Lessons Learnt from Accidents in Urban Tunnels
Prof. Andr P. Assis, PhD
(UnB / ITA) EPFL Master on Advanced Tunnelling Lausanne, Switzerland May 2011
Introduction
General Trends in the Tunnelling Industry
High risk type construction methods Trend towards design + build contracts One-sided contract conditions Tight construction schedules Low financial budgets Fierce competition in construction industries
Decade 1990
Major Tunnel Losses since 1994
PROJECT 1994 Munich Metro, Germany 1994 Heathrow Express Link, GB 1994 Metro Taipei, Taiwan 1995 Metro Los Angeles, USA 1995 Metro Taipei, Taiwan 1999 Hull Yorkshire Tunnel, UK CAUSE Collapse Collapse Collapse Collapse Collapse Collapse US$ LOSS 4 mi
US$ 141 mio US$ 12 mio US$ 9 mio US$ 29 mio US$ 55 mio US$ 9 mio US$ 24 mio
1999 TAV Bologna - Florence, Italy Collapse 2000 Metro Taegu, Korea Collapse
Major Tunnel Losses since 1994
PROJECT CAUSE 2000 TAV Bologna - Florence, Italy Collapse 2002 Taiwan High Speed Railway 2003 Shanghai Metro, PRC 2004 Singapore Metro, Spore 2005 Kaohsiung Metro, Taiwan 2005 Barcelona Metro, Spain Collapse Collapse Collapse Collapse Collapse LOSS US$ 12 mio US$ 30 mio US$ 80 mio t.b.a. t.b.a. t.b.a. t.b.a. t.b.a. t.b.a.
2005 Lausanne Metro, Switzerland Collapse 2005 Lane Cove Tunnel, Sydney Collapse 2007 Sao Paulo Metro, Brazil and so on Collapse
Statistics on Causes of Accidents
Accidents During Construction: Last Decade Scenario
Significant increase in the number of claims Insurance income <<< Claims outcome Insurance paid >>> Initial cost of the work Difficulties to insure underground works
Options of the Insurance Market
Stop insure underground works Increase insurance prices and tight conditions Professional approach to the problem involving all related parts Focus on other markets Insurance may become not feasible
Proposal of a code of practice for risk management
Aims and Results of the Code of Practice for Risk Management
Establish minimum standards for evaluation of risks and procedures of risk management Clear definition of responsibilities of all involved parts Reduce probability of losses Reduce number and size of claims Re-establish the trust of insurance companies Transfer the concept of good practice to other market sectors
No construction project is risk free. Risk can be managed, minimised, shared, transferred or accepted. It cannot be ignored.
Sir Michael Latham, 1994
18.05.2011
Lessons Learnt from the Pinheiros Station Accident in Sao Paulo, Brazil
Introduction IPT Investigation Work and Report Main IPT Report Findings Conclusions and Recommendations
Existing Technical Reports on the Pinheiros Station Accident
Barton, N. (March, 2008) IPT (June, 2008) CVA (August, 2008)
Introduction: SP Metro Line 4
Introduction: SP Metro Line 4
Pinheiros Station
Introduction: Pinheiros Station
Pinheiros Station Design (primary support)
Pinheiros Station Design (final support)
Pinheiros Station Construction Scheme
Introduction: Pinheiros Station Accident
Occurred on 12/01/2007 During the bench excavation, very close of arriving to the shaft First failure signs ~14h30 Daylight collapse at 14h54 Enormous material damages and 7 fatalities IPT commissioned the technical investigation
IPT Investigation Work and Report
IPT Commission (team of in-house specialists) Board of Consultants (4 Brazilians and 2 foreigners) Independent Auditing Firm (Rina International) Desk Studies Following-up of the collapse debris excavation Interviews with involved staff from all parties
IPT Report (main report 384 p. + 46 appendices ~3000 p. + video)
