The Nonproliferation Review

ISSN: 1073-6700 (Print) 1746-1766 (Online) Journal homepage: [Link]

The Brazilian Navy's nuclear-powered submarine

program

Antônio Ruy de Almeida Silva & José Augusto Abreu de Moura

To cite this article: Antônio Ruy de Almeida Silva & José Augusto Abreu de Moura (2016) The
Brazilian Navy's nuclear-powered submarine program, The Nonproliferation Review, 23:5-6,
617-633, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2017.1337625

To link to this article: [Link]

Published online: 09 Aug 2016.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 35

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

[Link]

Download by: [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] Date: 22 August 2017, At: 15:34
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, 2016
VOL. 23, NOS. 5–6, 617–633
[Link]

The Brazilian Navy’s nuclear-powered submarine program

Antônio Ruy de Almeida Silva and José Augusto Abreu de Moura

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This article discusses the main aspects of the Brazilian Navy’s Brazil; nuclear submarine;
nuclear-powered submarine program. It first discusses the Latin America; nuclear
Brazilian perception that the restrictions imposed by the world technology
powers related to so-called sensitive technologies are a tool to
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

maintain the status quo and hamper the technological progress of

developing countries. The article then focuses on the political,
economic, technological, and strategic reasons behind the
creation and maintenance of the autonomous nuclear-propulsion
submarine program. Next, the article examines strategic aspects of
the program and their institutionalization in high-level defense
documents, informing Brazil’s opposition to adopting additional
nonproliferation measures. Finally, it discusses Brazilian policy
toward the South Atlantic Ocean and the role of the nuclear-
powered submarine. The article seeks to shed light on the main
reasons that led Brazil to build and maintain such submarines and
maps the program’s phases of development.

This article rests on several assumptions that are central to understanding the Brazilian
Navy’s nuclear-propulsion submarine program. The most significant point is that the
decision to create and maintain the program was based mainly on the navy’s desire to
improve its strategic capabilities by emulating the other navies that own this type of
vessel. Other important factors were the country’s aspiration to master a technology
important for its development and its ambition for a more significant role on the
world stage.
The program can be divided into three phases. In the first, “golden” phase, which
enjoyed strong governmental support, Brazil mastered the technology to enrich
uranium, inaugurating its first cascade of gas centrifuges in 1988. The second, “vegetative”
phase lasted almost twenty years and was a period of extreme difficulty for the program.
The effort survived thanks to the navy’s decision to bear an increasing percentage of the
program’s budget. The program’s third, “institutionalization” phase began in 2007, when
the government prioritized its funding and institutionalized it in various high-level
defense documents.
Since the 1950s, the Brazilian government has sought to master nuclear technology to
improve national development. Initially, Brazil attempted to advance its nuclear technol-
ogy through cooperation with the United States, but decades of effort never yielded the
anticipated results. The evolution of the international security situation in the 1960s
and 1970s contributed to Brazil’s decision to develop the submarine program. In Brasília’s

CONTACT Antônio Ruy de Almeida Silva aruyasilva@[Link]

© 2017 Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
 618 A.R. DE ALMEIDA SILVA AND J.A.A. DE MOURA

view, the international system had become a condominium of superpowers that promoted
their national interests in order to maintain the status quo, denying or restricting the
access of developing states to the most advanced technology. These structural aspects of
the international system were confirmed, in the Brazilian perspective, by specific
actions such as Washington’s refusal to provide nuclear material to Brazil’s first
nuclear-power plant, the negotiations that resulted in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and US opposition to the 1975 Brazilian-West
German nuclear agreement.
During the same period, international debates were raging over territorial sea extension
and its potential economic, technological, and strategic implications. In the strategic field,
until the mid-1970s, Brazilian naval thinking was subordinated to the American vision of
hemispheric defense, in which the Brazilian Navy played a secondary role, primarily main-
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

taining an antisubmarine capability. Additionally, there was a strong material dependence

on the United States, which had provided surplus ships and other equipment through the
Military Aid Program since 1952. This situation, though comfortable, hindered the devel-
opment of a Brazilian naval military industry. US military aid did not include the pro-
vision of advanced ships and equipment for modernizing the Brazilian Navy. Brazil
therefore decided, in the late 1960s, to buy ships from Europe and, in the 1970s, to
change its naval strategic thinking to focus on Brazilian national interests, rather than
the US concept of hemispheric interests. These decisions led to the transfer of some
naval technologies.1
Thus, the nuclear-submarine program can also be understood within the context of an
effort to overcome external technological dependence. The program combines the navy’s
desire for a modern vessel that would improve its strategic capability and the government’s
will to develop nuclear technology as a step toward national economic development and
international prestige.
In pursuing the goal of a nuclear-powered submarine, Brazil considers that it has
demonstrated commitment to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disar-
mament through Article XXIII of the Brazilian Constitution, which allows the use of
nuclear technology only for peaceful uses, and through its participation in nonprolifera-
tion treaties and mechanisms. It therefore defends its right to develop nuclear technology
for peaceful uses as essential to its national security and development. Brazil considers
additional nonproliferation restrictions that impinge upon this right as an attempt to
hamper the country’s development.
The article’s argument proceeds in four stages. First, it analyzes Brazilian speeches at
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in the 1960s and 1970s, which express
the perception that the technological restrictions on sensitive technologies were structural
elements of the international system that hampered Brazilian’s security and development.
The second section sets out the difficulties the country faced in developing peaceful
nuclear technology in collaboration with the United States and West Germany, which con-
tributed to the decision to create an autonomous naval nuclear-propulsion submarine
program. The third section describes the three phases of the program: golden, vegetative,
and institutionalization. Lastly, the article highlights the importance of the South Atlantic
to Brazil, the country’s goal of maintaining this maritime space as a zone of peace and
cooperation, free of nuclear weapons, while reaffirming the right of regional states to
develop nuclear technology for peaceful uses, and the role of the submarine in this context.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 619

