions on D Day to secure the airfields in that area and the ports of Syracuse and Augusta. With the air protection afforded by those captured fields a fourth infantry division plus a brigade group and an airborne division would assault in the Catania area on D plus 3 to secure the port and the important eastern group of airfields. In the meantime operations by American forces would begin on D Day with a landing by one division on the south-west coast at Sciacca to secure the western airfields required for operations against Palermo. The main assaults in the Palermo area would be made on D plus 2 by two divisions charged with the task of capturing the port and linking up with the thrust from Sciacca. Each Task Force was allotted a reserve division to be landed respectively through Catania and Palermo, to provide by D plus 7 sufficient forces to deal with any opposition that the enemy might offer.36 Throughout February and early March, while the direction of operations in Tunisia, now at the critical stage, claimed the undivided attention of General Alexander and his two prospective army commanders, the planners at Bouzarea, although short-handed by reason of the continued employment of many of their key personnel at the 18th Army Group Headquarters, applied themselves to such basic planning tasks as might be undertaken before firm decisions had been reached at the higher level. "All that was possible", reports Alexander in his Despatch, "was to work out loading tables, training schedules and all such matters which must of necessity be taken in hand long before the date of the assault, while preserving complete flexibility of mind about the objectives which might eventually be selected for the assault."37 The tentative outline plan on which all preliminary discussions had been based came under criticism from the three commanders of the ground, air and naval forces when they held their first meeting with General Eisenhower at Headquarters Force 141 on 13 March.38 General Alexander was concerned at the wide dispersion of the proposed landings, particularly those of the Eastern Task Force. He considered it vital to the success of the entire operation that the D Day assault at Avola* in the Gulf of Noto should be strong enough to ensure the seizure of Syracuse and Augusta, and if possible Catania, very soon after landing. Only a third of the Force had been allotted to this crucial area, but additional insurance of success could be gained by transferring from the left flank the division assigned to land at Gela. Less than ten miles inland from Gela, however, was one of the most important airfields of the south-eastern group, the air base of Ponte Olivo, the capture of which for the use of the Allied air forces was deemed essential by Air Chief Marshal Tedder. This view was supported by
* See p. 697.

THE ALLIED DECISION TO INVADE SICILY

15

Admiral Cunningham, who was unable to accept the risk of leaving the enemy's air power free to operate against the naval forces from airfields so close to the proposed landing areas.39

The Second Outline Plan

It was clear that Force 545 (the code name given by the planners to the Eastern Task Force) required strengthening. After a discussion of plans on 18 March at Bouzarea, when both army commanders were represented'40 General Montgomery requested that his Force-the military component of which was to be the Eighth Army-be allotted another division.41 But it was not clear whence such additional strength would be forthcoming. Although a division might be found in North Africa or the Middle East, the limiting factor was once again that of shipping, for all sea transport and landing craft expected to be available for "Husky" had already been assigned. A redistribution of strength within the existing resources of Force 141 appeared to be the only solution. A proposal by General Alexander that the D Day assault by Force 343 (the Western Task Force) on the south-west shore at Sciacca should be cancelled, and the American division intended for that role transferred to the Gela beaches was tentatively agreed to by the Supreme Commander on 20 March.42 Like most compromise plans, however, this one had its weaknesses. It meant placing an isolated American division under the command of the British Task Force; and abandonment of the Sciacca landings would mean that the neutralization of the western airfields would have to be accomplished by long-range fighters based on the south-eastern group. Until such action had assured fighter cover for the operations against Palermo, it was not possible to fix exact dates for the American landings in that area. There thus appeared the unwelcome prospect of condemning the assaulting Seventh Army (the military element of Force 343) to stay aboard for an indeterminate period after D plus 3 somewhere between the North African ports and Western Sicily, exposed to possible attack from hostile aircraft based on the airfields behind Sciacca.43 In a letter to General Alexander on 23 March the Supreme Allied Commander expressed his uneasiness at the proposed change of plan.
The gist of the matter is that by agreeing to Montgomery's demand for an additional division, we have come to the conclusion that we need one more division than can be transported in the means available to our two governments. Realizing that there is no hope of obtaining this additional shipping, we are adopting a plan which we consider the least objectionable of any we can devise. I am not too happy about the matter, but I do agree that the conclusion expressed in the preceding sentence is a true one.44

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The British Chiefs of Staff too were disturbed by the proposal to abandon the southwestern assault, for they feared that its cancellation might allow the enemy the continued use of Palermo as a port of entry for reinforcements, besides leaving his air forces free to operate in Western Sicily. They made strong representations through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington that every channel should be explored to provide the additional division without disturbing the dispositions originally made for the Western Task Force.45

Further Revision of the Plan

Again the planners at Bouzarea examined the unfavourable shipping situation and counted British formations available in the Mediterranean area, and on 16 April General Alexander put forward a solution which tentatively restored the main outline of the original plan, and at the same time provided Force 545 with the extra strength it required in the Avola area. A new British division was introduced from North Africa to carry out the Gela landings, thereby releasing the American division for its assault on Sciacca. The specific employment of a division against Catania on D plus 3 was cancelled; instead one was to be held as an immediate reserve at Malta, on call after D plus 1. This formation would be neither assault trained nor assault loaded, and would be carried to Sicily in craft that had already been used in the D Day landings. By such a reshuffling of resources it was possible to meet the current demands of the assault plan without adding materially to the total number of landing craft required; the necessary increment was provided from British and American reserves at the expense of assault training and cross-Channel operations "on the decision to give absolute priority to 'Husky'.46 While the new plan followed essentially that produced by the British Joint Planning Staff for the Casablanca Conference, it contained important modifications in the timings of the landings. In drawing up the original schedule it had been recognized that simultaneous assaults at both ends of the island would have the desirable effect of dispersing the enemy's air and ground forces. But there was much to be said for initiating operations in southeastern Sicily, where surprise could more readily be obtained, and by so doing drawing off enemy reserves from the west-to the great benefit of a delayed assault there. The determining factor in making the change, however, lay in the decision to employ airborne troops in advance of the landings to "soften up" the defences. In order to drop the maximum number of troops in each area it would be necessary to employ all the available transport aircraft,

THE ALLIED DECISION TO INVADE SICILY

17

and to apply the total lift to each airborne assault in turn. Accordingly, a series of staggered landings was proposed. Whereas the four British divisions of Force 545 would assault on all beaches from Avola to Gela on D Day, the American landings were to be postponed to D plus 2 for the division assaulting at Sciacca, and to D plus 5 for the two divisions assigned to the landings in the Palermo area. In addition to the division to be held at Malta, one for each of the Eastern and Western Task Forces would be available in North Africa as a later follow-up. On 11 April the Supreme Commander notified the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington of his adoption of these changes,47 and it was in this form that the outline plan for "Husky" stood when Canadian participation in the operation was invited. But it was not yet the pattern of the actual assaults which were delivered in July; that formula had still to be worked out. On 24 April (the day following General McNaughton's visit to the War Office) General Alexander received from General Montgomery a signal expressing the latter's concern at the disposition of the British forces proposed by the existing outline plan. Always an exponent of the "principle of concentration"* he felt the need of a greater mobilization of power in the assault area. "Planning so far", wrote Montgomery, "has been based on the assumption that opposition will be slight, and that Sicily will be captured relatively easily. Never was there a greater error. The Germans and also the Italians are fighting desperately now in Tunisia and will do so in Sicily."48 General Alexander was disinclined to agree that the enemy's powers of resistance had been underestimated. In his Despatch he recalls the gloomy prognostications of the British Joint Planning Staff in its original report to the Casablanca Conference-"We are doubtful of the chances of success against a garrison which includes German formations"49-and he draws attention to the fact that "actually planning had been based on the appreciation that the mobile part of the garrison of the island would be more than doubled."50 On the other hand, he was only too conscious of the slimness of the margin of advantage which the assaulting forces might be expected to hold over the defenders. In actual numbers, if Intelligence estimates were accurate, the enemy garrison could outnumber the invading Allied troops. It was assumed for planning purposes that there would be in Sicily at the time of the invasion two German and six Italian mobile divisions and five Italian coastal divisions; Force 141, as we have seen, would have just over
* A recognized "Principle of War", that the concentration of the maximum possible force of every possible description should be brought to bear on the enemy at the decisive time and place. This appreciation was reasonably accurate. Enemy forces in Sicily at the time of the actual assault consisted of two German and four Italian mobile divisions and six Italian coastal divisions (see below, pp. 55-9).

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ten divisions, including airborne formations, and two more divisions in reserve. While it was reasonable to believe that this Allied inferiority in numbers would be more than offset by the advantages which the invaders held in their command of the sea and air, in their superiority in equipment (at least over the Italians), and in their possession of the initiative to choose the points of attack, it was apparent that these advantages would be seriously diminished by the dispersal proposed by the outline plan. To General Montgomery examining the commitments given the Eastern Task Force at a three-day conference of Force 545 planners in Cairo, which began on 23 April, it seemed essential that his forces "be landed concentrated and prepared for hard fighting."51 With only four divisions at his command he considered it necessary to restrict the frontage of his army's assault to the area of the Gulf of Noto and the Pachino peninsula. The assaulting forces would be close enough to Syracuse to ensure its early capture and the development of operations northward against Augusta and Catania. The proposal to concentrate in this manner had, however, one obvious drawback -the ComisoGela group of airfields was too far to the west to be included in the initial bridgehead. As may be readily imagined, the Commandersin-Chief of the other Services, who had once already successfully upheld their claim for including in the planning the early capture of the Ponte Olivo airfield north-east of Gela, strongly objected to a proposal that would now leave the whole Ponte Olivo-Biscari-Comiso group of fields in enemy hands during the initial operations. At a conference in Algiers called by General Alexander on 29 April, Admiral Cunningham declared that "apart from his conviction on general grounds, that in amphibious operations the landings should be dispersed, he considered it essential to secure the use of the southeastern airfields in order to give protection to ships lying off the beaches."52 If this were not done he feared that shipping losses might be so prohibitive as to prevent the landings in the west.53 Air Chief Marshal Tedder, pointing out that the Eighth Army plan would leave thirteen landing-grounds in enemy hands, far too many for effective neutralization by air action, formally stated that unless their capture for Allied use "could be guaranteed he would be opposed to the whole operation."54 Speaking for the ground forces, Lieut.-General Sir Oliver Leese,55 representing General Montgomery, objected that to shift the proposed Force 545 bridgehead westward to include the Comiso-Gela group of airfields would move it too far from the ports that had to be captured on the east coast.56 It was' impossible to reconcile these conflicting views. They clearly revealed the fundamental weakness of the entire strategic plan, "which in attempting-with limited resources-to achieve too much at the same time in too many places, risked losing all everywhere."57

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19

The Final Plan of Attack

"On May 3rd", wrote General Eisenhower, "we stopped tinkering and completely recast our plan on the sound strategic principle of concentration of strength in the crucial area."58 On that day the Supreme Commander, concurred in a decision by his deputy to cancel the American assaults in the west and the south-west and divert the entire Western Task Force to the south-eastern assault, placing it on the Eighth Army's immediate left.* In abandoning the idea that Palermo must be captured as a means of maintenance for the Seventh Army, General Alexander chose to take this administrative risk rather than the operational one of too much dispersion. Within the new area assigned for its landings the American Task Force would have only one small port-Licata, which now became the farthest west point of assault. Acceptance of the fact that the Seventh Army would rely almost entirely on beach maintenance marked an important departure from the belief that success in large-scale amphibious warfare depended upon the early capture of major ports. The Senior Administrative Officer of Force 141, Major-General C. H. Miller, had dubiously reminded the planners that they were ignoring the experience of the North African landings, "which proved that a force must have a port for its maintenance within 48 hours of landing". He had suggested, however, that this lesson might not apply to the forthcoming operations because of the better prospects for good weather in midsummer, the greater certainty of Allied air and sea superiority, and, most important of all, the fact that DUKWs would be available to transfer supplies from ship to shore.61 General Miller's advocacy of beach maintenance proved justified. The results in Sicily vindicated the decision to employ this new technique of combined operations, and led to its adoption, with outstanding success, in the invasion of Normandy in 1944. With the approval of the new plan by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 12 May it was possible to proceed with firm and detailed planning, and on 19 May General Alexander issued his first operation instruction setting forth the tasks of the two armies and the part to be played by the supporting naval and air forces.62 He stated that the intention of the Allied Commanderin-Chief to "seize and hold the island of Sicily as a base for future operations" would be accomplished in five phases: preparatory measures by naval and air forces to neutralize enemy naval efforts and to gain air supremacy; pre-dawn seaborne assaults, assisted by airborne landings with the object of seizing airfields and the ports of Syracuse and Licata; the
* In his Despatch Alexander points out that as early as February he had considered concentrating the efforts of both Task Forces against the south-east of the island.59 Different versions of the question of personal responsibility for the decision to make the assault as finally planned are given by Montgomery and his Chief of Staff.60

20

THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

establishment of a firm base upon which to conduct operations for the capture of the ports of Augusta and Catania, and the Gerbini group of airfields; the capture of these ports and airfields; the reduction of the island. The Eighth Army would assault with two corps, comprising a total of six infantry divisions, one infantry brigade and one airborne division, in the area between Syracuse and Pozzallo. It would be responsible for the immediate seizure of Syracuse and the Pachino airfield, and the subsequent rapid capture of Augusta and Catania and the Gerbini group of airfields. On the left the Seventh Army, with one corps headquarters, four infantry divisions, one armoured division and one airborne division, was to assault between Cape Scaramia and Licata, capture that port and the airfields at Ponte Olivo, Biscari and Comiso, and on gaining contact with the Eighth Army protect the British left flank from enemy reserves moving eastward. When the two armies were firmly established across the south-eastern corner of Sicily in a line from Catania to Licata, operations would be developed to complete the conquest of the island.63

The Background to Canadian Participation

With the pattern of "Husky" thus finally determined it may be useful to turn to an examination of the circumstances surrounding the entry of the Canadian formations into the Sicilian enterprise. The story of the high policy that directed the employment of Canadian forces during the war will be told elsewhere in this History; it will be sufficient here to take a brief look at the background to Mr. Churchill's invitation of April 1943. Early in the course of the "Husky" planning it had been decided that because of the limited facilities of the Middle East ports it would be necessary for Force 545 to draw direct from the United Kingdom an infantry division and an army tank brigade.64 Nomination of these formations lay with the War Office, which towards the end of February had selected the 3rd British Division.65 Detailed administrative planning began immediately and the division embarked upon a programme of intensive training in combined operations and mountain warfare. On 24 April it was replaced in this role by the 1st Canadian Division, with what must have been to the British formation disappointing abruptness. The considerations which brought about this substitution were not exclusively military. In Canada towards the end of 1942 public opinion, which could, of course, have no authentic knowledge of what plans might be in the moulding for the future employment of Canadian troops, was becoming increasingly vocal through the press and on the rostrum in exerting pressure upon the Government to get its forces into action as soon as possible. Canadian troops had been in the United Kingdom for three years, and except

THE ALLIED DECISION TO INVADE SICILY

21

for a single day's bloody action at Dieppe by units of the 2nd Canadian Division had seen no real fighting. Fairly typical of editorial comment was the suggestion made at the beginning of November that it would be "a sensible thing to send a full division to some theatre of war, or next best at least -our senior officers. . . . An opportunity like Egypt to get actual fighting experience for officers and men should not be allowed to slip by complacently."66 In Toronto an ex-Prime Minister of Canada, Lord Bennett, said that he could find no reason why the Canadian Army should have to spend its fourth Christmas in Britain without firing a shot.67 A journalist reported to his paper from overseas that Canadian troops were feeling themselves to be "a sort of adjunct to the British Home Guard"; they were regarded as "the county constabulary in the English countryside".68 Even statistics of a Canadian Army Neurological Hospital were presented under the headline, "Mental Illness in Overseas Army Laid to Inactivity and Anxiety".69 In Vancouver the Canadian Corps Association heard a veteran of the First World War declare:
It strikes me as one of the supreme tragedies of this war that the United States, following one year in the struggle has already placed men in battle engagements in Africa while Canadian soldiers are sitting idle in England. This constitutes the greatest disgrace of the present war.70

The argument for giving some of the Canadian formations large-scale battle experience before committing the Army as a whole to operations was sound, and one that might well carry conviction in the military councils of the United Nations at a high level; in a somewhat different category were the more domestic and political reasons advanced, that the continued inactivity of her Army was damaging to the Dominion's self respect, and that the lack of a demonstrable contribution to victory might well weaken her influence in the post-war world.* These aspects received increasing attention in the criticism which continued to be directed against the Government throughout the winter. As Parliament resumed after the Easter recess an opposition speaker regretted that men who had been overseas since 1939 should "have it thrown in their faces that while Australia and New Zealand are fighting gallantly on the sands of Africa personnel of the Canadian Army are not there."71 Some newspapers suggested that the decision to keep the Canadians out of action had been made at Canada's request.
All other Empire troops have had battle experience in this war . . . The British have been everywhere. Only Canadians, among all the Allied combatants, have not been tried. This, we confess, seems strange. To a great many it is disturbing.72
* In a memorandum prepared for the Prime Minister at the end of January 1943, Mr. Hume Wrong, Assistant UnderSecretary of State for External Affairs, expressed the fear that "Canada would become the object of taunts similar to that which Henri Quatre addressed to a tardy supporter who had arrived too late for the battle: 'Go hang yourself, brave Crillon, for we fought at Arques and you were not there!"'

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THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

It was charged that the blame lay with the Government's policy of wishing to maintain the Canadian Army intact. One editor pointed to the many theatres of war in which "one or two or even three Canadian divisions could play a useful role", and in urging the Government "to make at least fragmentary use of the great striking force" which had been raised and equipped by the nation, warned that "the hand which holds the poised dagger can become palsied through lack of use."73 In mid-May 1943, unaware that the course which he advocated had already been taken, another wrote in similar vein:
Now that the North African campaign is finished and a new phase of the war is opening up, the honest course would be to admit frankly, even at the expense of personal pride, that the creation of a cumbrous military establishment overseas was an error of judgment and to permit the utilization of Canadian divisions in any formation where they can be effectively employed.74

These popular representations were presumably not without effect upon Government policy, and at a meeting in the United Kingdom with Mr. Churchill in October 1942 the Minister of National Defence, Colonel J. L. Ralston, requested that active employment should be found for the Canadian Army at the first opportunity. Later General McNaughton received from Lieut.-General Kenneth Stuart, Chief of the General Staff, a brief account (as told him by Colonel Ralston) of what had transpired at this meeting. 'The Minister of National Defence had emphasized to Mr. Churchill
that there were no strings on the employment of the Canadian Army,. either in whole or in part: that the Government of Canada wished it to be used where it would make the greatest contribution: that the Canadian Government were ready to consider any proposals.75

On his return to Canada Colonel Ralston reported to the War Committee of the Cabinet on 21 October that it had once more been made clear to British authorities that the Canadian Army was available for service anywhere it could be most effectively employed. No condition that it must be employed as a whole was being imposed. The sole consideration was how and where the Army could serve best. But while the Government was thus disclosing its readiness to divide the Army if such means were necessary to bring Canadian troops into action, the Army Commander himself showed less enthusiasm towards such a proposal. On learning from. General Stuart of Colonel Ralston's representations to the British Prime Minister, General McNaughton reports that he then told the Chief of the General Staff that he was in
full agreement with the policy that the employment of the Canadian Army should be based on its making the maximum possible contribution; that this might be in whole or in part, according to circumstances. . . .

THE ALLIED DECISION TO INVADE SICILY He went on to give his opinion, however,

23

that there was no reason to doubt that morale could be maintained even if we had to remain in England on guard for another year; that this was therefore no reason in itself for advocating active operations for their own sake; that anything we undertook should be strictly related to military needs and objectives.76

To forecast accurately for a year ahead the state of the morale of the Army if kept in the United Kingdom without action was not easy, but the problem had to be faced by those responsible for shaping Canadian policy. The unremitting efforts of the Canadian commanders to keep up a high standard of morale and discipline were bringing excellent results. During the closing months of 1942 and early in 1943 the fortnightly Field Censorship Reports-which provided a valuable sampling of the opinions held by the Canadian forces as revealed in their letters home-indicated with gratifying regularity that the morale of the Canadians in Britain was being fully maintained.* This intelligence however was frequently qualified by a reference to the dissatisfaction of some of the troops at their present inactivity. During November some regret was voiced that Canadians had not been included in the landings which had been made in North Africa at the beginning of the month. There was always hope of action-Mr. Mackenzie King in his New Year's broadcast had warned the people of Canada that "all our armed forces" would be in action during 194378-and as winter turned to spring evidence appeared that some of the troops expected this to come in the near future. A report which covered the last week in April showed that
Notwithstanding the long period of waiting, the Canadian Army appears to be in excellent condition on the whole, and ready and anxious to move. There are still a number of comments which indicate restlessness and boredom due to this inactivity, but there is much evidence of a great desire for, and anticipation of, action in the near future. The chief desire is to get on with the job, for which they came over, and then get back to their homes.79

From this and similar evidence in the reports of newspaper correspondents overseas it is clear that the major factor contributing to the morale of the Canadians in the United Kingdom during the winter of 1942-43 was their conviction that action would not be much longer delayed. That hope more than anything else encouraged them to endure with comparative cheerfulness the routine of what must otherwise have seemed merely training for training's sake. The degree to which their enthusiasm might have been sustained had 1943 brought no operational employment to Canadian arms can only be surmised; but it is not difficult to imagine the disquietude with which the Canadian Government must have contemplated at the end of 1942 the
* In February 1943 General Sir Bernard Paget, C.-in-C. Home Forces, told [Link] H. D. G. Crerar, G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps, "that he was increasingly impressed by the smartness and behaviour of the Canadian troops which he daily saw in London. He said that he could recognize Canadian soldiers across the street by their excellent bearing, and that their saluting was quite first-class."77

24

THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

probable effect of another year of inactivity upon the morale of its overseas troops. Canada received no invitation for her troops to take part in the "Torch" landings in North Africa*-indeed it was not until September that General McNaughton was informed of the decision to launch the operation and of the progress of its detailed planning."81 On the last day of the year, however, the Army Commander was advised by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that an opportunity might soon arise for Canadian participation in an operation against Sardinia or Sicily.82 The Chiefs of Staff Committee was contemplating for such an enterprise the employment of a British corps of three divisions, and Sir Alan Brooke warned McNaughton that a formal request might be forthcoming for Canada to supply one of these divisions. Within a week a proposal for the conquest of Sicily had been placed on the agenda of the approaching Casablanca Conference as a joint Allied task; but there was still a possibility of the occupation of Sardinia being mounted as a British operation, under the code name "Brimstone".83 At the end of January, in anticipation of a favourable decision by the C.I.G.S., the 1st Canadian Division was given priority in the use of facilities to complete its training in combined operations. With the development of planning for the assault on Sicily, however, the mounting of Operation "Brimstone" was tentatively cancelled, the Army Commander and General Stuart being so informed by General Brooke on 9 February.84 It looked as though Canadian troops were fated not to see the Mediterranean; and the eyes of Canadian planners returned to the contemplation of operations against a hostile shore closer to the United Kingdom. By the middle of March, however, it had become apparent that there would be no largescale cross-Channel operation that summer, except in the extremely unlikely event of a major German collapse. This was exceedingly disappointing news for the Canadian Government, and there was a marked degree of urgency in the telegram sent by Mr. King to Mr. Churchill on 17 March suggesting that "the strong considerations with which you are familiar in favour of employment of Canadian troops in North Africa appear to require earnest reexamination."85 Additional representation was made at the military level when the Chief of the General Staff signalled General McNaughton next day that if there was little possibility
* It may be noted that in July, when the decision was reached to mount "Torch", Mr. Churchill was contemplating the employment of the Canadian Army in an operation to seize aerodromes in Northern Norway ("Jupiter") in order to counter enemy air action against convoys to Russia. (General McNaughton's connection with this project is discussed in Volume l of this History, Six Years of War.) The British Chiefs of Staff opposed the scheme as impracticable, but on the 27th the Prime Minister notified President Roosevelt that he was running "Jupiter" for deception and that the Canadians would "be fitted for. Arctic service".80 A project, put forward in October 1942, for a Canadian force under General Crerar's command to participate in a combined operation against the Canary Islands (in the event, of a German occupation of Gibraltar) did not get beyond the stage of preliminary planning (see Volume I, Chapter 12).

THE ALLIED DECISION TO INVADE SICILY

25

of the Canadians being employed in 1943 as planned (i.e., in an operation against NorthWest Europe) "we should urge re-examination for one and perhaps two divisions going as early as possible to an active theatre." General Stuart pointed out that it was the War Committee's opinion that if no operations other than raids were thought possible during 1943, Canada should press for early representation in North Africa."86 The replies to both these messages were not encouraging. On 20 March McNaughton reiterated his firm belief in the overriding authority of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee in the matter of strategic planning.
My view remains (1) that Canadian Forces in whole should be used where and when they can make the best contribution to winning the war, (2) that we should continue to recognize that the strategical situation can only be brought to a focus in Chiefs of Staff Committee, (3) that proposals for use of Canadian forces should initiate with this committee, (4) that on receipt of these proposals I should examine them and report thereon to you with recommendations.

"I do not recommend", he added, "that we should press for employment merely to satisfy a desire for activity or for representation in particular theatres however much I myself and all here may desire this from our our own narrow point of view."87 Mr. Churchill's answer to Mr. King, dispatched the same day, held out little hope of meeting the Canadian request. He explained that it was intended to send only one more division from the United Kingdom to North Africa; this formation was already committed and under special training, and plans were too far advanced to permit of a Canadian division being sent in its place. No further divisions were likely to be required. "I fully realize and appreciate", concluded the Prime Minister, "the anxiety of your fine troops to take an active part in operations and you may be assured that I am keeping this very much in mind."88 At the end of March the Canadian Government was able to obtain the views of Mr. Anthony Eden. The British Foreign Secretary was made fully conversant with the case for Canadian troops to be given an early opportunity for action, and it was emphasized to him that the Government and the Army Command were willing to have the Canadian Army employed, in whole or in part, at any time and in any theatre of war in which it would be most effective. He was reminded of the Government's understanding that the Canadian Army was to be held in Britain for use as a unit in European operations later that year, and was told that if there had been any change in this plan and Canadian troops were not to be used even for limited operations in 1943, it would be a serious blow to the spirit of both the Canadian Army and the Canadian people. But Mr. Eden could offer little encouragement; for although Allied plans had been based on the possibility of offensive operations in the late summer or early autumn, this did not mean

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THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

that full-scale invasion in 1943 was a probability. A great deal depended on the developments in Russia and North Africa. Nevertheless it must be concluded that this reiteration of the Government's request bore fruit with the British authorities. Mr. Churchill, having given his assurance to keep the question of operational employment "very much in mind", was as good as his word. Whatever may have been the considerations that finally turned the scale in favour of Canada, by St. George's Day the British Prime Minister had issued to Sir Alan Brooke his directive that Canadian participation was to be arranged in the next operation.89 The Chief of the Imperial General Staff immediately sent word of the inclusion of Canadian troops in Operation "Husky" to the Allied commanders in the Mediterranean Theatre.
Personal from C.I.G.S. for General Eisenhower, repeated General Alexander. 1. Both political and military grounds make it essential that Canadian forces should be brought into action this year. It had been hoped to employ them in operations across the channel from U.K. but likelihood of such operations has now become extremely remote owing to recent addition to HUSKY of practically all remaining landing craft. 2. It has therefore been decided that 1 Canadian Division and a tank brigade similarly organized to 3 Division and its tank brigade will replace latter in the Eastern Task Force for the HUSKY operation subject to confirmation from the Canadian Government which we hope will be immediately forthcoming. 3. 1 very much regret this last minute change. We have been very carefully into its implications and consider it quite practicable. The Canadian Division is In a more advanced state of combined training than 3 Division and the Canadian planning staff have already started work with full assistance of 3 Division so no time is being lost. 4. Request that Force 141 and 545 be informed.90

When General McNaughton advised General Brooke on 25 April of the Canadian Government's provisional acceptance of the British invitation it was with an important reservation. In his capacity as Senior Combatant Officer overseas he considered it part of his responsibility to examine the general plans of the proposed operation before recommending acceptance to the Canadian Government. After three crowded days, during which he was almost constantly engaged in discussion with War Office officials the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Vice Chief, the Director of Military Operations and Planning, with members of his own staff at Army Headquarters, and with the Commanders of the 3rd British and 1st Canadian Division91 - he was able to report to Ottawa his satisfaction that the plans represented "a practical operation of war."92 On the receipt of this assurance General Stuart notified the Army Commander of the Canadian Government's final approval.93 Next day McNaughton received a message from General Montgomery: "Am delighted Canadian Division will come under me for Husky."94

CHAPTER II

THE 1st DIVISION GOES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN

After Long Waiting
HE two Canadian formations whose future course of action had thus been plotted in such widely separated cities as Algiers, Cairo, Ottawa and London were the senior Canadian representatives of their arms of service in the United Kingdom. General McNaughton himself had brought the 1st Infantry Division to Britain in December 1939.1 The 1st Army Tank Brigade, first of the Canadian armoured formations to move overseas, had arrived during the summer of 1941 under the command of Brigadier F. F. Worthington, a pioneer of armoured warfare in Canada.2 Mobilized at the outbreak of war as one of the two divisions of the Canadian Active Service Force, the 1st Division included the nation's three Permanent Force infantry regiments (The Royal Canadian Regiment, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, and the Royal 22e Regiment). Its long sojourn in the United Kingdom is described elsewhere in this History.* After the dark days of June 1940, when it had sent a brigade group in a brief and disappointingly fruitless excursion across the Channel, the Division had settled down to what General McNaughton had "long thought was the important task, the defence of these islands."3 Through the remainder of that anxious summer, in which German invasion appeared imminent, officers and men stood on guard between London and the Channel coast, training intensively to meet the expected test. But Hitler's courage failed him, and there followed two and a half years of marking time - a period broken only by the sending of a small force of the Division on the bloodless expedition to Spitsbergen.4 The enforced waiting, however, was no time of idleness, for a great offensive weapon was in the forging. Throughout the length and breadth of the United Kingdom Briton and Canadian readied themselves to carry the war to the enemy, and the spring of 1943 found the three brigades of the Division, which was
* Volume I, Six Years of War.

27

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THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

commanded now by Major-General H. L. N. Salmon, completing an exacting course of basic training in combined operations. Two years of concentrated training across the Sussex Downs had brought the 1st Army Tank Brigade to a high standard of efficiency, which had been tested and proved on the fire-swept beaches of Dieppe, where one of its regiments - the 14th Army Tank Regiment (The Calgary Regiment) - had been the first unit of the Canadian Armoured Corps ever to go into action. Brigadier R. A. Wyman had succeeded Brigadier Worthington in the command in February 1942.

The 1st Division "Takes Over"

It was the natural claim of their seniority and efficiency which led General McNaughton to select these two formations for participation in Operation "Husky".5 Once the nomination had been made the Canadian Division lost no time in "taking over" its operational role from the British formation which it was replacing. Indeed, on 24 April, before a reply had been received from Ottawa, the War Office, acting on the assumption that Canadian confirmation would be forthcoming, issued a directive instructing the Commander of the 3rd Division, Major-General W. H. C. Ramsden, to establish direct contact with the Headquarters of the Canadian Division and "to place at the disposal of the Canadian Commander full details of the progress in planning and preparation that has so far been made."6 The actual "hand-over" was in the nature of an operation in itself, appropriately given the code name "Swift".7 For weeks the staff officers of the British Division, with a direct channel of communication established to Headquarters of Force 545 in Cairo, and in close touch with planners at the War Office, had been busy organizing the mass of information passed to them from higher levels and working out in detail the varied and complicated administrative problems arising from participation in the coming assault. A large part of the preliminary spade-work had been completed, much of it in extremely rocky ground, for even at this late date no firm plan for the invasion had reached the United Kingdom. The sound methods which General Ramsden's officers had employed enabled them to present the Canadians with a well-established and smoothly functioning planning organization which did not suffer from interruption during the take over. On 24 April General Salmon set up his divisional planning staff at Norfolk House, in St. James's Square, and upon a branch-to-branch basis each British officer individually put his Canadian "opposite number" in the picture, passing to him and explaining the contents of the bulky files of data

THE 1st DIVISION GOES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN

29

which went to make up the giant blueprint so soon to be translated into execution.8 It was an unkind turn of events which thus compelled the officers of the 3rd Division to surrender to others the high hopes of action towards the realization of which they had so enthusiastically laboured. The blow was the heavier in that it was not possible at the time for General Ramsden to pass on to the troops under his command the reasons (conveyed to him by Sir Alan Brooke) for their replacement by the Canadians.9 To their great credit be it said that they took their disappointment in good spirit, and the assistance which they gave their successors did much to smooth the Canadian path. For them entry into action was to be postponed for a year, but the associations formed with Canadians were to continue. When on 6 June 1944 the 3rd British Division landed on the beaches of Normandy, it was at the side of the 3rd Canadian Division.10

Canadian Planning Begins

At Norfolk House General Salmon's staff plunged energetically into their exacting task. Time was against them. D Day for "Husky" had been set as 10 July,* and embarkation was due to begin in mid-June.11 The complex problem of mounting a force that was to be sea-borne to its point of contact with the enemy was attended by many difficulties, and had to be met by most careful planning. Every morning saw conferences conducted at successive hours under the auspices of the General Staff Branch, the "A" and "Q" Branches, and an inter-service committee charged with coordination of the sea, ground and air aspects of the operation. The attendance at these meetings of officers of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and the War Office and close liaison between the Canadian branches and services ensured harmonious progress within the whole complex organization. As soon as Force 545 learned that the 1st Canadian Division would replace the 3rd British Division, it sent an urgent request for General Salmon and certain of his staff officers to come to Cairo forthwith.12 In the vast design of operation "Husky" the Canadian formation would enter the assault on D Day as part of an army it had never seen before, and it was therefore highly desirable that the divisional commander should have some previous contact with those who were to be his superiors and his colleagues,
* The final Anfa meeting had agreed that an intensive effort should be made to achieve the favourable June moon for the operation, but on 20 March General Eisenhower reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that it was impossible to meet this earlier deadline. The General Staff Branch is responsible for training, Intelligence, security and operations. The "A" and "Q" Branches are concerned with all phases of administration, including transportation arrangements and the provision of equipment and supplies.

