S

ANBEDAUNI
VERSI
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COLLEGEOFLAW
Cent
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izedBarOper
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COVEREDCASESAND
J.
PERLAS-
BERNABE
CASEDOCTRI
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CASEDI
GESTS

Cr
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 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Over-all Chairperson Mary Cyriell C. Sumanqui
Chairperson for Academics Erica Mae C. Vista
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SUBJECT COMMITTEE
Subject Chair for Political Law Cherish Kim B. Ferrer
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Subject Chair for Criminal Law Maria Regina C. Gameng
Subject Chair for Remedial Law Raymond F. Ramos
Subject Chair for Legal Ethics Rhev Xandra Acuña

LAYOUT AND CONTENT EDITORS

Roger P. Cuaresma Camille Victoria D. Dela Cruz
Gabrielle Anne S. Endona Paulo O. Hernandez
Joelle Mae J. Garcia Teresa Katherine R. Kua
Micah Regina A. Gonzales Ma. Lourdes M. Santos
Zennia S. Turrecha
Nestor J. Porlucas, Jr.

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JESSU R. TRINIDAD KENNETH PAOLO M. LUGTU
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ADVISER
Atty. RYAN S. MERCADER
 PREFACE
The COVERED CASES AND J. PERLAS-BERNABE CASE DOCTRINES was
crafted as an apt response for the need to provide a comprehensive compilation of
jurisprudence, promulgated by the Supreme Court, covered for this year’s Bar
Examinations. This complement significantly the other bar review materials in the
repository of the San Beda Centralized Bar Operations.

On this year’s edition, the COVERED CASES is in two forms: a printed copy of
the Covered Cases: Case Doctrines, and a digital copy of the Covered Cases: Case
Digests which include the Supreme Court decisions released from July 1, 2017 to June
30, 2018; while the J. PERLAS-BERNABE CASE DOCTRINES includes the
summary of the rulings pronounced by the 2019 Bar Examination Chairperson, the
Honorable Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, from September 16, 2011 to December
31, 2018.

In addition to that, the cases herein are categorized and arranged based on the
2019 Supreme Court Bar Exam Syllabus in order to guide its readers in their
appreciation and understanding of the court decisions.

With this material, the San Beda Centralized Bar Operations seeks to uphold
its legacy of service and excellence in helping the examinees achieve their goal of
becoming worthy members of the legal profession.

UT IN OMNIBUS GLORIFICETUR DEUS!

THIS IS THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE

SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW
CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS.

THE UNAUTHORIZED COPYING, REPRODUCTION,

MODIFICATION OR DISTRIBUTION
OF ANY OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS BOOK IS
STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
CRIMINAL LAW
Page
Number

People vs. Callao ..……………………………………………………………………………. 1

G.R. No. 228945; March 14, 2018
People vs. Cosgafa .………………………………………………………………………….. 2
G.R. No. 218250; July 10, 2017
People vs. Gallanosa ………………………………………………………………………… 3
G.R. No. 219885; July 17, 2017
Remegio vs. People ………………………………………………………………………….. 4
G.R. No. 196945; September 27, 2017
People vs. Endaya ……………………………………………………………………………. 5
G.R. No. 225745; February 28, 2018
People vs. Escobal …………………………………………………………………………… 6
G.R. No. 206292; October 11, 2017
Sombilon vs. People …………………………………………………………………………. 7
G.R. No. 177246; September 25, 2017
People vs. Duran, Jr. …………………………………………………………………………. 8
G.R. No. 215748; November 20, 2017
People vs. Ramelo ……………………………………………………………………………. 9
G.R. No. 224888; November 22, 2017
People vs. Tic ………………………………………………………………………………….. 10
G.R. No. 222561; August 30, 2017
People vs. Panerio ……………………………………………………………………………. 11
G.R. No. 205440; January 15, 2018
People vs. Siega ………………………………………………………………………………. 12
G.R. No. 213273; June 27, 2018
People vs. Lopez ……………………………………………………………………………… 13
G.R. No. 232247; April 23, 2018
People vs. Reyes ……………………………………………………………………………… 14
G.R. No. 224498; January 11, 2018
Mariano vs. People …………………………………………………………………………… 15
G.R. No. 224102; July 26, 2017
People vs. Miraña …………………………………………………………………………….. 16
G.R. No. 219113; April 25, 2018
People vs. Salvador ………………………………………………………………………….. 17
G.R. No. 223566; June 27, 2018
People vs. Dagsil ……………………………………………………………………………… 18
G.R. No. 218945; December 13, 2017
People vs. Pantoja ……………………………………………………………………………. 19
G.R. No. 223114; November 29, 2017
People vs. Racal ………………………………………………………………………………. 20
G.R. No. 224886; September 4, 2017
People vs. Balanza …………………………………………………………………………… 21
G.R. No. 207943; September 11, 201
People vs. Sisracon, et al. …………………………………………………………………... 22
G.R. No. 226494, February 14, 2018
People vs. Ordona ……………………………………………………………………………. 23
G.R. No. 227863; September 20, 2017
People vs. Grabador, Jr., et al. ……………………………………………………………... 24
G.R. No. 227504; June 13, 2018
People vs. Kalipayan …………………………………………………………………………. 25
G.R. No. 229829; January 22, 2018
People vs. Aquino, et. al. …………………………………………………………………….. 26
G.R. No. 203435; April 11, 2018
People vs. Campit …………………………………………………………………………….. 27
G.R. No. 225794; December 6, 2017
People vs. Corpuz …………………………………………………………………………….. 28
G.R. No. 215320; February 28, 2018
People vs. Mat-An …………………………………………………………………………….. 29
G.R. No. 215720; February 21, 2018
People vs. Delector …………………………………………………………………………… 30
G.R. No. 200026; October 4, 2017
People vs. Daroya ……………………………………………………………………………. 31
G.R. No. 229502; November 8, 2017
People vs. Castro ……………………………………………………………………………... 32
G.R. No. 211053; November 29, 2017
People vs. Condino …………………………………………………………………………… 33
G.R. No. 219591; February 19, 2018
People vs. Manzano ………………………………………………………………………….. 34
G.R. No. 217974; March 5, 2018
People vs. Moreno ……………………………………………………………………………. 35
G.R. No. 217889; March 14, 2018
People vs. Abina ……………………………………………………………………………… 36
G.R. No. 220146; April 18, 2018
People vs. Advincula ………………………………………………………………………… 37
G.R. No. 218108; April 11, 2018
People vs. Agramon ………………………………………………………………………….. 38
G.R. No. 212156; June 20, 2018
People vs. Francisco …………………………………………………………………………. 39
G.R. No. 216728; June 4, 2018
Chua vs. People ………………………………………………………………………………. 40
G.R. No. 172193; September 13, 2017
People vs. Lababo, et. al. ……………………………………………………………………. 41
G.R. No. 234651; June 06, 2018
People vs. Gimpaya ………………………………………………………………………….. 42
G.R. No. 227395; January 10, 2018
People vs. Fajardo ……………………………………………………………………………. 43
G.R. No. 216065 April 18, 2018
People vs. Delima …………………………………………………………………………….. 44
G.R. No. 222645; June 27, 2018
Manangan vs. People ………………………………………………………………………… 45
G.R. No. 218570; November 22, 2017
People vs. Villanueva ………………………………………………………………………… 46
G.R. No. 211082; December 13, 2017

People vs. Brusola …………………………………………………………………………… 47

G.R. No. 210615; July 26, 2017
People vs. Alapan …………………………………………………………………………….. 48
G.R. No. 199527; January 10, 2018
Del Rosario vs. People ………………………………………………………………………. 49
G.R. No. 199930; June 27, 2018
People vs. Dimaala …………………………………………………………………………… 50
G.R. No. 225054; July 17, 2017
People vs. Calomia …………………………………………………………………………… 51
G.R. No. 229856; November 20, 2017
People vs. de Chavez Jr. ……………………………………………………………………. 52
G.R. No. 229722; December 13, 2017
Lim vs. People ………………………………………………………………………………… 53
G.R No. 226590; April 23, 2018
People vs. Antido …………………………………………………………………………….. 54
G.R. No. 208651; March 14, 2018

Typoco, Jr. vs. People ……………………………………………………………………….. 55

G.R. No. 221857; August 16, 2017
Coson vs. People ……………………………………………………………………………... 56
G.R. No. 218830; September 14, 2017
Venezuela vs. People ………………………………………………………………………… 57
G.R. No. 205693; February 14, 2018

People vs. Pentecostes ……………………………………………………………………… 58

G.R. No. 226158; November 8, 2017
Barbosa vs. People …………………………………………………………………………… 59
G.R. No. 207193; July 24, 2017
People vs. Vibal Jr. …………………………………………………………………………… 60
G.R. No. 229678; June 20, 2018
Etino vs. People ………………………………………………………………………………. 61
G.R. No. 206632; February 14, 2018
People vs. Ragasa ……………………………………………………………………………. 62
G.R. No. 202863; February 21, 2018
People vs. Bauit …………………………………………………………………...………….. 63
G.R. No. 231359; February 7, 2018
People vs. Agalot ……………………………………………………………………………... 64
G.R. No. 220884; February 21, 2018
People vs. Gomez …………………………………………………………………………….. 65
G.R. No. 220892; February 21, 2018
People vs. Divinagracia, Sr. ………………………………………………………………… 66
G.R. No. 207765; July 26, 2017
People vs. YYY ………………………………………………………………………………… 67
G.R. No. 224626; June 27, 2018
People vs. XXX ………………………………………………………………………………… 68
G.R. No. 229860; March 21, 2018
People vs. Bagsic …………………………………………………………………………….. 69
G.R. No. 218404; December 13, 2017
People vs. Amarela …………………………………………………………………………… 70
G.R. No. 225642-43; January 17, 2018
People vs. De Guzman ………………………………………………………………………. 71
G.R. No. 228248; August 9, 2017
People vs. Pagamucan ………………………………………………………………………. 72
G.R. No. 2077772; November 8, 2017
People vs. Clemeno ………………………………………………………………………….. 73
G.R. No. 215202 (Resolution); March 14, 2018
People vs. Nuyte ...……………………………………………………………………………. 74
G.R. No. 219111; March 12, 2018
People vs. Opeña ……………………………………………………………………………... 75
G.R. No. 220490; March 21, 2018
People vs. Primavera ………………………………………………………………………… 76
G.R No. 223138; July 5, 2017
People vs. Cariat ……………………………………………………………………………… 77
G.R. No. 223565; June 18, 2018
People vs. Banayat …………………………………………………………………………… 78
G.R. No. 215749; March 14, 2018
People vs. Bongbonga ………………………………………………………………………. 79
G.R. No. 214771; August 9, 2017
People vs. Antonio …………………………………………………………………………… 80
G.R. No. 223113; February 19, 2018
People vs. Dela Cruz …………………………………………………………………………. 81
G.R. No. 219088; June 13, 2018
People vs. Ganaba ……………………………………………………………………………. 82
G.R. No. 219240; April 4, 2018
People vs. Napoles …………………………………………………………………………… 83
G.R. No. 215200; July 26, 2017
People vs. Deloso …………………………………………………………………………….. 84
G.R. No. 215194 (Resolution); December 14, 2017
People vs. EEE ………………………………………………………………………………… 85
G.R. No. 227185; September 27, 2017
People vs. Bugna ……………………………………………………………………………... 86
G.R. No. 218255; April 11, 2018
People vs. Amar……………………………………………………………………………….. 87
G.R. No. 223513; July 5, 2017
People vs. Manaligod ………………………………………………………………………… 88
G.R. No. 218584; April 25, 2018
People vs. Ramirez …………………………………………………………………………… 89
G.R. No. 219863; March 6, 2018
People vs. Panes ……………………………………………………………………………… 90
G.R. No. 215730; September 11, 2017
People vs. Martinez …………………………………………………………………………... 91
G.R. No. 226394; March 7, 2018
People vs. Niebres ……………………………………………………………………………. 92
G.R. No. 230975; December 4, 2017
People vs. Urmaza ……………………………………………………………………………. 93
G.R. No. 219957; April 4, 2018
People vs. Udtohan …………………………………………………………………………… 94
G.R. No. 228887; August 2, 2017
People vs. Ronquillo …………………………………………………………………………. 95
G.R. No. 214762; September 20, 2017
People vs. Tayaban …………………………………………………………………………... 96
G.R. No. 207666 (Resolution); November 22, 2017
People vs. Tanglao …………………………………………………………………………… 97
G.R. No. 219963; June 13, 2018
People vs. Agoncillo …………………………………………………………………………. 98
G.R. No. 229100; November 20, 2017
People vs. Dizon ……………………………………………………………………………… 99
G.R. No. 217982; July 10, 2017
People vs. Francica…………………………………………………………………………… 100
G.R. No. 208625; September 6, 2017

People vs. Reyes……………………………………………………………………………… 101

G.R. No. 207946; September 27, 2017
People vs. Concepcion………………………………………………………………………. 102
G.R. No. 214886; April 4, 2018
People vs. Caoili ……………………………………………………………………………… 103
G.R. No. 196342; August 8, 2017

People vs. Lidasan …………………………………………………………………………… 104

G.R. No. 227425; September 4, 2017
People vs. Villanueva ………………………………………………………………………… 105
G.R. No. 218958; December 13, 2017
People vs. Fabro ……………………………………………………………………………… 106
G.R. No. 208441; July 17, 2017
People vs. Siapno …………………………………………………………………….………. 107
G.R No. 218911; August 23, 2017
People vs. Ali ………………………………………………………………………………….. 108
G.R. No. 222965; December 6, 2017
People vs. Pabra-Rural ………………………………………………………………………. 109
G.R. No. 231884; June 27, 2018
People vs. Borja ………………………………………………………………………………. 110
G.R. No. 199710; August 2, 2017

Flores vs. People ……………………………………………………………………………… 111

G.R No. 222861; April 23, 2018
People vs. Bongos ……………………………………………………………………………. 112
G.R. No. 227698; January 31, 2018
People vs. Gamba …………………………………………………………………………….. 113
G.R. No. 215332; July 24, 2017
People vs. Domasig ………………………………………………………………………….. 114
G.R. No. 217028; June 13, 2018
People vs. Sulayao …………………………………………………………………………… 115
G.R. No. 198952; September 6, 2017
People vs. Madrelejos …………………………………………….…………………………. 116
G.R. No. 225328; March 21, 2018
People vs. Layug ……………………………………………………………………………… 117
G.R. No. 223679; September 27, 2017
People vs. Bragat ……………………………………………………………………………... 118
G.R. No. 222180; November 22, 2017
People vs. Bringcula …………………………………………………………………………. 119
G.R. No. 226400; January 24, 2018
People vs. Romobio ………………………………………………………………………….. 120
G.R. No. 227705; October 11, 2017
People vs. Llamera …………………………………………………………………………… 121
G.R. No. 218703; April 23, 2018
People vs. Belmonte …………………………………………………………………………. 122
G.R. No. 220889; July 5, 2017
People vs. Mejares ……………………………………………………………………………. 123
G.R. No. 225735; January 10, 2018
People vs. Sabado ……………………………………………………………………………. 124
G.R. No. 218910; July 5, 2017
People vs. Baladjay …………………………………………………………………………... 125
G.R No. 220458; July 26, 2017
Batac vs. People …………………………………………………………………….………… 126
G.R. No. 191622; June 6, 2018
People vs. Mateo ……………………………………………………………………………… 127
G.R. No. 210612; October 9, 2017
Facilities, Inc. vs. Lopez …………………………………………………………………….. 128
G.R. No. 208883; February 7, 2018
People vs. Racho ……………………………………………………………………………... 129
G.R. No. 227505; October 2, 2017
People vs. Cacho ……………………………………………………………………………... 130
G.R. No. 218425; September 27, 2017

People vs. Ladra ………………………………………………………………………………. 131

G.R. No. 221443; July 17, 2017
Lutap vs. People ………………………………………………………………………………. 132
G.R. No. 204061; February 5, 2018
People vs. Ursua ……………………………………………………………………………… 133
G.R. No. 218575; October 4, 2017
Fianza vs. People ……………………………………………………………………………... 134
G.R. No. 218592; August 2, 2017

Ramos vs. People …………………………………………………………………………….. 135

G.R. No. 226454; November 20, 2017
Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp. vs. Domingo ………………………………………….. 136
G.R. No. 170341; July 5, 2017

Cahulogan vs. People ……………………………………………………………………….. 137

G.R. No. 225695; March 21, 2018

Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Office of the Ombudsman ….. 138
G.R. No. 195962; April 18, 2018

People vs. Aguirre …………………………………………………………………………… 139

G.R. No. 219952; November 20, 2017
People vs. Nangcas ………………………………………………………………………….. 140
G.R. No. 218806; June 13, 2018
People vs. De Dios ……………………………………………………………………………. 141
G.R. No. 234018; June 6, 2018

Melgar vs. People …………………………………………………………………………….. 142

G.R. No. 223477; February 14, 2018
Lim vs. People and Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc. …………………………………………. 143
G.R. No. 224979; December 13, 2017

People vs. Arposeple ………………………………………………………………………… 144

G.R. No. 205787; November 22, 2017
People vs. Galicia ……………………………………………………………………………. 145
G.R. No. 218402; February 14, 2018
People vs. Sullano ……………………………………………………………………………. 146
G.R. No. 228373; March 12, 2018
People vs. Luna ……………………………………………………………………………….. 147
G.R. No. 219164; March 21, 2018
People vs. Saragena …………………………………………………………………………. 148
G.R. No. 210677; August 23, 2017
People vs. Saunar …………………………………………………………………………….. 149
G.R. No. 207396; August 9, 2017
People vs. Ejan ………………………………………………………………………………... 150
G.R. No. 212169; December 13, 2017
People vs. Mendoza ………………………………………………………………………….. 151
G.R. No. 220759; July 24, 2017
People vs. Calibod ……………………………………………………………………………. 152
G.R. No. 230230; November 20, 2017
People vs. Angeles …………………………………………………………………………… 153
G.R. No. 218947; June 20, 2018
People vs. Gaylon …………………………………………………………………………….. 154
G.R. No. 219086; March 19, 2018
People vs. Ceralde ……………………………………………………………………………. 155
G.R. No. 228894; August 7, 2017
People vs. Ahmad …………………………………………………………………………….. 156
G.R. No. 228955; March 14, 2018
People vs. De Asis ……………………………………………………………………………. 157
G.R. No. 225219; June 11, 2018
People vs. Santos …………………………………………………………………………….. 158
G.R. No. 223142; January 17, 2018
People vs. Mola ……………………………………………………………………………….. 159
G.R. No. 226481; April 18, 2018
People vs. Sanchez …………………………………………………………………………... 160
G.R. No. 231383; March 7, 2018
People vs. Abelarde ………………………………………………………………………….. 161
G.R. No. 215713; January 22, 2018
People vs. Año ………………………………………………………………………………… 162
G.R. No. 230070; March 14, 2018
People vs. Otico ………………………………………………………………………………. 163
G.R. No. 231133; June 6, 2018
People vs. Callejo …………………………………………………………………………….. 164
G.R. No. 227427; June 6, 2018
Casona vs. People ……………………………………………………………………………. 165
G.R. No. 179757; September 13, 2017
People vs. Villahermoso …………………………………………………………………….. 166
G.R. No. 218208; January 24, 2018
People vs. Segundo ………………………………………………………………………….. 167
G.R. No. 205614; July 26, 2017
People vs. Moner ……………………………………………………………………………… 168
G.R. No. 202206; March 5, 2018
People vs. Alvaro ……………………………………………………………………………... 169
G.R. No. 225596; January 10, 2018
People vs. Calates ……………………………………………………………………………. 170
G.R. No. 214759; April 4, 2018
People vs. Lumaya …………………………………………………………………………… 171
G.R. No. 231983; March 7, 2018
People vs. Villarta ………………………………………………….…………………………. 172
G.R. No. 217887; March 14, 2018
Calma vs. People ……………………………………………………………………………… 173
G.R. No. 180586; November 20, 2017
People vs. Geronimo ………………………………………………………………………… 174
G.R. No. 225500; September 11, 2017
Anyayahan vs. People ……………………………………………………………………….. 175
G.R. No. 229787; June 20, 2018
Mapandi vs. People …………………………………………………………………………... 176
G.R. No. 200075; April 4, 2018
People vs. Adobar ……………………………………………………………...…………….. 177
G.R. No. 222559; June 06, 2018
People vs. Mercader ………………………………………………………………………….. 178
G.R. No. 233480; June 20, 2018
People vs. Gamboa ……………………………………………………………………….….. 179
G.R. No. 233702; June 20, 2018
People vs. Ramirez …………………………………………………………………………… 180
G.R. No. 225690; January 17, 2018
People vs. Beringuil …………………………………………………………………………. 181
G.R. No. 220141; June 27, 2018
People vs. Dela Victoria …………………………………………….……………………….. 182
G.R. No. 233325; April 16, 2018
People vs. Sanchez .………………………………………………………………………….. 183
G.R. No. 216014; March 14, 2018
Calahi vs. People ……………………………………………………………………………… 184
G.R. No. 195043; November 20, 2017
People vs. Sagana ……………………………………………………………………………. 185
G.R. No. 208471; August 2, 2017
People vs. Hilario ……………………………………………………………………………... 186
G.R. No. 210610; January 11, 2018
People vs. Dela Rosa ………………………………………………………………………… 187
G.R. No. 230228; December 13, 2017
People vs. Calvelo ……………………………………………………………………………. 188
G.R. No. 223526; December 6, 2017
People vs. Carlit ………………………………………………………………………………. 189
G.R. No. 227309; August 16, 2017
People vs. Geronimo ………………………………………………………………………… 190
G.R. No. 180447; August 23, 2017
People vs. Seguiente ………………………………………………………………………… 191
G.R. No. 218253; June 20, 2018
People vs. Tomawis ………………………………….………………………………………. 192
G.R. No. 228890; April 18, 2018
People vs. Lumudag …………………………………………………………………………. 193
G.R. No. 220451; February 26, 2018
People vs. Battung ……………………………………………………………………………. 194
G.R. No. 230717; June 20, 2018
People vs. Ching ……………………………………………………………………………… 195
G.R. No. 223556; October 9, 2017
People vs. Gajo ……………………………………………………………………………….. 196
G.R. No. 217026; January 22, 2018
People vs. Reyes ……………………………………………………………………………… 197
G.R. No. 219953; April 23, 2018
People vs. Crispo ……………………………………………………………………………... 198
G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018
People vs. Lamama …………………………………………………………………………... 199
G.R. No. 88313; August 27, 2017
People vs. Sood ………………………………………………………………………………. 200
G.R. No. 227394; June 6, 2018
People vs. Alvarado …………………………………………………………………………. 201
G.R. No. 234048; April 23, 2018
People vs. Delociembre ……………………………………………………………………… 202
G.R. No. 226485; June 6, 2018
People vs. Macud ……………………………………………………………………………... 203
G.R. No. 219175; December 14, 2017
Dacanay vs. People …………………………………………………………………………... 204
G.R. No. 199018; September 27, 2017

Peralta vs. People …………………………………………………………………………….. 205

G.R. No. 221991; August 30, 2017

Lucido vs. People …………………………………………………………………………….. 206

G.R. No. 217764; August 17, 2017
People vs. Villacampa ……………………………………………………………………….. 207
G.R. No. 216057; January 8, 2018
Perez vs. People ………………………………………………………………………………. 208
G.R. No. 201414; April 18, 2018
People vs. Molejon …………………………………………………………………………… 209
G.R. No. 208091; April 23, 2018
Orsos vs. People ……………………………………………………………………………… 210
G.R. No. 214673; November 20, 2017
People vs. Macapagal ……………………………………………………………………….. 211
G.R. No. 218574; November 22, 2017
People vs. Padlan …………………………………………………………………………….. 212
G.R. No. 214880; September 6, 2017
People vs. Udang, Sr. ………………………………………………………………………… 213
G.R. No. 210161; January 10, 2018

People vs. Dela Peña ………………………………………………………….……………… 214

G.R. No. 219581; January 31, 2018
Gonzalez vs. People ………………………………………………………….………………. 215
G.R. No. 225709; February 14, 2018
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

STABBING A PERSON WHO IS MOTIONLESS ON THE GROUND WITHOUT PROOF

THAT SUCH PERSON WAS ALREADY DEAD CANNOT CONSTITUTE AN IMPOSSIBLE
CRIME

People of the Philippines vs. Callao and Amad

G.R. No. 228945; March 14, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the decision of the CA affirming with modification the decision of the
RTC finding Callao guilty of Murder.

Sario, Callao, Junello, and Remmy discussed a plan to kill Fernando. Upon reaching the
house of Fernando, Junello struck Fernando on the nape then hacked Fernando’s body on the
side. Fernando lost consciousness. After five minutes, Callao stabbed Fernando. Callao then
opened Fernando’s chest and took out the latter’s heart. Junello took out Fernando’s liver. The
organs were fed to a nearby pig. The accused thereafter left the crime scene.

Callao put forth the defense of denial contending that he did not kill Fernando for the latter
was already dead when Callao stabbed him.

ISSUE:
Is Callao guilty of an impossible crime when he killed Fernando who was allegedly already
dead?

RULING:
No. An impossible crime is attendant when the act performed would be an (1) offense
against persons or property, (2) that the act was done with evil intent, and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual.

The third element, inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime, was explained more
clearly by the Supreme Court in the case of Intod v. CA in this wise: “To be impossible under this
clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment.
There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount
to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. On the other
hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime”.

It was not proven that Fernando was dead when Callao stabbed him as Fernando was
merely motionless on the ground. Nonetheless, given that the crime was committed through
conspiracy, the collective liability of the accused conspirators renders them all guilty of the crime
of Murder.

Hence, Callao is guilty, not of an impossible crime but of the crime of Murder.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM IS THE PRIMORDIAL

ELEMENT OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Cosgafa

G.R. No. 218250; July 10, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by the accused-appellants Gio Cosgafa, Jimmy Sarceda, and Allan
Vivo assailing the decision of the CA which sustained their conviction for the crime of murder by
the RTC for the death of Nathaniel Asombrado, Sr. (Nathaniel).

At around 1:00 am, after finishing half a gallon of Bahalina (an aged native coco-wine),
Nathaniel, brothers Ronald and Rosbill, Panfilo, a certain Joseph and Bryan decided to go to the
disco held at a nearby school. Nathaniel’s group stopped by at a sari-sari store to talk to a certain
person. Rosbill, Joseph, and Panfilo proceeded to the nearby bridge and sat on the opposite
railings fronting the accused-appellants. Suddenly, Gio Cosgafa approached Rosbill and tried to
box him. They immediately ran back to the rest of the group and told them what happened. Victim
Nathaniel proceeded to the bridge to confront Gio. When he got there, accused-appellants took
turns in holding and stabbing him until he fell on the ground. He was brought to the hospital but
was declared dead therein.

The RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
rejecting Gio and Jimmy's uncorroborated claim of self-defense. Accused-appellants claim that the
victim was the aggressor when the latter chased them, held Jimmy’s shirt and kicked him until he
fell on the ground. According to Gio, he was no match to the victim as the latter was not only bigger
and taller than him but also trained in martial arts. Hence, they were forced to stab the victim to
defend themselves.

ISSUE:
Was there unlawful aggression on the part of the victim that will exempt the accused-
appellants from criminal liability where the victim, alone and unarmed, merely tried to confront the
accused?

RULING:
No. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in
defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be imagined or an imaginary threat.

In this case, the victim, alone and unarmed, went to the accused-appellants merely to
confront them. The alleged attack coming from the victim is not one to put the life of the accused
in peril. Also, the fact that Gio, who was armed with an ice pick, already came to Jimmy's rescue,
who was also armed with a Batangas knife and who had already hit the victim with a tree branch,
indicates that the threat from the supposed aggression already ceased to exist. More so, when Gio
already stabbed the victim with the ice pick causing the latter to fall on the ground, there was no
more aggression to prevent or repel. It, thus, became unnecessary for the accused-appellants to
continue to inflict injuries and/or to stab the fallen victim, which caused his death. As there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused cannot claim exemption by virtue of acting
in self-defense.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION, AS AN ESSENTIAL AND PRIMARY ELEMENT OF SELF-

DEFENSE, MUST BE REAL AND IMMINENT

People of the Philippines vs. Gallanosa, Jr.

G.R. No. 219885; July 17, 2017
Carpio, Acting C.J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by the appellant Augusto Gallanosa, Jr. assailing the decision of the
CA which affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, convicting appellant of two counts of
murder for the deaths of brothers Nonilon L. Frencillo, Jr. and Dante L. Frencillo.

Dante and his common-law wife, Maricel, passed by the appellant’s house as they were
on their way to a wedding procession. The relatives of appellant started throwing stones at Dante.
Appellant then ran towards Dante and stabbed him in his left abdomen causing his death. Nonilon
went to Dante’s aid but was likewise stoned and stabbed by appellant causing his death.

Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder. However, he claims that he acted in self-
defense. He claims that Dante challenged Medel Gallanosa to come out of his house and started
throwing rocks at his house when Medel did not come out. Dante allegedly ran towards Medel’s
uncle, Onto, and tried to stab him but missed. It was when appellant arrived at the scene and was
likewise attacked by Dante. Afterwards, appellant stabbed Dante with a bolo. Thereafter, Nonilon
came and punched appellant. When appellant ran away, Nonilon started throwing rocks at him and
ran after him. Nonilon tried to hit appellant with a piece of wood but appellant was able to stab him
first.

ISSUE:
Was appellant able to prove self-defense to acquit him in the two counts of murder?

RULING:
No, unlawful aggression which is the main ingredient of self-defense is not present in the
case at bar.

There are three essential elements that must be established by an accused claiming self-
defense: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual and imminent threat to
the life of the accused; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused
to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused claiming self-defense.

The victim, Nonilon, was stabbed by appellant five times which caused Nonilon's death.
Even if there was unlawful aggression on the part of Nonilon at the start, it already ceased when
Nonilon ran away. When appellant caught up with Nonilon, the latter was already kneeling with his
hands raised, indicating a position of surrender. However, appellant still hacked Nonilon. At that
moment, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Nonilon which amounts to actual or
imminent threat to the life of appellant.

Thus, the first element of unlawful aggression is already lacking in this case. As such,
appellant cannot claim that he acted in self-defense absent a finding of unlawful aggression on
Nonilon’s part.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY THE PERSON INVOKING SELF-DEFENSE IS REASONABLE

IF EQUIVALENT TO THE MEANS OF ATTACK USED BY THE ORIGINAL AGGRESSOR

Remegio vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 196945; September 27, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which affirmed
with modification the decision of the RTC finding petitioner Danilo Remegio guilty of homicide.

Petitioner, Danilo Remegio, a caretaker of a land, approached Felix Sumugat, who was
cutting an ipil-ipil tree with a chainsaw. The petitioner told Sumugat to cut only the branches and
not the trunk for it will be placed in the warehouse. Sumugat became infuriated and shouted at
petitioner. He then drew a revolver and aimed it at petitioner. Petitioner raised both of his hands
and told Sumugat that he would not fight him, but Sumugat repeated that he would kill him. Fearing
for his life, petitioner grappled with Sumugat but the latter picked up the chainsaw, turned it on,
and advanced towards petitioner. Petitioner stepped back and shot at the ground to warn Sumugat,
but the latter continued thrusting the chainsaw at him. Petitioner parried but lost his balance and
accidentally pressed the gun’s trigger, thus firing a shot which hit Sumugat in the chest.

Petitioner claims justifying circumstance of self-defense, while the defense contended that
opined that the firing of the gun was no longer justified as the victim was already unarmed.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner entitled to invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense considering that
he may have repelled the aggression without having to kill the victim, and that the latter was already
wounded and he held a chainsaw which was difficult to handle?

RULING:
Yes, petitioner can invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance. For self-defense to
prosper, petitioner must the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

All of the elements were satisfied. First, the utterance of Sumugat to kill petitioner coupled
by his act of aiming a gun at him, and his continued thrusting of the chainsaw that hit petitioner's
palm constitute unlawful aggression. Second, the gun which petitioner grabbed from the victim was
the only weapon available to him and that the victim was continuing to thrust the chainsaw towards
him. And third, petitioner's act of telling the victim not to cut the trunk of the uprooted tree could
hardly be considered provocation.

It must be noted that the gun which petitioner grabbed from the victim was the only weapon
available to him and that the victim was continuing to thrust the chainsaw towards him. Indeed, a
chainsaw is difficult to operate. Also, the chainsaw was switched on when the victim was thrusting
it towards petitioner. Hence, the danger that petitioner would be cut into pieces by the chainsaw
was very real. Perfect balance between the weapon used by the one defending himself and that
of the aggressor is not required, because the person assaulted loses sufficient tranquility of mind
to think, to calculate or to choose which weapon to use.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM IS THE PRIMORDIAL

CONSIDERATION IN SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Endaya

G.R. No. 225745; February 28, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal to the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC of
Rosario, Batangas finding Arsenio Endaya guilty of Parricide and Homicide, respectively.

The accused stabbed his wife, Jocelyn Quita-Endaya (Jocelyn), and the latter’s mother,
Marietta Bukal-Quita (Marietta), with a bladed weapon. De Torres, Jocelyn's son, rushed to his
mother's aid when he heard his mother shouting for help. The victims were rushed to the San Juan
District Hospital where they were pronounced dead on arrival.

Endaya claimed that he only acted in self-defense and that De Torres hacked him first;
hence, the Trial and Appellate Courts erred when they failed to appreciate the justifying
circumstance of self-defense in his favor.

ISSUE:
Was self-defense present to exonerate Endaya from the crimes of parricide and homicide?

RULING:
No. It is settled that when the accused pleads self-defense and effectively admits that he
killed the victim, the burden of evidence shifts to him.

In order to successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove that: (1)
the victim mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused; (2) that the means employed by
the accused to repel or prevent the aggression were reasonable and necessary; and (3) the
accused did not offer any sufficient provocation.

It is elementary that unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial
consideration in self-defense. Absent this element, there could be no self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated there must be an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude.

Endaya miserably failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of De Torres and/or
the victims. Aside from their absurdity, Endaya's claims are unsubstantiated by any physical
evidence. The anatomical sketch made no mention of any hack wound on Endaya's face, back,
shoulder, or any other part of his body, but merely indicated that Endaya sustained scratches, the
gravest of which being a laceration on his left hand. Contrary to his claims, these minor injuries
suggest that they may have been inflicted by Jocelyn and Marietta who resisted the attacks of their
ruthless assailant. Thus, the Court could not simply accept Endaya's bare claim that he was hacked
by De Torres several times considering the absence of wounds matching his allegation.

Moreover, the fact that the victims suffered multiple stab wounds — four each — which
caused their deaths belies and negates Endaya's claim of self-defense. If at all, these stab wounds
demonstrate a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victims.

Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of both the trial and appellate
courts.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION MUST BE PROVED FIRST IN ORDER FOR EITHER

COMPLETE OR INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE TO BE SUCCESSFULLY PLEADED; THE
EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY NEED NOT BE PROVED BY DIRECT EVIDENCE

People of the Philippines vs. Escobal

G.R. No. 20629; October 11, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by accused-appellants Escobal and Abaño assailing the decision of
the CA which affirmed the RTC’s decision finding them guilty of murder for the killing of the late
SPO1 Fernando Gaabucayan, Jr.

An eyewitness saw SPO1 Gaabucayan talk to Escobal. Seconds later, the witness heard
gunshots and then saw Gaabucayan lying on the ground while Escobal was pointing a gun at the
former, with Abaño beside him. Gaabucayan raised his hand and pleaded Escobal to “stop it
partner”. However, two successive gunshots were heard causing the death of Gaabucayan.

On appeal, Escobal claims that he acted in self-defense.

ISSUES:
(1) Was Escobal acting in self-defense hence exonerated from criminal liability? and;
(2) Was there conspiracy between Escobal and Abano?

RULING:
(1) No. Escobal failed to prove the existence of an unlawful aggression.

Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully

pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. In other words, "there can be no self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person
who resorted to self-defense."

Without proof of unlawful aggression on the part of SPO1 Gaabucayan by clear and
convincing evidence, Escobal did not discharge his burden of proving his plea of self-defense,
complete or incomplete. The witness testified that he saw the gun of SPO1 Gaabucayan still tucked
on his waistline after the shooting. The shooting inflicted nine frontal entry wounds on the victim,
and actually belied Escobal's having fired them in self-defense.

(2) Yes. The acts of Escobal and Abano, when pieced together, indicate conspiracy.

The existence of conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence, the same may be
sufficiently established by the actuation of the accused, as well as the circumstances occurring
prior to, during, or after the commission of the offense.

In the case at bar, the Court ruled that these acts of the two accused indicate that they
acted in conspiracy: 1) both appellants were seen with the victim before and after shooting; 2)
Abaño did not stop Escobal from continuously shooting victim; 3) Abaño was seen standing near
victim after the shooting; 4) Both appellants left the place of the incident immediately after the
gunshots were fired. Thus, the two conspired in killing Gaabucayan.

6|
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE TEST FOR THE PRESENCE OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION UNDER THE

CIRCUMSTANCES IS WHETHER THE AGGRESSION FROM THE VICTIM PUT IN REAL
PERIL THE LIFE OR PERSONAL SAFETY OF THE PERSON DEFENDING HIMSELF; THE
PERIL MUST NOT BE AN IMAGINED OR IMAGINARY THREAT

Sombilon vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 177246; September 25, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
Under review is the decision of the CA which affirmed the conviction of the petitioner
Antonio Sombilon for homicide by the RTC in relation to the fatal shooting of the late SPO3 Gerardo
F. Amerilla.

One evening, Nelson Andres was startled by a gunshot and saw petitioner pointing a gun
at him, forcing him to nervously enter his house, shut the door behind him, turn off the lights and
go upstairs together with his wife and daughter. Once inside his upstairs room, he peeked through
the window and saw the petitioner striding back and forth in front of his house, shouting and firing
his gun every now and then. Upon being informed of the commotion, SPO3 Amerilla proceeded to
the house of Andres and asked the petitioner what his problem was all about, but the latter instantly
fired his gun twice at Amerilla. SPO3 Amerilla fell face down to the ground, crawled towards the
gate of Andres' house seeking his help, but no one could approach him because the petitioner
stayed around for about 25 meters and prevented others from going to the victim's aid.

The RTC ruled that Sombilon is guilty of the crime of homicide. Petitioner, then the
barangay chairman, admitted shooting Amerilla but insisted that he had done so in self-defense.
He had gone to see Andres at his house in order to discuss matters with the latter who appeared
irritated and remarked that his decision should prevail. As petitioner was about to exit through the
gate of Andres, he saw a person aiming a gun at him. Fearing for his own life, he drew his .45
caliber firearm and fired twice at his assailant.

ISSUE:
Was petitioner able to prove that he acted in self-defense in fatally shooting Amerilla?

RULING:
No. Petitioner is required to establish his plea with clear and convincing evidence. In the
case at bar, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim that endangered the
petitioner’s life and limb.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or
at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely
imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong.

There was no proof that Amerilla was the first to aim and fire his gun. Further, the victim’s
alleged gun was not recovered in the place of shooting. Petitioner also claims that he merely
retaliated by firing his own gun after the victim allegedly fired at him. This cannot prosper since he
immediately ran towards his house after the shooting instead of going towards the victim whom he
professed not to have then recognized. Lastly, even before Amerilla came, petitioner had already
been firing his gun in order to scare Andres.

Thus, there is no unlawful aggression to speak of. Petitioner’s claim of self-defense cannot
prosper.

|7
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHERE THE WEAPON FROM THE INITIAL AGGRESSOR IS WRESTED BY THE

ACCUSED FROM THE SAME, THE UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION CEASES; SHOOTING THE
INITIAL AGGRESSOR IN SUCH CASE IS NOT SELF-DEFENSE BUT RETALIATION

People of the Philippines vs. Duran, Jr.

G.R. No. 215748; November 20, 2017
Caguoia, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed under Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the decision of
the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding herein accused-appellant Paul M. Duran,
Jr. guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery under Art. 248 of the RPC and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua for the death of Gilbert Grimaldo.

Beverly C. Quilana was awakened by her godson, Grimaldo who was asking for her help.
As soon as she opened the door for her godson, she saw the accused Paul Duran shoot Grimaldo
with a .38 caliber revolver from behind. Grimaldo was hit at the nape, and then fell to the ground
lying with his face down. Duran then left the place. The accused then returned and shot Grimaldo
three more times to make sure that the latter was dead.

For his part, Duran invokes self-defense and claims that it was Grimaldo who poked a gun
at him saying that they needed his money. Duran and Grimaldo wrestled for the possession of the
gun. Duran was able to take the gun away and hit Grimaldo three times.

ISSUE:
May the justifying circumstance of self-defense be appreciated in favor of Duran?

RULING:
No. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. Without unlawful
aggression, self-defense cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are
present.

When an unlawful aggression that has begun has ceased to exist, the one who resorts to
self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. Aggression, if not
continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting defense of one's self. The condition sine
qua non of unlawful aggression being absent, self-defense cannot be appreciated in favor of the
accused.

In the case at bar, even though Duran claims that there was an attempted robbery against
him, Grimaldo, albeit the initial aggressor, ceased to be the aggressor as Duran had successfully
wrested the weapon from him. Thereafter, Duran shot the gun at Grimaldo four times – three of
which hit Grimaldo on vital parts of his body. At this moment, actions of the accused were already
done in retaliation and not self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression initiated by the victim had
already ceased when the accused attacked him; in self-defense, the aggression from the victim is
continuing. Thus, Duran cannot invoke that he acted in self-defense.

8|
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

AS ALTERCATION CEASES DUE TO INTERVENTION OF A PERSON, THERE IS NO

LONGER UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION; THE ONE MAKING THE DEFENSE IS NOT
ANYMORE JUSTIFIED IN KILLING OR EVEN WOUNDING THE FORMER AGGRESSOR

People of the Philippines vs. Ramelo

G.R. No. 224888; November 22, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
On appeal is the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision
finding accused-appellant Roderick R. Ramelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder for killing Nelson Peña. On appeal, the CA found him guilty of homicide.

Peña was standing outside a basketball court when accused-appellant suddenly appeared
behind him and stabbed him. Samuel Vega, a barangay tanod, saw what happened, confronted
Ramelo and confiscated the knife he used. Ramelo was able to run away. Vega turned over the
knife to the chief tanod, who then reported the matter to the police station.

Ramelo was convicted of murder. However, he claims that he acted in self-defense.

Ramelo’s story was that he was smoking at a nearby store when he saw Peña having a drinking
spree with three other persons. A fight ensued when Ramelo was approached and slapped by one
of Peña’s companions. Thereafter, Peña approached Ramelo and strangled him by the collar.
Peña then allegedly sat on Ramelo’s abdomen and punched him, while his companions mauled
him. Afterwards, Ramelo pulled out his knife and stabbed Peña. Thereafter, Ramelo handed his
knife to Rey Pilapil.

ISSUE:
May the justifying circumstance of self-defense be appreciated in favor of Ramelo?

RULING:
No. The requisite of unlawful aggression was not present in the case at bar.

To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must be able to prove that: (1) the victim
mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused; (2) that the means employed by the accused
to repel or prevent the aggression were reasonable and necessary; and (3) the accused did not
offer any sufficient provocation. The most important of these elements is unlawful aggression
because without it, there could be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.

In the case at bar, although there was an altercation which happened before the stabbing
incident, said confrontation ceased due to Pilapil’s intervention. As a rule, when unlawful
aggression which has begun no longer exists, the one making the defense is not anymore justified
in killing or even wounding the former aggressor. Furthermore, Ramelo kept looking for his other
assailants – with whom he might have had a previous fight with. This, together with the fact that
Ramelo brought a weapon and hid it in his shoe negates the presence of unlawful aggression on
Peña’s part.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

STABBING THE UNARMED VICTIM TO DEATH IS NOT A REASONABLE MEANS TO

PREVENT THE ALLEGED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION; SELF-DEFENSE CONTEMPLATES
A RATIONAL EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN THE MEANS OF ATTACK AND THE DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Tica

G.R. No. 222561; August 30, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming with modification the trial court’s
decision indicting accused-appellant Jonathan Tica for murder for the death of Edward Intia.

Eliza Sabanal and Emelita Bagajo saw accused-appellant Tica walk towards Intia with a
knife in his hand. Intia tried to stand up and run away, but he was stabbed about six times which
caused his death. After that, Tica went home.

On the other hand, Tica claimed that Intia dropped by his house. They reached an
agreement that the latter will sell the seashells to Intia’s friend. However, Intia did not give the
proceeds of the seashells. Tica confronted Intia, got mad and boxed him. The following day, Tica
was at the seashore when he saw Intia running towards him to attack. Tica tried to evade by
swimming towards the sea. They submerged themselves in the seawater while grappling with each
other. Intia pulled Tica’s hair and pushed him down to drown him. On his part, Tica held Intia’s feet
until he reached the latter’s left waistline and held his knife, which he used to stab him on his left
breast. As a result, Intia released Tica, who upon standing up, again stabbed him. Thereafter, Tica
went home, changed his clothes, approached Edgardo Florig, his godfather, neighbour and the
Chief of Barangay Police, and informed the latter that he was going to surrender and requested to
be accompanied to the police station.

ISSUE:
Is the claim of self-defense proper when an accused fatally stabs an unarmed victim?

RULING:
No. Tica went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict fatal injuries
to Intia.

The essential elements of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. To
invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that
endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.

The means employed by Tica was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent
of the alleged attack that he sought to prevent. The means employed by the person invoking self-
defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. It
must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must
be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.

In this case, Intia was unarmed when he allegedly attacked Tica. Considering that Tica is
taller, had a bigger body built, and younger than Intia, he could have simply engaged him in a
fistfight. Instead, using his own knife, Tica chose to fatally stab Intia about six times, which caused
the victim's eventual death. We have held in the past that the nature and number of wounds are
constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense.

10 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE IS AS MUCH A CONFESSION AS IT IS AN AVOIDANCE; THE

LARGE NUMBER OF WOUNDS SUSTAINED BY THE VICTIM NEGATES SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Panerio

G.R. No. 205440; January 15, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal on the decision of the CA affirming with modifications the decision of the
RTC finding Panerio guilty of murder.

After causing a commotion in a billiard hall, Panerio and Orteza, who were both drunk, saw
Elesio on the road and repeatedly stabbed him using a fan knife and ice pick. Elesio sustained
eleven (11) stab and puncture wounds, seven (7) of which were deemed fatal having been inflicted
over vital organs such as the heart, the lungs, the liver, and the intestines.

Rebosura, the guard duty at the Mintal public market, was approached by Panerio and
Orteza and was told that they do not know who killed Elesio. Alojado, a police officer, noticed
bloodstains on the hands of the Panerio and Orteza and thereafter frisked them and discovered
the weapons used for the murder.

Panerio and Orteza alleged that they were only acting in self-defense because Elesio tried
to stab the them after they refused his offer to drink.

ISSUE:
Was the plea of self-defense as a justifying circumstance sufficiently established by the
accused?

RULING:
No, the accused failed to establish the plea of self-defense, which is as much a confession
as it is an avoidance.

By invoking self-defense, the accused admits having killed or having deliberately inflicted
injuries on the victim, but asserts that he has not committed any felony and is not criminally liable
therefor. Thus, the plea of self-defense can be described as a double-edged sword which can
either bring favorable or unfavorable consequences to the accused.

To bring about a result favorable to the accused in the form of exculpation from criminal
liability, jurisprudence teaches that the accused must establish the essential requisites of self-
defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means used to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.

The accused has the burden to prove these requisites by clear and convincing evidence.
In doing so, he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution because it could no longer be denied that he admitted to be the author of the victim's
death or injuries.

In the case at hand, the assertion that Elesio attempted to stab Panerio is unsubstantiated
by any convincing proof. Moreover, the large number of wounds sustained by Elesio negates the
claim of self-defense. The presence of multiple stab wounds on the victim strongly indicates a
determined effort to kill Elesio. Considering the quantity, nature, and location of the wounds
sustained by Elesio, Panerio's plea of self-defense is incredible. Hence, self-defense cannot be
appreciated as a justifying circumstance.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION REFERS TO ACTUAL PHYSICAL ASSAULT OR THREAT TO

INFLICT REAL IMMINENT INJURY UPON A PERSON; TREACHERY IS PRESENT WHEN
ATTACK IS SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED, AGAINST AN UNARMED AND
UNSUSPECTING VICTIM, WITHOUT CHANCE TO DEFEND HIMSELF

People of the Philippines vs. Siega

G.R. No. 213273; June 27, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal on the amended decision of the CA affirming with modification the
decision of the RTC finding Siega guilty of Murder.

Bitoy and Alingasa were walking alone the feeder road on their way home. Suddenly, Siega
approached them and asked who would dare challenge him. Bitoy replied that no one would dare
challenge him. Siega left, then returned and stabbed Bitoy with a long bolo on the left part of his
chest. When Bitoy tried to flee, Siega ran after him and continued his assault. Bitoy died due to the
severity of wounds. Siega surrendered himself to the police authorities.

Siega averred that it was Bitoy first who attempted to draw the bolo that was wrapped on
his waist. Scared by Bitoy’s actions, Siega immediately hacked Bitoy in the act of self-defense.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the justifying circumstance of self-defense attendant in the crime committed? and;
(2) Is the qualifying circumstance of treachery attendant in the case at hand?

RULING:
(1) No. Self-defense is attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.
Of these three, unlawful aggression is most important and indispensable.

Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person." Bitoy did not carry any weapon at that time, nor did he employ
any actual physical assault or at least threaten to inflict injury upon Siega. As a matter of fact, Bitoy
was merely walking when Siega stabbed him on his chest. Seiga failed to establish unlawful
aggression on the part of Bitoy.

(2) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack against an
unarmed and unsuspecting victim, who has no chance of defending himself.

The frontal attack employed by Siega does not rule out the existence of treachery because
it was so sudden and unexpected that Bitoy, unarmed and had no chance to defend himself, was
felled down by Siega's repeated hacking blows.

Hence, the CA correctly upheld Siega to be guilty of Murder.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE NATURE AND LOCATION OF THE VICTIM'S WOUND MANIFEST APPELLANT'S

RESOLVE TO END THE LIFE OF THE VICTIM, AND NOT JUST TO DEFEND HIMSELF

People of the Philippines vs. Lopez

G.R. No. 232247; April 23, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal to the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC of Las
Piñas City finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Parricide.

Accused Ronillo Lopez stabbed his father, Ronillo Lopez, Sr, in the chest, which
immediately caused the latter’s death. Thereafter, he fled from the scene after the incident, but
was later arrested at his brother-in-law's house.

Ronillo admitted that he stabbed his father but maintained that he merely acted in self-
defense. He averred that he was awakened to the beatings inflicted upon him by his drunken
father, Lopez, Sr. He then urged the accused to fight back, but the latter would not so he took a
hard object and struck it on his son's head. He avers that the Trial and Appellate Courts erred
when they failed to appreciate the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor.

ISSUE:
Was self-defense present to exonerate Lopez from the crime of parricide?

RULING:
No. Self-defense is appreciated as a justifying circumstance only if the following requisites
were present, namely: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or
imminent threat to the life and limb of the person acting in self-defense; (2) there was reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) there was
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense, or, at least, any
provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate
cause of the victim's aggression.