The search for development and prestige

Under the military government of 1964–85, one of Brazil’s most important objectives was
to pursue economic development to increase the country’s standing on the international
stage. The international system, in the official Brazilian view, was structured to prevent the
dissemination of technology that world powers viewed as “sensitive,” and which they used
in order to maintain the status quo and restrain the rise of emerging powers within the
international system.2
The speeches of Brazil’s representatives to the UNGA in that period illustrate this per-
ception of the world structure. In 1967, Brazil criticized the bifurcated international power
structure between the United States and the Soviet Union and called for reducing the econ-
omic and technological gap between developed and developing countries. Brazil also cri-
ticized the NPT—to be finalized the following year—as a means by which the nuclear-
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

armed powers would maintain their privileged status and create difficulties for others in
developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.3
In subsequent years, Brazil reaffirmed these positions at the United Nations. Brazil
believed that the superpowers had created a hegemonic condominium, zones of influence
under which other states enjoyed only limited sovereignty. This scenario was unfavorable
to Brazil’s aspiration toward a more influential role on the international stage.4 Its 1960s-
era security alignment with the United States—hemispheric collective defense—was
replaced in the 1970s with a more nationalist and pragmatic international position.5
The new strategy was to increase national capacity in order to diminish external depen-
dence by mastering advanced technologies previously denied to Brazil on the grounds
that it would harm international security.6
In the 1960s, world tensions increased over debates concerning the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea and other issues concerning the use of the oceans and the seabed. In late 1967,
the development of marine technologies increased the exploitation of marine resources,
including oil and minerals further from land. A UN document later considered that
It was a time that held both dangers and promises, risks and hopes. The dangers were
numerous: nuclear submarines charting deep waters never before explored; designs for anti-
ballistic missile systems to be placed on the seabed; supertankers ferrying oil from the
Middle East to European and other ports, passing through congested straits and leaving
behind a trail of oil spills; and rising tensions between nations over conflicting claims to
ocean space and resources. The oceans were generating a multitude of claims, counterclaims
and sovereignty disputes.7

In this context, in 1968, President Artur da Costa e Silva created the Brazilian Interminis-
terial Commission on the Exploration and Use of the Seabed and Ocean, and the state-
owned oil company, Petrobras, discovered the first oil field on the Brazilian continental
shelf.8 At the UNGA regular session the following year, Brazil criticized the great
powers’ use of the seabed and proposed that it be considered a world heritage and used
only for peaceful purposes.9
The Brazilian concern with maritime space was underscored in March 1970, when the
country declared its territorial sea to extend 200 nautical miles from the coast, following
the decision of several other nations that had done the same.10 In 1971, Brazil advocated in
the UNGA for “the right and duty” of member states “to use the resources of the sea,
seabed and subsoil thereof adjacent to their coasts in order to ensure economic and
 620 A.R. DE ALMEIDA SILVA AND J.A.A. DE MOURA

social well-being of their peoples.”11 At this time, the Brazilian Navy was running a public
domestic campaign on the importance of the seas and the need for a powerful navy, based
on ideas of the celebrated American naval theorist, Alfred T. Mahan, who had asserted a
relationship between a nation’s sea power and its prosperity.12 Brazil reaffirmed, in 1974,
the importance of the seas by establishing the Interministerial Commission for Sea
Resources, chaired by the Brazilian Navy, for the “purpose of coordinating the issues
related to the achievement of the National Policy for the Resources of the Sea.”13 The
next year, Brazil acceded to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, so that it could participate in dis-
cussions about the continent. 14
When the oil crisis of the 1970s exposed Brazil’s vulnerability to external energy
sources, President Ernesto Geisel adopted a policy of “responsible pragmatism” as a
way to broaden Brazil’s international relations. This policy allowed Brazil to strengthen
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

its ties with Arab countries, support decolonization, open the way to closer ties with
African states, and increase cooperation with developed countries such as West
Germany, which led to the nuclear agreement in 1975, discussed further below.15
In the opening speech to the 1976 UNGA, the Brazilian foreign minister reaffirmed the
critique of US-Soviet hegemonic condominium as having weakened the United Nations,
denounced the unequal political and economic relations between the North and the South,
and demanded steps to reduce the technological gap to allow the latter to develop the tech-
nologies they needed. Moreover, the minister expressed his government’s concern that the
world powers had been negotiating their security interests without considering the
national-security interests of developing states.16
Brazil’s policy of taking a more assertive role on the international stage took on renewed
urgency with the 1976 election of US President Jimmy Carter, who had advocated a
strengthened nonproliferation policy. During his campaign, Carter had positioned
himself against the Brazil-West Germany nuclear agreement and, as soon as he took
office, he took steps to oppose it.17 The US position that technological restrictions were
instrumental to maintaining the status quo of the international power structure hampered
Brazil’s development and reinforced Brasília’s decision to develop nuclear technology.

Brazil’s search for nuclear technology: dependency vs. autonomy

Two factors led to the 1975 nuclear agreement with Germany: Brazil-United States
cooperation on nuclear energy and Brazilian nuclear policy until the 1970s.18 In the
1950s, the United States reigned supreme in the nuclear field. There were two diver-
gent positions in Brazil on how to develop nuclear technology for peaceful uses. The
first group supported cooperation with the United States. The second favored inde-
pendent development. The first group prevailed, and in 1955, the two countries
signed a nuclear agreement, under which the United States was to sell two research
reactors to Brazil.
In 1971, Brazil bought a pressurized-water reactor (PWR) from the Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corporation for the first Brazilian nuclear-power plant, Angra 1. In June 1974, when
the plant was under construction, the US Atomic Energy Commission denied the supply
of enriched uranium for new nuclear plants, including Angra 1, “because the commercial
demands for enriched uranium were outstripping the capacity of the US enrichment
plants.”19 The US restrictions, the oil shock of 1973, and the expansion of the international
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 621

nuclear reactors market led Brazil to seek assistance elsewhere in order to become fully
self-sufficient in nuclear technology. On June 27, 1975, Brazil and Germany signed
their nuclear-cooperation agreement in Bonn.20 The agreement, among others aims,
had envisaged the construction of eight nuclear plants and the development of the jet-
nozzle enrichment technology.
In December of that year, the Brazilian government created a state nuclear company,
Nuclebrás Equipamentos Pesados (NUCLEP), with the purpose of making replacement
parts for Angra 1 and 2, as well as all the components for future plants.21 An economic
crisis, along with political problems, led to long delays in the construction of the plants:
Angra 1 went into operation in 1985 and Angra 2 in 2001. Both are based on German
PWR technology. Angra 3 is still under construction. Due to the delay in the construction
of the plants, NUCLEP changed its mission to “design, develop, manufacture and market
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