Chapters 1-3: Introduction, objectives & scope Chapter 4: Urban tunnelling Chapter 5: Trends in contractual practices Chapter 6: Pre-bidding knowledge Chapter 7: Contractual aspects of Line 4 Chapter 8: Design and construction Chapter 9: Collapse Chapter 10: Mechanism and causes Chapter 11: Conclusions and Lessons
IPT Main Report: Pre-Bidding
10 years of studies till bidding Amount of geological and geotechnical investigation and level of engineering design had been continuously upgraded very reasonable and adequate Geological-geomechanical model Hasui (1993) IPT (1997) Figueiredo Ferraz (2001)
GeologicalGeomechanical Model
N
Pinheiros Station
Caucaia Shear Zone
Structural Geology 4 families
Pre-Bidding From impressiom packer in Pinheiros station area and reginal surveys (319 poles)
From scanlines on the final surface (26 and 522 poles)
Geological interpretation considering strutctural information
142610 142630 142650 142670 142690 142710 142730 142750 142770 142790
SM-8701
178200
SM-8706 SM-8707 SM-8702
Filonite (SR-07)
SP-8709
178180
SM-8700 SM-8720 SM-8703
SM-8704 SM-6530 SM-8705
SR-06 SR-07 SR-08
178160
SM-6532 SM-8708
SR-04 SR-8584 SR-03
178140
SP-8711
SM-8719
SM-6803
SM-6802
SR-02 SR-05 DE-SM-ML4-23 SR-01 SP-8710
AS UNID
SM-8714
S NA AS
Pinheiros Station: Geomechanical sections obtained from 3D interpolation using structural geology information
142645 142665 142685 142705 142725 142745 142765 142785 178245 178245
178225
178225
178205
178205
178185
178185
178165
178165
178145
178145
178125 142645
178125 142665 142685 142705 142725 142745 142765 142785
Longitudinal sections (central, north side and south side)
WSW
ENE
720
720
710
710
700
700
690
690
680
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
680
WSW
ENE
720
720
710
710
700
700
Blue - fill Yellow alluvium Green tertiary sediments
690
690
680 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
680 140
WSW
ENE
Brown weathered soil Dark gray RMR IV Medium gray RMR III Light gray RMR II (rock mass classification from designer)
720
720
710
710
700
700
690
690
680 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
680 140
Cross-sections obtained from 3D interpolation
NNW
eixo entrevias
SSE
NNW
eixo entrevias
SSE
720
720
720
720
710
710
710
710
700
700 700
700
690
690 690
690
680
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
680 680 120 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
680 120
NNW
eixo entrevias
SSE
NNW
eixo entrevias
SSE
720
720
720
720
710
710
710
710
700
700 700
700
690
690 690
690
680
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
680 680 120 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
680 120
GeologicalGeomechanical Model
Sub-vertical alternation of granitic and biotitic gneiss, with variable thickness (sub-parallel to the tunnel longitudinal section) Four families of discontinuities Rockmass is heterogeneous and anisotropic due to discontinuities and uneven weathering bedrock surface as egg box type Post-bidding investigation confirmed the GG model developed during the pre-bidding design
IPT Main Report: Design Shortcomings
Geomechanical model adopted did not consider the anisotropy due to discontinuities Assumptions and calculations 2D analysis shaft effect neglected Oversimplified constitutive law for the soils above tunnel Ground assumed fully drained Design analyses indicated critical stability conditions during the bench excavation phase
IPT Main Report: Design Shortcomings