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THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

and that an opportunity should be given for members of the Canadian planning staff to consult with their "opposite numbers" who were at work in Cairo. Arrangements were made for General Salmon, accompanied by his naval associates and several officers of his staff, to fly out to the Mediterranean. The Air Ministry made two aircraft available, and the flight was ordered for 29 April. At nine o'clock that morning General Salmon and his party took off from Hendon in a Hudson. With the G.O.C. were Rear-Admiral P. J. Mack, R.N., the Naval Force Commander assigned to the Canadian section of the operation; Captain Sir T. L. Beevor, R.N., a member of his staff; Lt.-Col. G. G. H. Wilson, G.S.O. 1, 3rd British Division; and Lt.-Col. C. J. Finlay, who had just been appointed Assistant Adjutant and QuartermasterGeneral, 1st Canadian Division.13 The aircraft did not clear the United Kingdom; near Barnstaple, in Devonshire, it crashed and burned. All the occupants were killed. As a result, departure of the second aircraft was postponed.14 This misfortune was not permitted to halt even momentarily the course of preparations for the operation. When General McNaughton learned of the accident, he immediately gave instructions for Major-General G. G. Simonds to assume command of the 1st Division, put himself "in the picture" in regard to the forthcoming operation, and to fly to Cairo in General Salmon's place without delay.15 The new commander held the distinction of being Canada's youngest general officer. A Permanent Force officer, he had come overseas in 1939 as a major on the staff of the 1st Canadian Division. He had risen rapidly, serving as G.S.O. 1 of the 2nd Canadian Division, and as Brigadier General Staff of the 1st Canadian Corps, in which appointment he had won high commendation from General Montgomery.16 He had recently completed a tour of duty under the Eighth Army Commander in North Africa. On his return to England in mid-April he was promoted Major-General (at the age of 39) and given the command of the 2nd Canadian Divisionan appointment which he had held for only a few days when his transfer to the 1st Division entrusted him with the direction of Canada's share in the Sicilian enterprise. Late on the afternoon of 29 April General Simonds went to Norfolk House and immediately began to familiarize himself with the design of the operation and the progress so far made under General Salmon's direction. As noted above, the outline plan had not yet reached its final form; indeed at that very moment it was undergoing critical examination by the service Commanders-in-Chief in conference at Algiers (see above, p. 18). Thus when the new G.O.C. left London on the morning of 1 May for the flight to Cairo, he knew that a modification had been contemplated, but was not aware how the plan then stood, particularly with regard to the intended location of the Canadian assault. As a precaution in case of a future mishap

THE 1st DIVISION GOES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN

31

General Simonds' party had been divided into two groups for the flight. His G.S.O. 1, [Link]. George Kitching, and his C.O. Divisional Signals, Lt.-Col. J. H. Eaman, were placed aboard the second aircraft, which carried also Brigadier Christopher Vokes, Commander of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade; Brigadier A. W. Beament, Deputy Adjutant General at C.M.H.Q.; and Lt.-Col. D. K. Tow, Assistant Quartermaster General, 2nd Canadian Corps.* It was airborne early on 30 April. Travelling with Simonds in a third aircraft (replacing the crashed Hudson) were his Commander, Royal Engineers, Lt.-Col. Geoffrey Walsh; his Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, Major A. F. B. Knight; and Rear-Admiral Sir Philip L. Vian, R.N., an officer of great distinction, who had been appointed to replace Admiral Mack.17 "Vian of the Cossack" was no stranger to the Canadian Army, for in 1941 he had commanded the naval squadron which escorted the detachment of the 1st Canadian Division on its excursion to Spitsbergen. At Gibraltar and again at Algiers, where sandstorms delayed the journey eastward, General Simonds found that no decision had yet been reached on a final plan for "Husky". It was not until his arrival, on the evening of 4 May, at Headquarters Force 545 in Cairo that the Canadian Commander learned that the general plan of the operation was at last "firm". In conferences with the planning staff of the 30th British Corps-the formation to which the 1st Division had been allotted for "Husky"-the General discussed the changes that had been made in the broad scheme, and decided on the manner in which he wanted to carry out the Canadian share of the task allotted to the Corps. He then saw Lieut.-General Leese, the Corps Commander, and obtained his concurrence in certain modifications in the assault plan for the Canadian sector. These concerned the fixing of interdivisional boundaries, and provision for special attention to be given to enemy coastal defences on the Canadian right and left flanks. To ensure that the most accurate information possible would be available regarding the beaches at which the Canadians were to land, Simonds asked for a submarine reconnaissance to be made. He emphasized to Leese that time was short, and that he must soon return to England.
I told him I had to put forward a firm plan, and leave Cairo with the clear understanding that whatever plan I took back with me could not change, as the loading of the ships was soon about to start, and this could not be delayed. In the afternoon I made a further study of the map and model and put the plan down on paper and cabled it home that night. The plan was cabled to England within 24 hours of my arrival in Cairo and was never changed since.18

For four more days Simonds remained in Cairo, conferring with various officers of the Headquarters of the Eighth Army and the 30th British Corps.
* Lt. -Col. W. P. Gilbride, who succeeded Lt: Col. Finlay as A.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Canadian Division, remained in London to carry on planning.

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He had a number of meetings with Major-General D. N. Wimberley, G.O.C. 51st (Highland) Division, which was to assault on the Canadians' immediate right, "to make certain that we were properly tied in on the right flank as regards junction points."19 On the morning of 9 May he left Cairo on his return journey, and after a near mishap, when faulty navigation almost brought about a landing in Eire and consequent internment for the whole party, he reached London on the afternoon of the 11th.20

Training for the Assault

In the meantime units of the 1st Canadian Division and of the 1st Army Tank Brigade terminated their long stay in "Sussex by the Sea" and moved northward into Scotland. During the past winter, as we have seen, the three infantry brigades had completed basic training in combined operations; a final period of advanced training was now needed to fit them for what a War Office directive styled "(a) an opposed landing, (b) subsequent land operations including mountainous country.21 At Inveraray on the rugged Argyllshire coast each brigade in turn underwent a rigorous eight-day "refresher" course designed to put officers and men in tip-top physical condition and to practise them in the highly specialized technique of assault landing. A strenuous programme of forced route marches, cross-country runs, hill-scaling, rope-climbing and exercise with scramble nets achieved its purpose, drawing from one brigade diarist the comment, "the men are stiff but have stamina and carry very well their hardening".22 Under the skilled direction of specialist instructors in combined training units carried out day and night assault landings along the Ayrshire coast on "hostile" beaches "defended" by troops of a Royal Marine commando acting as enemy. With the keen and critical eye of the Royal Navy upon them, prairie lads, born and raised a thousand miles from the sea, mastered the niceties of transferring themselves from the decks of transport into small landing craft pitching on the choppy waters of a Scottish loch. In addition to the week at the Combined Training Centre the Canadian battalions, stationed briefly at camps in south-western Scotland, filled their days (and much of their nights) with an intensive programme of specialized training involving work with new types of equipment. "No. 1 novelty" (so new as to be still on the secret list) was an anti-tank weapon which was destined to achieve wide repute-the PIAT (Projector, Infantry, AntiTank). For the units of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade a special course in mountain warfare in the hills of Perthshire preceded the period at Inveraray. It was General Simonds' express desire that the Division should undergo as

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much mountain training as possible in the short time available, and particularly the 3rd Brigade, whose role in "Husky" was to follow up the initial assault of the 1st and 2nd Brigades. Cliff-scaling and mock attacks up steep mountain sides played an effective part in the hardening process, to which an important contribution was made by the introduction of the troops to the "Everest carrier"--"an ingenious device with which a man can take the load of a mule, or almost!"23 Meanwhile the Canadian Tank Brigade, with Headquarters temporarily established at Annan, in Dumfriesshire, was busily engaged in its particular form of preparation, having taken over training areas previously occupied by the 33rd Army Tank Brigade, the British armoured formation originally selected to go to Sicily. When Brigadier Wyman's units moved north from Sussex they said goodbye to the Canadian-made Ram tanks which had replaced their earlier British Churchills. In the Mediterranean theatre Sherman tanks had been adopted as standard equipment; accordingly on their arrival in Scotland the Canadian tank regiments inherited the Shermans which had been issued to their predecessors in the "Husky" order of battle. There was much to be done in little time. Officers and men quickly familiarized themselves with their new tanks, and on the armoured fighting vehicle range at Kirkcudbright each regiment practised the use of the 75-millimetre gun with which the Shermans were armed. In its forthcoming role in the Eighth Army (although until the end of May the secret was known to none below Brigade Headquarters, and then only to regimental commanders) the Brigade was to find itself in exalted company-the exploits of Montgomery's tank formations in the Western Desert were already legendary. The Brigade training staff was therefore fortunate in having the assistance of a small number of British officers who had served with armour in North Africa. Two of these-Brigadier G. W. Richards, the commander of the 23rd Tank Brigade, and Major E. S. Franklin, an expert in Sherman tanks-were expressly sent by General Montgomery to the United Kingdom to work with the Canadian Army Tank Brigade.24 With the group from North Africa was Brigadier M. E. Dennis, Brigadier Royal Artillery, Eighth Army (and later Major-General Royal Artillery, 21st Army Group); his timely advice and encouragement to Canadian gunners, both during the training period in Scotland and later in Sicily and Italy, contributed greatly to the effectiveness of the Canadian artillery in the operations in the Mediterranean theatre.25 May passed into June, and the deadline set by the War Office for the completion of preparation found the Brigade in a satisfying state of readiness. By the middle of the month, when the time came for

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THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

embarkation; units had received their full scale of equipment, their tanks were camouflaged and waterproofed,* and officers and men had completed five days' privilege leave.26

Administrative Preparations
While infantry and tank units were thus putting finishing touches to their training, the Canadian planning staff in London had been equally busy. The arrival of a firm outline plan for the invasion had made it possible to push to completion planning at divisional level; with the actual landing beaches selected intelligence staff officers could finish compiling their "Intelligence Summaries"-the established sources from which the assault troops would learn about the terrain over which they were to fight and the dispositions and characteristics of the enemy formations that they might expect to encounter. On the "A" and "Q" sides staff officers continued to fashion the administrative plan for equipping and maintaining the Canadian force. They were aided greatly by the visit to North Africa of Brigadier Beament, who, as we have seen, had flown out with the initial planning party. He attended meetings with the various planning staffs at Cairo and Algiers and brought back to the United Kingdom final decisions on many "A" and "Q" problems. Lt.-Col. Tow, who accompanied Brigadier Beament to the Mediterranean, remained in Africa to handle the numerous details of Canadian administration and to act as liaison officer with the Army Group and with Allied Force Headquarters (see below, p. 38).27 On the shoulders of the Canadian planners rested the responsibility of ensuring that when the troop convoys sailed from the United Kingdom they would carry with them every item of the great mass of equipment, vehicles and stores required for keeping the force in action during the first three weeks of the operation; thereafter maintenance would be carried out through Eighth Army channels from the Middle East.28 Every possible contingency had to be foreseen and measures taken to meet it. There could be no afterthought in the replacement of shortages, for no more shipping in support of the operation could be expected from the United Kingdom until 42 days after the landing. Thus, to give only one example, the possibility that a water-trailer might stall on a Sicilian sandbar caused the replacement of all water-trailers by water-trucks with fourwheel drive. Loading tables for each ship in the several convoys were worked out in the
* In waterproofing, the tanks were prepared for "wading" ashore under their own power through a maximum depth of six feet of water. The main precautions taken were to extend the exhaust pipe above water level and seal with a special plastic material exposed joints and working parts.

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minutest detail to ensure that the innumerable items of cargo would be available at the time and place they were required in Sicily. Every vehicle was stowed on board fully loaded, care being taken in the distribution to maintain a safe balance throughout the entire convoy of such important stores as ammunition, food and water. "We knew the contents of every lorry", said one of the planners afterwards, "and the drivers themselves knew what was in their lorries, where they were to go on landing and, once they arrived there, what to do".29 The task of the administrative planners was further complicated by the fact that since the Canadian force was to be supplied over the Eighth Army's lines of communication, it was necessary for the sake of standardization to adopt, in the main, British types of equipment which were in use in the Mediterranean Theatre and which could be maintained or replaced from bases in the Middle East. Accordingly the 1st Division and the Tank Brigade were re-equipped with the Thompson machine carbine, which had only recently been replaced by the new Sten. Other weapons that had been adopted for the Canadian overseas forces were issued. The former machine-gun battalion of the 1st Division, The Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.), now reorganized into three Brigade Support Groups, received the 4.2-inch mortar and the 20-millimetre anti-aircraft gun. The anti-tank platoons of the Canadian infantry battalions relinquished their 2-pounder guns in favour of 6-pounders, while the divisional anti-tank regiment drew 17-pounders in place of some of its 6-pounders.30 It will be observed that much of this equipment was not to be found in the list of the normal requirements of an infantry division or tank brigade mobilized for action. Wherever the various articles to be issued were included in the standard mobilization tables-in military terms the "G.1098" scaletheir provision to the 1st Canadian Division and the Army Tank Brigade was a Canadian Army responsibility; the furnishing of everything other than G.1098 equipment, including a large number of items peculiar to the forthcoming operation, was undertaken by the War Office.31 The most important addition to the vehicles with which the Canadian formations were now to be equipped was the American-designed amphibious truck-the DUKW (so designated from its factory serial initials). This was a normal U.S. two-and-a-half-ton six-wheeled truck which had in fact a boat built around it. All six wheels were power driven, but when the vehicle entered the water the motive power was transfered to a propeller. When afloat the DUKW attained a maximum speed of six knots, and should the propeller fail, under favourable conditions it could still be driven up to two miles per hour by the wheels. Ashore its crosscountry performance was similar to that of an ordinary three-ton lorry. Its primary task was the transfer of stores from ship to shore, and because of its amphibious powers it was the

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only craft that had no fear of the sandbars which it was expected would be found off the beaches where the Canadian Division was to land. In case of emergency, as will later be seen, it could be used in place of the L.C.A* to carry assault troops ashore. The planners of "Husky", mindful of the lessons of Operation "Torch", and alive to the necessity of assuring a rapid build-up for the assault forces, adopted the DUKW to accelerate the unloading of stores and equipment. As a result of successful trials during 1942 orders had been placed in America for 2000 of the amphibians, and by the early summer of 1943 production was well advanced. Of 350 of these vehicles allotted to the Eighth Army for the Sicilian operation, one hundred were sent direct from the United States to the United Kingdom for the 1st Canadian Division.32 Probably no other item of equipment for the expedition caused more anxiety than these hundred DUKWs. Until the last moment it was uncertain whether they would arrive in time for loading-a procedure which itself presented special difficulties in stowing for launching from the ships' davits at an early hour on D Day. The delay in delivery created a further problem with respect to the training of special drivers, to instruct whom driver-mechanics experienced in handling amphibious vehicles were flown from North Africa to the United Kingdom. Only two DUKWs were available at the Combined Training Centre until the first consignment arrived from America early in June, so that there was barely time to give all drivers some practice in operating the novel vehicles before they had to be reloaded for their journey to the Mediterranean. But all difficulties were successfully overcome; as will later be shown, these amphibians in their first employment in an operation in European waters splendidly proved, their worth. "Husky" wrote a new chapter in the story of beach maintenance of an assaulting force, and the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, when examining the lessons of the landings, was to underline "the profound effect that Dukws have had in amphibious warfare."34 The fact that Operation "Husky" was to take place in a climate considerably warmer than that of the United Kingdom, and would conceivably involve fighting in mountainous regions, added to the already long lists in the hands of the "Q" planners. While good Canadian battledress was adequate protection against the traditional rigours of an English summer, it was necessary now to provide all ranks with light weight "khaki drill" clothing, better suited for the torrid heat of Sicily in July. Ropesoled shoes and tinted eyeshields and spectacles were among the many items of tropical equipment provided, which included even a special camouflage paint to
* Landing Craft, Assault. General McNaughton personally tested one of these, driving it "ashore on soft sand and afloat in a considerable sea." The demand for DUKWs for the Canadian landings in Sicily followed.33

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conform with Middle East requirements. Mules might be acquired for carrying supplies in the Sicilian hills; and so over one hundred sets of pack saddlery were taken along and personnel experienced in animal transport were included in the first reinforcements. Nor did the providers overlook the dangers of disease lurking in the Sicilian valleys and plains. In the comprehensive cargoes that were being assembled antimalarial sets, mosquito nets, fly swatters and spray guns found an important place, to enable every precaution to be taken against the onset of tropical maladies. In such manner was provision made for the multitudinous needs of the Canadian force; for, as General Simonds had been told at the War Office, this was "to be the best found expedition which ever left the United Kingdom."35 The use of British channels for supplying from the Middle East all the material wants of the Canadian component of the Eighth Army once operations had begun could obviously not be extended to the "A" or personnel side to include the furnishing of reinforcements. Casualties in the Canadian force had to be replaced from Canadian sources-an arrangement presenting special problems which would not arise in the case of the non-Canadian formations engaged in "Husky". In an assault landing it was to be expected that initial casualties might be heavy. But whereas British and American reinforcements for the 15th Army Group would be available at short notice from depots already operating in North Africa, no such Canadian establishments existed nearer to Sicily than the United Kingdom. Accordingly a Canadian base reinforcement depot was planned, where reinforcements could be held in training close to the theatre of operations. For reasons of security it was not practicable to establish convenient reserves of Canadian troops in North Africa before the assault was launched. The Canadian planners therefore proposed that the headquarters and three of the battalions of the contemplated depot should be set up in North Africa on or after D Day, but that a fourth battalion of reinforcements, amounting to nearly 1500 all ranks, should be carried straight to Sicily in one of the early follow-up convoys, and thus be available within three days of the initial landings. Both the War Office and Allied Force Headquarters at first expressed doubts as to the practicability of this expedient, but they were finally convinced by the arguments which Canadian Military Headquarters presented.36 In the actual event the scheme quickly found its justification on the landing beaches, where every available man was required to assist in the unloading of ammunition, rations and stores; while in the fighting that followed reinforcements for the Canadian units were immediately forthcoming. On the other hand, had all the Canadian reinforcement battalions been sent to North Africa, it would have taken at least three weeks to replace early losses-a particularly serious situation in the event of the early casualties reaching their expected proportions. So convincingly did the "Husky" landings demonstrate the value of this policy that in planning

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the subsequent invasion of the Italian mainland the Eighth Army instructed each of its assault divisions to have 1000 reinforcements landed between D plus 3 and D plus 6.37 Closely paralleling the administrative problem of maintaining the reinforcement stream was that of arranging for the care and evacuation of the wounded. The process of recovering Canadian casualties from the Middle East bases to which the normal Eighth Army lines of communication would carry them might well be attended by complications, and it was early decided that they should be moved directly westward from the scene of action. It seemed expedient therefore that in addition to sending a Canadian general hospital direct to Sicily, Canadian medical installations should be established in North Africa athwart the line of evacuation to the United Kingdom. The British authorities welcomed such a proposal, and plans were made to dispatch a 1200bed general hospital and a convalescent depot to Algeria,* to be set up in the vicinity of No. 1 Base Reinforcement Depot.38 In the interest of avoiding confusion and unnecessary duplication it was essential that the conduct of Canadian administration should not intrude upon the British channels already existing in the Eighth Army. At an early stage of Canadian participation in the Force 141 planning it was prescribed as a basic principle that once the 15th Army Group was committed to action all matters of administration affecting Canadian troops were to be handled to the highest degree possible through the normal chain of Army and higher command.39 Notwithstanding these arrangements the need was recognized for a Canadian "A" staff element at General Alexander's headquarters to assist in the supervision of such peculiarly Canadian administrative matters as have been referred to above, and to provide a means by which Canadian service authorities in the United Kingdom might have liaison (in all except operational matters) with the Commander-in-Chief and with the Canadian force commander in the field. To fulfil these functions foundation was early laid for a "Canadian Section, General Headquarters First Echelon", to be attached to Headquarters 15th Army Group. Lt.-Col. Tow was appointed A.A. & Q.M.G. in charge of the Section, and thus became the senior officer of the Canadian Adjutant-General's Branch at General Alexander's Headquarters. At the same time a "Canadian Section, G.H.Q. Second Echelon" was authorized. "Second Echelon" was the office at the base of the senior A.G. officer at G.H.Q., and the officer in charge of the Canadian Section represented Colonel Tow in the execution of policy regarding Canadian personnel.' His chief duties were to maintain records of service of all ranks in the Canadian force, to report strengths and casualties
* No. 5 Canadian General Hospital (600 beds) began functioning at Syracuse on 22 July; No. 1 Canadian Convalescent Depot went to Philippeville, and No. 15 General Hospital to nearby El Arrouch.

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to C.M.H.Q., to register graves, and to arrange for the supply of reinforcements to units in the field.40 By the end of May planning was over and preparation was well advanced. Although the Division had passed from under the direct control of the 1st Canadian Corps, the Corps Commander, Lieut.-General H. D. G. Crerar, had found time to visit the Canadians on several occasions during their specialized training in Scotland; and Lieut.-General Leese, in whose 30th Corps the Division was soon to serve, had sent back his Brigadier General Staff, Brigadier G. P. Walsh, by air from Africa to co-ordinate details for the assault.41 On 22 May the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades and attached supporting arms and services, embarked in the same ships that were to take them to Sicily, carried out a great combined landing exercise on the Ayrshire coast near Troon. The rehearsal took place under the eyes of General McNaughton and the Commander of the Combined Training Centre, MajorGeneral J. S. Drew, and members of his staff, and their criticisms were of great value to the Divisional Commander in remedying certain weaknesses in technique which the exercise had revealed.42 General Montgomery visited England in the latter part of May, fresh from his victories in North Africa. There were discussions with General McNaughton and General Simonds, and on 27 May the Eighth Army Commander addressed at the War Office the senior officers of the three services who were to take part in Operation "Husky". Describing the pattern of the attack in forthright terms Montgomery "made a very fine impression, and earned the confidence of all present in his plans."43 From the Commander of the Eighth Army under whom they were to serve the Canadian officers caught the spirit of the great enterprise, and a fuller realization of its vast scope. It was stimulating to the imagination to discover that while Canadian troops were rounding off their training on the Scottish coast, British formations designated to assault alongside of them on the Sicilian beaches were similarly rehearsing their landings on the distant shores of the Red Sea. There was good reason for confidence, for the health, physical condition and morale of the troops were at the peak. The provision of equipment for the force was substantially complete, and it was almost time to begin the tremendous task of loading the vehicles and stores for the expedition.

The Convoy Programme

The transfer by sea of a completely equipped force of more than 26,000 troops* over a distance of more than two thousand miles could at best be no light undertaking; when in addition, the destination for a major part of that
* The total strength of Canadian units embarked from the U.K. for Operation "Husky" was 1851 officers and 24,835 other ranks.44

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force was a hostile shore, with an assault landing to be co-ordinated precisely with those of similar forces converging from other distant ports, the movement became one of extraordinary complexity. To carry the Canadians and all the vast paraphernalia of their material requirements the Navy assigned shipping to make up four main convoys. The date of departure of each of these from the United Kingdom was predetermined by its rate of progress and the designated time of its arrival in Sicilian waters. It was necessary for slowmoving cargo vessels laden with vehicles and stores to leave port several days before the speedier troop transports, in order that they might make timely rendezvous with them for the assault. "Follow-up" convoys were dispatched so as to reach Sicily three days after the initial landings. The majority of the troops, including the three infantry brigades of the 1st Division, were assigned to the "Fast Assault Convoy", due to leave the Clyde on D minus 12 (28 June), and to proceed at twelve knots. This convoy of a dozen vessels comprised the headquarters ship, H.M.S. Hilary, with Rear Admiral Vian aboard, great passenger liners like the Durban Castle and the Polish Batory, which had adopted with their wartime grey the classification of [Link]. (Landing Ships, Infantry) or [Link]. (Landing Ships, Personnel), and three of the new [Link]. (Landing Ships, Tank), bearing the pugnacious names of H.M.S. Boxer, Bruiser and Thruster. The Headquarters of the 1st Canadian Division travelled in Hilary. (Almost a. year later this ship was to serve the 3rd Canadian Division in the same capacity for the assault on Normandy.) The remainder of the Division embarked by brigades. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier H. D. Graham, sailed in H.M.S. Glengyle, Derbyshire and the Dutch Marnix van St. Aldegonde; the 2nd, under Brigadier Vokes, was aboard H.M.S. Circassia, Llangibby Castle and Durban Castle; H.M.S. Batory and Ascania carried Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale's 3rd Brigade.45 In assigning the troops to the vessels in which they were to sail due attention was paid to the order in which they would disembark at the end of their journey. Assaulting battalions had to be allotted to ships together with their full complement of beach group personnel (for organizing and maintaining traffic on the beaches), and engineer reconnaissance parties (to clear paths through minefields) . The bulk of the transport and stores required to support the first attack, together with a small number of troops, was carried in the "Slow Assault Convoy". This convoy sailed from the United Kingdom in two groups; the first, consisting of eight [Link]., setting out on D minus 21 (19 June), the other, made up chiefly of seventeen cargo vessels, leaving five days later. These two sub-convoys were timed to join forces off Algiers on D minus 5, and to proceed thenceforth at a uniform rate of eight knots.

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The two follow-up convoys carried the Tank Brigade-less the 12th Army Tank Regiment (Three Rivers Regiment), which was to take part in the assault-the Canadian hospital installations and No. 1 Base Reinforcement Depot, and various other units not required for the assault itself. A slow convoy of 42 ships sailed from Scotland on 25 June, and was followed on 1 July by the ten ships of the faster group.

Embarkation and Sailing

Early in June long motor convoys began to arrive at ports up and down the west coast of Great Britain-in the Bristol Channel, on the Mersey, and along Clydeside-bringing heavily-laden unit transport from the training areas. At the docks a vast assortment of stores gathered from ordnance depots all over the country found its way into the holds of the waiting ships. Loading was done tactically, i.e., in such a way that vehicles and cargoes could be discharged in an order of priority governed by the demands of the tactical plan and by the facilities for unloading that would be available on the beaches. Since it was essential that the vehicles, stores, supplies and ammunition necessary to maintain the assault should be landed as quickly as possible from the waiting convoys, the ships carrying the motor transport and the general cargo vessels had to be so grouped that their arrival at the "Release Position"* would immediately follow upon the landing of the assaulting waves. As the vessels in the English ports completed loading their respective quotas of vehicles and stores, they sailed up the west coast into the Clyde and anchored in their convoy assembly areas. Here, between 13 and 16 June all the assault troops of the 1st Canadian Division embarked on the ships that were to carry them into battle.46 Two more weeks were to elapse, however, before the Canadians actually left the United Kingdom; for one final phase of training yet remained. This was designed as a dress rehearsal for "Husky", and was to take the form of a large-scale combined operations exercise on a section of the Ayrshire coast closely resembling in local topography the Sicilian beaches assigned for the Canadian landings (although the security-minded authors of the scheme represented the area as being a part of the coast of German-occupied France). On 17 June a convoy of twelve transports sailed out of the Clyde, and in the very early hours of the following day the assault by the 1st and 2nd Canadian Brigades began. But bad weather interfered. High winds and a rising sea which endangered the landing craft forced a postponement of the exercise, and the troopships returned to the Clyde. The weather continued
* The point offshore where men and supplies are trans-shipped from the ocean-going vessels to the smaller landing craft that will carry them to the beaches.

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to be unfavourable, and finally, as though to emphasize the appropriateness of the rehearsal's code name, on 22 June forced cancellation of Exercise "Stymie". For the 3rd Brigade, which had not taken part in the combined practice landings on the Ayrshire coast, and had now been prevented from rehearsing its role of following through the assault brigades, a landing exercise in the Clyde was arranged. While, in all these circumstances, the Division's test was naturally not as successful as had been hoped, even in the very incomplete form in which it took place it taught certain useful lessons which were duly noted.47 The days crawled slowly by as the force waited impatiently on board for the day of departure. Physical training, lectures, and such routine tasks as weapon-cleaning helped pass the time, and there were one or two welcome route marches ashore. On 19 June the first of the slower convoys, with its accompanying corvettes and other protective naval craft, slipped quietly out to sea;* and thereafter at prescribed intervals other groups of ships followed. On the evening of 28 June the Fast Assault Convoy itself steamed away from Greenock. As the big transports and their naval escorts left the mouth of the Clyde, unknown to anyone on board a heart-felt God-speed came from the nearby shore. In a room in H.M.S. Warren, a shore naval establishment at Largs, on the Renfrewshire coast overlooking the firth, a group of senior Allied officers of all three services sat secretly in conference devising plans for new blows against the Axis. Under guise of the code name Exercise "Rattle", it was one of the important convocations of the war, for its object was to study the problems of combined operations in a cross-Channel assault on the continent, and on its conclusions was based much of the subsequent planning and preparation for the launching of Operation "Overlord". Suddenly the chairman, Lord Louis Mountbatten, halted the discussions, asking all to walk outside. They looked down across the darkening waters and saw the Canadian convoy moving majestically forward in line ahead out, into the open sea. To at least one of these observers, General McNaughton, it must have been a profoundly moving experience to see the 1st Canadian Division thus setting forth on its path of high adventure.49 With the convoys outward bound there was reasonable cause for satisfaction that the great secret of the enterprise had been well kept. It was unavoidable, of course, that a very considerable number of people had to know, in varying degree, the details of the forthcoming operation; planning and preparation for so extensive and complicated a business could not have otherwise proceeded. Every possible precaution was taken, however, to
* Escort groups for the various convoys during the voyage to the Mediterranean were as follows: for the "Fast Assault Convoy", two frigates and five sloops; for the "Slow Assault", one frigate, one sloop, one cutter and six corvettes; for the "Fast Follow-Up Convoy", three destroyers and three frigates; and for the "Slow Follow-Up", one destroyer, one frigate, one cutter and six corvettes.48

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ensure that no individual knew more of the great project than was absolutely necessary to the efficient performance of his duties. Up to the time of their departure from Scotland, and indeed for some days afterwards, the troops themselves, beyond knowing that their task was an assault landing (to be made in a latitude where tropical kit might be needed), were dependent upon rumour or their own imagination for an answer to the question, "Where are we going?" As we have seen, even battalion commanders were let into the secret only at a very late date, and they, as well as any other officers who knew parts of the truth, kept their own counsel. Throughout the days of training the lesson of security was emphatically impressed upon officers and men by means of lectures and the showing of specially prepared films which illustrated convincingly the dangers of careless talk.50 A particularly difficult problem of security had arisen with the untimely death of General Salmon, coinciding as it did with the beginning of the movement of the 1st Division from Sussex. It was clearly undesirable that any publicity regarding the loss of its Commander should direct attention to the Canadian Division, and it was of the utmost importance that no inkling of the crashed aircraft's destination should reach either the troops or the general public. There was some official discussion between the War Office and the Canadian military authorities as to whether an announcement of the accident should be made. It was decided that the news should not be concealed, and accordingly a simple announcement was made in Canada and in the United Kingdom that General Salmon and Lt.-Col. Finlay had been killed in a flying accident over south-west England.51 Striking evidence of the success of the security measures that had been taken to preserve the great secret of the forthcoming operation appeared in the genuine surprise with which the majority of troops aboard the convoys received the news, when several days out from land, that their target was Sicily; more convincing proof was later to come from the enemy himself, when his reaction to the Allied landings showed how completely he had been kept in the dark about the doom that was inexorably descending upon his Mediterranean outpost.

The Voyage to Sicily

On 1 July-Dominion Day-the last flight of transports weighed anchor in the Clyde and followed the other convoys out into the North Atlantic en route to the Mediterranean. There were now grouped at various intervals off the coast of Western Europe some 125 vessels, including the escorting naval craft, all forging steadily forward with their freight of Canadian troops and equipment. The allotted course took the troopships around the northern coast of Ireland and thence directly south, giving the Bay of Biscay

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a wide berth. The weather was fine and warm, and as officers and men donned their tropical kit excitement ran high at the prospect of early action. It was on Dominion Day that the troops aboard the Fast Assault Convoy, now well out to sea, learned that their destination was Axis-held Sicily, and that the expected day of their landing was to be 10 July. All ranks cheered heartily at the news that they were entering the Mediterranean theatre of war and were to become part of the famous Eighth Army. A greeting from General Montgomery, which was read on all ships, carried a warm welcome to the Canadians:
I know well the fighting men from Canada; they are magnificent soldiers, and the long and careful training they have received in England will now be put to good use-to the great benefit of the Eighth Army.52

There were messages too from the Commanders of the First Canadian Army and the 1st Canadian Corps, wishing the troops the best of luck. In a special Order of the Day Major-General Simonds called on all ranks of the 1st Canadian Division to live up to the fighting tradition which their formation had inherited from the First World War. He reminded them that with the co-operating naval and air forces the Division was a part of the best formed expedition ever to set sail to invade a hostile country.
It remains only to apply the lessons of our training under the stress of actual operations. I am not trying to tell you the task will be easy. War is not easyit is a hard and bitter struggle-the ultimate test of moral and physical courage and skill at arms. I do tell you that you will be launched into battle on a good plan which has been carefully rehearsed and that if you coolly apply what you have been taught during three years of preparation, success will be ours.53

There was something now to occupy every officer and man. It was part of General Montgomery's policy that all should be completely briefed on the proposed operations. On each ship the sealed bag containing instructions for units was opened, and the maps, air photographs, operation orders and intelligence pamphlets which it held were immediately put to good use. A large-scale relief model that every ship carried gave officers and men a realistic picture of the terrain of the beaches and their hinterland where the Canadian assaults would be made. On these models the expected course of the coming operations was explained to all ranks, and as a result of the intensive study which they received during the following days the actual landings were made on a shore whose topographical features were in the main recognizable to all. Every effort was made to maintain officers and men in the best physical condition. Divisional Headquarters issued a special directive for

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training during the voyage, which insisted on the "maintaining of regular hours for physical training, washing, eating, fatigues, games and lectures."54 These lectures placed emphasis on first aid, sanitation and the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians. The men were warned that looters would be dealt with in the "severest manner". To combat in advance the danger of infection from tropical diseases-a matter considered so important by General Montgomery that he had addressed a letter regarding it to all unit commanders-medical officers by special instruction and insistence on the taking of mepacrine tablets endeavoured to make all ranks fully "malaria-minded".55 By such means, as the convoys pursued their course towards Sicily, the members of the 1st Division groomed themselves to meet their Commander's direction-to "go ashore physically fit, with everyone knowing his job and what is required of him."56

In Mediterranean Waters
Opposite the south coast of Spain the Fast Assault Convoy swung eastward, and in the early hours of 5 July passed through the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean. Thence it continued along the North African coast, and rounding Cape Bon sailed southeast in the direction of Tripoli. On the morning of D minus 1 (9 July) it turned northward towards the appointed rendezvous south of Malta. When each convoy was well inside the Mediterranean a flotilla of destroyers replaced the group of smaller escort craft which had conducted the transports safely through Atlantic waters.57 The weather remained fair, and after their weeks of hard training amid the cold Scottish mists the troops found the cloudless skies and blue seas of the Mediterranean a welcome change. The entire voyage of the Fast Assault Convoy was accomplished in safety, although there were some alarms which set all the ships weaving in intricate emergency turns, and the troops on board saw at least one enemy submarine blown out of the water by the depth charges of the escorting destroyers. The Slow Assault Convoy was, however, less fortunate. On the night of 4-5 July Axis submarines lurking off the North African coast between Oran and Algiers torpedoed two of its merchantmen, the St. Essylt and the City of Venice. The former vessel. was abandoned in flames; and an attempt to tow the sinking City of Venice to Algiers failed. On the following afternoon a third ship, the Devis, carrying the Commodore of the convoy, was also hit. She caught fire and sank in twenty minutes.