heavy components for nuclear power plants and other projects, meeting the strategic
needs of the nation.”22 Today, the company is in charge of producing the hulls for four
conventional submarines.
Immediately after the signing of the nuclear-cooperation agreement, pressure mounted
against the deal, at home and abroad. Among the latter, both the United States and the
Soviet Union pressured Germany to refrain from transferring ultracentrifuge uranium-
enrichment technology to Brazil. The pressure resulted in a safeguards agreement
among Brazil, West Germany, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
1976, in which Brazil accepted safeguards stricter than those established in the NPT.
These safeguards severely restricted the scope of research that Brazil could carry out.23
In March 1977, the Brazilian government launched the Brazilian Nuclear Program
(BNP), a plan signed by President Geisel, predicated on the view that energy development
was necessary for the country’s economic development.24 The BNP presented the nuclear
agreement with Germany as encompassing four areas of cooperation: prospecting for,
extracting, and processing the Brazilian reserve of uranium; constructing nuclear reactors
and nuclear installations; enriching uranium and fabricating fuel elements; and reproces-
sing spent fuel. The document stated the “undeniable peaceful purpose of the program,”
underscored by the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and expressed Brazil’s support
for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and reaffirmed its strong position in favor of
nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, it criticized the nuclear-arms race, the North-South
technological gap, and the discriminatory restrictions that contributed to superpower con-
dominium. Finally, the document stressed that “the true meaning of non-proliferation is
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and not the spread of nuclear technology for the
benefit of humanity.”25
At home, the West German nuclear deal faced allegations of corruption and technical
problems, leading to the 1978 creation of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry. The
commission investigated the BNP to determine if it could indeed achieve the nuclear tech-
nological autonomy as intended. During the investigations, advocates for the indigenous
development of nuclear technology criticized not only the “jet-nozzle” uranium-enrich-
ment process to be developed with the Germans but also how the agreement marginalized
national scientists and governmental research institutes, including the Nuclear Energy
Research Institute (IPEN). In the end, the commission determined that the agreement
would help address Brazil’s energy problems by diminishing the country’s vulnerability
 622 A.R. DE ALMEIDA SILVA AND J.A.A. DE MOURA

to imported oil and contributing to the aims of the second National Development Plan,
established by President Geisel for the period of 1975–79.26
In sum, the unsatisfactory results of nuclear cooperation with the United States led
Brazil to conclude that it needed to overcome its technological dependence and exploit
its own advantage of possessing large unexploited reserves of uranium. The Commission
of Inquiry concluded that decades of negotiations with the United States amounted to
“twenty-seven years of frustration,” and that it was impossible for Brazil to obtain from
the United States the cooperation it believed it deserved for having chosen US nuclear
technology and buying a pressurized-water reactor from the Westinghouse Electric Cor-
poration for the first Brazilian nuclear power plant, Angra 1.27 Through the nuclear agree-
ment with West Germany, Brazil sought to develop the capability to enrich uranium and
build nuclear-power plants.
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

Due to a variety of difficulties, not least the slowdown of the Brazilian economy, the
agreement failed to achieve the desired results. This contributed to the 1979 decision to
establish a separate program to develop a national uranium-enrichment capability.
Under this decision, the armed forces led the effort, with the collaboration of the Aero-
space Technical Center and IPEN.28

Emulation, security, development, and prestige: the navy nuclear-

propulsion submarine program
The idea of using nuclear power for submarines had circulated within the Brazilian naval
community since at least 1954, when the 1953 article by US Navy Commander E.B. Roth,
titled “Atomic Power—where will it pay first?,” was translated into Portuguese and pub-
lished in Revista Marítima Brasileira (Brazilian Maritime Magazine). The article discussed
the US Navy’s nuclear-submarine program and the advantages of nuclear energy for mili-
tary and civilian use.29
On January 21, 1955, the USS Nautilus became the world’s first nuclear-powered sub-
marine. The event was chronicled in the 1974 book Nuclear Navy, which told the history of
the US naval nuclear-propulsion program, heralding it as an exceptional success of a mili-
tary technological project. The program, under the leadership of Admiral Hyman
G. Rickover, not only made an important contribution to the development of nuclear tech-
nology in the United States, but also radically modified submarine warfare and “made a
profound impact in the fleet.”30 In 1976, an important document was disseminated in
the Brazilian Navy, titled “Brazilian Naval Power Development.”31 The authors, Brazilian
Navy Captains Mario César Flores and Armando Vidigal, analyzed the international
context and adopted the same position expressed by Brazil at the United Nations. They
argued that the superpowers’ objectives were to maintain the status quo and guarantee
their own national interests. To minimize this hegemonic condominium, they called for
the construction of other poles of power, globally as well as regionally. They argued
that the concept of collective hemispheric defense merely cloaked the defense of US inter-
ests. The authors pointed out that the United States had intervened unilaterally in
countries of the region, failed to support Brazil in its confrontation at sea with France
in 1961 (the so-called “Lobster War”), and opposed the nuclear agreement between
Brazil and West Germany.32 Moreover, they argued that Brazil’s economic development
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 623

was generating tension with the United States, including those related to markets, ocean
freight, and sea resources.
Flores and Vidigal reaffirmed the interrelationship between security and development,
citing Brazil’s long and difficult path to becoming a great power. They concluded that,
considering the scarce financial resources available to the navy, Brazilian strategy
should be based on national interests and not the US vision of hemispheric defense.
The Brazilian Navy should be able to dissuade or fight defensive limited wars, including
those between “developed versus developing” states. They also concluded that Brazil
should develop a nuclear program to master nuclear technology, not only to construct
vessels propelled by this type of energy, but also to provide Brazil with the option of build-
ing nuclear weapons if, and only if, another South American country were to do so first.33
Also in 1976, Director-General of Naval Materiel Admiral Eddy Sampaio Espellet
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

visited a shipyard in the United Kingdom and saw the nuclear-powered submarine
HMS Churchill. According to him, the director of the shipyard pointed to the submarine
and said, “Admiral, this is the nuclear submarine that Brazil is going to build in the future;
it’s the best in its class … .”34 After returning to Brazil, he reported his visit to Navy Min-
ister Admiral Geraldo de Azevedo Henning and decided that Othon Luiz Pinheiro da
Silva, a navy engineer officer, should enroll in a nuclear-energy course at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology. After completing the course in 1978, Pinheiroda Silva
reported that it was feasible for the Brazilian Navy to build a nuclear-powered submarine.
According to Espellet, Pinheiro da Silva’s enthusiasm over the feasibility of a gas-centri-
fuge enrichment program, combined with the support of IPEN, led to the navy’s decision
to establish a nuclear program to develop uranium-enrichment technology and build a
prototype reactor to power a submarine.35
One year later, President Geisel approved the nuclear-propulsion submarine program.
In 1980, the navy established an agreement with IPEN to develop the nuclear-propulsion
technology.36 The Brazilian Navy sought to emulate navies with nuclear-powered submar-
ines capable of operating submerged at high speeds for long periods as a way to increase
strategic capacity to operate far from the coast and, at the same time, develop a technology
considered vital to national development.37
The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War justified the program’s security and defense aspects
to Brazilian leaders. The political and strategic development of the conflict—in which the
United States supported the United Kingdom—strengthened Vidigal and Flores’s argu-
ment that Brazilian strategy should be based on national interests and not the US
concept of hemispheric defense. Moreover, the role of UK nuclear submarines in this
war demonstrated their effectiveness in combat operations.38
The navy’s nuclear program was divided in two: the nuclear fuel-cycle program and the
nuclear-propulsion program, both developed by the Navy Technological Center in São
Paulo and subordinate to the Directorate-General of Naval Materiel. The center was
tasked with mastering the technological, industrial, and operational processes of nuclear
facilities applicable to naval propulsion. In 1985, these processes moved from São Paulo
to the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó.39
The program can be divided into three phases. The first, golden phase, began with
resources from the navy, and then received strong financial support from the National
Security Council between 1980 and 1989, allowing it to progress quickly. In 1982, the
program built its first gas centrifuge capable of enriching uranium, and in 1988, it
 624 A.R. DE ALMEIDA SILVA AND J.A.A. DE MOURA

