Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20216 and L-20217      November 29, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
TIBURCIO BALBAR, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Pedro M. Belmi for defendant-appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

On August 20, 1960 defendant-appellee Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room where
schoolteacher Ester Gonzales, complainant herein, was conducting her classes. Without warning
and right after complainant had finished writing on the blackboard, defendant allegedly placed his
arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Shocked, complainant instinctively pushed Balbar away
and tried to flee. Defendant allegedly brought out his "daga" (a local dagger) and pursued
complainant, catching up with her before she was able to get out of the room. Defendant embraced
her again, at the same time holding on to his "daga". They both fell to the floor, as a result of which
complainant sustained slight physical injuries.

Two informations, one for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority and another for Acts of
Lasciviousness (Criminal Cases Nos. 823 and 841 respectively) were filed by the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal against defendant before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, the latter charge
upon written complaint filed by the offended party duly sworn to before the Clerk of Court.

The information for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority is hereunder quoted:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of Assault
upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Camba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss
Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school building of Lian, duly qualified and
appointed as such and while in the performance of her official duties or on the occasion
therefor, by then and there pulling his dagger, braced and kissed, and repeatedly trying to
embrace and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with
the aggravating circumstances of having committed it inside the public school building and
during school classes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The information for Acts of Lasciviousness reads:

At the instance of the offended party in the above-entitled case the undersigned Assistant Provincial
Fiscal accuses TIBURCIO BALBAR of the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in the Barrio of Cumba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with the deliberate intent to satisfy his lust, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of lasciviousness on the person of Miss Ester
Gonzales, a public school teacher, by then and there placing himself close to her, embracing
and kissing her against her will and by means of force, and as a consequence thereof said
offended party fell to the floor resulting to her injury which caused her pain and tenderness
on the right side of the trunk on the posterior surface of the right arm which injuries may
require 3 to 4 days to heal; that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance
that the same was perpetrated inside the public school building and during class hour.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The accused filed separate motions to quash, contending that "(a) with respect to Criminal Case No.
823 for Direct Assault, the information does not charge a sufficient cause of action and that it
charges two offenses in a single complaint; and (b) with respect to Criminal Case No. 841 for Acts of
Lasciviousness, . . . that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy and that the complaint
charges two offenses." On August 16, 1962, over the opposition of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal,
the court a quo issued an order quashing the two informations. Said the court:

After reading the informations in both criminal cases, the Court agrees with counsel that the
acts committed by the accused as alleged in the two informations constitute one offense.

As regards the motion to quash filed in Criminal Case No. 841, the grounds alleged in
support thereof are: (1) that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy; and (2) that
the criminal complaint charges two offenses. Without discussing the merits of these grounds
above-quoted, the Court believes that the information filed in Criminal Case No. 841 should
be dismissed or quashed for the reason that the offense charged therein is already absorbed
in the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 823.

Thus, the dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, it is the opinion of this Court that the information in Criminal Case No. 823
which charges only unjust vexation or physical injuries should be quashed for the reason that
the same is within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace. And, as to the
information in criminal Case No. 841, the same should likewise be quashed on the ground
that the acts complained of is already included in Criminal No. 823.

From this order, the Government interposed the present appeal.

Stated differently in the rationale of its order, the court a quo quashed Criminal Case No. 823 on the
following ground: That "while the offense is designated as direct assault, nevertheless the main
allegations of the information may at most constitute unjust vexation for the reason that an important
element of the crime of direct assault is conspicuously absent in the information. This essential
element is the knowledge of the accused that the victim is a person in authority. . . .This being the
case and since . . . sufficient allegations are contained in the information in question to hold the
accused responsible for an offense, the Court believes that the information is sufficient in substance
to at least constitute unjust vexation or physical injuries."
Direct assault is committed "by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, . . . shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance." (See Art.
148, Revised Penal Code.)

By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors, and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed
persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Article 148." This special classification is obviously
intended to give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the performance of their official
duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the information on the ground that there is no express
allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person
in authority. This is clearly erroneous.

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that fact,
since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew
that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not that
such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority
being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his
part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal
(De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil.
254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.

