SO v.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 138869
August 29, 2002

FACTS:
This is a case for "Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event" and "Motion for
Suspension of Execution and Modification of Judgment" filed by petitioner David So in relation to a case
already decided by the Supreme Court affirming his conviction in two (2) separate cases both for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 sentencing him to one (1) year imprisonment.

It appears that after having been found guilty in both cases, petitioner first filed a Motion for New
Hearing relying on the promulgation of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-2001 which allowed
the imposition of a fine instead of imprisonment depending upon the discretion of the judge but the
same was denied. A motion for the reconsideration was filed but was likewise denied.

On February 11, 2002, petitioner So filed an Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening

Event alleging that he recently underwent a serious triple heart bypass and prayed that Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 be applied retroactively in his favor for humanitarian grounds. Instead, a fine be
imposed. Petitioner also filed a filed a Motion for Suspension of Execution and Modification of
Judgment, contending that his having undergone open heart surgery warrants, for humanitarian reasons
and in the higher interest of justice, the suspension of the execution of the judgment of conviction and
the modification of the sentence from imprisonment to a fine in double the amount of the checks
subject of this petition.

The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection applying Vaca vs. Court of Appeals and Rosa
Lim vs. People of the Philippines, where the Court deleted the penalty of imprisonment and imposed
only a fine equivalent to double the amount of the checks involved. It held that it would best serve the
ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by Section 1,
paragraph 1 of B.P. Blg. 22, "the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation
of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order."

ISSUE:
W/N the Solicitor General is correct in applying Vaca vs. Court of Appeals and Rosa Lim vs. People of the
Philippines

RULING:
YES. The Court ruled that pursuant to the doctrine enunciated in the Vaca case, and reiterated in Rosa
Lim vs. People of the Philippines which was eventually adopted by it as a policy on the matter of the
imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000,
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 vests in the courts "the discretion to determine, taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, whether the imposition of fine alone would best
serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice."
In this case, the Court opined that the present physical condition of petitioner So presents a compelling
reason to modify the decision of the trial court and impose, in lieu of imprisonment, a fine in an amount
equal to double the amount of the checks involved.

Although the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 8345 and 8346 has become final, the rule that it is the
ministerial duty of the court to order the execution of a final judgment admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, in the case of People vs. Gallo, the Court held that it has the authority to suspend the execution of
a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
MALABANG v. BENITO
G.R. No. L-28113 (127 SCRA 573)
March 28, 1969

FACTS:
This is a case assailing the validity of EO 386 of former President Carlos P. Garcia, creating the
Municipality of Balabagan out of barrios and sitios of Malabang. Petitioner relied on the ruling in Pelaez
v. Auditor General while respondents contended that that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no
application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of
Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this
was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality
itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this
action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked,
although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and
not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.

ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the Municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.
2. W/N the legal existence of the Municipality of Balaagan may be collaterally attacked.

RULING:
1. NO. The Supreme court ruled that the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the
statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently
of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is "no other valid statute to give color of
authority to its creation".

2. YES. While it is true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality may be
attacked directly only through a quo warranto or other direct proceeding, the Supreme Court
nevertheless ruled that rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation
is at least a de facto corporation. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity,
the rule is that its existence may be, questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by
any one whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory
incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so. Since Balabagan is neither a de
facto nor a de jure corporation, it may be collaterally attacked.
PEOPLE v. ANCHETA
G.R. No. L-46250
July 26, 1939

FACTS:
This pertains to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by appellant Vicente Ancheta whose conviction for
Arbitrary Detention was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

It appears that Bibiana and her brothers harbored a grudge against appellant by reason of his break with
Bibiana and because she was informed that appellant was allegedly spreading the news that he had in
his possession some of the Bibiana's innermost garments thereby terribly offending Bibiana and her
brothers.

As a result, appellant was assaulted one day by Bibiana’s brothers and a justice of the peace in broad
daylight. Appellant alleges that there is no doubt that Bibiana conspired with her brothers since she
suddenly approached him in broad daylight and acted friendly despite the rift between. A few moments
later, he was attacked by the Sanson brothers.

For this reason, filed a complaint for frustrated murder against Bibiana and her brothers and ordered
their arrest. Appellant argued that the Court committed an error in holding that: (1) the detention of
Bibiana Sanson ordered by the appellant was not justified on the ground that it has not been proven
that she had conspired with her brothers to assault said appellant; and (2) that the conviction of the
appellant in this case is a deviation from the uniform ruling that peace officers are empowered to make
arrests without warrant when they have reasonable cause to believe that an offense or violation of law
has been committed and that the accused is guilty thereof, and is likewise contrary to the express
provision of section 848 of the Administrative Code pertinent thereto.

ISSUE:
W/N Ancheta is liable for Arbitrary Detention.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that Ancheta’s action in ordering the arrest of Bibiana is correct and ruled
that there is no doubt that there is a strong circumstantial evidence that the aggression was
premeditated and was the result of a previous conspiracy in which Bibiana Sanson obviouslty took part.
Anybody who found himself in the same circumstances as the appellant, who have believed so himself
and would have made the same decision, all the more so because the person involved was not merely a
peace officer but a commanding officer of a detachment of constabulary soldiers, called upon, by reason
of his position, to act promptly in order to preserve order and to bring to the authorities those whom be
believes in good faith to be violators of the law

Hence, the Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration of Ancheta and reversed its earlier
ruling and ACQUITTED him.