46

THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

The Officer Commanding the troops on board has given the following details of the loss of the Devis:
At approximately 1545 hrs. 5 Jul 43, the ship was struck by a torpedo just aft of amidships. The explosion was immediately beneath the ORs' Mess Decks, and blew the body of one man up on the bridge, and two more on the boat deck, as well as the rear end of a truck, etc. Fire broke out immediately and within 3 to 4 minutes the fore part of the ship was cut off from the aft part. Explosions of ammunition were continuous. The men, with two exceptions, behaved extremely well. They took their boat stations in an orderly manner, and did not throw over the rafts or jump overboard until the order to abandon ship was given. In the meantime, they collected wounded and burned men, and took them overboard with them when they went.58

Of the more than 900 troops aboard these three ships 593 were Canadians. In the first two sinkings there was fortunately little loss of life; among. the Canadians one officer and five other ranks were listed as missing. Casualties were heavier for the Devis, which carried 261 Canadian and 35 British officers and men.59 A number of soldiers were killed or fatally injured in the initial explosion, and men were trapped in the hold when the companion-way burnt out; in spite of prompt rescue operations, 52 Canadian other ranks were reported as missing and subsequently presumed killed.60 The loss of the cargo carried by the three vessels was serious, but the less so because it was fortunately spread over a large number of units. More than 500 vehicles and some forty guns went to the bottom, and the resulting shortages caused considerable difficulties, especially to Divisional Headquarters, which lost almost all of its vehicles and signals equipment.61 July entered its second week, and now from many points of the compass the forces destined to the conquest of Sicily were closing in upon the island. From Alexandria and Port Said at the far end of the inland sea which the Fascist dictator had presumed to style an Italian lake, and from the ports of Tripoli and Sfax along its southern shore, great convoys of the Eastern Task Force had set out on the voyages which would bring them, each promptly upon its appointed hour, to the designated rendezvous with the Canadians. Some divisions of the American Seventh Army had already embarked on their eastward course from Oran and Algiers; in Bizerta and Tunis-wrested from the Axis only two months earlier*-and in Sousse, other formations of the Western Task Force, held in waiting to the last because of their relative proximity to the island target, were readying for their successive departures. Steaming along their prearranged paths in the intricate maze of seaborne traffic, the ships bearing the Canadians drew in
* Bizerta was taken by British troops on 7 May and Tunis by American forces on the same day. On 13 May General Alexander sent his historic signal to Mr. Churchill: "Sir, it is my duty to report that the Tunisian campaign is over. All enemy resistance has ceased. We are masters of the North African shores."62

THE 1st DIVISION GOES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN

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to the focal point of the converging convoys. In all, more than 3000 merchant vessels, naval fighting ships and assault craft of all types were preparing for the descent upon Sicily.63 During the passage through the Mediterranean the Allied convoys had kept generally close in to the southern shore, where they received adequate fighter protection from squadrons of the Allied air forces based on the North African mainland. During the first nine days of July aircraft of the Northwest African Coastal Air Force flew a total of 1426 sorties in safeguarding eastbound shipping, including a record number of 574 sorties on the 8th and 9th. Over the westbound convoys the fighter squadrons controlled by Air Headquarters, Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean, flew 1421 sorties during the same period. Naval co-operation aircraft in both sectors carried out nearly 600 sorties on antisubmarine patrols and submarine hunts. As the great armada converged on Malta during the morning of 9 July, fighters took off from the island's airfields to cover the approaching shipping with a protective umbrella of nearly 60 miles' radius.64 Effective as these measures were, there was a still more potent reason for the almost negligible opposition offered by the enemy's air and naval forces to the massing of the Allied invasion fleet. From the middle of May until the end of June his airfields, his ports and submarine bases and his lines of communication had been subjected to an intensive bombing programme. During these six weeks bombers and fighter-bombers of the Northwest African Air Forces and Middle East Command had flown 2292 sorties against airfields in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy, and 2638 against other strategic targets in these areas.65 Convincing evidence of the success which attended these Allied efforts appears in enemy records which came to light after the war. At a conference in Rome on 12 May 1943 Admiral Arturo Riccardi, Chief of the Italian Naval Staff, complained to the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, GrandAdmiral Karl Dnitz, that air attacks were causing such severe damage in the Strait of Messina that it had become difficult to maintain the garrison in Sicily. "Since railroad traffic has come to a complete standstill in Sicily", he stated, "the island has to be supplied by sea from Naples. The only way to improve transportation facilities on the island itself would be an increased use of lorries."66 The conference was further told "that in Messina not even 130 heavy antiaircraft guns, concentrated in a small area, were able to prevent the air attacks", and that "the Italian Admiral Borone* in Sicily had reported yesterday that a month from now nothing would be left on his island unless strongest efforts for the defence against enemy air raids would be made."67
* Probably Rear Admiral Pietro Baroni, Naval Commander Sicily.

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THE CANADIANS IN ITALY

During the week immediately preceding D Day an even greater effort was put forth against enemy airfields in Sicily. The group of landing-grounds in the Gerbini area received the severest attention, for it was here that the enemy had based the majority of his fighter planes. Between 4 and 9 July these fields felt the force of 373 heavy and 560 medium bomber sorties flown by the Northwest African Air Forces and by Cyrenaicabased Liberators of the Ninth United States Air Force. German losses were heavy. On one day, 5 July, an estimated 50 out of 54 Axis aircraft on the main Gerbini airfield were destroyed, and on the same day 35 out of a force of 100 German fighters were reported shot down while attacking a formation of 27 Fortresses.68 The remaining airfields in south-eastern Sicily all received their quota of heavy bombloads, and the landing-grounds in the west of the island, while regarded as of secondary importance, came in for their share, though in more limited proportions, of Allied aerial attack. Playing an important part in this great "softening-up" operation were three Royal Canadian Air Force night bomber squadrons of WellingtonsNo. 420 (City of London) Squadron, No. 424 (City of Hamilton) Squadron, and No. 425 (Alouette) Squadron. These formed a Canadian wing of Major-General James H. Doolittle's Northwest African Strategic Air ForceNo. 331 (R.C.A.F.) Wing, commanded by Group Captain C.R. Dunlap-and from 26 June to the time of the assault (and for many weeks thereafter) they took off night after' night from their Tunisian base in the Sousse area to raid targets in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy.69 All these blows by the Allied air forces had their desired effect. By the eve of D Day the attacks upon the Sicilian airfields had rendered many of them unserviceable, and had forced an estimated half of the enemy's aircraft formerly based there to withdraw to landing-grounds in Southern Italy. The Allied aerial offensive had fulfilled its mission in preventing the concentration of an effective air striking force, just as the control of. the Mediterranean seaways by our naval and air forces had dissuaded the enemy from employing submarines on any appreciable scale against the approaching convoys. By midday of 9 July the Canadian Fast Assault Convoy had reached a point 70 miles south of Malta, and now the precision of intricate naval schedules framed months earlier once again became apparent. During the hot, cloudless morning the eager troops looking out to starboard from their transports had watched the approach of convoys from the Middle East ports while they themselves were drawing in sight of their own Slow Assault Convoy, now only a few miles ahead. At noon the attendant naval vessels slipped away from the troopships which they had escorted through the Western Mediterranean. Their place was immediately taken by a force of four cruisers and six destroyers, assigned the task of bombarding the beaches

THE 1st DIVISION GOES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN

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and providing close gun support for the assaults of the Eastern Task Force.70 From the Slow Assault Convoy five vessels (but for the sinking of the St. Essylt and the City of Venice the number would have been seven) joined the faster group, which without delay continued on its path.71 The course was now drawn to the north, to pass between Malta and the setting sun, and thence to bend north-eastward in the direction of the Sicilian coast for one final rendezvous. Offshore, at a point half a dozen miles from the beaches where the 1st Canadian Division was to make its landings, a lone waiting British submarine marked the release position* from which the actual ship-to-shore assault would be launched.72

* 3636'N., 1457'E. Unrivalled, stationed at this point, was one of four submarines of the 10th Flotilla assigned to mark the release positions of the respective convoys and to lay navigational aids to assist landing craft flotillas in finding their beaches.

CHAPTER III

THE INVASION OF SICILY, 10 JULY 1943

Sicily and its People

ROM the earliest days of recorded history Sicily has known occupation at many hands. Twenty-five centuries have gone by since far-sailing Greek and Phoenician adventurers planted their first colonies along the island's seaboard and began gradually to crowd into serfdom the hill-dwellers, who, tradition says, had themselves come as immigrants or "Sicels" from the mainland peninsula. On more than a dozen occasions during the passing of the years the invader has landed on her shores; for Sicily's position between Europe and North Africa has made her a steppingstone between the two continents and a battleground for powers seeking control of the Mediterranean basin. Thus, many peoples have used the island as a resting place, but few as a final abode. Although throughout her chequered history Sicily has more than once enjoyed independent rule, her record is mainly one of domination, successively by Greek, Carthaginian and Roman, Vandal and Ostrogoth, Byzantine and Saracen, Norman and Angevin, Spaniard and Austrian. The last invasion before 1943 was in 1860, when the gallant expedition of Garibaldi and the Thousand opened the way for the annexation of the island into the new Kingdom of Italy. So turbulent a history was bound to leave upon the inhabitants of the island a mark no less enduring than the influences of geology and climate. The almost continuous state of defence which Sicily has been forced to maintain has compelled the population to live in large groups, and to build their inland communities on elevated, easily defended sites. The rugged topography of the country has provided ample scope for this practice, which has been further encouraged by the ravages of the malarial mosquito, which flourishes in the lowlands but not on the cooler high ground. The Allied armies in the summer of 1943 were to fight some of their fiercest battles when ousting the enemy from these lofty hill towns of the interior. As we have seen, Sicily's natural physical structure places the advantage overwhelmingly with the defender in any contest for possession of the

50

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island. The mountain backbone along the northern coast is flanked by lesser ranges which cover most of the central and southern regions. Two of these formations merit note, for they were in the area of operations assigned to the Eighth Army, and more specifically along the axis of the Canadian advance. The more extensive of these is the Monti Erei, an irregular chain of flat-topped hills which branches south-eastward from the main northern spine to mark the watershed between the Ionian Sea and the Malta Channel (see Map 1). Although erosion has much fretted the sandstone of which it is composed, the range forms a continuous and fairly level barrier descending gradually from an altitude of 3000 feet at Enna-the most centrally and loftily sited town in Sicily-to 2000 feet near Caltagirone at its southern extremity. From a point a few miles north of Enna a spur runs eastward between the Salso and Dittaino Rivers to the lower slopes of Mount Etna, bearing on its heights the towns of Leonforte, Assoro,* Agira and Regalbuto-names that were to become indelibly inscribed in the story of Canadian operations in Sicily. The soft rock of which these hills are formed makes their slopes unstable and subject to frequent landslide-a condition favourable to demolitions of which the engineers of a defending force might be expected to take full advantage. East of the Erei ridge the land declines to the Catania plain in a series of low clay and sandstone hills, which are traversed by the steep-sided, flat-floored valleys of the eastward-flowing Salso and Dittaino Rivers.1 The other hill system in the Canadian path consisted of the tableland of the Monti Iblei, which stretches north-westward from the Pachino peninsula to meet the Monti Erei at Caltagirone. This plateau, which rises to a height of 2000 feet or more, is broken by narrow valleys with precipitous sides. At its northern edge a series of terraces step down to the Catania plain; to the south it shelves more gradually to the narrow coastal strip running westward from Cape Passero.* As might be expected in a country where the majority of the towns and villages were perched on lofty hilltops, the roads of Sicily were rarely level and more seldom straight. Skilled engineering had eased the steepness of the gradients and the sharpness of the bends by which the main State highways mounted and descended these hills, but many of the Provincial and Communal roads (on which the Canadian Division was forced to rely) provided only a narrow and tortuous route. A standard-gauge railway ran through most of the coastal area, while the interior was served by a network of secondary lines, many of narrow gauge, and not expected to be of much value to the Allied forces in the early stages of the campaign. Because of difficulty of troop movement off the existing routes, it was apparent to the Allied planners, as Lord Montgomery has pointed out, that "the
* See p. 697.

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campaign in Sicily was going to depend largely on the domination of main road and track centres." Events were to show that these almost invariably became the main objectives of the advancing forces.2 The climate of Sicily may be summed up in its two major characteristics -high summer temperatures and absence of rain. July is described by the guidebooks as generally the driest month of the year, and certainly 1943 proved no exception. July is not included among the months recommended for tourist travel in the island, an omission which the men of the 1st Division, sweltering on the sun-baked hills and in the fiery valleys of the interior and choked by the dust which the combination of heat and drought engendered, could heartily endorse. The general briefing which Canadian officers and men received during the voyage to the Mediterranean included a picture of the people of Sicily, their characteristics, and the attitude which they might be expected to adopt towards the Allied invaders. The troops learned that only ten per cent of the four million population lived in scattered settlements outside of the towns and villages. Agriculture had always been the principal spite of the unpromising terrain ninety per cent of the surface of the island was under cultivoccupationination. Wheat-growing was of very long-established tradition. In early days Sicily was one of the chief granaries for ancient Rome, but in modern times the thin soils of the steep mountain slopes, the low rainfall, and the traditional but not particularly efficient methods of farming under the iniquitous system of the absentee landlord accounted for a low average yield which produced little surplus wheat for export. Of livelier interest to the average Canadian soldier were those more characteristic crops which he was to encounter in the growing state for the first time-the citrus fruits, vines, almonds and olives, the intensive cultivation of which occupied a large proportion of the agricultural population. Life for the Sicilian peasant had long been a harsh and constant struggle for existence. Under the latifundia, a discreditable system of land tenure which had persisted from feudal times, he toiled out his days in virtual serfdom to a landlord whom he might never see. From his humble lodging in some hilltop community he daily trudged down to wrest his meagre living from stony fields an hour's journey or more away, returning at night by a track often so steep and rough that even the sturdy Sicilian carts could not mount it. Such local isolation as this had combined with poverty and a low standard of literacy to make the mass of the population politically apathetic. In common with the rest-of Italy, Sicilians in the years before the Second World War had been relentlessly subjected to the indoctrination of the totalitarian state. Attempts by the Fascist regime to ameliorate the lot of the people in the island had met with only a measure of success, and the effectiveness of these reforms had been largely neutralized by the burdens

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which Mussolini's ill-conceived foreign policy had placed upon the Italian nation. All in all it was not expected by the planners of "Husky" that the civilian inhabitants of Sicily would offer much resistance or even show marked hostility to the Allied forces. An intelligence summary issued by the 1st Canadian Division thus appraised the situation:
At the outset of invasion it is possible that national pride stimulated by Fascist propaganda may induce the civil population to lend active assistance, at least in the early stages, to the defending forces. In these circumstances, they might even help the Germans, though this is most unlikely. It is, however, very questionable whether the efforts of the widely discredited Fascist propaganda machine will rally the Sicilians in the final emergency. On the contrary, it is more likely that the civil population will take no active part in military operations, but, as at Tripoli, will greet the invading forces with sullen indifference, whether they are British, Canadian or American.3

Events were to prove the accuracy of this appreciation.*

The Defences of the Island

The state of the defences of Sicily had been closely studied by the Allied planners, and information now available from enemy sources has confirmed that the conclusions then reached were generally remarkably well founded. Captured documents have shown that wherever miscalculations occurred the Allied appreciations erred on the right side in overestimating rather than minimizing the enemy's strengths. The Axis air power, as we have seen, had been seriously weakened by the merciless offensive carried out against enemy airfields by the Allied air forces. A draft intelligence report on the fighting in Sicily prepared after the campaign at the headquarters of FieldMarshal Albert Kesselring, the German Commander-in-Chief in Italy (and bearing amendments in his own handwriting),5 reveals that by D Day the German 2nd Air Fleetwhich included in its command Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and Southern Italy -had been reduced to some 430 serviceable aircraft, of which 250 were fighter planes; while the Italian Regio Aeronautica, with some 325 effective aircraft disposed on the mainland and in the islands, could muster within range of the battle area not more than 200 fighters.6 In some measure compensating for his weakness in the air the enemy had concentrated strong forces of flak artillery along the east coast and at the western tip of Sicily to provide effective anti-aircraft protection of the Strait of Messina and the important cities of Catania and Palermo. An urgent request made on 19
* It is of interest to note that late in May Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Chief of the Intelligence Branch, Armed Forces High Command, expressed similar doubts regarding the mood of the Italian people to Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Reich Propaganda Minister. Goebbels expressed the contrary view, that in defence of their own soil the Italians would "fight much more bravely than they did in North Africa, not to mention the Eastern Front."4

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June by the Italian General Staff for 2000 additional German aircraft* to ensure the efficient defence of the island against the vast resources of the Allied powers had remained unanswered.8 Although the enemy's naval forces were of considerable strength, it was not expected that they would offer serious resistance. At the time that "Husky" was launched Allied Intelligence believed that the Italian fleet included as effectives six battleships and seven cruisers, besides a large number of destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines.9 To escape air attack these ships had been distributed to various ports, chiefly in the north, at Genoa and Spezia, and in the south at Taranto (see p. 697)-although the German intelligence report cited above states that the Italian fleet, in consequence of heavy air attacks, had only one battleship ready for commitment. German naval craft in the Western Mediterranean consisted of two small flotillas of E-boats based respectively at Cagliari in Sardinia and Porto Empedocle on the south coast of Sicily.10 Whatever the Italian naval strength might be, battle experience was lacking, for in three years of war Mussolini had avoided committing the heavy units of his fleet to action, relying on the efforts of light craft, submarines and air power to oppose Allied incursions into Mediterranean waters. It is little wonder that morale was reported to be low and tactical ability poor. There was justification for the Allied view that even an assault on Sicily, "bastion of the so-called European fortress", would . fail to spur the Italian fleet, widely separated as it was, into striking an effective blow against the invading armada. It is on record that the German Admiralty was under no delusion about the probable effectiveness of the Italian Navy in preventing an Allied invasion. At the conference in Rome in May to which we have already referred, after hearing the plans of the Italian Admiralty for the operations of its naval forces in the event of an invasion of Sicily (which might be expected some time after 22 June), Admiral Dnitz declared that the Axis naval forces were "too weak to foil the enemy's plans by destroying either his embarkation points or the approaching invasion fleet."11 Although he was going to send more German submarines to the Mediterranean, it was only -for their nuisance value; he was convinced that they would not be able to stop an invasion. The Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy defined a less spectacular role for the Italian fleet:
Our whole problem is a successful defence on land. Although preparations for the battle at sea are necessary they are not decisive. The battle on land alone is decisive. Therefore, the most important part of the Navy's mission is to make battle on land possible. That means safe-guarding the supply lines across the sea.12
* The report by the German Armed Forces Operations Staff of the Feltre Conference, held on 19 July 1943, offers the following reason for non-compliance with the Italian request: "The material requirements of the Italians the Fhrer designated as partly unfulfillable; for instance the delivery of 2000 aircraft. Germany could neither produce them nor withdraw them from the East; neither could Italy handle them."7

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So vital was the need for keeping the islands supplied that Dnitz declared that submarines and even cruisers must be used for the purpose. For the "battle on land" which the German High Command rightly considered would be the decisive factor of the approaching test, Sicily was none too strongly garrisoned. An Allied appraisal at the time of invasion placed the number of Axis ground troops on the island at 323,500, but over eighty per cent of these were believed to be Italian troops of the notoriously indifferent Sixth Army Command.13 However, the most reliable statistics derived from enemy sources after the campaign show that this estimate was excessive; there were probably no more than 40,000 German* and 230,000 Italian troops in Sicily on 10 July 1943.16 These forces were in general to be found in two types of formation corresponding to the role which they were expected to play in the defence. Since the long coastline and numerous beaches made the island vulnerable to assault at many points, the enemy relied on a screen of coast defence formations in static positions to absorb the initial shock of the landings; he held his field divisions concentrated in the interior, ready to deliver deliberate counter-attacks which would complete the destruction of the invaders. All Italian formations in Sicily formed part of the Sixth Army, which at the time of the invasion was commanded by General Alfredo Guzzoni, with headquarters at Enna. Guzzoni had led the Italian expeditionary force against Albania in 1939, and had commanded one of the armies which invaded France in 1940. He subsequently served as Under Secretary of War and Assistant Chief of the General Staff, and in May 1943, at the age of 66, he had taken over the command in Sicily from General Mario Roatta, who became Chief of the General Staff. The Sixth Army consisted of two corps, the 12th and the 16th, comprising a total of four field and the equivalent of six coastal divisions. The 12th Corps, with two infantry-the 26th (Assietta) and the 28th (Aosta) Divisions-and three and a half coastal divisions under command, was stationed in the western half of the island, with headquarters at Corleone; the eastern sector was garrisoned by the 16th Corps, under the command of General Agostino Cinti, whose headquarters was at Piazza Armerina. This Corps included the 4th (Livorno) and the 54th (Napoli) Infantry Divisions, stationed respectively at Caltagirone and in the area between Vizzini and Syracuse, and the 206th and 213th Coastal Divisions, as well as certain independent coast defence commands. Also under Cinti were six aerodrome defence units and five mobile groups stationed at key inland points. Each stationary unit (difesa fissa aeroporto) in general comprised one or more infantry companies, a
* An additional 30,000 German troops reached the island during the campaign.14 On 25 July 1943 Hitler spoke of 70,000 Germans then in Sicily.15 An Armed Forces Operations Staff situation report of 4 August gave the ration strength (which invariably exceeded the actual strength) in Sicily as 80,000.

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platoon or company of machine-gun troops, and a battery or two of howitzers manned by Frontier Guard units transferred from Northern Italy; a gruppa mobile was built around approximately one armoured company, equipped with French Renault ("R.35") or Italian "Fiat 3000" tanks. A Sixth Army order of battle showed one of these aerodrome fixed defence units (No. 517) at Pachino at the end of May. The 206th Coastal Division guarded a seventy-mile stretch of the south and east coasts between the Gulf of Gela and Syracuse.* This was the sector in which the Eighth Army's assault was to be launched.17 The Italian coastal divisions, as not infrequently happens with troops assigned to garrison duties, were not the elite of their country's fighting forces. None had seen action; and in general their training had been haphazard, their equipment and supplies were inadequate, and their morale was low. These formations were not built on any fixed establishment, and none exceeded 12,000 in strength. They were composed of secondline troops organized into a number of static infantry battalions, machine-gun units and batteries of medium and coast defence artillery. Aerial reconnaissance revealed no strong defences along the assault beaches. The defenders had to rely on short belts of wire and scattered minefields covered by machine-gun posts and occasional concrete pillboxes. Guzzoni's Chief of Staff, General Emilio Faldella, writing ten years later, states that on the 206th Coastal Division's front there were on the average 26 men, two automatic rifles and three machine-guns per kilometre, with two pieces of artillery every three kilometres. The first-line formations of the Sixth Army were believed to be of somewhat higher calibre, but only one, the Livorno Division (commanded by Major-General Domenico Chirieleison), which had been trained and organized as a special Assault Landing Division three years before, could be considered at all formidable.18 Neither the Italian nor the German High Command was ignorant of the ineffectiveness of the Italian garrison in Sicily. In March 1943 General Roatta had submitted a detailed and decidedly pessimistic report on the state of the Sixth Army,19 and in May Field-Marshal Kesselring informed Admiral Dnitz that on a tour of inspection of the island he had "noticed that Italian defence preparations were very incomplete."20 Kesselring "had therefore impressed this fact on" Roatta, but apparently to little avail, for during the last week in June a group of Italian staff officers inspecting the units of the Sixth Army had found the situation unimproved, and had reported that the main burden of the defence of the island would have to fall upon the shoulders of the German armoured formations.21
* Specifically from Punta Braccetto, 23 miles south-east of Gela, to Masseria Palma, four miles south of Syracuse.

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The sorry state of the Italian forces on the island is revealed in a series of documents captured during the operations in Sicily, emanating for the most part from the 16th Corps and the 206th Coastal Division. These records show an almost unbelievably low standard of morale, training and discipline. Thus the Corps Commander reports that in early March, during mild weather "very favourable for intensive training", on two separate occasions while passing "between Syracuse and Caltagirone at an hour when training should be in full swing", he had "seen everywhere . . . isolated groups of soldiers idling and yawning in the sun, their mules torpid from lack of exercise and attention." Some efforts had been made to improve matters -it was proposed, for instance, to assign to each regiment at least one regular officer as battalion commander-but even as late as June 1943 it was found necessary after a review of the coastal regiments by the Prince of Piedmont to court-martial certain regular officers because their units had displayed before His Royal Highness a -complete ignorance of the elements of military etiquette and training. Among the "deficiencies and shortcomings" of this inspection to which General Cinti considered it "necessary to draw the attention of everyone" were cases of soldiers being "on pass" during an "Alert", without arms or steel helmet; a "present arms" being "carried out with [Link]. and [Link]. This movement should be carried out exclusively with rifles and carbines"; and the "greatest indifference" which soldiers of detached units affected to the passage of automobiles, pretending not to see and failing to salute those with a pennant. "In fact, His Royal Highness was actually not saluted on several occasions, although his automobile was carrying two pennants."22 The Commander of the 206th Division complains of a mortar unit no members of which "had ever had any practical training"; of guard duties being very slackly performed-it was possible to penetrate to the sleeping quarters without being challenged; and of a divisional Chief of Staff whom he continually finds "glued to the telephone. Every time I send for him he takes a long time to come because he is telephoning. This afternoon alone, between 1600 and 1850 hours, he had 53 (fifty-three) telephone calls. This is absurd." The same commander is greatly concerned over his soldiers' aversion to the use of the bayonet in fighting:
I have observed that units consider the bayonet as an object to be fixed on to the rifle only for presenting arms. If I summon a soldier, if I order a unit to move a few yards, the first thing anyone does is to unfix his bayonet as if it were not possible for a soldier to address an officer with the bayonet fixed, or for a unit to do a half-right turn or move five yards with the bayonet fixed. I cannot understand it. It would be perfectly easy to have a few hours' battle-drill, or even ordinary drill with fixed bayonets. Soldiers are not children two or three years old, who are afraid of cutting themselves if they carry a sharp instrument in their hands.23

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The German Garrison

German troops had been introduced into the garrison of Sicily comparatively recently. Convinced that the fighting power of the Italian forces on the island could not be sufficiently strengthened merely by supplying them with arms and equipment, early in February the German High Command ordered Field-Marshal Kesselring "to keep as strong as possible battle groups in constant readiness in Sicily".24 (Although nominally under the command of the Duce, and receiving his general instructions through the Italian Comando Supremo, Kesselring was the commander actually responsible for the conduct of German air and ground operations in Italy and the Western and Central Mediterranean; Hitler had appointed him Oberbefehlshaber Sd (Commander-in-Chief South) in December 1941.)25 Accordingly the C.-in-C. South created a Special Headquarters (Einsatzstab), to which he gave the task of organizing two German motorized divisions-one for Sicily and one for Southern Italy. Chief of this Special Staff was Colonel Bogislaw von Bonin, who had been First General Staff Officer (Operations) of the Fifth Panzer Army in North Africa .26 Under von Bonin's direction there was formed in Sicily, on 11 May 1943, the Kommando Sizilien, comprising three Grenadier Regimente Sizilien. On 29 June it was redesignated the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division (104th, 115th and 129th Panzer Grenadier Regiments), to perpetuate the original formation bearing that number, which had been lost in Africa.27 At about the same time the Einsatzstab was organizing for the defence of Sardinia a parallel German formation, which was destined to face Canadian troops on more than one battlefield in Italy-the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division. Into these divisions went the Rckstau Afrika--drafts of German reinforcements who had been awaiting transfer to North Africa, and whose further progress towards that destination had been rendered unnecessary by the collapse of Axis resistance in Tunisia. The termination of the North African campaign had left German military power in Italy in an extremely precarious state. To the very end the High Command in Berlin had refused to allow any evacuation from the Tunisian bridgehead, and even in the last weeks and days of the operations, in utter disregard of the protests of the field commanders in Africa, it had continued to send in by air from Italy entire battalions and completely useless headquarters staffs. As a result, when von Bonin reached Rome on 8 May by one of the last Axis aircraft to leave Tunis, he found that "there was not one battle-worthy formation of the German Army in Italy, including the islands."28 Accordingly, early in May, alarmed at the defenceless state of his Axis allyfor, as we have seen, the German High Command placed little reliance

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on the combat value of the Italian troops-Hitler offered to send Mussolini five divisions with modem equipment. 29 But the Duce, even after the loss of his African empire, was in no hurry to accept German aid. On a previous occasion when he had refused the offer of a German armoured division he is reported to have told Marshal Badoglio, at that time Chief of the Italian General Staff, "If they get a footing in the country we shall never be rid of them."30 Now, on 13 May, he gave Hitler's personal representative, Admiral Dnitz, only a partial acceptance. The minutes of the interview reveal the Fascist Dictator in all his arrogant assurance:
The Duce states that he is confident about the future. The only result of British air raids on Italy will be that the people will learn to hate the British, which has not always been the case. This helps in carrying on the war. If there is one Italian who hates the British, it is he himself. He is happy that his people are now learning the meaning of the word hate as well. He has answered the Fuehrer's offer of five divisions, by stating he wants only three of them.* This refusal came as a surprise to the Commander-in-Chief Navy. The Duce explains that he had asked that these three divisions should include six armoured battalions with 300 tanks, two of which are detailed for Sardinia, three for Sicily and one for southern Italy.32

Several weeks were bound to elapse before any new German forces other than those which Mussolini had thus none too graciously accepted could be moved into Italy equipped and organized for action. They could come only from France, where a number of divisions were being formed to replace formations lost at Stalingrad.33 In the meantime, in the face of the increasing danger of invasion, Kesselring decided to reorganize for the defence of Sicily the Hermann Gring Panzer Division. The bulk of this formation had been destroyed in Tunisia, but its custom had been to maintain large reserves in training. These were scattered over a wide area, with elements in Sicily, Naples and Northern Italy, and even in France and the Netherlands.34 Concentration proceeded rapidly, and by 1 July the complete division was in Sicily, under the command of Major-General Paul Conrath, a former police officer with (according to Kesselring) "too little experience in the handling of modern, combined arms."35 From the time of their arrival on the island until 16 July, when a German corps headquarters was brought over from the mainland, the 15th Panzer Grenadier and the Hermann Gring Divisions were for political reasons placed under the tactical control of General Guzzoni. For administrative purposes, however, they were under the command of Lieut.-General Fridolin von Senger and Etterlin, head of a German liaison staff attached to the Headquarters of the Sixth Army-a convenient arrangement which would keep Kesselring in touch with the forthcoming operations. In order to have a mobile reserve for counter-attack, Guzzoni initially placed both German formations (except for one regimental group of the 15th Panzer
* The 15th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisions and the Hermann Gring Panzer Division.31

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Grenadier Division held in western Sicily for flank protection) with the Livorno and the Napoli Divisions in the south-east corner of the island. He planned to use the two Italian field divisions in a delaying action first, and then to commit the Germans at the point where counter-attack promised greatest success. But it was the German view that an attempted landing should be repelled with concentrated fire at its weakest moment-while the assaulting troops were still in their landing craft; and that it was a mistake to station reserves far inland, where air attacks might make daylight movement to the coast impossible. The conflicting theories of a defence in depth by massed mobile reserves as opposed to a beach defence with reserves being held close to the coast produced a controversy which was to reach its crisis at the time of the Normandy landings. In Sicily neither plan could be assured of success, for the defenders did not have the troops either to hold a rigid front along the coast or to create a reserve strong enough to throw back into the sea an enemy which had completed the critical phase of landing and was established on dry ground. A compromise was reached at a conference between Kesselring, Guzzoni and von Senger in Enna on 26 June. At the Field Marshal's insistence the Italian Army Commander ordered the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division to move from the CaltanissettaEnna region to the western end of Sicily,36 where it would be ready to counter any surprise assault against Palermo.* ("It makes no difference", Kesselring told his divisional commanders privately, "whether or not you get orders from the Italian army at Enna. You must go into immediate action against the enemy the moment you ascertain the objective of the invasion fleet.")38 The transfer of the Panzer Grenadiers was unhurried, but on 5 July Kesselring was able to report to Berlin that the division had two regimental groups in the west of the island.39 The better to fulfil their role of strengthening the striking-power of the Italian field formations, the German divisions were divided into four mobile battle groups with varying specialized establishments. Thus the bulk of the Hermann Gring Panzer Division was held at Caltagirone, available for counter-attack against penetration from the south, while an armoured force from that formation, reinforced by the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division's third regiment (the 115th Panzer Grenadier Regiment), and commanded by Colonel Wilhelm Schmalz, was stationed immediately west of Catania, to meet an Allied landing on the east coast.40 By the second week in July German defence preparations in Sicily were well advanced, but by no means complete. A situation report by Kesselring on the 8th showed that there were' still gaps in the order of battle of the
* In the opinion of General von Senger and Etterlin, Kesselring erred in his choice of divisions, and should have given the more important task of defending eastern Sicily to the stronger 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which having been on the island for some time was familiar with local geography.37

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reinforcing units, particularly the fortress regiments and battalions.41 At the same time the defences of Sardinia were being steadily strengthened, for the enemy was by no means sure where the Allied landings would be made. A "top secret" appreciation drafted by Kesselring's Operations Staff on 28 June noted that American and British forces in North Africa were "sufficient for simultaneous attacks against Sardinia and Sicily. In view of the transfer of forces into the eastern Tunisian area it must not be assumed that Sardinia alone will be attacked."42 The emphasis placed upon Sardinia as a probable target for invasion owed its origin at least partly to a clever piece of Allied deception. On 9 May 1943 the "Foreign Armies West" intelligence section of the German Army High Command circulated a report: "Memorandum Concerning Documents Found on a British Courier". It told of a letter written on 23 April by the "English Chief of the General Staff to General Alexander", which had been found on the body of a British courier washed ashore in Spain,* and which contained "Anglo-Saxon High Command Plans [for] two landing operations in the Mediterranean". These were to be directed against Greece, with a cover name "Husky", and an unspecified target in the Western Mediterranean (cover name, "Brimstone"). A feint attack on Sicily also was mentioned. The Berlin report admitted that the brevity of the captured document made it impossible to say whether the information was genuine or an attempt at deception.' It declared, however, that "in consideration of the surrounding circumstances and the situation in the Mediterranean the genuineness of the communication is deemed possible." It was quite conceivable that Sardinia with its weaker defences would be selected by the Allies for attack in order to gain new bases for action against Italy and Sicily. The report therefore directed special attention to Sardinia and south-western Greek ports.43 The suggestion that Greece might be an Allied target came on top of reports of an increase in sabotage operations in that country by Greek guerrillas and British agents. These activities, which were carried out as part of the general Allied cover plan for "Husky", seem to have produced the desired results. The record of Hitler's naval conferences discloses that on 14 May 1943 the Fhrer voiced his belief "that the discovered Anglo-Saxon order confirms the assumption that the planned attacks will be directed mainly against Sardinia and the Peloponnesus."44 Already the High Command had
* Although the Germans were deceived into thinking that the "courier" had been killed in the crash of an aircraft at sea, actually the body, that of a civilian who had died of pneumonia, was "planted" from the British submarine Seraph a mile off the Spanish coast. The spurious "Personal and Most Secret" letter in his dispatch case had been written at the promptings of the Intelligence planners by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Archibald Nye, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff. A detailed account of the whole undertaking (which bore the code name "Operation Mincemeat") will be found in Ewen Montagu, The Man Who Never Was (London, 1953).