With respect to the dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, we agree with the
conclusion reached by the court a quo. Although it is true that the same acts may constitute more
than one offense, we are of the opinion, upon an examination of the events which gave rise to the
filing of the two aforementioned informations, that the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness does not
appear to have been committed at all.

It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing just what conduct
makes one amendable to the provisions of article 439 (now article 336) of the Penal Code.
What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the circumstances of
each case. It may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts are lewd
and lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another case to say where the line of
demarcation lies between such conduct and the amorous advances of an ardent lover. (U. S.
v. Gomez, 30 Phil. 22, 25)

The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the
environmental circumstances. In the instant case, considering the manner, place and time under
which the acts complained of were done, even as alleged in the information itself, lewd designs can
hardly be attributed to accused. The factual setting, i.e., a schoolroom in the presence of
complainant's students and within hearing distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion that
the accused was actuated by a lustful design or purpose or that his conduct was lewd or lascivious.
It may be that he did embrace the girl and kiss her but, this of itself would not necessarily bring the
case within the provision of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the order of the court a quo quashing the information for Direct Assault is hereby set
aside and this case is remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits; and with respect to the
dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, the same is hereby affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39275         December 20, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
RICARDO MENDOZA, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellant.

Zoilo Hilario for appellee.

DIAZ, J.:

In criminal case No. 4851 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, the provincial fiscal thereof
filed an information against the herein appellee, which reads as follows:

The undersigned provincial fiscal accuses Ricardo Mendoza of the crime of assault upon a
person in authority committed as follows:

That on or about September 30,1932, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of

Pampanga, Philippine Islands, the said accused, Ricardo Mendoza, being a pupil of the
teacher Iluminada Tinio, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack and lay
hands upon her person, to wit: slapped said Iluminada Tinio on one of her cheeks, while she
was engaged in the performance of her duties as such teacher and while she was within the
premises of the high school building exercising the functions inherent in such capacity.

Upon motion of the appellee, as accused in the aforesaid case, the trial court dismissed the
information on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute a crime but simply a
misdemeanor or light felony. The present appeal was taken by the fiscal for the purpose of setting
aside the order of dismissal in question.

The question to decide, therefore, is whether or not the facts as alleged in the said information really
constitute the crime of assault upon a person in authority or at least an assault upon an agent of
authority, or any other grave or light felony.

The fiscal bases his appeal on the findings of this court in the cases of People vs. Villacenda (G.R.
No. 32596, promulgated April 26,1930, not reported); People vs. Lagrimas (G.R. No. 33529,
promulgated April 8,1931, not reported); and People vs. Tacud (56 Phil., 800) wherein a question
similar to the one under consideration was discussed and decided, claiming that the facts as alleged
in the information constitute an assault upon a public officer and agent of authority at the same time.
In the three cases above-cited, this court, in modifying one and affirming two of the judgments
rendered by the courts a quo, really held that the acts committed by the defendants therein
constituted the crime of assault upon a public officer and, therefore, they should be sentenced to the
penalty prescribed in article 251 of the old Penal Code. The reason for such doctrine is based on the
fact that the said article, as explained in the case of People vs. Mijares (44 Phil., 684), provided as
follows:

The maximum degree of the penalty prescribed in the last paragraph of the preceding article
shall be imposed upon those who shall have employed the force or the intimidation
mentioned in No. 1 of article 249 for the object indicated in No. 1 of article 229 or who shall
have placed hands upon persons coming to the assistance of the authority or upon its
agents or upon public officers.

Inasmuch as the afore-cited article was in force at the time the decisions in the three cases were
promulgated and the acts complained of therein had been committed long before the present
Revised Penal Code went into effect, it was necessary that the defendants and appellants in the
aforesaid cases be convicted of the crimes with which they had been charged and sentenced later to
the penalty prescribed in the afore-cited article. The reason is obvious because said acts constituted
a violation of the article in question, as held by this court.

However, the truth is that said article 251 was not fully reproduced in the Revised Penal Code as
shown by article 149 thereof. The article in question now reads as follows:

The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall make use of force or
intimidation upon any person coming to the aid of the authorities or their agents on occasion
of the commission of any of the crimes defined in the next preceding article.

