© Michael Lacewing
The Form of the Good1
THE SIMILE OF THE SUN AND THE FORM OF THE GOOD
In The Republic, Plato introduces the simile of the sun after arguing (503-4)
that philosophers must be prepared to undertake the difficult task of study
he describes. Their studies will not be complete until they achieve the
highest form of knowledge, knowledge of the Form of the Good. It is from
the Good that ‘things that are just and so on derive their usefulness and
value…. Is there any point in having all other forms of knowledge without
that of the good, and so lacking knowledge about what is good and
valuable?’ (505a-b) And so Adeimantus and Glaucon ask Socrates what the
Good is, and he responds with this simile.
The simile of the sun
The visible world The intelligible world (the Forms)
The sun The Form of the Good
The eye The mind (reason)
Sight Intelligence
To see To know
Light Truth
Growth The being (reality) of the Forms
Unless there is light, our eyes cannot see, even though they have the power
of sight, and objects that we can see exist and have colour and shape. It is
only in the presence of light, which comes from the sun, that we can see.
The sun also causes growth, and Plato says, it is a cause of sight. This last
claim is difficult to understand; Plato thinks of sight as a power that the eye
gets from the sun (the eye is ‘sunlike’, he says), as though eyes actually
make what they see ‘visible’ in a way similar to how the sun makes things
visible. However, the sun is not sight and it is not light; it is different from
them, and because it is their cause, it is ‘higher’ than them.
The Form of the Good plays the same role in the intelligible world. We
cannot come to know anything without the Form of the Good. Just as sun is
the source of light and the source of sight – together necessary to see
anything – the Form of the Good ‘gives the objects of knowledge [the Forms]
their truth and the knower’s mind the power of knowing’ (508a). Both
intelligence and truth have their source in the Form of the Good. And, just
as the sun is cause of growth, the Form of the Good is the source of the very
being of knowable objects: ‘The good therefore may be said to be the
source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of
their being and reality’ (509b). And as we noted above, Plato says that
everything derives its value from the Good (505b). Finally, just as the sun is
not light nor sight nor growth, the Form of the Good is not intelligence nor
1
This handout is based on Lacewing, M. (2008) Philosophy for A2: Unit 4 (London:
Routledge), pp. 69-72.
truth nor the reality of the Forms, but ‘beyond it, and superior to it in
dignity and power’ (509b).
THE FORM OF THE GOOD
It is obvious from these remarks that the Good is not just one Form among
others. But what is the Form of the Good? Socrates says he cannot say
(506e), and offers the simile of the sun instead. We know that the Good is
not intelligence, truth, knowledge, or the reality of the Forms; and we know
that it is the source of all these. Plato doesn’t say any more, and we do not
even know how the Good is the source for all of this. But we can speculate
somewhat to fill out an account of what the Good is.
The Good is sometimes said to be the Form of the Forms. But in the handout
‘Plato’s theory of Forms’, we listed at least five characteristics of all Forms,
and Goodness will not be all of these. The obvious characteristic of the
Forms that is related to Goodness is perfection; Forms are purely and
perfectly their own essence. By contrast, particular things fail to be
completely their essence (hence their existence is inferior to the type of
existence enjoyed by the Forms).
The Form of the Good and harmony
But this doesn’t solve the puzzle. If the Good is just each thing exhibiting its
own essence, the Good would seem to be different in each case, since it is
dependent on what a thing is. However, in accordance with the rest of his
theory of the Forms, Plato assumes that the Good is the same thing in every
case. One suggestion is that if the Good is coherence or harmony or unity-
over-difference, this would make sense of a great deal of Plato’s theory of
the Forms, and so it is worth taking seriously:
1. mathematics leads to knowledge of the Good as it is through
mathematics that we understand the account of the one over the many;
2. the Good is superior to other Forms, not just another Form alongside
others, since it is the unity or coherence of other Forms;
3. it is the Form of Forms, and other Forms owe their being to it, since they
are good in being unities (of that which participates in them) and in
being part of a unifying and coherent order;
4. unity and harmony play a very important role in the ethics and politics of
the Republic – both the good state and the good soul are said to be
harmonious.
This interpretation is also supported by a passage from the Phaedo, where
Plato says ‘that the truly good… binds and holds everything together’ (99c).
How does this relate to the idea that the Good is each thing exhibiting its
own essence? Plato repeatedly argues in the Republic that when each person
plays their role in society, harmony is achieved. More generally, then, it
seems he believes that when each thing exhibits its essence, harmony – the
Good – is achieved.
However, Plato clearly thinks of the Good as not just a property that the
Forms have, but a force from which reality emanates. If the Good is unity
and harmony, it is also the first principle of everything, the standard by
which everything is what it is, that has an existence and power all of its
own.