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instructed the Operations Section of the Army General Staff to strengthen as much as possible the defences in areas in the Mediterranean particularly endangered by the threat of Anglo-American operations. The order concluded: "The measures to be taken in Sardinia and the Peloponnesus have priority over any others."45 Remnants of formations broken at Stalingrad were diverted to the Balkans for reorganization, and before the end of May the 1st Panzer Division (in spite of bitter protests by Col.-General Heinz Guderian, Inspector General of Armoured Troops, who rated it as "our strongest reserve") was on its way to Greece to guard against possible Allied landings there.46

The Allied Pattern of Assault

The general plan decided upon early in May for the invasion of Sicily had undergone little change by D Day. As we have seen, the original object of Operation "Husky" had been "to seize and hold the island of Sicily", and it was in these terms that Force 343 (which on D Day became the United States Seventh Army) and the Twelfth Army (the temporary designation of the British Eighth Army) issued their order for the assault. The forces with which General Patton was to carry out the task assigned to his Seventh Army were the 2nd U.S. Corps (1st and 45th Infantry Divisions), which would land before dawn on D Day in the Gulf of Gela, to take Gela town and the Comiso group of airfields; and the 3rd Infantry Division (reinforced by part of the 2nd Armoured Division), which was to assault farther west and capture the port of Licata and its airfield. To assist the landing of the 1st Division, parachute troops of the 82nd Airborne Division would be dropped on the previous night four miles inland from Gela near the Ponte Olivo airfield. On the advance inland the right flanking formation of the Seventh Army would be the 45th Division, which it was planned would eventually gain touch with the Eighth Army's left in the neighbourhood of Ragusa.47 General Montgomery's forces were to make five simultaneous pre-dawn assaults on the two coasts which contained the south-eastern tip of the island. The right-hand sector was assigned to the 13th Corps, under the command of Lieut.-General Miles C. Dempsey, who in 1940 had been General McNaughton's Brigadier General Staff at the 7th Corps Headquarters in the United Kingdom. The Corps would assault in the northern half of the Gulf of Noto, with the 5th Division directed to capture Cassibile and advance north on Syracuse, and the 50th (Northumbrian) Division to take Avola and protect the Corps' left flank. The main assault was to be preceded by the drop of a glider-borne brigade group of the 1st Airborne Division west of Syracuse late on 9 July, and a sea landing four hours later just south of the port by Commando troops. To these formations fell the tasks of securing road

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communications into Syracuse and capturing coastal batteries defending the port. On the completion of the assault phase of the operations, the 13th Corps was to advance northward across the River Simeto to capture Catania.48 General Leese's 30th Corps, which was to carry out the landings in the Eighth Army's left sector, consisted of the 1st Canadian Division, the 51st (Highland) Division and the independent 231st Infantry Brigade (the Malta Brigade).* The 51st Division was to assault astride the tip of the Pachino peninsula on beaches bearing the code name "Bark South" and occupy the town of Pachino. A few miles to the north, landings by the Malta Brigade on the "Bark East" beaches were designed to provide right flank protection for the 30th Corps bridgehead and to establish contact with the 13th Corps. The Canadian Division was to assault on the left flank of the Highland Division through "Bark West" beach and capture the Pachino airfield. Placed under General Simonds' command for the operation was a Special Service Brigade, composed of Nos. 40 and 41 Royal Marine Commandos, and commanded by Brigadier R. E. Laycock (later Major-General and. Chief of Combined Operations).49 The naval role in the general plan of "Husky" was threefold: to ensure the safe and timely arrival of the assault forces at their beaches; to cover their disembarkation; and to support and maintain them after landing and throughout the subsequent operations. For these duties Admiral Cunningham allotted his available naval forces to the Eastern and Western Task Forces, and planned additionally to employ two strong covering forces of battleships to operate to the east and west of the area of invasion. To disguise the direction of the Allied attack, concentration of ships in the Central Mediterranean was postponed as long as possible. As we have already indicated, the Allied troopships followed the routes of normal Mediterranean convoys, and their movements were so timed that they would not reach Sicilian waters until late on the eve of D Day. As a further deceptive measure, on the day before invasion the main covering force, designated Force "H", which consisted of four battleships, four cruisers, two aircraft carriers and eighteen destroyers, would concentrate in the Ionian Sea, as though to threaten the west coast of Greece. A smaller Force "Z" would be held in reserve in the Western Mediterranean, to replace possible casualties, or to reinforce Force "H".50 The naval component of the Western Task Force, commanded by ViceAdmiral H. K. Hewitt, United States Navy, consisted mainly of American elements organized into a Control Force and three Task Forces corresponding to the three areas of the Seventh Army's assault. The Eastern Task Force, under the naval command of Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, was similarly
* The 1st (Malta) Infantry Brigade garrisoned Malta from before the outbreak of war until March 1943. When it left the island it was redesignated the 231st Infantry Brigade.

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divided. Force "A" was to carry the 13th Corps and the 231st Brigade from the Middle East; Force "B" was to bring the 51st Division from Tunisia; while Force "V", commanded by Rear-Admiral Vian, was responsible, as we have seen, for transporting the 1st Canadian Division from the United Kingdom. A fourth component was Force "K", the four cruisers and six destroyers already referred to (above, p. 48), whose task was to provide the initial close gun support for the assault forces.51 The work of the Allied air forces in furnishing protection for the "Husky" convoys and in attacking the enemy's airfields, bases and lines of communication has been described above. By D Day air superiority over the landing beaches had been assured; there remained for the Mediterranean Air Command the tasks of providing direct support for the assaulting armies and the transportation of airborne troops and supplies. It was planned that fighter cover for the Eastern Task Force would be provided by Royal Air Force squadrons from Malta initially, and subsequently from captured airfields as the advance progressed. To support the Western Task Force British squadrons would be supplemented by twin-engined fighters of the Twelfth U.S. Air Support Command based first in Tunisia and then on Sicily itself.52 The reduction of Pantelleria,* which lies in the Sicilian Straits 100 miles west of Licata, furnished an additional base for a Royal Air Force Wing to provide convoy protection, and for American fighters to support the landings of the Seventh Army. Under the threat of an assault landing by the British 1st Infantry Division the Italian-held island surrendered on 11 June after having been subjected to six days and nights of relentless aerial bombardment which achieved concentrations described by General Eisenhower as "greater than any we had previously attempted."55 Two days later the Italian garrison of Lampedusa-a smaller island 100 miles to the south-capitulated under Allied bombing. The loss of these two outposts virtually deprived the enemy of any chance of early warning of the approach of the assault on Sicily.56 For these and all other air operations connected with the invasion of Sicily there were available to the Mediterranean Air Command 113 British and 146 American squadrons, employing more than 4300 aircraft, and in addition a force of 500 American gliders.57 If we measure against these figures the meagre strength of the Axis air forces in the Central Mediterranean at this time, it is obvious that Allied air superiority in the battle of Sicily was never in question.
* Late in 1940 the British Chiefs of Staff had approved a plan to capture Pantelleria by a force of Commandos led by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, Director of Combined Operations. The undertaking was, however, twice postponed, 53 and finally abandoned in January 1941. A close study of the effects of mass bombing upon the concrete shelters and gun emplacements on Pantelleria provided information of great value in planning future operations against similar heavily fortified positions-notably those 54 of the Normandy coast.

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The Role of the 1st Canadian Division

From a point two miles to the west of the extreme tip of the Pachino peninsula the coast sweeps north-westward for nearly five miles in a wide curving bay with a sandy shore, called on Italian maps Costa dell' Ambra (the Amber Coast) (see Map 2). The bay is defined by two sharp headlands, Punta delle Formiche (Cape of Ants) to the south, and Punta Castellazzo (Castle Point) to the north. Midway along the shoreline a small rocky limestone point, le Grotticelle (the Caves), divides the long beach into two sectors. This was "Bark West", the stretch of coast assigned to the Canadian landings; the right and left sectors were given the respective code names "Roger" beach and "Sugar" beach. There was no formidable land obstacle behind these beaches. One hundred feet above the high-tide mark the sandy shore-strip merged into a low ridge of limestone not more than ten feet high, almost entirely covered by drifting dunes, across which were several easy means of exit for motor transport. Inland the ground rose gradually across miserably poor fields that were at first little more than pure sand and then small patches of soil crowded in between rocky outcroppings. At the left end of "Bark West", behind "Sugar" beach, a group of sloughs or salt marshes, the largest of which was the Pantano Longarini, blocked the passage of vehicles in that area, but elsewhere the only hindrance to traffic was expected to be the "dry stone" walls which encircled the small fields. Half a mile inland from le Grotticelle a very rough cart track wound in a north-easterly direction to join the provincial road running westward from Pachino to Ispica* and Ragusa. At the junction was the airfield, the only landing-ground in the peninsula, which might in emergency accommodate from sixty to eighty fighter craft. The town of Pachino itself, with a population of 22,000, lay a mile to the east of the landing-strip, and some three miles north-east of "Roger" beach.58 Causing considerable concern to the Canadian planners were two false beaches or sandbars which lay submerged along Costa dell' Ambra some distance offshore. They were apprehensive that the assault craft might ground on these, and the troops on disembarking find themselves in water too deep for them to wade or to drive their vehicles ashore. A submarine reconnaissance made on the night of 25-26 June confirmed this fear by revealing the presence of a sandbar eighty yards off "Roger" beach 600 yards long and twenty yards wide, covered by only eighteen inches of water. Inside the bar there was a sharp drop of as much as' nine feet in some places. A similar underwater obstacle lay off "Sugar" beach, although shoreward the intervening water was not more than five feet deep.59 As we have noted
* See p. 697.

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earlier, General Simonds had prepared to meet such a contingency by using amphibious craft. On receiving this confirmation-which came to him aboard Hilary on 7 July-he issued orders that three of the assault companies of the 1st Canadian Brigade should land in [Link]. (Landing Craft, Tank) carrying DUKWs, which could swim ashore should the landing craft run aground on the sandbars.60 We have already observed that the enemy's prepared defences along the Sicilian coast were not very formidable. Air photography indicated about fifteen pillboxes and a score of machine-gun posts in the "Bark West" sector; there was some barbed wire along the beaches, and anti-tank mines might also be expected. There were several similarly defended positions inland, particularly in the vicinity of the airfield. The major possible sources of trouble were two coast defence batteries, one near some farm buildings which on the map bore the name Maucini,* about one and a half miles north-east of "Roger" beach, and the other, less dangerous to the Canadian attack, two miles farther east in the 51st Division's sector. A third battery (found when captured to comprise four six-inch howitzers) sited on the northern outskirts of Pachino to cover the approaches to the airfield was also in range of "Bark West". It was reasonable to suppose therefore that the worst the Canadians might have to contend with during the landings would be artillery fire from up to a dozen guns, followed by machine-gun fire as the assault craft approached the beaches; a forced disembarkation because of the sandbars before the troops reached shore; possible submerged mines in the intervening water passage; and on the beaches wire entanglements, mines and perhaps booby traps, all of which would have to be negotiated under fire from machine-gun posts and pillboxes. From these various sources heavy casualties were to be expected should the enemy offer determined resistance-indeed a somewhat gloomy prognostication by the interservice planners of the operation provided for the action that should be taken "if a whole Brigade were destroyed before the beaches were reached."62 But the Commander of the Canadian force was more optimistic. In a conversation with General McNaughton on 30 May he commented on the lack of battle experience of the Italian coastal divisions, and declared "that in view of the great superiority of force, the sound plans and the careful preparations he had not the slightest doubt of the successful outcome of the operation."63 On 7 June General Simonds issued his orders for the 1st Canadian Division's participation in Operation "Husky". The assault at "Bark West"
* A trace captured by the 231st Brigade on D Day showed that the Maucini position contained four 147/35 guns (i.e., having a calibre of 147 millimetres and a barrel length of 35 times this calibre), or approximately 6-inch howitzers. Postwar Italian sources give the total armament of the 206th Coastal Division as 215 sub-machine-guns, 474 machine-guns, 46 "isolated" guns, and 65 guns in batteries.61

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was to be made on a two-brigade front, supported on the left by a simultaneous attack by the Special Service Brigade. In the first phase of the operation the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade would land on "Roger" beach, to the east of le Grotticelle, and would destroy the enemy coastal battery reported near Maucini, capture the Pachino airfield, and establish contact with the other formations of the 30th Corps in the neighbourhood of Pachino town. West of le Grotticelle the 2nd Brigade, landing on "Sugar" beach, was to advance west and destroy beach defences, meet and assist the Special Service Brigade in its operation, and subsequently take up positions north of the Pantano Longarini marsh and patrol towards the north-west. The Special Service Brigade would land immediately to the west of Punta Castellazzo, and hence on the extreme left of the Eighth Army's front, and having overcome enemy resistance in the area, reorganize on the high ground to the north-west of the salt marshes. The landings of the two infantry brigades were to be made at H Hour, which was set at 2:45 a.m.; the Commandos were to touch down ten minutes earlier.64 The main Naval support fire for the "Bark West" assault would be provided by the monitor Roberts, the anti-aircraft cruiser Delhi, and three destroyers, all under the direct control of Admiral Vian in Hilary. In addition one destroyer and four smaller naval craft were to escort each brigade shorewards and give close support fire. To preserve the element of surprise the assault was to be a silent one, and the covering bombardment would begin only if and when the enemy opened fire.65 During the second phase of the operation the divisional reserve, which included the 3rd Infantry Brigade, the 12th Army Tank Regiment (Three Rivers Regiment), and certain artillery and medical units, would proceed ashore, while the assaulting brigades captured high ground astride the PachinoIspica road and the whole Division reorganized for the third phase-an advance to the north-west in conformity with the Highland Division.66

The Canadian Landings and the Capture of the First Objectives

D Day was forty-eight minutes old when the 1st Canadian Division headquarters ship, H.M.S. Hilary, dropped anchor seven miles off the coast of Sicily.67 For the past hour and a half medium bombers had been "softening up" the defences of Pachino airfield, and the flares and flak put up by the defenders were clearly visible from the ships as they arrived at the release position. By the time the big transports carrying the assault brigades had slowed to a stop, the landing craft aboard were loaded with troops and ready to be lowered.

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This called for the exercise of considerable skill. Early on the previous afternoon, as the various assault convoys of the Eastern and Western Task Forces were, completing the last few miles of their voyage, a sharp gale had suddenly blown up, so roughening the sea as for a time to threaten postponement of the landings. But the risks of attempting to defer the precisely timed and closely co-ordinated operation until more favourable conditions were considered greater than the hazards of proceeding with the invasion as planned, even in the heavy weather."68 Fortunately by sunset the wind had slackened, so that the beaching of the assault craft promised to be less dangerous than had been feared; but the storm had left in its wake a heavy swell which made the launching of the small craft from the heaving transports a tricky undertaking. At ten minutes past one the [Link].* carrying the first flight of Commando troops of the Special Service Brigade made the forty-foot descent into the sea. Twenty-four minutes later the two assault battalions of the 2nd Canadian Brigade-Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, commanded by Lt.-Col. R. A. Lindsay, and The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, commanded by Lt.-Col. B. M. Hoffmeister-were on their way to "Sugar" beach. As the flat-bottomed craft headed shorewards, the troops which they carried heard the reassuring thunder of salvo after salvo from the 15-inch guns of H.M.S. Roberts, bombarding the Pachino airfield and its defences.70 The 2nd Brigade was due to land with the Seaforth Highlanders on the left and the Princess Patricias on the right. Because of faulty navigation, however, the craft carrying the Seaforth ran some distance off their course and actually landed the battalion to the right of the Patricias. In one respect at least the heavy swell aided the invaders, for the high-running surf carried the landing craft right over the false beach which had been the cause of so much concern.71 Both units met with practically negligible opposition. As the craft approached the shore they came under desultory small-arms fire, which ceased as the assaulting troops reached the beach. Once ashore, they easily cut through or blew up the few wire obstacles in their path, quickly disposing of a few machine-gun posts manned by a handful of bewildered Italian soldiers. At about three o'clock the headquarters and the remaining companies of each battalion followed the assault companies ashore. An hour later Brigadier Vokes, who was still afloat with his headquarters, had received success signals from both his assaulting units. Thereafter the two battalions proceeded inland towards their first phase objectives.72 Meanwhile, on the left, the Special Service Brigade had landed rather farther to the west of Punta Castellazzo than intended. Otherwise this assault went according to plan, for the Italians left their beach defences as soon as
* Landing Craft, Assault, a 40-foot ramped craft, affording protection against rifle and machine-gun fire, with a carrying capacity of 40 men (including a crew of four).69

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they were seriously threatened. At the cost of a few casualties the two Commandos quickly destroyed the defences in their sector and moving inland made contact at 6:40 a.m. with the Seaforth Highlanders near the south-west corner of the Pantano Longarini.73 The 1st Canadian Brigade, scheduled to attack "Roger" beach in the right sector of the divisional front, experienced considerable delay in leaving its transports. It will be recalled that because of the false beach which barred direct passage to the shore, General Simonds had decided to use tank landing craft and DUKWs. Three [Link]. with 21 empty DUKWs on board had been requisitioned for this purpose from Malta, and it was intended that they should land a company of The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, and two companies of The Royal Canadian Regiment. (These battalions were commanded respectively by Lt.-Col. B. A. Sutcliffe and Lt.-Col. R. M. Crowe, two fine officers who were destined to give their lives in the battle for Sicily.) As a precautionary measure, when confirming this change of plan on 7 July, the G.O.C. had signalled Glengyle that if the [Link]. did not arrive in time (they were due at 12:15 a.m.), the original arrangement for sending all the assault units of the 1st Brigade ashore in [Link]. would stand.74 Brigadier Graham was thus faced with the unpleasant necessity of having to be ready with two different landing plans, with no means of knowing in advance which would be required. He could not communicate with the headquarters ship because of wireless silence (only lifted once surprise was lost). The Senior Naval Officer aboard Glengyle warned him that the [Link]. might have difficulty in finding their respective troopships in the dark, and the rough weather added to the probability of delay. It was 1:40 a.m. when the first craft reached the Brigade transport area. By that time the Brigadier had ordered the assault companies to begin embarkation into [Link]. This necessitated reorganization of the troops, and it was 2:26 before the craft carrying the first flight of the Hastings and Prince Edwards were ready for lowering from Glengyle. In the meantime the assault companies of The Royal Canadian Regiment, which were to land on the right sector of "Roger" beach, had begun to load into two [Link]. which had been brought alongside Marnix van St. Aldegonde. The heavy swell so prolonged this transfer that Brigadier Graham decided to send in his first Bight without the right hand assaulting companies. This decision anticipated a message from General Simonds delivered to him personally at 3:35 by the Division's A.A. & Q.M.G., whom the G.O.C. had dispatched in the Admiral's barge: "You must get your assaults away in either [Link]. or [Link]."75 The delay in beginning the landings on "Roger" beach had caused much concern on Hilary, for it will be remembered that it was to the 1st Brigade that the important tasks of capturing the Pachino airfield and the battery behind

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Maucini had been assigned. At 3:15 Admiral Vian signalled his Senior Naval Officer Landing on Glengyle: "Will your assault ever start?"76 One minute later the two leading companies of the Hastings and Prince Edward headed for shore in their [Link]. It was four o'clock before The Royal Canadian Regiment's first flight left Marnix van St. Aldegonde-two and a half hours late. During the approach to the shore there was occasional shelling from the Maucini battery, but this was silenced by naval fire. Each L.C.T. carried seven DUKWs, and as the large craft grounded on the sandbar the amphibians swam off to the beach laden with troops.77 The assault companies of both regiments made their landings approximately where planned, but one of the Hastings' reserve companies, which had been carried aboard H.M.S. Derbyshire, came ashore 5000 yards too far to the west, in the Commandos' sector.78 Fortunately this wide dispersal of the Hastings had no serious consequences; before long the battalion had reunited, having suffered casualties of two killed and three wounded by machine-gun fire. But this incident and the earlier confusion which marked the launching of the assault flights serve to emphasize the difficulties attending large-scale amphibious operations carried out in the darkness. Had there been heavier opposition to the landings these departures from plan could have led to extremely serious results. The 1st Brigade encountered no opposition on "Roger" beach, for by the time the first flights touched down-the Hastings at 4:45 and The Royal Canadian Regiment at 5:30-the weight of the naval bombardment and the success of the earlier landings farther west had induced what few Italian troops were present to withdraw from the beach defences. At 6:45 General Simonds was able to report to the 30th Corps Headquarters that the Canadian Division had captured all its first objectives.79 The reserve battalions of the assault brigades now began to land, The Edmonton Regiment coming in at "Sugar" beach and the 48th Highlanders of Canada going ashore on "Roger" with pipes playing. Shortly afterwards orders were given to the supporting arms and the divisional reserve to follow. From their huge [Link]. Sherman tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment splashed ashore through six feet of water, and by 10:15 a complete squadron was on "Roger" beach ready for action. The 3rd Infantry Brigade began landing at eleven o'clock. The 142nd Field Regiment (Royal Devon Yeomanry), a British self-propelled artillery unit placed under General Simonds' command, disembarked at about the same time, and could thus claim to be one of the first field regiments to invade Europe.80 In the meantime the assault units were rapidly completing their part in the opening phase of the divisional plan. After their delayed landing the battalions of the 1st Brigade wasted little time. The Royal Canadian Regiment quickly reached and cleared the Maucini buildings, taking a dozen

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prisoners. The battalion then advanced against the battery, where a single warning shot fired by a sergeant was sufficient to bring the entire garrison of three officers and 35 other ranks trooping from a dug-out in surrender. By nine o'clock the R.C.R. had reached the airfield, to find it ploughed up, and apparently deserted. (It is to the credit of the Engineers that the British 15th Airfield Construction Group, under command of the Canadian Division, had completed a landing-strip on the damaged field ready for emergency use by a little after midday.)81 "C" Company, crossing to the north-east comer, made contact with tanks of the 51st Division, which was now moving inland through Pachino. It took little time for "A" Company, aided by the Hastings, who had followed in from the left, to clear some barrack buildings to the north of the field. This same company then pushed forward towards the battery north of the town, which had directed some troublesome but fortunately ineffective fire at the R.C.R. while they were engaged at the airfield. This had been promptly silenced by the Navy, but as the advancing company approached the battery position it came under considerable machine-gun fire. Two Canadians were killed and two wounded before the garrison of 130 Italians surrendered with their four 6-inch guns. The determination and courage displayed by two members of a section of "A" Company in leading the final assault on the battery brought the R.C.R. the first awards for gallantry won by Canadians in Sicily. Private J. Grigas received the Distinguished Conduct Medal and Private J. W. Gardner the Military Medal."82 Meanwhile "C" Company had seized the high ground north-east of the airfield and had captured 100 more prisoners. By six in the evening the battalion had consolidated north and west of the field. Officers and men fell to work on their rations, for their first meal since leaving the ship fourteen hours before. On their left the Hastings, who had taken their objectives against even less opposition than met the R.C.R., dug in among the low grapevines in a defensive position covering the airfield.83 Farther west resistance had been almost totally lacking in the sector where the units of the 2nd Brigade were exploiting. During the day all three battalions had reached their assigned positions north and west of the Pantano Longarini, and their patrols had brought in many unresisting prisoners. Only on the Canadian Division's extreme left flank had the enemy displayed any offensive spirit. Here, late in the afternoon, a Blackshirt unit held up the advance of the Commandos with heavy mortar and anti-tank fire, and threatened to penetrate between the Special Service Brigade and the positions held by the Seaforth Highlanders. The Commandos, lacking heavy supporting weapons, were unable to reply effectively to the enemy's fire. Fortunately a Canadian heavy mortar detachment (of the Saskatoon Light Infantry) was in the vicinity, and on request from a Commando officer it quickly went into action, firing 160 rounds and "engaging the target with

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devastating accuracy", as Brigadier Laycock afterwards wrote.84 The Commandos then closed in and the Blackshirts hurriedly withdrew, abandoning their horsedrawn guns and large quantities of ammunition. Thus ended abruptly the only counter-attack attempted on the 1st Canadian Division's front that day.85 The second phase of operations was completed that first night. Under cover of darkness units of the 2nd Brigade moved forward some three or four miles to the northwest of the Pantano Longarini in the direction of Ispica, patrols increasing their harvest of prisoners along the way. On their right the 3rd Brigade, which upon landing had temporarily halted at Burgio, a large winery on the highway three miles west of Pachino, made a parallel advance of three miles, in the course of which The West Nova Scotia Regiment encountered its first opposition, and captured 25 Italians without sustaining any casualties. The Special Service Brigade completed its covering role on the left flank, and was withdrawn next day into army reserve. General Simonds' rear headquarters was now ashore and initially established, according to its war diary, "in a civilian hovel, 12 by 16, inhabited by an old woman, 11 guinea pigs, 4 dogs, a goat and 4 gallons of wine, all of which were quickly cleared out."86 Late that night an enemy air raid struck at the beaches and the crowded shipping in the bay. It met a heavy barrage of anti-aircraft fire from ship and shore, and caused little damage; but troops in the beach area, many under fire for the first time, hastened to deepen their slit-trenches, the digging of which had hitherto seemed one of the less profitable drudgeries of soldiering.87 The first day of the campaign had thus been highly satisfactory. Casualties had been surprisingly light. Final statistics show that the Canadian losses on 10 July were seven other ranks killed, and three officers and 22 other ranks wounded; the Special Service Brigade reported six killed and 19 wounded.88 Enemy losses were much higher. At 6:45 p.m. the Canadian divisional headquarters notified the 30th Corps that 650 prisoners had been taken (including a score of German Air Force personnel), and this figure grew before the day was over. The total number of enemy killed and wounded in the 1st Division's sector was estimated at close to 100.89 Late that evening General Simonds dispatched to General McNaughton, then at Headquarters 15th Army Group in North Africa, a signal which told the gratifying story of the day's achievements:
Landings effected with very little opposition and by 1200 hrs today all objectives for phase one were in my hands. Ineffective counter attacks in afternoon were repulsed. Casualties very light and first reports indicate do not exceed total of seventy-five killed and wounded including 40 and 41 Marine Commandos. We took over 700 prisoners and some material. Morale high and troops very confident of themselves. Details will follow. Success mainly due to excellent co-operation Royal Navy and RAF.90

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How Canada Learned the News

Because of the strong pressure which had for many months been brought to bear upon the Canadian Government to get troops into action, the means by which the initial announcement of Canadian participation in the invasion should be made was a matter of some concern in Ottawa. It was felt that the news of Canadian troops being in action should be released from the Dominion capital before, or at the latest simultaneously with, publication in Washington or London.91 On 28 June it was learned from C.M.H.Q. that General Eisenhower would make the original announcement of the landings.92 The reply from the C.G.S. urged that Canada should be accorded equal treatment with all other interested countries in the release of the Supreme Commander's official communique.
It would be expected that Prime Minister or Minister [of National Defence] would be in a position immediately to follow publication of communique with statement, probably by radio, amplifying as much as possible and giving particularly some idea of number of Canadians involved and name of Commander. As you can understand, this will be regarded by Canada as most important information and hesitancy about giving it is likely to be misunderstood. Realize that consideration of security must govern, but hope may be able to go just as far as possible in these respects. What we must avoid is that Canadian statement is in any way less complete on essential points than statements by any other governments and that it is no later than that of any other governments.93

It was planned that three announcements concerning the invasion should come from General Eisenhower's headquarters: the initial communique to the world; an Avis to the French people telling them that the invasion of Sicily was but the first stage in the liberation of Europe and warning them to remain inactive for the time being; and a proclamation to the Italian people. A signal from Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 5 July gave the text of these messages; none contained any reference to Canadian troops. The terms employed were "Allied forces" and "Anglo-American forces".94 When a copy of this signal reached Ottawa late on 7 July, immediate efforts were taken to have Canadians named in these first announcements. On the evening of the 8th Mr. Mackenzie King telephoned the White House and expressed his opinion that "it was an extraordinary thing that a communication should go from General Eisenhower without any mention of the participation of Canadian troops."95 Mr. L. B. Pearson, the Canadian Minister to Washington, saw President Roosevelt and his special adviser, Mr. Harry Hopkins, the same evening. The President "recognized the force and reasonableness" of Canada's representations. Hopkins in turn took up the matter with the British Prime Minister, who promised definite mention of the Canadians in the Churchill-Roosevelt proclamation which it had been decided should replace Eisenhower's proclamation to the Italian people.96

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At the same time the Canadian High Commissioner in London, Mr. Vincent Massey, approached Mr. Attlee and Lieut.-General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence, both of whom "took a sympathetic attitude to Canada's contention that she should be properly associated with the proclamation to the Italian people and the Avis to the French."97 This was followed by a telegram from the War Office to General Eisenhower. It advised him of the British Chiefs of Staff's decision to mention Canadian forces in the Churchill-Roosevelt proclamation, and assumed that Canada would be referred to by name in the Supreme Commander's Avis to the French people.98 On the same day Washington informed Eisenhower that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved mention of the Canadians in the Avis.99 General Eisenhower remained firm however.* At an early hour on the morning of 10 July he signalled the British Chiefs of Staff that "security requirements" and the need for being consistent with the terms of the communique made it undesirable that Canadians should be referred to in the Avis.101 On the previous day he had authorized the Canadian Prime Minister to issue a special communique twenty-four hours after the first landing, which would confine itself to the statement: "A Canadian force forms part of the Allied forces which are undertaking landing operations on Sicily."102 Having thus arranged that Canada should be the first to announce her participation in the invasion Eisenhower saw no reason for taking any action which would lead to her being "scooped" by the world press.103 His initial communique, issued in Algiers at 6:24 a.m. on D Day (12:24 a.m. Ottawa time), stated: "This morning Allied Forces under command of General Eisenhower began landing operations in Sicily Canadians were not named in either this or the immediately following Avis, which referred only to "AngloAmerican forces". Less than ten minutes after the Algiers release, however, the United States War Department most unexpectedly announced that "British, American and Canadian troops" had begun landing operations in Sicily.104 The release from Washington took the Canadian Prime Minister by surprise. He had received word that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had approved mention of the Canadians in the Avis to the French people, but, lacking confirmation that General Eisenhower would include them in his communique, he was prepared to wait until 11 July to make his own announcement. When the news broke from Washington, Mr. King felt himself free to act. "When I heard the announcement made", he told Parliament later, "I felt there was no obligation on my part which would bind me
* It will be noted that Mr. King was in error when in addressing the House of Commons later he attributed to "the military authorities in Great Britain" the decision "that no reference should be made to Canadians participating in the assault upon Sicily."100

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further not to make an announcement to the Canadian people."105 Accordingly he immediately issued a statement to the press and at eight o'clock in the morning (10 July) delivered the following message over the radio:
Armed forces of Britain, the United States and Canada are now in the forefront of an attack which has as its ultimate objective the unconditional surrender of Italy and Germany. All Canada will be justifiably proud to know that units of the Canadian Army are a part of the Allied force engaged in this attack.... 106

Early Allied Successes

The success which attended the Canadian landings had been matched along the whole of the invasion front. Assaults made by the other formations of the Eighth Army had met very little opposition. Elsewhere on the 30th Corps' front the 51st Highland Division and the 231st Brigade had captured the town of Pachino and occupied the eastern half of the peninsula with little difficulty. On the east coast the two divisions of the 13th Corps had captured their initial objectives of Avola and Cassibile by ten in the morning, and the 5th Division had then moved north on Syracuse. It entered that important port the same evening at nine o'clock to take it undamaged.107 The United States Seventh Army had landed against little initial opposition -although in rougher surf conditions on the more exposed western beaches -and had speedily taken all its D Day objectives. The 3rd Division encountered some resistance east of Licata before it captured the port and the adjoining airfield, and during the day Axis air forces threw against the beaches and transport areas scattered bombing and strafing attacks which later turned out to have been the major enemy air effort of the campaign. By nightfall the Americans held two firm beachheads from two to four miles deep, one extending from Scoglitti to Gela, and the other reaching six miles on each side of Licata.109 The airborne attacks in the sectors of both the Eastern and Western Task Forces had not achieved the success that crowned the seaborne assaults. At dusk on 9 July some 5000 troops in transport aircraft and gliders took off from Tunisian airfields in the largest night operation of its kind ever attempted up to that time. Unfortunately, faulty navigation by inexperienced pilots, due in part to the high wind which had threatened to cancel the beach landings, and to heavy enemy anti-aircraft fire over the Sicilian coast, resulted in a wide
* The most costly enemy air raid in the Canadian sector occurred on 12 July two miles east of Ispica, when six fighters attacked a column carrying Headquarters, Royal Canadian Artillery. One gunner was killed and the Brigade Major and five others wounded.108

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dispersion of the airborne formations.* Of the 134 gliders carrying the British 1st Airlanding Brigade, fifty came down in the sea, and only twelve landed in the intended dropping zone. In the Seventh Army's sector, paratroops of the 82nd Airborne Division made widely scattered landings over an area of fifty miles extending from Licata to Noto, inside the Eighth Army's boundary. Nevertheless, disappointing as this misfortune was, small parties of airborne troops in both sectors reached some of their objectives and carried out the role assigned to them, while others attacked strongpoints wherever they found them.111 An enemy authority, General Kurt Student, commander of the German airborne attack on Crete and Commander-in-Chief of all German paratroops from 1943 until the end of the war, in October 1945 gave an interrogator his opinion that "the Allied airborne operation in Sicily was decisive.... If it had not been for the Allied airborne forces blocking the Hermann Gring Armoured Division from reaching the beachhead, that division would have driven the initial seaborne forces back into the sea."112 In weighing this tribute due allowance must be made for the general's natural enthusiasm about troops (though hostile) of his own special arm. There is little doubt, however, that the activities of these first arrivals in Sicily and the confusion which the widespread droppings caused in the enemy's coastal defence organization contributed materially to the ease and rapidity with which the initial beaches were won. A large share of the credit for the satisfactory results achieved during this opening phase of operations must go to the naval and air support given the Allied Armies. Skilful planning and effective co-ordination of all the fighting services had brought to a hostile shore the greatest seaborne force ever embarked, and the culminating assault was a model for future combined operations. The value of naval bombardment in a landing operation was proved beyond doubt by the effective manner in which coastal batteries were neutralized.113 According to General von Senger and Etterlin the realization that troops manning defences near the shore would be "exposed to an annihilating fire from naval artillery" had been an important factor in the decision to place the main reserve well inland.114 As the ground forces made good their landings, the air attacks which had crippled the Axis air power in Sicily continued; 1092 sorties were flown on
* In two subsequent airborne operations, by American paratroops on the night of 10-11 July, and by British gliderborne and parachute troops on 13-14 July, serious losses were caused by anti-aircraft fire from Allied naval and merchant vessels. The precipitancy with which both operations were mounted had left insufficient time to clear in advance with naval forces a safety corridor for the troop-carrying aircraft. The unfortunate effects of what Eisenhower termed "inadequate coordination between the services" led to his appointment of an investigating board of officers, whose widely circulated recommendations had much to do with ensuring the success of subsequent airborne operations during the invasions' of Italy and Normandy.110

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D Day and 17 of the few enemy aircraft encountered* were shot down.116 Some of the sorties were carried out by Spitfires of No. 417 (City of Windsor) Squadron R.C.A.F., which from their base at Malta patrolled high above the "Bark West" beaches as the Canadians came ashore, and later escorted a medium bomber attack on Caltagirone. The Squadron was engaged in a heavy schedule of similar sweeps during the days that followed, and on 15 July it landed in Sicily, taking over the Pachino airfield as a base for subsequent operations in support of the Eighth Army's advance.117 Proof of the effectiveness of the cover provided by the Northwest African Air Forces appears in the small number of naval ships destroyed by enemy air action. For D minus 1 and D Day losses of up to 300 craft had been expected; the actual toll was only six vessels.118 To this great achievement by the Allied air forces Admiral Cunningham paid striking tribute in his official report on Operation "Husky":
To one who had fought through the Mediterranean campaign from the beginning it appeared almost magical that great fleets could remain anchored on the enemy's coast, within 40 miles of his main aerodromes... The navies (and consequently the armies) owed a great debt to the air for the effectiveness of the protection offered them throughout the operation.119

We have referred to the part played by R.C.A.F. squadrons in the general Allied air offensive; the Royal Canadian Navy too made its contribution to the conquest of Sicily. In the convoy which brought the 231st Infantry Brigade from the Middle East to assault the beaches on the 30th Corps' right flank two of the three flotillas of assault landing craft carried aboard the transports were Canadian-the 55th and the 61st Flotillas. For twelve hours these landing craft ferried the assault and reinforcing troops ashore on the "Bark East" beaches, and when early in the afternoon of D Day their convoy withdrew, they had put two thirds of the Malta Brigade safely ashore.120 In addition to these [Link]., two Canadian flotillas of the heavier Landing Craft, Mechanized were engaged in the operation. Commencing early on D Day, the 80th and 81st Flotillas, whose job was the transfer of vehicle's and stores from ship to shore, served for 26 days along the Sicilian coast between Avola and Syracuse until maintenance of the Eighth Army over the beaches came to an end on 5 August. A total of 400 Canadians manned these four flotillas, while an additional 250 served during the operation in various other support craft of the Royal Navy.121 Enemy testimony has shown that the complete tactical surprise which the Allied landings had achieved in all sectors was due in no small measure to the gale of the previous day. The daily situation reports submitted to Berlin
* Enemy aircraft flew an estimated 150-200 sorties on D Day. On succeeding days this effort declined sharply; by July it had fallen to an average of 50 sorties a day, and had ceased to provide effective opposition 115 See footnote to p. 202 below.