Monitoring and Instrumentation Instruments 4 sections (5 convergence pins) 4 sections (3 extensometers) Some open-pipe piezometers Threshold values for the instrumentation Shaft: all threshold values defined Tunnel: only the expected value calculated, but no definition of the warning and emergency values (qualitative criteria) No evidence of backanalyses
IPT Main Report: Construction Aspects
Quality control based on self-certification Poor control of methods and materials Forepoling filling Quantity of sprayed concrete fibres Early-age strength of sprayed concrete Deficient quality management Internal auditing system Geomechanical mapping Instrumentation data interpretation
IPT Main Report: Construction Aspects
Risk Management (contingency and emergency actions) Three main design violations during construction Inversion of the excavation direction of the bench towards the shaft Increase of the bench height (4 to ~5 m) Change of the bench excavation sequence (also the rate: 1.8 m/d in January 2007 and 0.9 m/day in December 2006)
-5 Recalque (mm)
7.0+86 - P1 7.0+86 - P2
-10
7.0+86 - P3 7.0+96 - P1 7.0+96 - P2 7.0+96 - P3 7.1+06 - P1 7.1+06 - P2 7.1+06 - P3
-15
Few Days before Collapse
13/12/06 23/12/06 02/01/07 12/01/07
23/12/06 02/01/07 12/01/07
-20
7.1+15 - P1 7.1+15 - P2 7.1+15 - P3
-25 23/11/06 03/12/06
Data
5,0
0,0
-5,0
-10,0 Convergncia (mm)
-15,0
-20,0
-25,0
-30,0 7.0+86 7.0+96 -35,0 7.1+6 7.1+15 -40,0 15/08/06 25/08/06 04/09/06 14/09/06 24/09/06 04/10/06 14/10/06 24/10/06 03/11/06 13/11/06 23/11/06 03/12/06 13/12/06 22/01/07
Data
Meeting on 11/01/2007
Installation of bolts in the tunnel bench walls decided No enough bolts in stock, despite it was forecasted in the design as contingency action (15% installed but all borehole drilled) No clear definition on the need to stop the works (contradictory version among participants) Three blasting on the 12/01/2007 (two around 8 h, one in each platform tunnel, and a third one around 12 h)
The Colapse
Fall of small concrete blocks Fracture propagation from the shaft till 1/3 of the tunnel length, position 11 h Fall of 6 to 8 lattice girders in the left-hand side wall Colapse daylight on surface at 14h54 Colapse of the north wall of the shaft at 15h30 (last event)
Main Report Findings: Collapse Evidences
eixo
1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 R e c alq u e (m m ) -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 -11 -12 -13 -14 23 /1 1/0 6 03 /1 2/0 6 13 /1 2/0 6 23 /1 2/0 6 02 /0 1/0 7 12 /0 1/0 7 22 /0 1/0 7
02/01/2007
13/12
23/12
TN.E-1 TN.E-2 TN.E-3 TN.F-1 TN.F-2 TN.F-3 TN.G-1 TN.G-2 TN.G-3 MS1 TN.H1 TN.H-3
Collapse: Instrumentation Data
Instrument Extensometer Convergence Pins (Settlement) Convergence
Position Axis
Data
Calculated (mm) -0,7 -0,7 -0,7 -0,9 -0,5 -0,2
Observed on 11/01/07 (mm) -11 -12 -7 -20 -7 -21
Observed / Calculated 17 19 10 22 13 95
Lateral Wall Axis Upper Lower P2-P3
Main Report Findings: Collapse Evidences
Instrumentation evidences
30 PINO 2 25 20 15 10 5 0 ESTACAS 7,0+86 / 7,0+97 / 7,1+06 / 7,1+15 25 20 15 10 5 0 ESTACAS 7,0+86 / 7,0+97 / 7,1+06 / 7,1+15 30 PINO 3 NOV29 DEZ15 DEZ27 JAN02 JAN08 JAN09 JAN10 JAN11 JAN12 JAN12T
VISTA GERAL DOS ESCOMBROS
Main Report Findings: Collapse Evidences
Debris position evidences
Section 7,0+87
Section 7,1+04
Section 7,1+13
Main Findings: Collapse Mechanism
Medidas de recalque nos tassmetros referenciadas a 11/01/07
142735 142745 142755 142765 142775 142785
TN.H1
178205 178205
TN.G1
TN.F1 TN.E1 TN.G2
178195 178195
TN.H3 TN.F2 TN.G3 TN.E2 TN.F3
178185 178185
TN.E3
178175
178175
?