inaugurated its first cascade of centrifuges. This golden phase was followed by a twenty-
year period of extreme difficulties—the vegetative phase—during which the National
Security Council was dissolved and the program moved under the purview of the Sec-
retariat for Strategic Affairs, an agency created in 1990, directly subordinate to the presi-
dent. In 1999, when the Secretariat was dissolved, the program merged into the Nuclear
Scientific-Technical Program of the Ministry of Science and Technology.40 These
changes, along with Brazil’s political and economic difficulties and the government’s
lack of political will to continue the program, vastly reduced the program’s financial
resources. Thus, the navy began to bear an increasing percentage of the program’s
budget, to the detriment of other naval programs and activities. This situation reached
its worst point in 2003–07, when the program became truly vegetative. During this
period, the navy provided the minimum amount of funding needed to ensure the pro-
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

gram’s survival, in the hope that someday the government would prioritize it again.41
The third phase of the program, the institutionalization phase, began in 2007 when, after a
visit to Aramar, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva decided to commit the funds needed to
complete the uranium-enrichment project and to accelerate the development of the nuclear-
powered submarine.42 Besides the financial support for the submarine project, the Brazilian
government institutionalized the program in the 2008 Brazilian National Defense Strategy.43
This was an important step toward transforming a naval program into a strategic state
program; the injection of federal funds allowed other stages of the program to advance,
including the construction of a land-based prototype project laboratory, Laboratório de
Geração Nucleoelétrica (LABGENE), to design, build, operate, and maintain the PWR-
type reactor able to power a submarine as well as other peaceful applications.44
The navy’s nuclear program has contributed to Brazil’s development through a variety of
new technologies, materials, and services. One of the program’s more important achieve-
ments has been the production of gas centrifuges for the Nuclear Industries of Brazil.45
The Aramar Experimental Center has facilitated the development of other peaceful
nuclear activities. Recently, the Brazilian Navy gave the National Nuclear Energy Commis-
sion (CNEN) a large area in Aramar to construct a multipurpose reactor, with completion
scheduled for 2018.46 The reactor will produce isotopes for medical and industrial use and
will contribute to research in nanotechnology, structural biology, and other fields.
Submarine construction is now coordinated by the General Coordination Program of
the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Development Program, created in 2008, subordinate to
the Directorate-General of Naval Materiel. Its task includes managing the design and con-
struction of the base and the shipyard dedicated to submarines, as well as the construction
of both nuclear-powered and conventional submarines.
The 2008 agreement with France regarding the diesel-electric Scorpène-class submar-
ine was intended to reduce technological steps in the construction of the nuclear submar-
ine.47 The agreement required France to transfer the technology to design submarines,
thereby accelerating the construction of the non-nuclear parts of the nuclear-powered
submarine. Additionally, France will provide the torpedoes for the submarines.48 The
agreement did not entail the transfer of nuclear technology. The French submarine
model will be adapted by Brazil to build four conventional submarines and one
nuclear-powered submarine (SN-BR).
In 2013, Amazônia Azul Tecnologias de Defesa (Blue Amazon Defense Technologies),
a public corporation linked to the navy, was created “to promote, develop, transfer and
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 625

maintain sensitive technologies of the activities of the Navy nuclear program, the Submar-
ine Development Program and the Brazilian Nuclear Program.”49
Because this program has been developed by a non-nuclear-weapon state, questions
have arisen over the level of uranium enrichment and the safeguards regime. According
to Rear Admiral André Luis Ferreira Marques, director of the Navy Technological
Center in São Paulo:
All nuclear systems to be used in SN-BR have been designed based on the LABGENE project,
which has been now under civil construction and mechanical assembling in Aramar. The
Center has already tested systems and machines of LABGENE, providing feedback for SN-
BR development. The nuclear fuel of the SN-BR will be the same as in LABGENE, with
ceramic pellets of UO2 [uranium dioxide], with enrichment below 5 percent, inserted into
metallic pins. The Laboratory already has been under the safeguards of the Brazilian-Argentine
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the International
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with design verification inspections already carried out.
The inspections approach for the LABGENE’s reactor operation will be established in nego-
tiations with ABACC/IAEA and CNEN. For the SN-BR, its nuclear fuel will be also under safe-
guards; due to the fact that Brazil has a comprehensive safeguards regime, all its nuclear
installations are under national and international safeguards. The whole set of inspections
techniques, which may be applicable to the SN-BR, is under evaluation by the Center and
CNEN. So far, there is in the world no mobile nuclear installation under safeguards (e.g., sub-
marines, surfaces ships, aircraft carriers and so on). Brazil will be the first country do so. It is
noteworthy that Brazil is the only country, as far as one knows, with international nuclear safe-
guards within its Defense installations, following what its Federal Constitution states.50

Article 13 of the 1991 Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the IAEA, and
ABACC addresses the special procedures regarding nuclear material safeguards on non-
proscribed nuclear activities, such as nuclear propulsion for submarines or other vehicles:
that State Party shall inform the Agency, through ABACC, of the activity, and shall make it
clear: (i) that the use of the nuclear material in such an activity will not be in conflict with any
undertaking of the State Party under agreements concluded with the Agency … and (ii) that
during the period of application of the special procedures the nuclear material will not be
used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices … the State
Party and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, these special procedures shall
apply only while the nuclear material is used for nuclear propulsion or in the operation of
any vehicle, including submarines and prototypes, or in such other non-proscribed
nuclear activity as agreed between the State Party and the Agency.51