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by the German Commander-in-Chief South reveal that from 1 July the enemy was aware from Allied shipping movements and the repeated attacks on Sicilian airfields that the hour of invasion was approaching, although he still considered Sardinia a possible objective.122 Finally, at 4:30 p.m. on 9 July his aerial reconnaissance discovered convoys steering towards Sicily, and he concluded that the Allies had started their offensive and would "move first of all against the southern and eastern coasts of Sicily."123 By 6: 10 p.m. the German Command had received further details of the approaching task forces, and half an hour later "all troops in Sicily had been alerted.124 Later, however, the captured Commander of the 206th Italian Coastal Division informed interrogators that this warning did not reach him until 10:20 p.m., and that his naval adviser then declared that the weather was much too rough for a landing to be effected. This must have been a welcome assurance, for the coastal garrisons had been wearied by false alarms and invasion rumours for weeks past, and were glad to relax their vigil when the storm offered seeming security from Allied invasion. But although the Italian defence formations might thus blame the weather for the manner of their surprise, their subsequent lack of resistance, as we have seen, amply bore out the pre-invasion Allied estimates of their low morale and poor fighting qualities. With the German defenders of Sicily, whose role, as noted above, was to be one of counter-attack, the Allied troops had so far made no contact. The fruitless dispatch of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division to the Palermo area had thinned out the German forces under General Guzzoni's command. The German component of the island's garrison was thus caught off balance on D Day; but not for long. Early in the afternoon of the 10th Guzzoni issued orders for the Panzer Grenadier Division and a mobile group of the Assietta Division to return to the centre of the island.125 At 3:40 a.m. on 11 July Kesselring sent the following report to the High Command in Berlin:
O.B.S. has given the following order to the Chief of the German liaison staff at H.Q. Sixth Italian Army: Mass of Hermann Gring Division ordered to destroy the enemy who has advanced to Caltagirone. Battle Group Schmalz (now at Lentini) will retake port of Syracuse in immediate counter-attack.126

The Advance Inland

On 11 July the 1st Canadian Division resumed its advance into the interior of the island. In its role on, the Eighth Army's left flank the 30th Corps' immediate post-assault objectives were, first, the road which cut across the comer of the island from Noto to Pozzallo, and then the high ground of the Iblei Hills which commanded the roads converging on Palazzolo and Ragusa. General Leese ordered both of his formations to carry out this

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advance simultaneously, the Highland Division (to whose command the 231st Brigade had passed on the afternoon of D Day) on the right and the Canadians on the left. Initially the interdivisional boundary was the Pachino-Rosolini road.127 In his sector General Simonds decided to move the 1st Brigade on the right and the 2nd on the left, leaving the 3rd Brigade still in reserve. Shortly after midday the 2nd Brigade pushed off towards Ispica, led by The Edmonton Regiment under the command of Lt.-Col. J. C. Jefferson. As the marching troops set off along the hot and dusty highway they could see their first objective half a dozen miles away, for Ispica stands on the eastern edge of a 150-foot cliff overlooking the coastal plain. Such a site offered natural opportunities for a prolonged defence, but Allied naval shelling and aerial bombing the previous night and again that morning along the line of the Corps' first objective had effectively reduced all opposition in the town. An ultimatum from the Edmonton C.O. followed by a warning salvo brought capitulation, and when the battalion entered in mid-afternoon it encountered only the "enthusiastic greetings of the civil population and the frantic endeavours of the military population to surrender".128 The naval fire which supported the Canadian advance came from the ships which had covered the "Bark West" landings-Roberts and Delhi and the destroyers Brecon, Brissenden and Blankney-129 and from the cruiser Orion, which formed part of a bombardment group from Force "K".130 The skill of the naval gunners caused Kesselring a few days after the invasion to warn the Germans that "in view of the complete naval supremacy of the British the effect of the naval artillery against land targets is of particular importance"131 As a subsequent survey by Combined Operations Headquarters pointed out, Allied bombardment in the Central Mediterranean was carried out in almost ideal circumstances. "Main enemy supply lines [which] ran along exposed coastal roads, a weak enemy submarine effort, little interference from the air, together with good weather, produced a set of conditions unlikely to be so favourable anywhere else in the world."132 The long-range bombardment of inland towns by the monitor Roberts was co-ordinated by the 1st Division's Commander Royal Artillery, Brigadier A. B. Matthews, who went aboard on D plus 1. Fire from the cruisers and destroyers was directed by forward observation officers (of the Royal Canadian Artillery), whose detachments moved with-or ahead of-the leading infantry battalions, and kept in communication with the guns afloat by means of Lucas lamp or wireless.133 The nature of his tasks meant that a naval "F.O.O." was generally well in the lead of the advance, and was thus often among the first to make contact with enemy positions. Such a case was that of Captain G. D. Mitchell, R.C.A., of No. 1 Naval Bombardment Unit. On D plus 1, having successfully directed H.M.S. Delhi's fire on to Ispica, he was driving westward in a P.P.C.L.I. carrier, in order to

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do the same for Modica,* the next town in the Canadian path. Half way on his journey his party of six came upon a road-block, where wire and mines, covered by two anti-tank guns, barred the way. Dismounting, and backed by the authority of two Bren guns, Mitchell forced the detachment of about twenty Italians to surrender and to dismantle the obstacle. This exploit, and the efficient manner in which "he never ceased his efforts to maintain communications with his bombarding ship and support the Army ashore by every means" brought Captain Mitchell the Military Cross, and the added distinction of being the first Canadian to win this award in Sicily.134 The Corps' progress had been equally satisfactory on the right, where the 51st Division had entered the town of Rosolini unopposed shortly before noon. The enemy was clearly on the run; accordingly orders were issued for the advance to continue to the next objectives without delay. In the Canadian centre the Patricias now took up the chase. Passing through the Edmontons at 5:15 p.m., the battalion moved off westward along the State highway which encircled the island. They marched all night without meeting opposition and by early morning were in position on the high ground which overlooks the town of Modica from the south-east. While the main body of the Seaforth also moved up to the Modica area, one company was detached to the 2nd Brigade's left flank, to take over the small coastal town of Pozzallo, which had surrendered earlier to naval landing . parties from H.M.S. Blankney and Brissenden after a warning bombardment of 160 rounds had bracketed the town. When the Highlanders arrived on the afternoon of the 11th, they collected 260 prisoners, along with much equipment. Here they met and solved their first problems of ministering to the needs of the civilian population. The machinery of local government had broken down, and deserted by their Fascist Mayor and corporation the people of Pozzallo were desperately short of food. With the help of the local priest and postmaster, the Canadians broke open a granary and organized the distribution of grain, bread and macaroni.135 In the northern sector the 1st Brigade, moving off from Burgio on the afternoon of the 11th, followed the 51st Division into Rosolini, where a detachment of the 12th Canadian Tank Regiment had earlier relieved British troops. While the 48th Highlanders, commanded by Lt.-Col. I. S. Johnston, spent an uncomfortable night in the town-which they found half on fire from the naval shelling and pervaded by a horrible stench136-the R.C.R. assumed the lead and pushed forward towards Ragusa. It was necessary for the battalion to press into use a variety of motor transport from the rest of the brigade, as well as tanks of the Three Rivers and captured enemy vehicles; for it will be recalled that the loss of the three
* Sae p. 697.

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ships in the Slow Assault Convoy had cut heavily into the vehicle establishment of the majority of the Canadian units. For some time after the landings the shortage of transport continued to be keenly felt. It was partly relieved by pooling all available equipment and requisitioning mules and carts, and by the decision to suspend the practice of making "first line maintenance" the responsibility of the driver-a system which had meant that each driver serviced his own vehicle, and it did not move without him. Now, with an excess of drivers on hand because of. the sinkings, it was possible to keep each vehicle continuously in operation by using relief drivers and having an enlarged workshop section carry out maintenance at the end of each shift.137 By early morning on the 12th the R.C.R. had deployed four miles east of Ragusa, a large centre of 40,000 inhabitants. A battery of the Royal Devon Yeomanry-the British field regiment was providing artillery support for both the leading Canadian brigadesfired several rounds into the town, and an R.C.R carrier patrol was sent in to secure its surrender.138 The patrol discovered that Ragusa was in the possession of the Seventh Army, a company of the 45th U.S. Division having entered the town from the west late on the previous evening. This, the first meeting of Canadian and United States troops in Sicily, established the contact between the two Armies that had been forecast in the general plan of assault.139 The pattern for the entry of Canadian troops into Modica that morning at first closely resembled that at Ragusa. Unlike the hill town Ispica, Modica lies in a deep gully, and from their position of vantage on the surrounding heights it appeared unlikely to the Patricias that the reduction of the place would present much difficulty. Late on the 11th the naval F.O.O., Captain Mitchell, after his exploit with the road-block had reached the outskirts of the town to find it occupied by Italians only. His report that there were no Germans in the Modica area was relayed by the 2nd Brigade to Divisional Headquarters shortly after midnight, and was followed by another message that. Modica was seeking to surrender. An immediate reply, dispatched at 1:25 a.m., ordered the Patricias to accept the town's submission.140 Accordingly, on the morning of the 12th, after a 15-minute bombardment by the 142nd Field Regiment, a fighting patrol from the battalion went down into the town and took a considerable number of prisoners.141 Reports appearing in the official war diaries and accounts given later by participants are at some variance as to what followed. It appears that Modica was left without any occupying forces, and that some enemy elements who showed more spirit than usual had either re-entered the town or ,emerged from the cellars to which the artillery bombardment had driven them. About mid-morning two small detachments, one consisting of two

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Seaforth lorries, bringing forward rations and ammunition, and one from the R.C.R.'s anti-tank platoon, both seeking their respective units, entered Modica under the impression that it was safely in Canadian hands. As the former approached the central square, however, it was ambushed; it suffered some casualties and lost one of its vehicles. The R.C.R. and Seaforth parties, joining forces, advanced under cover of fire from a mortar whose crew had become attached to the anti-tank group. Not until further artillery fire had been called down from the Royal Devon Yeomanry did resistance cease and the little band of fifteen reach the main piazza. There they captured seven field and five medium guns and one anti-tank gun, which were sited to cover all converging roads. From all parts of the town several hundred Italian soldiers now came flocking to surrender.142 They were turned over to The Edmonton Regiment-the fourth infantry battalion to claim a share in the occupation of Modica.143 A possible reason for the brief flare-up of resistance was the presence in Modica of the headquarters of the 206th Italian Coastal Division, the formation, it will be recalled, responsible for the defence of the coastline between Licata and Augusta. The Commander, Major-General Achille d'Havet, who had been decorated by the Duke of Connaught with the Military Cross in the First World War, was concerned that his capitulation should be made to an officer of appropriate rank--a sensitiveness which caused the General rather a frustrating morning, and produced a number of separate claims for credit for his initial capture. From the mass of conflicting evidence it would appear that the first Canadian to make contact with the Italian commander was a sergeant of the P.P.C.L.I. fighting patrol, who discovered d'Havet in a building in Modica.144 The General's request for a captor of more exalted rank 'was referred to the 2nd Brigade Headquarters-apparently on more than one occasion and by more than one agency.* Eventually he formally placed himself in the hands of the Brigade Major, Major R.S. Malone, who conducted him to General Simonds' Headquarters. Here the G.O.C. had the pleasure of accepting the submission of the first general officer to be captured by Canadian troops in the Second World War.146 From the Corps Commander came an order to move on beyond Modica without delay.147 The presence of American troops in the Ragusa area had obviated the need for further westerly advance by the Canadians, and the two leading brigades now turned northward. Before leaving Modica,
* It is reported that these included a Seaforth signals corporal who having entered Modica by mistake was prevailed on to bring back to his battalion, riding on the pillion of his motorcycle, a delegate who sought to surrender the town; and a liaison officer with Brigade H.Q. who for two hours held d'Havet's car at a crossroad near Modica while unsuccessfully trying to reach the ;Headquarters staff by wireless. The war diary of the Three Rivers Regiment relates that during this period the C.O., Lt.-Col. E. L. Booth, encountered d'Havet's naval and military chiefs of staff and accompanied them into the town, to receive there the Italian General's unconditional surrender.145

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however, the 2nd Brigade, methodically cleaning up remaining enemy pockets on its flanks, dispatched a platoon of the Edmontons with a troop of tanks to Scicli, a small town midway between Modica and the coast: It was a routine job. The unit diary reported tersely: "The tanks fired three shots over the town and 1100 prisoners emerged from the hills and gave themselves up." That night found the three battalions of the brigade in the hills about Ragusa, where there were still large numbers of Italian soldiers waiting to be rounded up. North of Ragusa the country becomes increasingly rugged as the sprawling ridges of the Iblei Hills climb towards their junction with the Erei Mountains. The secondary road leading northward from Modica now became the axis of advance for Brigadier Graham's 1st Brigade. Throughout the morning of 12 July the 48th Highlanders and the Hastings and Prince Edwards had marched through oppressive heat and dust from Rosolini to join The Royal Canadian Regiment at Ragusa. That evening the advance was resumed, and by the following morning the three battalions were grouped about the hill village of Giarratana, which the Hastings had occupied without trouble.148 The 1st Brigade, which was thus holding the Canadian Division's most forward positions, was now roughly 30 miles as the crow flies from its point of landing, and more than 50 by march route over mountain roads. The Division had stretched its supply lines to the maximum for the vehicles available, and the troops themselves were badly in need of a rest. Although they had engaged in no strenuous fighting the circumstances of their introduction to Sicily had been difficult enough. The contrast with the period of inactivity aboard the transports was severe, for there had been no time for leisurely acclimatization. Glaring heat and clouds of fine white dust were the normal conditions under which officers and men marched, and the long hours which the shortage of motor transport compelled them to travel on foot deprived them of opportunity for rest. The P.P.C.L.I. war diary said of the men during the battalion's march to Modica, "every time they stopped they fell asleep"; and on 13 July the R.C.R. diary recorded that its personnel had had an average of about eight hours' sleep since landing. The Canadian Division was the only one of the Eighth Army formations unaccustomed to the semi-tropical conditions of the Mediterranean area, and on 13 July General Montgomery called a halt on his extreme left flank, directing that the Canadians should rest in the Giarratana area for a day and a half.149 Here the 3rd Brigade caught up with its fellow formations, while Divisional Headquarters moved from Ispica to the Modica area. During this pause the arrival in the beach area of the follow-up convoy and the herculean efforts of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps units in

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bringing up vehicles considerably eased the transport situation for the forward troops.* On the 14th, General Montgomery visited every unit and was given an enthusiastic reception. Calling the men around his car, he welcomed them to the Eighth Army, praised their performance up to that time, and expressed his confidence that they would stand up to the tests ahead.152 In the brief respite at Giarratana, to those who had time or inclination for retrospection, there was cause for satisfaction that the introduction of the Canadian Division to the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations had been accomplished in so relatively easy a manner. Across the narrow sands of "Balk West" beach Canadian soldiers had made their entry into Hitler's European fortress with almost negligible losses. Yet we have shown that for the majority of the troops the first few days in Sicily were by no means a picnic. Had the men of the 1st Division been less well trained or in poorer physical condition they would have found the assignment harder still. As it was, the process of their "breaking in" was swift and rigorous, effectively fitting them for the future tasks to which Montgomery had pointed. These were not far distant. In the hills north of Giarratana the Canadians were soon to meet the German defenders of Sicily, and much hard fighting was to ensue.

* 23,400 tons of stores and 3700 vehicles required by the 1st Division were discharged across the beaches in just over twelve days.150 Battalions solved the problem in supply which the lack of transport had created by leaving rear parties to form dumps from which stores could be leapfrogged forward at times when the advanced troops were stationary.151

CHAPTER IV THE FIRST FIGHTING IN THE SICILIAN HILLS, 14-22 JULY 1943
Plans for Further Action
Y THE evening of 13 July the third phase of operations forecast in General Alexander's instructions of 19 May had been completed.1 The Allied Armies had established a firm base from which to proceed to the capture of Catania and the Gerbini group of airfields, and the subsequent reduction of the island (see above, p. 20). The limit of the Eighth Army's advance ran in a south-westerly direction from Augusta (which had been captured early that morning by the 5th Division, heading the 13th Corps' drive northward) to Vizzini, where the 23rd Armoured Brigade, under command of the 30th Corps, was meeting fairly strong resistance from elements of the Napoli Division reinforced with Hermann Gring tanks. (The Italian division as a whole was in a bad way; one infantry regiment had become encircled between Syracuse and Palazzolo, and the G.O.C., Major-General Gotti-Porcinari, and his headquarters staff had been captured.)2 On the Allied left, General Patton's forces had a firm grip on a continuous bridgehead which stretched westward to within five miles of Porto Empedocle. The Seventh Army was putting the captured airfields of Ponte Olivo, Comiso and Biscari into use, and was preparing to extend its holding far enough inland to place these fields beyond the reach of the enemy's long-range artillery, and so fulfil its role of protecting the Eighth Army's left flank.* So far the Americans had borne the brunt of German counter-attacks. The most critical of these had been a series of armoured blows directed against the 1st Division's beachhead at Gela on 11 and 12 July by a battle group of the Hermann Gring Division moving down from the Caltagirone region.3 In three separate attempts to throw
* Field Order No. 1, issued by Force 343, named this objective "Yellow Line", and defined it as an arc extending westward from the inter-army boundary at Vizzini to meet the seacoast at Palma di Montechiaro, fifteen miles west of Licata. The line contained the towns of Campobello di Licata and Mazzarino on the Seventh Army's left flank, and on its right included the section of the Syracuse-Enna highway (Highway No. 124) passing through Grammichele, Caltagirone and San Michele di Ganzeria (see Map 1).

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the invaders back into the sea the enemy launched 60 Mark IV tanks against the narrow American foothold; on each occasion the combined power of tanks, artillery, rocket guns and naval gunfire drove him back, destroying in all 43 of his tanks.4 Although, as we have seen, specific instructions covering the assault phase of Operation "Husky" had been issued several weeks before D Day, it was obviously not practicable to prescribe in advance a detailed course of action for the Allied Armies once their initial objectives had been secured. The directive of 19 May did not go beyond defining the Eighth Army's task of capturing Catania and the Gerbini airfields, and the Seventh Army's supporting role of preventing "enemy reserves moving eastwards against the left flank of Eighth Army". General Alexander has related however how he visualized the development of operations after the firm base-"on a line from Catania to Licata"--had been established.
The next thing to do was to split the island in half, and the first stage would be to seize and hold the irregular rectangle of roads in the centre round Caltanissetta and Enna. This would by itself seriously hamper all enemy east-west communications. From there I should be able to press on to Nicosia, which would leave only the north coast road open to the enemy, and then to the coast near San Stefano.* I could probably only maintain a small force at San Stefano but if it could hold firm the interruption of communications would be complete.5

A glance at the map of Sicily will show the strategic position of Enna as the hub of the highway system of the island. From this point roads lead in every direction. The main east-west highway from Catania to Palermo, and the north-south route from San Stefano to Gela intersect here. Other roads radiate to the south-west through Caltanissetta to Agrigento, to the south-east through Caltagirone and Vizzini to Syracuse, and northeastward through Leonforte, Nicosia and Troina to Randazzo and the coast highways leading to Messina. Thus the axis of German withdrawal from the south-west of the island had to pass through Enna; while the converging roads from the south and southeast provided the Allied forces with direct routes to this focal point. The enemy was keenly alive to the importance of retaining his hold on such a vital centre of communications, and his task was to be the easier because of the rugged country over which all the approaches to Enna were laid. It will be recalled that the original intention of "Husky" as expressed in the Operation Instruction of 19 May was "to seize and hold the island of Sicily as a base for future operations". Since then, however, the measures proposed at Casablanca had been extended, and the Allied strategists had reached a decision to knock Italy" out of the war as quickly as possible (see below, Chapter VII). This would conceivably alter the pattern of operations of the invading armies. We have the evidence of General Leese
* See p. 697.

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(who told General Simonds of the proceedings of a meeting held at Montgomery's headquarters on 9 June) that the Eighth Army's object was "to dominate the Messina Straits as soon as possible and to get a footing in the south of the mainland of Italy."6 The Commander of the 30th Corps defined the role of the Eighth Army after the capture of Catania as General Montgomery saw it at this time.
The Allied Plan after landing, therefore, is for the Americans to form a firm base on the West covering the aerodromes, and for 13 Corps to drive on relentlessly in order to seize Syracuse, Augusta and Catania with the least possible delay. From these bases the Eighth Army will strike with its right in order to secure crossings over the Straits. The general conception is thus to hold on the left and strike on the right. By this means we should cut off and isolate the enemy still holding out around Palermo and in the West of the island.7

The task of the 30th Corps was primarily to assist the 13th Corps' advance. If the Army met strong resistance, it might be necessary to concentrate the whole effort of the 30th Corps on its right flank, where it would be prepared to take over the high ground north of Avola, and subsequently Syracuse, in order to release General Dempsey's formations for their northward drive along the coast. The proposal to assault Calabria directly after the capture of Messina was quickly discarded by the Allied planners in favour of other schemes, but the early capture of the port remained a high priority for the Eighth Army. The 13th Corps, however, did not initially meet the resistance that had been expected, and the Eighth Army found it possible to develop an axis of attack for each of its two corps. Orders for 12 July were for the 13th Corps to continue its drive along the coast towards Catania and for the 30th Corps to advance on Caltagirone, Enna and Leonforte.8 This was the programme which by D plus 3 had brought the Eighth Army's leading formations into Augusta and to the outskirts of Vizzini. The decision to direct the 30th Corps north-westward towards Enna entailed a redefinition of the boundary between the Seventh and Eighth Armies.* The route which the Corps must use as its, axis was the main highway which runs from Syracuse through Vizzini to the centre of the island (see Map 3). The portion of this road between Vizzini and San Michele di Ganzeria, ten miles west of Caltagirone, had been included in the area assigned to the Seventh Army for its "firm base";10 indeed, a movement by formations of the Eighth Army along this route would be directly across the face of the 45th Division on the American right flank. Accordingly on 13 July General Alexander issued a directive
* Evidence that Montgomery requested a change in the inter-army boundary appears in the following message sent from H.Q. 30th Corps on 13 July: 45 U.S. Div now on general line Chiaramonte-Biscari. Information received they intend to send one brigade Vizzini, two brigades Caltagirone to-morrow 14 July. Army Comd rapidly attempting to direct them more to west to avoid clash with you, but in case NOT retire from accordingly. Warn all concerned.9

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which confirmed the Eighth Army's advance on two axes-to Catania with its adjacent airfields, and to the network of roads within the area of Enna and Leonforte. General Montgomery was given exclusive use of the road (Highway Nos. 124 and 117) from Vizzini through Caltagirone and Piazza Armerina to Enna. The American axis of advance was turned sharply westward. The Seventh Army was to pivot on its left and advance to a general line running south-west from Caltanissetta, gaining contact with the Eighth Army at the road junction south of Enna.11 In ordering the capture of Enna and Caltanissetta the Army Group Commander was putting into effect his original intention "to split the island in half'. He has revealed that it was his purpose, although "for the moment tentative and liable to change", that the 30th Corps, having captured Leonforte and Enna, should advance to San Stefano on the north coast.12 Subsequent events, as we shall see, forced a change in this programme. General Leese had planned for 13 July that the 23rd Armoured Brigade should lead the general advance of the 30th Corps to the north-west; he had ordered the brigade to capture Vizzini that day, take Caltagirone on the succeeding night, and advance towards Enna on the 14th. He directed the 51st Highland Division to clean up resistance in Vizzini and the area to the east, while advancing the Corps' right flank by a brigade thrust northward towards Scordia.13 The 1st Canadian Division remained in its positions between Ragusa and Vizzini. As we have seen, Vizzini did not fall on 13 July; indeed it was not until the following evening that the mixed German and Italian garrison withdrew towards Caltagirone, and elements of the Highland Division entered the town. The plan to send the armoured brigade on to Caltagirone was cancelled, and General Simonds was ordered to take the Canadians through the 51st Division at Vizzini, and advance to Enna.14

The First Encounter with the Germans-Grammichele, 15 July

At midnight on 14-15 July a long column of motor transport carrying the 1st Brigade, led by The Royal Canadian Regiment, set off along the very secondary road twisting northward from Giarratana. Three hours later the R.C.R. deployed in Vizzini, and the Hastings and Prince Edwards moved into the lead. At 6:00 a.m. the brigade resumed its advance, travelling now along the paved State Highway, No. 124, which followed the narrow-gauge railway line connecting Enna with the south-east. As the column rolled forward, the infantry riding in lorries and carriers or mounted on tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment, the troops found themselves passing through a more prosperouslooking area. than they had yet seen in Sicily.

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Much of the way the road ran through a wide upland valley, with gentle slopes rising to the high ground on either side. Fields were large, and free from trees and rock. As usual there were no houses to be seen along the route; the peasant workers followed their custom of centuries of congregating in the hilltop towns. Such a centre was Grammichele, a community of 13,000 ten miles distant by road from Vizzini. It was built in 1683, after an earthquake, and was constructed on the unique plan of a spider web, with six roads radiating from the central piazza. The completely hexagonal town was perched on a long ridge some 250 feet above the level of the surrounding country, and thus had a commanding view of the road from the east. It was a good spot for a delaying action. At about 9:00 the leading Canadian troops rounded a bend in the road and saw Grammichele on the sky-line two miles to the west. There was no sign of the enemy as the reconnaissance group of the Three Rivers approached the town, with the infantry battalion closely following. But a strong rearguard of artillery and tank detachments of the Hermann Gring Division was lying in wait, and as the first vehicles reached the outermost buildings they came under a sudden burst of fire from tank guns and anti-tank weapons of calibres reported as ranging from 20 to 88 millimetres.* The fire quickly shifted to the main body of troops; a Canadian tank and three carriers were knocked out and several vehicles destroyed.16 The infantry immediately began closing in on the town, while selfpropelled guns of the Devon Yeomanry rapidly deployed from the road into the neighbouring fields to give prompt and effective support. Guided by tracer bullets fired from one of the forward carriers to indicate the enemy's positions, the Three Rivers squadrons destroyed three German tanks and a number of flak guns. In wide, sweeping movements three companies of the Hastings converged upon the town from as many directions, while the remaining company gave covering fire. As the first Canadians gained an entry within the perimeter the enemy began to evacuate. By noon Grammichele had been cleared, and the Hermann Grings, leaving behind them a quantity of equipment and stores, were retiring westward along the
* At the time of the Sicilian campaign the Herman Gring Division was equipped mainly with the medium Mark IV tank, weighing 23 tons, which mounted the long-barrelled 75-mm. gun. It still had some of the older Mark III tanks (at one time the main armament of the German panzer regiment), mounting a long 50-mm. gun (or in a few cases the short 75 of low muzzle-velocity). The Hermann Grings also used a small number of the heavy (56-ton) Mark VI ("Tiger") tanks, equipped with 88-mm. guns-on 23 July the Division reported 23 tanks ready for action "including 3 Tigers". The 45-ton Mark V "Panther" (with long 75), which eventually replaced the Mark IV as the enemy's main fighting tank, did not appear in Sicily. The anti-tank weapons used against the Canadians at Grammichele included the 20-mm. Flakvierling, a selfpropelled four-barrelled gun, which could be employed against either aircraft or tanks; the 88s appear to have been mobile flak guns in a ground role.15

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highway, harassed by our artillery.17 This first encounter with the Germans had cost 25 Canadian casualties. Early in the afternoon the 48th Highlanders, with tank support, took up the chase as a motorized column, the 1st Brigade Support Group (of the Saskatoon Light Infantry) providing carriers to replace those which the Highlanders had lost at sea. Mines along the road delayed progress, and it was midnight before the battalion reached the outskirts of Caltagirone, having covered some of the distance by cross-country march. The town of 30,000, which had housed the headquarters of the Hermann Gring Panzer Division, had been heavily hit by Allied bombers, and when the 48th Highlanders and the Three Rivers tanks entered unopposed early on the 16th they found the place a veritable shambles, with the streets badly blocked by rubble and many fires burning. In the very inadequate local hospital the Highlanders' medical section did what it could for the civilian casualties, and the 4th Field Ambulance gave assistance when it arrived. Despite all their troubles the nuns insisted on serving the Canadians coffee-made of crushed acorns.18 While Brigadier Graham's battalions were thus leading the Canadian thrust towards Enna, the 2nd Brigade, leaving Ragusa late on 14 July, had moved up to Highway No. 124 by a winding road through Chiaramonte Gulfi and Licodia, west of the route taken by the 1st Brigade , from Giarratana to Vizzini. There had been only enough transport for the Edmontons and Brigade Headquarters, and the other two battalions had found the march of more than thirty miles, much of it in extreme heat, very fatiguing. The brigade encountered no enemy en route, but the Edmonton suffered some casualties from sniping as they left Ragusa, an incident which led the 30th Corps Headquarters to issue an order that in future hostages were to be taken in each town after its surrender.19 The German detachments which the 1st Brigade had driven out of Grammichele were providing flank protection for the Hermann Gring Division, now slowly falling back for the defence of Catania. By 14 July the pattern of the enemy's plan of campaign was clear. It had not taken Kesselring long after the Allied landings to realize-if indeed any confirmation of his earlier suspicions were needed-that the German garrison would be forced to fight the battle of Sicily practically alone. On 12 July, after visiting Generals Guzzoni and von Senger in Enna, he reported to Berlin:
The Italian forces in the area under attack are almost a total loss. The German forces at the moment are not sufficiently large to carry out a decisive attack against any one of the enemy bridgeheads.20

The battle groups formed to strike powerful blows against an invader who should have been already staggered by the resistance of the perimeter coastal defences, had managed to launch, as we have seen, only one serious

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counter-attack, and that unsuccessful. Now, as effective opposition by their Italian partners virtually ceased, and the danger grew that Allied thrusts might isolate and envelop each group in turn, their only hope appeared to be in forming a stable and continuous defensive line. It was not difficult for the German commanders to divine the Allied intention of striking up the east Sicilian coast in order to seize the ferry crossings and thus cut off the defenders and open the way to the mainland. Nor could they fail to recognize the threat which the Allied left was directing against the line of communication with the west of the island. In the draft report already referred to (above, p. 53) Kesselring has shown that he was fully alive to these contingencies.
The important thing now was to prevent the enemy from thrusting forward to Catania from the Syracuse or the Gela areas, and then with united forces pushing through to the Straits of Messina. At the same time, the strong enemy force that was advancing from Licata towards the north must be prevented from breaking through in the direction of Palermo, thereby making it impossible to bring up those of our troops still in the western part of the island and to evacuate important supplies.21

Accordingly the enemy shifted his weight towards his left flank and proceeded to concentrate his greatest strength in the Catania plain, where he was determined to deny to the Eighth Army the port of Catania and the vital Gerbini airfields. In face of threatened encirclement the main body of the Hermann Gring Division was withdrawn from the Vizzini-Caltagirone area and ordered eastward to the aid of Battle Group Schmalz at Lentini. Here it was joined by the remnants of the luckless Napoli Division, which during the first four days of the invasion had suffered most heavily of all the Italian field divisions. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which had been hurriedly recalled on D Day from its futile excursion to Western Sicily, was committed in the hills south and south-west of Caltanissetta, to oppose any northward thrusts by General Patton's forces. Its left made rather uncertain contact with the Hermann Gring right, with units of General Chirieleison's Livorno Division helping to fill the gap-a situation that was improved by subsequent withdrawals towards the natural bulwark of Mount Etna.22 On 14 July Kesselring's daily report to the German High Command admitted that "the western flank is exposed to envelopment and preparations are being made to retreat to the Etna position."23 This "position" was no strong system of fortifications such as the Allied Armies were later to encounter in central Italy; indeed the only preparation appears to have been the selection of a suitable site. The line to which the Hermann Gring Division fell back in the next six days was in general that of the CatenanuovaCatania railway, which followed the north bank of the River Dittaino. It marked the limit of withdrawal if Catania and Gerbini were to be held. The reason for German