TN.H1
P-2 P-2
TN.G1
178165 142735 142745 142755
P-2
142765 142775 142785
178165
TN.F1 TN.E1 TN.G2 TN.H3 TN.F2 TN.G3 TN.E2
P-2
P-3
TN.F3
P-3
TN.E3
P-3 P-3
Main Report Findings: Risk Factors and Causes
Non-Validated Design
Oversimplified geomechanical model Structural tunnel model Assumptions and completeness of calculations and simulations No definition of threshold values for monitoring Deficient GG mapping Deficient analysis and interpretation of monitoring data No evidence of back-analyses and design validation
Main Report Findings: Risk Factors and Causes
Non-Validated Construction Procedure
Change of excavation direction Increase of bench height Change of blasting scheme Deficient quality control Increase of excavation rate Deficient construction management (lack of bolts) No decision to stop works Deficient plans of contingency and emergency actions
Main Report Findings: Risk Factors and Causes
Accident Collapse and its Consequences Collapse of Pinheiros Station Presence of transit and pedestrians Fault of the emergency plan of actions
Non-validated design
Non-validated construction procedure and poor management
Risk Factors and Causes: Foreseeability and Other Aspects
Different ground conditions Excessive rain Seismic activity Pipe leakage
4,0 2,0 0,0 -2,0 Recalque (mm) -4,0 -6,0 -8,0 P1 -10,0 P2 P3 -12,0 P4 P5 -14,0 avano 7085 7090 7095
7130
7125
7120
7115
7110 Estaca (m)
7105
7100
Foreseeability
-16,0 29/11/06 04/12/06 09/12/06 14/12/06 19/12/06 24/12/06 29/12/06 03/01/07
7080
Data
Clear under good practice of engineering Misty by faults in several engineering processes
Conclusions
Geological model complex but data was fully disclosure no major changes by no means claim based on Different Ground Conditions Causes are related to shortcomings in engineering processes (design and construction) systemic fault process Lessons and recommendations to engineering and contractual arrangements
Recommendations for Future Contractual Arrangements
Keep fair balance among quality, schedule and costs Mix of technical and performance specifications quality control Independent auditing and full disclosure of control parameters owners must keep control Incorporate risk management and risk sharing
Lessons Learnt
Pre-Bidding Documents
Geological and geotechnical data as much as possible Full disclosure of all GG data
Geological model GG Data Report Geotechnical Base Report Different Ground Conditions Owner
Lessons Learnt
Design Documents
Geomechanical model Structural model of the tunnel Assumptions, completeness and type of calculations and simulations Continuum media? Type of model and parameters 2D or 3D analysis? Monitoring threshold values
Design Reviewer
Lessons Learnt
Design during Construction
Complementary investigation and mapping of all GG conditions Monitoring interpretation Design back-analysis Design Validation
Lessons Learnt
Construction
Faithful to the design agreement changes in
Quality control (materials and services) Integrated risk and construction management contingency and emergency actions
Lessons Learnt
Role of Contracts
Keep fair balance among quality, schedule and costs Mix of technical and performance specifications quality control Independent auditing and full disclosure of control parameters Incorporate risk management and risk sharing
Urban tunnelling is a great and increasing demand worldwide Urban tunnelling is challenging due to urban environment and constraints Urban tunnelling is likely dominated by limit admissible damage criteria Risk management has to be incorporated in all project phases
The worst happening is not to have an accident, it is to learn nothing from it.
Kovari, K. & Ramoni. M. (2004). Urban Tunnelling in Soft Ground Using TBMs. International Congress on Mechanised Tunnelling: Challenging Case Histories, Keynote Lecture, Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy ([Link]). Munich Re (2006). Code of Practice for Risk Management of Tunnel Works: Future Tunnelling Insurance from the Insurers Point of View. ITA Open Session, ITA World Tunnel Congress, Seoul, South Korea. Munich Re (2007). Insurance Cover as Part of the General Risk Management Strategy. ITA Open Session on Public Private Partnership Projects, ITA World Tunnel Congress, Prague, Czech Republic. Seidenfuss, T. (2006). Collapses in Tunnelling. Master Thesis, Stuttgart University of Applied Sciences, Stuttgart, Germany, 179 p.