At the heart of the claim for self-defense is the element of unlawful aggression committed
by the victim against the accused, which is the condition sine qua non for upholding the same as
a justifying circumstance. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim
committed unlawful aggression against the accused.

The physical evidence, showing that Lopez, Sr. did not commit unlawful aggression against
said appellant, belied the latter’s plea of self-defense. Had Lopez, Sr. attacked Ronillo, the latter
would have sustained some injury from the aggression. However, in the case, no injury of any kind
was found on the accused. Instead, the deceased suffered multiple injuries that led to his death.
In addition, the nature and location of the victim's wound manifest appellant's resolve to end the
life of the victim, and not just to defend himself.

Lastly, the appellant did not inform the authorities at the earliest opportunity that he stabbed
his father in self-defense; neither did he surrender right away the kitchen knife that he used in
stabbing the victim. Jurisprudence has repeatedly declared that flight is an indication of guilt. The
flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which
an inference of guilt may be established "for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first
available opportunity to defend himself and to assert his innocence.” Also, Ronillo only invoked
self-defense when he could no longer conceal his deed.

With appellant's failure to prove self-defense, the inescapable conclusion is that he is guilty
of Parricide as correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.

| 13
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION MEANS REAL PERIL, NOT IMAGINARY THREAT

People of the Philippines vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 224498; January 11, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA Decision affirming with modification the RTC Manila decision
modifying accused-appellant PFC Enrique Reyes' conviction from Murder to Homicide.

Around 7:00 in the morning of August 13, 1990, the eyewitnesses saw Reyes fire his
Armalite rifle upwards. Danilo, the deceased, was then walking towards his house and was three
steps away from his residence when Reyes suddenly fired at him from behind, causing him to fall
on the ground and die. Reyes then approached Danilo.

However, Reyes contends that he acted out of self-defense. He narrated how Danilo and
four other men talked about killing Reyes on board an owner-type jeep during the same day. One
of them allegedly remarked “ltumba na natin iyan puede na kahit anong mangyari,” to which Danilo
replied “Hagisan ng granada kahit sa bahay.” Reyes submits that Danilo's remarks were “more
than enough to show the imminent and real danger” to the former’s life.

ISSUE:
Is the act of shooting the deceased an act of self-defense that is sufficient to acquit the
accused?

RULING:
No, the act is not considered as self-defense.

By invoking self-defense, accused-appellant admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused
Danilo's death. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to him to show that the killing was
attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person invoking self- defense.

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent
injury, upon a person. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression is whether the victim's
aggression placed in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself. The
danger must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.

Tested against the foregoing criteria, the Court finds the element of unlawful aggression to
be wanting in this case. There is nothing in the records which would clearly and convincingly prove
Enrique's claim that his life was in danger when he saw Danilo. As found by the CA, Danilo was
only approaching Enrique while holding a gun. There was no positive act showing the actual and
material unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.

Anent the alleged threats, neither the “looming” threat perceived by accused-appellant nor
the remarks satisfy the requirement of an actual, menacing, sudden and unexpected danger to
accused-appellant's life. To constitute imminent unlawful aggression, the attack must be at the
point of happening and must not be imaginary or consist in a mere threatening attitude.
Furthermore, as the trial court found, the supposed threat made “no specific or definite reference
to (accused-appellant).” The Court is thus unconvinced that there was a real peril to accused-
appellant's life when he killed Danilo.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE STATE OF MIND OF THE ACCUSED DURING AN ALLEGED ACT OF SELF-DEFENSE

OR DEFENSE OF A RELATIVE OR OF A STRANGER MUST BE CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING WHETHER HIS OR HER MEANS OF REPELLING AN AGGRESSOR
WERE REASONABLE

Mariano vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 224102; July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the CA which affirmed the RTC, finding
petitioner Ryan Mariano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide under
Art. 249 of the RPC committed against Frederick Natividad.

One evening, Natividad saw Yuki Rivera walking. Yuki punched Natividad's head thinking
that Natividad would tell Yuki's aunt that he was selling marijuana. Natividad, who was drunk and
staggering, went to Yuki’s house to report the punching. Upon arriving at Yuki’s house, Natividad
then met petitioner and his common-law wife, Pamela. Later, petitioner stabbed Natividad twice.
Natividad would have died had it not been for timely medical intervention.

Mariano was charged with frustrated homicide. Petitioner claims that he acted in self-
defense and in defense of a relative. He claims that it was Natividad who went berserk and slapped
Yuki and kicked Pamela’s daughter, Pia Rivera. Pamela confronted Natividad who punched her in
the face and shoulder. Mariano then pushed Natividad to the ground. Natividad stood and kept
hitting Mariano. Mariano then got a knife and stabbed Natividad.

ISSUE:
Was petitioner acting in self-defense and in defense of a relative?

RULING:
No. However, Mariano is justified in stabbing Natividad not because he acted in self-
defense and in defense of a relative but because of defense of a stranger.

To properly invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, it must be shown

that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the means employed to repel the
victim were reasonably necessary, and that the accused was not induced by revenge, resentment,
or other evil motive.

The Court ruled that the attack on Pamela suffices as an unlawful aggression. As for the
reasonable necessity of the means employed, the Court stated that while Pamela, Pia, and Yuki
had already gone inside the house at the time of the stabbing, there was no other reasonable
means for petitioner Mariano to protect his family except to commit the acts alleged. It is
unreasonable for courts to demand conduct that could only have been discovered with hindsight
and absent the stress caused by the threats that the petitioner actually faced. Lastly, the petitioner
was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The victim himself, Natividad,
testified that he had no issues with petitioner before the incident.

As Mariano was justified in stabbing Natividad under Art. 11, paragraph 3 of the RPC, he
should be exonerated of the crime charged.

| 15
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FOR THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY TO PROSPER, IT MUST BE PROVEN THAT THE

ACCUSED WAS COMPLETELY DEPRIVED OF INTELLIGENCE WHICH MUST RELATE
TO THE TIME IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING OR SIMULTANEOUS TO THE COMMISSION
OF THE OFFENSE WITH WHICH HE IS CHARGED

People of the Philippines vs. Miraña

G.R. No. 219113; April 25, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an automatic review of the case against accused, Roland Miraña who was found
guilty of the crime of murder by the RTC which was affirmed by the CA.

Accused, Roland Miraña allegedly hacked Dominga Agnas V da. De Globo until the later
died. Policemen arrived at the scene and the accused, immediately claimed responsibility for the
death and adding that he had already washed the bolo he used to hack his victim. Family members
of the accused, testified that the latter exhibited odd behavior, he would smile without anyone in
front of him; he would call a chicken late at night; and would keep on saying to himself that the
victim was a witch. During trial, accused-appellant claimed not to know or recall the events
surrounding the incident, the identity of the victim, and his confinement and treatment at the mental
hospital.

The defense claims that accused, is insane which should be appreciated as an exempting
circumstance in the case.

ISSUE:
May the exempting circumstance of insanity be appreciated considering the odd behavior
exhibited by the accused?

RULING:
No. For the defense of insanity to prosper, it must be proven that the accused, was
completely deprived of intelligence, which must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous to the commission of the offense with which he is charged.

Unusual behaviors such as smiling to oneself and calling a chicken late at night are not
proof of a complete absence of intelligence, because not every aberration of the mind or mental
deficiency constitutes insanity. The Court has held that "the prevalent meaning of the word 'crazy'
is not synonymous with the legal terms 'insane,' 'non compos mentis,' 'unsound mind,' 'idiot,' or
'lunatic.' The popular conception of the word 'crazy' is being used to describe a person or an act
unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily
and conclusively prove that he is legally so." In order to be exempt from criminal liability, the
accused must be so insane as to be incapable of criminal intent.

Accused-appellant's actuations immediately after the incident also negate a complete

absence of intelligence or discernment when he killed the victim. As testified to by PO3 Corono,
accused-appellant approached the police officers when they arrived at the crime scene, told them
that he was responsible for hacking the victim, pointed to the bolo he used, and indicated that he
had already washed the weapon. That accused-appellant had the foresight to wash the bolo after
killing the victim and, thereafter, the consciousness to decide to confess to the authorities what he
had done upon their arrival, suggest that accused-appellant was capable of discernment during
the time of the incident.

It is clear from the foregoing circumstances that the defense failed to prove accused’s
insanity at the time of the commission of the crime with the requisite quantum of proof.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

MERE BEHAVIORAL ODDITIES CANNOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF INSANITY UNLESS

THE TOTALITY OF SUCH BEHAVIOR INDUBITABLY SHOWS A TOTAL ABSENCE OF
REASON, DISCERNMENT, OR FREE WILL AT THE TIME THE CRIME WAS
COMMITTED

People of the Philippines vs. Salvador

G.R. No. 223566; June 27, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal to the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC of
Tagum City, Davao del Norte finding accused-appellant guilty of five counts murder.

Accused-appellant hacked and killed his family members and relatives including Miraflor,
his live-in partner; Junie, Jr., his 2-year old son; Rossana, daughter of his live-in partner; Mariz, his
3-year old niece; and Jonessa, his 1-year old niece.

Accused-appellant testified that he remembered who his victims were but he does not
recall that he killed them. He averred that he was suffering from insanity, loss, or absence of reason
before and after he killed his victim and that, the court a quo erred in not giving probative weight
to testimony of and psychiatric evaluation finding him to be suffering from schizoaffective disorder.

ISSUE:
Was insanity present to exonerate the criminal liability of the accused?

RULING:
No. Jurisprudence dictates that every individual is presumed to have acted with a complete
grasp of one's mental faculties. Hence, a person who invokes insanity as a defense has the burden
of proving its existence.

For accused-appellant's defense of insanity to prosper, two elements must concur: (1) that
defendant's insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment; and
(2) that such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime.

In this case, the appellant was first examined a month after the incident happened.
However, the records of these cases were bereft of any showing that he had the disorder as of the
day of the killing, or even earlier than that date. Moreover, the diagnosis on accused-appellant long
after the 11 February 2011 incident- that he may have had said disorder at the time of the killing-
even if this was testified to by a doctor, may not be relied upon to prove his mental condition at the
time of his commission of the offenses. This is because an inquiry into the mental state of an
accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is
committed.

For purposes of exemption from criminal liability, mere behavioral oddities cannot support
a finding of insanity unless the totality of such behavior indubitably shows a total absence of
reason, discernment, or free will at the time the crime was committed. Therefore, his claim that he
allegedly failed to remember what had happened neither qualifies him as insane nor negates the
truth that he was fully aware that he had killed his victims.

| 17
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

DEFENSE OF INSANITY IS IN THE NATURE OF CONFESSION AND AVOIDANCE,

WHERE AN ACCUSED INVOKING IT ADMITS TO HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME BUT
CLAIMS THAT HE OR SHE IS NOT GUILTY BECAUSE OF INSANITY

People of the Philippines vs. Dagsil

G.R. No. 218945; December 13, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Loreto Dagsil is interposing this appeal to assail the CA’s decision
which affirmed his conviction by the RTC of the crime of murder for the death of Amean Banzuela,
a 14-year old girl.

Amelita Banzuela was rousing her minor daughter Amean to prepare for school. The latter
complained of headache. It was then that Amean told her that accused-appellant raped her.
Amelita then proceeded to the police station to report what happened to her daughter. The next
day, Amelita saw accused-appellant lurking outside their house and so she directed her son,
Angelo, to close the front door. At that time, Amean was still asleep in her room. Thereafter, Amelita
was shocked when Amean came to her, with blood all over her and said that the accused-appellant
just stabbed her.

For his part, accused Loreto C. Dagsil claims that although he indeed stabbed Amean, he
was confused and did not know what he was doing at that time. He recalled that after passing by
Amean’s house, he remembered her taunting and threatening gestures at him. He was suddenly
overcome with confusion and he was not conscious of what was going on. Not really certain of
what happened, the accused then found himself seated inside his bedroom. When he saw the
policemen, confusion prevailed over him and he started stabbing himself with the knife he was
holding. Thereafter, his bedroom door was forced open and he was brought to the hospital.
Afterwards, he was brought to the precinct for processing. He contends that he should be declared
criminally exempt of the murder charge because he was in a state of temporary insanity when he
stabbed the now deceased Amean.

ISSUE:
Was Dagsil in a state of temporary insanity when he committed the crime so as to exculpate
him from the crime?

RULING:
No. Accused is not exempt from criminal liability.

Art. 12 of the RPC provides for one of the circumstances which will exempt one from
criminal liability which is when the perpetrator of the act was an imbecile or insane, unless the
latter has acted during a lucid interval. Under Art. 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that
every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden
of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity
must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of
the offense with which he is charged.

In the instant case, the accused-appellant failed to present any proof of his claim of
insanity. What he presented were mere statements that he was 'confused' when he committed the
horrible act which are, at best, self-serving and devoid of credence. As such, the accused-appellant
failed to overthrow the presumption that he was sane during the commission of the offense.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

PROOF OF INSANITY MAY TAKE THE FORM OF TESTIMONY BY A WITNESS

INTIMATELY ACQUAINTED WITH THE ACCUSED OR BY AN EXPERT

People of the Philippines vs. Pantoja

G.R. No. 223114; November 29, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an automatic review of the decision rendered by the CA which affirmed with
modification the decision of the RTC finding accused-appellant Jonas A. Pantoja guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the death of AAA, a minor, and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua.

Accused-appellant, who was admitted to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH)
for exhibiting signs of mental illness, escaped therefrom and arrived at their house the day after. A
week after the incident, his mother, Cederina, noticed that the accused-appellant was suddenly
gone. She went outside to look for him and noticed that the front door of the house where six-year
old AAA resided was open. She heard the cry of a child, prompting her to enter the house. She
then saw accused-appellant holding a knife and the victim sprawled on the floor, bloodied. She
took the knife from him and asked him what happened. He did not respond and appeared dazed.
The appellate court acknowledged that the accused-appellant has a history of mental illness which
diminished the exercise of the willpower without depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. It
also ruled that this mitigating circumstance could not serve to lower the penalty meted against
accused-appellant because reclusion perpetua is a single and indivisible penalty. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Were Cederina’s testimony, doctor’s prescriptions, patient cards, and clinical record
enough to prove his insanity while committing the crime?

RULING:
No. A scrutiny of the evidence presented by accused-appellant unfortunately fails to
establish that he was completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he
fatally stabbed the victim.

For the defense of insanity to prosper, two (2) elements must concur: (1) that defendant's
insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment; and (2) that
such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime. Since
no man can know what goes on in the mind of another, one's behavior and outward acts can only
be determined and judged by proof. Such proof may take the form of opinion testimony by a witness
who is intimately acquainted with the accused; by a witness who has rational basis to conclude
that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused; or by a witness
who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.

As to the testimony of Cederina: she was unable to point out any behavior at the time of
the incident in question, or in the days and hours before the incident, which could establish that he
was insane when he committed the offense. As to the testimony of an expert: no expert testimony
was presented. Moreover, the fact that he was able to escape unnoticed from the institution and
to return home by himself is indicative of reasonable intelligence and free will merely a week before
the commission of the crime. Finally, the doctor's prescription slips only contain the medications
prescribed, but do not show the specific illness targeted by the medicine. Thus, there is no proof
that accused was insane when he committed the act.

| 19
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

DIMINISHED CAPACITY TO DISCERN WHAT WAS WRONG OR RIGHT IS NOT THE

SAME AS COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF INTELLIGENCE OR DISCERNMENT

People of the Philippines vs. Racal

G.R. No. 224886; September 4, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal filed by the accused-appellant Roger Racal assailing the
decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, finding him guilty of
the crime of murder for the death of Jose Francisco.

Francisco was a “trisikad” driver who was lining up to pick passengers with others. Also
present at that place during that time was Racal, who was standing near Francisco. While the
“trisikad” drivers were waiting for passengers, Racal spoke in a loud voice, telling the group of
drivers not to trust Francisco because he is a traitor. Francisco asked Racal why the latter called
him a traitor. Without warning, Racal approached Francisco and stabbed him several times with a
knife, hitting him in the chest and other parts of his body. Francisco, then, fell to the pavement.

Racal did not deny having stabbed Francisco. However, he raised the defense of insanity.
He presented expert witnesses who contended that he has a predisposition to snap into an episode
where he loses his reason and thereby acts compulsively, involuntarily and outside his conscious
control. Under this state, the defense argued that Racal could not distinguish right from wrong and,
thus, was not capable of forming a mental intent at the time that he stabbed Francisco.

ISSUE:
Can the defense of insanity be validly raised by the accused on the ground that he could
not distinguish right from wrong?

RULING:
No, Racal’s defense of insanity cannot be accepted.

To determine a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive
evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time.
Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices because a person's thoughts, motives,
and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine whether these conform to the
practice of people of sound mind.

In the present case, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. Dr.
Preciliana Lee Gilboy testified that for a number of years up to the time that appellant killed
Francisco, he had custody of and served as the guardian of his sister's children. He took care of
their welfare and safety, and he was the one who sends them to and brings them home from
school. Certainly, these acts are not manifestations of an insane mind. He found appellant to have
"diminish[ed] capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the
crime." "Diminished capacity" is not the same as "complete deprivation of intelligence or
discernment." Mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability.

Thus, on the basis of these examinations, it is clearly evident that the defense failed to
prove that appellant acted without the least discernment or that he was suffering from a complete
absence of intelligence or the power to discern at the time of the commission of the crime.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

A 13-YEAR OLD MINOR IS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

People of the Philippines vs. Balanza

G.R. No. 207943; September 11, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by the accused-appellant Robert Balanza assailing the decision of
the CA which affirmed with modifications the RTC’s judgment, which found Balanza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape in relation to R.A. No. 7610 otherwise known as the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and imposing upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Balanza, together with BBB, was charged with rape of a 14-
year-old girl.

AAA was on her way home from work when Ronnel Fernandez approached and told her
that accused-appellant, AAA’s neighbor, wanted to talk to her to offer her the position of treasurer
in their fraternity, Junior KKK. AAA refused such offer. Thereafter, Ronnel and another fraternity
member, Rommel Inot held her hands and forced her to go with them to a nipa hut owned by
Balanza. While inside the nipa hut, AAA again refused the offer which led the members of the
fraternity to forcibly bring her to the cornfield nearby. There, Balanza forcibly removed AAA’s pants
and forcibly entered his penis into her vagina. After Balanza consummated his act, another
fraternity member, BBB, a minor, raped AAA. Balanza and BBB left afterwards.

Balanza and BBB were charged with rape.

ISSUE:
Can BBB, a 13-year-old minor, be charged with the crime of rape?

RULING:
No. Under Sec. 6, in relation to Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006, a minor is exempt from criminal liability, to wit:

Sec. 6. Minimum age of criminal responsibility— A child fifteen (15) years of age
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Sec. 20 of
this Act. x x x

Sec. 20. Children below the age of criminal responsibility — If it has been
determined that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority
which will have an initial contact with the child has the duty to immediately release the child
to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child's nearest
relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social welfare and development officer
who will determine the appropriate programs in consultation with the child and to the person
having custody over the child. x x x

As BBB was only 13 years old when he committed the crime, he is deemed exempt from
criminal liability. Instead of being arraigned, BBB will just be subjected to an intervention program
under the DSWD.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

A CHILD ABOVE FIFTEEN (15) YEARS BUT BELOW EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS OF AGE
WHO ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT SHALL NOT BE EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL
LIABILITY, BUT SHALL BE SUBJECTED TO APPROPRIATE PROCEEDINGS UNDER R.A.
9344

People of the Philippines vs. Sisracon, et al.

G.R. No. 226494; February 14, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal on the decision of the CA affirming with modifications the decision of the
RTC finding all the appellants guilty of nine (9) counts of Qualified Rape.

The victim, AAA, 15 years old, testified that the appellants convinced her to go with them
at the apartment of Ranil's aunt, where they handed her a shot of liquor. After five to ten minutes
from drinking the liquor, AAA felt her legs and body turning numb, her vision turning blurry and she
started feeling dizzy. As she was closing her eyes, AAA felt that she was being carried by Jomar.
Then, he proceeded to lower her shorts. AAA tried to resist by bringing up her shorts but to no
avail due to her weakness. After successfully lowering AAA's shorts, Jomar went on top of her and
inserted his penis into her vagina causing her pain. After performing the deed, Jomar invited the
others to take their turns. A person of heavier weight went on top of AAA and it was then that the
latter lost her consciousness.

Appellants denied the allegations and interposed their respective alibis. They also claim
that the trial court should have appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under
par. 2, Art. 68 of the RPC in their favor. It is indisputable and proven in court that the appellants,
except appellant Roberto, are all minors who are above 15 years old, when the crime was
committed.

ISSUE:
Are the appellants, who are minors above 15 years old, exempted from criminal liability
under R.A. No. 9344?

RULING:
No. Under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 9344, the minor appellants herein, all above 15 but below 18
years of age, shall only be exempt from criminal liability if they did not act with discernment.

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration
all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In this particular case, the
prosecution was able to prove the presence of discernment.

Further, the Court held the appellants guilty of only two (2) counts of rape, as the other
seven counts have not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The findings of the medico-legal
officer is merely an affirmation that there was penetration on AAA's vagina but is inconclusive as
to the number of times or number of persons that caused such penetration.

The CA also did not err in modifying the penalties imposable on the same minor appellants,
applying the RPC and ISLAW. Pursuant to Art. 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over 15
and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. It is
error, however, for the RTC and the CA to not have applied Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, even if the
minor was convicted of reclusion perpetua. Further, herein minor appellants shall be entitled to
appropriate disposition under Sec. 51, R.A. 9344, which extends even to one who has exceeded
the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child,
and provides for the confinement of convicted children.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

EVIDENT PREMEDITATION MUST BE PROVEN WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY.

FACTS REGARDING "HOW AND WHEN THE PLAN TO KILL WAS HATCHED" ARE
INDISPENSABLE

People of the Philippines vs. Ordona

G.R. No. 227863; September 20, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
For this Court's resolution is an Ordinary Appeal from the decision of the CA, which
affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant Pedrito Ordona for the crime of murder.

On the day of the alleged incident, accused was seen loitering by the corner of the
witnesses’ house. He appeared to be waiting for someone. After some time, he left but returned
five (5) minutes later. The victim was seen emerging from the house, holding some food. Accused
approached the victim with a stainless knife, called his attention, and suddenly stabbed him in the
left shoulder. The witnesses stood two (2) feet away from them.

The victim managed to run away but accused chased him and eventually caught up with
him. Despite the victim’s pleas for mercy, Ordona stabbed him in the left torso. Hubay's stab
wounds proved to be fatal as he died immediately upon arrival at the hospital. PSI Cabrera, the
representative of the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy, testified that Hubay died
of hemorrhage and shock from the second stab wound.

Accused alleged that he went to the house of his mother-in-law on the same day, but met
a person running amok which prevented him from reaching his destination. He also argued that
evident premeditation cannot likewise be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance because the
prosecution failed to establish an overt act indicating his resolution to kill Hubay.

ISSUE:
Is evident premeditation present in the case even when the prosecution failed to establish
an overt act indicating his resolution to kill victim?

RULING:
No. For evident premeditation to qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder, the
following must be established by the prosecution "with equal certainty as the criminal act itself":
(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that
the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.

Evident premeditation must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely
suspected, which indicate deliberate planning. There must be direct evidence showing a plan or
preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the
victim. The date and, if possible, the time when the malefactor determined to commit the crime is
essential, because the lapse of time for the purpose of the third requisite is computed from such
date and time. In this regard, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance in the present case. The prosecution failed to establish the time when accused
resolved to kill the victim. There is no evidence on record to show the moment accused hatched
his plan. However, accused is still liable for murder as the killing was attended with treachery.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE ESSENCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION IS THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE

CRIMINAL ACT MUST BE PRECEDED BY COOL THOUGHT AND REFLECTION UPON
THE RESOLUTION TO CARRY OUT THE CRIMINAL INTENT

People of the Philippines vs. Grabador Jr., et.al.

G.R. No. 227504; June 13, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
The case at hand is an appeal filed by one of the accused, Alex Abierra, seeking reversal
of the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC convicting him crime of Murder.

Accused was implicated in the murder of Dennis Sumugat, along with his alleged co-
conspirators. The brother of the victim, Noel Sumugat, testified that victim, Dennis Sumugat, and
Rodolfo had an altercation earlier that day which ended amicably, the two shaking hands
thereafter. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Rodolfo came back with Roger, Dante and Alex. Suddenly
all four men shot the victim simultaneously with homemade guns. The victim was rushed to the
hospital where he was confined but later expired.

ISSUE:
Was a lapse of 15 minutes preceding the attack sufficient for the accused to have an
opportunity for thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent?

RULING:
No. A lapse of 15 minutes preceding the attack is not sufficient to conclude that evident
premeditation attended the commission of the offense.

The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during
the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. The premeditation to kill must be plain
and notorious, and thereafter proven by evidence of outward acts showing such intent to kill. It is
imperative to prove that the accused indeed underwent a process of cold and deep meditation,
and a tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal act. To establish the existence
of evident premeditation, the following requisites must be proven during the trial: (i) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime, (ii) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his
determination, and (iii) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act, and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will.

In the instant case, the prosecution failed to identify the time when Alex decided to kill
Dennis. This is necessary to prove that indeed, a sufficient period of time passed between the
determination to kill and its actual execution, which would have allowed Alex to meditate and reflect
on his plans and allow his conscience to overcome the determination of his will. Instead, the
prosecution randomly concluded that there was evident premeditation from the fact that Rodolfo
left, and came back after 15 minutes with Alex, and thereafter killed Dennis.

Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds that the killing of Dennis was not attended by
evident premeditation. The prosecution failed to establish the fact that the plan to kill Dennis was
preceded by a deliberate planning, and that there was a lapse of ample and sufficient time to allow
Alex's conscience to overcome the determination of his will, if he had so desired, after meditation
and reflection.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE MUST BE PROVEN

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; TREACHERY ABSORBS THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

People of the Philippines vs. Kalipayan

G.R. No. 229829; January 22, 2018
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the accused-appellant of the decision of CA which affirmed the
judgment of the RTC finding him guilty murder for the death of Glaiza Molina, appellant Kalipayan’s
former live-in partner.

Witnesses Josephine, the mother of Glaiza, and Celestina testified that accussed-appellant
entered their house without permission and went to the kitchen where Gliza was. Kalipayan then
repeatedly stabbed Glaiza in the back using a Rambo knife while pulling her hair and continued
stabbing her in the abdomen. A neighbor, Dennis Alegre, tried to stop Kalipayan but the latter is
udeterred. Accussed-appellant escaped and Glaiza was declared dead on arrival at the hospital.

The RTC found Kalipayan guilty of murder, with abuse of superior strength having been
absorbed in treachery which qualified the crime. However, it did not find evident premeditation or
dwelling to be attendant in the case. Accused-appellant, while admitting that he stabbed Glaiza,
argues that the qualifying circumstances were not sufficiently proven and he should only be
convicted for homicide.

ISSUES:
(1) Is evident premeditation present in this case? and;
(2) Is treachery present to qualify the killing into murder?

RULING:
(1) No, evident premeditation is not present in this case.

The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) previous decision to commit the crime, (2)
overt act manifesting that the accused clung to his determination, and (3) lapse of time between
decision to commit and actual execution of the act. It appears that Kalipayan has already decided
to kill Glaiza even before he entered the house. However, there is no proof which shows the
sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution. Neither was it evident that the accused
clung to his determination to kill her. There is no evident premeditation.

(2) Yes, the conclusion that the crime is still murder stays not because of the existence of
evident premeditation, but of treachery.

Treachery has two elements: (1) means of execution which gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (2) that said means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted. Both are attendant in this case. The Court is convinced that Kalipayan
entered the house unexpectedly, went for Glaiza immediately and without warning stabbed her
back multiple times, while her hair was held.

With this finding that treachery is present, the conclusion that the circumstance of abuse
of superior strength is absorbed therein necessarily follows. Even without a definite finding as to
whether it exists in this case or not, it is beyond cavil that treachery, as a qualifying circumstance,
absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength even though the latter was
alleged in the information. Thus, the circumstance of abuse of superior strength should not be
appreciated as a separate aggravating circumstance.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

MERE SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS IS NOT INDICATIVE OF THE PRESENCE OF ABUSE

OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

People of the Philippines vs. Aquino, et. al.

G.R. No. 203435; April 11, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of CA which affirmed with modification the Decision of
the RTC finding Mardy Aquino, Mario Aquino, and Juanito Aquino guilty of murder and frustrated
murder.

One morning, Ernesto's sons Edwin and Edward were waiting for the boat to arrive when
Mardy and other accused arrived and threw stones at Edwin's group. Jackie went to where the
accused were having a drinking session to ask them why they attacked his brothers. Instead of
answering, they just laughed at him and all of the sudden, they stabbed Jackie and Ernesto. On
the way to the hospital, Jackie died on the way.

According to the defense, the accused merely protected themselves from the attack made
by Ernesto. Mario, Mardy, and Juanito were charged and convicted with murder attended by abuse
of superior strength.

ISSUE:
Does superiority in number in the commission of the crime constitute abuse of superior
strength?

RULING:
No, superiority in number in the commission of the crime does not constitute abuse of
superior strength.

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces

between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the
aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Evidence must show that the assailants consciously sought the advantage, or that they had the
deliberate intent to use this advantage.

The prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence of a relative disparity in age, size,
and strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants stabbed the victim while three
others restrained him. However, the presence of several assailants does not ipso facto indicate an
abuse of superior strength. Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of the presence of this
circumstance.

Therefore, CA is not correct in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable of the crime
of murder and frustrated murder, but only homicide and frustrated homicide.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

SUPERIORITY IN NUMBER DOES NOT NECESSARILY AMOUNT TO ABUSE OF

SUPERIOR STRENGTH

People of the Philippines vs. Campit

G.R. No. 225794; December 6, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC of Calauag
finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder.

Campit and Macawili, while under intoxication, went to the bodega of Leon. Campit went
to the bodega while Macawili remained on the other side of the road. Campit approached Leon
and asked the latter to lend him money. Leon refused. Campit stabbed Leon several times. Leon
tried to run away from Campit, but Macawili was able to grab him and stab him on the chest.

ISSUE:
Does superiority in number in the commission of the crime constitute abuse of superior
strength?

RULING:
No. Superiority in number does not necessarily amount to abuse of superior strength.

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of

force between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission
of the crime.

Nevertheless, it must be stressed that superiority in number does not necessarily amount
to abuse of superior strength. For the qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, it must be shown
that the aggressors combined forces in order to secure advantage from their superiority in strength.
Differently stated, it must be proven that the accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased.
Furthermore, the evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or
that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. After all, to take advantage of superior
strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked. Thus, it had been held that when the victim was attacked by the
assailants alternatively, the claim that the accused abused their superior strength could not be
appreciated.

In this case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution established that only Campit
approached Leon while the latter was in his bodega. Thereafter, Campit, following an argument,
stabbed Leon multiple times. It was only when Leon escaped from Campit that Macawili appeared
and stabbed the victim on his chest. Considering that the perpetrators attacked the victim
alternatively and did not combine their superior strength to overwhelm the victim, they could not
be said to have taken advantage of their superior strength.

From the foregoing, it is clear that abuse of superior strength did not attend the commission
of the felony. The prosecution failed to prove that the numerical superiority was purposely sought
by the assailants to perpetrate the crime with impunity; and that there was blatant disparity in
strength between Leon and his assailants.

| 27
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THERE IS ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH WHEN A 36-YEAR OLD MAN USED A

LONG BLADED WEAPON TO KILL TWO UNARMED WOMEN, AGED 65 AND 74

People of the Philippines vs. Corpuz

G.R. No. 215320; February 28, 2018
Martires, J:

FACTS:
This is an appeal to the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC finding
Corpuz guilty of murder.

Manuel Corpuz hacked Leonila Histo, 65 years old, and Romana Arcular, 74, with the use
of a long-bladed weapon locally known as sundang. Both victims fell on the ground and died.

Corpuz averred that the trial court and the CA erred in ruling that the prosecution was able
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He sought to establish the defenses of alibi and denial.

ISSUE:
Was there abuse of superior strength to qualify the killing to murder?

RULING:
Yes. There is abuse of superior strength where the accused is a male, 36 years of age,
and used a long-bladed weapon to kill his 2 women victims, who were unarmed and aged 65 and
74 years old.

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of

force between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission
of the crime. Evidence must show that the assailants consciously sought the advantage or that
they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.

The appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength depends

on the age, size, and strength of the parties. An attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon
an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable
to defend herself. There is also abuse of such superiority when the victim is old and weak, while
the accused is stronger on account of his relatively younger age.

Here, it has been established that the two victims were defenseless old women— Romana
at 74 years old, and Leonila at 65 years old. In contrast, Manuel was shown armed with a deadly
weapon. Further, at the time of the incident, Manuel was around 36 years old, in the prime of his
years.

Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly convicted Manuel of two (2) counts of murder
for the deaths of Romana and Leonila.

28 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH IS PRESENT WHENEVER THERE IS INEQUALITY OF

FORCES BETWEEN VICTIM AND AGGRESSOR, AND THE LATTER TAKES
ADVANTAGE OF IT IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME; ACCUSED MUST FIRST
ESTABLISH HIS STATE OF INTOXICATION AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF
THE FELONY FOR THE ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCE OF DRUNKENNESS TO BE
APPRECIATED AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Mat-An

G.R. No. 215720; February 21, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal on the decision of the CA which affirmed with modifications the RTC
finding Oscar Escad guilty of Slight Physical Injury and Murder.

Oscar, drunk, entered the store of his mother-in-law, Minda, 61-years of age, who was
carrying her 18-month-old granddaughter, Anthonette. An argument ensued between Oscar and
Minda. Later on, Norma and Clyde, the persons outside the store of Minda, heard Minda moaning
as if her mouth was being covered. Norma ran inside the store and saw Oscar stab Minda twice.
Norma and Clyde sought for help. Oscar left the vicinity.

Oscar contended that he cannot recall anymore what has transpired because he was
shocked and had a blackout. It was only when he was apprehended by the police officers while he
was waiting for a taxi in an attempt to escape that he came back to his senses.

ISSUES:
(1) Was the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength attendant in the crime
of murder with respect to Minda?
(2) Can the alternative circumstance of intoxication be appreciated in the crime?

RULING:
(1) Yes. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the
commission of the crime.

In the case at hand, Oscar, being 5’10” in contrast to Minda’s 4’11” frame, who was likewise
burdened by a child and had no means to defend and repel the attacks of Oscar, it is proper that
the crime committed against Minda is Murder qualified by abuse of superior strength.

(2) No. Drunkenness or intoxication is a modifying circumstance which may either

aggravate or mitigate the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or intentional; and it is mitigating if not
habitual nor intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime.

Once intoxication is established by satisfactory evidence, then, in the absence of truth to

the contrary, it is presumed to be unintentional or not habitual. From the foregoing, however, it is
clear that the accused must first establish his state of intoxication at the time of the commission of
the felony before he may benefit from the presumption that the intoxication was unintentional and
not habitual. He must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the
commission of the crime, as would blur his reason.

In the case at hand, Oscar failed to present sufficient evidence that he was in a state of
intoxication as would blur his reason. The fact that he proceeded to the roadside and waited for a
taxi in an apparent attempt to escape makes his excuse of “being in a state of shock” and had a
“blackout” not worthy of any belief. Thus, the trial and appellate courts did not err in not appreciating
the alternative circumstance of intoxication in favor of Oscar.

| 29
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FOR TREACHERY TO BE APPRECIATED, TWO ELEMENTS MUST CONCUR: (1) THAT

THE MEANS OF EXECUTION EMPLOYED GAVE THE PERSON ATTACKED NO
OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND HIMSELF; AND (2) THAT THE MEANS OF EXECUTION
WERE DELIBERATELY OR CONSCIOUSLY ADOPTED. IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR THE
INFORMATION TO MERELY STATE TREACHERY AS ATTENDANT

People of the Philippines vs. Delector

G.R. No. 200026; October 4, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
Under review is the decision whereby the CA affirmed the decision rendered by the RTC
convicting the accused of murder for the killing of the late Vicente Delector.

The late Vicente Delector was talking with his brother, Antolin, when the accused, another
brother, shot him twice. Vicente's son, Arnel, identified his uncle, the accused, as his father's
assailant. Arnel attested that the accused had fired his gun at his father from their mother's house,
and had hit his father who was then talking with Antolin. Hence, the accused was charged with
murder.

Accused insisted that the shooting had been by accident when Vicente was arguing with
Antolin. Seeing Vicente to be carrying his gun, he tried to wrest the gun from Vicente, and they
then grappled with each other for control of the gun. At that point, the gun accidentally fired, and
Vicente was hit.

ISSUES:
(1) May the accused avail the exempting circumstance of accident considering that the gun
is a revolver, and two shots were fired? and;
(2) Is the accused guilty of murder where information nowhere made any factual averment
about the accused having deliberately employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the
act?

RULING:
(1) No. The exempting circumstance of accident was highly improbable because the
accused grappled with the victim for control of the gun. The elements of this exempting
circumstance are, therefore, that the accused: (1) is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3)
causes injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it.

Accident could not be appreciated because the gun was a revolver that would not fire
unless there was considerable pressure applied on its trigger, or its hammer was pulled back and
released. The assertion of accident could be considered had there been only a single shot fired,
however, two shots were fired.

(2) No. It was not enough for the information to merely state treachery as attendant
because the term was not a factual averment but a conclusion of law.

For treachery to be appreciated, therefore, two elements must concur, namely: (1) that the
means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
herself, or retaliate; and (2) that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted, that is, the means, method or form of execution must be shown to be deliberated upon
or consciously adopted by the offender.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THERE IS NO TREACHERY IF IT IS NOT PROVED THAT ACCUSED CONSCIOUSLY

ADOPTED THE MODE OF ATTACK TO FACILITATE THE KILLING WITHOUT RISK TO
HIMSELF

People of the Philippines vs. Daroya

G.R. No. 229502; November 8, 2017
Reyes, J.

FACTS:
On appeal is the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the conviction of
Rafael Daroya of Murder rendered by the RTC.

Ceralde, who was ferrying his pedicab along Bonuan-Gueset, Dagupan City, saw Daroya
suddenly appear. Ceralde noticed that Daroya's left hand was holding a piece of metal wrapped
with a towel. Thereafter, Daroya suddenly punched Rolando and immediately ran away. After
Daroya left, Ceralde and the other pedicab drivers brought Rolando to the hospital where he
subsequently died. The post-mortem examination by Dr. Bautista on Rolando's body revealed that
the latter died of "massive hemorrhage," which, in turn, was caused by injuries inflicted on his
head.

On the other hand, Daroya claims that the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.

ISSUE:
Does mere suddenness of attack constitute treachery?

RULING:
No. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in
a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance
to resist or escape.

The fact that Daroya "suddenly" punched Rolando does not automatically merit the
conclusion that the latter's killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In order
for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.

It must be shown proved that the accused consciously adopted such mode of attack to
facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. Treachery cannot be appreciated if
the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to ensure the
commission of the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or
defend himself.

It appears that Daroya's decision to punch Rolando, which eventually caused the latter's
death, appears to be the result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment brought about by
their argument as to who among them should be first in line among the pedicab drivers. It is basic
that a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous.

The Court is compelled to disregard the finding of the existence of treachery by the lower
courts. Daroya's guilt is thus limited to the crime of homicide.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THERE IS TREACHERY WHERE THE 2 ACCUSED HELD THE ARMS OF THE VICTIMS
WHILE THE OTHERS STABBED THEM

People of the Philippines vs. Castro

G.R. No. 211053; November 29, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA affirming the conviction of the accused for the crime of
murder.

The four accused went into a restaurant while intoxicated. The said accused occupied the
table adjacent to that of the victim. One of the accused, Orozco, stabbed the victim on his back
with a short bolo. When the victim tried to run, Maturan and Osir held the victim’s arms. Then
Castro stabbed him in the chest. The four accused continued stabbing the weakened victim with
their knives.

Accused-appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove that treachery attended the
killing of Mata, positing that the finding of treachery was based only on the fact that Orozco stabbed
Mata suddenly in the back, which is insufficient to establish treachery.

ISSUE:
Is there treachery where the 2 accused hold the arms of the victim while the other accused
stab the victim?

RULING:
Yes. The four accused’s concerted act clearly shows the element of treachery.

Contrary to accused-appellant's contention, the finding of treachery was not based only on
Orozco's act of swiftly stabbing Mata from behind. As observed by the CA, Mata was helpless
against a group of persons with knives, who ganged up on him and held his hands while stabbing
him.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to ensure
its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.

The actions of the four accused—that is two of the accused held the arms of the victims,
while the others stabbed him—clearly show that they weakened the defense of the victim to insure
the execution of the crime. The victim is helpless against the accused who are armed with knives.

32 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THERE IS TREACHERY WHEN THE ATTACK WAS EXECUTED IN A MANNER THAT

THE VICTIM WAS RENDERED DEFENSELESS AND UNABLE TO RETALIATE

People of the Philippines vs. Condino

G.R. No. 219591; February 19, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal to the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC
finding Condino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

Condino appeared at the barangay hall for a hearing of the charge filed against him for
an alleged destruction of a plastic chair owned by the barangay. After the hearing, Condino
calmly walked towards the victim, Isabelo Arrabis, and with his left hand, grabbed the victim's
neck from behind and stabbed the latter three to four times using a yellowish pointed metal,
hitting a portion just below the victim's left breast.

Condino claimed that he merely acted in self-defense as Arrabis was armed with a
knife.

ISSUE:
Was there treachery where the accused suddenly grabbed the victim’s neck from
behind and stabbed him multiple times?

RULING:
Yes. There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense, which the offended party might
make.

The Court affirmed the CA's conclusion that "[t]he attack was executed in a manner
that [the victim] was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.” Appellant, coming from
behind the victim, suddenly held the latter's neck using his left hand, and with his right hand,
stabbed the victim three to four times using a yellowish pointed metal. Clearly, the attack was
attended by treachery, considering that: a) the means of execution of the attack gave the
victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b) said means of execution was
deliberately adopted by appellant.

Thus, the findings of the lower courts need not be disturbed as the evidence on record
duly supports said findings.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE ABSENCE OF SCUFFLE AMONG THE ACCUSED AND VICTIM SUBSTANTIATE

THE FINDING THAT THE ATTACK WAS SWIFT AND DELIBERATE AS TO SUSTAIN
THE FINDING OF TREACHERY IN THE KILLING

People of the Philippines vs. Manzano, Jr. and Manzano

G.R. No. 217974; March 5, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal to the decision of the CA, which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC
of San Jose Antique finding Rezor Juanillo Manzano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

Lucio, the victim, was having his dinner at the kitchen inside their store while Victoria, his
wife, was watching the store. Rezor Manzano, and his brother Resurrecion, came to buy some
cigarettes. Because the gate leading to the store was already closed, they were allowed to enter
the premises. Rezor immediately went inside the store and proceeded to the kitchen. In the
meantime, Resurrecion engaged Victoria in a talk by pretending that he was buying cigarettes but
he, too, forthwith went to the kitchen upon being told by Victoria that she had run out of the
cigarette. Subsequently, she heard her husband’s plea so she rushed into the kitchen and there
she saw Lucio bloodied and leaning on the door, while the two were stabbing him.

Resurrecion remained at large, while the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty for the crime
and raised the justifying circumstance of self-defense. He contended that he was guilty only of
homicide in view of the absence of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength.

ISSUE:
Were the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength present to
qualify the killing to murder?

RULING:
Yes. Treachery had qualified the crime to murder but the generic aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former.

For the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following elements must
be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety
of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to
the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.

Additionally, the offender must have the intent to kill. The evidence to prove such may
consist of, inter alia, the means used; the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by
the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of or immediately after the killing
of the victim.

As to the second element, jurisprudence requires that there must be evidence to show that
the accused deliberately or consciously adopted the means of execution to ensure its success
since unexpectedness of the attack does not always equate to treachery. The means adopted
must have been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the crime. The
absence of scuffle among Lucio, the accused-appellant, and Resurrecion substantiate the finding
that the attack was swift and deliberate so that the unarmed and unsuspecting Lucio had no chance
to resist or escape the blow from his assailants.

Moreover, the intent to kill by the accused-appellant and Resurrecion was confirmed by
the fact that they were armed with knives when they attacked Lucio who sustained a total of fifteen
wounds. The prosecution established that the accused-appellant and Resurrecion deliberately
made it appear that their main purpose in coming to the store was to buy cigarettes.

34 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN TREACHERY, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE MEANS ADOPTED MUST HAVE BEEN

DELIBERATELY SOUGHT

People of the Philippines vs. Moreno

G.R. No. 217889; March 14, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of accused-appellant Ritz Baring Moreno found guilty of Murder.

The facts of the case were based on the testimony of Vicente Capsa (Vicente), Reanne
Vincent Kerby Capsa (Reanne) and Atty. Rene Bautista, On October 3, 2005, Reanne, and his
younger brother Kyle Kales Capsa (Kyle), had a fistfight with his cousin Tyke Philip Lomibao
(Tyke). Around 10:45 pm, while Reanne and Kyle were discussing what happened earlier, the
accused-appellant arrived, and fired at them twice, the second shot hitting Kyle in the chest. The
accused-appellant immediately ran away because there were neighbors who saw him.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty of Murder because of the presence of a qualifying
circumstance of treachery. The accused-appellant recounted that he was merely pulled by Tyke
towards the Capsa compound and thereafter instructed to shoot Kyle. The accused-appellant was
not aware of Tyke's was reason for choosing him to shoot Kyle. As the accused-appellant came
near, he borrowed Alexander Pala's gun, and when he spotted Kyle, he shot him twice. The CA
affirmed the RTC Decision and held that the RTC properly appreciated the qualifying circumstance
of treachery. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Was the qualifying circumstance of treachery sufficiently proven?

RULING:
No, the prosecution was not able to establish the presence of treachery.

Under Art. 248 of the RPC, murder is committed by any person who shall kill another with
treachery. Treachery is present when the following requisites are present: (1) the employment of
means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the
defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself
or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted by the offender.

Although the first requisite was present for Kyle was sitting with his back towards the gate,
the second requisite was not met. The accused-appellant's narration of the facts confirmed that
the attack he made on Kyle was not preconceived nor deliberately adopted; or that he reflected on
the means, method, or form of the attack to secure his unfair advantage. The accused-appellant
acted on impulse or at the spur of the moment, i.e., there was simply a directive from Tyke to kill
Kyle.

The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of finding of treachery. It is

necessary that the means adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure success
in committing the crime which was absent in the case. Therefore, the accused-appellant is not
guilty of Murder but only of Homicide.

| 35
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

EVEN IF THE ATTACK WAS SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED, THERE IS NO TREACHERY

WHEN IT CANNOT BE SHOWN THAT IT WAS DELIBERATELY AND CONSCIOUSLY
ADOPTED TO FACILITATE THE KILLING WITHOUT ANY RISK TO HIMSELF ARISING
FROM ANY DEFENSE THAT A PERSON MIGHT HAVE ADOPTED

People of the Philippines vs. Abina

G.R. No. 220146; April 18, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal to the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC of
Calbiga, Samar finding accused-appellant guilty of murder for killing Anthony Asadon and homicide
for the killing of Rodolfo Mabag.

A drinking spree took place at Glen’s house for his birthday celebration. Just as when
Anthony, one of the victims, was about to leave, Glen suddenly took his gun and shot the latter.
Upon witnessing what happened to his cousin, Rodolfo, drew his bolo and hit Glen at his chin. In
turn, Glen and Jesus hacked and stabbed Rodolfo.

The RTC and the CA ruled that the killing of Anthony was treacherous which qualified the
crime to murder. While that of Rodolfo, only amounted to homicide because of the absence of
treachery.

However, the Court already dismissed the case against Jesus in view of his death. Hence,
the Court will only resolve the issue of Glen's culpability.

ISSUE:
Was treachery present to constitute murder?

RULING:
No. Art. 14 (16) of the RPC provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.

There are two requirements in order that treachery may be appreciated: (1) the victim was
in no position to defend himself or herself when attacked; and, (2) the assailant consciously and
deliberately adopted the methods, means, or form of one's attack against the victim.

In this case, while Glen suddenly attacked Anthony, there was no showing that he
deliberately and consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the killing without any risk
to himself arising from any defense that Anthony might have adopted.

Glen suddenly shot Anthony in the presence of the latter's wife and the other guests at the
party. If Glen deliberately intended that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen another
time and place to attack Anthony. As it is, the location and time of the attack did not discount the
possibility of retaliation coming from the other guests. In addition, the shooting and stabbing
incident transpired at around 5:00 p.m. or during such time that Glen could still be easily seen and
recognized as the perpetrator of the crime. From all indications, it thus appeared that Glen did not
consciously intend to employ a particular mode of attack to kill Anthony. The attack was a spur of
the moment decision caused by sheer annoyance when Anthony and his wife left while the party
was still on-going.

As such, in the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed
was only homicide.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THERE IS TREACHERY WHERE THE ACCUSED SURREPTITIOUSLY SNEAKS BEHIND

THE VICTIM, GIVES THE LATTER A HEADLOCK, AND WHILE IN THIS POSITION,
STABS THE VICTIM

People of the Philippines vs. Advincula

G.R. No. 218108; April 11, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
For resolution is the appeal of accused-appellant Rodolfo Advincula y Mondado assailing
the CA Decision, which affirmed the RTC decision finding him guilty of murder for the death of
Reggie Tan.

Reggie together with his friends were talking when Advincula suddenly sneaked from
Reggie's back, grabbed his neck with his left arm, and drove a knife at his side. Reggie was able
to push away Advincula causing both of them to fall down. Reggie got of his feet and ran away but
Advincula caught up with him and stabbed him twice in the chest. Reggie was brought to the
hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

The accused narrates that he followed Reggie to the store intending to hurt him because
of the threats he made to him. He tried to grab the knife from Reggie and when he got hold of it,
he stabbed the right side of Reggie's body.

ISSUE:
Is there treachery where the accused surreptitiously sneaks behind the victim, gives the
latter a headlock, and while in this position, stabs the victim?

RULING:
Yes, Advincula is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder attended by
treachery.

To warrant a conviction for the crime of murder, the following essential elements must be
present: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the
killing is not parricide or infanticide.

All the elements are present in this case. With respect to treachery, jurisprudence
maintains that there is treachery when a victim is set upon by the accused without warning, as
when the accused attacks the victims from behind, or when the attack is sudden and unexpected
and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim that the latter cannot defend himself,
thus insuring the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant. The prosecution was
able to prove that there was treachery. Advincula surreptitiously sneaked behind Reggie and gave
him a headlock that restrained his movement, thus denying him the chance to defend himself.

Considering that the elements of treachery attended the killing of Reggie, the CA was
correct in convicting Advincula of murder.

| 37
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

TREACHERY NOT ABSORBED WHEN VICTIM KNEW OF THE ATTACK; EVIDENT

PREMEDITATION MUST SHOW CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF PLAN

People of the Philippines vs. Agramon

G.R. No. 212156; June 20, 2018
Caguioa, J:

FACTS:
This is an appeal on the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC finding
Gerry guilty of the crime of Murder.