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sensitiveness along the route which the Canadians were following was thus apparent. The hilltop towns of Caltagirone, Piazza Armerina, Valguarnera, Enna and Leonforte all commanded lateral roads which led eastward into the Catania plain. It became the task of the German rearguards in these places, each of which because of its lofty location was readily convertible into a strongpoint, to contest our advance with increasing determination, in order both to counter the threat of encirclement of the main body of the Hermann Gring Division in the plain and to keep open a route for the passage of the Panzer Grenadiers from the west. To General Montgomery on 15 July it was imperative that as far as possible the Germans should reap no profit from delaying tactics on the Eighth Army's left flank. The attack of the 13th Corps along the coast was meeting strong opposition. Two nights earlier troops of No. 3 Commando, landing in the Gulf of Catania, had secured a road bridge on the main Syracuse-Catania highway, north of Lentini; while the 1st Parachute Brigade, dropping at the mouth of the Simeto River, had seized the important Primosole Bridge six miles south of Catania. Relieving troops of the 50th Division had met fierce enemy reaction, however, and by the evening of the 15th the Simeto crossing was still in dispute.24 That night the Army Commander wrote to General Leese:
So operations are a bit slow and sticky on the right, and all indications are that enemy troops are moving eastwards from the Caltagirone-Enna area and across to the plain of Catania. He is trying desperately to hold us off from getting to the airfields about Catania. As we are held temporarily on the right, it is now all the mote important to swing hard with our left; so push on with all speed to Caltagirone, and then to Valguarnera-Enna-Leonforte. Drive the Canadians on hard.25

Acting on this injunction General Leese ordered the 1st Canadian Division to "continue the advance vigorously directed on Enna."26 In a letter sent to General Simonds earlier in the day the Corps Commander had suggested the pursuit tactics that the situation invited.
If opportunity occurs push a mobile mechanized force with tanks quickly through towards Enna. . . . All our experience in this island has been that if you are held up, put in a well supported attack in strength.27

Simonds now ordered the 2nd Brigade into the lead, and placed under its command the 12th Canadian Tank Regiment, the Royal Devon Yeomanry and the 3rd Field Regiment R.C.A. The situation with regard to transport had improved, and the divisional "Q" staff was able to round up enough 3-ton lorries to lift the whole brigade tactically. While this mobile force pressed on to secure its objectives in the Enna area, the 1st and 3rd Brigades were to be ready to follow at short notice and secure the communications in the respective areas of Valguarnera and Leonforte.28

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Piazza Armerina, 16 July

Early on 16 July the 2nd Brigade Group pushed up Highway No. 124 from Caltagirone, the Edmontons with one squadron of the Three Rivers tanks forming the vanguard. They passed through the village of San Michele di Ganzeria without opposition, and turned north along the Gela-Enna highway (No. 117). By noon they were three miles south of Piazza Armerina, another typical "rural town" of 22,000 population. Its altitude of 2366 feet exceeded that of any Sicilian community yet encountered by the Canadians. At a sharp bend where the road swept down from a long level ridge to skirt a steep, narrow gully, the leading troops ran into fire from machine-guns, mortars and artillery. The enemy was well concealed on the heights commanding the southern approach to the town. The two leading Edmonton companies rapidly worked their way forward and seized high ground on either side of the road; but these positions, and indeed the whole of the road up to Piazza Armerina, came under heavy cross-fire from enemy mortars on two prominent hills about a mile to the north and north-east. Lt.-Col. Jefferson, with only three companies at his disposal ("D" Company was still in Ragusa), directed "A" and "B" Companies respectively against these heights, holding "C" in reserve to reinforce success. Advancing under the heavy hostile fire "A" Company secured its objective, and was quickly joined by "C" Company. It was essentially an infantry action, for the Three Rivers tanks were unable to raise their guns sufficiently to engage the Germans' lofty positions. The only supporting fire came from the battalion's 3-inch mortars until, later in the day, enemy targets were engaged by the self-propelled guns of the Royal Devon Yeomanry and the 5.5s of the 7th Medium Regiment.* The attack on the right proved considerably more difficult. "B" Company "took a terrific battering" as it fought its way uphill, and much of the afternoon suffered from being out of communication with the rest of the battalion. Enemy fire cut off part of the Company, pinning them down in an orchard, but eventually one platoon managed to reach the summit and drive the Germans off. The two hills so gamely captured by the Edmontons gave them vantage points overlooking Piazza Armerina; but the enemy (later identified as the 2nd Battalion, 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division30) retained for a time his grip on the town. He continued to shell the Canadian positions with his 75s, until these were silenced by the fire of the British "mediums". During the night the Germans withdrew, and by 6:00 next morning the 2nd Brigade was in firm possession of the town. In their first action the Edmontons had acquitted
* The 7th Medium Regiment R.A. was under General Simonds' command from 15 July until 8 August. Previously the Canadians had been supported by a battery of the 70th Medium Regiment R.A.29

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themselves well, but they had suffered 27 casualties. Piazza Armerina, formerly the home of the headquarters of the Italian 16th Corps, yielded the Canadians large stocks of signal equipment and a considerable quantity of petrol; while civilian refugees hurrying home as the Germans moved out lost no time in enriching their household possessions with abandoned furniture and equipment from the deserted barrack buildings.31 The enemy's obstructive tactics along Highway No. 117 were paying him good dividends. Piazza Armerina had held up the Canadian Division for twenty-four hours; not until. noon on the 17th did the 3rd Brigade, going into the lead for the first time in the campaign, resume the advance towards Enna. Yet it was important that the Eighth Army's left wing should make rapid progress, for on the right determined German resistance was repelling all attempts by the 13th Corps to extend its bridgehead over the Simeto River. On 16 July General Alexander had issued a second directive, which laid down three axes of advance for the Eighth Army into the Messina peninsula-"northwards from Catania; from Leonforte to Adrano to sever communications this side of Etna; and via NicosiaTroinaRandazzo to sweep round the northern slopes of Etna." The Army Group Commander hoped that the "Eighth Army would be able to mount a rapid attack on this formidable position before the Germans could assume a good position of defence," and he envisaged the Canadian Division, as General Montgomery's left flank formation, driving in behind Mount Etna from the west. The Seventh Army's task was "to protect the rear of this attack by seizing the central rectangle of roads around Enna and cutting the east-west road at Petralia."32 Enna itself thus came into the American sector of operations; but the Eighth Army was to retain unrestricted use of the road from Piazza Armerina to Leonforte and Nicosia which passed just east of that hub town. In the west General Patton was directed to capture Agrigento and Porto Empedocle, if this could be done "without involving heavy casualties."33 It will be observed that the directive based future operations for the Eighth Army upon the capture of Catania. Enemy resistance before the port, however, showed little sign of diminishing; a costly attack by the 50th Division on the night of 17-18 July to enlarge the Simeto bridgehead achieved little.34 This stalemate in the east heightened the importance of the Eighth Army's other axes of advance, and caused a modification of Montgomery's plans for the proposed northern sweep by the 30th Corps on the left flank. In a signal to Alexander on the 17th he reported that the 51st Highland Division was moving north from Scordia to "capture Paterno* to-morrow with luck", and declared his intention of sending the Canadians--whom he expected to reach Enna that night-eastward from Leonforte to
* See p. 697.

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Adrano, rather than along the wider arc through Nicosia and Troina. "I will then operate with 30 Corps round the west and north of Etna and will cut off any enemy who stay east of Etna and about Catania." He further suggested that the Americans after capturing Petralia should drive to the coast road and "make faces eastwards" along the coast, thereby completing the bisection of the island and hemming the enemy within the Messina peninsula.35 For the Canadian Division this programme in the main was to remain unchanged. The distance from Piazza Armerina to Enna by road is only 22 miles, but the 3rd Brigade's hopes of reaching its goal on 17 July soon faded. Eight miles north of Piazza Armerina a side road to Valguarnera branched to the right from Highway No. 117. This was an important junction to the Germans. By holding it they could halt the Canadians' further progress in two directions: north-westward to Enna, and north-eastward to Valguarnera, which from its commanding height overlooked the Dittaino valley and the western Catania plain. As so frequently in Sicily, topography was in the enemy's favour. Immediately before it reached the fork, Highway No. 117 climbed through a narrow gap in a long ridge which broke from the backbone of the Erei Mountains to bend around to the north-east and cover Valguarnera from the south and east sides. In the hills on either side of this passwhich was called the Portello Grottacalda--the 2nd Battalion, 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (the unit which the 2nd Brigade had fought at Piazza Armerina), strengthened, it seems probable, by the 1st Battalion of the same regiment withdrawing from the American front, had taken up a stand awaiting the Canadian Division. Their best vantage point was Monte della Forma, a square-topped hill, 2700 feet high, on the west side of the pass; and it subsequently transpired that they had sited several mortars on its reverse, or northern, slope. In the action that followed the enemy demonstrated that two determined battalions by exploiting naturally strong positions could effectively hold up two brigades for more than twenty-four hours. A blown bridge brought the 3rd Brigade to its first halt four miles north of Piazza Armerina. While sappers of the 4th Field Company R.C.E. constructed a diversion, reconnaissance reported the presence of the enemy at the road junction ahead. This was confirmed when the advance was resumed at 4:30, as The Carleton and York Regiment at the head of the column came under mortar and machine-gun fire. The infantry dismounted, and from hull-down positions on the crest of a hill about one and a half miles south of Monte della Forma tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment successfully engaged the enemy outposts, forcing a withdrawal to the main line of defence. The Carletons' C.O., Lt.-Col. F. D. Tweedie, then moved his battalion up to within a mile of the Grottacalda pass.36

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The Fighting at Grottacalda and Valguarnera, 17-18 July

The situation seemed to require "a well supported attack in strength". Calling a conference of his brigade commanders, General Simonds issued orders committing to battle two of his infantry brigades supported by tanks and all the divisional artillery. The 3rd Brigade was to press on along the axis of the Enna highway; the 1st Brigade, which had been waiting at Piazza Armerina, was to strike north-eastward across country to Valguarnera. His remaining formation was to be ready to follow the 3rd Brigade at two hours' notices.37 At eight that evening Brigadier Penhale sent the Royal 22e Regiment, commanded by Lt.-Col. J. P. E. Bernatchez, forward through the Carleton and Yorks in troop-carrying vehicles. They were soon halted, this time by a large mine crater which the methodical enemy rearguard had blown in a stretch of the road that could not be by-passed. By the time that unit pioneers had repaired this breach night had fallen, and the advance continued in moonlight. A few hundred yards short of the pass, as the narrow road began its ascent around the base of Monte della Forma, the column was stopped by a heavy volley of machine-gun fire from the hills ahead. Quickly dismounting, the Royal 22e retaliated with their Bren guns, and in the skirmish that followed routed with heavy casualties a party of Germans seeking to cut off the battalion from the rest of the column. Then they dug in, and there was no further movement for the Canadians that night.38 After an early morning reconnaissance on the 18th Brigadier Penhale decided to attack with the Carleton and Yorks on the right, while the Vingt-deuxieme kept contact with the enemy in the centre. This plan was extended when the G.O.C. directed that The West Nova Scotia Regiment, which was now immediately to the rear of the Royal 22e, should make a wide left flanking attack to sever Highway No. 117 at a point some two miles west of the road junction and so cut off the enemy's retreat towards Enna. The main fire plan provided for concentrations of 68 rounds per gun by four artillery regiments.* These were fired early in the afternoon on four selected targets about the pass, with results extremely encouraging to the attacking infantry.39 About mid-morning Lt.-Col. M. P. Bogert withdrew his West Novas a mile or so down the highway and then turned west across country, screened from the enemy's view by the hill from which the Canadian tanks had fired on the previous evening. It was heavy going under the blazing sun, and to
* The 1st Field Regiment R.C.H.A., the 2nd and 3rd Field Regiments R.C.A. and the 7th Medium Regiment R.A. The 142nd Field Regiment (S.P.) R.A. was supporting the 1st Brigade. Two troops of the 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft Battery (2nd L.A.A. Regt.) R.C.A. in the infantry column carried out effective anti-personnel firing with their 40-millimetre Bofors guns during the day.

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make matters worse a deep ravine halted the battalion's carriers, and so forced the perspiring troops to carry the heavy 3-inch mortars. While the artillery pounded the face of Monte della Forma and Lt.-Col. Tweedie's troops launched their attack on the right, the West Novas, turning northward, forced their way through the tall thickets of cane that marked the course of the dry river bed. By four in the afternoon they had occupied a hill dominating the Enna highway west of the pass. They met little enemy resistance, for at Grottacalda the Carleton attack had already driven the Germans from their posts northeast of the road forks,* and a parallel withdrawal from Monte della Forma had brought to an end the fourteenhour frontal fight of the Royal 22e under continuous mortaring. The junction was securely in Canadian hands by five o'clock.41 On the Division's right flank the 1st Brigade had undergone a hard day's fighting. Called forward during the evening of 17th July, the Hastings and Prince Edwards left the highway some two miles north of Piazza Armerina, and struck off in a north-easterly direction across the rugged countryside. Deep ravines and dried-up watercourses hindered their progress, soon separating them from their mortars and carriers. Their only roads were the goat paths that twisted around the steep hillsides. The tank carrying the artillery F.O.O. and his wireless set was unable to negotiate the difficult terrain, and the attacking companies were without fire support throughout the following day.42 Dawn found Battalion Headquarters and "B" and "D" Companies on the heights less than a mile south of Valguarnera, looking over the ravine through which the road winds steeply up into the town; the remaining companies had lost contact during the night. On their right front a circular knoll, terraced with olive trees, rose 300 feet above the floor of the valley, dominating the road which bent around its northern base, although itself overlooked by the superior height of the town and the surrounding hills. From a nearby hill a solitary enemy machine-gun post checked further movement by the Hastings. On his own initiative a platoon sergeant of "D" Company, Sergeant W.J.R. McKnight (who was later awarded the D.C.M. for his bravery), accompanied by another non-commissioned officer, crawled across the intervening valley and assaulted the position with grenade, rifle and bayonet, killing its ten defenders.43 Lt.-Col. Sutcliffe now directed the building of a roadblock, from behind which one company successfully engaged a number of enemy vehicles coming up the winding route from Grottacalda. The prize hit was that scored by a PIAT bomb on an ammunition truck which was carrying several enemy troops. It killed
* The success of the Carleton and York attack owed much to the gallantry and initiative of Private M. Brisson, surviving member of a party of three advancing on an enemy machine-gun post. He carried on .the assault alone and took the position, shooting two of the occupants and killing the third with his rifle-butt. This action brought him the battalion's first D.C.M.40

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all the occupants and immobilized an 88-millimetre gun which the vehicle had in tow. This may well have been the initial Canadian success for the new infantry anti-tank weapon. An attempt by the battalion commander to lead a platoon up into the town failed, and about noon a German detachment of lorried infantry attacked the road-block and forced the Canadian companies to withdraw into the encircling hills.44 Meanwhile, scarcely a mile to the east, but completely out of touch with the rest of the battalion, "A" and "C" Companies were engaged in a separate action of their own. Early that morning, guided by an unwilling farmer whom the battalion Intelligence Officer pressed into service, they had reached the knoll commanding the approaches to the town, and had dug in within 600 yards of the enemy's forward guns. From this point of vantage they ambushed at close range a column of mechanized infantry on the road, inflicting heavy losses with their intense fire; the commander of "A" Company is reported himself to have accounted for eighteen Germans in a truck, catching them point blank with a Bren gun fired from the hip. Enemy reinforcements, believed to be the previously uncommitted balance of a battalion, now stormed the exposed Canadian position. In the first sharp engagement the Hastings repulsed the attackers, but the threat of artillery action compelled a decision to fall back across the road to the main line of hilts. The retirement was made with one company covering the other's withdrawal, and during the evening the scattered battalion reorganized at its starting point on the highway. In the day's fighting it had lost 20 other ranks killed or wounded and seven taken prisoner; it was later confirmed that the Hastings had killed between 80 and 90 Germans, and wounded as many more.45 On the 1st Brigade's left the attempt of The Royal Canadian Regiment to capture Valguarnera also failed, and from the same series of causes arising from the uncompromising terrain-the immobilization of the unit carriers with their 3-inch mortars and wireless sets, the consequent breakdown of communications with the rest of the brigade, and the resultant loss of artillery support and absence of co-ordination with the flanking infantry battalion. It was 5:30 on the morning of the 18th before the R.C.R. left Highway No. 117 a mile south-east of the Portello Grottacalda to strike across country towards Valguarnera; and when they reached the ridge of hills bordering the road into the town, enemy sniping and mortar and machine-gun fire pinned them to ground until noon. Shortly thereafter they pushed forward another mile, to gain positions directly south of Valguarnera on what must have earlier been the immediate left flank of the Hastings' "A" and "C" Companies; indeed, a number of stragglers of that battalion, who had been pinned down by enemy fire when the main body withdrew, were

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rescued from their predicament by a party led by the R.C.R.'s Second-inCommand, Major J.H.W.T. Pope.46 Lt.-Col. Crowe then directed a two-company attack against the enemy on the knoll ahead. As his men advanced well deployed down the open hillside in the face of brisk fire from mortar and machine-guns, the battalion comander himself walked at their head, "eager to keep the action rolling." There was some spirited fighting before the enemy, who had apparently relied on advantage of position to compensate for his inferiority of numbers, withdrew, leaving the Canadians in positions from which they could overlook the entrance to Valguarnera half a mile to the north. Three German tanks guarding these approaches now opened fire, and Major Pope went forward with six men to engage them. By extreme misfortune three bombs fired from a PIAT failed to explode.* A hail of bullets from the tanks' machine-guns forced the patrol to retire; Major Pope was killed. Shortly afterwards the tanks withdrew into Valguarnera, and a long mechanized column was observed leaving the town by its northern exits. Expecting a counter-attack, however, Lt.-Col. Crowe ordered his men to dig in. At two o'clock he addressed a situation report to the Brigade Commander, explaining his intention of patrolling into the town, but not "before dark as I have no support weapons or armour of any kind." This message was carried back to Battalion Headquarters by the regimental padre alone and on foot, and under rifle fire much of the way. Before last light a patrol from the R.C.R.'s Support Company reached the rifle companies with rations.48 Meanwhile Brigadier Graham had ordered forward his reserve battalion, the 48th Highlanders, to occupy a ridge two miles south of Valguarnera. In taking this objective the leading company claimed 35 Germans killed and a score of prisoners. One Highlander, Cpl. W.F. Kay, won the D.C.M. for his part in the action; his section of five men captured a machine-gun position manned by seventeen Germans, he himself personally accounting for eight of the enemy. After clearing out nests of snipers who were still operating in the rear of the R.C.R. and the Hastings, the battalion marched around to the right, to enter Valguarnera in the dead of night and find it clear of enemy.49 The fighting on that Sunday had been the most extensive in which the Division had yet participated; there were 145 Canadian casualties, 40 of them fatal. Against this must be set the figures of 250 German and 30 Italian prisoners captured, and claims of from 180 to 240 Germans killed
* Reports of other instances of the failure of the PIAT bomb to detonate unless striking the target squarely were fairly common. The adoption, early in 1944, of a "graze" fuse (which was actuated by the deceleration produced when the bomb struck an object, even obliquely) increased the proportion of detonations, thereby considerably improving the weapon's performance against tanks.47

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or wounded.50 As we have shown, the actual gains of ground during the day were relatively small, so effectively had the enemy, although heavily outnumbered, capitalized on the advantages of his naturally strong positions. On the other hand the Canadians had acquired some much-needed battle experience, which was to serve them well in subsequent encounters with the Germans. Two days later Kesselring's daily report to Berlin carried a measure of unconscious tribute to the 1st Brigade: "Near Valguarnera troops trained for fighting in the mountains have been mentioned. They are called `Mountain Boys' and probably belong to the 1st Canadian Division."51

The By-Passing of Enna

During the afternoon of 18 July, while the battle among the hills was still in progress, General Simonds held an orders group and directed his 2nd Brigade to continue the advance northward towards Leonforte. It was 4:30 next morning when the Seaforth Highlanders passed through Valguarnera, followed by the Patricias. The enemy's peculiarly effective knack of denying road passage to vehicles by mine crater and demolished bridge compelled both battalions to go on foot, and hence without supporting arms. On the other hand the retreating Panzer Grenadiers took full advantage of having their artillery with them, and from a hill which overlooked an important intersection of roads, railway and river five miles north of Valguarnera their rearguard halted Canadian progress with shelling, mortaring and machine-gun fire. Not until the afternoon, when the good work of the Canadian sappers in repairing demolitions enabled the guns to be brought forward, and the enemy felt the weight of a number of divisional concentrations on his positions, did he. withdraw in the face of an attack by the Patricias. The end of the day found the two forward battalions holding the disputed crossroads.52 That morning, as they came out of the hills about Valguarnera into the rolling upland plains which fill the angle between the main backbone of the Erei Mountains and the spur stretching eastward to Etna, the marching troops had caught their first glimpse of the majestic snow-topped volcano, forty miles to the north-east. Over to their left, a bare half dozen miles away, the square crag of Enna, reaching 3300 feet above sea-level, dominated the western sky-line. The horizon between these two landmarks was filled with the chain of heights which marked the path of the main Palermo-Catania .road, Highway No. 121: Along this winding route through the rugged hills the Canadian Division was to do battle during seventeen days of bitter fighting, wresting one by one from the enemy the towns and villages which crowned the highest summits (see Map 5).

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One of these mountain strongholds was clearly visible to the 2nd Brigade as they headed north along the road from Valguarnera--the lofty peak of Assoro projecting like a sharp tooth in the jagged sky-line eight miles ahead. This height formed a southern projection to the main ridge, which here flattened out as a high plateau extending from Leonforte, two miles north-west of Assoro, to Agira, six miles to the north-east. At Regalbuto, nine miles east of Agira's 2700-foot cone, Highway No. 121, which had thus far climbed tortuously into every town and village along the main ridge, temporarily forsook the hills, dropping down by relatively easy gradients to cross the valley of the Simeto west of Adrano. It thus left Centuripe*--most easterly of this group of communities in the sky--to be reached by a very indifferent trail which clambered by steep zig-zags up to the 2400-foot peak on which the town was sited. The rugged country which the Canadians were now entering; is pierced by a number of tributaries of the River Simeto, which empties into the. sea south of Catania, draining the greater part of the eastern Sicilian plain., Two of these, rising in the mountains north of Enna, have courses that parallel on either side the Leonforte-Centuripe hill barrier-the Salso to the north, and the Dittaino to the south. The main branch of the Simeto itself has its source in the high watershed north-west of Etna, and flows almost due south along the volcano's western flank, meeting the Salso midway between Centuripe and Adrano before breaking through a gap in the hills into the Catania plain. One more river that the 1st Division was to meet, the Troina, which shares its name with a lofty town lying near, its point of origin between the headwaters of the Salso and the Simeto, has carved a rocky south-easterly course through the mountains to join the former stream five miles to the west of its junction with the parent river. More than a year later in Nor-them Italy Canadians were to know the hardships of campaigning across raging torrents swollen by the autumn rains; but here in the drought of summer these Sicilian streams had dwindled to mere trickles connecting the shallow pools which were scattered along their wide, boulder-strewn beds. These dried courses were no obstacle to infantry on foot; but the passage of tracked or wheeled vehicles presented a challenge that the Engineers were quick to take up. Although the valleys, which average a mile or more in width, form broad corridors through the wild terrain, they could not be used as avenues of advance for the Canadians while the Germans still held the commanding heights above them. At a conference on the afternoon of 19 July, General Simonds outlined his plans for the 1st Division's future operations. He had decided to advance that night on a two-brigade front, with the 2nd Brigade proceeding towards its objective of Leonforte, and the 1st branching out to the right to take
* See p. 697.

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Assoro, and thence pushing northward to cut the highway east of Leonforte. While the 3rd Canadian Brigade temporarily remained in reserve, the 231st (Malta) Brigade was to come under the G.O.C.'s command on the Division's right flank. Since 17 July the Malta Brigade had been moving forward in an independent role between the Canadians and the 51st Highland Division. It had captured Raddusa, eight miles east of Valguarnera, on the 18th, and was now in position astride the Dittaino River, six miles east of the crossroads which the 2nd Canadian Brigade was holding. A continued advance along its present axis would bring it to Agira, but it was Simonds' intention that no attempt would be made to reduce this stronghold until the capture of Leonforte and Assoro should enable the Canadian Division to attack simultaneously from the west.53 The inclusion of Agira within the sector of Canadian operations and an announcement by the G.O.C. that the main divisional axis was to be eastward along Highway No. 121 confirmed the change in the earlier plans of higher command for a Canadian "left hook" around the north of Mount Etna. That same morning of the 19th, General Montgomery had reported to General Alexander that because of the strong enemy resistance near the coast he had decided not to, persist with the thrust of his 50th Division in that sector but instead to increase the pressure farther west. To this end he ordered attacks to be made at the centre of the Eighth Army's front, the 5th Division (of the 13th Corps) towards Misterbianco and the 51st Division against Paterno, two towns on Highway No. 121 between Adrano and Catania.54 In accordance with the intentions which he had expressed to the Army Group Commander on 17 July the Army's left flank would conform with this convergence upon the enemy's hold on the southern base of Etna. "It was now clear", writes Alexander, commenting on this modification of the plans set forth in his directive of 16 July, "that Eighth Army would not have the strength to encircle Etna on both sides against the stout resistance of the Germans. The Canadians were therefore ordered to advance to Leonforte and then turn east to Adrano, the centre of the three original thrusts, abandoning the proposed encirclement through Randazzo."55 The tasks given to the two Canadian brigades were not easy. To reach their mountain objectives--Leonforte at an altitude of more than 2000 feet, and Assoro nearly 1000 feet higherthe attackers had to cross the Dittaino valley many hundreds of feet below, exposed to continual fire which the Germans were able to direct with great accuracy from their observation posts along the dominating ridge between the two towns. The advance began a little before midnight of 19-20 July. By morning the Edmonton had secured a bridgehead over the dry bed of the Dittaino just east of Highway No. 121, and about five miles from Leonforte. During

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the day the Patricias occupied without opposition an isolated hill, Mount Desira Rossi, two miles behind the Edmonton crossing, and high enough to command the brigade's further advance. Five miles downstream the 48th Highlanders crossed near Dittaino Station, whence The Royal Canadian Regiment went into the lead for the 1st Brigade. Supported by "C" Squadron of the Three Rivers Regiment, they took two hills, one on either side of the Dittaino, but not before nine Canadian tanks had been immobilized by mines and the crews held pinned inside for five hours by the enemy's continual artillery fire. A narrow, steep-sided valley led directly north-westward to the towering height of Assoro four miles away, but was under observation for its entire length from the enemy positions. Further advance by daylight being impossible, Brigadier Graham gave orders for the Hastings and Prince Edwards to attack that night.56 The final incident in the friendly rivalry between Canadians and Americans to be the first to enter Enna may here be told. With Valguarnera in Canadian hands and the enemy's line of retreat through Leonforte threatened his position in Enna was obviously untenable; during the night of 18-19 July a terrific explosion in the town gave notice that the Germans were withdrawing. Early on the 20th the 1st United States Division had announced that it would make a reconnaissance of Enna that day and attack on the following night.57 When news of the German evacuation reached General Simonds' headquarters, where the main attention was now focussed on Leonforte and Assoro, "A" Squadron of the Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment (the 4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards) received orders (according to the General Staff war diary) "to send a patrol to take the town before the Americans reached there." The troop entrusted with the mission set out from Valguarnera in four carriers, but five miles from their goal they were stopped by a badly cratered road which prevented further use of their vehicles. One sergeant, two corporals and a trooper went forward on foot. After more than a mile's uphill plodding under the blazing Sicilian sun they commandeered a donkey and rode it in turn. Near the top of the long zig-zag climb they saw entering the town two truckloads of troops, which to their relief turned out to be Americans, not Germans. The long-suffering donkey was abandoned in favour of a lift in a jeep, and in this manner the Canadian patrol arrived in the main piazza of Enna simultaneously with the American vanguard.58

The 1st Brigade Takes Assoro, 20-22 July

Early on that same afternoon (20 July) the Hastings' C.O., Lt.-Col. Sutcliffe, went forward with his Intelligence Officer into the R.C.R. area

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north of the Dittaino River, to reconnoitre the ground over which his battalion was to make the assault on Assoro. While he was engaged in this task, a German 88-millimetre shell exploded near their shallow weapon-pit, killing Colonel Sutcliffe and mortally wounding his 1.0. Major The Lord Tweedsmuir, son of a former Governor-General of Canada, assumed command of the unit, and took his company commanders forward to complete the survey which had been so tragically interrupted.59 In the failing light the enormous silhouette of their objective stood out starkly against the northern sky, dwarfing by comparison the massive barrier which stretched on either side to Leonforte and Agira. The direct approach was by the road winding up an exposed spur on the left side of the valley; but . this route would obviously be well registered by enemy artillery, and to attack along it would be suicidal. The village itself* clung to the western (the least precipitous) slope of the Assoro mountain. Its steep, narrow streets climbed to within a few hundred feet of the summit, which was crowned by the fragmentary ruins of a castle built in the twelfth century by Roger II. The Norman king had chosen his site well, planting his stronghold in what must have seemed a well-nigh impregnable position on the edge of the eastern cliff, which towered a thousand feet above the valley. Conceiving that the Germans would regard an attack from this direction a physical impossibility, Tweedsmuir determined on a march to the right across country and an assault up the steep eastern face of the mountain. Preparations to put this bold plan into effect began `immediately. To encourage the enemy's probable belief that the Canadian attack would come from the south-west, just as night fell three Bren gun carriers of the 48th Highlanders went racing up the winding road. They got half way to the village before the Germans opened fire, whereupon they withdrew as previously ordered. At nine o'clock the divisional artillery began a four-hour programme of intermittent harassing fire on Highway No. 121 east of Leonforte, paying special attention to the junction where a side road branched off to Assoro.60 Half an hour later the Hastings moved off in single file on their daring venture. At the head of the column Tweedsmuir placed a specially formed "assault company" composed of twenty of the fittest and most active men from each of the rifle companies, armed with rifles and a few Bren guns and carrying nothing else except their ammunition. About a mile from Dittaino Station they struck north-east into the hills. Bright moonlight helped them pick their way across the wild terrain, now following a twisting goat path, now tracing the narrow course of a rocky stream bed, and now mounting steadily along a well beaten mule track. Daylight was not an hour away when the mile-long column halted on a rocky ridge east of the objective.
* The ancient Assorus, one of the principal towns founded by the Sicels about 1000 B.C.

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In the paling darkness the big mountain loomed vaster than ever, and a deep ravine that girdled its base like a natural moat looked formidable indeed to the desperately tired Hastings.61 The new C.O. now divided his battalion, sending one company and the picked assault group to scale the left shoulder of the mountain, while he led the rest in search of an approach from the north-east. A providential goat track took them down the almost sheer wall of the ravine and at the bottom they scrambled over huge boulders to the other side. Let Lord Tweedsmuir's own words describe what followed:
Then began a climb which no one who took part will ever forget. The mountain was terraced and always above was a tantalizing false crest, which unfolded to another crest when one approached it. It was forty sweating, tearing minutes before we stood on the top beside the shell of the great Norman castle and realized that we had achieved complete surprise. A German O.P.* party had fallen to the left hand group and we had control of a vantage point from which we could see for fifty miles.62

The Hastings had taken their objective without losing a man, and it was some time before the enemy recovered from his surprise. Opening fire from their superior position the Canadians forced a German withdrawal from the village and knocked out eight vehicles in a convoy which they saw approaching along the roadway beyond. One of Tweedsmuir's companies entered Assoro; but the enemy counter-attacked, and the confused fighting that followed brought no decisive results. Soon the guns from a German battery that had been firing on Leonforte swung around and began dropping shells with unpleasant accuracy into the restricted Hastings area, inflicting several casualties. It was now that good wireless communication, which was so sadly lacking at Valguarnera and later at Leonforte, proved its value. An urgent request by radio for artillery support brought the 7th Medium Regiment into action, and at 10:30 the enemy battery was reported silenced.63 For several hours thereafter the Hastings, clinging to their exposed position on the mountain top, the rocky nature of which prevented the digging of effective slit-trenches, were subjected to intermittent mortar and artillery fire. Enemy snipers still in Assoro were also a constant hazard; nevertheless, casualties were suprisingly light. The day wore on, and the Canadians, worn out from their exertions of the night before, found it difficult to keep on the alert. Their only food was the emergency chocolate ration that each man carried, and they were running short of ammunition. Late in the afternoon the enemy launched a sudden counter-attack from Assoro, advancing almost to the top of the hill. Quickly a call went through to Brigade *Headquarters, and with gratifying promptness artillery concentrations began to crash down on the near edge of the village and the tightly packed houses beyond. The enemy's
* Observation Post.

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effort was broken up; and the battalion stood to for the remainder of a long night which was interrupted only by an occasional exchange of salvoes between the German artillery and the guns of the medium regiment.64 Early morning of the 22nd brought much-needed food and ammunition. On the previous day an officer of the Hastings and the Regimental SergeantMajor had made the arduous journey to Brigade Headquarters in order to explain the situation and to guide a carrying party forward. At midnight one hundred volunteers of The Royal Canadian Regiment, stripped of their own equipment, and bearing a full day's rations and ammunition in Everest packs and bandoliers, set off across country, escorted by another R.C.R. company as precaution against enemy intervention. Led by the two intrepid messengers they reached the mountain top without detection by the enemy and returned to their unit without incident. In and about the ruins of the ancient castle the Hastings ate their first meal in thirty-six hours.65 Meanwhile vigorous efforts were being made to open the road up the valley into Assoro, and so bring to Tweedsmuir the additional strength he needed to decide the issue. An attempt by his support weapons to reach the village on the previous afternoon had failed under heavy enemy fire, and at sunset he had seen some of their carriers and trucks burning on the road far below.66 Brigadier Graham then ordered the 48th Highlanders forward. In the darkness they laboriously climbed to positions west of Assoro, the men pulling each other up the almost vertical sides of mountain terraces 30 or more feet high. At dawn they drove the enemy from the heights covering the south-western approach to the village, and opened the way for engineers of the 1st Field Company (with the enforced aid of a hundred prisoners of war) to fill a road crater which had barred the passage of vehicles. Throughout the morning the battalion methodically cleared the rocky high ground west of Assoro, receiving valuable support from the 75-millimetre guns of a Three Rivers squadron, whose drivers showed amazing skill in negotiating the steep and narrow winding trail. By midday of the 22nd a Highland company had joined the Hastings, and Assoro was firmly in Canadian hands.67 Some six weeks later, in preparing his "experience report" of the campaign in Sicily, the commander of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division wrote that the Allied infantrymen were "good soldier material" who exhibited "in general fair ways of fighting". He added a tribute which may well have been prompted by his recollection of the Canadian tactics in the assault on Assoro:
In fieldcraft [lndianerkrieg] superior to our own troops. Very mobile at night, surprise break-ins, clever infiltrations at night with small groups between our strongpoints.68

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The seizure of the Assoro pinnacle by The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment was as significant to the Canadian Division's advance as it was dramatic, for it upset the whole German plan of defence on that front, and thus hastened the fall of Leonforte. Assoro and Leonforte were two phases of the same battle; for the enemy had to hold the whole ridge, or withdraw from it altogether. We have seen how his grasp on the eastern end was pried loose by the 1st Brigade; let us turn now to the scene on the Canadian left, and follow the fortunes of the 2nd Brigade in its assault on the more westerly town.