It will be noted that the Legislature suppressed and omitted all reference to public officers in the
article just cited, which necessarily conveys the idea that it did not intend to make the same
applicable to cases of assault upon public officers who are not persons in authority or agents
thereof. And there cannot be the least shadow of a doubt that a teacher is not a person in authority
in the strict sense of the phrase, as employed in article 148, on the ground that he does not exercise
a directly vested jurisdiction. Neither is he an agent of authority on the ground that, as has been held
in the case of United States vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil., 472), wherein Viada was cited in support thereof,
agents of authority are only those persons who, by direct provision of law, or by appointment by
competent authority, are charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and
security of life and property, and those who come to the aid of persons in authority.

It is true that Viada said that by implication and in accordance with the final section of article 264 of
the Spanish Penal Code, which corresponds to the aforesaid article 251 of our old Penal Code, it
may be affirmed that for the purposes of the said article, public officers are also entitled to be
considered as agents of authority. However, such consideration was due to the fact that assault
upon public officers was penalized likewise in the said article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code.

A teacher is not a person in authority on the ground that he does not possess the necessary
requisite thereof prescribed by law. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines a person in
authority as follows:

In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person
directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority.
The word "authority" has been given a restricted meaning in the case of United States vs. Smith (39
Phil., 533), so as to include only persons who perform some of the functions of the Government of
the Philippine Islands and who according to the aforesaid article, are directly vested with jurisdiction.
By "directly vested jurisdiction" is meant "the power or authority to govern and execute the laws,
particularly the authority vested in the judges to administer justice, that is, to try civil or criminal
cases or both, and to render judgment thereon in accordance with the law" (Escriche, Rational
Dictionary of Legislation and Jurisprudence, p. 1154); and "authority" as well as "directly vested
jurisdiction" are two things which should be conferred by law.

The Administrative Code, which creates the Executive Department and the bureaus and offices
dependent on it, for the purpose of exercising the executive functions of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, is silent with regard to powers had or which may be had by high school teachers,
in defining those vested in functionaries of the aforesaid offices. The Code in question only defines
the duties and powers of the Director of Education and of the division superintendents. Nothing is
said about principals, except that their authority should be determined by the Director of Education,
and much less about high school teachers. The powers granted to the said Director of Education
and division superintendents are very limited and are not for purposes of government nor execution
of any law, but only as provided for in section 910 et seq. of the aforesaid Code.

There can be no doubt that a teacher is not a person in authority not only on the grounds already
stated but also because the distinction between the two may be inferred clearly from the very
provisions of article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. After defining less serious physical injuries, the
law provides as follows:

Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender's parents, ascendants,
guardians, curators, teachers, or persons of rank, or persons in authority, shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, provided that, in the case of
persons in authority, the deed does not constitute the crime of assault upon such persons.

If the Legislature had not intended to exclude teachers from the category of persons in authority or
agents thereof, it would have omitted them from the enumeration of those against whom the act, as
defined therein, may be committed and for which a heavier penalty is provided.

There is no question that a teacher is a public officer inasmuch as it is an actual fact that he
performs part of the public functions of the Government. Furthermore, the same ruling has been
established in the afore-cited cases of Villacenda, Lagrimas and Tacud. However, this cannot be
construed to mean that every public officer is at the same time an agent of authority.

Commenting on articles 263 and 264 in connection with article 416 of the Spanish Penal Code,
which corresponds to articles 249, 250 and 401, respectively, of our old Penal Code and from which
articles 148, 149 and 203 of the Revised Penal Code had been taken, with slight alterations,
although assault upon public officers has been omitted in the latter Code, Groizard has said:

Are public officers agents of persons in authority? If not, may they be the subject of assault
although they are not included in article 263 which describes and defines said crime? And if
they should be so, in the case stated in the last paragraph of article 264, shall it be
understood that may also be, in all the cases relative to persons in authority and their agents
as stated in article 263? To decide these questions, it is necessary to know beforehand who
are public officers. Article 416 defines them as: those who, by direct provision of law, popular
election, or appointment by competent authority, take part in the performance of public
functions. From the above cited provision, it follows that every agent of authority is a public
officer but not every public officer is an agent of authority. The officers of a ministry and
 those of provincial governments are public officers inasmuch as they perform functions
intended for the preservation and government of the State, yet in spite of it, they are not in
authority nor agents thereof. They are not persons in authority on the ground that they are
not directly vested with jurisdiction either individually or as members of some court or public
corporation. They are not agents of authority because, as subordinate officers, they are not
charged with the task of executing the orders of any such person. This important difference
should be borne in mind so as not to mistake offices for functions.