Gerry, who appeared to be drunk, and was shouting “I will kill you all,” entered the dwelling
of his brother Roger and his wife Pelita. Gerry delivered a stab thrust against Roger who was able
to hold the weapon with his hand causing him to sustain wounds. Pelita, 2 months pregnant, tried
to cover Roger. Pelita was stabbed by Gerry on her left breast which caused her death. Roger run
and sought for help from the barangay officials. Gerry was later on arrested.

Gerry interposed self-defense. The RTC found that both qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation are present. It held that the number and location of the
wounds of the victims as compared to the unscathed accused was indicative of the treacherous
execution of the crime, with the victims having no opportunity to defend themselves. Further, that
evident premeditation was apparent from the fact that the accused was armed with two (2) scythes
at the time of the incident and several hours had already lapsed from morning to 6:00 in the evening
for him to reflect on his intentions to commit the crime. While the CA found that only the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation was established. It held that treachery cannot be
appreciated because Roger and Pelita were aware of the imminent danger to their lives.

ISSUE:
Was the killing attended by treachery and evident premeditation?

RULING:
No.

In treachery, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means,
methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The existence of a struggle before the attack
on the victim Pelita clearly shows that she was forewarned of the impending attack, and that she
was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense.

Evident premeditation was not established because the prosecution's evidence was limited
to what transpired on the event itself. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, it is
indispensable to show concrete evidence on how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how
much time had elapsed before it was carried out.

Hence, with absence of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident

premeditation, the crime committed is Homicide and not Murder.

38 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

SUDDENNESS OF ATTACK DOES NOT, OF ITSELF, SUFFICE TO SUPPORT A FINDING

OF TREACHERY, EVEN IF THE PURPOSE WAS TO KILL, SO LONG AS THE DECISION
WAS MADE ALL OF A SUDDEN AND THE VICTIM'S HELPLESS POSITION WAS
ACCIDENTAL

People of the Philippines vs. Francisco

G.R. No. 216728; June 04, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding the
accused, Decito Francisco guilty of the crime of murder.

Accused, Decito Francisco, allegedly attacked the victim, Jaime Noriega III, from behind
while the later was watching a game of lucky nine. Accused allegedly inflicted fatal blows, stabbing
the victim on the left side of his body with a 13-inch knife locally known as “picao” and thereafter
left the scene. The victim expired the following morning despite being rushed to the hospital.

In his defense, accused claims that he did not intentionally kill Noriega. Instead, accused
claims that he was on his way home from a drinking spree when two strangers accosted him, one
of them suddenly stabbing his left arm and he defended himself by stabbing one of his assailants
with his bolo.

ISSUE:
Can the qualifying circumstance of treachery be appreciated in the case when the accused
attacked his victim from behind without proof of the method of killing being consciously adopted?

RULING:
No. To constitute treachery, two conditions must be present: 1) the employment of means
of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and 2)
the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Treachery cannot be
appreciated where there is nothing in the record to show that the accused had pondered upon the
mode or method to ensure the killing of the deceased or remove or diminish any risk to himself
that might arise from the defense that the deceased might make. When there is no evidence that
the accused had, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved to commit the crime, or there is no
proof that the death of the victim was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection, treachery
cannot be considered.

In this case, the victim was stabbed suddenly and he was totally unprepared for the
unexpected attack as he was watching a card game at the precise time of the incident. The
prosecution, however, failed to prove the existence of the second condition. The mere fact that the
attack was inflicted when the victim had his back turned will not in itself constitute treachery. It
must appear that such mode of attack was consciously adopted with the purpose of depriving the
victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The suddenness of attack does not, of itself, suffice to
support a finding of treachery, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made
all of a sudden and the victim's helpless position was accidental. It does not always follow that
because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted with treachery.

Aside from showing that accused-appellant's attack on the victim was sudden and
unexpected, there is nothing in the record which would prove that such method or form of attack
was deliberately chosen by accused-appellant. Thus, treachery cannot be appreciated in order to
qualify the killing to murder.

| 39
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE PRESENCE OF CONSPIRACY RENDERS ONE LIABLE DESPITE NOT BEING

PHYSICALLY PRESENT DURING THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME

Chua vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 172193; September 13, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Celerino Chua seeks to reverse the decision of the CA which affirmed his
convictions for carnapping in violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) and for
robbery as defined and punished by Art. 294(5) of the RPC handed down by the RTC. The CA
found that Chua was in conspiracy with the two other accused, Leonardo Reyes alias Leo and
Arnold Lato alias Arnold or Rodel.

Teresa Ravago was on her way to work when, upon opening the door, she was pushed
inside the house by accused Lato and Reyes. Lato tied Teresa’s hands while Reyes stabbed
Reynaldo, Teresa’s husband, who was able to escape. The accused took their television sets,
Sony Betamax sets, pieces of jewelry, cash and loaded the items in an owner type jeep owned by
Teresa’s mother. It was later on found that petitioner Chua brought and sold the jeep in Bani,
Pangasinan. Spouses Ravago were able to recover said vehicle in Jessie Tugas’ shop.

In his petition, Chua submits that the CA erred in finding the existence of a conspiracy
between him and the two other accused despite the failure of the State to establish his actual
participation in the commission of the crimes charged. The CA held that the three (3) accused
conspired to commit the crime. The circumstances before, during and after the incident point to
the appellant as the mastermind. First, the day before the incident, Reynaldo told his compadre
about the broker's commission he received in the sale of a fishpond. Petitioner Chua eavesdropped
and intently listened to the conversation. Second, on the day of the robbery, Leonardo and Arnold,
the two (2) other accused, asked for the said broker's commission. Only Chua could have told
Arnold and Leo About said commission. Third, subsequent to the commission of the crime, Chua
disappeared. He left the place where he stayed. He hid in his father's house in Malolos Bulacan.
Flight in jurisprudence has always been a strong indication of guilt, betraying a desire to evade
responsibility. Fourth is the sale of the owner type jeep.

ISSUE:
Was there conspiracy where Chua could be held liable as a principal by inducement?

RULING:
Yes, Chua conspired with the two other accused which renders him liable for the crimes of
robbery and violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.

For an accused to be validly held to conspire with his co-accused in committing the crimes,
his overt acts must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive conspirator
cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such passive
conspirator is the mastermind. Chua was found to be the mastermind in the commission of the
crimes. Chua eavesdropped Reynaldo’s conversation with his compadre about the commission he
received in the sale of a fishpond. He told this information to the two other accused. He was able
to induce the others to commit the crime – without said inducement, the crimes would not have
been committed. As such, Chua is liable as a principal by inducement in the crimes committed by
the two other accused.

40 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ONE WHO PARTICIPATES IN THE MATERIAL EXECUTION OF THE CRIME BY

STANDING GUARD OR LENDING MORAL SUPPORT TO THE ACTUAL
PERPETRATION THEREOF IS CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE TO THE SAME EXTENT AS
THE ACTUAL PERPETRATOR

People of the Philippines vs. Lababo, et. al.

G.R. No. 234651; June 06, 2018
Velasco Jr., J

FACTS:
The case is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding
accused Benito Lababo Alias "Ben," Wenefredo Lababo, Junior Lababo (Al), and FFF guilty of the
crime of murder, and Benito Lababo and Wenefredo Lababo guilty of the crime of frustrated
murder.

The facts of the case reveal that BBB and his son AAA, was allegedly assaulted by Benito
in conspiracy with Wenefredo, Junior and FFF. AAA was shot by Benito using a homemade gun
while Wenefredo, Junior and FFF were all standing near him brandishing bolos. AAA died while
BBB survived despite sustaining eight gunshot wounds after receiving timely medical attention.
Because of the incident, an information for murder was filed against all the accused for the death
of AAA, while an information for frustrated murder was filed against Benito and Wenefredo.

ISSUE:
Can conspiracy be appreciated in this case when only one of the accused inflicted the fatal
would against the victim while the others were simply standing guard?

RULING:
Yes. There was conspiracy in this case.

Art. 8 of the RPC provides that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To prove conspiracy,
the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: (1) two or more persons came to an
agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) the execution of the
felony was decided upon. It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act
as a direct or indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting
moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the
discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not
enough for purposes of conviction.

While it is true that mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission,
without actively participating in the conduct thereof, is insufficient to prove that the accused
conspired to commit the crime, Wenefredo and FFF's act of standing near the victims and Benito,
while wielding bolos, does not partake of this nature. Their overt act of staying in close proximity
while Benito executes the crime served no other purpose than to lend moral support by ensuring
that no one could interfere and prevent the successful perpetration thereof.

Based on the circumstances the Court is convinced that indeed, the three conspired to
commit the crimes charged. However, FFF, being a 17-year old minor at the time of the commission
of the offense, should benefit from a suspended sentence pursuant to Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344,
or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.

| 41
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

AS A RULE, CONSPIRACY MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; THE

ACT OF ONE IN MERELY HUGGING THE VICTIM DOES NOT ESTABLISH CONSPIRACY
IN THE INTENT TO KILL

People of the Philippines vs. Gimpaya

G.R. No. 227395; January 10, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Oscar Gimpaya assailing the decision of the
CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding herein accused-appellant Oscar Gimpaya and
his co-accused Roel Gimpaya guilty of the crime of murder under Art. 248 of the RPC.

There was a commotion between Genelito Clete, Oscar Gimpaya, and Roel Gimpaya.
Oscar was hugging Clete, while Roel was stabbing him. Roosevelt Agamosa informed Rosalyn
Clete, spouse of Genelito, that her husband was stabbed. Rosalyn went to the aid of her husband
and brought Clete to the hospital. However, he still died.

The RTC found Oscar and Roel guilty as co-conspirators of the crime of murder, qualified
by treachery and abuse of superior strength. Genelito previously extended aggression towards
Genelito by hitting him and continuously punching him. Oscar asked for help to which his cousin
Roel came, and stabbed Genelito in the back.

ISSUE:
Is accused Oscar Gimpaya also liable for the crime of Murder when he only hugged the
victim while his cousin did the stabbing?

RULING:
No. There was no proof that Oscar acted in concert with Roel.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action
and purpose. Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crime —
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case at bar, the act of Oscar in merely hugging Clete did not establish conspiracy in
the intent to kill. There was no proof that he acted in concert with Roel or that he even knew of
Roel’s intent to stab Genelito. It was not proven that Oscar hugged Clete to enable Roel to stab
him as he had no knowledge of Roel’s intention. Also, after the incident, Oscar did not abandon
Clete, unlike Roel. As there was no proof that Oscar and Roel conspired in killing Clete, Oscar was
acquitted of the crime.

42 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

CONSPIRACY CAN BE INFERRED FROM THE ACTS OF THE ACCUSED THEMSELVES

WHEN THEIR OVERT ACTS INDICATE A JOINT PURPOSE AND DESIGN

People of the Philippines vs. Fajardo

G.R. No. 216065; April 18, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
People of the Philippines appealed the Decision of the CA which modified the decision of
the RTC. CA held that there was insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy to commit robbery.

According to the prosecution, private complainant Tony Chua was handcuffed and pushed
into a van parked by three men identifying themselves as agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation. His wallet, ring and cellphone were taken from him. Moreover, Tony’s sister Cynthia
Chua received several calls informing her that they had Tony and asking her to prepare money in
exchange for Tony’s liberty. Interlocking admissions of Manzanero, Tanyag, Mario, and Angelito
evinced the conspiratorial acts of the accused in kidnapping Tony Chua.

Arthur Fajardo, one of the accused, denied the allegations. He further argued that aside
from the extrajudicial confessions his co-accused executed, the prosecution failed to offer other
evidence to prove conspiracy.

ISSUE:
Was conspiracy established independent of the extrajudicial confession of the co-accused,
of acting together to achieve their common purpose?

RULING:
Yes. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be express as it can be
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when their overt acts indicate a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interests. Proof of the agreement does not need to rest
on direct evidence, as the agreement may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a
common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it
is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective
is to be carried out.

Contrary to Fajardo's position, there is evidence to establish conspiracy independent of the

extrajudicial confession of his co-accused. Tony's testimony clearly illustrated how Fajardo and his
cohorts acted together to achieve their common purpose of detaining him. He narrated the exact
participation of the assailants in his abduction. Fajardo, Manzanero, and Mario were the ones who
forcibly pushed him into a van where the driver Tanyag was waiting; and all of them were wearing
NBI uniforms.

Thus, it is readily apparent that Fajardo and his co-accused performed their coordinated
actions with the common understanding or intent to detain Tony and demand ransom for his
release.

| 43
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THERE IS IMPLIED CONSPIRACY TO KILL BETWEEN TWO ACCUSED WHERE ONE

HELD THE PANTS OF THE VICTIM WHILE THE OTHER STABBED THE VICTIM;
WHERE IT IS NOT PROVED THAT ACCUSED CONSCIOUSLY AND DELIBERATELY
ADOPTED THE MEANS OF COMMITTING THE CRIME, THERE IS NO
TREACHERY/EVIDENT PREMEDITATION

People of the Philippines vs. Delima, et al.

G.R. No. 222645; June 27, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding
Michael and Allan guilty of Murder.

Jose witnessed the stabbing incident that occurred outside the house of Anthony when
Jose decided to go home after celebrating the barangay fiesta. He saw two persons holding and
stabbing Ramel. Jose rushed back inside the house and told Anthony about the incident. Anthony
pointed out that it was Allan who stabbed Ramel while Michael held his pants. After the incident,
Michael and Allan just left the crime scene. The two, and the other co-accused, were charged for
murder.

Michal and Allan employed denial and alibi contending that they were asleep in their own
houses at the time of the incident.

ISSUES:
(1) Is there implied conspiracy between the two accused in the act of killing of Ramel where
one held the pants of the victim while the other stabbed the victim? and;
(2) Are the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery present?

RULING:
(1) Yes. There is an implied conspiracy if two or more persons aim their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful subject, each doing a part, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment and may be inferred though no actual
meeting among them to concert means is proved. The essence of conspiracy is unity of action and
purpose.

In the case at hand, the concerted actions of Michael and Allan, despite the absence of
any actual meeting, was towards the common purpose of the desire to kill Ramel is employed.
Accused-appellants were mutually motivated by the desire to kill Ramel after Allan stabbed Ramel
while Michael held the latter by the legs. Their concerted actions cannot be brushed aside as
separate and distinct because Michael continued to hold the victim while Allan stabbed him several
times. Hence, implied conspiracy is present.

(2) No. In evident premeditation, the previous decision to commit the crime, overt acts
indicating one’s determination, and lapse of time between the decision and actual execution must
be present. Neither the RTC nor the CA discussed the presence of the said qualifying
circumstance.

Treachery, on the other hand is committed when means, methods, or forms are directly
executed towards the victim, without risk to the accused arising from the defense which the victim
might make. Ramel's defenseless state alone does not suffice to appreciate the existence of
treachery. After all, not only must the victim be shown defenseless, but it must also be shown that
the accused deliberately and consciously employed the means and method of attack.

There is doubt whether accused-appellants consciously and deliberately adopted the

means employed to kill Ramel. It is doctrinal that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated. In the absence of the qualifying
circumstances, the accused are only guilty of homicide, not murder.

44 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IMPLIED CONSPIRACY EXISTS EVEN IF ONE DOES NOT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATE IN

THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME

Manangan vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 218570; November 22, 2017
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of CA affirming the decision
of the RTC of Cabagan, Isabela finding Manangan, et al. guilty of robbery by a band.

On one evening, Manangan and six others, all armed with various firearms went into the
house of Jolita Dannan. The accused requested Jolita to cook for them, which she did. After eating,
three of the armed men went to the house of her brother-in-law, while the three remained in her
house. Then the accused declared hold up. Jolita and her husband told them they had no money.
The three-armed men threatened to kill them if they did not give them money. Out of fear, Jolita
gave them their savings worth Php50,000. The RTC of Cabagan convicted the accused of robbery
by a band, ruling that there was implied conspiracy based on honest belief.

Manangan denied the allegations and argued that there is no implied conspiracy as he did
nothing aside from merely standing outside the house during the act.

ISSUE:
Can Manangan be held criminally liable as a co-conspirator in the crime of robbery by a
band by merely standing outside the house being robbed?

RULING:
Yes. Manangan is proven to have led the other five accused into the house of the victim.

There is implied conspiracy among the accused. It exists when two or more persons are
shown to have aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected
and cooperative. Their acts must indicate a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment. It is proven that the accused was the one who led the armed men into the house of
the victims.

Hence, Manangan is a member of the band of robbers.

| 45
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

PROOF OF CONSPIRACY MAY BE INFERRED FROM COLLECTIVE CONDUCT OF

ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Villanueva

G.R. No. 211082; December 13, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA affirming the RTC decision which found Anthony Villanueva
(accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A of the
RPC.

AAA, who was a boarder in a boarding house, slept alone in the room she shares with the
daughter of the building’s owner. She was awakened and found three men inside the room, who
she recognized as Melvin Tupaz, Ruel Regner and accused-appellant. Regner approached her
and covered her mouth with his palm. Accused-appellant poked the right side of her body with a
short bolo. Being pinned at this position, Melvin undressed AAA and began kissing her. Melvin
then inserted his penis into her vagina. Afterwards, accused-appellant took his turn. Accused-
appellant kicked AAA in the stomach several times and then inserted his penis into her vagina.
Thereafter, AAA became unconscious. AAA was awakened when she felt accused-appellant bit
her arm. It was then that Regner took his turn raping her.

The accused-appellant, Tupaz, and Regner were charged under three separate
Informations for three counts of rape. During the arraignment, only accused-appellant appeared
and pleaded not guilty while the two other accused remained at large. The RTC and the CA found
accused-appellant guilty of one count of rape.

ISSUE:
Did the RTC and CA properly convict accused-appellant of only one count of rape where
there were three accused who conspired and took turns in raping the victim?

RULING:
No, accused-appellant is guilty of three counts of rape.

Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred
from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime
indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.

Here, the evidence presented by the prosecution fully support the charge that accused-
appellant, together with his co-accused, conspired to rape AAA. The act of Regner in approaching
and covering AAA's mouth, the act of accused-appellant in poking a bolo at her side, the act of
Melvin in having sexual intercourse with AAA and then later on followed by Regner and accused-
appellant, all point to their unified and conscious design to sexually violate AAA.

Accordingly, accused-appellant should be held liable not only for the act of rape he
perpetuated against AAA, but also for the rape committed by his co-accused Regner and Melvin,
or for three counts of rape in all, conspiracy being extant among the three of them during the
commission of each of the three violations.

46 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

RECLUSION PERPETUA IS THE PROPER PENALTY WHERE THERE ARE MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES IN A PARRICIDE CASE WHICH IS PENALIZED WITH RECLUSION
PERPETUA TO DEATH

People of the Philippines vs. Brusola

G.R. No. 210615; July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by the accused-appellant Abenir Brusola assailing the decision of
the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of parricide under Art. 246 of the RPC for the death of his wife Delia and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua applying Art. 63 of the RPC.

Abenir and Delia's children, Joanne, Abegail, and Kristofer were inside their home when
suddenly, Joanne saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso (mallet). Joanne hugged Abenir
and asked why he did it. Abenir claimed that while he was in the bathroom, he heard people talking
outside and when he looked out through a crack in the plywood wall, he saw Delia kissing another
man. Abenir picked up the maso and attacked the man who used Delia as a shield. Delia went
inside while Abenir chased the man. After a failed pursuit, Abenir returned to the house where he
noticed that Kristofer was carrying Delia whose head was bleeding. He instructed his children to
take her to the hospital. He voluntarily went with the officers to the police station where he learned
that Delia was hit on the head. He asserted that he planned to attack the man whom he saw was
with his wife but accidentally hit Delia instead. The following day, Delia passed away.

Abenir argues that in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the trial court failed to
consider the mitigating circumstances of passion, obfuscation, and voluntary surrender. Accused-
appellant cited People v. Genosa (464 Phil. 680) to support the imposition of a lower penalty in
light of mitigating circumstances where the Court applied Art. 64 of the RPC.

ISSUE:
Is the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua proper where the crime is punishable
by two indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua to death) but committed with only one mitigating
circumstance and with no aggravating circumstance?

RULING:
Yes. The Court explained in People v. Sales (674 Phil. 150) that the crime of parricide is
punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death and that the presence of only
one mitigating circumstance with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of
reclusion perpetua applying Art. 63 of the RPC, to wit:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — . . . In all cases in which the
law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof: xxx 3. When the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.

Art. 64 provides the rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.
Considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two indivisible penalties—Art. 63, and not Art.
64, is applicable. Under Art. 63, when there are some mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. As such, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was
properly imposed.

| 47
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION MUST SPECIFICALLY PROVIDE FOR SUBSIDIARY

IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF ACCUSED’S FAILURE TO PAY THE PENALTY BEFORE
THE ACCUSED CAN BE COMPELLED TO SERVE SUCH

People of the Philippines vs. Alapan

G.R. No. 199527; January 10, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of the CA, which dismissed
the petition seeking the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for nonpayment of fine in eight (8)
cases of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

In August 2005, spouses Salvador and Myrna Alapan borrowed Php 400,000 from
petitioner Brian Britchford promising to pay the amount in three months. They issued eight (8)
postdated checks for said purpose. When the checks became due, Britchford deposited such
checks to PNB – Olongapo Branch. However, the PNB informed Britchford that the checks were
dishonored because the account was closed. Britchford then informed spouses Alapan of such
dishonor. Spouses Alapan claimed that their account was closed only on the last week of October
2005 due to business reverses. Nonetheless, they stated that they were willing to settle their debt.

In May 2006, spouses Alapan were charged with eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 before the MTC, which acquitted Myrna but sentenced Salvador to pay a fine and to indemnify
Britchford in the amount of Php 411,000, among others. However, Salvador failed to pay the fine
imposed by MTC. As a result, Britchford filed a Motion to Impose Subsidiary Penalty for Salvador’s
failure to pay the fine. The MTC denied Britchford’s motion on the ground that their decision did
not impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The RTC dismissed the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction while the CA dismissed the petition due to failure to comply with the Administrative
Code requiring OSG intervention.

ISSUE:
Is the accused compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment for his failure to pay the fine
imposed by the MTC where said court did not specify, in the judgment of conviction, any subsidiary
imprisonment in case of failure to pay?

RULING:
No, Alapan cannot be compelled to undergo subsidiary imprisonment because the MTC’s
judgment of conviction did not specify subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the penalty
of fine.

Art. 78 of the RPC states that “no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final
judgment. A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with
any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.”

Since the said subsidiary imprisonment is not stated in the judgment finding Alapan guilty,
the court could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment. To allow such would
be a violation of the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.

Thus, Alapan cannot be compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment despite his failure to
pay the fine.

48 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

AS A GENERAL RULE, PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME SHALL RUN FROM THE DATE OF

THE COMMISSION OF CRIME. IF THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION IS UNKNOWN, IT
SHALL RUN FROM THE TIME WHEN THERE IS SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO THE STATE
THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED

Del Rosario vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 199930; June 27, 2018
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
In this appeal, accused Del Rosario seeks the reversal of the Sandiganbayan decision
setting aside the rulings of the RTC and MeTC, which had granted her motion to quash the
informations charging her with violations of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6713.

Petitioner Del Rosario is a government employee holding the position of Chief of Valuation
and Classification Division – Office of the Commissioner, BOC, Port Area, Manila. On October 28,
2004, the General Investigation Bureau-A of the Office of the Ombudsman resolved to charge the
petitioner with violation of Sec 8 of R.A. No. 6713 for her failure to file her SALNs for the years
1990 and 1991. The criminal informations however were filed only on March 11, 2008. Thus, the
petitioner filed Motions to Quash the informations on the ground of prescription. The MeTC granted
the Motions to Quash, which was upheld by the RTC.

Undeterred, respondent State elevated the decision of the RTC to the Sandiganbayan
arguing that the RTC had erred in ruling that the 8-year prescriptive period for violation of Sec. 8
of R.A. No. 6713 commenced to run on the day of the commission of the violations, not from the
discovery of the offenses. The Sandiganbayan promulgated its assailed decision overturning the
RTC.

ISSUE:
Is the Sandiganbayan correct in stating that prescription of offenses charged against
petitioner commenced from the discovery of offenses?

RULING:
No, the Sandiganbayan erred in applying the discovery rule.

R.A. No. 6713, which mandates public officers to file their SALNs annually, does not
expressly state the prescriptive period for the violation of its provisions. Hence, Act No. 3326, the
general law on prescription of offenses punished under special law shall govern.

As a general rule, prescription shall run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law. If the date of commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted from the date of
discovery thereof.

In this case, it would be unwarranted to hold that the Ombudsman could not have known
of the accused’s failure to file her SALNs on the dates they were due as the Ombudsman is part
of the government and was in the position to know who failed to file their SALNs. The prescriptive
period under Act No. 3326 must therefore be reckoned from such due dates. The prescriptive
period is long enough to investigate and identify the public officials and employees who did not
observe the requirement for the submission or filing of the verified SALNs. Thus, by the time the
informations were filed, the offenses had long prescribed.

| 49
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

CRIMINAL LIABILITY IS TOTALLY EXTINGUISHED BY THE DEATH OF THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT PENDING APPEAL

People of the Philippines vs. Dimaala

G.R. No. 225054; July 17, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant appealed the CA’s decision which affirmed his conviction by the RTC
for the crime of murder for killing Rodrigo Marasigan. He later on decided not to pursue his appeal.
The CA declared the finality of its resolution granting Dimaala’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal.

Subsequently, the CA got word from the Bureau of Corrections that Dimaala had died in
the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on August 23, 2016, as evidenced by his Certificate of Death.

ISSUE:
Does Dimaala’s death, prior to his final conviction and pending appeal, extinguish his
criminal liability?

RULING:
Yes, Dimaala’s death totally extinguished his criminal liability.

Art. 89 (1) of the RPC provides that one of the modes of totally extinguishing criminal
liability is by the death of the accused. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.

In this relation, the Court stresses that accused-appellant's civil liability based on sources
other than the subject delict survives, and the victim may file a separate civil action against the
estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

Thus, Dimaala’s death extinguished his criminal liability.

50 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

DEATH OF AN ACCUSED PENDING THE APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION

EXTINGUISHES THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO

People of the Philippines vs. Calomia

G.R. No. 229856; November 20, 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by the accused-appellant Ruben Calomia assailing the decision of
the CA which affirmed with modifications the RTC’s judgment, which found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape of his minor daughter, AAA.

On September 4, 2017, the Court received a later dated August 2, 2017 from Jail Chief
Inspector Felipe A. Montejo, stating that the appellant has “died of Asphyxia due to Strangulation,
Self-Inflicted, Hanging” while in the confinement of Bohol District Jail last September 29, 2015.

ISSUE:
Were the civil and criminal liabilities of the accused extinguished by his death pending
appeal of his conviction?

RULING:
Yes, Calomia’s death pending his appeal extinguished his liability - both criminal and civil.

Paragraph 1 of Art. 89 of the RPC, as amended, provides that the death of an accused
pending his appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil liability ex delicto. The reason behind
this is that there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. The civil action, on the other
hand, is likewise ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal action.

In the case at bar, accused-appellant died during the pendency of his appeal before the
CA. Unfortunately, the appellate court was not timely informed of accused-appellant’s death prior
to the promulgation of its decision. Still, accused-appellant’s death extinguished his criminal liability
and his civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the crime/s he committed.

Irrefragably, accused-appellant's death extinguished his criminal liability and his civil
liabilities directly arising from and based solely on the crime/s he committed. Accused-appellant's
conviction by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, must therefore be set aside as the same had already
been rendered ineffectual.

| 51
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

DEATH OF THE ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION EXTINGUISHES

HIS CRIMINAL LIABILITY AS WELL AS THE CIVIL LIABILITY BASED SOLELY
THEREON

People of the Philippines vs. De Chavez Jr.

G.R. No. 229722; December 13, 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Dionisio de Chavez, Jr. assailing the decision
of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

During the pendency of the present appeal, however, in a letter dated August 10, 2017,
Police Superintendent I Roberto R. Rabo, Superintedent of the New Bilibid Prison, informed this
Court that accused-appellant de Chavez had died on December 9, 2016 at the New Bilibid Prison
Hospital.

ISSUE:
Did the death of accused pending his appeal extinguish his criminal liability?

RULING:
Yes. Paragraph 1, Art. 89 of the RPC provides that by death of the convict, criminal liability
is totally extinguished as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before the final judgment.
Further, in People v. Bayotas, the Court ruled that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

Thus, the death of accused-appellant de Chavez on December 9, 2016, during the

pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his criminal liability, but also his civil liabilities arising
from or based on the crime. But, as held in Bayotas, accused-appellant de Chavez's civil liability
may be based on other sources of obligation other than ex delicto, in which case the heirs of Virgilio
A. Matundan may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant de Chavez,
as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

52 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION FOR INSTITUTING CRIMINAL ACTIONS FOR

FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT COMMENCES ON THE DATE OF
REGISTRATION

Lim vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 226590; April 23, 2018
Reyes, Jr. J.

FACTS:
Petitioners Shirley Lim, Mary Lim Leon and Jimmy Lim are all siblings, all of whom are
officers of Pentel Merchandising Co., Inc. (Pentel). They filed a petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA, which found
the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of a public document
punishable under Art. 172 in relation to 171 of the RPC.

In 2010, Lucy Lim, one of the stockholders of Pentel, filed an affidavit of complaint alleging
that the petitioners falsified the Secretary’s Certificate. A criminal complaint was filed on May 15,
2012. The petitioners were accused of conspiring with one another in falsifying the Secretary’s
Certificate dated February 29,2000 and registered on March 29, 2000; and Board Resolution 2000-
01.

Petitioners argued that they were erroneously charged with the crime of falsification of
public document. According to the petitioners, the evidence of the prosecution actually proved the
falsification of Board Resolution 2000-001, a private document, instead of the Secretary's
Certificate dated February 29, 2000. Moreover, for the first time on appeal, they argue that despite
the finding of their guilt, the crime with which they were charged already prescribed.

ISSUE:
Was the criminal liability extinguished due to prescription?

RULING:
Yes, the criminal liability was extinguished due to prescription.

Art. 90 of the RPC provides that the period for the prescription of offenses commences
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.
But if the offense is falsification of a public document punishable under Art. 172 of the RPC, as in
this case, the period for prescription commences on the date of registration of the forged or falsified
document. Moreover, as consistently applied in land registration proceedings, the act of
registration serves as a constructive notice to the entire world, charging everyone with knowledge
of the contents of the document.

March 29, 2000 is the proper reckoning point from which the prescription of the crime of
falsification of a public document began to run. From this date of registration, there was
constructive notice of the falsification to the entire world, including the complainant Lucy. She and
all other persons were charged with the knowledge of the falsified Secretary's Certificate dated
February 29, 2000, beginning on March 29, 2000. It is well-settled that the filing of the complaint
in the fiscal's office interrupts the prescriptive period. The Court notes, however, that the Affidavit
of Complaint was executed on September 21, 2010, or more than ten (10) years from the time that
prescription commenced to run on March 29, 2000. Considering that Lucy's complaint could not
have been filed earlier than its date of execution, prescription already set in by March 29, 2010, or
approximately five (5) months before the execution of the complaint on September 21, 2010.

| 53
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

DEATH OF THE ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION EXTINGUISHES

CRIMINAL LIABILITY

People of the Philippines vs. Antido

G.R. No. 208651; March 14, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant died before the promulgation of the Resolution affirming the decision of
the CA convicting accused-appellant guilty of rape. Hence, the Resolution must be set aside
dismissing the case against accused-appellant.

ISSUE:
Is death of the accused-appellant pending appeal of his conviction a ground for a dismissal
of the criminal case against him?

RULING:
Yes. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him.

Art. 89 (1) of the RPC provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of
the accused. Art. 89 provides that: by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.

In People v. Culas, the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an accused
pending appeal on his liabilities, as follows:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as the civil liability, based solely thereon x x x

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-
contracts d) x x x e) Quasi-delicts.

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of ling a separate civil action and subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. x x x

Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action
is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded
as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in
connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts.

54 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THERE BE AN INTENT TO GAIN OR THE INTENT TO

INJURE A THIRD PERSON IN THE CRIME OF FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIAL
DOCUMENTS IN CONTRADICTION TO PRIVATE DOCUMENTS

Typoco, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 221857; August 16, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the
decision of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioners Jesus Typoco, Jr. and Noel Reyes guilty of
falsification of public document penalized under Art. 171, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the RPC.

In the implementation of the “Medical Indigency Program”, various purchase orders and
requests for medical supplies were approved by petitioner Typoco, then Governor of the Province
of Camarines Norte. After a post-audit of the Commission on Audit, it was revealed that the
purchase order for medicines from a supplier was altered to make it appear the it was prepared
after a public bidding was held when in fact it was prepared by Reyes, then OIC of the General
Services Office, and approved by Typoco prior thereto.

Petitioner Typoco argued that he may have acted negligently when he affixed his signature
on the subject purchase orders, which document was forwarded to him with all the necessary
signatures of his subordinates, and that he had no criminal intent. He stressed that he relied in
good faith on his subordinates and provincial officers

ISSUE:
Is criminal intent required for the accused to be convicted of the crime of Falsification of
Public Document?

RULING:
No, wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential
element of the crime of falsification of public document.

The elements of falsification by a public officer or employee or notary public are that: (1)
the offender is a public officer or employee or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of
his official position; and (3) he or she falsifies a document by committing any of the acts mentioned
in Art. 171 of the RPC. The act of "altering true dates" requires that: (a) the date mentioned in the
document is essential; and (b) the alteration of the date in a document must affect either the
veracity of the document or the effects thereof. In the falsification of public or official documents,
whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of
gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.

It was sufficiently shown from the evidence adduced that P.O. No. 0628 was actually
prepared on April 21, 2005 prior to the conduct of public bidding, and that petitioner Reyes gave
the directive to change the original date in the subject PO only on May 23, 2005, after the conduct
of public bidding. Hence, the changing of the date in the subject PO from April 21, 2005 to May 20,
2005 was not a mere correction but an act of falsification to make it appear that a bidding was
conducted prior to ordering the medicines from CDMS.

| 55
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

MISAPPROPRIATION OR CONVERSION REFERS TO ANY DISPOSITION OF ANOTHER'S

PROPERTY AS IF IT WERE HIS OWN OR DEVOTING IT TO A PURPOSE NOT AGREED
UPON

Coson vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 218830; September 14, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails decision of the CA
which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC finding Jesus Coson guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa.

Petitioner, Jesus Coson, is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Good God
Development Corporation (GGDC), a corporation engaged in the business of developing
subdivisions and building houses/condominiums therein for sale to the general public. GGDC,
through its President, borrowed P2.52 million from private complainant to buy the land to GGDC's
property. A Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by the parties whereby the property
owned by GGDC was put up as collateral for the loan. Another Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was
executed by GGDC through petitioner in favor of private complainant for a loan of P4.78 million.
The land purchased using the first loan was given as security for the latter loan. Petitioner
thereafter borrowed from private complainant the title of the land. Petitioner said that he would use
it in obtaining a loan from the Home Development Mutual Fund and promised that he would pay
him the mortgage consideration upon release of the proceeds of the loan by the said agency.
However, upon receipt of proceeds, the herein accused refused to perform his obligation to pay
private complainant.

Petitioner claims that Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by him as the duly
authorized officer of GGDC and that GGDC is the owner of the property used as security, and not
the private complainant. Therefore, he contends that, the aggrieved party should be GGDC, and
not the private complainant.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of estafa even when he did not convert the proceeds to his own personal
use, benefit or advantage?

RULING:
No. There was no misappropriation or conversion of the TCT subject of this case or the
proceeds of the PAGIBIG Fund loan by petitioner to his own personal use, benefit or advantage.

It is clear from the evidence on record that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed
by petitioner as the duly authorized officer of GGDC. In all his dealings with private complainant,
he acted in behalf of GGDC which owns the title and the loan proceeds. The purpose of the loan
was in pursuance of the housing business of GGDC, which is not totally unknown to private
complainant. If there was any misappropriation or conversion of the TCT or the PAGIBIG Fund
loan proceeds, the aggrieved party should be GGDC, and certainly not the private complainant.
For his uncollected debt, private complainant's remedy is not a criminal action, but a civil action
against petitioner. To stress, misappropriation or conversion refers to any disposition of another's
property as if it were his own or devoting it to a purpose not agreed upon. It connotes disposition
of one's property without any right.

56 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN THE CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO PROVE

THAT THE OFFICER RECEIVED PUBLIC FUNDS AND FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR
THEM

Venezuela vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 205693; February 14, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the
Decision and Resolution rendered by the Sandiganbayan Third Division which convicted petitioner
Manuel M. Venezuela (Venezuela) of Malversation of Public Funds under Art. 217 of the RPC, as
amended.

Venezuela was the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio when a group of auditors conducted an
investigation of the accounts of Pacita Costes and discovered a shortage of Php2,872,808.00 on
the joint accounts of Costes and Venezuela. The auditors discovered that the 17 cash advances
made by Valenzuela were illegal. He was likewise not authorized to receive cash advances.

One Marita Laquerta confirmed that the signatures appearing on 16 of the 17 illegal
disbursement vouchers belonged to Venezuela. Costales, Officer in Charge in the Municipal
Treasurer's Office, testified that the receipts presented by Venezuela, did not actually reflect the
payments claimed by Venezuela. The receipts were issued to different persons, in different
amounts and for different purposes.

Venezuela declared that he submitted to then Municipal Treasurer Costes all the
supporting documents to liquidate his cash advances before the end of his term in June 1998.
Witnesses support Venezuela’s defense.

ISSUE:
Is there malversation where the public officer fails to return cash advances, subsequently
found illegal, upon demand?

RULING:
Yes, Venezuela is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds.

The elements of malversation are (i) that the offender is a public officer, (ii) that he had
custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, (iii) that those funds or
property were public funds or property for which he was accountable, and (iv) that he appropriated,
took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take them. Verily, in the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for
conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he failed to
account for the said funds upon demand without offering a justifiable explanation for the shortage.

The prosecution sufficiently proved all the elements of the crime. Venezuela was a public
officer, being the mayor in the period relevant to the time of the crime charged. During his term as
mayor, he incurred unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php2,872,808.00 that constituted
funds belonging to the Municipality of Pozorrubio, and earmarked for use by the said municipality.

Finally, anent the last element for the crime of malversation of public funds, Venezuela
failed to return the amount of Php2,572,808.00, upon demand. His failure or inability to return the
shortage upon demand created a prima facie evidence that the funds were put to his personal use,
which Venezuela failed to overturn.

| 57
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

MOTIVE IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND THE

ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT PRECLUDE A FINDING OF GUILT; MOTIVE ONLY
BECOMES MATERIAL WHEN THERE IS DOUBT AS TO THE IDENTITY OF THE
MALEFACTOR

People of the Philippines vs. Pentecostes

G.R. No. 226158; November 8, 2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an Appeal under Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the decision of the
CA which affirmed the decision rendered by the RTC which found herein accused Liberato
Pentecostes (Liberato) guilty of the crime of Murder.

Accused was having a drinking spree with several other friends at the house of the victim’s
father. When the drinking spree ended at around 2:00 pm, Vivian, the victim, was asked by his
father to return a chair that they borrowed from Auring who lives at around 200 meters away. From
that time, Vivian never returned.

Thereafter, Vivian’s cousin and his friend encountered accused at a corn plantation.
Accused was said to be carrying Vivian on his back and heading towards a nearby body of water.
Vivian’s lifeless body was recovered the following morning. The autopsy revealed that Vivian died
of asphyxia by submersion or drowning.

Accused denied commission of the crime. He further contended that the motive or intent
to commit the crime charged was not established in this case.

ISSUES:
(1) Is motive or intent to kill an essential element of murder? and;
(2) When does motive become material in criminal prosecutions?

RULING:
(1) No. Motive pertains to the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular
criminal activity. It is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proven by the State in
criminal prosecutions. Hence, proof of motive alone will not establish guilt in the same way that the
absence thereof cannot establish innocence. The question of motive only becomes material when
there is doubt as to the identity of the malefactor committing the offense charged.

In this case, the totality of circumstantial evidence on record sufficiently dispels any doubt
that Liberato was responsible for the death of Vivian. The circumstances established in this case
form an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion and pointing to the accused-
appellant Pentecostes —to the exclusion of all others—as the guilty person.

(2) The question of motive only becomes material when there is doubt as to the identity of
the malefactor committing the offense charged.

58 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF MURDER,

PARRICIDE AND INFANTICIDE, THE ACCUSED MAY ONLY BE CONVICTED OF
HOMICIDE

Barbosa vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 207193; July 24, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 which assails the decision of the CA affirming
the RTC decision finding petitioners were in conspiracy in killing the victim and guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

Prosecution witness, Arnem Betita, testified that while inside their family home she heard
a man outside their house shouting "Get out" to which her father responded to the challenge
stepping out of their house. After hearing three gunshots, she went outside and saw petitioner
Ramdy Barbosa running away with a gun in his hand. She also noticed petitioner Roble Barbosa
on the terrace of his house holding a long firearm. The autopsy revealed that his death was due to
a gunshot wound in his left eyebrow caused by a bullet fired from a caliber .25 firearm.

Petitioners contend that there was no conspiracy between them since nobody actually saw
the commission of the crime.

ISSUE:
Will the absence of any of the qualifying circumstances of murder make the accused guilty
of homicide only?

RULING:
Yes, the accused may be convicted of homicide when there is lack of any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder.

Under Art. 249 of the RPC the elements of the crime of homicide are: (1) a person was
killed; (2) the accused killed that person without justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or that of parricide or infanticide.

According to the Certificate of Death of the victim, it was showed that the underlying cause
of his death was a gunshot wound. Petitioners were seen holding firearms immediately after the
victim was shot and his fatal injury was caused by a bullet fired from one of the firearms of
petitioners. Petitioners' criminal intent is conclusively presumed due to the death of the victim. They
only desisted from further shooting the victim after Betita pleaded for them to stop. In the absence
of any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide and infanticide, treachery having been
properly disregarded by the courts, the crime committed by petitioners was homicide.

| 59
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IF THE WOUNDS SUSTAINED BY THE VICTIM WERE NOT FATAL OR MORTAL, THE
CRIME COMMITTED IS ONLY ATTEMPTED MURDER OR ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE, AS
THE CASE MAY BE

People of the Philippines vs. Vibal, Jr., et al.

G.R. No. 229678; June 20, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA decision finding accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr and
Arnold David guilty two (2) counts of the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder for the deaths
of Mayor Leon C. Arcillas and PO2 Erwin Rivera and one (1) count of Direct Assault with Frustrated
Murder against PO3 Wilfredo Almendras.

PO3 Almendras, together with PO2 Binmaot, PO2 Rivera, and two (2) other civilian
escorts, was with Mayor Arcillas at the Municipal City Hall of Sta. Rosa City. On their way to the
Office of the Mayor, gunshots were fired on them. PO3 Almendras was not able to pull out his gun
since there was a rapid fire coming from their front and back. He, PO2 Rivera and the Mayor
sustained gunshots wounds. While on the floor, PO3 Almendras heard three (3) more gunshots
before he felt dizzy. Thereafter, PO3 Almendras and Mayor Arcillas were brought to the hospital.
PO2 Erwin Rivera died on the spot. During the investigation, Cipriano Refrea appeared and told
SPO1 Peria that accused-appellants Vibal and David, who were detained in Trece Martirez and
GMA, Cavite respectively, were his companions when the killing transpired. Refrea pointed to them
as the gunmen.

Accused-appellants interposed the twin defenses of denial and alibi. They insist that PO3
Almendras could not have properly seen and identify them at the time of the shooting incident.

ISSUE:
Was the CA correct in finding the accused-appellants guilty of Direct Assault with
Frustrated Murder?

RULING:
Yes. When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in authority for that
matter, there arises the complex crime of Direct Assault with murder or homicide.

It is well-settled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use
of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wounds but did not die
because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated
homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances under Art. 249 of the
RPC are present. But, if the wounds sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal,
then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.

The prosecution failed to prove that the gunshot wound inflicted upon PO2 Almendras was
fatal. No evidence was adduced to show that the nature of gunshot wounds sustained by PO3
Almedras was sufficient to cause the latter's death without timely medical intervention. Where there
is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the
character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused
and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated, murder.

60 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

CRIME COMMITTED IS SERIOUS, LESS SERIOUS OR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURY WHEN

WOUNDS SUSTAINED ARE NOT FATAL AND INTENT TO KILL IS ABSENT

Etino vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 206632; February 14, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the CA decision affirming with
modification the RTC decision which found petitioner Eden Etino guilty of frustrated homicide
against Jessierel Leyble.

While Leyble and his companions were on their way home, Etino shot the former hitting
the back portion of his right shoulder and other parts of his body. Leyble was brought to the hospital
and was found to sustain serious physical injury as proven by the medical certificates presented
in court in the absence of the testimony of the physician.

Etino contended that Leyble had ill motives to falsely institute the complaint and testify
against him. Further, he questions the lapse of unreasonable time for Leyble to file the complaint
and the latter’s positive identification of him as the assailant.

ISSUE:
Was there intent to kill on the part of Etino when he shot Leyble?

RULING:
None.

The crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or

not any of the qualifying circumstances under Art. 249 of the RPC are present. However, if the
wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed
is only attempted murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent to kill on the part of the
accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be
serious, less serious or slight physical injury.

In the case at hand, it was proven that Etino had no intent to kill because he only fired a
single shot at close-range but did not hit any vital part of Leyble’s body. Thereafter, Etino
immediately fled the scene. These acts certainly do not suggest that petitioner had intended to kill
the victim; for if he did, he could have fired multiple shots to ensure the latter's demise.

Hence, absent the intent to kill on the part of Etino and the wound/s sustained by Leyble
were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury only.

| 61
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE GRAVAMEN OF RAPE UNDER ART. 266-A (1) OF THE RPC IS CARNAL
KNOWLEDGE OF A WOMAN AGAINST HER WILL OR WITHOUT HER CONSENT

People of the Philippines vs. Ragasa

G.R. No. 202863; February 21, 2018.
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Isidro Ragasa y Sta. Ana alias "Nonoy" from
the Decision of the CA convicting him of Rape under Arts. 266-A and 266-B of the RPC.

“AAA’s” mother and grandmother left her alone in the house one morning because they
had to sell banana cue. “AAA” heard someone trying to open the door to her room. Nonoy entered
the room holding a knife. Before “AAA” could shout, Nonoy covered her mouth with a cloth and
tied her hands behind her with a strip of rubber. Nonoy instructed her not to tell anyone about what
is about to happen or else he will kill her. Nonoy then undressed “AAA” and mounted her. They
had sexual intercourse four times. Satisfied, Nonoy dressed “AAA” but left her hands tied and left
through the window. When “BBB”, “AAA’s” brother, got home, he found “AAA” alone with her hands
tied. He untied her but she didn't say anything. Three days after the incident, “AAA” told her father
and BBB at the municipal hall that Nonoy was the person responsible for what happened to her.
“AAA” and her grandmother reported the incident to the police. On the same day, “AAA” was
examined by Dr. Muñoz who thereafter issued a medical certificate on her findings.

Nonoy argued that at the time of the alleged rape he was working in a plantation. He denied
knowing any of the parties who identified him. One Montoya owned a hut near the plantation and
testified that he indeed saw Nonoy working in the plantation.

ISSUE:
Was the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING:
Yes, the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

For a charge of rape under Art. 266-A(1) of R.A. No. 8353 to prosper, it must be proven
that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through
force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she
was under 12 years of age or was demented. The gravamen of rape under Art. 266-A (1) is carnal
knowledge of "a woman against her will or without her consent." In rape cases alleged to have
been committed by force, threat or intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that
the element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution must
prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by accused upon his victim to achieve his
end. Failure to do so is fatal to its cause.

Records will confirm that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will through threat and
intimidation. Armed with a knife, the accused-appellant threatened AAA not to tell anyone,
otherwise, he would kill her. To avoid any resistance on the part of AAA and to ensure that he
would be able to successfully carry out his bestial acts, the accused-appellant even tied her hands
at the back. Thus, these pieces of evidence produce a moral certainty that accused-appellant had
indeed raped the victim.

62 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT TO PROVE RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Bauit

G.R. No. 231359; February 7, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Crisanto Cirbeto y Giray (accused-
appellant) assailing the Decision of the CA finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder, defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the RPC.

“AAA,” daughter of Bauit, was walking to the bathroom when her father held her and forced
her to lie down. Bauit pulled down her pants and underwear. He then removed his own pants and
inserted his penis into her vagina. “AAA” resisted but to no avail. She says that she felt pain. Her
aunts helped her report the incident to the barangay kagawad and then to the police station. The
medical examination stated that “AAA” obtained deep healed hymenal lacerations indicating a
blunt penetrating trauma on the genitalia. According the medic, these healed lacerations could
have been inflicted more than a week before the examination.

Bauit denies raping “AAA.” He argues that the filing of the rape case against him was meant
to cover up the wrongdoings of "AAA.” He claims that the rooms were separated only by plywood
making it impossible for the rape to have been committed without alarming the occupants of the
other rooms. Bauit emphasizes that the medico-legal finding states that the lacerations were
caused by sexual contact more than one week before the general examination. He argues that
since the alleged rape occurred less than three days before "AAA" was examined, the lacerations
were not caused by him but somebody else.

ISSUE:
Was the testimony of “AAA” sufficient to support the conviction of rape?

RULING:
Yes, the testimony of “AAA” is sufficient to support the conviction of rape.

The elements of rape were clearly established by the prosecution. In the crime of rape, the
testimony of the victim, and not the findings of the medico-legal officer, is the most important
element to prove that the felony had been committed. It has also been held that a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim's
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. A doctor's certificate
is merely corroborative in character and not an essential element in proving the commission of
rape.

The fact that the rooms were adjacent, that only plywood divided the rooms and any
adjacent noise could be heard such that it was unlikely for accused-appellant to commit the rape
is of no moment. Jurisprudence teaches us that rape may be committed even in places where
people congregate. Thus, it is not impossible or unlikely that rape is perpetrated inside a room
adjacent to a room occupied by other persons, as in this case.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHEN A VICTIM'S TESTIMONY IS CREDIBLE AND SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHES THE

ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME, IT MAY BE ENOUGH BASIS TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED OF
RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Agalot

G.R. No. 220884; February 21, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Joseph Agalot y Rubio from the Decision of
the CA finding him guilty of Rape in relation to R.A. No. 7610, as amended.

When “AAA” was twelve years old, she was left at home with Agalot and some of her nieces
and nephews. “AAA” was taking of their crippled relative when Agalot instructed her to get a
calendar from his brother’s house. “AAA” complied while not knowing that Agalot was following
her. He then told her to go upstairs but she refused. Agalot dragged her upstairs. This was
witnessed by “EEE,” one of the nieces. Agalot, armed with a hunting knife, forced “AAA” to lie
down. He threatened her that he would stab her should she refuse. Agalot removed undressed
himself and “AAA.” While holding the knife, he inserted his penis into her vagina. “AAA” cried
because she felt pain. After having carnal knowledge with “AAA,” Agalot left. “AAA” told a relative
that she was raped. The relative accompanied her to the hospital where she was examined.