The Capture of Leonforte by the 2nd Brigade, 21-22 July

From its bridge over the Dittaino River, Highway No. 121 climbed steadily in a series of sweeping curves to the Leonforte escarpment, with only one break in the otherwise continuous ascent. Two miles from the town the road swung abruptly eastward, dropping downhill to cross a deep ravine; thence it turned sharply to the north-west in a long gradient that led up into Leonforte's southern outskirts. The town, with a population of 20,000, was both larger and more modern than the neighbouring Assoro. It was spread over the western shoulder of the mountain ridge, and its long central thoroughfare reached almost to the summit. Early on the morning of 21 July, the Seaforth Highlanders, now leading the 2nd Brigade's advance, reached the road bend in front of Leonforte and found that the bridge over the ravine had been demolished and that its approaches were being swept with fire from the town and the surrounding heights. In spite of the enemy's advantageous position, the Seaforth prepared to launch a daylight attack that afternoon. By ill-fortune, however, part of the preliminary artillery concentration fell upon the battalion's headquarters, causing thirty casualties and not a little disorganization. Brigadier Vokes postponed action, and ordered the Edmontons to take over from the Seaforth. Two rifle companies would cross the ravine and force an entry into the town while sappers bridged the road gap to permit the passage of supporting arms.69 Shortly before nine that evening another bombardment, reported to have been the heaviest that the divisional artillery had yet fired, provided the overture for the infantry assault.70 Mortars and machine-guns of the Saskatoon Light Infantry rang up the curtain, and as "A" and "D" Companies of The Edmonton Regiment moved off down the road they received covering fire from the Seaforth. At first the attack went well. The bombardment had sent the enemy to ground, and the assault companies clambered down into the steep ravine,

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scaled the far side and entered the town with little difficulty. The balance of the battalion followed, Lt.-Col. Jefferson's headquarters moving with "C" Company. Meanwhile a platoon of the 3rd Field Company R.C.E. went to work at the blown bridge. Before long the enemy launched a powerful counter-attack, supported by tanks and by machine-gun fire from the rooftops. A bitter struggle developed in the darkened streets. The failure of wireless communication with Brigade Headquarters prevented the hard-pressed battalion from calling for anti-tank guns to deal with the enemy armour, even had it been possible for these weapons to cross the intervening ravine.71 The action deteriorated into house-to-house combat as the unit became split up; in the fog of battle small groups of platoon or section strength fought on independently, each believing itself to be the sole survivor of the larger body. "B" Company, which had followed "D" Company's assault, skirted the western edge of the town and seized some high ground to the north; then, unable to find the rest of the battalion, they decided to fight their way back to their starting point. "A" Company forced a way out through the eastern outskirts. In the centre of the town the Edmonton C.O., with his battalion headquarters strengthened by two and a half platoons from "C" Company and some stragglers from "D", took up a firm position in a number of buildings from which the enemy had been cleared. There the small band of about 100 officers and men held until morning.72 Attempts by unit signals personnel to open wireless communication with Brigade Headquarters from high rooftops failed, but during the night Jefferson entrusted to the hand of an Italian boy a written appeal for help addressed to "any British or Canadian officer." The message reached Brigadier Vokes, creating in him a "great ray of hope" at a time when he thought he had lost "a very able battalion commander and most of his battalion."73 While the Edmontons were battling through the night in Leonforte, outside the town the Engineers had been working vigorously but methodically to bridge the 50foot gap. They were under constant mortar and machinegun fire which they later nonchalantly described as being "slightly high".74 While the job was still in progress, their company commander, Major K.J. Southern, moved up the road with a few of the Edmontons to the outskirts of Leonforte, where they were confronted by a machinegun covering the only approach to the town, and close beside it two enemy tanks and a small force of infantry. Here was a potential threat to the sappers toiling in the ravine below that might well have halted their efforts and spelled disaster for the isolated Edmontons awaiting reinforcement in the town. Catching the Germans by surprise, Major Southern's little party discharged their small arms and made such a display of force that the more formidable enemy group was deterred from advancing. Shortly afterwards the commander of the 90th Canadian Anti-Tank Battery, Major G.A.

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Welsh, who had come forward with the engineer party, recrossed the ravine under heavy fire to bring two of his six-pounders into action. The machine-gun post and one of the tanks were destroyed, and Welsh kept up the good work* by once more approaching the town and with the help of two engineers taking twenty German prisoners.75 Shortly after two o'clock the bridge was reported open for traffic, although the crossing and the road on either side were still being swept by enemy fire. Through the remaining hours of darkness vague and conflicting scraps of intelligence concerning the fighting filtered back with Edmonton stragglers until Brigadier Vokes received the written message from Jefferson. He at once decided upon a daring plan. This was to rush a "flying column" across the bridge in broad daylight to the aid of the hard-pressed Edmontons. He detailed "C" Company of the Patricias, a troop of four tanks from the Three Rivers Regiment and a troop of the 90th Battery's anti-tank guns. He placed in command the P.P.C.L.I. company commander, Captain R. C. Coleman, whose "leadership and skill" that morning were to bring him the Military Cross.76 The bold venture was launched at nine o'clock. The Shermans, followed by the antitank troop, thundered down the road to the ravine, the infantrymen riding on the tanks and in the tractors and clinging to the guns, some even astride the barrels themselves. At breakneck speed the column swept across the bridge and raced up the long hill into Leonforte. Such was the speed of its assault that it sustained only one casualty as it passed through the enemy fire. It fell like a whirlwind upon the German posts at the entrance to the town and won their immediate surrender. The Patricias quickly became involved in house-to-house fighting, the anti-tank guns giving effective support by knocking out at close range troublesome. machine-gun and mortar positions. By ten o'clock they had reached the lost band of Edmontons in the heart of Leonforte. As the P.P.C.L.I. reinforcing companies moved in to exploit the initial success, their "C" Company battled up the mile-long main street, to seize the railway station on the northern outskirts. There was heated action in the centre of the town. Tank met tank at point-blank range, and anti-tank weapons on both sides took their toll of opposing armour in the narrow streets. The Germans knocked out a Sherman, and lost at least three of their own tanks. By the afternoon Leonforte itself was clear; but the enemy had still to be driven from two commanding heights east and west of the town. The task was assigned to two of the P.P.C.L.I. Companies, "A" to the left, and "B" to the right. By 5:30 both had gained their objectives, but only after much hard fighting and at a high cost in casualties.77
* Both Southern and Welsh received the D.S.O. for their parts in this operation. The former was killed in Italy in 1944 while commanding the R.C.E. of the 1st Division.

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Among the many deeds of bravery performed that day in and about the hard-won town (altogether twenty-one awards were made for the Leonforte engagement) none was more spectacular than that of Private S. J. Cousins, a member of "A" Company of the Patricias. During the company's assault on the height referred to above, the two leading platoons were halted by the intensity of fire coming from two enemy machine-gun posts on the objective. While they were reorganizing, Cousins, accompanied by an N.C.O., on his own initiative advanced against the German positions. One hundred and fifty yards from the crest, Cousins' companion fell under the hail of bullets which swept the slope. "Despite the fact that further progress appeared to be utter suicide to the men of his company who were watching this gallant soldier, he then, with complete disregard for his own life, rose to his feet in full view of the enemy, and carrying his Bren gun boldly charged the enemy posts."78 This resolute action so demoralized the enemy that he was able to close within less than fifty yards of their positions. Then firing from the hip he killed or wounded the German machine-gunners, silencing both posts. "A" Company took and successfully held the ridge; but unfortunately Private Cousins was killed later in the afternoon by a direct hit. He was subsequently Mentioned in Dispatches.* The three days of fighting for Assoro and Leonforte had cost the 1st Canadian Division more than 275 casualties. Most heavily hit were the units of the 2nd Brigade. The Seaforth lost 76 officers and men, including 28 killed; the Patricias lost 21 killed and 40 wounded; the Edmontons 7 killed and 17 wounded, and one taken prisoner. The price paid by the 1st Brigade for Assoro fell just short of 100 all ranks. As the two Canadian brigades drove the last of the German garrisons from Assoro and Leonforte, Allied Kittyhawks found satisfying targets in the numerous groups of vehicles withdrawing to the north and east. For the past week attacks by the Tactical Air Force on enemy road movement had been increasing in intensity and had taken a heavy toll. One of the most important centres of communication in the whole area under interdiction was Randazzo, situated at the intersection of roads which linked Axis positions on the east and north coasts with the battlefronts south and west of Mount Etna. The town and the roads and bridges in its vicinity became the object of consistent aerial effort. The 22nd saw a particularly successful attack in support of the Canadian Division. On that morning a long reinforcement column of 300 enemy vehicles and guns travelling west from Randazzo through Troina was bombed and strafed continuously by American and British squadrons based at Pachino. By evening these had flown 156 sorties; they had scored 65 "flamers" and claimed at least as many more vehicles damaged.79
* Neither the Distinguished Conduct Medal nor the Military Medal can be awarded posthumously.

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An unfortunate event marred the day's achievement, when R.A.F. pilots attacked some Canadian vehicles on the road south of Leonforte, having apparently mistaken the town for Troina, which was similarly situated with respect to roads and rivers. Three members of the divisional Defence and Employment Platoon were killed-ironically while they were delivering new ground recognition strips. Gunners of the 54th Light AntiAircraft Battery, assuming that the attack was being made by "friendly planes in hostile hands", shot down one in flames.80 "This regrettable incident", wrote the diarist of the 1st Division, "must be considered one of the fortunes of war, since it is not always entirely possible for aircraft in the forward areas not to mistake our own vehicles for those of the enemy." It was a fair observation. Direct co-operation with ground troops was the most difficult of air operations, and there were to be other instances of faulty co-ordination when our aircraft undershot the bomb line and bombed or strafed friendly troops; or ground forces, insufficiently trained in aircraft identification, fired upon Allied aeroplanes.81 The Northwest African Tactical Air Force, which was charged with providing air support for the 15th Army Group, formed part of the Northwest African Air Forces,* commanded by Major-General Carl Spaatz under the general direction of the Air Officer Commanding Mediterranean and Levant, Air Chief Marshal Tedder. The N.A.T.A.F. was established at Carthage, under the command of Air Vice-Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, and it comprised the Desert Air Force (Air Vice-Marshal Harry Broadhurst), assigned to support the operations of the Eighth Army, the Twelfth U.S. Air Support Command (with the Seventh Army) and the Tactical Bomber Force. Its total strength at the time of the invasion of Sicily was about 890 aircraft.82 The 21 medium and light bomber squadrons of the Tactical Bomber Force operated from Tunisia, Malta and, after 10 August, bases in Sicily. During the air campaign against the island, from 2 July to 17 August, they flew 5988 sorties against enemy-held towns and communications, and dropped more than 4600 tons of bombs. Fighters and fighter-bombers of the Desert Air Force and Twelfth Air Support Command began moving to Sicily immediately after D Day, and by 21 July more than 27 squadrons were using captured airfields on the island.83 Liaison between the Desert Air Force and the formations of the Eighth Army which its squadrons were supporting was furnished by No. 2/5 Army Air Support Control (a combination of the two units indicated by its designation). By means of a number of mobile wireless links ("tentacles") this organization provided communications through which headquarters of brigades and higher formations could make requests for air support direct to Army
* Other components of the N.A.A.F. were the Northwest African Strategic Air Force, the Northwest African Coastal Air Force, the Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing and the Northwest African Troop Carrier and Training Commands.

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Headquarters for transmission to the R.A.F., and keep the air arm fully informed on the battle situation and the positions of our forward troops. The Army Air Support Control was also responsible for "broadcasting" to ground and air formations the results of air reconnaissance carried out by the Desert Air Force's Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron or by fighter-bomber squadrons on "armed reconnaissance" in search of their own targets. By this means the information gained about the enemy's movements or the "score" obtained in attacks by our aircraft would normally become known to the forward troops within an hour of the sortie's landing.84 Such a message reaching General Simonds' headquarters on the afternoon of the 22nd brought encouraging news of successful attacks on enemy traffic on the roads in front of the Canadians:
Fighters 1420 hrs bombed and strafed 50 MET [enemy mechanical transport] Troina-Nicosia. 9 flamers including 1 tank and some damaged.85

Kesselring's early morning report to Berlin on 23 July laconically admitted, "Leonforte fell into the hands of the enemy."86 This unadorned statement failed to disclose that a key position in the German line of defence had been lost. A subsequent message from the C.-in-C. South, however, amplified the earlier news: "After extremely hard and fluctuating fighting and many casualties, Leonforte and Assoro were lost in the afternoon in renewed attacks by the enemy."87 To Canadian Intelligence it was clear that the enemy's relinquishment of the two hill towns was not of the same pattern as his withdrawals from Grammichele, or Piazza Armerina or Valguarnera. This was no smallscale rearguard delaying action. He had fought strenuously with all available resources to maintain his hold on the vital LeonforteAssoro ridge, for the first time employing all three battalions of the 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment as one tactical formation. It was learned from prisoners that when Assoro fell, the companies (probably of the 3rd Battalion) fighting there were hurried across to join the other two battalions in the defence of Leonforte; at first light on the 22nd the garrison in the western town was reported to have been reinforced by five tanks and about 75 infantrymen.88 A divisional intelligence summary commented on the significance of the changed enemy tactics.
This resolute defence is something new. Hitherto the German rearguard has pulled stakes cleanly and retired some 8 or 10 miles to a new position. The fact that they are not voluntarily retiring from their latest strongpoint but are fighting for every yard of ground indicates that we are nearing something like a serious defence zone. Beyond doubt they would have held Leonforte had they not been driven out of it.89

During their slow and difficult progress across the mountains during the next two weeks the Canadians were to become bitterly familiar with "this resolute defence" by German panzer grenadiers and paratroopers.

CHAPTER V

THE BEGINNING OF THE EASTWARD DRIVE, 23-31 JULY 1943

The Conquest of Western Sicily
HE five days of bitter fighting during which the Canadians had dislodged the enemy from the Valguarnera heights and then forced him out of his Assoro and Leonforte strongholds had seen little progress elsewhere on the Eighth Army's front. Between 18 and 21 July the 13th Corps had fought two major actions in a fruitless attempt to break through to Misterbianco, on the high ground west of Catania; while the 51st (Highland) Division (of the 30th Corps), trying to reach Paterno, had been halted after taking Sferro village and Gerbini in two bitterly contested engagements. Then the Hermann Grings, determined at all costs to deny Allied use of the main Gerbini airfield, had counterattacked and driven the 51st back to the line of the Dittaino River.1 It was apparent to Army Headquarters that the bulk of the German forces had now concentrated in the north-east comer of the island, specifically in the Catania plain and the hills that bounded it to the north, and that any further attack by the 13th Corps and the 51st Division would inevitably lead to high casualties.2 Western Sicily, however, presented a very different picture. At the end of the first week of the campaign there remained here two intact Italian divisions-the 202nd and 208th Coastal Divisions-and elements of the 26th Assietta and 28th Aosta Divisions which were covering the general withdrawal to the east. In order to make the Allied left flank secure, these had to be liquidated; moreover the excellent port of Palermo was urgently needed as a supply base for the Seventh Army. The defensive role to which his troops had been relegated on 16 July (see above, p. 94) while the Eighth Army carried the main offensive irked General Patton. "To have adhered to this order", he wrote later, "would have been disloyal to the American Army." He flew to Algiers on the 17th and presented General Alexander with a

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draft plan3 for an enveloping attack on Palermo.* Next day the Army Group Commander issued orders for the Seventh Army to cut the coast road north of Petralia and then from a firm base along the line Campofelice-Agrigento to "advance westwards to mop up the western half of Sicily."5 "The rapid and wide-sweeping manoeuvres envisaged in this directive were very welcome to General Patton", writes Lord Alexander, "and he immediately set on foot the measures necessary to carry them out with that dash and drive which were characteristic of his conduct of operations."6 While the 2nd U.S. Corps, commanded by Lieut.-General Omar N. Bradley, drove northward to form the firm base and split the island in two, Patton sent Major-General Geoffrey Keyes' Provisional Corps (which had been created on 15 July from the 3rd Infantry, 82nd Airborne and 2nd Armoured Divisions) racing north-westward towards Palermo.7 By 20 July the 2nd Corps had taken Enna, and the Provisional Corps was at Sciacca, the port on the south coast which, it will be recalled, had been chosen for an American D Day landing in the original Casablanca Outline Plan for Operation "Husky". That evening, encouraged by the rapid American progress, General Alexander directed Patton "to turn eastwards on reaching the north coast and develop a threat along the coast road" and the parallel inland road (Highway No. 120), which runs south of the mountain barrier through Petralia, Nicosia and Troina to Randazzo.8 The directive concluded with a forecast of the pattern for the final stages of the campaign. "Future operation is to make Palermo the main axis of supply for 7th Army and to develop a combined offensive against the Germans by bringing American forces into line with 8th Army with a view to breaking through to Messina."9 The terms of this order had been largely anticipated in the discussions of 17 July, and General Patton was able to maintain the momentum of his advance without slackening. Late on 22 July his Provisional Corps swept into Palermo, and on the 23rd the 2nd Corps took Petralia and reached the coast midway between Termini Imerese and Campofelice.10 That same day General Keyes occupied the seaports of Trapani, Marsala and Castellammare; and early on the 25th Kesselring admitted to Berlin, "The occupation of Western Sicily by the enemy can now be considered as completed."11 There remained only the elimination of a few isolated pockets of resistance and the disarming of the many disorganized Italian units. The capture of 11,540 prisoners by the Americans that day was their biggest bag of the campaign
* The Seventh Army Report of Operations contains a marked map of Sicily illustrating a proposed change in the Army Group Directive of 16 July. Having indicated the Eighth Army's three main axes of advance into the Messina peninsula (above, p. 94), the plan provided that "the 7th Army will drive rapidly to the northwest and north, capture Palermo, and split the enemy's forces." This plan, the Report states, "was agreed to 17 July 1943 at a conference between CG 15th Army Group and CG 7th Army accompanied by Brig.-General Wedemeyer, U.S.A."4 See p. 697.

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and brought to more than 50,000 the total taken by the Seventh Army since D Day. Patton now transferred the bulk of his artillery to General Bradley's 2nd Corps, which without loss of time had turned eastward for its drive into the Messina peninsula.12

Reinforcing the German Garrison

Up to the time of the capture of Enna, while the Allied field of operations was still restricted to the southern half of Sicily, the enemy's main concern, as we have seen, was to establish and maintain a continuous defensive line running westward across the island from Catania. It was apparent, however (no less to the German than to the Allied Command), that a collapse of Italian resistance in the west would leave this line with an exposed right flank and provide the Allies with an open avenue of approach into the Messina peninsula. To see how the enemy met this threat to his rear it is necessary to turn back several days and survey the changes that had taken place in German troop dispositions in Sicily. It will be recalled that by 14 July the Hermann Gring Division was preparing to concentrate its forces in the Catania plain, while on the German right, west of the central portion of the line (which was held by elements of the Italian 4th Livorno Division), the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division had assumed responsibility for the Caltanissetta-Enna region. As Italian resistance dwindled, it became clear to Kesselring that the defence of the island could not be successfully sustained by two German divisions in the face of two well-equipped Allied armies. It was moreover obviously unsatisfactory that the German forces in Sicily should remain under the tactical control of General Guzzoni's Sixth Army Headquarters, tenuous though that control might be. Accordingly on or about 14 July the Headquarters of the 14th Panzer Corps, which had been carrying on the tasks begun by the Einsatzstab, was ordered to cross the Messina Strait and assume command of all German formations on the island. The Commander of the Corps (which had been reconstituted after destruction at Stalingrad) was General of Panzer Troops Hans Hube, a one-armed veteran of the First World War, who had distinguished himself by his brilliant leadership on the Russian front in 1941 and 1942. General Hube and his staff moved to Sicily on 16 and 17 July, and established tactical headquarters on the northern slope of Mount Etna, east of Randazzo.13 His task, as set forth in verbal orders brought to him by von Bonin, his new Chief of Staff, from General Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, was "to fight a delaying action and gain further time for stabilizing the situation on the mainland".14 Officially the German Corps Headquarters was under command of H.Q. Italian Sixth Army,

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but in actual practice the relationship was reversed, and in the remaining weeks of the campaign orders were channelled directly from the Commanderin-Chief South to the 14th Panzer Corps, and carried out without question by General Guzzoni.15 It was no mere chance that brought about this assumption of control over the Italian armed forces in Sicily. The move had been carefully engineered in Berlin; and three days before Hube set foot on the island a staff officer was dispatched by air to advise Kesselring of Hitler's plan for the 14th Panzer Corps Commander to usurp the Italian command. The gist of this is revealed in a situation report of the Armed Forces Operations Staff for 13 July:
In a further written communication O.K.W.* informs O.B. South that the Fuehrer had caused a special directive to be issued for Headquarters 14 Pz Corps, which is to be kept secret from the Italians, and the [distribution] of which is to be limited to the smallest possible circle, even in German quarters. Hereafter it will be the task of Corps Headquarters, in close co-operation with the head of the German Liaison Staff attached to Italian Sixth Army, to take over the overall leadership in the bridgehead of Sicily itself, while unobtrusively excluding the Italian headquarters. The remaining Italian formations are to be divided up and placed under the command of the various German headquarters.16

The flow of reinforcements to the island proceeded apace. Already, in the first days after the Allied landings, two regiments of the 1st Parachute Division (before 1 June designated the 7th Flieger Division) had been hurriedly flown from France to reinforce the Hermann Grings in the defence of Catania (the 3rd Parachute Regiment jumped near Lentini on 12 July; the 4th Regiment descended near Acireale, about ten miles north-east of Catania).17 The balance of the Division (except for its anti-tank units, which reached Sicily on 22 July) remained on the Italian mainland. The units on the island were placed under the Hermann Gring Panzer Division, "a wasteful use" of his troops which considerably annoyed the commander of the Parachute Division, Lieut.-General Richard Heidrich.l8 The remaining major German formation to be committed in strength was the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, an advance group of which (the reinforced 1st Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment) was reported by Kesselring on 16 July to be in action north of Catania.20 At the time of the Allied landings the Division, commanded by MajorGeneral Walter Fries, had been on the Italian mainland in the Foggia-Lucera area, whence it had immediately been rushed to the Tyrrhenian coast in the vicinity of Palmi, less than twenty miles north of Messina Strait. Completion of the transfer to Sicily was held up by Hitler, who was concerned that German supplies on the island might be insufficient for another formation--"a finickiness" said Kesselring later, "which was to be
* Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces). This battalion came under command of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division near Regalbuto, and only rejoined its parent formation on 14 or, 15 August. It defended Agira against the 1st Canadian Division.19

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paid for in the subsequent battles."21 The bulk of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment crossed on 18 July. Four days later Kesselring ordered the remainder of the Division to follow (although an amendment to this order kept Fries' Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion and Tank Battalion on the mainland as coastal protection).22 In planning his course of action Hube's primary concern was that the Strait of Messina should be kept open-first for the passage of vital supplies to his forces, and subsequently as a means of evacuation from the island. Jodi's orders (as reported by Hube's Chief of Staff) were most explicit on this point: "The vital factor ... is under no circumstances to suffer the loss of our three German divisions. At the very minimum, our valuable human material must be saved."23 Accordingly the Commander of the 14th Panzer Corps took immediate measures to meet as far as possible the three-fold danger that continually menaced his life-line to the mainland: that of air attack, blockade of the Strait by an Allied fleet, or an Allied seaborne landing. He appointed as Commandant of the Strait of Messina a capable and energetic officer, Colonel Ernst Gunther Baade, whose contribution to the successful German evacuation from Sicily was later to win for him the command of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division. It was Baade's task to organize and co-ordinate all available means of protecting the narrow water passage and maintaining the flow of traffic across it, and for this purpose he was given unconditional control over all artillery and anti-aircraft units and other forces in the Messina region and the mainland area about Villa San Giovanni and Reggio Calabria.24 The only two batteries of heavy artillery on the island (17-cm. guns with a maximum range of 17 miles) were brought from the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division to the Strait to protect the ferry route against naval attack. All non-combatant installations that could be dispensed with (workshops, camps of all sorts and medical establishments) were ordered back to Calabria, where a specific area was allotted each division to serve as a supply base, and eventually as a concentration area when the final evacuation from Sicily should take place. Command of these bases was given to General Heidrich, who was, as we have seen, without other duties at this time.25 Simultaneously with these measures for the protection of his escape route, Hube took action to meet the American threat to his western flank. After the loss of the central region about Enna the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, commanded by MajorGeneral Eberhard Rodt, had lengthened its right wing with weak elements towards the northern coast (Kesselring's subsequent claim of having held "a solid defence front on the general line Cefalu*Leonforte"26 is somewhat exaggerated). On 23. July, however, as the United States 45th Infantry Division began to push eastward along the coastal road, the reinforced 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (29th Division), under
* See p. 697.

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the command of Colonel Max Ulich, was sent forward to the Cefalu area to fill the gap between General Rodt's division and the sea.27 During the next day or two Ulich's group was joined by the 71st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and by the divisional headquarters of General Fries, who assumed command of the northern sector on a front of a dozen miles. From his Mount Etna headquarters, General Hube could now contemplate with satisfaction a continuous line of resistance* reaching across the peninsula from Catania on the east coast to San Stefano on the north.28

The Eighth Army's Change of Plan

On 21 July General Montgomery finally decided that Catania could not be taken by frontal attack without incurring heavy casualties which he "could not afford". He planned instead to break through the Etna position from the west using the 30th Corps, reinforced by the 78th Infantry Division, which he had ordered the previous day to be brought across from Sousse, in Tunisia. Accordingly he issued instructions for all formations of the Eighth Army except the 1st Canadian Division to assume a defensive role along the line of the Dittaino River. The Canadian operations were "to continue without restraint directed on Adrano".29 He thus explained his intentions in a message to General Alexander on the 21st:
We are making new airfields on the South edge of Catania Plain, but they will be in range of artillery from Misterbianco area. Heat in the Plain is very great and my troops are getting very tired. During the past ten days we have driven enemy into North East comer of the island. He is determined to hold fast on his left flank about Catania and further attacks here by me will mean heavy losses. I am therefore going to hold on my right and will continue operations on my left against Adrano. Will give 78 Division to 30 Corps so that 30 Corps can have greater strength in its operations North towards Bronte. Two things are now very important-(I) American thrust eastwards along North coast towards Messina. (2) The full weight of all air power that can be made available from North Africa must be turned on the enemy army now hemmed in to the North East corner of Sicily.30

Montgomery had good grounds for his change of plan. The 13th Corps, which had been the first to strike the main line of resistance of the enemy's resistance which was subsequently strengthened by reinforcing German paratroops and the concentration of the Hermann Gring Division in the east-had been fought to a standstill. The 51st Division of the 30th Corps, although initially facing lighter opposition, had advanced across 150 miles of difficult country in the wide flanking sweep which had brought it to the
* The central portion of this line ran south-east from Nicosia to a point about three miles west of Agira, thence eastward along the highway to midway between Agira and Regalbuto, where it turned south-eastward towards Catenanuova.

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Dittaino River in line with General Dempsey's forces; any further attempt to reach Paterno would leave its left flank dangerously exposed to counter-attack from Catenanuova. A shortage of artillery ammunition had developed, to meet which temporary limitations were imposed upon the daily allotment to all guns except those supporting the Canadian Division (thirty rounds per gun for 25-pounders, and twenty for self-propelled guns). The 78th Division, which General Montgomery intended to commit in the centre of the 30th Corps front in "a blitz attack supported by all possible air power" on the thrust line Adrano-Bronte-Randazzo, was not expected to be ready to attack before 1 August. Time was also required to enable the American Seventh Army to develop its eastward thrust in the north of the island and for the Canadian Division to move up in the centre of the Allied front.31 It thus became the role of the Eighth Army's right flank to hold a firm base on which the remainder of the Army Group could pivot. Meanwhile the Allied air forces continued to exploit fully the advantages of complete air superiority over Sicily. After 21 July there was no more enemy air activity from Sicilian fields,32 which were strewn with the broken remains of Axis aircraft. By the end of the campaign Allied Intelligence, delving through the aeroplane "graveyard" which lay beside every airfield, had counted the remnants of 564 German and 546 Italian aircraft (including those captured intact). The discrepancy between these totals and enemyreported air strengths in Sicily on D Day may be partly attributed to the inclusion in the Allied figures of many craft destroyed during the pre-invasion bombing, or which had crashed long before during training flights. The exact losses in the air are impossible to establish. The Allies reported 740 hostile craft shot down, with their own losses less than half that number. Enemy statistics admitted only 320 aircraft (225 German, 95 Italian) lost on war missions from 1 July to 5 September, while claiming a total of 640 Allied brought down during the same period, either in aerial combat or by ground flak.33 Allied fighters now patrolled all sectors of the battlefield without encountering hostile aeroplanes. As the Eighth Army began regrouping for the next, and it was hoped, final offensive, the plan of air support aimed at the isolation of the main Catania positions by systematically bombing and strafing every line of reinforcement and supply. From the night of 19-20 July to the end of the month medium and light bombers and fighterbombers constantly attacked the ring of towns which encircled Mount Etna, and on the connecting roads no enemy transport was safe. During the last twelve days of July, including attacks on Catania Itself, aircraft under the control of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force flew a total of 1959 sorties against these targets.34

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The Opening of the Struggle for Agira, 23 July

The fall of Assoro and Leonforte brought no respite to the Canadian troops, who, as we have seen, were under orders to push on with all speed. On 21 July, while the 1st and 2nd Brigades were engaged in reducing these two strongly held hill towns, Brigadier Penhale's 3rd Brigade had moved eastward from Valguarnera to the road running north to Agira, up which the 231st Brigade had moved two days before. On the 22nd The Carleton and York Regiment crossed the Dittaino at Raddusa-Agira Station, relieving a battalion of the Malta Brigade, whose forward troops had been in contact with the enemy for two days in the hills south of Agira. The better to co-ordinate operations on the 30th Corps' left flank, the Malta Brigade, which was commanded by Brigadier R.E. Urquhart, had been placed under General Simonds' command on the 20th.35 On the afternoon of 22 July the Canadian G.O.C. gave his four brigades detailed instructions for the capture of Agira and the subsequent reorganization for the "move east to secure Aderno* in conformity with the Corps plan."36 The attack on Agira was to be made by a battalion of the 1st Canadian Brigade approaching by night along Highway No. 121, and supported in the actual assault, which would be launched early on the 23rd, by the full weight of the divisional artillery. Protection on the Division's left flank would be ensured by placing a second battalion across the road (Highway No. 117) which led north to Nicosia; while the 2nd Brigade was to form "a firm base" about Assoro and Leonforte. On the right it was the 231st Brigade's task to threaten Agira from the south. Supported by the 142nd Field Regiment, the brigade was to capture hill positions three miles south of the town on either side of the road from Raddusa, and exploit northward to a line, about half a mile south-east of Agira, which marked the limit of Canadian artillery targets. Simonds ordered his remaining formation, the 3rd Canadian Brigade, to remain in the vicinity of RaddusaAgira Station (which was twelve miles by road from the town of Agira itself). At his conference on 19 July he had announced his intention that after the capture of Agira the advance eastward would be led by these two latter brigades-the 231st on the left and the 3rd Canadian on the right.37 It was little more than eight miles by road from Leonforte to the medieval town of Agira, perched high upon its mountain cone overlooking the Salso and Dittaino valleys. In this sector of its course the main Palermo-Catania highway followed what was for Sicily .a comparatively direct route along the rugged plateau which separated the two river systems. The road was generally free from very steep gradients, but at least four times between Leonforte and Agira it curved over low hill barriers which crossed the plateau
* Renamed Adrano by Mussolini to perpetuate the ancient Adranum on which site it stood.

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from north to south. Four miles west of Agira, in the relatively flat ground between two of these ridges, lay the village of Nissoria, a small community of less than a thousand inhabitants. Because it was overlooked from the high ground to west and east, Nissoria itself was not expected to present a serious obstacle to the 1st Brigade's advance. On receiving instructions to attack Agira Brigadier Graham ordered the 48th Highlanders, who were in Assoro, to occupy the junction of Highways No. 117 and No. 121, a mile east of Leonforte, in order that The Royal Canadian Regiment might then pass through. Heavy artillery shelling caught the Highlanders in their forming-up area, inflicting several casualties, and their first attempt to reach the objective was driven back by machine-gun and mortar fire. When day broke the enemy withdrew over a line of hills, and the 48th established themselves just east of the crossroads. But the 2nd Brigade had not yet formed its firm base, and shortly after noon Divisional Headquarters signalled the 231st Brigade that the attack on Agira was postponed twenty-four hours. The R.C.R. deployed to the south of the road junction, and during the day the 4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards reconnoitred to the north and east. One troop encountered enemy positions on the Nicosia highway; the other reached the western limits of Nissoria, where it was turned back by enemy mortar fire.38 Next morning (the 24th) the G.O.C. held another conference and gave detailed orders for the capture of Agira by nightfall. The advance of the 1st Brigade was to be closely coordinated with a timed programme of artillery concentrations on successive targets along the route; a creeping smoke barrage would provide a screen 2000 yards long 1000 yards ahead of the forward troops; in front of this curtain Kittyhawk fighter-bombers of the Desert Air Force would bomb and strafe targets along the road, and six squadrons of medium bombers would attack Agira and its immediate vicinity. The 2nd Canadian Brigade was to take over Assoro from the Hastings and Prince Edwards and the Nicosia road junction from the 48th Highlanders, in order to free Brigadier Graham's battalions for exploitation beyond Agira.39 This elaborate programme, which would give the Canadians their first experience of heavy air co-operation, obviously impressed the R.C.R. diarist, who wrote on the 24th, somewhat irreverently:
The feature [Agira] is deemed so important to gain that the Bn, which is leading the Bde, will be supported by the complete Div Arty, plus ninety bombers, plus more than a hundred fighter-bombers in close support. It is a set piece attack, with a timed arty programme, report lines, bells, train whistles and all the trimmings.