The same Code, speaking of the laying of hands upon agents of authority or upon public
officers defines the difference between one and the other. Therefore, an agent of authority
cannot be confused with a public officer when the legislator himself speaks of them
separately.

Therefore, inasmuch as public officers are not agents of authority, it seems that, generally
speaking, they cannot be the subject of the crime of assault, as defined in article 263, on the
ground that said article considers assault as only those acts committed upon persons in
authority and their agents, it being silent with regard to public officers.

It is true that there is a manifest contradiction between the generic doctrine of article 263 and
the specific statement of article 264 relative to penalty. It is true that if there can never be any
crime of assault upon mere public officers for want of one of the essential requisites thereof
as stated in article 263, neither can the last paragraph of article 264, relative to public
officers, have any application even if the guilty parties lay hands on them. Yet, what can we
do? There is conflict in the law and it is useless to pretend not to notice it. (Groizard, Penal
Code, vol. 3, p.468.)

It is for the specific purpose of clarifying the law and eliminating such conflict that the Legislature
suppressed the phrase "public officers" in enacting article 149 of the Revised Penal Code, which is a
reproduction of the afore-cited article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code. It therefore becomes clear that
the crime of assault cannot be committed against a public officer unless he is a person in authority or
agent thereof at the same time.

For further elucidation of the matter, it was held in three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain:
one of May 7,1874, another of November 16, 1889, and the other of October 8, 1901, that a teacher
of a public primary school, a professor in a higher school for teachers, and instructors in public
primary schools, are public officers. (Jose Garcia and Romero de Tejada, Penal Monographs on
Assaults upon Persons in Authority and Their Agents, Resistance and Disobedience, p. 80; Alcubilla,
Dictionary of Spanish Administration, vol. I, p. 742; and Viada, Revised Penal Code of 1870, Fourth
Supplement, p.281.)

The afore-cited reasons show that a teacher is neither a person in authority nor an agent thereof but
merely a public officer, and therefore, the assault committed upon him while he is engaged in the
performance of his duties as such does not constitute assault upon a person in authority nor an
agent thereof.

There is no question that the acts complained of, as alleged in the complaint, constitute light felony,
whether they be considered under the provisions of article 359 (Slander by Deed), or of article 266
(Maltreatment) of the Revised Penal Code. However, inasmuch as the complaint does not allege the
motive of the defendant in maltreating the aforesaid teacher, in the manner he had so done, nor the
fact that the act was committed publicly, it is more proper and more in accordance with the law to
consider the aforesaid acts as merely constituting light felony as defined and penalized in the said
article 266, with the third aggravating circumstance. In such case, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to
try the case by reason of the penalty therefor as prescribed by law.

Let it not be said that we did not take into consideration the doctrine laid down in the case
of Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga vs. Rosauro (G.R. No. 39289) 1, for we had it before us in
considering the case at bar. The truth is that there is no similarity between the former and the
present case on the ground that although the crime alleged therein was "direct assault upon a
person in authority" and the offended party therein was a public elementary school teacher acting in
the performance of his duties as such, nevertheless, it was clearly alleged in the body of the
complaint that the defendant therein gravely intimidated and threatened said teacher. There is no
question that, in accordance with the provisions of article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, the
jurisdiction to try cases of grave threats belong to Courts of First Instance by reason of the penalty
prescribed therein. Prescinding from the title of the offense stated in the information under
consideration, it is observed from the allegations contained in the body of said pleading that the
crime committed is slight in nature, the trial of which falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace court.

Wherefore, we are of the opinion and so hold that the order of dismissal appealed from is in
accordance with the law and should therefore be sustained.