Agalot argued that he asked “AAA” to fetch water. She took a while to return so he went
out to look for her. He found her playing with her slippers at the basketball court. He whipped her
with a guava branch and dragged her home because she did not want to go home.

ISSUE:
Is the testimony of a 12-year old child sufficient to prove the crime of rape?

RULING:
Yes, the testimony of a child is sufficient to prove the crime of rape.

The basic rule is that when a victim's testimony is credible and sufficiently establishes the
elements of the crime, it may be enough basis to convict an accused of rape. The records reveal
that the testimony of AAA, though she was only a child, was full of details which she credibly
narrated because these were the truth. Mindful that the identity of the offender is crucial in the
success of the prosecution of an offense, the Court notes AAA's unshakable and consistent
positive identification of the accused- appellant as the one who raped her despite the grueling
cross-examination by the defense.

Moreover, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth,
been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being. When the
offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of
what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity.

Here, AAA’s prompt report to BBB, CCC and FFF and FFF’s husband further fortified her
credibility. She even readily submitted herself to a medical examination. There is thus reason to
apply the well-settled jurisprudence that where no compelling and cogent reason is established
that would explain why the complainant was so driven as to blindly implicate an accused, the
testimony of a young girl having been the victim of a sexual assault cannot be discarded.

64 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CATEGORICAL TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM IS

SUFFICIENT TO PROVE RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Gomez

G.R. No. 220892; February 21, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
The accused Benedict Gomez was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
simple rape.

“AAA” was 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. She was serving drinks
to a group having a drinking session. She herself had 10 shots of Matador making her dizzy. After
another glass, she lost consciousness. She woke up naked to Benedict Gomez on top of her with
his penis inside her vagina. “AAA” tried to push Gomez but to no avail. She realized that an
unidentified man was lying next to her and that one Neil Iliw-Iliw was standing by the door. One
Ronald Severino even held her hand when she started to struggle. When “AAA” woke up the next
day, Neil’s brother Joe told her that she was raped by Mark, Glen, Neil, Ronald, Macky, Dexter,
and Talibao. She was feeling weak, felt pain in her vagina which was bleeding. "AAA" told her
mother what happened and she submitted herself to a medico-legal examination. The examination
revealed that she suffered from “recent blunt force or penetrating trauma."

Gomez claims that he and “AAA” were once sweethearts. He denied having carnal
knowledge of “AAA” and argued that “AAA” was just upset with him because, when they were
sweethearts, he had other girlfriends aside from her.

ISSUE:
Was the testimony of the victim sufficient to convict the accused of rape?

RULING:
Yes. The straightforward and categorical testimony of "AAA" and her positive identification
of appellant proved that the latter had carnal knowledge of "AAA" against her will and without her
consent. As such, her testimony must prevail over the uncorroborated and self-serving denial of
appellant.

Moreover, her prompt report bolstered her credibility. “AAA” reported the incident to her
mother a day after it transpired. "AAA" immediately underwent a medico-legal examination. These
matters only proved that "AAA" did not have the luxury of time to fabricate a rape story.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHEN A RAPE VICTIM'S ALLEGATION IS CORROBORATED BY A PHYSICIAN'S

FINDING OF PENETRATION, THERE IS SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION TO CONCLUDE
THE EXISTENCE OF THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITE OF CARNAL KNOWLEDGE

People of the Philippines vs. Divinagracia, Sr.

G.R. No. 207765; July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the RTC decision finding the
accused Julito Divinagracia guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness committed against his minor
daughter.

Julito Divinagracia was charged with two (2) crimes: (1) Rape, for having carnal knowledge
with his then eight (8) year old daughter by means of force and intimidation, against her will and
consent, and (2) Acts of Lasciviousness, for pressing his penis against the buttocks and touching
the breasts of his then twelve (12) year old daughter.

Accused asserted that the charges of rape and acts of lasciviousness against him were
unfounded and that his guilt was never established beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Were all the elements of qualified rape sufficiently established by the rape victim’s
allegation, which was corroborated by a physician’s finding of penetration?

RULING:
Yes, all the elements of qualified rape were established.

The elements of qualified rape are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by
force and without consent; (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape; and
(5) the offender is a parent of the victim. Furthermore, when a rape victim's allegation is
corroborated by a physician's finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the
existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. It is well-established that physical
evidence is evidence of the highest order.

It was not disputed that AAA was eight years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
The medical findings of the doctor also corroborate AAA's allegations of her father's abuse. The
doctor testified the lacerations could have only been caused by the insertion of a penis, object, or
finger into the vagina. The physical evidence of the healed lacerations in AAA’s vagina strongly
corroborates AAA and BBB's testimonies that AAA was raped by their father.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

A MEDICO-LEGAL REPORT IS NOT INDISPENSABLE IN RAPE CASES AS IT IS MERELY

CORROBORATIVE IN NATURE

People of the Philippines vs. YYY

G.R. No. 224626; June 27, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the Judgment of the RTC finding
YYY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Rape.

The appellant, YYY, was charged with 3 counts of rape committed on the following dates:
June 1993, September 1993, and March 1994 committed against AAA, 10 years old. However, it
was only in 2000 when AAA reported the incident after discovering that YYY was also raping her
younger sister. The medical examination conducted on AAA revealed that she had shallow and
deep healed lacerations in her hymen; this meant that a blunt object had been inserted into her
vagina. YYY was convicted for 3 counts of rape.

YYY’s contention was mainly based on the credibility of the victim’s testimony and that
there is no evidence that would corroborate the victim’s claim. In addition, YYY finds it unbelievable
that AAA could still recall the details even if she only testified nine (9) years after the last rape
incident.

ISSUE:
May an accused be found guilty of rape based solely on the testimony of the victim and
without a medico-legal report?

RULING:
Yes. A medico-legal report is not indispensable in rape cases as it is merely corroborative
in nature. Thus, even without it, an accused may still be convicted on the sole basis of the testimony
of the victim. As such, the credibility of the witness should be assessed independently regardless
of the presence or absence of a medico-legal report. Trial courts are expected to scrutinize the
victim's testimony with great caution, with or without a medico-legal report to corroborate the same.
It is axiomatic that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses, the probative weight
of their testimonies and conclusions drawn therefrom are accorded the highest respect by
appellate courts considering that their revisory power and authority are generally limited to the bare
and cold records of the case.

It is not farfetched that AAA could remember events that transpired on those fateful dates.
After all, it is especially traumatic for a child of tender age to have been defiled by her own flesh
and blood. Surely, it could have been possible that the details of the harrowing event were painfully
etched in the recesses of her mind.

AAA's testimony alone sufficed in establishing the elements of rape: (1) accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) it was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation;
(b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the victim is under
12 years of age or is demented.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ACCUSED CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF RAPE WHEN WHAT IS ALLEGED IN THE

INFORMATION IS THAT THE RAPE WAS COMMITTED THRU FORCE, THREAT, OR
INTIMIDATION BUT WHAT WAS PROVED DURING TRIAL WAS THAT THE VICTIM
WAS FEEBLE-MINDED

People of the Philippines vs. XXX

G.R. No. 229860; March 21, 2018
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of herein accused-appellants XXX, Gilles, Monter, and Castil from
Decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the decision of RTC finding appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

AAA's brother, BBB, hosted a party for his grandchild, with appellants among the visitor.
During the party, appellants invited her to go to the seashore to drink tuba. Sometime during the
night, AAA felt like urinating and she did so in front of the appellants after asking them to turn their
backs. After urinating, Castil took off her pants and underwear and AAA complied as she felt very
sleepy. Castil placed himself on top of her and the next thing she knew, his penis was already in
her vagina. After Castil raped her, the other accused followed. RTC and CA convicted the accused-
appellants of rape based on AAA's feeble-mindedness.

The accused-appellants denied the allegations of AAA. They stress that AAA is not
mentally deficient. The medical certificate purportedly signed by Dr. Escalamado was never
testified to by the physician. Even assuming that there was carnal knowledge between AAA and
appellants, such was done in accord with their own volition.

ISSUE:
Can the accused be convicted of the crime of rape upon the finding that the victim was
feeble-minded, but such was not alleged in the information?

RULING:
No, when the element of feeble-mindedness was not alleged in the information, the
accused cannot be convicted of the crime.

The information against appellants alleged that they committed the heinous act through
force, threat, or intimidation. It appears from the RTC and CA decisions that appellants were
convicted of rape because AAA was feeble-minded, and not because of existence of force, threat,
or intimidation. Such was not alleged in the information. The Court had previously ruled that an
accused cannot be convicted of rape if the information charged him with rape through force, threat,
or intimidation when what was proven was sexual congress with a woman deprived of reason,
unconscious, or under twelve years of age.

The instant case shows an obvious lack of clear and convincing evidence of the victim's
mental deficiency upon which the conviction of the appellants is based. The Court has only the
RTC's assessment of AAA to go by and determine that AAA was feeble-minded and therefore
sexual congress with her equated to rape. The medical certificate stated that "the patient is known
to have mental deficiency." However, this was not even testified to by the doctor who signed the
same. Thus, the conclusion of the RTC was made absent Dr. Esclamado's testimony as well as
medical proof of AAA's mental state.

Therefore, the force, threat, and intimidation as alleged in the information, as well as AAA's
mental deficiency, were not proven with moral certainty.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE BY THE COMPLAINING PARTY IS NOT GROUND FOR

DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Bagsic

G.R. No. 218404; December 13, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA Decision which affirmed with modification the RTC’s Joint
Decision finding accused-appellant Rolando Bagsic y Valenzuela (accused-appellant) guilty of
rape by sexual assault and of statutory rape.

BBB, a minor 8 years of age, was called and brought to a nipa hut by accused-appellant
“Lolo”, their maternal grandmother’s common law husband. Inside the hut, accused-appellant told
BBB to lie down. He removed her shorts and underwear and had carnal knowledge of BBB, but he
was unable to make a full penetration. After two years, BBB, was again assaulted when she was
awakened by a finger being inserted into her vagina by Bagsic.

During the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, however, BBB executed an affidavit
of desistance. Accused now contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape by sexual
assault and statutory rape, since BBB executed such affidavit of resistance.

ISSUE:
Should the accused be acquitted on the basis of BBB’s affidavit of desistance?

RULING:
No, BBB’s affidavit of desistance cannot be given weight.

BBB's affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the case’s dismissal. Rape is no longer
considered a private crime as R.A. No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 has reclassified rape
as a crime against persons. It may now be prosecuted de officio; a complaint for rape commenced
by the offended party is no longer necessary for its prosecution.

Hence, an affidavit of desistance, which may be considered as pardon by the complaining

witness, is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of a rape action over which the court has already
assumed jurisdiction.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ABANDONMENT OF THE WOMEN’S HONOR DOCTRINE; EVALUATION OF THE

TESTIMONY OF A PRIVATE COMPLAINANT OF RAPE WITHOUT GENDER BIAS OR
CULTURAL MISCONCEPTION

People of the Philippines vs. Amarela

G.R. No. 225642-43; January 17, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of CA finding respondents Juvy Amarela (Amarela) and
Junard Racho (Racho) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two different charges of rape.

At around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, AAA was watching a beauty contest at a basketball
court. AAA then went to the comfort room where Amarela pulled her under the stage of the day
care center, punched her in the abdomen, and undressed her. He placed himself on top of her and
inserted his penis inside her vagina. When she shouted for help, Amarela fled. AAA was then
brought to the Racho residence. Neneng Racho asked her son Racho to bring AAA to her aunt's
house instead. AAA claimed that Racho brought her to a shanty along the way against her will and
was told to lie down. When she refused, Racho boxed her abdomen. He, then, undressed himself
and placed himself on top of AAA. After consummating the act, Racho left.

Amarela testified for himself denying that he had anything to do with what happened with
AAA. On his part, Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but also denied raping
her. They argued that there were several circumstances casting doubt on AAA' s claim that she
was raped because her testimony does not conform to common knowledge and to ordinary human
experience.

ISSUE:
Does the lone testimony of the victim suffice to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of rape?

RULING:
No, the ‘women’s honor’ doctrine should be abandoned. More often than not, where the
alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual depredation, rape cases are solely decided based
on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In doing so, we have hinged on the
impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually
abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.

However, this misconception, particularly in this day and age, not only puts the accused at
an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice. This opinion borders on the fallacy of non
sequitur. And while the factual setting back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural
for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today, we simply cannot be stuck to the
Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman who has over the years
transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her
rights. In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender
bias or cultural misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an
accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the
testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things. In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must
be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the prosecution miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired.
Here, we cannot ascertain what happened based on the lone testimony of AAA. Hence, the
accused were acquitted as a matter of right.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

SPECIFIC REFERENCE OF THE EXACT DATE OR TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF RAPE

IS NOT NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION OF THE SAID CRIME

People of the Philippines vs. De Guzman

G.R. No. 228248; August 9, 2017
Reyes Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed with modifications the decision
of the RTC finding accused-appellant Romeo De Guzman guilty of two counts of qualified rape
under Art. 266-A, in relation to Art. 266-B, of the RPC.

The victim, AAA, was first sexually assaulted by her stepfather, accused Romeo De
Guzman, when she was only 8 years old. He inserted his penis inside her vagina and successfully
had carnal knowledge of her. The sexual abuses of AAA from the hands of the accused continued
between the years of 2006 and 2010. Upon physical and genital examination of AAA, lacerations
on AAA’s hymen, which could have been caused by any blunt, hard object like a finger or erect
penis were found.

Accused De Guzman interposed the argument of mandatory reference in the two sets of
information of the specific time and date of the commission of rape.

ISSUE:
Does specific reference of the exact date or time of the commission of rape necessary to
sustain conviction for the crime of rape?

RULING:
No, precision as to the time when the rape is committed has no bearing on its commission.

Under Art. 266-A (1) of the RPC, rape is committed through the following acts: 1) By a man
who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through
force, threat, or intimidation; b.) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. Consequently, the date or the time of the commission
of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute accuracy, for it is
sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime was committed at any time as near
as possible to the date of its actual commission.

AAA was able to recount in open court the circumstances of her ill-fated ordeal — from the
first instance when De Guzman, being her stepfather, had carnal knowledge of her since she was
merely 8 years of age up to the following years of repeated sexual abuses through the use of force,
threat and intimidation. The first commission of rape in 2003 does not require any other
circumstance to support conviction. As provided by the above-mentioned law, rape is committed
by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age such as AAA. Same
finding is arrived at to the subsequent acts of carnal knowledge of AAA between the years of 2006
and 2010. As oft-repeated ruling, no young girl such as AAA would subject herself to humiliation
and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN RAPE CASES, THE FAILURE TO SPECIFY THE EXACT DATES OR TIMES OF THE
RAPE DOES NOT IPSO FACTO MAKE THE CORRESPONDING INFORMATION
DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE

People of the Philippines vs. Pagamucan

G.R. No. 207772; November 8, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
On appeal is the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the decision of the
RTC. The RTC found appellant Gavino Pagamucan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory
rape.

AAA testified that on September 10, 2005 while she was defecating under coconut trees,
accused-appellant, her next-door neighbor, approached her and got her up, and carried her to a
grassy place. He undressed her, mounted her, held her breasts, and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She felt pain and cried but could not shout because accused-appellant had covered her
mouth, pointed a knife at her, and threatened to kill her. After the rape, accused-appellant gave
her P5.00 and left. Thereafter, she went home. BBB, AAA's father, testified that on September 9,
2005, he noticed that AAA had money. Bothered, because he never gave her money, he asked
her where she got it. AAA revealed that appellant had given her P5.00 every time he raped her.

The appellant presented alibi as a defense. He testified that he could not have raped AAA
on September10, 2005 because he was home that day, in bed with a fever. Also, he contends that
the prosecution failed to prove the date of commission of the offense.

ISSUE:
Did the difference in the testimonies of AAA and BBB regarding the date of commission of
the crime make the information defective?

RULING:
No, the differences in the testimonies of the witness regarding the date of commission of
the crime will not make the information defective on its face.

As pointed out in the rulings of the RTC and the CA, in rape cases, the failure to specify
the exact dates or times of the rape does not ipso facto make the corresponding information
defective on its face. The reason for this is that the date or time of the commission of rape is not a
material ingredient of said crime. At any rate, because AAA positively testified that she was raped
on 10 September 2005, her testimony confirms the date of the rape stated in the information. It is
AAA, not her father, who has personal knowledge of when she was raped. It is her testimony,
therefore, not her father's, that must be given greater weight.

72 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

RAPE VICTIMS MAY HAVE DIFFERENT REACTIONS TO THE SHOCK AND TRAUMA
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT; DELAY IN REPORTING RAPE DOES NOT INDICATE FALSE
ACCUSATION

People of the Philippines vs. Clemeno

G.R. No. 215202; March 14, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an Appeal filed by the accused-appellant Villarin Clemeno assailing the decision of
the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape, defined and penalized under Art. 266-A, par. 1 in relation
to Art. 266-B of the RPC, committed against AAA.

Sometime in 2003, AAA narrated that her father, Clemeno, raped her. Thereafter, accused-
appellant threatened to kill the whole family if she reported the incident. AAA kept silent about the
ordeal because she believed her father was capable of carrying out his threat. Same incident
occurred in 2004 which resulted to AAA's pregnancy. AAA revealed to her mother her ordeal with
the accused-appellant.

Clemeno questioned AAA's credibility and posited that: (1) AAA's act of resistance was
insufficient to prove that the sexual assault was against her will because she did not shout or ask
for help; (2) AAA's delay in reporting the rape, despite several opportunities to do so, was unnatural
and contrary to human experience.

ISSUE:
Is the failure to ask for help and the belated reporting of rape renders the rape charge
doubtful?

RULING:
No, the failure to ask for help and belated reporting of rape do not render the charge
doubtful.

The Court takes judicial notice that rape victims may have different reactions to the shock
and trauma of sexual assault. No standard form of reaction is expected from a victim in the face of
such horrific event, because the workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable. What is essential is that the act was accomplished against the will and despite the
resistance of the victim. The Court has ruled that in rape committed by a father against his own
daughter, the father's parental authority and moral ascendancy over his daughter substitute for
violence and intimidation. Here, AAA testified that she tried to push her father away but was
overpowered. Moreover, in the face of her father's moral ascendancy and parental authority, it is
not contrary to human experience that AAA would resign to her father's wicked deeds.

On the issue of delay in reporting the incident, it is settled that long silence and delay in
reporting the crime of rape are not necessarily indications of false accusation and cannot be taken
against the victim unless the delay or inaction in revealing its commission is unreasonable and
unexplained. Here, AAA offered a reasonable explanation for her long silence - she was afraid that
her father would carry his threat to kill her family if she reported the incident.

Therefore, the failure to ask for help and belated reporting of rape do not render the charge
doubtful.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

DELAY IN REPORTING AN INCIDENT OF RAPE IS NOT AN INDICATION OF A

FABRICATED CHARGE AND DOES NOT NECESSARILY CAST DOUBT ON THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE COMPLAINANT

People of the Philippines vs. Nuyte

G.R. No. 219111; March 12, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal challenging the decision of CA which affirmed the decision RTC of
Legazpi City, finding appellant Nelson Nuyte guilty of one count of rape and five counts of violation
of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

For the prosecution, it was contended that on April 10, 2004 after tethering the cows, ["A"]
(victim) heard a clapping sound. On her way home, appellant Nuyte appeared, grabbed her by the
hair, pointed a knife at her, warned her not to tell her mother, or else he will kill them both. Nuyte
forced ["A"] to the ground, removed her undergarment and his, inserted his penis into her vagina.
After ejaculating, he left. The same act was committed on April 12, 14 and 19, 2004 where [“A’]
tried to make an outcry but nobody heard. On May 3 and 6, 2004, Nuyte again succeeded in his
dastardly acts which caused [“A’] to decide to tell everything to her mother despite the threats.

As for the defense, it was only in December 2003 that Nuyte met ["A"] when the latter
introduced herself to him and they eventually became a couple. There was consensual sex
admitted by Nuyte which usually occurred at noontime in the same grassy place. As he further
contended that it was unnatural for the mother not to take action upon learning of the rape of her
daughter and the absence of the physical injury was enough to prove she was not forced to lie on
the grassy ground.

ISSUE:
Did the delay in reporting rape incident belie the claim of rape?

RULING:
No. Delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be
taken against the victim because delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of a
fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant.

"No standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement,
particularly a child who could not be expected to fully comprehend the ways of an adult. People
react differently to emotional stress and rape victims are no different from them.” Tenacious
resistance against rape is not required; neither is a determined or a persistent physical struggle on
the part of the victim necessary. Rape through intimidation includes the moral kind such as the
fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol. The "sweetheart theory" claimed by
appellant is futile. The only evidence adduced to show such relationship were his testimony and
that of his wife. The alleged love letter supposedly written by "A" was never presented in court.

The Court finds no reason to reverse appellant's conviction for April 10, 2004. “A's" bare
statements that appellant repeated what he had done on her previously were not enough to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the incidents on said dates.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

DELAY IN REPORTING AN INCIDENT OF RAPE IS NOT NECESSARILY AN INDICATION

THAT THE CHARGE IS FABRICATED; EXERTION OF A STRONG MORAL INFLUENCE
OVER ONE’S DAUGHTER MAY SUBSTITUTE FOR ACTUAL PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND
INTIMIDATION

People of the Philippines vs. Opeña

G.R. No. 220490; March 21, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the appeal of Alfredo Opeña y Baclagon assailing the Decision of the CA
which affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC, finding the appellant guilty of the crime
of rape.

AAA was inside a room when her father, Opeña, suddenly entered, approached her and
forcibly removed her shorts and underwear. After removing her underwear, Opeña inserted his
penis into AAA's vagina. While he was doing this act, AAA kept resisting and crying. Appellant told
AAA to keep quiet or else he will inflict harm upon her.

Opeña contended that the credibility of AAA is doubtful because the alleged incident was
reported after nine years. He also averred that there was no evidence to establish that force and
intimidation was employed by him.

ISSUE:
(1) Is the delay in the reporting of the alleged incident for nine years rendered AAA's
accusation doubtful? and;
(2) Is the element of force and intimidation present so as to establish the guilt of the
accused?

RULING:
(1) No, the delay for nine years does not render the accusation doubtful.

It has been repeatedly ruled by the Court that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not
necessarily an indication that the charge is fabricated, particularly when the delay can be attributed
to fear instilled by threats from one who exercises ascendancy over the victim. In People v.
Coloma, the Court considered an eight-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by the
victim's father as an understandable and insufficient to render the complaint of the 13-year old
daughter incredible. In the present case, the inaction of AAA is understandable and may even be
expected as she was scared due to the threat on her and her mother if she would divulge the
incident done to her.

(2) Yes, the element of force or intimidation is present considering that the appellant, being
the biological father or AAA, undoubtedly exerted a strong moral influence over her which may
substitute for actual physical violence and intimidation.

Hence, the delay in the reporting does not render the accusation doubtful and the element
of force and intimidation in this case was established.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF RELATIVES AT THE SCENE OF THE RAPE DOES NOT
NEGATE THE COMMISSION OF SUCH CRIME

People of the Philippines vs. Primavera

G.R. No. 223138; July 5, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC convicting
accused-appellant Ricky Primavera of rape.

AAA, who was 16 years old then, was sleeping alone in their living room while AAA’s
mother, BBB and her siblings were sleeping in their store adjacent to the living room. AAA was
suddenly awakened by the voice of Primavera who, strangling her with a cord, proceeded to have
carnal knowledge with her. Primavera further threatened to kill AAA, her siblings and mother if she
would report the incident.

Primavera argues that it was impossible for him to consummate the crime considering the
proximity between the room of AAA’s mother and siblings and the living room, where AAA was
allegedly raped.

ISSUE:
Does the close proximity of relatives at the scene of the rape negate the commission of the
crime?

RULING:
No, the close proximity of relatives at the scene does not negate the crime of rape.

The close proximity of relatives at the scene of the rape does not negate the commission
of the crime. It has always been held that rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are
other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping.
It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the victim's family to be in deep slumber and
not to be awakened while a sexual assault is being committed. Lust is no respecter of time and
place.

In the case at bar, the fact of close proximity between the room of the victim’s mother and
siblings and the scene of the rape does not negate the fact of commission of the crime of rape,
such crime having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

76 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

EVEN IF THE APPELLANT DID NOT PERSONALLY HAVE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE

WITH THE VICTIM, HIS ACTS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED A COMMON DESIGN TO
HAVE CARNAL KNOWLEDGE WITH THE VICTIM

People of the Philippines vs. Cariat

G.R. No. 223565; June 18, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal to the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC of
Davao City finding accused-appellant guilty for the crime of rape of AAA, his neighbor.

AAA testified that she was invited by the defendants to join in their drinking spree. However,
after taking several shots, she felt dizzy and intoxicated. Magbanta punched her and warned her
not to resist or else he would kill her, while the appellant held a knife pointed it at her. Thereafter,
appellant helped Magbanta, Pal, and Cutacte in restraining "AAA" and in dragging her to a
secluded grassy area. He also pointed a knife at "AAA" and held her while Magbanta inserted his
penis into "AAA's" vagina. "AAA" recalled that appellant, Pal, and Cutacte were all laughing as
they watched what was happening. Of the four accused, only appellant was arrested and brought
under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Appellant Cariat averred that the RTC erred in convicting him of rape in view of the
prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the failure to establish the
existence of a conspiracy.

ISSUE:
Was the accused-appellant guilty of rape, even without having carnal knowledge with the
victim?

RULING:
Yes. To secure a conviction for rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC, the prosecution must
prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act
through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or was demented.

Nonetheless, the Court established the presence of conspiracy. There is conspiracy "when
the acts of the accused demonstrate a common design towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful purpose." Unmistakably, appellant concurred in the criminal design to rape "AAA." While
appellant did not personally have sexual intercourse with "AAA," the acts of appellant, Magbanta,
Pal, and Cutacte clearly demonstrated a common design to have carnal knowledge of "AAA." Since
there was conspiracy among appellant, Magbanta, Pal, and Cutacte, the act of one was the act of
all making them equally guilty of the crime of rape against "AAA”.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

MERE PRESENCE OF FORCE OR INTIMIDATION IS A SUFFICIENT ELEMENT TO

ESTABLISH RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Banayat

G.R. No. 215749; March 14, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by the accused-appellant Danny Banayat assailing the Decision of
the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape, defined and penalized under Art. 266-a, par. 1, in relation to Art. 266-B of the RPC,
committed against AAA.

Banayat, armed with a knife, forcibly dragged AAA towards an abandoned house and there
she was ordered to remove her clothes. Banayat placed his body on top of her and forcibly inserted
his penis repeatedly into her vagina. Banayat threatened to kill AAA if she reported the incident to
anyone. The next day, however, AAA revealed it to her grandmother because she was not feeling
well.

Banayat contended that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the
element of force or intimidation was not established to be irresistible. AAA merely narrated that the
accused was armed with a bladed weapon which was a knife, but the manner as to how the knife
was used to threaten her was not revealed.

ISSUE:
Should the element of force or intimidation be irresistible so as to hold the accused guilty
of crime of rape?

RULING:
No, the element of force or intimidation need not be irresistible.

Citing People v. Bayani, it must be emphasized that force as an element of rape need not
be irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all
considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. Intimidation includes
the moral kind as the fear is caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol.

It can be gleaned from AAA's testimony that accused-appellant's possession of a knife —

coupled by the fact that he had covered her mouth when she attempted to shout for help, forcibly
dragged her to an abandoned house, and AAA's observation that accused-appellant was strong
even when drunk — instilled fear that he would kill or injure her if she did not yield to his demands,
such that AAA need not categorically describe how he communicated fear to her, contrary to
accused-appellant's insistence.

Hence, the presence of force and intimidation is undeniable.

78 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE FACT THAT A MAN AND A WOMAN WERE LIVING IN THE SAME HOUSE IS NOT
ENOUGH TO RULE OUT THE BESTIAL ACT OF FORCED SEXUAL INTERCOURSE

People of the Philippines vs. Bongbonga

G.R. No. 214771; August 9, 2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC convicting
accused-apellant Ruben Bongbonga of rape and acts of lasciviousness.

Accused, wielding a "balisong", forcibly had carnal knowledge with AAA, then sixteen (16)
years old in different occasions.

Pleading his innocence, Ruben denied the accusations against him on the claim that he
and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual encounters were consensual. AAA argues that
she is merely living with the accused out of fear of her father and that she and the accused were
not lovers prior to the incidents

ISSUE:
Is mere cohabitation an evidence of consent to sexual intercourse that negates the crime
of rape?

RULING:
No, the fact that a man and a woman live in the same house is not enough to rule out the
bestial act of forced sexual intercourse.

Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be substantiated by the
accused with convincing proof. Here, the fact of cohabitation is immaterial to the charge of rape as
it only took place after the alleged incidents. Even if he and the victim were really sweethearts,
such a fact would not necessarily establish consent. It has been consistently ruled that "a love
affair does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually violated against her will." The fact
that a woman voluntarily goes out on a date with her lover does not give him unbridled license to
have sex with her against her will. Even a husband has no ownership over his wife's body by
reason of marriage, for in assenting to marital union, the wife does not divest herself of her right to
exclusive autonomy over her own body. Hence, a married woman can give or withhold her consent
to sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in
case of her refusal.

In this case, contrary to Ruben's assertions, any consent implied from the fact of
cohabitation is dispelled by AAA's express declarations that she was forced against her will to live
with Ruben out of fear of her father.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FAILURE OF THE VICTIM TO RESIST THE SEXUAL ASSAULT DOES NOT NEGATE
RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Antonio

G.R. No. 223113; February 19, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
On appeal is the Decision of the CA finding appellant Marcelo Antonio (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

Accused Marcelo Antonio was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Marcelo Antonio, together with Augusto Gonzales and Esmenio Pader, Jr. invited the victim
“AAA” to go with them to the house of one Uncle Viano. “AAA” refused. Antonio, Gonzales and
Pader dragged “AAA” pinned her down and punched her. The three took turns inserting their penis
in “AAA’s” vagina. They warned “AAA” not to tell her parents. When Pader inserted his penis in
“AAA’s” vagina, “AAA” cried. One Lorna Pascua heard the cries and asked for assistance. Only
Antonio was apprehended. The medical examination of “AAA” yielded the following results:
multiple lacerations surrounding the hymen, bleeding, and presence of spermatozoa.

Antonio argued that he discovered Gonzales on top of “AAA.” Because of this, an

unidentified person hit him and held a knife to his neck. He was also stabbed in his left hand. Upon
the arrival of the police, Antonio confessed to the rape under duress. He also argued that “AAA’s”
failure to resist the assault should militate her credibility in claiming that she was raped.

ISSUE:
Does the failure of the victim to resist sexual assault negate rape?

RULING:
No, the failure of a victim to shout for help does not negate rape.

There is no specific behavior that can be expected of a person being raped. Physical
resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust
of an accused; it is not an essential element of rape.

It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit,
because when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity

The CA further held that there was greater reason to believe the veracity of "AAA's"
statements since her testimony was corroborated by the testimony of the physician who examined
her after the commission of the rape and the Medico-Legal Certificate he issued which showed
that "AAA" sustained hymenal lacerations and bleeding and the presence of spermatozoa in her
genitals.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FORCE OR VIOLENCE THAT IS REQUIRED IN RAPE CASES IS RELATIVE; WHEN

APPLIED, IT NEED NOT BE OVERPOWERING OR IRRESISTIBLE

People of the Philippines vs. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 219088; June 13, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding
accused appellant Ronnie Dela Cruz guilty the crime of Rape.

The victim in this case, AAA is a 14-year old who claims to have been raped by the
accused. According AAA, she and BBB, her 17-year old aunt were having a drinking spree in the
house of BBB’s boyfriend. Later, BBB asked Dela Cruz to let AAA sleep in his house since AAA
did not want to go home yet. Upon arrival at Dela Cruz’s house, the accused showed AAA an unlit
room where AAA could stay in. Dela Cruz followed her inside and committed the dastardly act.
Afraid that Dela Cruz would repeat the act, AAA stayed with him until 6AM that morning. Eventually,
she told her aunt about the ordeal who informed her mother about it. The medical examination
yielded fresh lacerations found in AAA’s vagina. Hence an information for rape was filed against
the accused.

Dela Cruz claims that he could not remember what transpired that night but claims that if
something happened to him and the victim, it was consensual. Dela Cruz argues that AAA's
testimony was insufficient to establish that he exerted force to have sex with her. He explains that
his act of following her into the room and kissing her hardly constitutes force.

ISSUE:
Does the victim in rape cases need to prove irresistible resistance to convict the accused
of rape?

RULING:
No. In rape, the victim need not prove resistance because it is not an element of rape and
the lack thereof does not render the victim's act voluntary.

In People v. Joson, the Court expounded that the force required in rape varies depending
on the circumstances, to wit: The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that force or violence
that is required in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible.
That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The parties' relative age, size
and strength should be taken into account in evaluating the existence of the element of force in
the crime of rape. The degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is an adult may be
more than enough if employed against a person of tender age.

Here, AAA verbally and physically manifested her resistance towards Dela Cruz's
advances — at one point she even cried. Nonetheless, he persisted and ultimately consummated
his desire to have carnal knowledge of her. The degree of force he employed becomes immaterial
in view of AAA's minority and the fact that her intoxication impaired her physical strength.

AAA's testimony was straightforward and categorical as she never flinched in describing
what happened to her and in identifying Dela Cruz as the one who did it. Further, AAA's failure to
shout for help or to offer spirited physical resistance cannot be used as basis to damage her
credibility. In rape cases, there is no expected uniform reaction from the victim considering that the
workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. Her urgency in
reporting the incident to the authorities strengthens her credibility.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FORCE, THREAT, OR INTIMIDATION, AS AN ELEMENT OF RAPE, NEED NOT BE

IRRESISTIBLE, BUT JUST ENOUGH TO BRING ABOUT DESIRED RESULTS

People of the Philippines vs. Ganaba

G.R. No. 219240; April 4, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the accused-appellant Bryan Ganaba y Nam-ay assailing the Decision
of the CA affirming with modification as to award of damages, the decision of the RTC finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC.

AAA has been working in the house of the Ganaba as nanny to the latter’s four-month old
child. While AAA was inside the room feeding the child, Ganaba sneaked in and closed the door
and window. When AAA turned, Ganaba held both her arms and mounted her. AAA tried to fight
and escape but failed to do so. Then Ganaba poked the knife at AAA, threatened to kill her,
dragged her to the bed, mounted her, parted her legs, and inserted his penis to her vagina. After
the incident, AAA immediately left for her brother's house and reported it to the police station.

The accused contends that on 1 July 2009, at about 2:30 p.m., the accused-appellant was
at home with his wife Jane, their son Edison, and a boarder named Erickson. He was watching
television. The accused-appellant claimed that the accusation against him was not true and that
he was implicated by AAA to ask for money.

ISSUE:
Is the force, threat or intimidation as an element of rape required to be irresistible?

RULING:
No, the element of force, threat or intimidation as an element of rape is not required to be
irresistible.

For a successful prosecution of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said
act was accomplished: (a) through the use of force and intimidation, or (b) when the victim is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is
demented. Jurisprudence tells that the act of holding a knife by itself is strongly suggestive of force
or at least intimidation; and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring a woman to
submission, although the victim does not even need to prove resistance. Force, threat, or
intimidation, as an element of rape, need not be irresistible, but just enough to bring about desired
results.

The evidence of the prosecution validates the conclusion that the accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation. AAA narrated that despite her
efforts to escape from the room after the accused-appellant pinned her arms, mounted her, and
pinched her shoulder, he was able to get hold of a knife that he used to threaten her.

Therefore, CA is correct in holding Ganaba guilty of the crime of rape.

82 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FAILURE TO SHOUT OR OFFER TENACIOUS RESISTANCE DOES NOT MAKE

VOLUNTARY THE VICTIM'S SUBMISSION TO THE PERPETRATOR'S LUST

People of the Philippines vs. Napoles

G.R. No. 215200; July 26, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding
accused-appellant Nomerto Napoles guilty of six counts of rape.

AAA, then nineteen (19) years old at the time of the incident, testified that her stepfather,
accused Napoles, raped her six (6) in different occasions. AAA’s medical examination report
shows that the victim had successive penetrations because of the old healed lacerations due to
constant use or possible sexual intercourses.

Napoles contended that there was no showing that she defended her honor and dignity
with utmost courage and determination. Hence, he avers that AAA's silence and lack of showing
of any outrage place her story in grievous doubt.

ISSUE:
Does the victim’s failure to offer tenacious resistance bar the conviction of the accused for
the crime of rape?

RULING:
No, failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s
submission to the perpetrator's lust.

The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force
or intimidation or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or (c) when
the victim is under 12 years of age or demented.

The appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA because his penis penetrated her vagina. That
the carnal knowledge was accomplished through force and intimidation was likewise established
in view of AAA’s straightforward testimony that she was threatened with death; furthermore, he
used a bolo and knife, as well as physical violence to accomplish his bestial acts. It must be noted
that failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission
to the perpetrator's lust. Besides, physical resistance is not an element of rape. Moreover, a rape
victim is oftentimes controlled by fear rather than reason. The use of a knife and bolo and the threat
of death posed by appellant constituted sufficient force and intimidation to cow AAA into
submission. Furthermore, appellant, who is AAA’s stepfather, undoubtedly exerted a strong moral
influence over AAA, which may even substitute for actual physical violence and intimidation.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

MORAL INFLUENCE OR ASCENDANCY BY CLOSE KIN TAKES THE PLACE OF

VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION IN THE CRIME OF RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Deloso

G.R. No. 215194; December 14, 2017
Leonardo-DeCastro, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by the accused-appellant Ronaldo Deloso y Bagares from the CA
Decision affirming the RTC decision convicting him of one count of qualified rape.

AAA, 13 years of age, was sleeping along with her sibling when she was awakened by
Deloso, who was the live-in partner of her mother for five years. Deloso removed AAA’s shirt and
panty, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She did not shout but wrestled against him who held
her both hands. While on top of her, Deloso warned not to tell her mother of the incident.

Deloso admitted that he inserted his finger into AAA’s vagina that night while AAA was
lying down. Anent the element of force, threat or intimidation, Deloso claims that the same was not
fully established in the testimony of AAA and he was not even armed with any weapon with which
to threaten AAA.

ISSUE:
May an accused be convicted of qualified rape despite the absence of showing of the
element of force, threat or intimidation?

RULING:
Yes, an accused may be convicted of qualified rape despite the absence of showing of the
element of force, threat or intimidation.

For a charge of rape to prosper under Art. 266-A of the RPC, the prosecution must prove
that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act
through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or was demented.

Applying the elements, both the RTC and the CA found that the element of carnal
knowledge had been duly established by the testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution. On
the element of force, threat or intimidation, it is a settled rule that in cases where the rape is
committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse
of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. Under Art. 266-B of the RPC, the minority
of a rape victim and her relationship to the offender qualify the charge of rape.

The fact that AAA was only 13 years old when the rape incident occurred on September
16, 2009 was established by her Certificate of Live Birth that was offered in evidence. As to the
relationship of AAA to Deloso, the defense already stipulated on the fact that Deloso is the
common-law spouse of AAA's mother and he likewise admitted this fact when he testified in court.

84 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN CASES WHERE THE RAPE IS COMMITTED BY A RELATIVE SUCH AS A FATHER,

STEPFATHER, UNCLE, OR COMMON-LAW SPOUSE, MORAL INFLUENCE OR
ASCENDANCY TAKES THE PLACE OF VIOLENCE

People of the Philippines vs. EEE

G.R. No. 227185; September 27, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the decision
of the RTC finding accused EEE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape committed
against his minor stepdaughter, AAA.

AAA testified that one morning as she was about to take a bath and already preparing
her things, her stepfather, accused-appellant EEE, pulled her and brought her to the bedroom.
He took off her clothes and undressed himself. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. He
threatened her not to tell her mother, BBB, about the incident, saying that BBB would scold
and send them to prison.

When the rape incident transpired, BBB left the house, while AAA's brother was
instructed by EEE to go outside. However, BBB almost caught them in the act as she left her
gloves in the house. She confronted EEE and inquired on what they were doing inside the
bedroom. Afraid, AAA said that nothing happened.

EEE denied commission of the crime and interposed the defense that he could not
have committed it due to the fact that he was not already living at the house where the crime
was allegedly committed, and the aggravating circumstance of force, threat or intimidation was
not proven because the consent to perform sexual congress was given before the alleged
threat was made towards AAA.

ISSUE:
Is force, threat or intimidation essential in cases where rape is committed by a relative
such as father, stepfather, uncle, or common-law spouse?

RULING:
No. In cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather,
uncle, or common-law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence.

For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary
elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent, (4) the
victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent
(whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.

EEE's claim that the element of force, threat or intimidation is wanting in his case has
no merit.

x x x A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape

liability by shifting the blame on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual
abuse. However, this Court has recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be
expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of
the victim to shout or seek help does not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not
imply that the victim has consented to the sexual act, especially when that person was
intimidated into submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is committed by
a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common-law spouse, moral influence
or ascendancy takes the place of violence.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN INCESTUOUS RAPE OF A MINOR, THE MORAL ASCENDANCY OF THE ASCENDANT

SUBSTITUTES FOR THE ELEMENT OF FORCE OR INTIMIDATION

People of the Philippines vs. Bugna

G.R. No. 218255; April 11, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision finding accused-appellant, Jerry Bugna y Britanico guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of qualified rape defined and penalized under Art. 266-B (1) of the RPC.

AAA and her four siblings were about to go sleep when Bugna arrived drunk. While they
were sleeping, AAA felt her father removing her shorts and inserted his fingers into her vagina.
Unsatisfied, he inserted his penis into her vagina. Another act of rape was committed against AAA.

Bugna argued that he cannot be held guilty of through force and intimidation because it
was never mentioned whether he had a weapon to threaten AAA with.

ISSUE:
Is CA correct in ruling that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape notwithstanding the fact that it was never mentioned whether the accused had a
weapon to threaten the victim?

RULING:
Yes, Bugna is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape.

There is qualified rape when a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by

consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the victim has
carnal knowledge with a minor through force, threat or intimidation. In other words, the element of
qualified rape is as follows: (a) there is sexual congress; (b) with a woman; (c) done by force and
without consent; (d) the victim is a minor at the time of the rape; and (e) offender is a parent
(whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.

The elements are all present in this case. Sexual congress was proven through the physical
examination conducted to AAA. Rape was done through force and intimidation. The contention of
Bugna regarding the absence of a weapon to show force and intimidation is unwarranted. The
court emphasized that in incest rape of a minor, the moral ascendancy of the ascendant substitutes
force or intimidation. In the present case, actual force and intimidation need not be present to
convict Bugna with rape. It was proven that AAA was a minor and the offender, Bugna, is the father
of AAA.

Therefore, CA is correct in finding Bugna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT ACTUAL FORCE AND INTIMIDATION BE EMPLOYED IN

RAPE COMMITTED BY A CLOSE KIN; MORAL INFLUENCE AND ASCENDANCY TAKES
ITS PLACE

People of the Philippines vs. Amar

G.R. No. 223513; July 5, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming with modification the decision of the
RTC finding accused-appellant Alex Amar guilty of rape.

AAA who was then 16 years old was sleeping in her room when she was roused from her
sleep as she felt somebody touching her breast, who turned out to be the accused-appellant Alex
Amar, her own father. Amar then proceeded to have sex with her. It is shown that the molestations
started when AAA was in Grade 6 and repeated 10 times a month. After being silent for some time,
AAA narrated her ordeal to her aunt, DDD. The following day, the eldest sister of the accused,
likewise confided to DDD that the accused was sexually molesting her.

The accused, aside from interposing the defense of denial and alibi, insists that AAA’s
failure to immediately report the rape incident is not the normal behaviour of a minor girl who had
been previously assaulted.

ISSUES:
(1) Is actual force or intimidation necessary to constitute rape if committed by a close kin?
and;
(2) Is the victim’s failure to immediately report the crime of rape favorable to the accused?

RULING:
No, in both cases.

In rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the
common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be
employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation which then
be a qualifying circumstance. Furthermore, different people react differently to a given situation
involving a startling occurrence. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress
are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still others
may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion

Accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against the latter's will through force and
intimidation. It has been previously held that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate
a story that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her
charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her father. That legal dictum finds
application in this case since accused-appellant did not allege nor prove any sufficient improper
motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of such a serious charge of raping his own flesh
and blood. Lastly, the harrowing incident experienced by AAA in the hands of her own father would
negate any reasonable standard form of reaction on a rape victim.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

LACERATION, WHETHER HEALED OR FRESH, IS THE BEST PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF

RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Manaligod

G.R. No. 218584; April 25, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of CA that affirmed the decision of the RTC finding the
accused, Dennis “Kulot” Manaligod guilty of statutory rape for raping AAA.

The victim, AAA is an 8-year-old girl who claimed that accused Dennis “Kulot” Manaligod
had sexual intercourse with her. The crime was allegedly committed by accused when the victim
was sent by her mother, BBB to borrow a cellphone charger. AAA came back with the charger and
PHP 20.00. BBB asked AAA where the money came from and the victim explained that the money
came from “Kulot”. After further inquiry, the victim claimed that Kulot repeatedly inserted his penis
into her vagina. AAA was immediately examined and medical examination found healed
lacerations in AAA’s vagina.

Accused denied liability and claims that he must be acquitted based on the inconsistencies
on the testimony of the witnesses and that the medical findings yielded that the lacerations were
old even if BBB was allegedly raped on the same day.

ISSUE:
Can the accused be convicted of the crime of statutory rape despite the fact that the
medical examination found that the lacerations of the victim had already healed?

RULING:
Yes. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of
age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or
consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence
of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. To convict an
accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (a) the age
of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the
accused and the complainant.

As evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth, AAA was only eight (8) years old at the time
she was sexually molested. Inside the courtroom, AAA identified accused-appellant as her rapist.
Thus, the remaining element of statutory rape which needed to be established is carnal knowledge
between accused-appellant and AAA. AAA's narration was likewise corroborated by Dr. Lorenzo's
medical findings as to the existence of hymenal laceration. When the testimony of a rape victim is
consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal
knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration.

In this case, accused-appellant failed to impeach the credible and straightforward

testimony of AAA considering that he did not even bother to present any evidence in his defense.
All told, the prosecution has successfully established the elements of statutory rape.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

EXISTENCE OF HYMENAL LACERATIONS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF RAPE.

People of the Philippines vs. Ramirez

G.R. No. 219863; March 6, 2018.
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
Assailed in this appeal is the Decision of the CA finding appellant Richard Ramirez y
Tulunghari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness.

AAA, neighbor of Ramirez, was then only six years old when she was raped and molested
by the accused. Ramirez was also a good friend of AAA’s uncle and would frequently spend the
night in their home. One night, Ramirez placed himself on top of AAA and removed her pajamas
and underwear. He licked her vagina and then inserted his penis into it. Because of the pain, AAA
cried. Ramirez threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. About a month later, AAA was
awakened by her uncle’s scream. Ramirez was standing at the corner of the house with her
underwear at his feet. AAA instantly wore her shorts, ran and embraced her uncle.

AAA, her grandparents and her uncles, went to the police to report what happened. The
medico legal examination of the private organ of AAA revealed no laceration in her hymen.

Ramirez denied the accusations. He claimed that the absence of lacerations on "AAA’s"
hymen negated sexual intercourse.

ISSUE:
Does the absence of hymenal lacerations refute the occurrence of rape?

RULING:
No, the absence of hymenal lacerations does refute the occurrence of rape.

To convict an accused of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: 1) the age of the
complainant; 2) the identity of the accused; and 3) the sexual intercourse between the accused
and the complainant. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12
years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. The absence of free
consent in cases of statutory rape is conclusively presumed and as such, proof of force,
intimidation or consent is immaterial.

The rupture of the hymen is not an essential and material fact in rape cases; it only further
confirms that the vagina has been penetrated and damaged in the process. The CA correctly
pointed out, the Initial Medico-Legal Report itself stated that although there was "no evident injury
at the time of examination," the "medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse.”

Thus, accused appellant is guilty of the crime charged.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FINDINGS OF HYMENAL LACERATION ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE FOR A

CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Panes

G.R. No. 215730; September 11, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
Melchor Panes appeals from the decision of the CA finding him guilty of three (3) counts
of qualified rape.

"AAA" testified on the three occasions when she was ravished by her father. She narrated
that on September 22, 2003, after her father assisted her mother in giving birth, the former went
upstairs where she was sleeping together with her siblings. Sensing that somebody was holding
her thigh, "AAA" woke up and saw her father. Appellant held her thigh, removed her panty, and
then embraced her. "AAA," although afraid, tried to remove appellant's hold on her thigh but was
unsuccessful. Appellant then undressed and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. "AAA"
felt pain.

Three days later, appellant again raped "AAA." According to "AAA," she and her father
were on their way home and while passing by a creek, appellant pushed her towards a big rock,
removed her clothes, inserted his penis into her vagina, then made push and pull movements.
"AAA" was shocked as she was not expecting her father to rape her in such a place.The third
ravishment was committed inside their house. Appellant first embraced "AAA" then pushed her to
the floor. "AAA" tried to resist but her effort proved futile. Appellant succeeded in removing her
panty and inserted his penis into her vagina.

The appellant argued that the examining physician found no external laceration, swelling,
or hematoma on private complainant AAA's external genitalia; and, there is doubt as to whether
she fully understood the meaning of what she testified on.

ISSUE:
Does the accused’s contention that no external laceration, swelling, or hematoma was
found on private complainant AAA's genitalia deserve credit?

RULING:
No. In any case, it bears emphasis that hymenal laceration is not an element of rape.

Otherwise stated, the presence of lacerations in the victim's vagina is not necessary to
prove rape. It is not necessary to show that the victim had a reddening of the external genitalia or
sustained a hematoma on other parts of her body to sustain the possibility of a rape charge.

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the
elements of qualified rape. In rape cases, the relationship of the victim to the accused and the
minority of the victim are special qualifying circumstances which must be alleged and proved by
the prosecution. These were clearly established by the prosecution by the presentation of the birth
certificate of the minor victim showing that AAA was born on 16 January 1991 and that her father
is Melchor Panes; this was not rebutted by the defense. It is beyond cavil that appellant had carnal
knowledge of "AAA" on three separate occasions and the same were committed through force,
threat, or intimidation. Appellant also used his moral ascendancy to cow "AAA" to submit to his
bestial desires.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

CARNAL KNOWLEDGE WITH A WOMAN WHO IS A MENTAL RETARDATE IS RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Martinez

G.R. No. 226394; March 7, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by Raul Martinez (Martinez) and Lito Granada (Granada) seeking
the reversal of the Decision rendered by the CA convicting the accused-appellants of the crime of
Rape under Art. 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC, as amended.

AAA narrated that while she was cooking at her home, Martinez dragged AAA to a bushy
area where his co-accused Granada was waiting. Both men forced AAA to lie down, undressed
her, and thereafter took turns in having sexual intercourse. This was corroborated by his son, BBB.
As a result of rape, AAA became pregnant. Martinez acknowledged that he was the father and
even offered support. During trial, Yolita Gallo (Gallo), a social worker, and Anna Alvez (Alvez), a
psychologist, testified on the impaired mental condition of AAA revealing that the latter is suffering
from a Mild Mental Retardation. On the other hand, Martinez narrated that they were sweethearts
who engaged in a sexual intercourse.

