Grand Boulevard Hotel v.

Genuine Labor Organization

Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied

Industries Silahis International Hotel Chapter (GLOWHRAIN-Silahis) (respondent
union for brevity) and the petitioner Grand Boulevard Hotel (then Silahis
International Hotel, Inc.) executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
covering the period from 1985 to 1988. The hotel thereafter dismissed some of
its employees and suspended others who were members of the union. The
respondent union filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor and
Employment alleging illegal dismissal, suspension, violation of the terms of the
CBA and harassments.

The DOLE issued an order that the parties undergo compulsory arbitration
pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code; and further directing the employees
to return to work within forty-eight hours from receipt of the order, and for the
petitioner to accept all returning employees under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the labor dispute. The union filed for another notice of strike
and the DOLE again ordered the compulsory arbitration process. A third CBA
was signed by the parties, but the hotel put the union director under preventive
suspension.

The union filed a third notice of strike. Thereafter, the hotel issued a letter for the
retrenchment of several employees on the ground of financial losses due to the
weakening tourism industry. The union informed the DOLE that it will conduct a
strike vote referendum. The result ruled in favor of the strike.

The hotel pursued its retrenchment policies and terminated employees under the
first in first out basis involving seventy employees until the hotel announced that
it will stop its operations within six months.

The fourth notice of strike was filed and the employees decided to picket the
premises of the hotel preventing ingress and egress. The police officers
dispersed the picket line and detained the union president. The officers of the
union were also terminated from employment for allegedly participating in an
illegal strike. The Secretary of Labor issued an order finding fault in both parties
for causing the continued deterioration of their relationship.

The Hotel then filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal strike against the union.
The NLRC declared the strike illegal for failure to comply with the order enjoining
any strike or lockout. The Labor Arbiter, although sympathetic with the
respondent union, held that for the latter's failure to comply with the requirements
laid down in Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, the strike that was staged
was illegal. Considering the admissions of the individual respondents that they
participated in the said strike, the termination of their employment by the
petitioner was legal. The Labor Arbiter noted that if as alleged by the respondent
union the petitioner was guilty of ULP, it should have filed a complaint therefor
against the petitioner and/or its officials for which the latter could have been
meted penal and administrative sanctions as provided for in Article 272 of the
Labor Code. The respondent union failed to do so. The NLRC affirmed the
decision of the labor arbiter.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decisions of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, the
CA took into account the observation of the Solicitor General that the petitioner
(Silahis) retrenched employees pending the resolution of the certified cases
respecting the alleged illegal suspension and dismissals effected by the
petitioner during and prior to the notices of strike filed by the union. The Solicitor
General opined that even if the strike was staged without the proper notice and
compliance with the cooling-off period, resort thereto was simply triggered by the
petitioners' belief in good faith that respondent Silahis was engaged in ULP.

Issue:

Whether the union complied with the requirements under the labor law to conduct
a strike in accordance with law.

Ruling:

No. A striker cannot invoke good faith where assumption orders of the SOLE,
which operate as an injunction against a prospective strike, are disregarded. The
respondents failed to prove that the petitioner had committed any ULP on the
respondents and its employees. The testimony of respondent Rogelio Soluta and
the other officers of the respondent union before the Labor Arbiter did not
constitute sufficient proof of ULP. If the respondents perceived that the petitioner
committed ULP, the matter should have been threshed out with the appropriate
labor tribunal (NLRC or CA). Instead, the respondents staged a strike. Thus, the
retrenchment by the petitioner of its employees was within its prerogative and
was necessitated.

In this case, the respondent union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on
November 16, 1990 and on the same day, staged a picket on the premises of the
hotel, in violation of the law. Police operatives of the Western Police District had
to disperse the picketers and take into custody Union President the other officers
of respondent union. The respondents cannot argue that since the second notice
of strike were for the same grounds as those contained in their first notice of
strike which complied with the requirements of the law on the cooling-off period,
strike ban, strike vote and strike vote report, the strike staged by them was
lawful. The matters contained in the notice of strike of had already been taken
cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued a status quo ante bellum order
enjoining the respondent union from intending or staging a strike. Despite the
SOLE order, the respondent union nevertheless staged a strike simultaneously
with its notice of strike, thus violating Article 264(a) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended, which reads:

Art. 264. . . .

No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the

President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike or lockout.

While it may be true that the petitioner itself barred the officers of the respondent
union from working and had terminated the employment of Kristoffer So, and
sent out circulars of its decision to retrench its employees effective December 16,
1990, the same were not valid justifications for the respondents to do away with
the statutory procedural requirements for a lawful strike. It behooved the
respondents to avail themselves of the remedies under the CBA or file an illegal
dismissal case in the office of the Labor Arbiter against the petitioner or by
agreement of the parties, submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA
so that the matter may be subjected to voluntary arbitrary proceedings instead of
resorting to an immediate strike.

There was no immediate and imperative need for the respondents to stage a
strike on the very day that the notice of strike on November 16, 1990 was filed
because the retrenchment envisaged by the petitioner had yet to take effect on
December 14, 1990. The grievances of the respondent union could still very well
be ordered and acted upon by the SOLE before December 14, 1990.

The respondents' claim of good faith is not a valid excuse to dispense with the
procedural steps for a lawful strike.