At three in the afternoon the artillery barrage from five field and two medium regiments* began to fall, as the leading R.C.R. companies, supported
* The 1st Field Regiment R.C.H.A., the 2nd and 3rd Field Regiments R.C.A., the 142nd, (S.P.) and 165th Field Regiments R.A., and the 7th and 64th Medium Regiments, R.A.40

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by "A" Squadron of the Three Rivers, set off along the highway towards Nissoria. From the excellent vantage point of the castle ruins above Assoro General Simonds with officers of the 30th Corps and members of his staff watched their progress. Eastward above the geometrically sharp lines of the escarpment which walls the broad Dittaino valley they could see the dominant Agira mountain six miles away standing out boldly against the background bulk of Etna. Lower to the left lay the flat white cluster of the buildings of Nissoria. The heavy concentrations of high explosive landed with great accuracy on their targets. All efforts to build up a satisfactory smoke-screen however were nullified by a strong breeze which blew across the field of action, even though in a rapid succession of signals to his Commander Royal Artillery General Simonds increased the intensity of fire of smoke shells from one to three rounds per gun per minute.41 It was remarked later by one of the divisional intelligence staff that in this attack the infantry had a tendency to advance too late after the artillery shelling had ceased, with the result that the Germans were then ready for them with mortar and medium machine-gun fire.* He said "that German prisoners had told him that we Canadians are very much like the British in that we are slow in following up any advantage we may have gained by an artillery barrage."42 This failure to follow the fire support closely enough was afterwards cited by General Simonds as the fundamental cause of the reverses suffered by units of the 1st Brigade in their attacks at Nissoria.43 After some delay the Kittyhawks arrived and one by one dived down to drop their bombs along the road, but due to a break in R.A.F. communications the scheduled attack by medium bombers did not take place.44 As events were to show, however, this failure to bomb Agira on the 24th probably did not materially affect the progress of the ground operations that day, for strong enemy opposition was to engage the Canadians in four more days of bitter fighting before they reached their hilltown objective.

The Reverse at Nissoria, 24-25 July

Led personally by Lt.-Col. Crowe, the R.C.R. covered the three miles to Nissoria without incident and successfully cleared the village, reporting it secure at 4:15 p.m.45 Almost immediately the battalion ran into difficulties. From the eastern outskirts of Nissoria the highway curved south of a wide gully to climb easily through a gap between two low hills which formed a mile-long edge 1000 yards beyond the village (see Map 4). The rocky high ground on either side of this saddle concealed
* The Divisional Artillery Task Table shows that the concentrations on the high ground half a mile east of Nissoria were to be fired from 3:30 to 4:00 p.m. It was 4:30 however before the infantry reached the eastern edge of the village.

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a force of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, identified later as the 2nd Battalion, 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, with stragglers from the 1st and 3rd Battalions, and a number of artillery sub-units.46 The shelling did not achieve the desired effect upon these particular positions, either because the concentrations in general seem to have been confined to the road and its immediate vicinity, or more probably because the enemy, who were well dug in, had been allowed time to recover before the Canadians arrived. The appearance of the R.C.R. at the edge of Nissoria was greeted by a hail of machinegun bullets accompanied by heavy mortar fire. Crowe ordered his two forward companies to clear the ridge, sending "C' Company around to the right of the highway to take the southern knoll, and "D" directly across the gully to the left. The latter's objective was a solitary square red building at the highest point of the road where it crossed the ridge. This landmark was the Casa Cantoniera--the dwelling of the local highway foreman-but by the Canadians who fought around it on that and subsequent days it will always be remembered as the "red school-house".47 "D" Company, attacking across the open gully, made little headway against the enemy fire. Its platoons became separated, and wireless contact with Battalion Headquarters in Nissoria failed. The breakdown in communications within the battalion became general, and subsequent attempts to relay messages by runner from one company to another were unsuccessful. In the resultant fog of uncertainty the sound of brisk fighting on the right flank led Crowe to believe that "C" Company had gained its objective; accordingly he dispatched his two remaining rifle companies with orders to push on through "C's" position. An earlier attempt by "A" Company to attack the right end of the southern hill in support of "C" Company had been abruptly called back because of an additional artillery concentration on this objective which had been ordered for 5:15. In the confusion of withdrawal it lost one of its platoons, which became involved in "D" Company's effort. About six o'clock the battalion commander, judging from the noise of considerable firing coming from the enemy's right rear that his companies had cleared the ridge, and anxious to re-establish wireless communication with them, moved forward from Nissoria on foot, accompanied by a small party of engineers and signallers. At the foot of the south hill they came under enemy fire. Calling out, "R.C.R.", Crowe pressed on, hoping to reach his troops. He was struck by a machine-gun bullet; but seizing a signaller's rifle he engaged the enemy, until a second bullet killed him. His wireless operators fell by his side, and with the loss of their sets went hope of restoring contact with the missing companies. The Second-inCommand, Major T.M. Powers, took over the regiment.48 The virtual blackout on information which now descended on Battalion Headquarters, as reflected in the brigade message log, and the indefinite

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and often conflicting reports given by companies after the action make it impossible to chart with certainty the subsequent action on the right. It appears that when "A" and "B" Companies received the battalion commander's instructions to advance, they followed a small valley well out on the right flank, which took them south of the hill against which "C" Company had been directed. Ultimately they came upon their missing comrades, considerably behind the enemy position-to find that they too had by-passed the objective. They were now well on their way to Agira--some reports suggest within two miles of the town-but with the enemy in their rear, between them and Nissoria. The three company commanders, realizing that the battalion was out of control, held a council-of-war and decided to consolidate their forces for the night. Dawn found them under enemy observation, and brought casualties from mortar and machine-gun fire.49 In the meantime the curving mile of road east of Nissoria had been the scene of an independent and bitter action between the Three Rivers tanks and the strongly entrenched enemy on the hill south of the "red school-house". During the approach to the village "A" Squadron had destroyed an enemy Mark III tank, and at the eastern end of the narrow main street had silenced a troublesome 88-millimetre anti-tank gun. Taking over the lead from the infantry the Shermans advanced towards the high ground, the unfavourable terrain compelling them to travel singly along the highway. Heavy fire across the valley from the hill on their left--which is named on large-scale maps Monte di Nissoria-knocked out one of the leading tanks, effectually blocking the road to those following. In the fighting that ensued the Canadian armour claimed successful hits on four German 88s. Two tanks of the leading troop patrolled through enemy territory supporting the few of the R.C.R. who had got forward, until all their ammunition was exhausted. But the technique of successful infantrycum-tank co-operation which brought satisfying results later in the campaign in Italy had not yet been perfected. The failure of the infantry to reach and clear the enemy positions cost the squadron dear; ten Shermans were knocked out, four of them beyond recovery.50 Casualties to Three Rivers personnel numbered fifteen, including four men killed; among the wounded were the commander of "A" Squadron and his second-in-command. When late on the 24th it became obvious that the R.C.R. had failed to dislodge the enemy, General Simonds ordered the 1st Brigade to renew the attack that night. Agira was the objective, and Regalbuto the limit of exploitation.51 Brigadier Graham, who had been close to the scene of action riding in one of the headquarters tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment, assigned the task to the Hastings and Prince Edwards. The C.O., Lord Tweedsmuir, had not seen the ground by daylight. "The only thing", he

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wrote later, "was to get as far as possible in the darkness and hope for the best."52 After consultation with Major Powers he decided to outflank the troublesome enemy positions by advancing south of the highway and then swinging left to cut it about a mile west of Agira. Shortly after midnight the Hastings marched into Nissoria from the west, and in the early hours of the 25th, guided by an R.C.R. patrol, moved to the attack. The battalion advanced in its accustomed single file, with one company patrolling ahead. But the plan to reach the enemy's rear failed. At the southern end of the ridge beyond the village "B" Company, in the lead, stumbled upon a machine-gun position. When the enemy opened fire, pinning down the leading Hastings, the remaining companies deployed and pressed on up the slopes. The German post was outflanked and overrun; but now came the deadly rattle of machine-guns from the alerted defenders all along the ridge. Lt.-Col. Tweedsmuir*, who was fighting his last action in Sicily (he was wounded and evacuated that morning), thus describes the situation:
The Battalion formed a rough square on the hilltop. The light came up and there were plenty of targets to shoot at as the Germans moved about the slopes. Then the mortar fire started. Their object was to fill in the gaps in the geometrical patterns made by the machine-gun fire, and with extraordinary accuracy they did it. The number of wounded began to mount up. . . . A wounded man was repeating over and over again "Give 'em Hell, Tweedsmuir, give 'em Hell", as we called the artillery on the radio.53

But the withering fire which pinned the Canadians to ground-the enemy mortars and medium machine-guns were being supported by three well dug-in Mark III tanks-made it impossible to pick good artillery targets or to find a suitable position from which to observe. The Hastings were in a serious predicament. The steady rate of fire which they were maintaining had left their stock of ammunition dangerously low; to attempt further advance, or even to remain in such exposed positions, might well have meant the loss of most of the battalion. A withdrawal was ordered, and under rearguard protection given by "D" Company, they fell back behind Nissoria. Tweedsmuir, who had suffered a severe leg wound from a mortar bomb, turned over command of the regiment to Major A.A. Kennedy.54 During the morning two R.C.R. carriers had reached their battalion's forward companies in the hills east of Nissoria and recalled them to a concentration area near Assoro. Here the regiment reorganized from its dislocation of the previous day. The brigade's second attempt to dislodge the Panzer Grenadiers had failed, and the casualties were mounting. The cost to The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment had been five officers and 75 other ranks killed, wounded and missing-the heaviest losses suffered in
* Promoted to this acting rank on 22 July.

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a single day by any Canadian unit during the entire campaign in Sicily. In their two days' fighting the R.C.R. had lost in addition to their Commanding Officer, three officers and 43 men, of whom sixteen had been killed. That evening Graham sent his remaining battalion, the 48th Highlanders, against the stubborn enemy. To avoid the dispersion which had dissipated the R.C.R.'s effort, he directed that the left flank should be tested by a single company attack, and if this succeeded the remaining companies would follow through in succession and wheel out into the enemy's positions along the ridge. Lt.-Col. Johnston launched his attack at six in the evening, directing "B" Company against Monte di Nissoria at the northern end of the long feature, after medium machine-guns of the Saskatoon Light Infantry had searched the rocky hillside with their fire.55 At first there was little opposition, and the Highlanders quickly reported themselves on their objective. "D" Company now entered the attack, climbing the steep terraced position to the right of "B" Company. Soon word came back of strong resistance, for "B" Company had reached only a false crest, and the Germans above them were holding the summit and the reverse slopes of the escarpment, where they had been comparatively safe from the Canadian machine-gun fire and artillery concentrations. Harassed by enemy fire both Highlander companies were forced to find what shelter they might on the narrow ledges below the German positions. Johnston attempted to call new supporting fire, but once again wireless sets, their range considerably reduced by the screening of intervening hills, proved ineffectual. The two forward companies now found themselves out of communication with Battalion Headquarters, and after nightfall they withdrew from their untenable positions. In the meantime "C" Company, sent forward on the right of "D", halted when overtaken by darkness, and about midnight assaulted its objective, the Casa Cantoniera, north of the road. Enemy tanks and machine-guns held off the Highlanders, and on Johnston's orders the attempt was abandoned. The battalion withdrew west of Nissoria, having suffered 44 casualties, including thirteen killed.56 The 48th Highlanders' difficulties in maintaining wireless communication were of a pattern with those frequently experienced by other Canadian units during the fighting in Sicily. After the campaign General Simonds reported to the 15th Army Group that whereas wireless communications behind brigade headquarters were excellent throughout the Eighth Army, those from brigade headquarters forward had fallen behind requirements. It was his view that the No. 18 set-the portable man pack wireless set in use down to headquarters of infantry companies-"did not meet the range demanded to control an infantry brigade when dispersed over a wide front and/or in great depth."57 The mountainous terrain through which the Canadians were operating produced freak conditions which seriously restricted wireless reception,

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particularly at night -a problem not encountered by the other formations fighting in the Catania plain. Much of the trouble appears to have been caused by faulty batteries; the extreme heat was blamed for deterioration of the chemicals. On 28 July the war diary of the 1st Canadian Divisional Signals recorded "difficulty in 18-set battery supply. Batteries coming up are duds or very weak." And at the end of August Headquarters 15th Army Group noted that "large quantities of the old unreliable pattern batteries for wireless sets No. 18 continue to arrive in this theatre. Of these, between 60% and 70% are completely exhausted when received."58 It will be recalled that the 1st Division had lost a considerable amount of signal equipment in the convoy sinkings. The resultant shortage had imposed a severe strain in maintenance; with the lack of spares sets broke down faster than they could be repaired.59 As reports of the ineffectiveness of the No. 18 set in the fighting before Agira multiplied, the Canadian G.O.C. gave orders for the more powerful No. 22 set to be made available to forward units on a scale of six to a brigade. These heavy sets had been used during the landings, where they were transported on special handcarts. The carts had not proved very satisfactory, for the narrow-tired wire wheels dug deeply into the sand of the beaches, and were too lightly constructed to withstand the rough passage over the stony tracks farther inland. The sets would now be carried by sturdy and sure-footed pack mules.60

The Winning of "Lion" and "Tiger" Ridges, 26 July

It was now the turn of the 2nd Canadian Brigade to enter the battle; but before proceeding with the story of its participation, we may glance briefly at what was happening on the right in the 231st Brigade's field of operation. It will be recalled that on 22 July, when he issued the first orders for the capture of Agira, General Simonds had assigned the Malta Brigade the role of threatening the town from the south, while the main attack went in from the west. On the night of the 22nd the brigade, which was astride the Raddusa-Agira road, seized two strongly defended hills 4000 yards south of Agira, the 2nd Battalion, The Devonshire Regiment, taking the left position, Point 533*, and the 1st Battalion, The Dorsetshire Regiment, Point 482,* east of the road. At midday on the 23rd Brigadier Urquhart received word of the postponement of the 1st Canadian Brigade's attack; and that night he moved forward his third battalion, the 1st Hampshires, in readiness for a co-ordinated effort with the Canadians on the 24th.
* Designated by the altitude in metres.

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About a mile to the east of Agira Highway No. 121 was commanded by two prominent hills which were dominated only by the Agira mountain itself. To the north of the road was Mount Campanelli, 569 metres high; to the south, in the angle between the highway and the road to Raddusa, was a somewhat higher feature closer to the town and under complete observation from the Agira heights. It was named on large-scale maps Mount Gianguzzo, but was always referred to by the Malta Brigade as Point 583. On the night of 24-25 July, while the R.C.R. were making their fruitless attempt east of Nissoria, the Hampshires gained positions astride the highway, prepared to intercept Germans retreating from Agira when the town should fall. An early morning report that the Canadian attack had failed brought a change in plan, and two companies of the Hampshires were ordered forward to Mount Campanelli, with instructions to lie low throughout the day. Partially screened from view by rows of vines and cactus hedges they spent the morning of the 25th watching enemy traffic on the highway and on the secondary road running north from Agira to Troina. The Germans were using these two escape routes freely, and many tantalizing targets were presented to the Hampshires, who dared not, however, disclose their presence on Campanelli. Yet the enemy's suspicions were evidently aroused, for at mid-afternoon he counter-attacked the hill, and compelled the Englishmen, who were without mortars or artillery support, to withdraw south of the highway.61 That night, as the 48th Highlanders unsuccessfully tried to force the German defences east of Nissoria, the 231st Brigade again co-operated. Two Hampshire companies worked their way in the darkness on to Mount Campanelli, with orders to withdraw at first light if the Canadian effort failed. The Dorsets got patrols on Point 583. But the Highlanders did not break through, and the troops from both battalions of the Malta Brigade ,fell back at daybreak as planned.62 Preparations were now made for a fresh effort from the west. Early on 26 July General Simonds ordered the 2nd Brigade to relieve the 1st and to launch an attack against Agira that evening. The G.O.C. directed that the operation should take place in two stages: an advance by one battalion under a heavy barrage to seize and consolidate a firm base 2300 yards in depth east of Nissoria, and a subsequent exploitation by a second battalion to the high ground which overlooked the western entry to Agira. In his detailed plan Brigadier Vokes selected Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry to carry out the first phase of the attack. The unit's objectives were the ridge east of Nissoria which, had cost the 1st Brigade so much bloodshed, and a second feature of equal height a thousand yards nearer Agira; these were given the code names of "Lion" and "Tiger" respectively. From an assembly area within an hour's march of "Tiger" the Seaforth

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Highlanders would be prepared, on thirty minutes' notice, to move forward and seize the final objective, "Grizzly", a stretch of high ground within half a mile of Agira rising at either end to a well defined crest--Mount Crapuzza north of the highway, and Mount Fronte to the south.63 At 8:00 p.m. the crash of high explosive shells on a mile-long front across the highway immediately east of Nissoria signalled the commencement of the heaviest barrage yet fired by the artillery of the 1st Canadian Division.* For seventeen minutes eighty guns of the three Canadian field regiments and the 165th Field Regiment R.A. concentrated their fire on the opening line; then the barrage lifted and moved eastward along the highway in twenty-eight successive steps, advancing one hundred yards in every three minutes.65 The effect upon the enemy was paralyzing. Supported by guns of the 90th Anti-Tank Battery and by the tanks of the Three Rivers' "C" Squadron, "C" and "D" Companies of the Patricias, following closely upon the barrage, swept rapidly on to their objectives, respectively the right and left crests of "Lion". They took these without difficulty, for the Germans were shaken and demoralized by the intensity of our attack. One dazed prisoner who had fought in Poland, France, Russia and North Africa, declared that he had never before experienced such devastating fire;66 a captured officer is said to have asked to see the "automatic field gun" which was capable of producing such an incredible rate of fire!67 The Patricias took more than seventy prisoners, and it was later reported that of those defenders of the ridge who were not killed or captured few escaped unwounded. Now the barrage paused for twenty minutes, to allow the P.P.C.L.I. reserves to move up for their attack on "Tiger". Unfortunately these companies, "A" and "B", probing forward in the darkness over the rugged, unfamiliar ground, lost their way and with it the advantage of the barrage when it began again. The brief respite in the shelling allowed the Germans to get their heads up, and a bitter fight ensued. Neither P.P.C.L.I. company reached its objective.68 Although wireless communication appears to have been maintained unusually well, uncertainty of companies about their own positions, coupled with the inevitable "fog of battle" which cloaked the battalion's movements, left Brigade Headquarters with a confused picture of the situation. It was not clear whether "Tiger" had yet been taken. At midnight, therefore, Vokes decided to commit the Seaforth Highlanders, in the hope that aggressive action would bring a clear-cut decision in our favour. The Seaforth, deploying on either side of the road outside Nissoria, mounted the "Lion" objective, where they were held up by fire from a
* The fire plan provided for 139 rounds per gun. In the series of concentrations fired in support of the attack on 24 July the demands upon each battery averaged not quite sixty rounds per gun.64

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number of well-concealed medium machine-guns and tanks. While "A" Company engaged and knocked out the machine-gun posts, a troop of Shermans, assisted by antitank guns of the supporting battery, effectively quelled the opposition of the German armour, destroying at least two enemy tanks. The company now pushed ahead, and at 4:25 a.m. sent back the report, "Forward elements on `Tiger'." With grim tenacity the enemy clung to his hold on the high ground, meeting the Seaforth assault with fire from flanking machine-gun nests and tanks in hull-down positions on the reverse slope of the crest. Once the infantry had secured a footing however, anti-tank guns were rushed forward, followed closely by the Seaforth's "B" Company. There was more bitter fighting, in which "A" and "B" Companies of the Patricias played an important part, and by 11 o'clock "Tiger" ridge was firmly in Canadian hands.69 From their hard-won vantage point the Canadian artillery, tanks and infantry had an excellent field of fire over the stony fields to the high ground of "Grizzly" two miles to the east, and to the north, where the land fell steeply away across the Agira-Nicosia road into the broad valley of the Salso River. During the morning several German tanks and machinegun posts were spotted and destroyed, and a number of retreating vehicles and infantry paid the penalty of being caught in the open by our guns.70 The enemy's use of the road to Nicosia had already been interrupted by Canadian troops. Nicosia, fifteen miles to the north-west, was under attack by the American 1st Division, and there was much shuttling of Axis traffic forward and back between the two threatened towns. It was too good an opportunity to miss, and on the night of 26-27 July The Edmonton Regiment was ordered to send a fighting patrol well out on the northern flank to cut the road. "D" Company carried out a difficult six-mile cross-country march, routed an enemy post with a sudden bayonet charge in the darkness, and before rejoining the battalion successfully established a platoon astride the road three miles from its junction with Highway No. 121. By means of well placed "Hawkins" grenades* and some remarkably cool-headed and effective handling of the PIAT, this platoon accounted for no less than three enemy tanks, a large tank-transporter and three lorries. On the afternoon of the 27th the position was strengthened by the arrival of "C" Company. Next day the Edmonton force drove off three counter-attacks of varying strength, as enemy pressure came alternately from the north and the south. While continuing to block the road the company also contrived to blow up an enemy ammunition dump, and to capture a truckload of hospital brandy. Late on the 28th an Edmonton carrier brought orders to rejoin the battalion. The episode was an example of the effective employment of a small detached
* The No. 75 ("Hawkins") grenade, of weight 2 lbs., could be lightly buried like an anti-tank mine, or thrown directly in the path of a moving vehicle. It was also used as a portable demolition charge.

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force, and was matched on the following night by the work of another strong fighting patrol sent by the Edmontons to investigate enemy positions north of Agira. Commanded by a sergeant of the Support Company the patrol, about two platoons in strength, surprised an estimated 200 Germans in the hills north of the Salso and routed them with mortar and machine-gun fire. They counted 24 enemy dead and took nine prisoners.71 Kesselring reported on the operations of 27 July: "A strong attack of 1 Canadian Inf Div has been repelled up to now"; and later, "In the afternoon renewed attacks of strong forces on Agira."72 But a captured operation order of the Hermann Gring Panzer Division, dated 27 July, admitted that the Germans had been forced to give ground.
15 P.G. Div, under strong enemy pressure, is taking up positions adjoining H.G. Armd Div back on the general line Regalbuto-Gagliano-east of Nicosia, leaving a standing patrol in area Agira... Contact will be established and maintained between Regalbuto and the left flank of 15 P.G. Div and any enemy elements infiltrating between the flanks of the two divisions will be spotted and wiped out.73

The "standing patrol" whose fate it was to fill the gap betwen the two major formations proved to be the entire 1st Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment,* of the 29th Division-fresh troops who had been hastily moved into defence positions along "Grizzly" to replace the decimated battalions of the 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment.74

The Capture of "Grizzly" and the Entry into Agira, 27-28 July
The renewed attacks to which the C.-in-C. South had referred started at midday, as Allied medium bombers struck Agira and Kittyhawks strafed and bombed enemy positions west of the town. At two o'clock Brigadier Vokes sent the Seaforth against the "Grizzly" objective, supporting them with artillery, medium machine-guns, anti-tank guns and two troops of Shermans. To the right of the highway "A" Company, commanded by Major H. P. Bell-Irving, advanced upon Mount Fronte, a square-topped hill with a precipitous southern flank. One enemy company was firmly installed upon this commanding height, and it poured such a volume of machine-gun and mortar fire down the forward slope as to make a frontal attack on the feature impossible. Accordingly Major Bell-Irving decided on a right-flanking movement, and an assault up the face of the cliff, next to impossible though the feat might seem. The operation was brilliantly successful. While one platoon
* As noted earlier (p. 116) this battalion was operating independently of its parent regiment, which was opposing the United States 1st Division's advance in the Nicosia area.

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energetically held the enemy's attention by their fire and infiltration from the west, the remainder of "A" Company, making skilful use of the cover afforded by terraced orchard and vineyard, reached the southern base of the mountain and scaled the 300-foot cliff. Completely taken by surprise the enemy nevertheless fought back strongly; but the Seaforth hung grimly on, and by employing admirable tactics of fire and movement executed with great determination, secured a commanding position, which they held throughout the night against counter-attacks. Early in the morning, as reinforcing companies arrived on the scene, Bell-Irving launched a final attack with rifle and grenade. So vigorously was the assault pressed forward that the enemy fled in complete disorder "literally and actually screaming in terror". By six the whole of Mount Fronte was in Canadian hands.75 On the north side of the highway the attack by "D" Company during the afternoon of the 27th had been halted by the vehemence of the German fire. The immediate objective was a sprawling hill at the left centre of the "Grizzly" ridge, of about equal height with Mount Crapuzza half a mile to the north, and bearing on its summit a walled cemetery characteristically bordered by tall, sombre cypress trees. The south-eastern slopes of "Cemetery Hill" ran down to the outlying buildings of the town itself, which was spread over the western slopes of the towering cone of the Agira mountain. Lt.-Col. Hoffmeister, realizing that one company could not successfully dispute the enemy's possession of the hill, withdrew "D" Company into reserve, in order that he might concentrate his forces against Mount Fronte. The wisdom of this decision was vindicated, as we have seen, by the Seaforth success on the right. For their outstanding part in directing and carrying out the Seaforth operation against "Grizzly" both the battalion C.O. and his gallant company commander, Major Bell-Irving, were awarded the D.S.O.76 Late that afternoon Brigadier Vokes, realizing the need for a more powerful effort against the northern end of "Grizzly", ordered The Edmonton Regiment into action. The battalion set off at eight o'clock, swinging wide to the left through country broken by hills and ravines, intending to attack Mount Crapuzza and Cemetery Hill from the north. But the route was difficult beyond expectation, and the maps which the Edmontons carried proved unreliable. By the time they reached the point from which the final assault was to be launched, an artillery concentration, intended to support their attack, had been completed several hours before.77 It was shortly before three in the morning when the attack finally went in, with "A" Company directed against Mount Crapuzza and "B" and "D" against Cemetery Hill. "B" Company found itself faced by an almost precipitous slope on which the alerted enemy was dropping heavy concentrations of mortar fire while his forward troops lobbed down "potato masher" grenades from the heights above. While "B" was thus pinned to ground

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with quickly mounting casualties, "D" Company, farther south, managed to work a section of men around to the right of the hill. This daring little party created so effective a distraction in the enemy's rear that the remainder of the company, rallied by the secondin-command when the commander was killed, assaulted the cliffs, and with 2-inch mortars, hand grenades and Bren guns carried Cemetery Hill against opposition estimated at four times their numerical strength. The enemy broke into disorganized retreat, many suffering further casualties as they came under fire from the Edmontons' "A" Company, which had in the meantime established itself upon Mount Crapuzza without opposition.78 The night's work had cost the Edmontons three killed and 31 wounded; but at 8:55 a.m. Brigadier Vokes was able to send Divisional Headquarters the satisfying message:
Whole of Grizzly in our hands. Nearly all enemy killed. Survivors retreating northwards. We have lost contact. All approaches safe.79

On the two preceding nights the 231st Brigade had played their now familiar role for the third and fourth times, on each occasion putting small parties astride the road east of Agira in anticipation of the capture of the town by the Canadians. The coming of daylight on the 27th compelled the accustomed withdrawal of their patrols from Mount Campanelli and Point 583; but on the following morning the 2nd Canadian Brigade's success enabled Brigadier Urquhart's forward troops to retain their footing on these important positions. During the day Devons and Dorsets put in spirited attacks to consolidate their hold, and by nightfall the Malta Brigade was firmly astride the main highway, and ready to lead the divisional attack eastward against Regalbuto. In these operations the support of "A" Squadron of the Three Rivers Regiment, which came under Brigadier Urquhart's command on the 27th, was very welcome, for the brigade had parted from tanks of the 23rd Armoured Brigade at Vizzini, and from that time forward had been thrusting deep into enemy country with "soft skin" vehicles only.80 The final scene in the prolonged battle for Agira was enacted on the 28th. Determined to take no half measures, the Commander of the 2nd Canadian Brigade ordered a bombardment of the town with all available artillery and mortars to commence at 3:45 p.m. Immediately afterwards Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry would go into the town. But the population were spared the destruction of their homes by Canadian shells, for about noon an officer of the 1st Canadian Field Regiment, whose eagerness to select a good vantage point for his task of observing fire for the Patricias had carried him right into Agira, found no sign of enemy activity, but streets crowded with people who gave him an enthusiastic welcome. The bombardment was cancelled, and at 2:30 two P.P.C.L.I. companies entered the town. They received an ovation from the populace on the outskirts; but as they climbed the steep streets into the heart of Agira they met a different kind of welcome

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from enemy pockets of resistance. It required two hours of fairly stiff house-to-house fighting and the employment of a third rifle company, as well as assistance from a squadron of tanks, to clear the town.81 So Agira fell, after five days of hard fighting in which practically the whole of the Canadian Division, with the exception of the 3rd Brigade (whose place was in effect taken by the 231st Brigade) had been engaged. It was the Division's biggest battle of the Sicilian campaign and it cost 438 Canadian casualties. (This includes neither the losses of the 3rd Brigade, which was engaged in a separate action, nor those of the 231st Brigade, which suffered approximately 300 casualties during the fighting for Agira.) * In its early stages the battle provided the enemy with an opportunity of strikingly demonstrating the principle of economy of effort. Because the extremely rugged nature of the country prevented deployment on a large scale, the six battalions of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Brigades had been committed one by one against the stubborn defenders of the NissoriaAgira road. Thus in the early stages of the action the Canadians attacked on a single- or twocompany front, a procedure which enabled the enemy, although numerically inferior to the total force opposing him, to concentrate the fire of his well-sited weapons upon the relatively small threatened area. It was not until the last two days of the battle, when the 2nd Brigade used more than one battalion at critical moments-the Seaforth to turn the tide of the Patricias' assault on "Tiger", and the Edmontons to assist the Seaforth against "Grizzly"-that the desired momentum was achieved and the issue was at last decided. The enemy had been hit heavily. The 1st Division's intelligence staff estimated that 200 of the 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment had been killed, and 125 of the reinforced 1st Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which relieved it. We took 430 German prisoners, and 260 Italiansremnants from the 33rd and 34th Infantry Regiments of the Livorno Division, and from the 6th Regiment of the Aosta Division, which had been brought down from Nicosia without supplies or supporting arms to bolster the German defences of Agira.83 These battered battalions of Panzer Grenadiers did not again oppose the 1st Division in Sicily, and there is good reason to suppose that they desired no return engagement. They had met Canadian troops at close quarters and had painfully experienced the impact of what one prisoner called "their tenacious fighting spirit in the face of concentrated fire". From interrogations
* Exact casualty figures for the 231st Brigade for this period are not available. An indication of the losses suffered is shown in a-report in the 1st Hampshires' war diary of 26 casualties sustained by the unit on 26 July and 83 on the 27th. The total of 300 is taken from the published story of the brigade's operations in Sicily.82 On 1 August the 2nd U.S. Corps identified the 1st Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, at Gagliano, midway between Agira and Troina; what was left of the 104th Regiment showed up next day north of Troina.84

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conducted after the capture of Agira the C.O. of the Patricias reported a German dislike of hand-to-hand and night fighting:
They consider that our troops are not only too persistent in their manner of fighting, but also extremely unorthodox-that is to say, they do not manoeuvre in the manner the enemy expects them to.85

On the Canadian left flank Nicosia fell to the American 1st Division on the same day as Agira. A score of miles farther north on the 2nd U.S. Corps' coastal flank the 45th Division pushed to within four miles of San Stefano, which the strongly resisting 29th Panzer Grenadier Division did not relinquish until the 31st.86 The relief of the 1st Canadian Brigade in Leonforte on 27 and 28 July by advanced troops of the 9th Infantry Division heralded the regrouping which was taking place preparatory to the major American drive eastward. Palermo harbour was opened to shipping on the 27th, and the bulk of the Division disembarked there from North Africa on 1 August.87 For the 1st and 2nd Canadian Brigades there was a brief period of recuperation, during which much-needed reinforcements were brought forward from the beach areas, where they had been waiting since their landing on 13 July.88 It is not to be wondered that the war diary of almost every unit should make special note of a five-hour rain storm which swept over the hills on 28 July, for it was the first precipitation that the Canadians had encountered in their hot and dusty journey through Sicily. The 48th Highlanders reported that "all ranks including the C.O. took advantage of it and held impromptu shower baths out in the rain". On the evening of the 30th the Seaforth pipes played "Retreat" in the town square of Agira, to the huge gratification of the assembled townspeople. The unit diarist reported, with understandable pride, that "it was heard in London and broadcast over the B.B.C." The people of Agira, and indeed of every Fascist-ridden city, town and village in Italy, felt that they had good cause for rejoicing in those last days of July 1943. Late on the evening of the 25th a dramatic announcement by the Rome radio struck the country like a thunderbolt:
His Majesty the King and Emperor has accepted the resignation of the head of the Government, the Chancellor and State Secretary, tendered by His Excellency Cavalier Benito Mussolini.89

The wheel was come full circle, and the irresponsible dictator, who in May 1940, on the eve of his treacherous attack on France, had declared, "I need a few thousand dead so as to be able to attend the peace conference as a belligerent",90 now found himself toppled from his pedestal by the turning fortunes of the struggle into which he had so blithely plunged his unhappy country.

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"It is defeat in war that brings about the fall of a regime", wrote Mussolini during the following winter, in a series of articles, History of a Year, published by a Milan newspaper.91 The political crisis which precipitated his downfall he attributed, and with good reason, to the military crisis which had arisen in Sicily. The Italian people had come to realize that the loss of the island was imminent. Already disillusioned by the North African disaster, and faced with the prospect of aerial bombardment of their towns and cities and an impending invasion of the Italian mainland, their resentment was strong against the man who had plunged them into war. The picture drawn by Marshal Badoglio is probably not exaggerated:
Conscious of our complete helplessness, the morale of the people rapidly deteriorated; in trains, in trams, in the streets, wherever they were, they openly demanded peace and cursed Mussolini. Anger with the Fascist regime was widespread, and everywhere one heard: "It does not matter if we lose the war because it will mean the end of Fascism."92

Events in the coup d'tat moved rapidly. On 19 July the Duce met Hitler at Feltre, where, in spite of earlier assurances to his Chief of Staff that he would impress upon the Fhrer the impossibility of Italy's remaining in the war, he appears to have said nothing to interrupt the usual harangue of his Axis partner.93 He returned to Rome next day, to find that during his absence in the north the city had suffered its first air raid. The attack had been directed with great accuracy against the city's marshalling yards and the nearby Ciampino airfield by 560 bombers of the Northwest African Strategic Air Force. These dropped more than 1000 tons of bombs, inflicting severe damage upon railway installations and rolling stock and nearby industrial plants.94 The raid on their capital struck a heavy blow at the already sagging morale of the Italian people, and the clamour for a cessation of hostilities became louder than ever. But there could be no withdrawal from the war as long as the dictator remained in power. Leading Fascists insisted that he summon the Grand Fascist Coun