RTC held the accused guilty of Rape which Decision was affirmed by the CA, refusing to
give credence to the sweetheart defense. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Is carnal knowledge with a woman who is a mental retardate rape?

RULING:
Yes, the prosecution sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused.

To sustain a conviction for rape through sexual intercourse, the following must be proven:
(a) carnal knowledge, and (b) that the said act was accomplished through use of force or
intimidation, when the victim is deprived of reason or is unconscious, by fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority or when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.

Parenthetically, jurisprudence holds that "carnal knowledge with a woman who is a mental
retardate is rape." This stems from the fact that "a mental condition of retardation deprives the
complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial assault on her chastity and womanhood."
Consequently, sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is
incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already constitutes rape. This is true regardless of the
presence or absence of resistance. Only the fact of sexual congress between the accused and the
victim, as well, as the latter's mental retardation must be proven.

In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused-appellants successively had carnal knowledge with AAA on September 13, 2000, by
taking turns in inserting their penis into her vagina, against her will and without her consent. In fact,
AAA narrated the harrowing details of her defilement. Therefore, herein accused is guilty of the
crime of Rape beyond reasonable doubt.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE OFFENDER MUST HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MENTAL RETARDATION OF THE

VICTIM TO BE LIABLE FOR STATUTORY RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Niebres

G.R. No. 230975; December 4, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal assailing the decision of the Court of Appeal affirming the
decision of the RTC of Camarines Sur finding the accused guilty of qualified rape.

The accused, Niebres, with his family went to the house of his parents-in-law for the palay
harvesting. After the harvest, Niebres went drinking with his father-in law and brother-in-law, and
he went home by midnight. He went directly to the room where his family and AAA, his wife’s sister,
is sleeping, and laid beside AAA. AAA suddenly woke up and noticed that Niebres is kissing her.
Niebres continued to remove her shorts and successfully had carnal knowledge of her against her
will. AAA was sixteen years old but with the mental capacity of a nine-year-old.

ISSUE:
Is the conviction of qualified rape proper?

RULING:
No. Niebres is only guilty of simple rape.

Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of
the crime of rape is a special qualifying circumstance, which makes it punishable by death. Such
must be alleged and proved during trial.

In this case, knowledge of Niebres of the mental retardation of AAA was alleged, but no
supporting evidence was adduced by the prosecution.

The fact that Niebres did not dispute AAA’s mental retardation during trial is insufficient to
qualify the crime of rape, since it does not necessarily create moral certainty that he knew of her
disability at the time of its commission. Moreover, the victim’s mental retardation was not externally
manifest, becoming noticeable only after the required psychological test.

By and large, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Niebres was
aware of AAA’s mental disability at the time he committed the crime. Thus, Niebres should only be
convicted of simple rape.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCUSED OF THE VICTIM’S MENTAL RETARDATION

MUST BE ALLEGED IN ORDER FOR RAPE TO BE QUALIFIED

People of the Philippines vs. Urmaza

G.R. No. 219957. April 4, 2018
Martirez, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the CA decision which affirmed the RTC finding accused-appellant
Eleuterio Urmaza y Torres guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape.

AAA, a demented person, recounted that she was visited by Urmaza one morning. AAA
prepared coffee for Urmaza and after he had drunk the coffee, AAA asked him to leave as he was
about to sleep. Urmaza did not leave; instead, he closed the door and windows and raped AAA.
During the trial, Dr. Caoile testified that according to the Psychiatric Evaluation Report, AAA
suffered from mental retardation and did not know the idea of safety.

Urmaza asserted AAA was not a mental retardate because she was able to prepare coffee
for him and that she was able to narrate her alleged ordeal with clarity of thought and precision.

ISSUE:
Should the information allege the accused’s knowledge of the mental retardation of the
victim in order for him to be convicted of qualified rape by reason of mental retardation?

RULING:
Yes, the information must allege the accused’s knowledge of the mental retardation of the
victim in order for him to be convicted of qualified rape by reason of mental retardation.

The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or
intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.

While the crime of rape can be qualified by the fact that AAA is mentally retarded, Urmaza
cannot be convicted with qualified rape. Indeed, the knowledge of the offender of the victim's
mental disability at the time of commission of rape qualifies the crime. Nevertheless, the offender's
knowledge of such mental disability was not properly alleged. There was no averment in the
Amended Information stating that Urmaza knew of AAA's mental retardation during the
commission of the rape. It appears that the tribunals a quo lost sight of the precondition that an
allegation in the Information of such knowledge of the offender is necessary, as a crime can only
be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. A contrary ruling would result in denial of
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and hence, a denial of due
process.

Hence, Urmaza is not guilty of qualified rape.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THERE IS QUALIFIED RAPE WHEN THE VICTIM IS BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE AND
THE OFFENDER IS AN ASCENDANT OR RELATIVE BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY
WITHIN THE THIRD CIVIL DEGREE

People of the Philippines vs. Udtohan

G.R. No. 228887; August 2, 2017
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC convicting
accused-appellant Dominador Udtohan of the crimes of Statutory Rape under Art. 266-A (1)(d) of
the RPC and Violation of Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.

11-year old AAA together with her mother, BBB, and two siblings lived in appellant
Dominador Udtohan’s house who was the brother of their father. While on their way to buy some
bananas, appellant suddenly dragged AAA to a vacant lot and he inserted his penis inside AAA’s
vagina. Consequently, appellant continued in sexually abusing AAA almost every day at the same
place. One evening, appellant caressed and touched AAA’s vagina. On the following day, she
revealed her ordeal to her teacher who was then suspicious of her odd behaviour. On the same
day, appellant’s live-in-partner disclosed to BBB that she saw him insert his finger into AAA’s
vagina.

Udtohan denied the accusations against him claiming that the charges were fabricated by
BBB and that BBB was coaching her children to testify against him and that she threatened to
physically harm them should they refuse to follow her.

ISSUE:
Does minority of the victim and ascendancy of the offender qualify the crime of rape?

RULING:
Yes, minority of the victim and ascendancy of the offender qualify the rape committed.

Under Art. 266-B of the RPC, there is qualified rape when the victim is below 18 years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

It is apparent from the testimony of AAA that she suffered sexual abuses. Accused used
and inserted his penis in her vagina which caused her tremendous pain and injuries. After
satisfying his lust, he made threats and intimidation against AAA, which caused her to suffer silently
in fear until she finally disclosed her ordeal to her teacher. Further, AAA was only eleven (11) years
old at the time of the rape incident, as evidenced by her birth certificate. Moreover, the medico-
legal report showed the presence of deep-healed lacerations showing blunt penetrating trauma.
Furthermore, the crime committed by accused must be qualified since he was the paternal uncle
of AAA, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN STATUTORY RAPE CASES, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE AGE OF THE VICTIM IS

PROVEN AND THAT THERE WAS SEXUAL INTERCOURSE REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER THERE WAS FORCE, THREAT, OR INTIMIDATION OR GRAVE ABUSE OF
AUTHORITY

People of the Philippines vs. Ronquillo

G.R. No. 214762; September 20, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
For review is the decision of the CA affirming the decisionof the RTC finding Rommel
Ronquillo guilty of statutory rape.

While going to a friend’s house, AAA saw a man with a red handkerchief under the waiting
shed who approached her and offered to accompany her but she refused. While walking home,
she noticed that someone was following her. When she looked back, a man poked a gun at her
and pushed her against a wall. The man then cocked his gun and told her to calm down, follow
him, or he would shoot her. Afraid that the man would kill her, AAA told him that she would follow
all his orders. Thereafter, the attacker brought AAA to an isolated place and pressed her against
a wall. The man then told her to remove her shorts and panty and to raise her blouse up to her
head so that she would not be able to see him. Then he started kissing AAA all over her body and
then told her to lie down. He parted her thighs, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made push
and pull movements. AAA felt intense pain and cried. Afterwards, the man let AAA up and told her
to get dressed. While the man himself was getting dressed, AAA noticed that the maong pants he
was wearing were the same pants she saw worn by accused-appellant at the waiting shed earlier.
She also recognized accused-appellant as her attacker when the red handkerchief covering his
face fell off. AAA then rushed home and related the rape incident to her parents, who immediately
reported it to the authorities.

The appellant presented alibi as a defense alleging that he attended a barrio fiesta at
Barangay XXX, with six (6) friends. He also claimed that there was no proof of force and
intimidation.

ISSUE:
Is proof of the tender age of the victim sufficient to disregard showing of existence of force
and intimidation in cases of statutory rape?

RULING:
Yes. The elements necessary in every prosecution for statutory rape are: (1) the offended
party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless
of whether there was force, threat, or intimidation or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the
age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. What the law punishes in
statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Hence, force and
intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her
own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed
incapacity to discern evil from good.

The requisite elements were proven in the present case. As to the first element, AAA's age
at the time of the commission of the offense is uncontroverted to be 11 years and 11 months.
AAA's testimony is sufficient to convict accused-appellant of statutory rape. Hence, conviction
should be upheld.

| 95
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

VICTIM’S MENTAL AGE DETERMINES HER CAPACITY TO GIVE CONSENT

People of the Philippines vs. Tayaban

G.R. No. 207666 (Resolution); November 22, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the appeal from the CA affirming with modification the decision of RTC of
Lagawe Ifugao, convicting the accused of the crime of rape.

AAA, a sixteen year old mental retardate, went to the house to his uncle, accused Tayaban.
While she was there, the accused undressed her, and the accused removed his pants. Then the
accused inserted his penis in her vagina many times and bit her breast.

The accused interposed his alibi that he was not in his home during the commission of the
crime.

ISSUE:
Is the accused guilty of the crime of rape against a person under 12 years of age?

RULING:
Yes. AAA’s mental age determines her capacity to give consent.

To sustain a conviction under Art. 266-A(1) of the RPC, it must be shown that a man had
carnal knowledge of a woman, and that said carnal knowledge was under any of the following
circumstances: (1) Through force, threat or intimidation; (2) The victim is deprived of reason; (3)
The victim is unconscious; (4) By means of fraudulent machination; (5) By means of grave abuse
of authority; (6) When the victim is under 12 years of age; or (7) When the victim is demented.

In relation to the requirement that the victim should be under 12 years of age, it is the
victim's mental age that is determinative of her capacity to give consent. The Court has held in
People v. Quintos y Badilla that a person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express
resistance to an adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her
mental age.

A person with a chronological age of 7 years old and has normal mental capacity is as
capable of making decision as with a 35 years old person with a mental age of 7 years old. If a
woman who is older than 12 years but with mental age below 12 years old is raped, the offender
is still liable under Art. 266-A Par. 1(d) of the RPC. Upon examination, AAA who is sixteen years
of age has the mental capacity of a 12 years old. Therefore, accused-appellant is guilty of the crime
of rape.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE TESTIMONY OF AN INNOCENT CHILD WHOSE CHASTITY WAS ABUSED

DESERVES FULL CREDENCE

People of the Philippines vs. Tanglao

G.R. No. 219963; June 13, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by accused-appellant, Ricardo Tanglao from CA affirming the
decision of the RTC, finding him guilty of Statutory Rape.

The victim in this case is the biological daughter of the accused-appellant who at the time
of the commission of the crime was seven years old. The prosecution presented AAA, the victim
and her brother DDD as their witnesses. AAA testified that her father had carnal knowledge of her
while she was attempting to sleep next to her brother DDD. The testimony of AAA was corroborated
by DDD, claiming he heard his sister whimpering, and saw his father doing a forward and backward
motion. Later, his sister (AAA) informed DDD that accused-appellant had raped her. Thereafter,
AAA was able to report the incident to her mother who caused the medical examination of the child
which confirmed that the child could have been raped. Hence an information for statutory rape was
filed against the accused-appellant Ricardo Tanglao.

ISSUE:
Were the testimonies of the victim AAA and her brother DDD enough to convict the
accused-appellant of the crime of statutory rape?

RULING:
Yes. The testimony of a rape victim who is of tender age is credible. The revelation of an
innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. The child's willingness to undergo the trouble and
humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. The same can be
said of her brother DDD who, despite being a minor during the time he took the witness stand,
courageously and credibly testified against the accused-appellant. Most importantly, a review of
AAA's and DDD's respective testimonies proves that neither wavered in their statements despite
the grueling cross-examination by the defense.

The record is bereft of any showing that there was reason for AAA and DDD to falsely
testify against the accused-appellant-appellant, their father. A reading of the testimony of the
accused-appellant would readily establish that AAA had nowhere to go but to him (accused-
appellant) when she left BBB 's (mother of AAA) care as she was allegedly being abused by BBB,
EEE, and Reyes. The accused-appellant was expectedly AAA's only refuge; hence, it was beyond
cognition that she would want him placed behind bars. In the same vein, DDD, who lived with the
accused-appellant, was aware that it would be to his great disadvantage if his father would be
incarcerated; yet, this truth did not deter him from revealing before the RTC what he witnessed. To
stress, DDD was not only a witness to the dastardly act committed by the accused-appellant upon
AAA, but was himself a victim of his father's moral depravity.

Considering, therefore, that there was no showing that the witnesses for the prosecution
had ill motives to testify against accused-appellant-appellant, their testimonies should be accorded
full faith and credence.

| 97
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT UNDER ART. 266-A (2) OF THE RPC IS COMMITTED
WHEN THE ACCUSED INSERTED HIS FINGER INTO THE VICTIM’S VAGINA;
STATUTORY RAPE IS COMMITTED WHEN THE RAPE VICTIM IS A MINOR

People of the Philippines vs. Agoncillo

G.R. No. 229100; November 20, 2017
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA’s decision which affirmed with modification the RTC’s
decision convicting accused-appellant Romeo Agoncillo for three (3) counts of statutory rape under
Art. 266-A(1) in relation to Art. 266-B(1) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 and for one
(1) count of acts of lasciviousness under Sec. 5(B), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610, committed upon the
person of AAA.

In 2001, AAA, who was then nine (9) years old, was in the comfort room when accused-
appellant entered and despite her resistance, accused-appellant inserted his index finger in her
vagina while poking a knife on her side. In 2002, AAA sensed the accused-appellant inserting his
finger in her vagina while she was sleeping. She tried to resist but she felt a knife poking on her
side, and he threatened to kill her if she makes a sound. Accused-appellant also tried to insert his
penis into her vagina but failed. In 2003 while AAA was in the comfort room, accused-appellant
entered, leaned AAA against the wall and inserted his penis into her vagina. He held a knife on his
other hand and again threatened AAA that he will kill her if she tells anybody about the incident. In
2004 sexual abuse allegedly transpired while AAA was in the comfort room.

ISSUE:
Was Agoncillo guilty of 3 counts of Statutory Rape and 1 count of Acts of Lasciviousness
under the given circumstances?

RULING:
No. The Court found accused-appellant guilty of one (1) count of rape by sexual assault;
and two (2) counts of statutory rape.

Rape under Art. 266-A (1) of the RPC is committed by sexual intercourse under any of the
circumstances stated therein. It becomes statutory rape when the offender has carnal knowledge
against a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent. Rape by sexual assault under
Art. 266-A (2) of the RPC is committed when there is an insertion of the penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person's genital or anal orifice and
any of the circumstances enumerated in Art. 266-A(1) is present.

The Court finds that accused-appellant committed the crime of rape by sexual assault
under Art. 266-A (2) of the RPC in 2001. Contrary to the findings of the CA and the RTC, there
was no carnal knowledge because it was his finger that was inserted in her vagina. In 2002 and
2003, the Court finds that accused-appellant committed two (2) crimes: rape by sexual assault and
statutory rape. Accused-appellant first inserted his finger in the vagina of the minor victim, which
constitutes rape by sexual assault and then he inserted his penis in AAA's vagina albeit
unsuccessful. Time and again, the Court held that the slightest penetration of the labia of the
female victim's genitalia consummates the crime of rape. However, since the charge against
accused-appellant in 2002 was only for statutory rape, he cannot be held liable for rape by sexual
assault for that incident. It would also be unjust to convict accused-appellant for the crime of acts
of lasciviousness simply based on an unsubstantiated complaint.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

RAPE CAN BE COMMITTED EITHER THROUGH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE OR SEXUAL

ASSAULT

People of the Philippines vs. Dizon

G.R. No. 217982; July 10, 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding the
accused Rolly Dizon guilty of statutory rape under Art. 266-A, paragraph 1(d) and rape through
sexual assault under Art. 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC.

Accused was charged with rape through sexual assault and statutory rape for having carnal
knowledge with AAA, an eight (8) year old, and for inserting his finger in the anus of the victim
during said incident.

Dizon interposed the defense of denial and alibi.

ISSUE:
Does the act of inserting a finger into the anus and the act of inserting a penis into a vagina
constitute two different types of rape?

RULING:
Yes, the act of inserting a finger into the anus constitutes the crime of rape through sexual
assault and the act of inserting a penis into a vagina constitutes the crime of rape through sexual
intercourse.

For a charge of rape through sexual intercourse to prosper, the prosecution must prove
the following elements: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he
accomplished such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious, by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or
when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12
years of age is statutory rape. As to the charge of rape by sexual assault, the same contemplates
either of the following situations: (1) a male offender inserts his penis into the mouth or anal orifice
of another person, whether a man or a woman, under any of the attendant circumstances in
paragraph 1 of Art. 266-A; or (2) a male or female offender inserts any instrument or object into
the genital or anal orifice of another person, whether a man or a woman, under any of the attendant
circumstances in paragraph 1 of Art. 266-A.

Dizon committed the crime of rape by sexual assault against AAA by forcibly inserting his
finger into her anus. Dizon also committed the crime of statutory rape through sexual intercourse
against AAA when he forcibly had carnal knowledge of her. Likewise, the findings of medical
examination indicated the presence of "perineal laceration secondary to sexual abuse; disclosure
of sexual abuse, genital findings conclusive of sexual abuse." The fact that AAA was only eight
years old when the rape incident occurred was established by her birth certificate.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

RAPE UNDER ART. 266-A(1)(D) IS ALSO CALLED STATUTORY RAPE AS "IT DEPARTS
FROM THE USUAL MODES OF COMMITTING RAPE"

People of the Philippines vs. Francica

G.R. No. 208625; September 6, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed the conviction of accused-
appellant Ramon Francica for three (3) counts of statutory rape under Art. 266-A(1)(d) of the RPC,
as amended by R.A. No. 8353, in relation to R.A. No. 7610 otherwise known as the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, upon the person of AAA,
an 11-year old girl, and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.

Victim AAA claims that she knew accused Ramon Francica because he was their neighbor.
She testified that accused-appellant licked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. The
touching started in March 2004 and went on many times. Francica would even give her P50.00
after touching her.

The trial court found Francica guilty of rape under Art. 266-A (1) and imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count of statutory rape. On appeal, Francica argues that the
presence of healed hymenal lacerations belies AAA's accusation that he sexually abused her.

ISSUE:
Is accused guilty of the crime of Statutory Rape?

RULING:
Yes, beyond reasonable doubt, Francica took advantage of AAA's youth and naiveté to
repeatedly sexually abuse her.

For a charge of rape under Art. 266-A(1) to prosper, it must be proven that "(1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation,
or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years
of age or was demented.” Rape under Art. 266-A(1)(d) is also called statutory rape as "it departs
from the usual modes of committing rape."

The child victim's consent in statutory rape is immaterial because the law presumes that
her young age makes her incapable of discerning good from evil. The defense did not dispute the
fact that AAA was 11 years old at the time of the incidents. Despite the absence of the medico-
legal officer as a witness, the presence of healed lacerations corroborates AAA's testimony as it
"is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration."

100 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE FELONY OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE IS A SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME, I.E., TWO
OR MORE CRIMES THAT THE LAW TREATS AS A SINGLE, INDIVISIBLE AND UNIQUE
OFFENSE FOR BEING THE PRODUCT OF A SINGLE CRIMINAL IMPULSE

People of the Philippines vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 207946; September 27, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition taken from the decision of the CA affirming, although with modification as
to the award of damages, the decision of the RTC, finding Alfredo Reyes guilty of Rape with
Homicide.

Charmaine, who was eight years old at the time of the crime and fifteen years old when
she took the witness stand, testified that while she and Lerma Leonora, the victim, were sleeping
inside their house, she was awakened when Reyes entered the room. She saw Lerma grapple
with Reyes who struck Lerma’s head with a stone causing the latter to lose consciousness. Reyes
then dragged Lerma to the kitchen where Reyes removed her shorts and took off his jacket and
pants and thereafter mounted Lerma making push and pull movements. When Reyes saw her, he
warned her not to tell anyone or else he will kill her and her parents.

The appellant presented alibi as a defense stating that he was asleep with his son in their
house on the night of the happening of the crime and questioned the credibility of the witness
based on the following grounds.

ISSUE:
Does the fact of death of the victim during or on occasion of the rape constitute the special
complex crime of rape with homicide?

RULING:
Yes. In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the following elements must
concur: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was
achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.

The Court sustains the finding that the guilt of the accused was established beyond
reasonable doubt. Charmaine had testified that she vividly saw Reyes entering her and Lerma's
room at dawn on 13 February 1998; that Lerma struggled with Reyes who, with the use of a stone,
hit Lerma on her head rendering her unconscious; that Reyes dragged Lerma to the kitchen; that
Reyes removed the shorts of Lerma and his own pants and jacket; that Reyes rode on Lerma using
push and pull movements; and that Dr. Arrojo declared that Lerma's hymen had "fresh lacerations
at 6:00, 3:00 & 9:00 with bleeding"; that the substance taken inside Lerma's vagina was confirmed
as spermatozoa; and that the cause of her death was "massive intracranial hemorrhage resulting
to shock then cardiac arrest due to traumatic injury in the head."

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

CONTINUED DETENTION OF THE VICTIM AFTER THE RAPE CANNOT BE DEEMED

TO ABSORB THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL DETENTION

People of the Philippines vs. Concepcion

G.R. No. 214886; April 4, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the appeal from CA Decision. RTC found the accused, Bernie Concepcion,
guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. However, the CA, on appeal, ruled that
the crime of rape absorbed the crime of forcible abduction.

AAA arrived home in a tricycle while Concepcion was at the gate of the house, drunk.
Concepcion intercepted AAA at the garage area and held a knife to her back and dragged her to
his room, locked the door and blocked it using his bed. Concepcion raped AAA. Shortly after, a
person arrived who introduced himself as Chief of Police Obaldo, Jr., called on Concepcion to
release AAA but refused and made demands to first produce certain persons. Upon their arrival,
he asked Peralta, his girlfriend to admit that she has been raped. Peralta admitted but Concepcion
still refused to release AAA. Concepcion then again raped AAA, holding a knife to her neck. In
order to prevent persons from entering the room where they were confined, Concepcion installed
electric wires on the door. The police forcibly entered his room and arrested Conception.

Concepcion argued that he detained AAA only to extract an admission from his girlfriend
of the fact of her being raped and to bring the alleged perpetrators out in the open. Absent the
proof that he abducted AAA with lewd designs, he could not be convicted of forcible abduction
under Art. 342 of the RPC. Further, he insisted that there was no proof that he raped AAA.

ISSUE:
the CA correct in ruling that the crime of rape absorbed the crime of illegal detention where
the victim was detained after being raped?

RULING:
No, the CA is incorrect in ruling that the crime of illegal detention was absorbed by rape.

As to the charge of serious illegal detention, CA was incorrect in holding that forcible
abduction was absorbed in the crime of rape. Slight illegal detention has four elements: (1) that
the offender is a private individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives him of his liberty; (3) the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; (4) that the crime is
committed without attendance of any circumstances enumerated in Art. 267.

The elements of slight illegal detention are all present here. After raping AAA, Concepcion
continued to detain her and to deprive her of her liberty. The detention was illegal and not attended
by circumstances that would render it serious illegal detention. Thus, although the initial abduction
of AAA may have been absorbed by the crime of rape, the continued detention of AAA after the
rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise, since the detention continued after the rape had
been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary means for the crime of rape.

Hence, CA is not correct in holding Conception guilty of rape absorbing forcible abduction.

102 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

KISSING THE VICTIM’S LIPS, TOUCHING AND MASHING HER BREAST, AND
INSERTING ACCUSED’S FINGER INTO HER VAGINA MAKING A PUSH AND PULL
MOVEMENT ARE CONSIDERED "SEXUAL ABUSE" AND "LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT"
UNDER R.A. NO. 7610, WHICH APPLIES WHEN THE VICTIM IS BELOW 18 YEARS OF
AGE

People of the Philippines vs Caoili

G.R. No. 196342; August 8, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 which assails the decision of the CA which set
aside the conviction of the accused Noel Caoili of the crime of rape by sexual assault under
paragraph 2 of Art. 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353.

AAA, fifteen (15) years of age, testified that her father, respondent Noel Caoili, sexually
molested her at their house. Caoili kissed her lips, touched and mashed her breast, inserted the
fourth finger of his left hand into her vagina, and made a push and pull movement into her vagina
with such finger for 30 minutes. Accused was charged with rape through sexual intercourse in
violation of Art. 266-A, in relation to Art. 266-B, of the RPC.

interposed the defense of denial.

ISSUE:
Does the act of inserting the finger in the minor victim’s genitalia likewise constitute the
crime of lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610?

RULING:
Yes, Caoili's acts were clearly covered by the definitions of "sexual abuse" and "lascivious
conduct" under R.A. No. 7610.

R.A. No. 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination
are children or those persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition. "Sexual abuse" includes the
employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist
another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either
directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of
a person.

Caoili committed lascivious acts against AAA when he kissed her lips, touched and
mashed her breast, and inserted his finger into her vagina and made a push and pull movement
with such finger for 30 minutes. AAA was a child below 14 years old at the time the lascivious
conduct was committed against her.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FOR THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING, THERE MUST BE A PURPOSEFUL OR KNOWING

ACTION BY THE ACCUSED TO FORCIBLY RESTRAIN THE VICTIM COUPLED WITH
INTENT TO EFFECT THE SAME

People of the Philippines vs. Lidasan et. al.

G.R. No. 227425; September 4, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC convicting
accused-appellants of Kidnapping for Ransom as defined and penalized under Art. 267 of the
RPC.

Accused-appellants were all charged for kidnapping private complainant, Michelle Ragos,
and demanding ransom money for her release. All the accused-appellants were arrested after a
successful entrapment operation was conducted during the payoff of the ransom money.

All the accused denied the charges and offered separate, albeit similar narrations that they
were based in Mindanao and just went to Metro Manila to attend to certain matters when they were
arrested by the authorities and were made to answer for the aforesaid crime

ISSUE:
Is deprivation of liberty coupled with intent to effect the same necessary for the offender to
be convicted of kidnapping?

RULING:
Yes, the prosecution must establish the deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the
circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same.

Under the RPC, the elements of the crime Kidnapping for Ransom are as follows: (a) the
offender is a private individual;(b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission
of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: i) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than three days; ii) it is committed by simulating public authority; iii) any serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or iv)
the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.

It is undisputed that accused-appellants, among others, illegally detained the victim Ragos
against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom from her family. Moreover, the collective
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, such as victim Ragos and state witness Bauting, positively
identified the perpetrators to the kidnapping — including accused-appellants Adil, Daliano, and
Kamir — as well as narrated in detail the events that transpired from Ragos's abduction up to her
rescue.

104 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE ACT OF WAITING FOR THE VICTIM TO FALL ASLEEP TO TIE HIS HANDS IS NOT
DETERMINANT OF THE INTENT TO DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS LIBERTY

People vs. Villanueva

G.R. No. 218958; December 13, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal to reverse the decision of the CA in affirming with modification the RTC
of Bacolod City in finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of attempted kidnapping with
murder.

The victim is a friend of the accused. One afternoon, the accused was in the house of the
victim waiting for the latter. Not long enough from the time the victim went home, the accused with
the victim left the house. Later that evening, the victim with the three accused rented a room in an
apartelle. When the victim started to fall asleep, the accused tied him, but the latter resisted. The
accused struck the victim with a piece of wood on his head, causing his death.

ISSUE:
Is the conviction of attempted kidnapping with murder proper in this case?

RULING:
No. The crime committed is only homicide. The intent to deprive liberty was not proven to
qualify the offense as kidnapping. There is no treachery to qualify the killing as murder.

First. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty
coupled with the intent of the offender to that effect. Both act and intent must be proven. The fact
alone of waiting for the victim to fall asleep and then and there tying his hands and feet, was not
determinant of intent to actually detain the victim or deprive his liberty. As such, the trial court was
indulging in speculation when it held that the victim will either be taken away or simply be kept in
the hotel and thereafter ransom will be demanded for his release.

Second. It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be
a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. Indeed, the
accused suddenly struck the victim on the head with a piece of wood causing the latter’s death.
But this is because the victim resisted when he was being tied. The prosecution failed to prove that
the accused’s manner of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted.

Considering that none of the circumstances alleged in the information was proven during
the trial, the same cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing into murder. Hence, the crime
committed is only homicide.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FOR KIDNAPPING TO EXIST, IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE OFFENDER KEPT THE
VICTIM IN AN ENCLOSURE OR TREATED HIM HARSHLY

People of the Philippines vs. Fabro

G.R. No. 208441; July 17, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding
accused-appellant Zenaida Fabro or Zenaida Viñegas Manalastas guilty of Serious Illegal
Detention.

A 9-year old, AAA, was attending her Grade IV class when accused Zenaida Fabro
suddenly arrived supposedly to fetch her. The teacher allowed the accused to take AAA since she
was AAA's aunt residing just next to AAA's house. However, instead of bringing AAA home, the
accused kept AAA despite the latter's plea to go home. She refused to let AAA go even after AAA's
parents called begging her to release their daughter. After reporting the abduction, the police
organized a team to rescue AAA and apprehend the accused in the house of her brother.

Zenaida contended that AAA had not been deprived of liberty while in her custody. She
argued that AAA was neither physically restrained, nor was under her constant control, nor was
ever prevented from going home. She claims that during the period she had custody of AAA, the
latter was free to interact with third persons and communicate with her relatives, and was well
taken care of.

ISSUE:
Does the curtailment of the 9-year-old victim's liberty require any physical restraint upon
the victim's person?

RULING:
No, the prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment
of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim's person.

For kidnapping to exist, the following elements must be present: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any
of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped
or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.

That AAA was deprived of her liberty is clear from her testimony that despite her pleas for
accused-appellant to let her go home, the accused refused. It is not necessary that the offender
kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Nine-year old AAA was brought by Zenaida
to a place unfamiliar to her. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home,
even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation
of liberty. Under such a situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and control of the
abductor. Despite the absence of evidence that AAA was locked up, she was still deprived of her
liberty because considering her minority and the distance between her home and Nueva Ecija, she
could not possibly go back home without Zenaida’s assistance.

106 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

DEPRIVATION OF THE VICTIM’S LIBERTY INCLUDES NOT ONLY THE

IMPRISONMENT OF A PERSON BUT ALSO THE DEPRIVATION OF HIS LIBERTY IN
WHATEVER FORM AND FOR WHATEVER LENGTH OF TIME

People of the Philippines vs. Siapno

G.R. No. 218911; August 23, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification decision of
the RTC convicting accused-appellant Leonardo Siapno of serious illegal detention under Art. 267
of the RPC.

Dulce Tibay was with her one year and seven-month-old daughter, Chloe Tibay, when
accused Siapno knocked at their gate. Siapno then pushed the gate and grabbed Chloe poking a
fan knife at her neck and dragged Dulce inside the house. Dulce struggled to be released and was
able to run out of the gate and sought help from a passerby, who called barangay tanods. The man
locked himself up together with Chloe inside the comfort room for three (3) minutes but was
thereafter released after the barangay tanods successfully negotiated with the accused.

Siapno insists that he got hold of Chloe purely by accident, with no intention of ever taking
her away from her mother.

ISSUE:
Does the act of the accused in depriving the minor of her liberty and the parent of custody
of her child, however short the time, constitute serious illegal detention?

RULING:
Yes, the accused committed the crime of serious illegal detention.

The crime has the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps
or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or
kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances
is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female or a public official.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty,
coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person
but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves
a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention, or is restricted
or impeded in his liberty to move.

If the victim is a child, the deprivation of liberty also includes the intention of the accused
to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. Moreover, the victim's lack of consent is
presumed when the victim is a minor.

In this case, Siapno, a private individual, knowingly and without lawful authority detained a
minor, causing deprivation of the victim's liberty and of the mother's custody over her child.
Therefore, Siapno is guilty of serious illegal detention

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

PERIOD OF DETENTION IS IMMATERIAL IN A CHARGE FOR SERIOUS ILLEGAL

DETENTION WHEN THE PERSON DETAINED IS A WOMAN

People of the Philippines vs. Ali

G.R. No. 222965; December 6, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the RTC of Zamboanga City in
finding the accused guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

Antonio Lim, Marry Lim, and Cherry Lim were heading home in their vehicle, together with
their driver, Igno, and Oliz, their helper. The accused, while riding a tricycle, intercepted the victims.
They presented themselves as police officers, and requested that they commandeer the vehicle to
bring it to the police station, as they vehicle is suspected to be bringing contrabands. The accused
merely passed by a police station. While stuck in traffic, Mary was able to escape. The accused
with the victims veered by the beach. The accused instructed the victims to alight. Oliz was able
to escape and ask help.

The accused argued that they cannot be convicted of serious illegal detention since the
victims have been deprived of liberty for only 1 or 2 days and not 3 days as provided by Art. 267,
RPC.

ISSUE:
Is the period of detention material to qualify the crime as serious illegal detention where
the victim is a woman?

RULING:
No. Period of detention is immaterial if the victim is a woman.

Deprivation of liberty is qualified to serious illegal detention if at least one of the following
circumstances exists: a) detention lasts for more than 3 days; b) accused simulated public
authority; c) victim suffers serious physical injuries or is threatened to be killed; or d) the victim is
a minor, female, or public officer.

In the case, the elements of serious illegal detention were duly proven by the prosecution.
First, Ali and his cohorts were clearly private individuals. Second, they deprived Oliz of her liberty.
This was manifested by the fact that they forcibly boarded the vehicle and placed Igno and Antonio
in handcuffs evincing their intent to detain the occupants of the motor vehicle. Third, Oliz was a
female victim.

The CA was correct in ruling that the period of detention became immaterial in view of the
victim’s circumstances. If, during the deprivation of liberty, any of the circumstances under Art.
267(4) of the RPC occurs, i.e., the victim was a female who was Oliz in this case, the crime of
serious illegal detention is consummated.

108 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THERE IS KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WHERE THE VICTIM IS ABDUCTED AND

FORCED INTO A CAR, THEN TAKEN TO HER HOME FOR THE VICTIM TO GET ALL OF
HER JEWELRY, AND THEN BROUGHT TO THE BANK TO WITHDRAW FROM HER
DEPOSIT ACCOUNT

People of the Philippines vs. Pabra-Rural

G.R. No. 231884; June 27, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the Decision of the RTC finding the
Michelle Rural and May Daza (appellants) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.

Nenita Marquez was forcibly abducted by appellants in Fairview Market. She was forced
into a Ford Fiera where she was threatened that if she refused to go with them, something bad
would happen to her. She was taken to her home and was asked to get all of her jewelry, worth
P3 million. She gave it to her captors. Afterwards, she was brought to the bank, and she was asked
to withdraw her time deposit account, amounting to P400,000. While waiting for the transaction,
she had the opportunity to report the incident to the police with the help of her driver and daughter
who saw her at the bank.

Consequently, an Information was filed against appellants charging them with the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. Appellants denied committing the crime and offered a different version of
the facts. It was alleged that it was Nenita who approached them and asked for help and taking
pity on her, they accompanied her to her house.

The RTC in finding the appellants guilty stated that the prosecution was able to prove all
the elements of kidnapping for ransom. Thus, appellants elevated the case to the CA, which later
affirmed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:
Is there kidnapping for ransom where the victim was abducted, forced into a car and taken
to her home to get all her jewelry?

RULING:
Yes. In prosecuting a case involving the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the following
elements must be established: (i) the accused was a private person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained,
or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (iii) the kidnapping or detention was illegal;
and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.

Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a
captured person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to
consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining
chip in exchange for the victim's freedom. The amount of, and purpose for, the ransom is
immaterial.

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of
the above-mentioned elements. In her testimony, Nenita, a private person, narrated how she was
deprived of her liberty from the time she was forcibly taken by the appellants and their companions
for the purpose of extorting money and jewelry from her until she relented to their demands.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

A PUBLIC OFFICER WHO DETAINS A PERSON FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXTORTING

RANSOM CANNOT BE SAID TO BE ACTING IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND THUS,
MAY BE PROSECUTED UNDER ART. 267 OF RPC

People of the Philippines vs. Borja

G.R. No. 199710; August 2, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding
accused-appellant PO3 Julieto Borja guilty of kidnapping with ransom.

Ronalyn Manatad was allegedly abducted by accused Borja who demanded ransom from
the victim’s relatives in exchange for her liberty. During an entrapment operation for the ransom
payoff, Borja was successfully arrested. However, the authorities failed to rescue Ronalyn, who
was then taken by her captors to PDEA where she was charged with illegal sale of shabu.

Borja anchors his arguments on the arrest and subsequent conviction of Ronalyn for the
sale of shabu. He argues that it is absurd to convict him of kidnapping considering that the alleged
victim was caught in flagrante delicto during a buy-bust operation on the day of the alleged incident

ISSUE:
May a public officer be convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom?

RULING:
Yes, a public officer may be convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

Although the crime of kidnapping can only be committed by a private individual, the fact
that the accused is a public official does not automatically preclude the filing of an information for
kidnapping against him. A public officer who detains a person for the purpose of extorting ransom
cannot be said to be acting in an official capacity. Public officials may be prosecuted for kidnapping
with ransom under Art. 267 of the RPC if they act in their private capacity. The burden is on the
accused to prove that he or she acted in furtherance of his or her official functions.

Accused-appellant's membership in the Philippine National Police does not automatically

preclude the filing of an information for kidnapping or serious illegal detention against him. He may
be prosecuted under Art. 267 of the RPC if it is shown that he committed acts unrelated to the
functions of his office. In this case, Ronalyn, a woman, was forcibly taken by accused-appellant
and loaded in a van where she was detained for several hours. These acts are completely
unrelated to accused-appellant's functions as a police officer, and as such, he may be prosecuted
under Art. 267 of the RPC.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

KING IS CONSIDERED COMPLETE FROM THE MOMENT THE OFFENDER GAINS

POSSESSION OF THE THING

Flores vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 222861; April 23, 2018
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner PO2 Jessie Flores y De Leon filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the CA
which affirmed the decision of the RTC finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple
Robbery (extortion) under Art. 295 of the RPC.

The Petitioner was accused of Simple Robbery. Allegedly, he, the officer assigned to
investigate a vehicular incident, asked the private complainant Roderick France, driver of the
vehicle, to prepare money in the amount of P2,000 in return for the latter’s confiscated license.
Subsequently, the petitioner was arrested in an entrapment operation following the complaint filed
by France. Among the evidence presented by the prosecution is the photocopy of the marked
money used which was allegedly placed by the petitioner inside his drawer upon receipt.

The petitioner argued that RTC incorrectly convicted him of simple robbery by giving weight
on pieces of evidence in violation of the Best Evidence Rule. He argued that the prosecution's
exhibits were mere photocopies and the original pieces of the marked money were never even
presented.

ISSUE:
Was there an unlawful taking when the petitioner demanded and received the P2,000 in
exchange of the private complainant’s license?

RULING:
Yes, there was an unlawful taking when the petitioner demanded and received the P2000
in exchange of the private complainant’s license.

In order to prosecute the offense of Simple Robbery under Art. 294 of the RPC, there must
be an unlawful taking. Unlawful taking is defined as the taking of items without the consent of the
owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
Moreover, as ruled in a plethora of cases, taking is considered complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he did not have the opportunity to dispose of the
same. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, on the other hand, is an internal act that is presumed from
the unlawful taking of the personal property belonging to another.

In the present case, the private complainant categorically testified that petitioner demanded
and eventually received from him the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) in exchange
for the release of his driver's license. When the marked money was placed inside petitioner's
drawer, who counted it afterwards, he was deemed to have taken possession of the money. This
amount was unlawfully taken by petitioner from France with intent to gain and through intimidation.

Therefore, the existence of all the element of unlawful taking and all other elements of the
offense of Simple Robbery, is sufficient to prosecute the accused.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

INTENT TO GAIN IS PRESUMED FROM THE UNLAWFUL TAKING OF THINGS

People of the Philippines vs. Bongos

G.R. No. 227698; January 31, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Before this Court is an appeal via Rule 45 from the Decision of the CA convicting accused-
appellant Hernando Bongos y Arevalo of the complex crime of robbery with rape.

One day, AAA, helper of BBB and CCC, was left to tend the house when CCC went to her
mother's house. While AAA was washing dishes, two male persons entered the house through the
kitchen. She identified them as Bongos, the one wearing bonnet up to his forehead, and Dexisne,
the one wearing black short pants with red stripes on the side. She knew them because they are
neighbors of her employers. Bongos pointed a gun at her, while Dexisne pointed his knife. They
forced her to enter the room where the money of her employer was and demanded her to open
the drawer. Since it was locked, Dexisne forced it open using a steel, while Bongos remained at
AAA's side poking the gun at her neck. After they took the money, they forcibly dragged AAA
outside the house until they reached a clearing on the lower level of the yard. There, armed with a
knife and gun, both accused threatened and ordered AAA to undress herself. When she refused
to do so, Dexisne got violent and slashed her leg and then hit her chest near her left breast which
caused her to lose consciousness.

When AAA woke up, she no longer had her clothes on and felt pain on her private part.
She was afraid so she went to DDD, the grandfather of CCC and asked for help. DDD summoned
someone to fetch CCC to come home. Together with CCC, AAA reported the robbery incident to
the authorities the following day. However, AAA did not tell CCC of the rape incident because she
was ashamed and afraid that accused would really make good of their threat to kill or harm her in
case she makes a report about the incident. Bongos' defenses consist merely of alibi and denial,
and questioning the credence and probative weight to AAA's testimony.

ISSUE:
Were the elements of Robbery with Rape established?

RULING:
Yes, the elements of Robbery with Rape were established in this case.

Robbery with rape is a special complex crime under Art. 294 of the RPC. To be convicted
of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is
accompanied by rape.

Intent to gain was sufficiently proven. Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of
the crime of robbery, is an internal act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things. Thus,
the first three elements of the crime were clearly established.

As to the last requirement, the courts a quo correctly held that although AAA did not exactly
witness the actual rape because she was unconscious at that time, circumstantial evidence shows
that the victim was raped by the appellant and his co-accused.

In several decided cases, the victim was unconscious and was not aware of the sexual
intercourse that transpired, yet the accused was found guilty on the basis of circumstantial
evidence.

112 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE ROBBERY

SHOULD BE THE MAIN PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE MALEFACTOR

People of the Philippines vs. Gamba

G.R. No. 215332; July 24, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming with modification the decision of the
RTC finding accused-appellant Mark Gamba guilty of six counts of robbery with homicide.

Accused Mark Gamba, together with three unidentified men, boarded a jeepney and
announced a “hold-up.” Mark and one of his companions drew out their guns and divested a
passenger of his cash and other possessions. John Cerbito, a passenger seated beside the driver,
refused to give his cellphone hence Mark shot him twice. Cerbito died due to the gunshot wounds.

Accused interposed the defense of alibi that he was engaged in a drinking session with a
friend during the robbery-homicide incident.

ISSUE:
Should robbery be the main purpose of the perpetrator in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide?

RULING:
Yes, the intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. However, the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery in committing the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.

The elements of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of
personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. The robbery is the main purpose and
objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.

Mark, together with his three companions, boarded the public utility jeepney and declared
a "hold-up." The passengers were forced at gunpoint to turnover their cash and possessions. When
Cerbito refused to be divested of his cellphone, Mark kicked him three or four times with such force
that he fell off the jeepney. Still dissatisfied with the violence he vented on Cerbito, Mark fired at
him twice resulting in his untimely death. Mark and his three cohorts then fled together with their
loot. Undoubtedly, their main objective was to rob the passengers of the jeepney; the fatal shooting
of Cerbito was merely incidental, resulting by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery.

| 113
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE INTENT TO ROB MUST PRECEDE THE TAKING
OF HUMAN LIFE BUT THE KILLING MAY OCCUR BEFORE, DURING OR AFTER THE
ROBBERY

People of the Philippines vs. Domasig

G.R. No. 217028; June 13, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed decision of the Regional Trial
Court finding Benjamin Doniasig a.k.a. "Mando" or "Pilikitot", guilty of Robbery with Homicide.

The prosecution presented Gerald Gloriana who testified that AAA was sleeping in a
makeshift bed with a plastic containing P300 when he saw accused stab AAA four times. Terrified
of what he witnessed, Gloriana hid under a bridge until the following day when the body of AAA
was discovered and the money inside the plastic was found missing. Gloriana claims that he was
able to identify the accused because the place where the assault took place was well lit and he
was familiar with the tattoo of the accused. Accused posed an alibi, claiming that at the time the
crime was committed he was working in an amusement park.

Accused-appellant denied robbing and killing the victim. He claimed that he was at
Barangay Bato, Nabua, Albay, and was working as a caller in a bingo game at an amusement park
where he had been employed.

ISSUE:
Was there robbery that preceded the killing of the victim to constitute robbery with
homicide?

RULING:
No. Robbery with homicide qualifies when a homicide is committed either by reason or on
occasion of the robbery.

In charging robbery with homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: (a) the taking of
personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs
to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (d) on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense,
was committed.

A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and the objective of
the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. What is crucial
for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to firmly establish the
offender's intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the
homicide is actually carried out. In this case, there was no showing of accused-appellant's
intention, determined by his acts prior to, contemporaneous with; and subsequent to the
commission of the crime, to commit robbery.

From the record of the case, it can be inferred that Gloriana merely saw accused-appellant
stab the victim. He did not see accused-appellant taking the P300 which the victim allegedly had.
Based on his testimony, Gloriana merely presumed that the victim was killed because of the P300
he supposedly had in his possession. Thus, it appears that Gloriana had no personal knowledge
that the victim was robbed. The element of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged
to have been lost and stolen by accused-appellant, was not adequately established.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

A CONVICTION REQUIRES CERTITUDE THAT THE ROBBERY IS THE MAIN PURPOSE

AND OBJECTIVE OF THE MALEFACTOR AND THE KILLING IS MERELY INCIDENTAL
TO THE ROBBERY

People of the Philippines vs. Sulayao

G.R. No. 198952; September 6, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
On appeal before this Court is the decision of the CA affirming the decision RTC convicting
accused Danilo Sulayao of the crime of Robbery with Homicide committed against the victim
Marianito Casiano Palacios.

While he was on patrol as a Barangay Security Development Officers (BSDO) member

along EDSA Boulevard, William saw two males and a female, wearing bloodstained clothes
walking along the boulevard. When William's group approached the three individuals, they
scampered in different directions. They caught one of them, who was later identified as Danilo
Sulayao. Accused told William's group that he, together with the man and the woman who fled,
had just robbed Floor Center and killed the security guard therein. William's group brought accused
to the barangay hall.

Thereafter, William's group returned to the building of Floor Center and immediately, they
called the police. They noticed that the front glass door of the store was broken. William saw
bloodstains, broken marbles and tiles scattered all over the place. Upon arrival, the police officers
followed the trail of blood that led to the toilet. The police officers forcibly opened the locked door
and once inside, they saw the lifeless body of the victim, Marianito, slumped on the floor in a pool
of blood. Amalia, the branch manager of Floor Center, likewise recalled that upon seeing the
accused, the latter apologized to her; he admitted that, although he was not the one who killed
Marianito, he was the one who hammered the victim's head; and, he told her that he did not get
any money from the robbery incident.

However, the accused argues that there are inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses
and interposes the defense of denial.

ISSUE:
Should accused be convicted of robbery with homicide or separate crimes of robbery and
homicide?

RULING:
Robbery with homicide. Robbery with homicide exists "when a homicide is committed
either by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery.” To sustain a conviction, the prosecution must
prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with
intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and, (4) on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or
after the robbery.

The following pieces of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to prove the guilt of accused-
appellant for robbery with homicide beyond reasonable doubt: (1) BSDO members saw accused-
appellant wounded and wearing bloodstained clothes while walking near the crime scene; (2) upon
apprehension, accused-appellant disclosed that he and his companions just robbed a store and
killed its security guard; (3) the store's security guard, Marianito, was found dead, inside the store
where accused-appellant worked; (4) accused-appellant admitted to Amalia, the branch manager
of Floor Center, that he hammered the victim's head and that he and his companions took money
from the Floor Center during the subject incident. All the foregoing circumstances were duly proven
by the prosecution during the trial of the instant case. The presence of such leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the accused acted in conspiracy with his unidentified companions in
robbing Floor Center and in killing Marianito in the course of the robbery.

| 115
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN A SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, IT IS IMMATERIAL

THAT THE VICTIM OF HOMICIDE IS SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE VICTIM OF THE
ROBBERY

People of the Philippines vs. Madrelejos

G.R. No. 225328; March 21, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
For review is the Decision of the CA affirming with modification the Decision of the RTC
convicting accused-appellant Madrelejos of robbery with homicide.

The victim, Jovel Jacaban, was aboard a jeepney when two of the passengers, one of
which is Madrilejos, declared a hold-up. Madrilejos ordered the other to get the passengers'
belongings. Jovel refused to give his bag prompting the accused-appellant to shoot him.
Thereafter, the Madrilejos and his companion got out of the jeep. Jovel was brought to the hospital
where he eventually died.

Madrilejos denied that he robbed the passengers of the jeepney and claimed that he shot
Joven by accident. He claimed that when he was about to get off, his enemy, who was also in the
same jeepney, pulled out a gun, saying, "natiyempuhan din kita," and aimed at the accused. They
grappled possession of the firearm and when accused got hold of the gun, he fired it, accidentally
hitting Joven.

ISSUE:
In a crime of robbery with homicide, is it required that the person killed also be the victim
of the robbery?

RULING:
No, in a crime of robbery with homicide it is not required that the person killed to also be
the victim of the robbery.

In People v. Ebet, this Court explained the nature of the complex crime of robbery with
homicide. In such case, the original design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must
precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is
other than the victim of the robbery.

In this case, the intention to rob was revealed as soon as the robbers announced the hold-
up. While it seems to be unclear that the robbers were able to take Jovel's bag, it was established
that the belongings of the other passengers were taken. It is immaterial that the victim of homicide
is other than the victim of the robbery, as long as the homicide occurs by reason of the robbery or
on occasion thereof, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is deemed to have been
committed.

Hence, RTC was correct that the crime of robbery with homicide was consummated.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, TREACHERY IS A GENERIC AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCE IF THE VICTIM OF HOMICIDE IS KILLED TREACHEROUSLY

People of the Philippines vs. Layug et al.