Let the costs be declared de oficio. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes

1 Decided by resolution of March 31, 1933.

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS IN

AUTHORITY AND THEIR AGENTS
Crimes Against Persons in Authority and their Agents

A. They include: (1) Direct Assault (2) Indirect Assault (3) Resistance and Disobedience and (4)
Disobedience to Summons of Congress and Constitutional Commissions

B. Distinctions between:
 1.     Public officer- any person who takes part in the performance of public functions in the

government (Art. 203)

1. Person in authority( PIA)- one who is directly vested with jurisdiction to execute or enforce the laws
2. Agent( APIA)- one who is generally charged with the maintenance of peace and order and the
protection and security of life and property 

4.     Hence a public officer is not necessarily a PIA or APIA but the latter are always public

officers.

Art. 148 Revised Penal Code. Direct Assault

I. There are two kinds the first being: Without a public uprising by employing force or intimidation to attain
any of the purposes of rebellion or sedition. This is very rare. It is the second form which is commonly
committed.

II. Second kind is committed when, without a public uprising, the offender: (i) Attacks (ii) Employs force
(iii) Seriously intimidates or seriously resists (iv) Any person in authority or his agent (v) while engaged in
the performance of official duties or on the occasion thereof (vi) knowing him to be such.

III. Requirements:

  A. There must be an attack or employment of force or serious intimidation, upon the person of the
victim. This includes any offensive or antagonistic movement of any kind, with or without a weapon.
This may be an actual physical contact or the instilling of fear or threat of an evil on the person of the
victim, but not on his property.

1. Examples: boxing, pointing a gun, brandishing a weapon, shouting and berating, challenging to a
fight, throwing an article at him

2). The degree of force required depends on whether the victim is a PIA or APIA. In case of a PIA
actual forced is not necessary because mere laying of hands is sufficient, such as by pushing or
 shoving him or pulling at his collar. If he were an APIA, actual force is required because mere
laying of hands would constitute simple resistance

3). As to intimidation and resistance the same must be serious and actual whether the victim is a
PIA or APIA otherwise the offense is resistance and disobedience under article 151.

B. The offended party must be a PIA or a APIA and has not yet been separated from the service. Thus
the crime is committed even if at the time of commission the PIA/APIA is on leave, on vacation, or
under suspension, but no when he has retired or was dismissed or removed. 

1. The following are PIAs:

a). Any person directly vested with jurisdiction i.e he has the power to govern, execute the
laws and administer justice

b). Teachers, professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities. They must be within the school
premises during school hours or are actually performing the tasks outside the school
premises

c). Lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance   

Note that teachers and lawyers are PIAs only for purposes of Direct Assault and Resistance
and Disobedience but not for purposes of Indirect Assault

d). Under the Local Government Code: (a) the Punong Barangay, (b) Sanguniang Barangay
members and (c) members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa

2. The following are APIAS:

a. Those who, by direct provision of law, or by election or by appointment, are charged with
the maintenance of public order and the protection of life and property ( AGENTS PROPER)
such as :

(i). Law Enforcement Agents such as the PNP and the NBI irrespective of their rank
 (ii). Barangay Tanods

(iii).Municipal treasurer being the agent of the provincial treasurer

(iv). The postmaster being the agent of the Director of Posts

(v). But Members of the AFP are not included 

                        

b. Any person who comes to the aid of PIAs who is under direct assault. ( AGENTS BY
ASSISTANCE)

       Note that if a teacher or lawyer is the person who comes to the assistance of the PIA,
then he is considered as an APIA.

3. Thus private persons may be victims but to a limited extent: (i). when they are considered by law
as PIAs or APIAs such as teachers and lawyers (ii). and those who come to the aid of PIAs 

     

C. The accused must know the victim is a PIA/APIA which fact must be alleged in the Information

1. There must be a clear intent on the part of the accused to defy the authorities, to offend, injure or
assault the victim as a PIA/APIA

IV. Time of the Assault:

1.     If the assault is during the occasion of the performance of official duties the motive of the accused
is immaterial. As long as the victim was assaulted in his office or in the premises where he holds
office, or even while on his way to office, it is not required that he was actually doing an act
related to his duties

2.      If not on the occasion then the motive is important as the assault must be because of the past
performance of official duties by the victim. The length of time between the performance of the
duty and the time of the assault is immaterial. If the motive cannot be established, there is no
direct assault but some lesser offense.