High-level defense documents and the institutionalization of the nuclear-

propulsion submarine program
According to a former commander of the Brazilian Navy, two imperatives enabled the cre-
ation and maintenance of the program. The first was the need for a fast submarine capable
of operating far from the coast to provide the navy with “strategic mobility,” the capacity
to move quickly to an area of operations. The second imperative addressed the technologi-
cal apartheid that had always denied developing countries the opportunity to develop
nuclear technology for peaceful uses.52
President Lula’s 2007 visit to Aramar was a turning point for the nuclear-submarine
program, marking when the strategic vision of the navy converged with the government’s
vision of a greater role for Brazil in the international arena. After the visit, President Lula said:
 626 A.R. DE ALMEIDA SILVA AND J.A.A. DE MOURA

Now we have [the] conditions [needed] to complete this project and Brazil can afford to be
one of the few countries in the world to master all the technology of the uranium-enrichment
cycle, and hence, I think we will be much more valued as a nation that intends to be a
great power.53

Lula’s government subsequently endeavored to institutionalize the nuclear-powered sub-

marine program in various high-level defense documents.
The 2012 Brazilian National Defense Policy states that the international order is charac-
terized by asymmetries of power, which produce tensions and instabilities. Disputes over
maritime areas, as well as the aerospace domain and sources of fresh water, food, and
energy could lead to intervention by some states in the internal affairs of others and to
conflict among states. States such as Brazil that have great biodiversity, huge reserves of
natural resources, and immense, untapped areas with untold potential may become the
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

targets of intervention arising from disputes over natural resources. In this context, the
2012 defense policy identifies the Amazon region and the South Atlantic as priorities in
defense planning. Moreover, the document establishes that Brazilian foreign policy
must pay special attention to South America and Western Africa.54
The policy reinforces Brazil’s support for the elimination of nuclear weapons and
reaffirms the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses, according to NPT Articles
IV and VI, respectively. Diplomatic efforts to manage conflicts must be complemented by
a deterrent military strategy, in which strategic mobility has an important role. The docu-
ment establishes three strategic sectors: space, cyber, and nuclear, where the country must
develop technologies in order to reduce foreign dependency and avoid unilateral restric-
tions related to dual-use technologies.55
The National Defense Strategy states that Brazil “shall rise to the first stage in the world
neither promoting hegemony or domination.”56 It considers development and security as
interrelated and maintains that Brazil’s technological development—including nuclear
technology—is essential to achieving national independence. It also demonstrates
concern with the technological gap as it affects the defense sector, and establishes the
aim of developing advanced technologies to overcome external dependency and the uni-
lateral restrictions applied by developed countries. Thus, the document reaffirms the need
to strengthen the nuclear, cyber, and space sectors, considered strategic for the country’s
development and defense.57
The document also stresses that
Brazil is committed—as per the Federal Constitution and international treaties—to the strictly
peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, Brazil also asserts its strategic need to develop and
master nuclear technology. The country needs to ensure the balance and the versatility of its
energy matrix and advance in areas such as agriculture and health, which may benefit from
nuclear technology. And [Brazil] must carry out, among other nuclear-energy initiatives
that require technological independence, the nuclear-propelled submarine project.58

Regarding nonproliferation, the document states that Brazil “will not adhere to amendments
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons … until the nuclear weapon states
advance in the central premise of the Treaty: their own nuclear disarmament.”59
The strategy establishes the following priorities for the nuclear sector: achieving an
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle on an industrial scale and constructing reactors for
Brazil’s exclusive use; implementing measures to discover new deposits of uranium in
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 627

order to intensify its use; improving the capacity to use nuclear energy for other peaceful
activities; and developing human resources specialized in nuclear technology.60
Still, the most important task for the Brazilian Navy remains “sea denial,” i.e., prevent-
ing an enemy from gaining access to the sea.61 Thus, one of the strategic objectives
assigned to the navy is the creation of a strong submarine force based on both conven-
tional and nuclear-powered submarines:
Brazil will maintain and develop its ability to design and manufacture both conventional and
nuclear-propelled submarines. It will speed up investments and the necessary partnerships to
run the nuclear-propelled submarine project. It will arm conventional and nuclear-propelled
submarines with missiles and will develop the capacity to design and manufacture them. It
will seek to gain autonomy in cyber-technologies that guide submarines and their weapon
systems, making [it] possible for them to network with other naval, ground and air forces.62
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

The importance of the submarine in the South Atlantic

The South Atlantic plays an important economic, political, and strategic role in Brazilian
policy. Brazil has consistently sought to guarantee its rights in the South Atlantic through
the international regimes such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The main goals have been to keep this maritime area free of nuclear weapons and military
conflicts, reduce the military presence of extra-regional actors, and construct a South
Atlantic identity among the countries that share this ocean, in order to promote regional
security and development.63
From an economic perspective, Brazil’s link to the ocean is explained by several facts.
Brazil has the longest coastline in the South Atlantic, and the majority of its population
lives within 200 kilometers of the coast. Ninety-five percent of its foreign trade is trans-
ported by sea, and offshore oil reserves are estimated at 35 billion barrels; in November
2015 alone, 820,000 barrels per day were extracted from the “pre-salt layer” under the con-
tinental shelf.64 The maritime space over which Brazil has some sort of jurisdiction rep-
resents approximately 3.5 million square kilometers. However, there is a real possibility
that this area will increase by about 1 million square kilometers, due to Brazil’s request
to extend its continental shelf, submitted to the United Nations Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf. If it succeeds in these claims, Brazil will have jurisdiction
over maritime spaces nearly half as large as its continental area. This maritime area—
known as Amazônia Azul, or Blue Amazon—is where most of its potential oil reserves
are located.65 There is also the possibility of exploiting other mineral resources in the
future. In November 2015, for instance, Brazil signed a fifteen-year contract with the Inter-
national Seabed Authority to explore the cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts in the Rio
Grande Rise in the South Atlantic.66
The economic importance of the South Atlantic has security and implications. It is
therefore possible to understand why Brazil strongly supports the South Atlantic Peace
and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS in its Portuguese acronym), established in 1986 by
the UNGA. The Falklands/Malvinas War demonstrated that the United States favors
the United Kingdom and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the detriment of
its hemispheric defense commitments. This war contributed to an increase in the impor-
tance of the South Atlantic in Brazilian foreign policy and also bolstered efforts to create
ZOPACAS.67 In the opening of the 1985 session of the UNGA, President José Sarney, after
 628 A.R. DE ALMEIDA SILVA AND J.A.A. DE MOURA

reaffirming Brazil’s support for Argentina’s claim to the Malvinas, stated that Brazil would
take all measures necessary to preserve the South Atlantic as a zone of peace, free from
nuclear weapons and conflicts originating in other regions.68
ZOPACAS has twenty-two member states representing both sides of the Atlantic and
seeks to expand cooperation among them in many fields, including defense. The mechan-
ism gained momentum at a 2007 meeting in Luanda, Angola, and continued with the min-
isterial meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, in January 2013, where comprehensive
statements on international politics and a plan of action were adopted.69 The Montevideo
Declaration reaffirms the “commitment to consolidating the South Atlantic as a Zone of
Peace and Cooperation, free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion.”70 This objective is facilitated by the 1968 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean—the Treaty of Tlatelolco, covering the
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

southern part of the Atlantic—and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty—the