G.R. No. 223679; September 27, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
For consideration of this Court is the appeal of the decisionof the CA affirming with
modification the decision of the RTC finding appellants Wilfredo Layug and Noel Buan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

The state witness in this case testified that during a shabu session with the accused-
appellants herein, she overheard one of the accused giving instructions to his two other
companions about a "hold-up." The state witness however did not hear the name of the person
intended to be held-up. After the shabu session, the state witness met with her customer, the victim
in this case, to have sex with him in exchange of money. The state witness then brought the victim
to accused-appellants’ house and thereafter had shabu session with the accused-appellants. They
thereafter boarded a tricycle. The tricycle stopped at a sitio, citing as reason the necessity to walk
as they tricycle could not enter the place. As they alighted, the accused and appellants herein
executed their plan to take the wallet, wristwatch, and necklace of the victim. The victim sustained
19 stab wounds which caused his immediate death.

Accused denied that they had any participation in the incident, and the trial court gravely
erred in finding that treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength attended the
commission of the crime.

ISSUE:
What are the effects of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength to
the charge of robbery with homicide?

RULING:
Robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery
is a generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously.
Thus, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is appreciated in the crime of robbery with
homicide only as to the killing but not as to the robbery. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed by
treachery. Evident premeditation, on the other hand, cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide because the elements of which are already
inherent in the crime. Evident premeditation is inherent in crimes against property.

As to the conviction, what is important is that the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the
following must be proved: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo
lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.

| 117
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ROBBERY WITH RAPE CONTEMPLATES A SITUATION WHERE THE ORIGINAL

INTENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS TO TAKE, WITH INTENT TO GAIN, PERSONAL
PROPERTY BELONGING TO ANOTHER AND RAPE IS COMMITTED ON THE
OCCASION THEREOF OR AS AN ACCOMPANYING CRIME, AND NOT THE OTHER
WAY AROUND

People of the Philippines vs. Bragat

G.R. No. 222180; November 22, 2017
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the decision
of the RTC finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape
committed upon the person of AAA.

One evening, spouses AAA (wife) and BBB (husband) heard someone from outside of their
house asking BBB for water. It turns out that it was Jundie Balvez, a classmate of their child. AAA
told BBB to not open the door. Afterwards, just when they were about to lock their door, 4 armed
and masked men, including accused-appellant Eluterio Bragat, barged into their kitchen. These
men tied them and asked them where their money was hidden. When BBB replied that they had
no money, Bragat and his companions beat him up and brought BBB to his bedroom while pointing
a gun at his head. Bragat brought AAA to the back of the kitchen and laid on top of AAA. AAA
resisted and told Bragat that she had her menstruation. Afterwards, Bragat pointed a gun at AAA,
telling her that he will kill them all if she still refuses. Bragat was able to have sexual intercourse
with AAA. Afterwards, AAA gave Bragat and his companions their money amounting to PHP600
and a pair of small gold earrings worth PHP 3,000.

Bragat testified that he did not know his co-accused, Jundie Balvez and the spouses and
raised the defense of alibi. He claimed that he was sleeping at the house of his employer.

ISSUE:
Did the trial court err in convicting Bragat for the crime of robbery with rape?

RULING:
No. Both the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the special complex crime of robbery with rape under Article 294 of the RPC as amended by
Sec. 9 of R.A. No. 7659.

Robbery with rape contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was
to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the
occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime, and not the other way around. The prosecution's
evidence satisfactorily established the following essential elements of the crime: (a) the taking of
personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (b) the property taken
belongs to another; (c) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (d) the robbery is accompanied
by rape.

In this case, the accused-appellant and his three companions took the cash and gold
earrings of the spouses AAA and BBB by means of violence and intimidation. Accused-appellant
and his cohorts barged into the house of the spouses armed with firearms and tied their hands
behind their backs using a nylon rope. Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the
crime of robbery, is an internal act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things. Having
established that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully taken by accused-appellant,
intent to gain was sufficiently proven. Accused-appellant argues that AAA's lone testimony is not
sufficient to prove that rape was committed on the occasion of the robbery. We disagree. The
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the sole testimony of the rape victim may be sufficient
to convict the accused. If her testimony meets the test of credibility, such is sufficient to convict the
accused. The credibility of the victim is almost always the single most important issue to hurdle.

118 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ROBBERY WITH RAPE CONTEMPLATES A SITUATION WHERE THE ORIGINAL

INTENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS TO TAKE, WITH INTENT TO GAIN, PERSONAL
PROPERTY OF ANOTHER AND RAPE IS COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION THEREOF

People of the Philippines vs. Bringcula

G.R. No. 226400; January 24, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is to resolve the appeal of appellant Joselito Bringcula that seeks to reverse and set
aside the Decision of the CA finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with rape.

On the night of May 2, 2011, private complainant AAA was sleeping in her house together
with her children, house helper and niece. She was awakened when a man wearing a mask
touched her shoulder and poked a firearm at her neck. The man told her that it was a robbery and
that she should keep quiet or else he would kill her. She was able to recognize the voice of the
man to be that of appellant Bringcula. Then, she was ordered to lie face down and was hogtied
using a shoelace.

The appellant took AAA's jewelries and thereafter, made AAA lie on her back and pulled
her pajama and underwear. He also removed his own clothing including his mask. Appellant
proceeded to lick AAA's vagina, kissed her neck, laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. AAA was unable to cry for help because appellant threatened to kill her if she does. After
satisfying his lust, appellant dressed up and took AAA's necklace and two (2) cellular phones.

Appellant denied the allegations and interposed alibi as a defense. He claimed that in the
evening of May 2, 2011, he was at home sleeping. His testimony was corroborated by his wife who
testified that appellant was sleeping beside her the day in question.

ISSUE:
Is accused-appellant guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape?

RULING:
Yes, the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape.

The crime of Robbery with Rape is a special complex crime under Art. 294 of the RPC. It
contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain,
personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an
accompanying crime. In People v. Evangelio, et al., this Court ruled that for a conviction of the
crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by reason or
on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. Thus, to be convicted of robbery with
rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking
is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.

The elements of robbery with rape are present in this case. The asportation by appellant
of private complainant's personal properties constitutes the first three (3) elements of the crime.
Appellant barged into the house of the victim armed with a weapon, tied her down to immobilize
her, and robbed her of some personal belongings, hence, the intent to gain was sufficiently proven.
The prosecution was likewise able to establish that appellant raped private complaint on the
occasion of the robbery.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ART. 294 OF THE RPC DOES NOT DISTINGUISH WHETHER THE RAPE WAS
COMMITTED BEFORE, DURING OR AFTER THE ROBBERY; THE TRUE INTENT OF THE
ACCUSED DETERMINES THE OFFENSE COMMITTED

People of the Philippines vs. Romobio

G.R. No. 227705; October 11, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the decision of
the RTC finding accused Hermin Romobio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape.

One night, AAA was awakened by a man armed with a knife, wearing a ball cap, and whose
face was covered by a white towel from the middle of the nose to the chin. He demanded for her
cellular phone and bag, and proceeded to open the drawers. She attempted to get up from the
bed, but he rushed towards her and hit her forehead several times with the knife handle. Hermin
continued ransacking AAA's house, placing all his loot inside a plastic bag. The man was able to
steal and carry away three cell phones, four pieces of gold ring, three wristwatches, three gold
necklaces, cash money of ₱4,000.00, bags, wallet, perfumes, lotions, yellow jacket, BDO and
RCBC ATM cards, or a total of ₱120,000.00.Hermin sat at AAA's bed side, removed her blanket,
tore her T-shirt and white underwear, and removed his belt. He placed himself on top of her, licked
her nipples, and inserted his penis inside her vagina.

On the other hand, Hermin contended that he was at home when the crime took place, and
even slept beside his mother during that night, and that AAA neither adduced a single receipt to
prove the value of the items allegedly stolen nor stated the particular value of each and every item
that was said to be taken.

ISSUE:
Is Hermin liable for robbery with rape?

RULING:
Yes. To sustain a conviction for robbery with rape, it is imperative that the robbery itself
must be conclusively established; proof of the rape alone is not sufficient.

For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape
was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This
felony contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to
gain, personal property belonging to another, and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as
an accompanying crime. If the original plan was to rape but the accused after committing the rape
also committed the robbery when the opportunity presented itself, the offense should be viewed
as separate and distinct; if the intention of the accused was to rob, but rape was committed even
before the asportation, the crime is robbery with rape. Art. 294 of the RPC does not distinguish
whether the rape was committed before, during or after the robbery; it suffices that the robbery
was accompanied by rape

In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of robbery
with rape. It can be culled from the evidence presented by the Prosecution that before Hermin
raped AAA, he first ransacked the drawers inside her room and even had a plastic where the things
he took from the drawers and aparador such as her jewelries and cellular phones were placed.
Afterwards, Hermin sat on the bed where AAA was lying and tied, removed her blanket, tore her
T-shirt and underwear then raped her. The primary intention of Hermin was made manifest by his
actions — that is, to rob AAA which precedes his intention to rape her.

120 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ROBBERY WITH RAPE IS PRESENT WHEN ROBBERY IS ACCOMPANIED WITH RAPE;

PROHIBITION OF THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH FOR ROBBERY
WITH RAPE REDUCES PENALTY TO RECLUSION PERPETUA ONLY

People of the Philippines vs. Llamera

G.R. No. 218703; April 23, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming with modification the decision of the
RTC finding Llamera guilty of Robbery with Rape.

Llamera, along with Edwin and Alvin, all with weapons, barged into the house of the victims.
Edwin ordered BBB, the uncle of AAA, to produce money and guns. BBB refused and as a result,
he was hit in the head by Edwin. After ransacking the house, the accused found money, pieces of
jewelry, and a shotgun. Thereafter, when Llamera got tired of mocking and bossing around the
victims, he dragged AAA, the niece of BBB, to the office of BBB. Llamera inserted his left hand into
AAA’s pants and used it to penetrate her vagina. When Llamera ordered AAA to remove her
underwear, Edwin got mad and allowed AAA to leave the office room.

The accused all raised the defense of denial and alibi. Llamera was the only one found
guilty by the RTC of the crime of robbery with rape. Llamera contended that he should not be
convicted because his identity was not established, and that he merely inserted his hands into
AAA’s pants, not vagina.

ISSUE:
Is it correct for the court to convict Llamera of robbery with rape and impose the penalty of
reclusion perpetua?

RULING:
Yes. To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the
taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the
property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.

The first three elements were clearly established by the acts of Llamera, Edwin, and Alvin.
As regards the last element, it was only Llamera who assaulted AAA. He likewise asserted that he
just touched AAA's genitalia and did not insert his finger.

Art. 294 provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when the robbery is
accompanied by rape. In view, however, of the passage of R.A. 9346, prohibiting the imposition of
the death penalty, the trial court and the appellate court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

Hence, the court is correct to convict Llamera of reclusion perpetua as the penalty
constituting robbery with rape.

| 121
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHENEVER RAPE IS COMMITTED AS A CONSEQUENCE, OR ON THE OCCASION OF

A ROBBERY, ALL THOSE WHO TOOK PART THEREIN, ONCE CONSPIRACY IS
PROVED, ARE LIABLE AS PRINCIPALS OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE,
ALTHOUGH NOT ALL OF THEM TOOK PART IN THE RAPE, IF NONE ENDEAVORED
TO PREVENT THE OTHER FROM COMMITTING THE RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Belmonte et. al.

G.R. No. 220889; July 5, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC convicting
accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte of robbery with rape.

Belmonte, together with 2 of his cohorts, armed with guns and a knife, robbed the house
of spouses Dela Cruz during a birthday celebration. After tying the hands of all the persons inside
the house and divesting them of their belongings, Belmonte and his co-accused Noel Baac
proceeded to the maid’s quarters where Noel, at gunpoint, proceeded to have carnal knowledge
of AAA. Belmonte was convicted of robbery with rape with Baac as he had the opportunity but did
not endeavor to stop his co-accused Baac from raping AAA.

Belmonte and his co-accused interposed the defense of alibi alleging that they were at
their house at the time of the incident.

ISSUE:
Is the failure to prevent a co-accused from committing the crime of rape, on the occasion
of a robbery, make one liable as co-principal?

RULING:
Yes, the accused is liable for the crime of Robbery with rape for failing to prevent the
commission of the rape despite having the opportunity to do so.

Once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission of the crime of
robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them on the
occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from
committing the rape. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a
consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as
principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape.

The prosecution's evidence established with certainty that accused-appellant, together

with his brother Marvin, and co-accused Noel, have intruded the house of spouses Dela Cruz.
They aided each other in divesting the guests of Hiroshi of their personal belongings through
violence and intimidation. Furthermore, on the occasion of the robbery, AAA was raped. The
original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, the personal effects of their victims.
Accused-appellant was implicated because he was positively identified as Noel's companion inside
the room where AAA was soundly sleeping. Accused should be convicted of the special complex
crime of robbery with rape even if he did not rape AAA, as he had the opportunity but did not
endeavor to stop accused Noel Baac from raping AAA.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN CASES OF THEFT, THE PENALTY IS BASED ON THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY

STOLEN

People of the Philippines vs. Mejares

G.R. No. 225735; January 10, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming in toto the RTC which found
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft of assets
amounting to P1,056,308.00.

On May 22, 2012, accused Belen Mejares, then a domestic servant of spouses Mark and
Jacqueline Gavino, received a call. When Raquel Torres, a fellow domestic helper, asked her who
called, Mejares said that Jacqueline has met an accident, and that the caller instructed her to get
something from a drawer in the master’s bedroom.

When Mejares emerged from the bedroom, she was holding a plastic hamper containing
a black wallet and some envelopes. Mejares said that Jackie also asked for a watch and some
jewelry because the cash in the drawer was not enough to pay. After preparing such, Mejares left.

An hour after Mejares returned, Torres received phone calls from Jacqueline, who sounded
“loud, normal, and animated”, which caused Torres to wonder if Jacqueline had really undergone
an accident.

The RTC found Mejares guilty of the crime of qualified theft. She was sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua, pursuant to Art. 310 vis-à-vis Art. 209 of the RPC.

ISSUE:
Was the penalty of reclusion perpetua proper?

RULING:
No. The penalty imposed is incorrect by virtue of the enactment of R.A. No. 10951.

This Court affirms with modification the conviction of accused-appellant Belen for the crime
of qualified theft. While this Court finds no reversible error in the ruling that she was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds it necessary to modify the penalty initially imposed upon her.

On August 29, 2017, President Duterte signed R.A. No. 10951 which sought to help
indigent prisoners and individuals accused of committing petty crimes. It increased the fines for
treason and publication of false news. It also increased the baseline amounts and values of
property and damage to make them commensurate to the penalties meted on the offenses
committed in relation to them.

R.A. No. 10951 took effect during the pendency of the case at bar. Because the penalty in
cases of theft depends on the value of the property stolen, the penalty should be based on the
value proven during trial. However, the value of the properties stolen by Mejares were not
determined. As such, the Court applied the minimum penalty under Art. 309 (6) of the RPC, as
amended by Sec. 81 of R.A. No. 10951, which is arresto mayor.

| 123
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THEFT BECOMES QUALIFIED IF COMMITTED BY AN EMPLOYEE ENTRUSTED WITH

CONFIDENCE WHICH HE HAD EXPLOITED TO COMMIT THE CRIME

People of the Philippines vs Sabado

G.R. No. 218910; July 5, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding the
accused Luther Sabado guilty of qualified theft committed against his employer.

Appellant Luther Sabado is an employee of Diamond pawnshop. The shop owners gave
Sabado authority to manage the shop alone, keys to the locks of the shop, and access to the vault
and the combination of the same. However, appellant together with two unidentified men took and
stole an assortment of jewelry and cellular phones belonging to said pawnshop without the owner’s
knowledge and consent.

Accused alleged that a man held him at gunpoint to open the pawnshop’s vault who
thereafter took all its contents. He also claims that he was admitted back to work after the incident
and was even ordered to inventory the contents of the vault and make a cartographic sketch of the
robbers.

ISSUE:
Does robbery committed by an employee who has the keys to the locks of the shop and
access to the vault and knows the combination of the same constitute qualified theft?

RULING:
Yes, theft here became qualified because it was committed with grave abuse of
confidence.

Theft becomes qualified when any of the circumstances under Art. 310 is present. One of
those circumstances is grave abuse of confidence. Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of
theft, must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance,
between the accused-appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of
confidence between them which the accused-appellant abused.

Luther, as established by the prosecution, is an employee of the Pawnshop. He could not

have committed the crime had he not been holding the position of the trusted employee which
gave him not only sole access to the Pawnshop's vault but also control of the premises. The
management of the Pawnshop clearly had reposed its trust and confidence in Luther, and it was
this trust and confidence which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of his
employer.

124 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FALSE PRETENSES AND REPRESENTATIONS MADE PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS

WITH THE COMMISSION OF FRAUD AND RELIANCE THEREON BY PRIVATE
COMPLAINANTS CONSTITUTE THE ELEMENT OF DEFRAUDATION IN THE CRIME OF
SYNDICATED ESTAFA

People of the Philippines vs. Baladjay

G.R. No. 220458; July 26, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding
accused-appellant Rosario Baladjay guilty of syndicated estafa defined and penalized under Art.
315(2)(a) of the RPC in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1689 which increased the penalties for certain
forms of swindling or estafa.

Baladjay, President and Chairman of Multinational Telecom Investors Corporation

(Multitel), and her co-accused are all employees, officers, and/or agents of Multitel, an association
operating on funds solicited from the public. Private complainants alleged that the accused made
representations that that they have the business, property and power to solicit and accept
investments and deposits from the general public and capacity to pay the complainants guaranteed
monthly interest on investment from 5% to 6% and lucrative commissions which induced the
complainants to invest, deposit, give and deliver the total amount of Php7,810,000.00 as
investment or deposit which the accused misappropriated and converted the same to their own
personal benefits to the damage and prejudice of said complainants.

Baladjay interposed the defense of denial and contended that she never knew, met, or
transacted with the private complainants and denied taking the money of the complainants.

ISSUE:
Do the acts of accused Baladjay of soliciting investments from the public promising
guaranteed investments and misappropriating the same constitute syndicated estafa?

RULING:
Yes, the accused committed the crime of syndicated estafa.

The elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined
in Arts. 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang
nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.

The gravamen of syndicated estafa is the employment of fraud or deceit to the damage or
prejudice of another. Here, using Multitel as their conduit, Baladjay and her more than five (5)
counselors employed deceit and falsely pretended to have the authority to solicit investments from
the general public when, in truth, they did not have such authority. The deception continued when
Baladjay's counselors actively solicited investments from the public, promising very high interest
returns starting at five percent (5%) per month. Convinced of Baladjay's and her counselors'
promise of lucrative income, the private complainants were then enticed to invest in Multitel.
However, unknown to them, the promised high-yielding venture was unsustainable, as Multitel was
not really engaged in any legitimate business. Eventually, Baladjay and her cohorts ran away with
the private complainants' money causing them damage and prejudice.

| 125
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

DECEIT AND DAMAGE ARE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN ESTAFA BUT ARE NOT
REQUIRED IN VIOLATIONS OF B.P. BLG. 22

Batac vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 191622; June 06, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Iluminada
Batac (Batac) assailing the Decision of CA affirming the decision of the RTC, finding Batac guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa.

The case started one afternoon when Batac visited Frias together with a certain Erlinda.
Batac was able to persuade Frias to purchase 14 checks at a rediscounted price representing that
the checks were funded. However, Frias was unable to encash the check upon their due date
because the account was already closed. Aggrieved, Frias demanded payment from Batac who
failed to pay the amount of the checks. Thus, Frias instituted a criminal complaint for estafa aganst
Batac.

Batac denies liability for estafa and claimed that at most she is only liable for violating B.P.
Blg. 22. Batac merely insisted that it was Erlinda, not she, who committed the crime, without laying
any basis for such conclusion.

ISSUE:
Should accused be charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 instead of estafa despite finding
that she had committed deceit?

RULING:
No, Batac should be liable for the crime of estafa.

Jurisprudence has consistently held that such estafa consists of the following elements:
(1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time
of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender
has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check;
and (3) the payee has been defrauded.

It has been settled in jurisprudence that in the above-defined form of estafa, it is not the
non-payment of a debt which is made punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance
of a check. Deceit has been defined as "the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by
words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his
legal injury.”

While sourced from the same act, i.e., the issuance of a check subsequently dishonored,
estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are separate and distinct from each other because they pertain
to different causes of action. Deceit and damage are essential elements in Art. 315 (2-d) of the
RPC, but are not required in B.P. Blg. 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is
dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the
same without sufficient funds and hence punishable, which is not so under the RPC.

126 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

MAKING OF FALSE PRETENSES AND REPRESENTATIONS TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC

REGARDING A SUPPOSED LUCRATIVE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY IN ORDER TO
SOLICIT MONEY FROM THEM AND MISAPPROPRIATING THE SAME TO THE
LATTER’S PREJUDICE CONSTITUTES ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315(2)(A)

People of the Philippines vs. Mateo et al.

G.R. No. 210612; October 9, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused assailing the decision of the CA
which affirmed with modification the Judgment of the RTC finding Mateo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of syndicated estafa.

A certain Geraldine Alejandro introduced herself as the head of a company (MMG) to

private complainant to solicit investments. The Articles of partnership showed accused-appellant
as a general partner. The other 4 accused were shown to be limited partners. The complainants,
after investing, received several post-dated checks supposedly covering their investments with
interest. However, when they tried to deposit the checks, their banks informed them that these
were dishonored because MMG's accounts in the bank from which the checks were drawn were
already closed.

Accused insists that he may not be found guilty of violating PD 1689 in relation to estafa
under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC as the element of fraud or deceit is absent

ISSUE:
Does the act of soliciting investments under false pretenses enticing another to invest and
thereafter misappropriating the same constitute estafa by means of deceit under Art. 315(2)(a)?

RULING:
Yes. It has been settled in a number of cases that estafa, as defined under Art. 315 (2)(a)
of the RPC, is one of the kinds of swindling contemplated under P.D. No. 1689.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following: (a) that there must be a false
pretense or fraudulent representation as to his business; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent
representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(c) that the offended party relied on the fraudulent representation; and (d) that, as a result thereof,
the offended party suffered damage. In addition, P.D. No. 1689 qualifies the crime to syndicated
estafa if estafa under Arts. 315 and 316 are committed by a syndicate of five or more persons and
results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.

In the case at hand, such elements were present because; (a) the incorporators/directors
of MMG comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused, made false pretenses
and representations to private complainant regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity
with MMG in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and representations
were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private
complainants invested their hard-earned money into MMG; and (d) the incorporators/directors of
MMG ended up running away with the private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's
prejudice.

| 127
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT UNDER PD NO. 957 DOES NOT BAR A CRIMINAL

COMPLAINT UNDER THE RPC

Facilities, Incorporated vs. Lopez

G.R. No. 208883; February 7, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This petition is for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45, assailing the Decision of the CA.

A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was entered into between Facilities, Inc. (Facilities),
and Development Corporation (PPDC), represented by its developer, President and CEO, Ralph
Lito W. Lopez (Lopez). PPDC is the owner of three lots (subject lots) which it is developing into a
residential subdivision project known as Tagaytay Woodsborough Residential Estate; while
Facilities is the registered owner of Units 1601 and 1602 (condominium units) of Summit One
Office Tower located at 530 Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City. On even date, the parties
executed a Contract to Sell over the subject lots and Contract of Lease over the condominium
units.

Facilities followed-up on PPDC's commitment to deliver the TCTs over the subject lots.
Despite repeated demands, PPDC failed to comply with its contractual obligation and instead
vacated the leased premises without leaving any forwarding address. Later on, Facilities
discovered that contrary to PPDC's representation, the title over the subject lots was still registered
in the name of a certain Primo Erni. Lopez insists that Facilities' remedy is purely civil in nature.
Instead of filing a criminal complaint for estafa, Lopez claims that Facilities could have exhausted
the remedy under the MOA, and the Contract to Sell, by demanding that the contract be rescinded
and that PPDC be ordered to pay P2,384,985.60.

ISSUE:
May the criminal charge for estafa proceed together with the criminal action for violation of
PD 957?

RULING:
Yes, the criminal charge for estafa may proceed together with the criminal action for
violation of PD 957.

In this case, there is evidence showing that more likely than not Lopez violated Sec. 25 of
P.D. No. 957 and committed acts constitutive of the crime of estafa under paragraph 1, Art. 316 of
the RPC. Sec. 25 of P.D. No. 957, requires a developer, such as PPDC, of which Lopez is the
President and CEO, to deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer, upon full payment of the said
lot or unit. Indeed, the failure to comply with this explicit obligation makes the developer or the
person who was charged of the administration of the business, criminally liable pursuant to Sec.
39 of P.D. No. 957.

Contrary to Lopez's stance, a suit for the violation of P.D. No. 957 is independent from
whatever remedy granted under the MOA, i.e., rescission of the Contract to Sell, or under existing
laws, which obviously includes the provisions of the RPC. A perusal of P.D. No. 957 reveals that
a violation of its provisions may be the subject of a criminal action, and not merely limited to a civil
remedy. The decree expressly recognizes that the aggrieved party may avail of the remedies
provided not only in P.D. No. 957, but also under existing laws. Corollarily, Lopez may likewise be
held criminally liable under the RPC. Paragraph 1, Art. 316 of the RPC penalizes a person who
pretends to be the owner of a real property and sells the same.

128 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

A PERSON MAY BE CHARGED AND CONVICTED FOR BOTH ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

AND ESTAFA SIMULTANEOUSLY

People of the Philippines vs. Racho

G.R. No. 227505; October 2, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused assailing the decision of the CA
which affirmed the decision of the RTC convicting Racho of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and
six (6) counts of Estafa under Art. 315 paragraph 2 (a).

Accused herein was alleged to have recruited and promised employment or job placement
to and collected fees from 16 contract workers, without first obtaining any license/authority from
the POEA or by the DOLE to recruit workers for overseas employment.

Accused denied the charges against her and argued that she was an auditor of PET Plans,
Inc. from March 23, 2000 to August 31, 2005, making it highly unlikely for her to have engaged in
the business of recruitment and promised employment abroad.

ISSUE:
May the accused be held guilty of both Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa
simultaneously?

RULING:
Yes. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum,
while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative.

A person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without the requisite
authority is engaged in illegal recruitment. The definition of "recruitment and placement" under Art.
13 (b) of the Labor Code includes promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not, provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement. Thus, Racho's act of offering and promising to deploy the complainants to East
Timor for work and collecting placement fees from more than three (3) persons, despite not being
authorized to do so, renders her liable for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.

On the other hand, Estafa by means of deceit is committed when these elements concur:
(a) the accused used fictitious name or false pretense that he possesses power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or other similar deceits;
(b) he used such deceitful means prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (c) the
offended party relied on such deceitful means to part with his money or property; and (d) the
offended party suffered damage.

Records show that Racho defrauded five people by representing that she can provide them
with jobs in East Timor even though she had no license to recruit workers for employment abroad.
She even collected the irrelevant documents and placement fees of varying amounts. When they
returned to the country and looked for Racho, complainants could not locate her to recover the
amounts they paid.

| 129
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE CRIME COMMITTED IS ARSON ONLY, OR

MURDER, OR ARSON AND HOMICIDE OR MURDER, AS THE CASE MAY BE, THE MAIN
OBJECTIVE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE DETERMINED

People of the Philippines vs. Cacho

G.R. No. 218425; September 27, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
For automatic review is the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC
finding Wilson Cacho guilty of the crimes of Murder and Destructive Arson.

Police officers received an information that a house located in a certain sitio in the province
of Rizal caught fire. Upon investigation, the officers discovered a burned body of a headless man
underneath an iron sheet. The informant revealed that it was his brother, accused herein, who
killed the headless man. Accused’s wife likewise told the police officers that her husband was a
patient of National Center for Mental Health and has a recurring mental illness.

The police officers went to the house of accused where they saw a shallow pit with a steel
peg standing at the center, which they believed was used to burn a head because there were
traces of ash and a human skull on top of the heap of charcoal. The police officers then saw
accused in his backyard. He admitted killing the victim and burning his house but did not say why
he did it.

Accused claims that he should liable only for the crime of murder and not both crimes of
murder and arson since the finding that the burning of the house was an attempt to conceal the
killing has no factual basis.

ISSUE:
Is the accused guilty of arson, murder, homicide or separate crimes of arson and homicide
or murder, as the case may be?

RULING:
Accused is liable for two separate crimes of homicide and destructive arson as the
accused-appellant burned the house of the victim in order to hide or conceal the commission of
the crime. It was established that accused-appellant first beheaded the victim before setting the
latter's house on fire.

In order to determine the crime committed, the main objective of the accused is to be
examined. If the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason
or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed. If,
on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or
edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is
murder only. Lastly, if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender
has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two
separate and distinct crimes committed--homicide/murder and arson.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

SQUEEZING, WHICH SIGNIFIES THAT THE ACT WAS INTENTIONAL, THE PRIVATE
PART OF A CHILD WHO IS UNDER 12 YEARS OLD SIGNIFIES LEWD OR INDECENT
DESIGN AND CONSTITUTES ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS AND LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT
UNDER ART. 336 OF THE RPC, AS AMENDED, IN RELATION TO SEC. 5(B) OF R.A. NO.
7610

People of the Philippines vs Ladra

G.R. No. 221443; July 17, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC convicting
accused-appellant Dominador Ladra of the crime of rape and unjust vexation.

AAA, only five (5) years old at the time of the rape incidents, testified that she was
repeatedly molested by Ladra, also always carrying a bolo during the molestations. AAA – who
was already twelve (12) years old at the time – again encountered Ladra at their house’s kitchen
where the latter allegedly suddenly squeezed her vagina.

Ladra denied the charges and claimed that AAA's family were merely angry at him when
he left their house, leaving no one to attend to their errands. He further argues that he could not
have committed the rape in the presence of AAA's younger brother, who slept beside her.

ISSUE:
Does the act of squeezing the private part of a child constitute lewd or indecent design
warranting conviction for acts of lasciviousness and lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610?

RULING:
Yes, the mere fact of "squeezing" the private part of a child — a young girl 12 years of age
— could not have signified any other intention but one having lewd or indecent design.

Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC has the following elements: (a) that the
offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) that it is done under any of the
following circumstances: x x x and (iv) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and (c) that
the offended party is another person of either sex.

Also, an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Sec. 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610, provided the requisites of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under
Art. 336 of the RPC is met and, in addition: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse; and (3) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

The intentional touching of the genitalia with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person constitutes lascivious conduct. Furthermore,
“lewd” is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality
which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner

In the case at bar, AAA was then 12 years old at the time of the commission of the
lascivious act. Therefore, accused-appellant, an adult who exercised influence on the victim,
committed a lewd and lascivious act by "squeezing" AAA’s vagina.

Thus, accused-appellant Ladra is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

MERE ACT OF TOUCHING A FEMALE SEXUAL ORGAN IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO RAPE

Lutap vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 204061; February 5, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
Through this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner Edmisael C. Lutap
seeks the reversal of the Decision of the CA finding petitioner guilty of attempted rape.

Petitioner, who was known as "Egay", frequently visits the house of AAA’ who was at the
time of the incident, only six (6) years old, being the best friend of AAA's father. One day, petitioner
touched AAA's vagina. AAA reacted by swaying off his hand. BBB saw petitioner using his middle
finger in touching AAA's vagina. Upon seeing this, BBB said "Kuya Egay, bad iyan, wag mong
kinikiliti ang pepe ni Ate. " BBB then went to where DDD the mother and told her that petitioner is
bad because he is tickling AAA's vagina. DDD then called AAA, brought her inside the room and
asked her if it were true that petitioner tickled her vagina. AAA answered, "but I swayed his hand,
Mama." DDD again asked AAA how many times have petitioner tickled her vagina and AAA
answered, "many times in petitioner's house" and that he also "let her go on the bed, remove her
panty, open her legs and lick her vagina."

In defense, petitioner denied the accusations against him. Petitioner testified that he merely
pacified AAA and BBB who were quarreling over the text cards. Petitioner denied having touched
AAA and suggested that AAA be examined. The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was similarly denied by the CA. Hence, the instant recourse.

ISSUE:
Is the mere act of touching the vagina sufficient to establish the crime of rape?

RULING:
No, mere act of touching the vagina is not sufficient to establish the crime of rape.

Here, the fact of insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's sexual organ was not established
beyond reasonable doubt to support petitioner's conviction of rape by sexual assault. There was
sexual molestation by petitioner's established act of touching AAA's vagina. Be that as it may, the
act of touching a female's sexual organ, standing alone, is not equivalent to rape, not even an
attempted one. At most, therefore, petitioner's act of touching AAA's sexual organ demonstrates
his guilt for the crime of acts of lasciviousness, an offense subsumed in the charge of rape by
sexual assault.

Rape, under Art. 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 or the "Anti-Rape Law
of 1997" can be committed in two ways: Art. 266-A paragraph 1 refers to rape through sexual
intercourse, the central element of which is carnal knowledge which must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt; and Art. 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault which must be
attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.

Since there was neither an insertion nor an attempt to insert petitioner's finger into AAA's
genitalia, petitioner can only be held guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness following
the variance doctrine enunciated under Sec. 4 in relation to Sec. 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Acts of lasciviousness, the offense proved, is included in rape, the offense
charged. Thus, absent any showing that there was actual insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's
vagina, petitioner cannot be held liable for consummated rape by sexual assault.

132 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN DETERMINING THE PROPER NOMENCLATURE OF THE CRIME (R.A. NO. 7610 OR

ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS), THE AGE OF THE VICTIM SHALL BE TAKEN INTO
CONSIDERATION

People of the Philippines vs. Ursua

G.R. No. 218575; October 4, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the decision of the
RTC convicting accused Francis Ursua of qualified rape and acts of lasciviousness.

Three separate charges of qualified rape were filed against Ursua for three separate
occurrences.First, one evening, while Ursua, drunk, was sleeping in one bed with her daughter
AAA, he undressed her, touched her vagina, held her breast, and afterwards he inserted his penis
in her vagina. Due to threats, AAA merely cried—she did not shout, resist, or ask her father to stop.
Second, the same series of acts were done by Ursua to AAA early dawn the next day. And third,
later in the evening, Ursua once more held AAA's breasts and vagina and placed himself on top of
her.

Ursua denied having any carnal knowledge of AAA. However, in view of the failure of the
prosecution to prove the fact of penile penetration with regard to the alleged rape, the appellate
court downgraded the offense to acts of lasciviousness.

ISSUE:
Is accused guilty of qualified rape when there was no specific mention of a penetration of
Ursua's penis or fingers into AAA' vagina, and is the CA correct in convicting the accused with acts
of lasciviousness considering that there was no penetration?

RULING:
No. The proper nomenclature for the third charge is sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 or
the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, not of acts
of lasciviousness. The following guidelines must be followed in determining the proper
nomenclature of the crime committed:

1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating the offense, and in
determining the imposable penalty.
2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts
of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen
(18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself
or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct
or Sexual Abuse under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.”

Considering that the victim in this case was 14 years old at the time of the commission of
the crime, accordingly, Ursua should be convicted of sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of R.A.
No. 7610, and not just acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC, in relation to the same
provision of R.A. No. 7610.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IF A CHILD UNDER 12 YEARS OF AGE IS SUBJECTED TO SEXUAL ABUSE THROUGH

LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT, THE OFFENDER SHOULD BE PROSECUTED UNDER ART. 336
OF THE RPC, BUT SUFFER THE HIGHER PENALTY PROVIDED IN R.A. No. 7610

Fianza vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 218592; August 2, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which assails the decision of the CA affirming
the decision of the RTC convicting Christopher Fianza of two (2) counts of violation of Sec.
5(b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as the “Special Protection of Children against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act”.

Petitioner Christopher Fianza called AAA, who was then 11 years old, to his house.
Then, he asked her to go with him to the kamalig. From there, they proceeded to the second
floor where petitioner removed his pants and briefs, lied down, and ordered AAA to hold his
penis and masturbate him. After ejaculating, Fianza put on his clothes, and gave P20.00 to
AAA who, thereafter, went home. After some time, petitioner asked AAA to clean his house
and when AAA was finished sweeping the floor, they went to kamalig. Again, Fianza removed
his and brief and ordered AAA to fondle his penis.

On the other hand, petitioner Fianza interposed the defense of denial and alibi.

ISSUE:
Is it necessary that for an accused to be convicted of child abuse through lascivious
conduct on a minor below 12 years of age under R.A. No. 7610, the requisites for Acts of
Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual
abuse thereunder?

RULING:
Yes, before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on
a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for Acts of Lasciviousness must be met.

Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 7610 provides that “Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under 12 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Art. 335, par. 3, for rape and Art. 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, of the RPC, for
rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be”. The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness are:
(a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) the lascivious act is done
under any of the following circumstances: (i) by using force or intimidation; (ii) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party
is under twelve (12) years of age; and (c) the offended party is another person of either sex.
On the other hand, sexual abuse, as defined under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610 has
three (3) elements: (a) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(b) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and (c) the child is below 18years old.

In this case, Fianza induced AAA, an 11-year-old minor, to hold his penis and
masturbate him. Records likewise indicate that Fianza was about 35 years old at the time of
the commission of the offense, or 24 years older than AAA, more or less. The age disparity
between them clearly placed Fianza in a stronger position over AAA which enabled him to
wield his will on the latter.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

UTTERING DEFAMATORY WORDS IN THE HEAT OF ANGER, WITH SOME

PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE OFFENDED PARTY CONSTITUTES ONLY A
SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION

Ramos vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 226454; November 20, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the decisions of the CA which affirmed
with modification the conviction of petitioner for the crime of Grave Oral Defamation.

Private complainant Dumaua was watering her plants in her yard, when suddenly, she
noticed five (5) schoolchildren pick up dried leaves and throw them into her yard. When Dumaua
called the attention of the children, the latter ran towards the direction of Sto. Nino Elementary
School, where Ramos works as a public school teacher. A quarrel between Ramos and Dumaua
transpired where Ramos told the latter "Vulva of your mother, prostitute, illiterate, you built a very
big house, it overshadows my house." This was corroborated by Orlando Baltazar and Babileo
Dumaua, who testified that they were watching television inside Dumaua's house when the
commotion ensued.

For her defense, Ramos denied making any derogatory remarks against Dumaua and
contended that it was Dumaua who got angry at her while she was just passing through a pathway
adjacent to Dumaua's house, blamed her for the garbage in her yard, and threatened her not to
use the pathway or else something will happen. Ramos's testimony was then corroborated by her
husband, who stated that he was waiting for his wife to go home when he noticed a commotion
involving her.

ISSUE:
Does uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of
the offended party, constitute grave oral defamation?

RULING:
No. The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the
accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents
or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention
of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of
anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.

It must be pointed out that Dumaua's claim to that effect was not supported by her
corroborative witnesses whose testimonies only pertain to matters transpiring during the height of
the verbal altercation as they were inside the house when the fight started. Absent such evidence,
the Court is inclined to lend more credence to Ramos's narration that she was just passing through
a pathway adjacent to Dumaua's house when the latter got mad at her; and warned her not to use
the pathway anymore or else something will happen to her - all of which resulted in the two of them
hurling invectives against one another. Thus, it may safely be concluded that while Ramos indeed
said defamatory words against Dumaua, the utterances were made in the heat of anger and were
with some sort of provocation on the part of the latter. As such, the Court is constrained to hold
that Ramos is only guilty of the crime of Slight Oral Defamation.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS THAT CONTAIN DEFAMATORY

IMPUTATIONS ARE NOT ACTIONABLE UNLESS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN MADE
WITHOUT GOOD INTENTION OR JUSTIFIABLE MOTIVE

Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp. vs. Domingo

G.R. No. 170341; July 5, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner seeks
to nullify the decision of the CA which affirmed the RTC finding respondent guilty of Libel.

Batuigas wrote two articless for the Manila Bulletin. The first article dealt with a letter-
complaint of the Waray employees of the DTI which accused respondent Domingo of dereliction
of duties. Batuigas’ second article contained statements of the alleged lousy performance of
respondent. Finding these articles as offensive, respondent filed a complaint for libel against
petitioners.

Batuigas contended that his work is an exposé, a product of investigative work. Likewise,
he claimed that he only came to know of Domingo when he received several letter-complaints
against respondent. He presumed that the copies of the complaints were those already filed before
the CSC and Ombudsman and found them to be of public interest which caused him to write about
it in his articles.

ISSUE:
Does the writing of the said articles against a public figure constitute the crime of libel?

RULING:
No, the two articles written by Batuigas are qualifiedly privileged and hence, are
unactionable and cannot constitute the crime of libel.

For an imputation to be libelous under Art. 353 of the RPC, the following requisites must
be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and
(d) the victim must be identifiable. However, those articles which are qualifiedly privileged, although
containing defamatory imputations, are not actionable. Qualifiedly privileged communications are
those which contain defamatory imputations but which are not actionable unless found to have
been made without good intention or justifiable motive, and to which "private communications" and
"fair and true report without any comments or remarks" belong. The conduct, moral fitness, and
ability of a public official to discharge his duties are undoubtedly matters of public interest for he
is, after all, legally required to be at all times accountable to the people and is expected to discharge
his duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty; and to act with patriotism
and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest.

The statements on the "lousy performance" and "mismanagement" of Domingo are matters
of public interest as these relate to his moral conduct, his capacity to lead the DTI Region VIII
employees, and to manage and supervise the affairs of the office. These statements are fair and
true reports without any comments or remarks and undoubtedly are qualifiedly privileged
communication and thus, would require actual malice to be actionable. In this case, there was no
proof of actual malice on the part of Batuigas.

136 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

P.D. NO. 1612 CREATES A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF FENCING FROM EVIDENCE
OF POSSESSION BY THE ACCUSED OF ANY GOOD, ARTICLE, ITEM, OBJECT OR
ANYTHING OF VALUE, WHICH HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ROBBERY OR THEFT

Cahulogan vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 225695; March 21, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari led by petitioner Cahulogan assailing the decision
by the CA on the complaint by Johnson Tan (Tan) which affirmed the RTC of Cagayan De Oro
City convicting petitioner of the crime of fencing defined and penalized under P.D. 1612 or "Anti-
Fencing Law of 1979."

Private complainant Tan, a businessman of Coca-Cola products, instructed his truck driver
and helper, Lopez and Lariosa, to deliver 210 cases of Coca-Cola products worth P52,476.00 to
Demins Store. The next day, Tan discovered that they delivered the products to petitioner’s store.
Tan went to petitioner and told him the mistake of delivery and he was pulling out the products.
However, petitioner claimed that he bought them from Lariosa for P50,000.00, but could not
present a receipt as evidence. Tan asserted that Lariosa had no authority to sell the same to
petitioner, but the latter still refused which led Tan to charge petitioner with the crime of Fencing.

RTC found that all the elements of the crime of Fencing were established. CA affirmed and
held that the possession of the stolen items by petitioner constituted a prima facie evidence of
fencing—a presumption petitioner failed to rebut.

ISSUE:
Was Cahulogan guilty of the crime of fencing by his possession of stolen products?

RULING:
Yes. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (a) a crime of robbery
or theft has been committed; (b) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything
of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (c) the accused
knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (d) there is, on the part of one accused,
intent to gain for oneself or for another. Notably, Fencing is a malum prohibitum and PD 1612
creates a prima facie presumption of Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any
good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft, thus,
giving the Court no reason to overturn the conviction.

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found the presence of all the elements of the crime
of Fencing as it was shown that: (a) Lariosa sold to petitioner the subject items without authority
and consent from his employer, Tan, for his own personal gain, and abusing the trust and
confidence reposed upon him as a truck helper; (b) petitioner bought the subject items from Lariosa
and was in possession of the same; (c) under the circumstances, petitioner should have been
forewarned that the subject items came from an illegal source, as his transaction with Lariosa did
not have any accompanying delivery and official receipts, and that the latter did not demand that
such items be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common practice among dealers of soft
drinks; and (d) petitioner's intent to gain was made evident by the fact that he bought the subject
items for just P50,000.00, lower than their value in the amount of P52,476.00.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ABSENT ANY PROOF TO THE CONTRARY, THERE IS A PRESUMPTION THAT

OFFICIALS REGULARLY EXERCISED SOUND BUSINESS JUDGMENT TO SAFEGUARD
THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT

Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 195962; April 18, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) dismissing the complaint for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.

On 8 October 1992, then President Ramos issued AO No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). In its Report, the Committee reported
that the loans obtained by Philippine Pigment and Resin Corporation (PPRC) from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) possessed positive characteristics of behest loans.

The complaint filed before the OMB alleges that PPRC was able to obtain two (2) foreign
currency loans from DBP. The said loans were secured by collaterals valued at PhP17,615,685.00
and 64% thereof consisted of yet-to-be-acquired assets. It also alleged that said accounts are
indeed behest loans and the same would have not been extended or granted to PPRC had it not
been for the manifest partiality bestowed upon it by the Board of Governors of DBP. The OMB
conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued its now assailed Resolution dismissing
petitioner's complaint for lack of probable cause to warrant private respondents’ indictment.

ISSUE:
Were the transactions done with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable
negligence?

RULING:
No, the elements of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence
are lacking and petitioner failed to prove that the questioned foreign currency loans granted by the
DBP to PPRC were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

The essential elements of violation of Sec. 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019 are: 1. The accused is a
public officer discharging official, administrative or judicial functions or private persons in
conspiracy with them; 2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of
his official duty or in relation to his public position; 3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 4. His action caused injury to the
Government or any private party, or gave unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. To
determine the culpability of private respondents under Sec. 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019, it must be
established that: (1) they are public officers; (2) they entered into a contract or transaction on behalf
of the government; and (3) such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government.

The approval of the foreign currency loans of PPRC by the DBP Board of Governors in
January 1978 was a collective act in the exercise of its sound business judgment and was in strict
and full compliance with the DBP Charter and all other existing bank policies, rules and regulations.
Furthermore, while petitioner pointed to how the Committee was able to conclude that the foreign
currency loans were behest loans, it failed to discuss the specific participation or acts of each of
private respondents constituting violation of Sec. 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.

138 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE PRESENCE OF THE TRAFFICKER'S CLIENTS IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME

OF RECRUITMENT OR TRANSPORTATION OF VICTIMS UNDER R.A. No. 9208. THE
LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE VICTIMS BE TRANSPORTED TO OR BE FOUND
IN A BROTHEL OR A PROSTITUTION DEN FOR SUCH CRIME OF RECRUITMENT OR
TRANSPORTATION TO BE COMMITTED

People of the Philippines vs. Aguirre et al.

G.R. No. 219952; November 20, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed the conviction of accused for
Qualified Trafficking in Persons, as rendered by the RTC.

The accused, together with one Jeffrey Roxas, in conspiracy with one another, convinced
ten girls, seven of whom are minors, to go swimming and drinking, and to have sex, with foreigners
in exchange for money and/or shabu.

Before bringing them to the hotel where the foreigners could be found, the girls were first
brought in an apartment. After a while, several people, who identified themselves as police officers,
appeared and arrested accused and Roxas. The police officers were members of the CIDG-WPD
who acted on information from a civilian informant of “Tutok-Tulfo.” Four of the ten girls testified in
Court against accused. Their testimonies showed that at different times on November 16, 2010,
they were convinced by accused-appellants to go swimming and drinking, and to have sex, with
foreigners in exchange for money and/or shabu.

Accused contend that there was no evidence that said apartment was a brothel or a
prostitution den, hence they should be acquitted of the crime charged.

ISSUE:
Is the prosecution bound to prove that the place where the arrest was effected was a
brothel or a prostitution den?

RULING:
No. It must be noted that the presence of the trafficker's clients is not an element of the
crime of recruitment or transportation of victims under Secs. 3 (a) and 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9208. In
the same vein, the law does not require that the victims be transported to or be found in a brothel
or a prostitution den for such crime of recruitment or transportation to be committed.

In fact, it has been held that the act of sexual intercourse need not have been
consummated for recruitment to be said to have taken place. It is sufficient that the accused has
lured, enticed or engaged its victims or transported them for the established purpose of
exploitation, which includes prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, and the removal
or sale of organs. In this case, the absence of foreigners in the apartment was due to the fact that
said place was not the ultimate destination for the sex-trafficked victims. As AAA testified, private
complainants "were at the apartment only to rest, after which they would proceed to a hotel to meet
these foreigners.

With this, it could be said that the prosecution has satisfactorily established accused-
appellants' recruitment and transportation of private complainants for purposes of prostitution and
sexual exploitation.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THERE IS FRAUD OR DECEPTION WHEN THE ACCUSED LURED VICTIMS FOR

PURPOSES OF UNLAWFUL TRAFFICKING AS SLAVES, INVOLUNTARY SERVANTS, OR
PROSTITUTES BY PROMISING THEM LAWFUL EMPLOYMENT AS HOUSEHELPERS

People of the Philippines vs. Nangcas

G.R. No. 218806; June 13, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of CA affirming RTC decision on finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.

As stated in the information, by means of fraud, deception, and taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the victims, Gloria Nangcas willfully and unlawfully recruited, transported and
transferred four (4) women, 3 of whom were minors aged 13-17, for the purpose of offering and
selling said victims for forced labor, slavery or involuntary servitude. She did so by promising them
local employment as house helpers in Cagayan De Oro City. However, said accused brought them
to Marawi City and sold them for PhP1,600.00. CA affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE:
Was fraud or deception employed by Nangcas?

RULING:
Yes, the accused-appellant employed fraud and deception. It is immaterial that the victims
consented.

Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208 defines Trafficking in persons as “the recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person x x x” Under Sec. 6(a), the crime, punished under Sec. 4, is qualified
when the victim is a minor.

Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which
deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.

Fraud is every kind of deception whether in the form of insidious machinations,

manipulations, concealments or misrepresentations, for the purpose of leading another party into
error and thus execute a particular act.

It is clear that actual fraud and deception are present in this case, such as when Nangcas
induced and coaxed the victims to go with her. She promised the victims and their parents that
their daughters would be working within Cagayan De Oro City, with an enticing salary of P1,500.00
per month. Nangcas specifically employed several deceptive tactics to lure the victims and their
parents into agreeing to take the victims, who were mostly minors. The record shows that Nangcas'
decision to bring the victims to Marawi City was planned, contrary to her defense that she only
took them there after the supposed employer in Iligan changed her mind to accept them as her
house helpers.

140 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS MAY BE COMMITTED ALSO BY MEANS OF TAKING

ADVANTAGE OF THE PERSONS’ VULNERABILITY AS MINORS EVEN IN THE ABSENCE
OF THREAT, FORCE, COERCION OR FRAUD

People of the Philippines vs. De Dios

G.R. No. 234018; June 6, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA Decision, which affirmed the RTC Decision, finding accused-
appellant Evangeline De Dios y Barreto (De Dios) guilty for violation of Sec. 3 (a), in relation to
Sec. 6 (a), of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, as amended by R.A. No. 10364.

The prosecution alleged that De Dios peddled AAA, a 16-year old, to Gay and two other
male customers for sexual trade in Marikina City. De Dios introduced herself as “Vangie” and asked
if Gay wanted to have “gimiks” or sex with a girl for P500. Negotiations ensued between them. She
selected AAA among the three girls that was with her. However, it turned out it was an entrapment
operation to arrest De Dios and Gay was actually an Intelligence Agent of the DOJ. The Anti-
Human Trafficking Division of the NBI received information prior to the operation that she was
peddling minors for sexual trade under the bridge at Marikina River Park. AAA confirmed the
accusation against De Dios when she testified for the prosecution during trial.