 
V. Rule When Material Injury Results: The crime of Direct Assault aims to punish lawlessness and
defiance of authority and not the material injury which results from such defiance. When material injury
however results, the following are the rules:    

1. Where death, serious or less serious physical injuries result, they are to be complexed with direct
assault. Example: A policeman was shot death while directing traffic: the crime is Homicide with
Direct Assault 

2. If only slight physical injuries are committed, the slight physical injury is a qualifying circumstance
separate offense if the victim is a PIA but it will be absorbed if the victim is an APIA ( PP. vs. Acierto,
57 Phil. 614)

VI. When the Attack does not Constitute Direct Assault:

1. If both accused and victim are PIAs/APIAs and they contend or there is conflict arising from the
exercise of their respective functions or jurisdictions. Examples:   

(a). A fight between the Incumbent  Mayor and the Acting Mayor as to who shall occupy the office

(b). NBI vs. Police concerning who shall take custody of a suspect

2. Where the PIA/APIA act with abuse of their official functions, or when they exceed their powers
they are deemed to be acting in a private capacity. They become aggressors and the accused has a
right to defend himself

3. Where they voluntarily descend to matters which are purely personal. But not when the PIA/APIA is
dragged down to purely personal matters by the accused.

VII. Qualified Direct Assault:

1.     When the accused lays hand upon the victim who is a PIA

2.     When the accused is himself a Public Officer or employee

3.     When the assault is with a weapon

Atty. Joseph Noel M. Estrada
tmSmurrDteaSpceifombhensllr 3o0,r on2te01tld9  · 

DIRECT ASSAULT COMMITTED BY A CO-TEACHER

Facts:

Lydia and Gemma are public school teachers. Lydia's son, was a student of Gemma. In the morning of July 17, 1981, Lydia
confronted Gemma after learning from her son that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the
cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma who was
pregnant at that time suffered incomplete abortion.

Issue:

Is Lydia liable for the crime of Direct Assault for attacking her co-teacher Gemma?

Ruling:

Direct assault is a crime that may be committed in two ways, and one of which is -by any person or persons who employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or
on occasion of such performance.

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy
with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she
was assigned. Lydia was already angry when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia
refused to be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim. Gemma then
proceeded towards the principal's office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing her against a
wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemma's fall to the floor.

Gemma being a public school teacher, is a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code.

Lydia is guilty of the crime of Direct Assault.

(Please read in full the case of Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, [July 28, 2010], 640 PHIL 109-120)

What is the penalty of direct assault?

The Revised Penal Code (Article 148) imposes the penalty of imprisonment of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos
upon anyone who commits the crime of direct assault when, as in these cases, the
offender lays hands upon a person in authority.

What is prision Correccional?

- The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months.

The Revised Penal Codes Act No. 3815

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20216 and L-20217      November 29, 1967

Note: General Register

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
TIBURCIO BALBAR, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Pedro M. Belmi for defendant-appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

On August 20, 1960 defendant-appellee Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room where
schoolteacher Ester Gonzales, complainant herein, was conducting her classes. Without warning
and right after complainant had finished writing on the blackboard, defendant allegedly placed his
arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Shocked, complainant instinctively pushed Balbar away
and tried to flee. Defendant allegedly brought out his "daga" (a local dagger) and pursued
complainant, catching up with her before she was able to get out of the room. Defendant embraced
her again, at the same time holding on to his "daga". They both fell to the floor, as a result of which
complainant sustained slight physical injuries.

Two informations, one for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority and another for Acts of
Lasciviousness (Criminal Cases Nos. 823 and 841 respectively) were filed by the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal against defendant before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, the latter charge
upon written complaint filed by the offended party duly sworn to before the Clerk of Court.