Treaty of Pelindaba, which covers the territorial waters of fourteen African states.71 The
Montevideo Declaration also stresses the strong link between disarmament and nonpro-
liferation, demanding advancement in both areas and reaffirming the “inalienable rights of
the Member States of the Zone to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination, in conformity with Articles I, II, III and IV
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.”72
Despite statements about keeping the region free from disputes and conflicting interests
of the great powers, outside actors remain present in the South Atlantic. Among them, the
United Kingdom has a privileged role by controlling a set of positions, through the islands
of Ascension, Saint Helena, and Tristan da Cunha; the Falklands/Malvinas; and the South
Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. The dispute with Argentina over the Falklands/Mal-
vinas Islands is the main point of tension involving an extra-regional country. France is
another important extra-regional actor, by virtue of its position in French Guiana,
home of the Kourou Space Center, which performs launches for France and the European
Space Agency. Finally, the United States, as a maritime superpower, has the capacity to act
globally. The 2008 re-establishment of the Fourth Fleet, subordinate to Southern
Command, whose “area of responsibility” includes the Caribbean and Central and
South America, is embedded in this context.73
As Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister Celso Amorim once told an African diplomat,
“The South Atlantic is, in a way, our lake. We can’t ignore it. If we neglect it, someone
comes up and occupies it. And therefore, we will have problems.”74 The strengthening
of ZOPACAS in order to minimize the influence of extra-regional actors depends on
the political will and the capacity of the countries of the region to ensure peace and
cooperation in the South Atlantic. Adequate naval power of ZOPACAS states is essential,
and constitutes one aim established by ZOPACAS’s Plan of Action.75
The Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine will contribute to this aim. As stated in the
National Defense Strategy, the vessel is considered an important component of an
increased Brazilian presence in the South Atlantic and an important deterrence asset.
As expressed by Vidigal:
The Brazilian Navy, as indeed all the navies of the world, considered the nuclear submarine
the solution to their strategic problem, a kind of technological breakthrough that would place
them on the same level as the most advanced navies in the world. The capacity of the nuclear
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 629

submarine as a war weapon makes it the best deterrent option. This deterrence capability is
further enhanced by what it represents in terms of managerial and technological advance-
ment of the country that is able to develop and use it.76

There is the possibility that other ZOPACAS states will try to emulate Brazil and con-
struct a similar submarine program. The Argentine Navy, for instance, has expressed
interest in a nuclear-propelled submarine.77 Its dispute with the United Kingdom over
the Falklands/Malvinas may be a contributing factor in the decision to create a similar
program, based on Article 3 of a 1991 nuclear agreement between Argentina and
Brazil for the Exclusive Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy: “None of the provisions of the
present Agreement shall limit the right of the Parties to use nuclear energy for the pro-
pulsion of any type of vehicle, including submarines, since propulsion is a peaceful appli-
cation of nuclear energy.”78
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

Conclusion
The decision to create and maintain the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program
was primarily based on the navy’s desire to improve its strategic capability by emulating
technologically advanced navies. Two additional reasons contributed to the program’s
development: Brazil’s aspiration to master an important technology for national develop-
ment and its ambition for a more significant role on the world stage. Thus, the nuclear-
powered submarine symbolically and materially unites the goals that Brazil has pursued
since at least the 1960s: security, technological development, prestige, and power on the
international stage.
In the Brazilian view, national development implies the reduction of foreign depen-
dency, especially concerning so-called “sensitive technologies.” The Brazilian perception,
consolidated over time, and expressed at the United Nations, is that there is a condomi-
nium of the most developed nations trying to limit the technological capability of devel-
oping countries in order to maintain the status quo. This structural constraint is
particularly pronounced in the nuclear global order, where there is an unabated reliance
on nuclear weapons in the defense postures of the nuclear-weapon states and a failure to
implement Article VI of the NPT, while there are increasing restrictions on the develop-
ment of peaceful nuclear technology.79
Domestically, Brazil’s search for nuclear independence exhibited a tension between two
groups: those that advocated cooperation with established nuclear powers and those that
advocated autonomous nuclear development. The first group initially prevailed, and Brazil
pursued cooperation with the United States and subsequently with West Germany.
Although this route was pursued for decades, it ultimately failed to achieve the desired
results. Ultimately, those who argued for the autonomous development of nuclear
energy were vindicated.
The nuclear-powered submarine program is based on the idea of an autonomous
nuclear capability. Brazilian officials view external concerns and criticism of the
program as a tool to deny Brazil its right to develop nuclear technology and improve
its military capabilities.80 The program has demonstrated that at least three conditions
are necessary to construct a nuclear-powered submarine: political will, financial resources,
and technological capacity. After languishing for years, the program now appears to have
 630 A.R. DE ALMEIDA SILVA AND J.A.A. DE MOURA

found the required conditions necessary for its eventual success. Nevertheless, there is still
a long way to go before a Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine will be “underway on
nuclear power.”81