The RTC found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified trafficking of persons. The
CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. De Dios insists on an acquittal, as she claims that (1) AAA
voluntarily peddled herself near Marikina bridge for sexual services and (2) there was no threat,
force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or abuse of power that was established in the case.

ISSUE:
Was threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or abuse of power necessary to
consider an act as Trafficking as provided under the law?

RULING:
No. The Court reiterated the following elements of the offense in People v. Hirang, as
derived from Sec. 3 (a) of R.A. No. 9208: (1) The act of recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge; (2) The means
used which include taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another"; and (3)
The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes sexual exploitation.

It did not matter that there was no threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or
abuse of power that was employed by De Dios when she involved AAA in her illicit sexual trade.
AAA was still a minor when she was exposed to prostitution by the prodding, promises and acts of
De Dios. Trafficking in persons may be committed also by means of taking advantage of the
persons' vulnerability as minors, a circumstance that applied to AAA, was sufficiently alleged in the
information and proved during the trial. This element was further achieved through the offer of
financial gain for the illicit services that were provided by AAA to the customers of De Dios.

| 141
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

VARIANCE DOCTRINE ALLOWS THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCUSED FOR A CRIME

PROVED WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM BUT NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE CRIME
CHARGED

Melgar vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 223477; February 14, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA which affirmed
the Judgment RTC finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sec. 5 (e) of R.A. No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and
their Children Act of 2004."

AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which resulted in the birth of BBB, an
illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB. When BBB was just about one
year old, Melgar stopped giving support, prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was
eventually granted. However, Melgar still refused to give support to her and BBB. Thus, AAA was
constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar.

To absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar argues, that he was charged of violation
of Sec. 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262, a form of psychological violence, as the Information alleged that the
acts complained of "caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA]
and her son [BBB]." Thus, he contends that he cannot be convicted of violation of Sec. 5 (e) or
economic abuse of R.A. No. 9262.

ISSUE:
Was the conviction of the accused under Sec. 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 proper despite being
charged under Sec 5 (e) of the same law?

RULING:
Yes. Sec. 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262, a form of psychological violence, punishes the act of
"causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.

Notably, "psychological violence is an element of violation of Sec. 5 (i) just like the mental
or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by
the offended party.

In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and
BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or
BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Sec.
5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262. This notwithstanding — and taking into consideration the variance doctrine
which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily
included in the crime charged— the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Sec. 5
(e) of R.A. No. 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional
element of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein.

142 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHAT IS MATERIAL IN B.P. BLG. 22 CASES IS THE DATE OF ISSUANCE OF THE

CHECKS WHICH APPEAR ON THEIR FACE, AND NOT THE EXACT DATE OF THE
DELIVERY OR SIGNING THEREOF

Lim vs. People of the Philippines and Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc.
G.R. No. 224979; December 13, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA, which denied
petitioner Ivy Lim's petition for review, and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The RTC affirmed the
Joint decision of the MeTC which found Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of
violation of BP 22.

Private respondent Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc. (BPHI) granted Rochelle Benito a loan
amounting to P1,149,500 as evidenced by a promissory note acknowledged before a notary public.
Petitioner Lim signed as a co-maker of her sister Benito. To secure payment of the loan, Benito
and Lim issued eleven (11) Equitable PCI Bank checks with a face value of P67,617.65 each, or
a total amount of P743,794.15. Later on, 10 of these 11 checks were dishonored when presented
for payment for having been drawn against a closed account. BPHI sent Lim various demand
letters, but to no avail.

For her part, Lim raised the defense, among others, that she could not have signed and
issued the checks on July 29, 2003 in the presence of BPHI Finance Officer Juanito Enriquez
because she was then abroad as shown by the Certification of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation.

ISSUE:
Did the appellate court err in holding petitioner liable for 10 counts of violations of BP 22?

RULING:
No, all the elements of violation of BP 22 were established beyond reasonable doubt by
the prosecution, to wit: 1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or
for value; 2. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reasons, ordered the bank to stop payment; and 3. The accused knows at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for payment
of the check in full upon its presentment.

As to the first element, the Court finds that the checks were issued for value where
petitioner is a signatory along with her sister in favor of Blue Pacific. As to the second element, the
evidence shows that the ten (10) checks were presented for payment and subsequently
dishonored for the reason "Account Closed". As to the third element, the demand letter dated May
18, 2005 addressed to Ivy Benito Lim and signed by Juanito Enriquez was undisputedly received
by Ivy Lim.

With regard to her denial and alibi that she was abroad when she supposedly signed the
10 checks, the MeTC correctly noted that (1) the unresolved issue is when these checks were
issued and delivered to BPHI, and (2) the fact that the checks were issued is not an issue, as the
existence of the checks and signatures of the accused on these checks are uncontroverted. What
is material in B.P. Blg. 22 cases is the date of issuance of the checks which appear on their face,
and not the exact date of the delivery or signing thereof.

| 143
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECS. 5, 11 AND 12 OF R.A. No. 9165, THE CORPUS DELICTI IS THE
DANGEROUS DRUG ITSELF, THE EXISTENCE OF WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION

People of the Philippines vs. Arposeple and Sulogaol

G.R. No. 205787; November 22, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of CA affirming the decision of RTC holding accused-
appellants guilty of violation of Sec. 5, 11 and 12 of R.A. No. 9165, but with modification as to the
fine imposed.

A buy-bust operation was conducted, and the accused was thereafter charged with three
counts of violation of R.A. No. 9165 for sale and illegal possession of shabu and illegal drug
paraphernalia. RTC and CA convicted them.

On appeal, they argue that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Based on the records of the case, Ramos, Tabuelog, and Jimenez failed to explain how
and when the seized items were marked.

ISSUE:
Was the corpus delicti properly established?

RULING:
No. Equally significant as establishing all the elements of violations of R.A. 9165 is proving
that there was no hiatus in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs and paraphernalia.

It would be useless to still proceed to determine the existence of the elements of the crime
if the corpus delicti had not been proven beyond moral certainty. Irrefragably, the prosecution
cannot prove its case for violation of the provisions of R.A. 9165 when the seized items could not
be accounted for or when there were significant breaks in their chain of custody that would cast
doubt as to whether those items presented in court were actually those that were seized.

In all prosecutions for violation of R.A. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself,
the existence of which is essential to a judgment of conviction, thus, its identity must be clearly
established.

In this case, nothing was mentioned in the certificate of inventory as to the marking of the
seized items. True, there were already markings on the seized items when these were submitted
to the laboratory for examination but not one of the prosecution witnesses testified as to who had
made the markings, how and when the items were marked, and the meaning of these markings.
Conspicuously, the uncertainty exceedingly pervades that the items presented as evidence against
the appellants were exactly those seized during the buy-bust operation. The breaches in the
procedure provided in Sec. 21, R.A. 9165 committed by the police officers, and left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the appellants as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
had been compromised.

144 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FOR THERE TO BE CONVICTION OF MAINTAINING A DRUG DEN UNDER SEC. 6 OF

R.A. NO. 9165, THE PROSECUTION MUST ESTABLISH THAT THE ACCUSED IS
MAINTAINING A DEN WHERE ANY DANGEROUS DRUG IS ADMINISTERED, USED, OR
SOLD

People of the Philippines vs. Galicia

G.R. No. 218402; February 14, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by Ramil Galicia (appellant) assailing the Decision of the CA which
affirmed the the Decision of the RTC finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Secs. 6, 11, 12, and 15, Art. II of R.A. No. No. 9165.

Galicia was charged with maintaining a drug den punishable under Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
9165. He was arrested during a raid in Mapayapa Compound. Armed with a search warrant, police
operatives searched the numerous shanties inside the compound. Appellant and his wife were in
his shanty during the search. Appellant was sitting in front of drug paraphernalia when the team
started to conduct its search. In the course of the search, the team was able to find and seize from
the appellant plastic sachets containing crystalline substances, weighing scale, cellphone,
assorted lighters, wallet containing dollars and a few coins, aluminum foil, and assorted cutters
and scissors.

For his defense, appellant claimed that he was with his pregnant wife on their way to a
hospital for a check-up when men in uniform who looked like soldiers stopped them and ordered
them to inside the Mapayapa Compound. He was then ordered to join a group of men who were
arrested and were lying face down on the ground. They were all brought to Camp Crame and were
thereafter processed and were charged with various violations under R.A. No. 9165.

ISSUE:
Should the conviction of the appellant under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 9165 be upheld?

RULING:
No. For an accused to be convicted of maintenance of a drug den, the prosecution must
establish with proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is maintaining a den where any
dangerous drug is administered, used, or sold. It must be established that the alleged drug den is
a place where dangerous drugs are regularly sold to and/or used by customers of the maintainer
of the den.

The prosecution must show that the place he is maintaining is a den, dive, or resort where
dangerous drugs are used or sold in any form. Hence, two things must be established, thus: (a)
that the place is a den — a place where any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential [chemical] is administered, delivered, stored for illegal purposes, distributed, sold, or used
in any form; (b) that the accused maintains the said place. It is not enough that the dangerous drug
or drug paraphernalia were found in the place. More than a finding that dangerous drug is being
used thereat, there must also be a clear showing that the accused is the maintainer or operator or
the owner of the place where the dangerous drug is used or sold.

The Court finds that the prosecution failed to clearly establish that the appellant was guilty
of violation of maintenance of a drug den. From the testimonies of the arresting officers, it is clear
that the prosecution failed to establish that the shanty where appellant was found was a place
where dangerous drugs were sold or used.

| 145
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

A PERSON MAY NOT BE CONVICTED UNDER SEC. 15 OF R.A. NO. 9165, BASED ON
THE RESULT OF THE RANDOM DRUG TESTING CONDUCTED UNDER SEC. 36 OF
THE SAME LAW

People of the Philippines vs. Sullano

G.R. No. 228373; March 12, 2018
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the Decision of the CA which
affirmed the RTC in granting the demurrer of evidence of accused and dismissed the case for
violation of Sec. 15, Art. 2 of R.A. No. 9165 against respondent.

P/SSupt. Bermudo ordered 50 randomly selected police officers under the Butuan City
Police Office to undergo drug testing pursuant to Sec. 36, Art. III of R.A. No. 9165. One of them
includes herein respondent who tested positive of metamphetamine. With that, Bermuda filed a
Complaint Affidavit against respondent for violation of R.A. No. 9165 and as counter-affidavit,
respondent claimed that he voluntarily submitted to the random drug test, the urine sample he
submitted gave a positive result to the presence of methamphetamine, he did not use the
dangerous drug but had no means to contest the test's veracity, and he entered into a rehabilitation
program with Cocoon Foundation for Substance Abuse. The Deputy City Prosecutor Go found
probable cause against respondent and filed an information against the latter.

Petitioner contends that once the results of the mandatory drug test showed a positive
result, the person tested may be criminally prosecuted under Sec 15, Art. 2 of R.A. No. 9165 and
that arrest or apprehension of the accused is not required prior to the submission to drug
examination.

ISSUE:
May a person found positive of drug use after the random drug testing conducted under
Sec. 36, Art. III of R.A. No. 9165, be charged with the violation of Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9165, which
penalizes a person apprehended or arrested and found to be positive for use of any dangerous
drug, after a confirmatory test?

RULING:
No. First, in the analysis of the construction of the sentence, Sec. 15 is unambiguous, only
apprehended or arrested persons found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug may be
prosecuted under the provision. Second, Congress itself confined and restricted the liability arising
from use of dangerous drugs to those who were apprehended or arrested if charged with a violation
of Sec. 15, applying the rule expressio unius est exclusion alterius. Finally, the essential element,
i.e., the accused was apprehended or arrested, was not specifically alleged in the information.
Moreover, nowhere in the information was Sec. 36 mentioned. Urging the inclusion of Sec. 36 in
accusing the respondent of the crime will deprive the latter of the opportunity to prepare his defense
and violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Convicting an accused of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against
the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. This appears to be petitioner's
intention here and should not be condoned.

The Court recognized that only apprehended or arrested persons for the specified offenses
fall within the provisions of the law and the Court already narrowly interpreted the terms of the
statute, as it should be. Sec. 15 is thus already limited in scope and coverage

146 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ALLOWING THE CONDUCT OF PHYSICAL INVENTORY AND PHOTOGRAPHING "AT

THE NEAREST POLICE STATION/OFFICE OF THE APPREHENDING OFFICER/TEAM,
WHICHEVER IS PRACTICABLE," IN CASES OF WARRANTLESS SEIZURES DOES NOT
DISPENSE WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF HAVING THE DOJ OR MEDIA
REPRESENTATIVE AND AN ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICIAL TO BE PHYSICALLY
PRESENT THEREAT

People of the Philippines vs. Luna

G.R. No. 219164; March 21, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal under Sec. 13 (c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the decision of
the CA which affirmed the Joint Decision RTC of Marikina City. It found accused-appellant Richael
T. Luna guilty of violation of Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165.

The CI and SPO1 Soriano, as poseur-buyer, walked toward Luna’s house and as they
were approached by Luna, he (Luna) offered the drugs and at that point, SPO1 Soriano and Luna
exchanged the drugs for the P300 marked bills. After making his signal, the other members of the
team immediately approached Luna and arrested him. SPO1 Soriano marked the two sachets in
the presence of Luna at the place of arrest. The inventory of confiscated evidence was signed by
Brgy. Kagawad Rabe at the barangay hall, while Danny Placides, a member of the media, signed
the same at the police station. For the defense, he denied all charges and claimed to be at home
with his children when suddenly two men barged into his house and introduced themselves as
police officers. Luna was brought to the police headquarters. Upon arrival, SPO1 placed three
P100 bills and two sachets in front of the accused. The RTC found accused guilty of both charges
despite admission of non-compliance with the procedure under Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. 9165. This
was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
May the presence of all elements of the sale of dangerous drugs justify the absence of the
required witnesses provided by Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. 9165?

RULING:
No. The legality of entrapment operations involving illegal drugs begins and ends with Sec.
21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165. As a rule, strict compliance with the foregoing requirements is
mandatory. However, following the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, the courts may allow a deviation from
these requirements if the following requisites are availing: (1) the existence of "justifiable grounds"
allowing departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. If these two elements
concur, the seizure and custody over the confiscated items shall not be rendered void and invalid;
ergo, the integrity of the corpus delicti remains untarnished.

In case of warrantless seizures, while the physical inventory and photographing is allowed
to be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable," this does not dispense with the requirement of having the DOJ or media
representative and an elected public official to be physically present at the time of apprehension.
In this case, no explanation was proffered as to why none of the witnesses was present at the
place and time of the seizure, or as to the failure to photograph the drugs immediately after seizure
in the presence of such witnesses.

After a judicious scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that the police officers
reneged on their duty to comply with the requirements on the seizure, initial custody, and handling
of the seized items pursuant to Sec. 21. Such lapses, to the mind of the Court, cast serious doubt
on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti and, consequently, reasonable doubt on the guilt
of accused-appellant Luna.

| 147
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHEN THE QUANTITY OF THE CONFISCATED SUBSTANCE IS MINISCULE, THE

REQUIREMENTS OF SEC. 21 OF R.A. 9165 MUST BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH

People of the Philippines vs. Saragena

G.R. No. 210677; August 23, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC and CA finding respondent Abundio
Saragena guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drug under Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165.

Saragena was arrested after a buy-bust operation was conducted by the authorities. The
plastic pack of white crystalline substance confiscated from him was delivered to the Crime
Laboratory for examination where the same tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu).

The prosecution, however, failed to present the police officer who acted as the poseur-
buyer in the buy-bust operation, which allegedly involved 0.03 grams of shabu, coupled with the
improbability that the two (2) apprehending police officers witnessed the transaction at nighttime.
The prosecution's failure to sufficiently establish the chain of custody in accordance with the law
further amplifies the doubt on accused's guilt.

ISSUE:
Is the accused entitled to an acquittal on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable due to substantial lapses in the chain of custody?

RULING:
Yes. When the quantity of the confiscated substance is miniscule, the requirements of Sec.
21 of R.A. No. 9165 must be strictly complied with.

There is great possibility of abuse in drug cases, especially those involving miniscule
amounts. This Court has recognized that buy-bust operations could be initiated based on dubious
claims of shady persons, or that small amounts of illicit drugs could be planted as evidence on
innocent individuals, in view of the secrecy surrounding drug deals in general.

Therefore, courts must subject "the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe
testing. . . [T]he presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration
of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused." In deliberating the
accused's guilt, courts must exercise "utmost diligence and prudence." More importantly, they must
be on their guard in trying drug cases; otherwise, they risk meting severe penalties to innocent
persons. Here, there is reasonable doubt that the sale of shabu took place.

To successfully convict an accused for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution
must establish the identities of the buyer and the seller, the item sold, and the consideration given
for it. There must be an actual sale, consummated through delivery and payment. Finally, the
corpus delicti must be presented in court as evidence.

The prosecution’s failure to comply with the chain of custody rule is equivalent to its failure
to establish the corpus delicti, and therefore, its failure to prove that the crime was indeed
committed. Citing People v. Dela Cruz, the Court held that non-compliance [with the chain of
custody rule] is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element
of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

By failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender

the acquittal of an accused.

148 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

LAW ENFORCERS SHOULD NOT TRFILE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO

ENSURE INTEGRITY IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY WHEN ONLY A MINISCULE
AMOUNT OF DANGEROUS DRUGS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN SEIZED FROM THE
ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Saunar

G.R. No. 207396; August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of CA, affirming the RTC’s decision holding accused-
appellant Saunar guilty of violation of R.A. 9165.
The accused was charged with a violation of Art. 2, Section 5 of R.A. 9165 for selling two heat-
sealed plastic sachets of shabu after being caught in a buy-bust operation. She argues that she
was merely framed up; that she was merely made to sign a seizure receipt.

ISSUE:
Is the accused entitled to an acquittal on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable due to substantial lapses in the chain of custody?

RULING:
Yes. The belated marking of the seized items creates doubt on the identity and origin of
the dangerous drugs allegedly taken from the accused.

The chain of custody rule provides the manner by which law enforcers should handle
seized dangerous drugs. The duly recorded authorized movements of the seized dangerous drugs
may be ascertained through the testimonies of every person who handled them. Although strict
compliance with the chain of custody may be excused provided that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved, a more exacting standard is required of law enforcers
when only a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs are alleged to have been seized from the
accused.

In this case, only 0.0496 grams and 0.0487 grams or a total of 0.0983 grams of shabu
were allegedly taken from accused-appellant. Such a miniscule amount of drugs is highly
susceptible to tampering and contamination. A careful review of the factual findings of the lower
courts shows that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of preserving the identity and
integrity of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from accused-appellant. The prosecution failed
to establish who held the seized items from the moment they were taken from accused-appellant
until they were brought to the police station. The designated poseur-buyer, PO2 Montales, did not
mention who took custody of the seized items for safekeeping.

The failure of the prosecution to strictly comply with the exacting standards in R.A. 9165,
as amended, casts serious doubt on the origin, identity, and integrity of the seized dangerous drugs
allegedly taken from accused-appellant. Thus, accused-appellant must be acquitted.

| 149
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHAT IS MATERIAL IN THE PROSECUTION FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS

DRUGS IS THE PROOF THAT THE TRANSACTION OR SALE ACTUALLY TOOK
PLACE, COUPLED WITH THE PRESENTATION IN THE COURT OF THE CORPUS
DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Ejan

G.R. No. 212169; December 13, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC and CA finding accused-appellant Jojo Ejan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165.

Ejan was apprehended in a buy-bust operation conducted by the authorities upon a

confidential information that a known drug pusher had just delivered a large amount of shabu at
Barangay Dos, Dumaguete City. The authorities confiscated a sachet of dangerous drug from him
upon the receipt of the appellant of the marked money. The seized item was brought to the
Provincial Crime Laboratory for examination which tested positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under R.A. 9165.

Appellant denied that the seized drug was his. He argues that the prosecution's failure to
present the informant during trial was fatal since the identity of the poseur-buyer was not duly
established.

ISSUE:
Is presentation of an informant essential to establish the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs?

RULING:
No, the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the
conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be
merely corroborative and cumulative.

The prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish the following elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs: "(1) [the] identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

The appellant cannot escape culpability by insisting the fatality of not presenting the
informant during the trial.

150 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

INCONSISTENCIES IN THE MARKINGS ON THE SEIZED DRUGS AND THE NUMBER OF

TEABAGS SOLD BY ACCUSED DO NOT NECESSARILY DISCREDIT THE TESTIMONIES
OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES; WHAT IS MATERIAL IS THE PROOF THAT THE
TRANSACTION OR SALE ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE, COUPLED WITH THE
PRESENTATION IN COURT OF EVIDENCE OF CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Mendoza

G.R. No. 220759; July 24, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC convicting
accused-appellant Armando Mendoza of illegal sale of dangerous drugs defined and penalized
under Sec. 5 of Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Mendoza was arrested during a buy-bust operation for selling four (4) teabags of
marijuana, a dangerous drug, to the poseur-buyer. During the trial, one of the apprehending
officers, PO3 Parena testified that it was the evidence custodian who marked the seized items and
claimed that only two (2) teabags of marijuana were seized from Mendoza. However, this is
contradicted by the testimony of the poseur-buyer, PO2 Ricote who testified that it was him who
marked the seized items and that he bought four (4) teabags of marijuana from Mendoza.

Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of said crime as there was a gap in the chain
of custody of the seized items and that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as to who made the markings on the seized items and the number of
teabags bought and found in appellant’s possession.

ISSUE:
Do inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses as to the marking and
amount of the seized items constitute gaps in the chain of custody warranting acquittal of the
accused?

RULING:
No, inconsistencies do not necessarily discredit the testimonies especially when it is
consistent with the evidence on record.

In every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, the following elements must be
proved: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.

While it may be conceded that there were inconsistencies as to who made the markings
on the seized drugs and the number of teabags sold by appellant, however, it does not necessarily
follow from their disagreements that both or all of them are not credible and their testimonies
completely discarded as worthless. The markings on the seized items clearly show that it was
marked “EA-1” to “EA-4”. Notably, these were the same markings which were written and received
in the request for laboratory examination. Thus, the testimony was also corroborated by the
documentary evidence on record.

| 151
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE PROSECUTION MUST SHOW AN UNBROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY OVER THE

DANGEROUS DRUGS, ACCOUNTING FOR EACH LINK THEREOF FROM THE MOMENT
OF SEIZURE UP TO ITS PRESENTATION IN COURT AS EVIDENCE OF THE CORPUS
DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Calibod

G.R. No. 230230; November 20, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused Nino Calibod assailing the decision
of the CA which affirmed the Judgment of the RTC finding him guilty of violating Sec. 5, Art. II
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

A tip was received from a confidential informant that a certain "Toto," who was later
identified as Calibod, was selling shabu along the railroad tracks in Calamba City, Laguna. After
verifying the said tip, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area and upon seeing Calibod,
PO2 Oruga, the designated poseur buyer, approached him. PO2 Oruga handed over the buy-bust
money to Calibod, who, in turn, gave him one plastic sachet of shabu. After receiving the sachet,
PO2 Oruga introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Calibod, and retrieved the buy-bust
money from him, prompting the buy-bust team to approach the scene. PO2 Oruga then marked
the seized sachet with his initials. After the marking, PO2 Oruga immediately brought Calibod, the
buy-bust money, and confiscated sachet, to the crime laboratory at Camp Vicente Lim in
Canlubang, Laguna for examination. After examination, Forensic Chemical Officer Donna Villa
Huelgas confirmed that the confiscated sachet contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, and
that Calibod's hands tested positive for ultra-violet powder.

For his part, Calibod interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up. Also, he contends
that the apprehending team failed to follow the procedures required under the chain of custody
rule.

ISSUE:
Is Calibod liable for crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, despite the lapses of the
apprehending team in following the chain of custody rule?

RULING:
No. In order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with the said crime,
the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. The chain of custody is
divided into four (4) links: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer
of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. The Court finds
that there were unjustified gaps in the prescribed chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. He did
not state if the marking was done within the view of Calibod, an elected public official, and a
representative from the DOJ or media. He likewise did not mention whether the said witnesses
were present during the buy-bust operation or immediately thereafter. Also, it was not shown if P02
Oruga actually conducted a physical inventory and photography of the seized shabu.

152 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE LINKS IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED IN

BUY-BUST SITUATIONS TO PROVE THAT INTEGRITY OF THE SEIZED ARTICLE WAS
PRESERVED

People of the Philippines vs. Angeles

G.R. No. 218947; June 20, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC
finding accused-appellant Rey Angeles (Appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Appellant was arrested in a buy-bust operation for selling illegal drugs punishable under
Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 9165. Once appellant was arrested, PO2 Saez marked the sachet he received
from the accused with his initials and then made an inventory of the evidence on site. Thereafter,
Angeles was brought to the station for documentation, investigation, and disposition. There, a
request for a laboratory examination was prepared. Thereafter, PO2 Saez brought the specimen
and the request for examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory and was attended to by a certain
Relos, a receiving clerk. The examination by the forensic chemist yielded the specimen positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Appellant claimed that he was wrongfully arrested by the police officers who allegedly
caught him selling illegal drugs in a buy bust operation.

ISSUE:
Was the procedure under the rules on chain of custody properly complied with on account
of the absence of proper documentation after the seized items were brought to the police station?

RULING:
No. As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be.

The Supreme Court laid out the links in the chain of custody which must be sufficiently
established in buy-bust situations: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the illegal drugs seized
by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer
of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and
submission of the seized and marked illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.

The testimony of PO2 Saez, sufficiently established the first two links in the chain of
custody. He clearly narrated how he marked and handled the drugs recovered from Angeles.
Further, PO2 Saez explained that from the time of the arrest until they reached the police station
for further investigation, he had possession of the seized items. Nonetheless, his single testimony
miserably fails to establish the remaining links of the chain. He turned over the drugs to the PNP
Crime Laboratory and was received by a certain Relos. Curiously, the identity of the person who
received it for the PNP Crime Laboratory was never made clear and was identified only as the
receiving clerk. After PO2 Saez handed the drugs to the alleged receiving clerk of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, no other details were provided except that the test performed by the forensic chemist
yielded a positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

| 153
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE WAS DESIGNED BY THE LAW TO PREVENT

PLANTING, OR SWITCHING, OR CONTAMINATION OF EVIDENCE, AND THEREBY
SECURE THE SUSPECTS AGAINST MALICIOUS INCRIMINATIONS

People of the Philippines vs. Gaylon

G.R. No. 219086; March 19, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision CA which affirmed decision of the RTC of Pasig City in
finding Bonifacio Gaylon a.k.a. "Boni" (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165.

A buy-bust group was formed wherein PO1 Nervar acted as the poseur-buyer. Upon
reaching the area, PO1 Nervar approached appellant and then the latter asked how much PO1
Nervar was going to buy to which he said, “P300.” Once appellant received the money, he took a
plastic sachet that contained shabu and gave the same to PO1 Nervar, who thereafter, removed
his cap to signal that the transaction was consummated. PO1 Nervar marked the sachet and
prepared the inventory; however, appellant refused to sign the same.

As for the defense, he claimed that the police officers suddenly barged in and forcibly
brought him to the police station. Moreover, the defense also pointed to the failure of the police
officers to coordinate with the PDEA. It argued that the supposed coordination form should not be
given any weight because it was faxed from a residential house and not from the PDEA. The RTC
found that the prosecution had proven the existence of the elements of illegal sale of shabu. The
RTC held that a buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA
claiming that a buy-bust operation is just a form of an in flagrante arrest.

ISSUE:
Does non-compliance with the requirements of the chain of custody rule invalidate the buy-
bust operation?

RULING:
Yes. As held in People v. Lumandag, the requirements of chain of custody rule were
precisely designed by the law to prevent planting, or switching, or contamination of evidence, and
thereby secure the suspects against malicious incriminations. In the field of drug enforcement, the
need for the requirements to be literally followed, or at least to be substantially complied with, has
become all the more pronounced.

In this case, the prosecution had the burden of establishing the presence of the elements
of the crime of illegal sale of shabu in order to secure a conviction of the appellant therefor. In this
connection both the RTC and the CA failed to take into consideration the buy-bust team's non-
compliance with Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165. The prosecution failed to show that the non-
compliance with the requirements was upon justifiable grounds, and that the evidentiary value of
the seized items was properly preserved by the apprehending team. Moreover, a perusal of the
Inventory of Seized Properties/Items shows that it was signed only by PO1 Nervar with a notation
that the appellant had refused to sign the same. No representative of appellant signed said
Inventory of Seized Properties/Items; neither did any representative from the media, DOJ, and any
elected public official. Worse, the prosecution did not provide any justifiable ground for this lapse.

154 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE EVILS OF SWITCHING, PLANTING, OR CONTAMINATION OF EVIDENCE NEGATE

THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE SEIZURE AND CONFISCATION OF THE
SAID DRUGS THAT WERE EVIDENCE HEREIN OF THE CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Ceralde

G.R. No. 228894; August 7, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal filed by respondent John Paul Ceralde from the decision of RTC
and CA finding him guilty of violation of R.A. 9165.

Ceralde was charged of violation of Sec. 5 and 11 of R.A. 9165, after he was caught in a
buy-bust operation possessing and selling marijuana leaves. While the seized items were properly
marked by PO3 Delos Santos immediately upon their confiscation at the place of the arrest and in
the presence of Ceralde, the same was not done in the presence of any elected public official and
a representative from the DOJ and the media.

However, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of R.A. 9165. Aggrieved by the decision. Ceralde appealed.

ISSUE:
Is the accused entitled to an acquittal on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt due to substantial lapses in the chain of custody?

RULING:
Yes, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected official. Without the insulating
presence of the aforesaid personnel, the evils of switching, planting, or contamination of the
evidence negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the said drugs that
were evidence herein of the corpus delicti.

In this case, the justification given by the police officer that the “instant” buy-bust operation
is a confidential matter which requires them “not to tell other people about it” cannot be given
credence, as the law mandates their presence to ensure the proper chain of custody.

| 155
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE ENSURES THAT UNNECESSARY DOUBTS

CONCERNING THE IDENTITY OF THE EVIDENCE ARE REMOVED

People of the Philippines vs. Ahmad

G.R. No. 228955; March 14, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA which affirmed the Consolidated Judgement
of the RTC finding accused Ahmad guilty of violating Sec. 5 and 11, Art. 2 of R.A. No. 9165.

A PDEA organized buy-bust operation chose Investigation Officer (IO1) Aguilar to act as
the poseur-buyer. Upon arrival, IO Aguilar and the confidential informant went inside the house
and bought the shabu for P500. After giving the signal, the buy-bust team went inside the house
and introduced themselves as PDEA officers. Ahmad and the two other individuals in the house
were subsequently arrested. The area was allegedly dangerous so the PDEA conducted the
inventory in their office.

Ahmad denied the allegations against him and claims that on that day, several PDEA
agents entered and accused Ahmad of selling drugs. He told them that he does not have any
shabu in his possession, to which they allegedly replied that if he had none, then they had some.
Ahmad claimed that under the threat of electrocution, he was forced to admit that he sold drugs.
He was also not shown a warrant of arrest. The RTC found Ahmad guilty of both crimes and the
CA affirmed. Ahmad claims that the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti was not proven in
this case because of the lapses in the prescribed procedure for the inventory and marking at the
place of arrest under Sec 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

ISSUE:
Did PDEA comply with the prescribed procedure for the inventory and marking when they
conducted the inventory in their office and not in the place where the drugs are confiscated?

RULING:
No, the chain of custody rule performs its function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. In cases of illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug seized from the accused constitutes corpus delicti of the
offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be
shown to be fully preserved. The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 provides the procedure for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs. It states that the apprehending officers must
immediately conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the seized items in the presence of
the following: (a) the accused or the person from whom the items were confiscated, or his
representative or counsel; (b) a representative from the media; (c) a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ); and (d) any elected public official. They should also sign the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.

It is readily apparent from the records that the arresting officers committed several lapses
in the prescribed procedure for the handling of the seized illegal drugs. The marking and inventory
of the items confiscated from Ahmad were not conducted immediately after the arrest. While non-
compliance with these requirements is excusable, this only applies when the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved.

156 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FOR DRUG-RELATED CASES TO PROSPER, THE CORPUS DELICTI – THE DRUG/S

SUBJECT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED – MUST BE DULY IDENTIFIED, PROVED, AND
PRESENTED IN COURT

People of the Philippines vs. De Asis

G.R. No. 225219; June 11, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
On appeal is a decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding accused Rico
De Asis guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

Accused Rico De Asis was apprehended during a buy bust operation when he sold shabu
or methamphetamine hydrochloride to a poseur buyer identified later as Agent Gacus. The police
operatives also seized four sachets of the same drug from the accused along with the marked
money. Thereafter the drugs seized were marked, photographed, and an inventory was
accomplished by Agent Taghoy in the presence of a Barangay Kagawad of the place and a
representative of the media as witnesses. Subsequently, the pieces of evidence were brought to
the PDEA office and thereafter the PNP Crime Laboratory.

In his defense, accused claims that the evidence was planted by the PDEA agents, that he
was mauled and his face covered with a towel and that when the same was removed, the packets
of shabu was already on the table in front of him. Despite his averments the accused was convicted
by the Regional Trial Court of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE:
Was the required chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs followed for the case to
prosper?

RULING:
Yes. Jurisprudence has consistently stressed that for drug-related cases to prosper, the
corpus delicti – the drug/s subject of the offense charged – must be duly identified, proved, and
presented in court. Essential aspects of the chain of custody are: (1) the immediate marking,
inventory, and taking of photographs of the recovered items; (2) the examination of the Forensic
Chemist attesting that the seized items yielded positive results for the presence of illegal drugs;
and, (3) the presentation of the same evidence in court.

All these requirements were fully complied with here. Records reveal that after Agent
Gacus turned over the item she bought from appellant to Agent Taghoy, the latter immediately
marked it and the four sachets he (Agent Taghoy) recovered from appellant at the very place where
the buy-bust operation transpired. Agent Taghoy specifically marked them with his initials "EMT"
(with successive numbers) and the date of the buy-bust operation. While still at appellant's house,
and in the presence of a barangay kagawad and a media representative, Agent Taghoy made an
inventory of the seized items. In turn, Agent Gacus took photographs of these items, the taking of
the inventory, including the signing of the inventory by the kagawad and the representative of the
media.

Therefore, the evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs was preserved. Consequently,
accused’s alibi is not meritorious, and his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.

| 157
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE ABSENCE OF TESTIMONY FROM THE FORENSIC CHEMIST WILL NOT

AUTOMATICALLY MAKE THE SEIZED DRUGS INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE THE
INTEGRITY OF THE EVIDENCE IS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN PRESERVED UNLESS
THERE IS A SHOWING OF BAD FAITH, ILL WILL, OR PROOF THAT THE EVIDENCE
HAS BEEN TAMPERED WITH

People of the Philippines vs. Santos

G.R. No. 223142; January 17, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Rolando Santos seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the CA decision finding him guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia under R.A. 9165.

The RAID-NBI received information from their confidential informant that there was a group
of individuals at Tagaytay St., Caloocan City, selling drugs and using minors as runners. They
conducted surveillance for two (2) weeks, where videos were taken of the buying, selling, and use
of drugs in the area. The informants were able to buy drugs from Santos and to use them inside
his house. Thereafter, armed with a search warrant, the team proceeded to the house of Santos
where they found several used and unused foil strips. Marijuana leaves wrapped in paper was also
found on the right pocket of Santos’ pants. He was charged with violation of Secs. 6, 11 and 12,
Art. II of R.A. 9165.

Santos interposed the defense of frame-up and that there was doubt as to the whether the
marijuana and paraphernalia seized from him were the very same objects offered in court as
corpus delicti due to the failure of the forensic chemist to testify in court.

ISSUE:
Was there an unbroken chain in the custody of the seized drugs and paraphernalia?

RULING:
Yes. The Court found the defense of frame-up put up by Santos as self-serving and failing
to rebut the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution.

The Court has explained in a catena of cases the four (4) links that should be established
in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.

As opposed to the claim of Santos, there was no significant gap in the chain of custody of
the seized items. Moreover, the assertion of Santos that the forensic chemist did not testify to
explain the measures undertaken to preserve the integrity and identity of the substance examined
until their presentation in court has no merit. The legal teaching in our jurisprudence is that "the
integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad
faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the
burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that
public officers properly discharged their duties.

158 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE LACK OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF REQUIRED WITNESSES DURING THE

ACTUAL MARKING AND PHYSICAL INVENTORY OF ALL THE CONFISCATED ITEMS
POSES A REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI WHICH
WARRANTS ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Mola

G.R. No. 226481; April 18, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the CA Decision affirming the RTC decision convicting appellant
Jaycent Mola a.k.a. "Otok" for illegal sale of shabu in violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

SPO4 Columbino testified that he conducted a buy-bust operation against Mola upon
receiving a tip. While inside the tricycle, Columbino waved to Mola with the use of the marked
money, extending his finger and putting it under his nose to signify the use of shabu. Mola, who
was standing in front of Cayabyab’s store, waved back at him and entered an alley. Later, Mola
went out of the alley and gave him a sachet of shabu in exchange for the P500 bill. Thereafter, he
identified himself as a police officer. While arresting Mola, Cayabyab arrived asking what
happened. Columbino showed the confiscated shabu and told him to inform Mola’s relatives to
follow him to PCP Tondaligan where he marked the seized items and prepared the
inventory/confiscation receipt. He later returned to the store to ask Cayabyab to sign the
inventory/confiscation receipt.

Mola appealed to CA alleging that the prosecution failed to comply with Sec. 21 (1), Art. II
of R.A. No. 9165, particularly the marking of the seized shabu at the place of arrest and presence
of specified persons during the inventory-taking and photograph.

ISSUE:
Was the integrity of the confiscated sachet of shabu maintained notwithstanding non-
compliance with the chain of custody rule in that there was failure of the required witnesses to see
the actual marking and physical inventory thereof?

RULING:
No. The original provision of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 states that the apprehending team
was required to immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph of the same in the
presence of (1) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the
media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof, after seizure and confiscation of the drugs.

While Cayabyab witnessed the seizure of a sachet of alleged shabu from Mola, he did not
see the actual marking and physical inventory of all the confiscated items. His only participation
was that he signed, by writing his name in printed form, the accomplished confiscation/inventory
receipt at his store. These considering, it cannot be said with certainty that Cayabyab could attest
to the fact that the marked sachet of shabu was the same item that was seized from Mola at the
time of his arrest.

The illegal drugs being the corpus delicti, it is essential for the prosecution to establish with
moral certainty and prove beyond reasonable doubt that the illegal drugs presented and offered in
evidence before the trial court are the same illegal drugs lawfully seized from the accused, and
tested and found to be positive for dangerous substance. The evidence at hand do not support the
conclusion that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject sachet of shabu were successfully
and properly preserved and safeguarded through an unbroken chain of custody.

| 159
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNJUSTIFIED ABSENCE OF REQUIRED REPRESENTATIVES DURING PHYSICAL

INVENTORY AND PHOTOGRAPHY OF SEIZED ITEMS COMPROMISES THE LATTER’S
INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE AND LEADS TO THE FAILURE TO PROVE:
CORPUS DELICTI AND GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Sanchez

G.R. No. 231383; March 7, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Joey Sanchezy Licudine (Sanchez)
assailing the Decision of CA which affirmed the Decision of RTC finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165.

IO1 Tabuyo, as poseur-buyer met Sanchez, who, after receiving the marked money,
handed over a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to the former. After Tabuyo
executed their signal, the buy-bust team immediately arrested Sanchez. The buy-bust team then
conducted the markings, inventory, and photography on site before proceeding to their office for
documentation purposes. The team was met with representatives from the DOJ and the media,
both of whom signed the Certificate of Inventory. As for the defense, Sanchez then insisted that
when he was frisked, the men were only able to find money from the bets from jueteng and that
they only made it appear that they recovered sachets containing shabu from him. The RTC found
Sanchez guilty of the crimes charged and the CA affirmed such decision and it further held that
the unbroken chain of custody over the seized drugs, and thus, proving their integrity and
evidentiary value.

ISSUE:
Was the chain of custody rule observed despite the absence of any elected public official
in the actual inventory?

RULING:
No. It is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.
The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives from the DOJ
and the media during the actual conduct of inventory and photography to ensure that the chain of
custody rule is observed and thus, remove any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence which could considerably affect a case.

The Court found that the arresting officers committed unjustified deviations from the
prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value
of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Sanchez. A more careful scrutiny of the records
shows that the buy-bust team conducted the marking, inventory, and photography where the arrest
was made, and merely made the aforesaid representatives sign the Certificate of Inventory upon
the buy-bust team's arrival at their office. Moreover, the said procedures were not done in the
presence of any elected public official.

The Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Sanchez have been compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for
the sale and possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165, the State carries the heavy
burden of proving not only the elements of the offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus
delicti, failing in which, renders the case for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE PROSECUTION CANNOT INVOKE THE OPERATION OF THE SAVING CLAUSE

WHEN THE ABSENCE OF REQUIRED WITNESSES DURING PHYSICAL INVENTORY
AND PHOTOGRAPHY WAS UNJUSTIFIED AND THERE WAS NO DEMONSTRATION
THAT THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ILLEGAL DRUGS
WERE PRESERVED

People of the Philippines vs. Abelarde

G.R. No. 215713; January 22, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA’s decision, affirming with modifications the RTC’s decision,
finding accused-appellant Bobby Abelarde guilty of both illegal sale and possession of illegal drugs
under R.A. No. 9165.

Abelarde was arrested during a buy-bust operation and was frisked. Search of the
accused-appellant's body yielded seven packets of the banned substance shabu (0.24 g total).

Abelarde categorically denied the charges and claimed that he was "framed-up" the
alleged packets of shabu were "planted" evidence. Nothing in the records also indicates whether
the physical inventory and photograph, if done at all, were in the presence of the accused-appellant
or his representatives or within the presence of any representative from the media, DOJ or any
elected official.

ISSUE:
Is the accused entitled to an acquittal on account of the buy-bust team’s non-compliance
with the prescribed procedures embodied in Sec. 21, par. 1 and Sec. 21 (a) of Art. II of R.A. No.
9165?

RULING:
No. While the chain of custody has been a critical issue leading to acquittals in drug cases,
we have nevertheless held that non-compliance with the prescribed procedures does not
necessarily result in the conclusion that the identity of the seized drugs has been compromised so
that an acquittal should follow.

The last paragraph of Sec. 21 (a), Art. II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides a saving
mechanism to ensure that not every case of non-compliance will irretrievably prejudice the
prosecution's case. To warrant application of this saving mechanism, however, the prosecution
must recognize and explain the lapse or lapses in the prescribed procedures. The prosecution
must likewise demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized have
been preserved.

In this case, the prosecution miserably failed to adduce evidence establishing the chain of
custody of the seized illegal drugs and failed as well to establish compliance with the saving
mechanism discussed above. While the identities of the seller and the buyer and the transaction
involving the sale of the illegal drug were duly proven, the Court held that the testimony of PO1
Carlos did not state the details material to the handling of the items seized from the accused-
appellant. The lapses in procedure heretofore set forth are just too egregious and too glaring to be
shunted aside; hence such lapses must cast serious lingering doubts upon the prosecution's claim
that the packets of alleged shabu that were "offered" as evidence in court were the self-same
packets of shabu that were seized from the herein accused-appellant. Thus, we are not prepared
to say that the the corpus delicti has been convincingly identified in these twin cases. And, as
stressed in the Denoman case, the failure to establish the existence of the corpus delicti must
inevitably result in the acquittal of the accused-appellant.

| 161
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

SUBSTANTIAL GAPS AND NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE APPREHENDING TEAM WITH

THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE SEIZED ITEMS FROM THE ACCUSED WHICH ARE
LEFT UNEXPLAINED AND UNJUSTIFIED PUT INTO QUESTION THEIR INTEGRITY
AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE AND PRODUCES THE ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Año

G.R. No. 230070; March 14, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC of
San Mateo, Rizal convicting Nestor Año y Del Remedios (Año) guilty for violating Sec. 5 of R.A.
9165.

Police Officers, Ruel Ayad, Aldwin Ortilla, and Jenesis Acu informed a buy-bust team
designating PO2 Ayad as the poseur-buyer, and marked two (2) P100 bills to be used in the
operation. Thereafter, they went to the house of Año where PO2 Ayad knocked on the door, and
whispered that he wanted drugs worth P200. Año replied and gave PO2 Ayad a transparent plastic
sachet, while the latter handed the money. Once received by Año, PO2 Ayad introduced himself
as a policeman which caused Año to flee but who was eventually caught. Barangay Captain
Buenviaje witnessed and signed the Inventory of Seized Items; photographs were also taken in
the presence of Año and the police officers. On the same day, the seized sachet was turned over
to Police Inspector Forensic Chemist Villaraza for examination. In the Laboratory Report, FC
Villaraza confirmed that the seized sachet was positive for shabu. Año pleaded not guilty and
claimed that he was at home celebrating the 4th birthday of his nephew when he was suddenly
arrested and the next day was charged of drug pushing.

The RTC as affirmed by the CA found all elements for the sale of dangerous drugs present.

ISSUE:
Is the presence of the required witnesses during the seizure and marking of the dangerous
drugs indispensable for the charge under R.A. No. 9165 to prosper?”

RULING:
No. It is also essential for a conviction that the drugs subject of the sale be presented in
court and its identity established with moral certainty through an unbroken chain of custody over
the same. In this relation, Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, where
the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical
inventory and take photographs of the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person
from whom such items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the DOJ, and any elected public official, who shall then sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy of the same; and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination purposes.

In this case, there are substantial gaps and no justifiable ground for non-compliance in the
chain of custody of the seized items from Año, thereby putting into question their integrity and
evidentiary value. Upon Año's arrest, PO1 Ortilla called Brgy. Captain Buenviaje to witness the
marking and to sign the inventory. After, he prepared an inventory of the seized items, which was
signed by Brgy. Captain Buenviaje as witness, and had them photographed. While the fact of
marking and inventory of the seized item was established by the attached Inventory of
Seized/Confiscated Items, the records are silent as to the presence of the required witnesses, it
then follows that there are unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the items seized from Año,
thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which resultantly warrants his
acquittal.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ASIDE FROM PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE

CORPUS DELICTI, STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 21 OF R.A. NO. 9165 AND ITS IRR
ALSO SEEKS TO OBVIATE THE EVILS OF “PLANTING” OF EVIDENCE DURING BUY-
BUST OPERATIONS

People of the Philippines vs. Otico

G.R. No. 231133; June 6, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal under Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure assailing the
CA Decision denying the appeal and affirming the RTC Decision, which found Otico guilty of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs in violation of R.A. No. 9165.

The Oslob police confirmed based on a surveillance conducted that Otico was engaged in
the sale of illegal drugs or shabu in Oslob, Cebu. They conducted an entrapment operation to
apprehend Otico. An officer conducted an inventory of the seized items in the presence of Otico
and Municipal Coun. Zamora, at the police station. The items were also photographed and marked.
The Certificate of Inventory, a spot report and a letter-request for laboratory examination was
prepared as well. The request and the specimen were then delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for laboratory examination. The PNP Forensic Chemist’s examination on the specimen gave
positive result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under R.A. No.
9165. The Chemistry report, specimen and letter-request were then forwarded to the evidence
custodian at the PNP Crime Laboratory.

ISSUE:
Was the integrity of the seized drugs maintained despite non-compliance with the chain of
custody rule, in that there was absence of third-party witnesses during the inventory, among
others?

RULING:
No, the officers committed deviations that puts into question the evidentiary value of the
seized drugs.

The Court explained in People v. Mendoza that the deliberate taking of the identifying
steps, which include marking, physical inventory and photographing of the contraband,
immediately upon seizure by the police officer concerned, or, if that is not possible, as close to the
time and place of the seizure as practicable under the obtaining circumstances before the
insulating presence of the three third-party witnesses is aimed at preserving an unbroken chain of
custody and obviating the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had
tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972). The failure to do so will negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation
of the dangerous drug that is evidence of the corpus delicti, and adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.

In this case, there were major deviations from the statutorily mandated procedure and there
was no attempt whatsoever by the prosecution to explain why an honest-to-goodness compliance
with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR, as well as the PNP Manual, was unavailable under the
circumstances obtaining during the buy-bust operation. The following are the flaws or defects
committed by the police officers in violation of Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR: (1) The inventory
and photograph taking were not done immediately after seizure and confiscation in the place of
operation; (2) Except for the elected official, the required witnesses were not present during the
inventory and photograph taking. Only one of the three third-party witnesses was present; (3)The
police officers did not present justifiable grounds for their noncompliance with the required
procedure and proof that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were properly
preserved by them. Given the unexplained major procedural lapses, the presumption of innocence
in stands.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

AN UNSUBSTANTIATED TESTIMONY OF A SOLE WITNESS ON TO THE MOVEMENTS

OF THE SEIZED ITEMS STARTING FROM THE ACCUSED TO THE COURT IS
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH EACH LINK OF THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND CASTS
DOUBT ON THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF SEIZED ITEMS

People of the Philippines vs. Callejo

G.R. No. 227427; June 6, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This case involves two separate charges for sale and possession of dangerous drugs, both
charges stem from a single buy-bust operation, and in turn, a single chain of custody. This is an
appeal from the CA Decision affirming the RTC Decision which found Callejo guilty of illegal
possession and illegal sale of shabu, and Antoque guilty of illegal sale of shabu under R.A. 9165.

The police officers planned a buy-bust operation against one “Delia Callejo” and alias
“Bitoy,” after receiving a report about an on-going illegal drug activity in Brgy. Palanan, Makati City.
The marked money from Antoque was confiscated and the plastic sachet was taken into custody
as subject of the sale after the apprehension of the appellants. A member of the back-up team
went to see Kgd. Bernal to ask him to assist in the inventory of the confiscated items. The accused
and the seized items were presented to Kgd. Bernal who later watched as the Inventory Receipt
was prepared. He signed it after ascertaining that the items listed were the items actually shown
to him. An officer photographed the entire process.

Appellants averred that the said courts erred when it found them guilty of the offenses
charged despite the broken chain of custody in the seizure and handling of the alleged corpus
delicti.

ISSUE:
Was the integrity of the seized items maintained notwithstanding non-compliance with the
chain of custody rule in that there was no other testimony in explaining how seized items were
passed?

RULING:
No, unjustifiable gaps exist in the chain of custody of the items which creates reasonable
doubt as to the identity and integrity thereof.

In cases involving dangerous drugs, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense. Thus, it is of paramount importance that the prosecution prove that the identity and
integrity of the seized drugs are preserved. Each link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs
must be established.

PO3 Ramos testified that he turned over the seized items to PO3 Castillo for investigation
and referral after physical inventory and photographing. Notably, however, no other testimony was
offered to explain how the seized items were passed on and placed in the hands of PO3 Castillo
and PSI Bacani, or how the integrity of said items were preserved while they remained in their
custody. The Court finds that while the parties indeed made the stipulations in question, such
stipulations do not relate to or do not cover the specific manner through which the seized items
were handled while in their possession. The Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish
each link in the chain of custody as required by Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165. Such failure casts doubt
on the identity and integrity of the seized items which cannot be excused through the expedience
of invoking presumption of regularity.