The information for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority is hereunder quoted:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of Assault
upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Camba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss
Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school building of Lian, duly qualified and
appointed as such and while in the performance of her official duties or on the occasion
therefor, by then and there pulling his dagger, braced and kissed, and repeatedly trying to
embrace and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with
the aggravating circumstances of having committed it inside the public school building and
during school classes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The information for Acts of Lasciviousness reads:

At the instance of the offended party in the above-entitled case the undersigned Assistant Provincial
Fiscal accuses TIBURCIO BALBAR of the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in the Barrio of Cumba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with the deliberate intent to satisfy his lust, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of lasciviousness on the person of Miss Ester
Gonzales, a public school teacher, by then and there placing himself close to her, embracing
and kissing her against her will and by means of force, and as a consequence thereof said
offended party fell to the floor resulting to her injury which caused her pain and tenderness
on the right side of the trunk on the posterior surface of the right arm which injuries may
require 3 to 4 days to heal; that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance
that the same was perpetrated inside the public school building and during class hour.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The accused filed separate motions to quash, contending that "(a) with respect to Criminal Case No.
823 for Direct Assault, the information does not charge a sufficient cause of action and that it
charges two offenses in a single complaint; and (b) with respect to Criminal Case No. 841 for Acts of
Lasciviousness, . . . that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy and that the complaint
charges two offenses." On August 16, 1962, over the opposition of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal,
the court a quo issued an order quashing the two informations. Said the court:

After reading the informations in both criminal cases, the Court agrees with counsel that the
acts committed by the accused as alleged in the two informations constitute one offense.

As regards the motion to quash filed in Criminal Case No. 841, the grounds alleged in
support thereof are: (1) that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy; and (2) that
the criminal complaint charges two offenses. Without discussing the merits of these grounds
above-quoted, the Court believes that the information filed in Criminal Case No. 841 should
be dismissed or quashed for the reason that the offense charged therein is already absorbed
in the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 823.

Thus, the dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, it is the opinion of this Court that the information in Criminal Case No. 823
which charges only unjust vexation or physical injuries should be quashed for the reason that
the same is within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace. And, as to the
information in criminal Case No. 841, the same should likewise be quashed on the ground
that the acts complained of is already included in Criminal No. 823.

From this order, the Government interposed the present appeal.

Stated differently in the rationale of its order, the court a quo quashed Criminal Case No. 823 on the
following ground: That "while the offense is designated as direct assault, nevertheless the main
allegations of the information may at most constitute unjust vexation for the reason that an important
element of the crime of direct assault is conspicuously absent in the information. This essential
element is the knowledge of the accused that the victim is a person in authority. . . .This being the
case and since . . . sufficient allegations are contained in the information in question to hold the
accused responsible for an offense, the Court believes that the information is sufficient in substance
to at least constitute unjust vexation or physical injuries."
Direct assault is committed "by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, . . . shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance." (See Art.
148, Revised Penal Code.)

By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors, and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed
persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Article 148." This special classification is obviously
intended to give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the performance of their official
duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the information on the ground that there is no express
allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person
in authority. This is clearly erroneous.

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that fact,
since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew
that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not that
such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority
being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his
part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal
(De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil.
254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.

With respect to the dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, we agree with the
conclusion reached by the court a quo. Although it is true that the same acts may constitute more
than one offense, we are of the opinion, upon an examination of the events which gave rise to the
filing of the two aforementioned informations, that the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness does not
appear to have been committed at all.

It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing just what conduct
makes one amendable to the provisions of article 439 (now article 336) of the Penal Code.
What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the circumstances of
each case. It may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts are lewd
and lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another case to say where the line of
demarcation lies between such conduct and the amorous advances of an ardent lover. (U. S.
v. Gomez, 30 Phil. 22, 25)

The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the
environmental circumstances. In the instant case, considering the manner, place and time under
which the acts complained of were done, even as alleged in the information itself, lewd designs can
hardly be attributed to accused. The factual setting, i.e., a schoolroom in the presence of
complainant's students and within hearing distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion that
the accused was actuated by a lustful design or purpose or that his conduct was lewd or lascivious.
It may be that he did embrace the girl and kiss her but, this of itself would not necessarily bring the
case within the provision of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the order of the court a quo quashing the information for Direct Assault is hereby set
aside and this case is remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits; and with respect to the
dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, the same is hereby affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

By expressing the provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part
of Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors, and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized
private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed
persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Article 148."
This special classification is obviously intended to give teachers
protection, dignity, and respect while in the performance of their
official duties.