Notes
1. Armando A. F. Vidigal, A Evolução do Pensamento Estratégico Naval Brasileiro [Evolution of
Brazilian Naval Strategic Thought] (Rio de Janeiro: Escola de Guerra Naval, 1982), pp. 123–
26.
2. Amado L. Cervo, Inserção Internacional: Formação dos Conceitos Brasileiros [International
Insertion: Formation of Brazilian Concepts] (São Paulo: Saraiva. 2008), p. 133.
3. Ministry of External Relations, A Palavra do Brasilnas Nações Unidas 1946-1995 [The Word
of Brazil at the United Nations 1946–1995] (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, 1985),
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

pp. 215–24.
4. Ibid., pp. 225–59.
5. João R. Martins Filho, “O projeto do submarino nuclear brasileiro [The Brazilian Nuclear
Submarine Project],” Contexto Internacional, July/December, 2011, <[Link]/scielo.
php?pid=S0102-85292011000200002&script=sci_arttext>.
6. Cervo, Inserção Internacional: Formação dos Conceitos Brasileiros, pp. 132–33.
7. United Nations, “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A historical per-
spective,” 1998, <[Link]/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_
[Link]#HistoricalPerspective>.
8. Brazilian Federal Senate, Decree no. 62.232, “Cria a Comissão Interministerial sobre a
Exploração e Utilização do Fundo dos Mares e Oceanos [Creation of the Interministerial
Commission on the Exploration and Use of the Seas and Oceans Seabed],” Brasília: Diário
Oficial da União, February 7, 1968, <[Link]
action?id=117938&tipoDocumento=DEC&tipoTexto=PUB>.
9. Ministry of External Relations, A Palavra do Brasilnas Nações Unidas 1946–1995, p. 240.
10. Presidential decree No. 1098, “Altera o limite do mar territorial e dáoutrasprovidências
[Changes to territorial sea limits and other orders],” Brasília, March 25, 1970.
11. Ministry of External Relations, A Palavra do Brasil nas Nações Unidas 1946–1995, p. 267.
12. Ministry of the Navy, Fatos da História Naval, p. 5.
13. Interministerial Commission on Sea Resources, “Welcome!,” n.d., <[Link]/secirm/
ingles/[Link]>.
14. Therezinha de Castro, Atlântico Sul: Geopolítica e Geoestratégica [South Atlantic: Geopolitics
and Geostrategy] (Rio de Janeiro, Escola Superior de Guerra: 1998), pp. 19–21.
15. Ministry of External Relations, A Palavra do Brasilnas Nações Unidas 1946–1995, pp. 299–
309.
16. Ibid., pp. 311–19.
17. Ibid., p. 331.
18. National Commission on Nuclear Energy, “Acordo Nuclear Brasil e Alemanha (1975)
[Nuclear Agreement Brazil and Germany], n.d., <[Link]
cronologia/ARQ_ACORDO_CPDOC.pdf>.
19. Norman Gall, “Atoms for Brazil, danger for all,” Foreign Policy 23, Summer 1976, pp. 155–
201.
20. National Commission on Nuclear Energy, “Acordo Nuclear Brasil e Alemanha.”
21. See “Timeline: The history of NUCLEP as part of the development of the Brazilian Nuclear
Program,” Nuclebrás Equipamentos Pesados (NUCLEP), n.d., <[Link]/linha-
tempo>.
22. “Defense,” NUCLEP, n.d., <[Link]/defesa>.
23. Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 26 February 1976 Between the Agency, Brazil and the
Federal Republic of Germany, INFCIRC/237, May 26, 1976, <[Link]/sites/default/
files/[Link]>.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 631

24. Federal Republic of Brazil, “Programa Nuclear Brasileiro [Brazilian Nuclear Program],” Bra-
sília, March 1997.
25. Ibid., p. 22.
26. Federal Senate, “CPI do Acordo Nuclear Brasil e Alemanha [Parliamentary Commission of
Inquiry on the Brazil-Germany Nuclear Agreement],” June 25, 1982, <[Link]/
web/atividade/materias/-/materia/40104>.
27. Ibid., p. 110.
28. Fernanda das Graças Corrêa, “O projeto do submarino nuclear brasileiro: Uma historia de
ciencia, tecnologia, e soberania [Brazil’s nuclear submarine project: A history of science, tech-
nology, and sovereignty],” (Rio de Janeiro: Capax Dei, 2009), pp. 70–74; National Commis-
sion on Nuclear Energy, “Acordo Nuclear Brasil e Alemanha.”
29. E.B. Roth, “Onde a Energia Atômica Daráos Primeiros Resultados [Where Will Atomic
Energy Deliver First],” Revista Marítima Brasileira, numbers 10–12, April, May, June
1954, pp. 845–66.
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

30. Richard [Link] and Francis Duncar, Nuclear Navy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1974), p. 376.
31. Armando Amorim Ferreira Vidigal and Mário César Flores, Desenvolvimento do Poder Naval
Brasileiro. Tópicos para o Debate [Brazilian Naval Power Development: Topics for Debate]
(Brasília: Estado-Maior da Armada, 1976).
32. The so-called “Lobster War” was a diplomatic crisis involving Brazil and France over the Bra-
zilian government’s prohibition on lobster fishing by French fishing boats off the northeast
Brazilian coast. The countries sent warships to the region but naval combat did not ensue.
33. Vidigal and Flores, Desenvolvimento do Poder Naval Brasileiro, pp. 78–79.
34. Eddy Sampai Espellet, “Cartas dos Leitores [Letters to Readers],” Revista Marítima Brasileira
129, 2009, p. 202.
35. Ibid.
36. “History,” Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research, n.d., <[Link]/portal_por/portal/
[Link]?secao_id=571>.
37. The phenomenon of military emulation is defined as the “deliberate imitation by one state of
any aspect of another state’s military system that bears upon its own system.” João Resende-
Santos, Neorealism, States and the Modern Mass Army (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), p. 9.
38. Admiral Sandy Woodward with Patrick Robson, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the
Falklands Battle Group Commander (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1992),
pp. 122–24; 146–64.
39. Vera Dantas, “CTMSP: impactos positivos para a região de Iperó [CTMSP: Positive impacts
for the Iperó Region],” no 41, 2013 <[Link]/revista-brasil-nuclear/edicao-n-41/
especial_3>.
40. Julio Soares de Moura Neto, “O Programa Nuclear da Marinha [The Brazilian Navy Nuclear
Program],” September 12, 2007, <[Link]/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/
comissoes-permanentes/cme/audiencias-publicas/anos-anteriores/2007/12-09-2007-apresen
tacao-do-programa-nuclear-da-marinha/material/Programa%20Nuclear%20da%20Marin
[Link]>.
41. Ibid.
42. “Lula anuncialiberação de recursos para o programa nuclear da Marinha [Lula announces
release of funds for the Navy’s nuclear program,” Folha Online, August 10, 2009, <www1.
[Link]/folha/dinheiro/[Link]>.
43. “Estratégia Nacional de Defesa,” Brazilian Ministry of Defense, December 17, 2008.
44. “Área nuclear: desenvolvimento para o future [The nuclear area: development for the
future],” Marinhaem Revista Number 10, June 2014, <[Link]/hotsites/
marinhaemrevista/junho_2014/[Link]>.
45. National Congress, “Livro Branco da Defesa Nacional [National Defense White Paper],” Leg-
islative Decree no. 373/2013, p. 68, <[Link]/doc/104866394/Livro-Branco-Da-
Defesa-Nacional#scribd>.
 632 A.R. DE ALMEIDA SILVA AND J.A.A. DE MOURA

46. Almirante Carlos Passos Bezerril, “O Centro Technológico da Marinhaem São Paulo [The
Navy Technological Center in São Paulo],” Boletim Informativo no. 55, 2014.
47. Julio Soares de Moura Neto, “A importância da construção do submarine de propulsão
nuclear brasileiro [The importance of building the Brazilian nuclear propulsion submarine],”
Techno News, April/May 2009, pp. 20–22, <[Link]/7dn/comsocial/Comandan
[Link]>.
48. José A. A. Fragelli, “Marinha do Brasil-COGESN,” Seminário Amazônia Azul [Blue Amazon
Seminar], <[Link]/>.
49. Amazonia Azul Technologias de Defesa S.A, “Sobre a Amazul,” n.d., <[Link]/
amazul/empresa/sobre-a-amazul>.
50. André Luis Ferreira Marques, Director of the Navy Technological Center in São Paulo, email
correspondence with the author Antônio Ruy de Almeida Silva, January 27, 2016.
51. Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazi-
lian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, and the Inter-
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

national Atomic Energy Agency for the Applications of Safeguards, p. 6, <[Link].

br/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Acordo-Quadripartite-ingl%C3%[Link]>.
52. Julio Soares de Moura Neto, “A importância da construção do submarino de propulsão
nuclear brasileiro [The importance of constructing the Brazilian nuclear-propulsion submar-
ine],” Defesa Aérea & Naval, <[Link]/a-importancia-da-construcao-
do-submarino-de-propulsao-nuclear-brasileiro/>.
53. “Lula anuncia liberação de recursos para o programa nuclear da Marinha [Lula announces
release of funds for the Navy’s nuclear program],” Folha Online, August 10, 2009, <www1.
[Link]/folha/dinheiro/[Link]>.
54. “Política Nacional de Defesa [National Defense Policy],” Ministry of Defense, Brasília, 2012,
pp. 17–23.
55. Ibid., pp. 25, 32.
56. “National Strategy of Defense,” Ministry of Defense, 1st edition, December 17, 2008, p. 8.
57. Ibid., pp. 41–44.
58. Ibid., pp. 12.
59. Ibid., p. 34.
60. Ibid., pp. 33.
61. Ibid., p. 20.
62. Ibid., p. 21.
63. United Nations General Assembly, “Declaration of a zone of peace and cooperation in the
South Atlantic,” A/RES/41/11, October 27, 1986; Antonio Aguiar de Patriota, Speech at
the VII Ministerial Meeting of ZOPACAS, <[Link]/[Link]?option=
com_content&view=article&id=4547:vii-reuniao-ministerial-da-zona-de-paz-e-cooperacao-
do-atlantico-sul-zopacas-texto-base-do-discurso-do-ministro-antonio-de-aguiar-patriot
a-montevideu-15-de-janeiro-de-2013&catid=194&Itemid=454&lang=pt-BR>.
64. Agência Nacional de Petróleo, “Produção de Petróleo e Gás no Pré-sal tem aumentoem
novembro [Oil and Gas production increased in November],” 2015 <[Link]
com/portal/?p=12288>.
65. Brazilian Navy, A Amazônia Azul: Patrimônio Brasileiro No Mar [The Blue Amazon: Brazi-
lian patrimony in the sea], n.d., <[Link]
66. International Seabed Authority, “Isa and Companhia de Pesquisa de Recursos Minerais of
Brazil Sign Exploration Contract,” Jamaica, November 9, 2015, <[Link]/news/isa-
and-companhia-de-pesquisa-de-recursos-minerais-brazil-sign-exploration-contract>.
67. Castro, Atlântico Sul: Geopolítica e Geoestratégica [The South Atlantic: Geopolitics and Geos-
trategy] (Rio de Janeiro: Escola Superior de Guerra, 1998).
68. Ministry of External Relations, A Palavra do Brasilnas Nações Unidas 1946-1995, p. 444.
69. “Montevideo Declaration,” Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Zone of Peace and
Cooperation of the South Atlantic, <[Link]
Montevideo-Declaration-Seventh-Ministerial-meeting-of-the-Zone-of-Peace-and-Cooperati
[Link]>.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 633

70. Ibid.
71. Antonio Aguiar Patriota, speech at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of ZOPACAS.
72. “Montevideo Declaration,” p. 5.
73. Antônio Ruy de Almeida Silva,“O Atlântico Sul na Perspectiva da Segurança e da Defesa [The
South Atlantic from a security and defense perspective],” in Reginaldo Mattar Nasser and
Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes, eds., O Brasil e a Segurança no seu Entorno Estratégico.
América do Sul e Atlântico Sul (Brasília: Ipea, 2014).
74. Celso Amorim, “Conversas com jovens diplomatas [Conversation with young diplomats],”
São Paulo, Benvirá, 2011, p. 490.
75. “Montevideo Declaration,” p. 5.
76. Armando Amorim Ferreira Vidigal, A evolução do pensamento estratégico naval brasileiro-
meados da década de 70 atéos diasatuais [The Evolution of Brazilian Strategic Naval
Thought—from the seventies to today] (Rio de Janeiro: Clube Naval, 2002), p. 18.
77. Daniel Gallo, “Promete Garré que se construirá un submarine nuclear en el país [Garré
Downloaded by [José Augusto Abreu de Moura] at 15:34 22 August 2017

promises that a nuclear submarine will be built in the country],” La Nacion, June 4, 2010,
<[Link]/1271651-promete-garre-que-se-construira-un-submarino-nuclear-
en-el-pais>.
78. Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the
Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy. Guadalajara, México, 18 July 1991<[Link].
[Link]/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/10/[Link]>.
79. Antônio Ruy de Almeida Silva e Mariana Oliveira do Nascimento Plum, “Nuclear Disarma-
ment and Proliferation: Can we get the genie back into the bottle?,” World Politics of Security
(Rio de Janeiro: Konrad–Adnauer-Stifung, 2015). <[Link]/wf/doc/17310-1442-5-30.
pdf>.
80. Toghzan Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity, (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), pp. 29–34; Andrea de Sá, “Brazil’s
Nuclear Submarine Program,” Nonproliferation Review 22 (March 2015), pp. 15–19; Paul
Taylor, “Why does Brazil need nuclear submarines?,” Proceedings, June 2009, <[Link].
org/magazines/proceedings/2009-06/why-does-brazil-need-nuclear-submarines>.
81. This historic message was sent by the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, the USS Nau-
tilus, on January 17, 1955, to announce the success of the program. We are using in the text in
a symbolic way.