164 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHERE THE INVENTORY, PHOTOGRAPHING, AND MARKING OF THE SEIZED

DRUGS AT THE CRIME SCENE IN THE PRESENCE OF ACCUSED, MEDIA AND DOJ
REPRESENTATIVES, AND ELECTED OFFICIAL ARE NOT ESTABLISHED, THERE IS
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE RENDERING THE CORPUS
DELICTI OPEN TO DOUBT

Casona vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 179757; September 13, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision rendered by CA, affirming the RTC’s decision in holding
petitioner Leonardo Casona guilty of violation of R.A. No. 9165.

Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of shabu defined and penalized under Sec.
11 of R.A. 9165, on the basis of an information from an unnamed citizen. Petitioner denied the
charges and claimed that CA erred in finding that the chain of custody was preserved by the
arresting officers, because no inventory and photographing of the shabu was made.

ISSUE:
Is the accused entitled to an acquittal on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable due to substantial lapses in the chain of custody?

RULING:
Yes. R.A. 9165 has incorporated affirmative safeguards that the apprehending officers
should faithfully comply with in their seizure and custody of dangerous drugs. Non-compliance with
the affirmative safeguards rendered the evidence of the corpus delicti open to doubt.

In this case, the arresting officer did not make any inventory and photographing of the
shabu. It was not established that police operatives marked the seized shabu at the crime scene
and in the presence of the petitioner, a representative of the media, a representative of the DOJ,
and any elected official, as similarly required. No justifiable ground for the non-compliance was
given.

| 165
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

AS LONG AS THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS ARE
PROPERLY PRESERVED BY THE APPREHENDING POLICE OFFICERS, SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE TO THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE IS SUFFICIENT

People of the Philippines vs. Villahermoso

G.R. No. 218208; January 24, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Brian Villahermoso (appellant) from Decision of the CA
affirming the Judgment of the RTC finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA. 9165 (sale of dangerous drug).

The appellant was arrested in a buy bust operation for selling illegal drugs to a police
poseur-buyer. Appellant was handcuffed and was brought to their office together with the seized
shabu. The arrest was recorded in a police blotter. The two sachets of shabu were then marked
as "BV-01" and "BV-02" at their office as the appellant was struggling and trying to get away from
the police after the arrest. The marked sachets of shabu were then submitted to the crime
laboratory for examination. Appellant claimed that the charge against him was fabricated. He
contended that on account of the failure of the police to conduct prior surveillance and to comply
with the Chain of Custody Rule as the seized items were not properly marked, inventoried, and
photographed, the prosecution failed to prove his guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Was there substantial compliance with the Chain of Custody rule when the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved despite the marking of the drugs being
done at the police’s station, lack of inventory, and lack of photograph of the drugs?

RULING:
Yes. Jurisprudence has consistently held that "prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for
the validity of an entrapment operation x xx especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied to the
target area by their informant." Such is the situation in this case. PO2 Villaester, who was
designated as the poseur buyer, was assisted by the confidential informant, who contacted the
appellant to inform the latter that there was a prospective buyer of "shabu."

As to the Chain of Custody Rule, the Court, taking into consideration the difficulty of
complete compliance with the said rule, has considered substantial compliance sufficient "as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending police officers."

In the instant case the policemen were justified in marking the sachets of shabu at their
office. [Appellant] was struggling and trying to get away from the police, as testified by defense
witness Alex Esconas. [Appellant] himself testified that he even elbowed one of the arresting
officers as he was resisting arrest. The priority of the arresting officers is to apprehend the offender.
They would have had difficulty, if not impossibility, in marking the corpus delicti at the scene of the
crime considering that the [appellant] was quite out of control.

Likewise, the absence of a physical inventory and the lack of a photograph of the seized
items are not sufficient justifications to acquit the appellant as the Court in several cases has
affirmed convictions despite the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of
Custody Rule as long as the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti of the crime are preserved.

166 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHILE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE IS NOT FATAL
TO THE PROSECUTION'S CASE PROVIDED THAT THE INTEGRITY AND
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS ARE PROPERLY PRESERVED BY THE
APPREHENDING OFFICERS, THIS IS QUALIFIED BY THE EXISTENCE OF A GROUND
THAT JUSTIFIES DEPARTURE FROM THE GENERAL RULE

People of the Philippines vs. Segundo

G.R. No. 205614; July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal assailing the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding
Segundo guilty of sale of dangerous drugs or of violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

After receiving a tip about the accused Jaime Segundo’s sale of illegal sale of drugs, the
Mandaluyong Police Station created a team to conduct a buy-bust operation, which led to the
former’s arrest. During trial, the assigned investigator to the case admitted that no picture was
taken on the alleged recovered object evidence. Furthermore, no members of the media and
representative from the barangay were present when the said items were allegedly marked.

Segundo insists that even assuming that he perpetrated the charge, the trial court erred in
finding him guilty due to the broken chain of custody of the alleged seized prohibited drugs.

ISSUE:
Is compliance with the chain of custody rule necessary to sustain conviction for illegal sale
of prohibited drugs?

RULING:
Yes, compliance with the chain of custody rule is required in relation to proving the first
element of the crime of sale of illegal drugs.

The crime of Illegal sale of prohibited drugs has the following elements: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor. Accordingly, these entail proof that the sale transaction transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust
situation requires evidence that the drugs seized and examined are the same drugs presented in
court. Chain of custody is composed of testimonies on each link of the sequence that starts from
the time the item was taken until it was presented as evidence. Nonetheless, failure to comply with
Sec. 21 "is not fatal to the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers."

However, the prosecution failed to comply with the chain of custody that would supposedly
ensure that shabu offered as evidence in court was the one retrieved from Segundo at the time of
the operation and offered no justifiable reason why they failed to comply with the conditions
provided for under the law. The police officers’ statements were contradicting whether they
photographed and marked the pieces of evidence recovered. The varying testimonies on the
photographing of the articles direct this Court to a logical conclusion that there were really no
photos taken during the seizure of the item. Furthermore, the prosecution offered no justifiable
reason why they failed to comply with the conditions provided for under the law. To underscore,
"for the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been preserved.

| 167
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE NEED NOT BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH AS LONG AS

THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS HAVE BEEN
PRESERVED

People of the Philippines vs. Moner

G.R. No. 202206; March 5, 2018
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the decision of the CA affirming the joint decision of the RTC finding
Moner guilty of sale of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A.
9165.
As per the information gathered from Taudil, Police Chief Inspector Cabal formed a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation for the apprehension of Moner. Before proceeding, the team sought
authority to operate outside their jurisdiction. Upon their arrival at Moner’s house, Taudil told Moner
that he was interested to buy shabu. The exchange of the money and shabu commenced.
Thereafter, the pre-arranged signal was given to the team. Moner tried to run inside his house but
was still arrested. The confiscated items were marked in the presence of police operatives and
Moner. An inventory was prepared. The specimen was brought to the police crime lab and yielded
positive to the test for shabu.

Moner contended that the police officers failed to prove an unbroken chain of custody
because the physical inventory and the taking of photograph was not conducted in the presence
of the accused, or his representative at the place where the seizure was made. The police officers
averred that their noncompliance with the chain of custody rule is excusable because they wanted
to make sure they do not linger in the place for they operated outside their area of responsibility,
hence, strict conformance to the procedure is immaterial.

ISSUE:
Is strict conformance to the chain of custody rule material in order to properly convict the
accused guilty of the crime/s under R.A. 9165?

RULING:
No. Realizing the inconvenient truth that no perfect chain of custody can ever be achieved,
the Supreme Court has consistently held that the most important factor in the chain of custody rule
is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.

This is not the first time that this Court has been confronted with the question of whether
or not to uphold the conviction of a person arrested for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs who had
been positively identified by credible witnesses as the perpetrator of said crime but the manner by
which the evidence of illegal drugs was handled did not strictly comply with the chain of custody
rule. To reiterate past pronouncements, while ideally the procedure on the chain of custody should
be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is not as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain. Unfortunately, rigid obedience to procedure creates a scenario wherein the safeguards that
we set to shield the innocent are likewise exploited by the guilty to escape rightful punishment.

In the case at bar, the trial court judge convicted Moner on the strength of the credibility of
the prosecution's witnesses despite an imperfect chain of custody concerning the corpus delicti.

168 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FOR THE SAVING CLAUSE TO APPLY, THE PROSECUTION MUST EXPLAIN THE
REASONS BEHIND THE PROCEDURAL LAPSES, AND THAT THE INTEGRITY AND
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED EVIDENCE HAD NONETHELESS BEEN
PRESERVED

People of the Philippines vs. Alvaro and Geronimo

G.R. No. 225596; January 10, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal filed by herein accused-appellants assailing the decision of the
CA in affirming the decision of RTC in holding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
R.A. 9165.

The conviction stemmed from an information charging accused-appellants of violating Sec.

5, Art. II of R.A. 9165, and another information accusing Geronimo of violating Sec. 11 of the same
law.

Accused-appellants raised as a defense the prosecution’s failure to strictly comply with the
chain of custody rule as required under Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165. First, the police officers did not
prepare the inventory at the place of the arrest since Laperal Compound was teeming with people;
instead, they conducted the inventory along EDSA, at the trunk of the service vehicle. Second,
The prosecution failed to show that the inventory was made in the presence of the accused as
required by law. They also failed to show that the seized items were photographed. The records
also reveal that the request for laboratory examination was not delivered by PO1 Santos but by a
certain Serrano who could not explain how he came to possess the seized items.

ISSUE:
May the accused be held liable despite lack of strict compliance with the chain of custody
rule?

RULING:
Yes, Non-compliance with the requirements of the chain of custody under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.

However, for this saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind
the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.

In this case, there were unexplained breaks in the links in the custody of the confiscated
drugs which constitute flagrant and procedural lapses and obvious evidentiary gaps that are fatal
to the prosecution’s case.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE PROPER HANDLING OF THE CONFISCATED DRUG IS PARAMOUNT IN ORDER

TO ENSURE THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY, A PROCESS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVING THE
INTEGRITY OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Calates

G.R. No. 214759; April 4, 2018
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
The Court reviews the decision promulgated by the CA which affirmed the conviction for a
violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 of accused Dina Calates by the RTC of Bacolod City.

PO1 Sonido acted as the poseur-buyer with the asset, Insp. Lorilla as team leader and with
others as back-up. On the day of the entrapment, the accused was handed the marked money
which PO1 Sonido gave her (accused), while the latter took a small sachet of shabu and gave it to
PO1 Sonido. Thereafter, PO1 Sonido immediately arrested the accused. The marked money was
recovered and the sachet of shabu was marked "ASS" which stands for Alain S. Sonido. The
Policemen thereafter searched her house without a warrant and recovered nothing, thus they were
not able to conduct an inventory.

The RTC convicted the accused. This was affirmed by the CA based on the testimonies of
the Prosecution’s witnesses and presence of all elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.

ISSUE:
Was the corpus delicti proven despite the lack of the inventory and the non-taking of
photographs in the presence of the accused or her representatives?

RULING:
No. The proper handling of the confiscated drug is paramount in order to ensure the chain
of custody, a process essential to preserving the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti.

Chain of custody refers to the duly recorded authorized movement and custody of seized
drugs, controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment, from the
time of seizure or confiscation to the time of receipt in the forensic laboratory, to the safekeeping
until presentation in court as evidence and for the purpose of destruction. The documentation of
the movement and custody of the seized items should include the identity and signature of the
person or persons who held temporary custody thereof, the date and time when such transfer or
custody was made in the course of safekeeping until presented in court as evidence, and the
eventual disposition. There is no denying that the safeguards of marking, inventory and picture-
taking are all vital to establish that the substance confiscated from the accused was the very same
one delivered to and presented as evidence in court.

A review of the records reveals that the non-compliance with the procedural safeguards
prescribed by law left serious gaps in the chain of custody of the confiscated dangerous drug. First,
PO1 Sonido, who testified having marked the confiscated drug at the place of arrest, did not claim
that he did the marking in the presence of Dina. Secondly, although P/Insp. Jonathan Lorilla
attested on cross-examination that an inventory of the confiscated drug had been conducted, his
testimony had no corroboration in the records. That he was also unsure if photographs of the
confiscated drug had been taken in the presence of Dina accented the non-observance of the
safeguards. The absence of the justification accented the gaps in the chain of custody, and should
result in the negation of the evidence of the corpus delicti right from the outset.

170 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE IMMEDIATE MARKING UPON CONFISCATION OR RECOVERY OF THE

DANGEROUS DRUGS OR RELATED ITEMS IS INDISPENSABLE IN THE PRESERVATION
OF THEIR INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE

People of the Philippines vs. Lumaya

G.R. No. 231983; March 7, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Crispian Lumaya assailing the
Decision of the CA which affirmed the Judgment of the RTC finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Secs. 5, 11, and 12, respectively, of Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, for
selling and possession of illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia.

Appellant was arrested in San Jose Extension in Barangay Motong, during a buy bust
operation where he was caught after selling to a police poseur-buyer. After the arrest, the appellant
was frisked and was caught with more illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia in his possession.
Subsequently, they all went to the appellant's house to execute the subject warrant and conduct
an inventory.

According to the accused, they were not informed that the said inventory was a result of
the buy-bust operation and/or implementation of the subject warrant.

ISSUE:
Does the chain of custody rule require that the marking of dangerous drugs be made on
the place where they are confiscated?

RULING:
Yes. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs,
should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest.

The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of
dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to
set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the moment
they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby
forestalling switching, planting or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately
upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the
preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value. To note, marking upon immediate confiscation
has been interpreted to include marking at the nearest police station, or the office of the
apprehending officers.

In this case, it is undisputed that the police officers did not immediately mark the sachets
of “shabu” at the place of confiscation during the buy-bust operation or at the nearest police station.
Instead, they proceeded to the house of Crispian to implement the subject search warrant and only
thereafter, conducted the marking. To justify the deviation, they proffered that that they could not
"allow [the accused's] companions to escape and bring the possible huge amount of “shabu”. Thus,
they marked the items "only after the search of the house of the parents of Crispian.”

By and large, the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers militate against
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.

| 171
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

MARKING IMMEDIATELY UPON CONFISCATION OR RECOVERY OF THE

DANGEROUS DRUGS OR RELATED ITEMS IS INDISPENSABLE IN THE PRESERVATION
OF THEIR INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE

People of the Philippines vs. Villarta

G.R. No. 217887; March 14, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of RTC of Cebu City
finding Clover A. Villarta (appellant) guilty of violating Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165.

During a buy-bust operation, Jake, later on identified as Villarta, drugs which was worth
P200 was shown to him. After the exchange, his companions rushed towards them and recovered
two packs of ‘shabu’ from Jake’s pocket. However, the team failed to bring a container for the
drugs and a marker, thus he marked the drugs at the police station. SPO1 Petallar signed the
inventory with a notation stating that no barangay official, media representative and DOJ
representative signed the inventory due to difficulty to get their presence. For the defense,
appellant claimed that, at the operation, four people arrested him and saw one of them trying to
slip something into his pockets. Appellant further claimed that the charges against him were
fabricated; that PO2 Bugtai, was never present during the arrest.

The RTC ruled that Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. 9165 had been complied as there was no
evidence of tampering. The CA further ruled that the prosecution had successfully established all
the elements of illegal sale of shabu as well as all the elements of illegal possession of shabu and
that the non-recording of the marked money would not necessarily result in acquittal as long as
the sale of the prohibited drug is adequately proven.

ISSUE:
Does non-compliance with the chain of custody rule necessarily result in acquittal despite
the sale of the prohibited drug having been adequately proven?

RULING:
Yes. As held in People v. Gonzales, the importance of the prompt marking cannot be
denied, because succeeding handlers of dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as
reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related
items from other material from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the
close of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching, planting or contamination of
evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs
or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value.

In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution miserably failed to establish an unbroken
chain of custody of the confiscated items. With regard to the first link in the chain of custody in the
instant case, PO2 Bugtai testified that he seized the illegal drugs from appellant at the locus
criminis, and did not mark them immediately, but marked the same only after he got to the police
station because he failed to bring a marker at the place of arrest. Additionally, the prosecution
failed to show that they even at least tried to contact “a representative from the media and the
DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof" as to signify that such physical inventory was done in their presence. It
has been ruled that there is a gap or break in the fourth link of the chain of custody where there is
absence of "evidence to show how the seized shabu were handled, stored, and safeguarded
pending its presentation in court," as in this case.

172 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

CONTRABAND MUST BE MARKED IMMEDIATELY UPON SEIZURE

Calma vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 180586; November 20, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the decision of
the CA in affirming the RTC in convicting the accused guilty of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs.

The Solano Police conducted a buy-bust operation on Calma. The operation was based
on a call from an informant that Calma is selling prohibited drugs. Calma was accosted and two
sachets of crystalline substance, which later found to be shabu, were seized from him, first the
object of the sale, while the second was found in his wallet under his motorcycle’s driver seat. The
arresting police brought the contraband to the police station where the same are marked by an
officer not a member of the buy bust team.

Insisting on his acquittal, Calma argued that the prosecution failed to clearly and
adequately show the details surrounding the purported transaction which was the subject of the
buy-bust operation. He pointed out that the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent and even
contradicted each other, as to who organized and who were the members of the buy-bust team,
who prepared and photocopied the marked money used in the operation, and how the search on
the motorcycle was conducted.

ISSUE:
Did the prosecution fail to prove Calma’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for failing to mark
the seized item upon seizure?

RULING:
Yes, the prosecution failed. The chain of custody was not established.

In all prosecutions for violation of R.A. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself,
the existence of which is essential to a judgment of conviction, thus, its identity must be clearly
established. It is of paramount importance that the prosecution prove that the identity and integrity
of the seized drugs are preserved. Each link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs must be
established.

Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. To ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence, the marking of the seized items should be done in the
presence of the apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation of the said items. The
two sachets of shabu should have been marked immediately after being handed to the police. The
police officers should have not brought the same to the police station, where the same were
marked by an officer not a member of the buy bust team.

Thus, the prosecution failed to prove Calma’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

| 173
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNDER THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE, THE APPREHENDING TEAM SHALL

IMMEDIATELY AFTER SEIZURE AND CONFISCATION CONDUCT A PHYSICAL
INVENTORY AND PHOTOGRAPH THE SEIZED ITEMS

People of the Philippines vs. Geronimo

G.R. No. 225500; September 11, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Jonas Geronimo
assailing the decision of the CA which affirmed the Joint decisionof the RTC finding him guilty of
violating Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

A tip was received from a confidential informant that Geronimo was peddling illegal drugs
in Caloocan City. Acting on the said tip, Intelligence Agent 1 Arquero immediately organized a buy-
bust operation, which was coordinated with the PDEA and the PNP. Arquero then instructed the
informant to order P500.00 worth of shabu from Geronimo. When Geronimo arrived, he took out
from his right pocket a transparent plastic sachet containing a suspected shabu, and handed it
over to the poseur-buyer, who in turn, paid him with the buy-bust money.

Subsequently, Intelligence Officer 1 Lorilla and Intelligence Officer 2 Advincula recovered

the buy-bust money and the marijuana leaves wrapped in a newspaper. Because the area is “so
dark and the area may be risky,” Arquero ordered the officers to conduct the inventory and
photography of the said item to the nearest station. The team proceeded to the headquarters in
Quezon City, and the confiscated items were supposedly marked, photographed, and inventoried
by Lorilla in the presence of Geronimo and Barangay Kagawad Ruiz. After conducting the
inventory, Lorilla delivered the specimens to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. Consequently,
the specimens were received and examined by Forensic Chemist Santiago, who later on revealed
that the substances found tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
mefenorex, and marijuana.

Geronimo interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up, and that the apprehending
officers did not follow the procedures required by the chain of custody rule.

ISSUE:
May the accused be convicted of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
despite the lack of requisite inventory and photography immediately after seizure and confiscation
of the dangerous drugs and at the place of Geronimo's arrest?

RULING:
No. Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 provides the chain of custody rule where the
apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person
from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and the seized drugs must be turned
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination. R.A. No.
9165 explicitly provides that non-compliance with the required procedure can only be allowed
under exceptional circumstances, provided that justifiable grounds are given and proven as a fact
therefor by the apprehending officers, which IA1 Arquero failed to show in this case since he
maintained that the area of operation was “so dark,” so he instructed the buy-bust team to conduct
said processes at their office.

174 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

R.A. NO. 9165 REQUIRES THAT PHYSICAL INVENTORY AND PHOTOGRAPH OF

SEIZED EVIDENCE MUST BE DONE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED AND
OFFICIALS

Anyayahan vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 229787; June 20, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ricky Anyayahan assailing the
Decision CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, for the sale and possession of illegal drugs.

During the buy bust operation, SPO1 Monte handed 3 marked bills to Anyayahan who
advised SPO1 Monte to wait as he entered his house. Upon his return, Anyayahan pulled out from
his right pocket two (2) small pieces of transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance, and gave one (1) sachet to SPO1 Monte, while he returned the other sachet inside his
pocket. After inspecting the contents, SPO1 Monte placed his arm around the shoulders of
Anyayahan as he waved his other hand which was the pre-arranged signal. He then introduced
himself as a police officer, arrested Anyayahan, and ordered the latter to bring out the contents of
his pocket from where the other plastic sachet of suspected shabu, together with the buy-bust
money, was recovered.

Anyayahan denied the charges against him alleging that when walking to the store one
evening, he was grabbed by the policemen and was brought to the barangay where the policemen
brought out the drugs allegedly recovered from him.

ISSUE:
Was the proper chain of custody followed?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court finds that the police officers unjustifiably deviated from the
prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value
of the items purportedly seized from Anyayahan.

Records failed to show that SPO1 Monte conducted the requisite inventory in the presence
of an elected official, a media representative, and a DOJ representative. In his testimony during
trial, he admitted that it was only after he had finished the Inventory of Evidence that he proceeded
to the Barangay Hall and procured the signatures of the barangay official and the media
representative, without, however, mentioning the presence of any representative from the DOJ.

Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehending team, after seizure and
confiscation, to immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused, representatives from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given copies thereof. The
mere production of the inventory, without the necessary personalities physically witnessing the
proceeding, fails to approximate compliance with the mandatory procedure under the law. It is well-
settled that the procedure in Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. While non-compliance is allowed, the
same ought to be justified.

| 175
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED, HIS COUNSEL ANY MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE, A

DOJ REPRESENTATIVE, OR AN ELECTED OFFICIAL DURING THE PHYSICAL
INVENTORY IS MANDATORY TO ESTABLISH AN UNBROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY

Mapandi vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 200075; April 04, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the CA affirming
the conviction of accused Salim Mapandi for violation of Art. II, Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

In a buy-bust operation, Mapandi was arrested by PO2 Javier and a civilian asset. Mapandi
took out a white envelope, suspected of containing shabu, in exchange for money. After the drugs
were allegedly marked in the police station, the same were then brought to the crime laboratory.
The chemistry report showed that the specimen tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu).

As part of his defense, accused insisted that the rules on chain of custody were not strictly
complied with as the presence of insulating witnesses were not proven. The RTC nevertheless
found the accused guilty, which the CA affirmed. CA said that it has been established that the
chain of custody of the seized shabu was continuous and unbroken. The shabu sold by accused
were sufficiently shown to have been the same substance which were taken from him and
subjected to forensic examination.

ISSUE:
Was the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items properly preserved?

RULING:
No. As a general rule, evidence of strict compliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 should
be shown in court to prove the identity and integrity of the subject drugs in this case.

The provision dictates that the apprehending team shall, immediately after confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the (a) accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, (b) his representative or counsel, (c) a
representative from the media and (d) the Department of Justice, and (e) any elected public official.

The members of the apprehending team never mentioned the presence of any media
representative, DOJ representative, or elected official during the physical inventory. Worse, they
also failed to show that the inventory was done before Mapandi or his representative. For all we
know, the apprehending team could have done all this behind closed doors. Although we cannot
assume this was what happened, due to the lack of any testimony or proof suggesting otherwise,
serious or reasonable doubt sets in.

The Court only excuses non-compliance when: (1) there exist justifiable grounds to allow
departure from the rule, and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending team. If these two (2) elements are present, the seizures and
custody over the confiscated items shall not be doubted.

176 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED, HIS COUNSEL ANY MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE, A

DOJ REPRESENTATIVE, OR AN ELECTED OFFICIAL DURING THE PHYSICAL
INVENTORY IS MANDATORY TO ESTABLISH AN UNBROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Adobar

G.R. No. 222559; June 06, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an Appeal under Sec. 13, Rule 124 filed by accused-appellant Aquila "Payat"
Adobar (Adobar), assailing the CA's Decision, which found accused-appellant Adobar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, or Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In a buy-bust operation, Adobar was caught selling a heat-sealed transparent plastic

sachet containing white crystalline substance, to PDEA agent, who acted as poseur-buyer. After a
confirmatory test conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory, said sachet is found positive of the
presence of 0.03 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. The sale was in
consideration of Php500.00 which is recorded as marked money in a buy bust operation.

Accused-appellant Adobar assailed his conviction claiming that PDEA agents failed to
comply with Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 as the media and DOJ representatives, respectively,
were not presented to testify on the Inventory which they supposedly witnessed. On the contrary,
the prosecution contended that this lapse did not render the subject drugs seized inadmissible
because the prosecution had duly shown that its integrity and evidentiary value were preserved.

ISSUE:
Is the presence of the DOJ representative, media representative, and elected public official
indispensable during the seizure?

RULING:
Yes, the DOJ, media representative, and elected public official must be physically present
at the time of and at or near the place of apprehension and seizure.

While the physical inventory and photographing is allowed to be done "at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizure," this does not dispense with the requirement of having the DOJ, media
representative, and the elected public official to be physically present at the time of and at or near
the place of apprehension and seizure so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation." The reason is
simple: it is their presence at that point that would insulate against the police practice of planting
evidence.

Here, none of these three witnesses under Sec. 21 were present at the time the subject
drugs were allegedly confiscated from Adobar. Hence, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus
delicti of the crime due to the serious lapses in observing Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Adobar is
hereby acquitted.

| 177
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED, HIS COUNSEL ANY MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE, A

DOJ REPRESENTATIVE, OR AN ELECTED OFFICIAL DURING THE PHYSICAL
INVENTORY IS MANDATORY TO ESTABLISH AN UNBROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Mercader

G.R. No. 233480; June 20, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
The is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Mercader on his conviction for Illegal
Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise
known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,” as affirmed by the CA.

In 2003, the PNP of Marikina City received a report from a confidential informant that
accused and her husband, alias “Tisoy” were selling drugs at their house in Antipolo City. A buy-
bust operation was conducted which resulted to the arrest of Mercader. A preventive search on
Mercader yielded two more plastic sachets of suspected shabu. Upon confiscation, the items were
marked at the place of arrest. Thereafter, the seized items were examined and confirmed that they
tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.

The RTC found Mercader guilty, ruling that the lack of prior surveillance and the failure to
offer the marked monies as evidence, do not invalidate the buy-bust operation, since the integrity
and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were properly preserved and the chain of custody
sufficiently established to convict Mercader.

ISSUE:
Did the arresting officers comply with the rules on chain of custody?

RULING:
No. It is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.
Thus, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same.

Although this court has ruled that failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over
the items as void and invalid, it must still be shown by the prosecution that there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.

In this case, the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain
of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Mercader. Records reveal that the marking of the seized items was not
done in the presence of any elected public official, as well as a representative from the DOJ and
the media. Despite the failure to observe this requirement, no justifiable ground was given to
explain such lapse. Hence, the chain of custody was violated without justification.

178 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED, HIS COUNSEL ANY MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE, A

DOJ REPRESENTATIVE, OR AN ELECTED OFFICIAL DURING THE PHYSICAL
INVENTORY IS MANDATORY TO ESTABLISH AN UNBROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Gamboa

G.R. No. 233702; June 20, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant questioning his conviction for violating
Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002,” which was affirmed by the CA.

In January 2014, a buy-bust operation was conducted against respondent Gamboa alias
"Kuya" who was allegedly engaged in rampant selling of shabu in Tondo, Manila. After the
transaction and arrest of Gamboa, a preventive search was conducted on him, where the arresting
officers recovered another plastic sachet and the buy-bust money. PO2 Nieva immediately marked
the two plastic sachets and inventoried the items at the place of arrest in the presence of Gamboa
and a media representative. Photographs of the confiscated items were also taken during the
marking and inventory. Thereafter, Gamboa and the seized drugs were brought to the police
station where the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, confirmed after examination that
the substance inside the seized items were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The RTC found Gamboa guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Was there an unjust deviation from the chain of custody when the marking was made
without the presence of the needed representatives?

RULING:
Yes, there was an unjust deviation from the procedure.

Under Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 the apprehending team shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official. The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, non-compliance with
the procedure — under justifiable grounds — will not render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.

In this case, the Court found that the police officers committed unjustified deviations. While
the seized items were properly marked, the same was not done in the presence of any elected
public official, as well as a representative from the DOJ, without any plausible explanation given
by the prosecution. Thus, for such failure, the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Gamboa have been compromised. In a prosecution for the sale and
possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of proving
not only the elements of the offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti failing in
which, renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

| 179
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

MARKING SHOULD BE DONE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE APPREHENDED VIOLATOR

IMMEDIATELY UPON CONFISCATION TO TRULY ENSURE THAT THEY ARE THE
SAME ITEMS THAT ENTER THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Ramirez and Lachica

G.R. No. 225690; January 17, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review, assailing the decision of the CA in affirming the conviction of
herein accused-appellants for illegal sale of shabu. Lachica and Ramirez denied the prosecution's
version and claimed that the PDEA operatives made a mistake in arresting them.

The buy-bust operation took place at the parking lot at SM Bicutan. However, the marking,
physical inventory, and photography of the seized items were done in PDEA office in Brgy.
Pinyahan, Quezon City.

ISSUE:
Was the marking of the illegal drugs away from the place where the buy-bust operation
was conducted proper?

RULING:
No, marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link and is vital to be
immediately undertaken because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as
reference.

R.A. No. 9165 is silent on when and where marking should be done. Marking is the first
and most crucial step in the chain of custody rule as it initiates the process of protecting innocent
persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting the apprehending officers as well
from harassment suits based on planting of evidence. This is when the apprehending officer or
poseur-buyer places his or her initials and signature on the item/s seized.

Thus, in People v. Sanchez, the Supreme Court ruled that marking should be done in the
presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon confiscation to truly ensure that they are
the same items that enter the chain of custody. It serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching, planting,
or contamination of evidence.

From his testimony, IO1 Bautista claims that it was not safe that the marking, physical
inventory, and photography be done at the parking lot of SM Bicutan. Contrary to the position taken
by the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that IO1 Bautista's failure to mark the two (2) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet immediately after confiscation was inexcusable considering the
fact that there were more than enough PDEA agents at that moment to ensure that the area was
secure for IO1 Bautista to mark the confiscated items.

In this case, IO1 Bautista admits that he marked the confiscated items in Quezon City,
almost one hour away from the crime scene. Considering that IO1 Bautista was the only PDEA
agent who was there at the time of seizure, none of the other PDEA operatives could attest that
they saw him take custody of the confiscated items. Also, they rode in separate vehicles going to
Quezon City. Even granting that IO1 Bautista did mark the sachets, breaks in the chain of custody
had already taken place: (1) when he confiscated the sachets without marking them at the place
of apprehension; and (2) as he was transporting them to Quezon City, thus casting serious doubt
upon the value of the said links to prove the corpus delicti.

In sum, the gaps in the prosecution's evidence create reasonable doubt as to the existence
of the corpus delicti for the illegal sale of shabu.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

DISCREPANCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES

REFERRING TO MINOR DETAILS OF THE CRIME COMMITTED DOES NOT IMPAIR
THEIR CREDIBILITY; WHAT IS MATERIAL IS PROOF OF ACTUAL SALE
TRANSACTION AND PRESERVED INTEGRITY OF EVIDENCE

People of the Philippines vs. Beringuil

G.R. No. 220141; June 27, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
In this appeal, petitioner Arnulfo Beringuil (Beringuil) challenges the decision of the CA in
affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec.
5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 for the illegal sale of one brick of cocaine.

In a buy-bust operation conducted by the PDEA, Intelligence Officer Laus (IO1 Laus) acting
as poseur-buyer with a confidential informant waited for Beringuil in a public market, whom they
knew was looking for a buyer of cocaine for the amount of P20,000. Once IO1 Laus gave Beringuil
the cash, he gave the prearranged signal and Beringuil was arrested. IO1 Laus took possession
of the bag containing the brick of cocaine. Since the buy bust operation was held at 9:00 PM and
considering that the crime scene was poorly lit and surrounded by people, the PDEA team brought
Beringuil and the confiscated items to the police station which was 500 meters away.

During the initial inventory, IO1 Laus marked the confiscated drug in the presence of
Beringuil and an elected barangay official. Another team member took pictures of the inventory
proceedings. Beringuil did not sign the certificate of inventory. The elected barangay official signed
the certificate as a witness. Beringuil was then brought to the PDEA office. IO1 Laus kept
possession of the confiscated items on their way to the office. Upon arrival, it was only then that a
final inventory was done in the presence of representatives from the media and the DOJ. IO1 Laus
with two members of his team personally turned over the confiscated drugs and then requested
for the chemical analysis of its contents. The chemistry report revealed that the examined item
tested positive for cocaine.

ISSUE:
Was the prosecution able to show that an illegal sale of drugs actually took place?

RULING:
Yes, the prosecution was able to clearly show that the sale of one brick of cocaine actually
took place and that the authorities seized it; which thereafter passed through the proper custodial
chain until it was identified and submitted to the court as evidence. In the prosecution of illegal sale
of drugs, what is material is proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.

The RTC properly found that Beringuil was guilty because it was convinced that all the
elements for the crime were present, even the corpus delicti or the drug itself, because all the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were consistent with the rest of the evidence. The RTC
also held that even if the buy-bust team did not strictly observe the guidelines for proper custody
and disposition of dangerous drugs, they were able to preserve the identity and integrity of the
confiscated drugs.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE ABSENCE OF THE REQUIRED WITNESSES AND OMISSION OF MARKING THE

CONFISCTATED ITEM NEGATE THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE SEIZURE
AND CONFISCATION OF THE SAID DRUGS THAT WERE EVIDENCE OF THE CORPUS
DELICTI, AND THUS ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE
INCRIMINATION OF THE ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Dela Victoria

G.R. No. 233325; April 16, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant (Dela Victoria) assailing the CA
decision which affirmed the decision of the RTC of Butuan City finding Dela Victoria guilty of
violating Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165.

When IO1 Ibarra, as poseur-buyer, with IO1 Daguman reached the target area, accused
Dela Victoria approached them and upon exchange of the marked P500 bill and the plastic sachet
containing shabu, IO1 Ibarra executed his signal which led to Dela Victoria’s arrest and search
which was conducted in the PDEA vehicle. When they went to the PDEA office, IO1 Ibarra marked
the sachet, prepared the inventory, and took pictures, while Dela Victoria remained inside the car
until Barangay Captain Cañete arrived. All of these were not done in the presence of the required
witnesses provided by law, i.e. in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items
were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official For the defense, he claimed that the drugs were
merely planted by the PDEA operatives in order to charge him with the said crime. The RTC found
the accused guilty as affirmed by the CA and held that even if the requirements under Sec. 21, Art.
II of R.A. 9165 were not fully complied, the integrity and evidentiary value of the same were shown
to have been duly preserved.

ISSUE:
Is the presence of all elements of the sale of dangerous drugs sufficient to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the same despite the omission of marking the confiscated sachet
and absence of a DOJ representative?

RULING:
No. In the case of People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that "without the insulating
presence of the representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the seized drugs, the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of
the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of R.A. No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and
credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the said drugs that were evidence herein of the corpus
delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.”

In this case, records show that IO1 Ibarra failed to mark the confiscated sachet in the
presence of the accused, Dela Victoria. In this relation, the said marking and preparation of
inventory were not even done at the place of arrest or at the nearest police station. Moreover, there
was no DOJ representative during the conduct of the inventory and no justification given for the
absence. The presence of these personalities and the immediate marking and conduct of physical
inventory after seizure and confiscation in full view of the accused and the required witnesses
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE DISCREPANCY OF TESTIMONIES ON WHERE THE SEIZED ITEMS WERE

MARKED IS A MINOR DETAIL THAT DOES NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT THE
ACCUSED WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS THE SELLER OF PROHIBITED DRUGS

People of the Philippines vs. Sanchez

G.R. No. 216014; March 14, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This case resolves the appeal assailing the CA Decision that affirmed the conviction of
accused-appellant Edwin Sanchez y Salvo (Sanchez) for illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs.

At the target area, a man approached the confidential informant and IO1 Diocampo, as
poseur-buyer, introduced as "Kat-Kat." Upon exchange by IO1 Diocampo of the marked P500 bills
and the plastic sachet containing the shabu accused Sanchez was immediately arrested.
Afterwards, the seized items were then inventoried in the presence of Punong Barangay Mendoza
and DOJ representative Magnaye.

On the other hand, accused Sanchez was the lone witness for the defense and testified
that on the same day, during a drinking session, armed persons invited him to the office of the
PDEA. After showing Sanchez two P500 bills and two small plastic sachets, Sanchez was placed
under arrest. Also, he specifically assails the inconsistent testimonies of IO1 Diocampo and IO1
Riñopa where IO1 Diocampo marked the items at the barangay hall while IO1 Riñopa stated that
it was marked at the place of arrest. The RTC convicted accused Sanchez of the crimes charged
as all elements of the crime were present. The CA affirmed such decision despite the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies on where the seized items were marked.

ISSUE:
Was the unbroken chain of custody of the dangerous drugs established despite the
differing testimonies on where they were marked?

RULING:
Yes. The discrepancy of testimonies on where the seized items were marked is a "minor"
detail that "does not change the fact that accused-appellant Sanchez was positively identified as
the seller of prohibited drugs; and the chain of custody of the seized drugs was established by the
prosecution.” Although the testimonies differed on where the seized items were marked, the
prosecution has sufficiently demonstrated that this discrepancy did not affect the integrity or
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.

The elements of the crime of selling dangerous drugs are: first, "the identities of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and second, the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. "IO1 Diocampo recounted how she posed as "Kat-Kat" and bought a sachet of
shabu from accused-appellant Sanchez in exchange for P1,000. Thus, her testimony establishes
the elements provided.

The elements of possession of dangerous drugs are: first, "the actual possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug"; second, "such possession is not
authorized by law"; and third, "the accused freely or consciously possessed the said drug. "IO1
Diocampo further testified that apart from the sachet sold to her, another sachet containing 0.211
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride was obtained from accused-appellant Sanchez. Thus,
the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of both crimes charged.

| 183
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE GAP IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY CAUSED BY THE LACK OF MARKING UPON
CONFISCATION UNDERMINED THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE
CONFISCATED DRUG

Calahi vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 195043; November 20, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside
decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession and use of dangerous drugs.

While serving a search warrant to Elsie Valenzuela, the members of the PNP CIDG noticed
an XLT jeep parked near Elsie's house. Suspicious, they approached said jeep and saw four (4)
persons holding a pot session inside. They noticed drug paraphernalia and remnants of shabu
inside. Subsequently, the CIDG requested a laboratory examination on the confiscated substance
by the PNP Crime Laboratory, Cabanatuan City. An Information charged petitioners for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Law.

The petitioners argue that the identity and integrity of the drugs are undermined because
the arresting officers failed to inventory and photograph the seized items in petitioners' presence.

ISSUE:
Did the absence of an inventory and photograph of the seized items in petitioner’s
presence affect the continuity of the chain of custody, affecting the integrity of the evidence?

RULING:
Yes. The absence of such inventory and photographs tarnished the integrity of the
evidence.

The chain of custody rule requires proof of every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was seized to the time it is presented in court and offered into evidence, such that witnesses
constituting the chain are able to testify on how it was given and received, including the precautions
taken to ensure that the seized item was not altered or tampered with.

In this case, the facts only established that after seizure of the items and arrest of the
petitioners, the apprehending team took the latter to the police station, then requested a laboratory
examination of the confiscated items, and eventually requested inquest proceedings in connection
with the petitioners' arrest. It was not in any way established that the items were marked after
seizure. The gap in the chain of custody caused by the lack of marking upon confiscation
undermined the identity and integrity of the confiscated drug, raising reasonable doubt that the
specimen presented in court is the same one confiscated from the petitioners. Hence, such
evidence is inadmissible.

184 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE SALE

TRANSACTION ACTUALLY HAPPENED AND THAT THE PROCURED OBJECT IS
PROPERLY PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SHOWN TO BE THE SAME
DRUGS SEIZED FROM THE ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Sagana

G.R. No. 208471; August 2, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of CA, affirming RTC’s decision holding the accused-
appellant guilty of violation of R.A. 9165.

After a buy-bust operation was conducted, accused was charged with a violation of Art. II,
Sec. 5 and 11 of R.A. 9165 for the sale of shabu. At the police station, the incident was entered in
the police blotter. They took photos of Sagana and the confiscated items in the presence of a
representative from the Department of Justice, media representatives, and an elected barangay
official.

Sagana posed as defense frame-up and extortion; that police officer demanded from his
wife P50,000 for the non-filing of case against him. Accused-appellant insists that there are
substantial gaps in the chain of custody. He asserts that the prosecution failed to show that the
marking and preparation of the receipt were made in his presence. Despite the signatures of an
elected public official and representatives from the media and the Department of Justice on the
receipt, there were still infirmities as these signatories were not present in the operation when the
inventory was done.

ISSUE:
Is the accused entitled to an acquittal on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable due to substantial lapses in the chain of custody?

RULING:
Yes. In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually
happened and that the procured object is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to
be the same drugs seized from the accused.

Aside from proving the elements of the charges, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold was the same substance offered in evidence in court as exhibit must likewise
be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
In this case, the prosecution offered testimonies corroborating the narration of the alleged sale of
illicit drugs that paved the way for Sagana's arrest. However, the prosecution failed to establish
that the miniscule amounts of dangerous drugs presented as evidence in court were the very same
ones allegedly seized and retrieved from Sagana.

The significant lapses committed, as well as their failure to explain their non-compliance
with the directives of the law, cast doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti. With these
circumstances, this Court acquits accused-appellant Sagana as his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHERE THERE ARE DOUBTS ON WHETHER THE SEIZED SUBSTANCE WAS THE
SAME SUBSTANCE EXAMINED AND ESTABLISHED TO BE THE PROHIBITED DRUG,
THERE CAN BE NO CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OR ILLEGAL SALE OF A
PROHIBITED DRUG

People of the Philippines vs. Hilario and Guadayo

G.R. No. 210610; January 11, 2018
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal on the decision of the CA holding accused-appellant Marilou Hilario guilty
of illegal sales of drugs, defined and penalized under R.A. 9165.
Three informations were filed against the accused: one for illegal sale, two for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165. Two sachets of shabu were presented by the prosecution
during the trial, but only one sachet was seized from the accused. RTC found him guilty for all
three informations, but CA acquitted him for the informations for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.

Accused-appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. Hilario contended that PO1 de Sagun only made a blanket declaration
that as poseur-buyer, he was able to buy shabu from Hilario and his testimony lacked clear and
complete details of the supposed buy-bust operation. Hilario likewise averred that the identity of
the shabu supposedly bought and confiscated from Hilario was not established with certainty by
the prosecution, pointing out that PO1 de Sagun's confusion as to the markings affixed on the
seized item was apparent. Thus, Hilario asserted that serious doubts arose as to whether the
sachet of suspected shabu submitted for laboratory examination were the same as that purportedly
bought and confiscated from her.

ISSUE:
Should the accused be acquitted considering that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the corpus delicti?

RULING:
Yes. To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165,
prosecution must establish: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and tis
consideration; (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

Where there are doubts on whether the seized substance was the same substance
examined and established to be the prohibited drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession or
illegal sale of a prohibited drug.

In this case, the police officer who claims to have seized the sachet of shabu could not
positively identify which between the two sachets of shabu he was presented with at the trial was
the one he actually seized from Hilario. PO1 de Sagun's testimony — consisting of generalizations
which lacked material details, riddled with inconsistencies, and uncorroborated — failed to
establish the elements of the offense charged with proof beyond reasonable doubt.

186 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IN PROSECUTING ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS, CONVICTION CANNOT BE

SUSTAINED IF DOUBT PERSISTS ON THE IDENTITY OF SAID DRUGS DUE TO THE
PROCEDURAL LAPSE OF UNEXPLAINED ABSENCE OF THE DOJ REPRESENTATIVE

People of the Philippines vs. Dela Rosa

G.R. No. 230228; December 13, 2017
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of RTC and CA holding accused-appellant Manuel dela
Rosa guilty of violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165.

Herein accused-appellant was charged with the crime of illegal sale of marijuana. Based
on the testimony of the witnesses of the prosecution, dela Rosa was caught in a buy-bust operation
selling dried leaves of marijuana.

Dela Rosa denied the charge and claimed that the prosecution failed to establish the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item. Aside from the inconsistent dates when the
alleged transaction took place, the records of the case show that the physical inventory of the
confiscated drug and the photographs of the same where only done in the presence of the
accused-appellant, Brgy. Captain Vergara and media representative Nebrejo. A representative of
the DOJ, as required by Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, was not present during the inventory of the
seized item.

ISSUE:
May the accused be held liable despite lack of strict compliance with the chain of custody
rule?

RULING:
No, in prosecuting illegal sale of dangerous drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if doubt
persists on the identity of said drugs.

Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 requires the apprehending team after seizure and confiscation to
immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph the same in the presence of (1) the
accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Given the substantive flaws and procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of
the seized marijuana that the prosecution presented as evidence before the Court. Particularly,
they were not able to explain the absence of a representative of the DOJ and the distant conduct
of the inventory of the seized item.

| 187
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE PRESENTATION OF AN INFORMANT AS A WITNESS IS NOT REGARDED AS

INDISPENSABLE TO THE SUCCESS OF A PROSECUTION OF A DRUG-DEALING
ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Calvelo

G.R. No. 223526; December 6, 2017
Martires J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC and CA finding accused Ariel Calvelo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. (Sec.) 5, Art. (Art.) II of R.A. 9165.

Calvelo was arrested after a buy-bust operation was conducted by the authorities. The
three heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets seized from him were brought to the laboratory for
examination wherein all tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).

Accused alleges that it should be the informer and not the buyer who should be put on the
witness stand, because the latter had personal no knowledge of the alleged transaction.

ISSUE:
Is the presentation of the informer as witness indispensable to establish the identity and
integrity of the alleged confiscated drugs?

RULING:
No, there was no need for the prosecution to present the informant if only to determine
whether there was a prior drug deal between him and the poseur buyer.

Continuing accretions of jurisprudence restate the requirements to secure a conviction for

illegal sale of dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller; (2) the
object and the consideration; and (3) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish beyond moral certainty the details of the
transaction that took place between Villanueva and Ariel from the offer to purchase shabu until the
consummation of the sale. The presentation of an informant as a witness is not regarded as
indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. Hence, there was no
need for the prosecution to present the informant.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

FAILURE TO OFFER TESTIMONY OF EVIDENCE CUSTODIAN IS FATAL TO

PROSECUTION OF A BUY BUST CASE WHEN THE INTEGRITY OF THE DRUGS IS IN
DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Carlit

G.R. No. 227309; August 16, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This ordinary appeal assails the ruling of the CA convicting accused-appellant Jocelyn G.
Carlit (Carlit) for illegal sale of drugs, in violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

In a buy bust operation, PO3 Christian Caravajal (Caravajal) was tasked to act as a poseur-
buyer to entrap Carlit. Caravajal, together with a civilian asset, approached Carlit and personally
bought shabu from her, handing the buy bust money consisting of five 100-peso bills. After
obtaining possession of the shabu, Caravajal introduced himself as a police officer and arrested
Carlit. The shabu was marked in a police station with the Caravajal’s initials, signed by a DOJ
representative and Carlit, all in the latter’s presence. Thereafter, Caravajal brought the shabu to
the PNP Crime Laboratory, where PSI Todeño received the same and conducted examination.
Afterwards, Todeño handed the shabu to the evidence custodian PO2 Manuel. An information
against Carlit was filed and trial ensued. The prosecution presented Caravajal and PSI Todeño as
witnesses to prove the culpability of the accused but did not present PO2 Manuel. The RTC and
CA convicted Carlit of the crime charged.

Carlit assails the CA ruling, pointing out that the chain of custody required to preserve the
identity of the object of the sale was not observed.

ISSUE:
Did the prosecution prove the chain of custody in the case at bar?

RULING:
No, the prosecution failed to prove a link in the chain of custody.

There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy bust situation,
namely: "first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug
to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and, fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court."

PO2 Manuel was never presented as witness in this case. Needless to say, the probability
of the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti being compromised is present in every single time
the prohibited item is being stored or transported, be it from the PNP crime laboratory directly to
the court or otherwise. It was therefore imperative for the prosecution to have presented as witness
PO2 Manuel, and anyone else for that matter who may have handled the drug after him.

Thus, without PO2 Manuel's testimony, there is no guarantee that the corpus delicti of the
offense had been preserved. Carlit must be acquitted.

| 189
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO TENDER EXPLANATION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR

THE SUBSTANTIAL LAPSES IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RESULTS TO THE FAILURE
TO PROVE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Geronimo

G.R. No. 180447; August 23, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC and CA finding accused-appellant Fernando
Geronimo guilty of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165.

The accused was arrested in a buy-bust operation and thereafter charged for the sale of
shabu. The accused-appellant denied the charges and claimed instead that the arresting police
officers had arrived and conducted a search of another house near the house of his sister where
he was then watching a show on television with his niece and her three classmates.

RTC and CA convicted him for having been caught in flagrante delicto.

ISSUE:
Is the accused entitled to an acquittal on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable due to substantial lapses in the chain of custody?

RULING:
Yes. In every prosecution of the sale and possession of shabu under R.A. 9165, the state
carries the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offenses, failing in which the state could
not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Chain of custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
from the time of seizure to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court
for des0truction. Hence, R.A. 9165 requires the marking of the seized drug immediately upon
seizure.

Records reveal several lapses on the part of the buy-bust team. To start with, no
photograph of the seized shabu was taken either at the place of the entrapment and arrest, or even
later on after the buy-bust team had brought the accused-appellant to their office. Secondly,
although PO1 Janet Sabo, the poseur-buyer, attested that she had placed her initials "JAS" on the
confiscated shabu at the place of the entrapment right after the accused-appellant had been
apprised of his constitutional rights by PO3 Hunilassan Salisa, none of the members of the buy-
bust team saw the need to photograph the seized shabu and the confiscated buy-bust bills then
and even later on. And, thirdly, no elected official, or member of the media, or representative of
the Department of Justice was present. Prosecution tendered no explanation for such lapses, thus
accused must be acquitted.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHILE MARKING MAY BE DONE IN THE PLACE OF CONFISCATION OF ILLEGAL

DRUGS, IT SHOULD STILL BE DONE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED TO AVOID
PRODUCING SERIOUS DOUBTS ON THE INTEGRITY AND IDENTITY THEREOF

People of the Philippines vs. Seguiente

G.R. No. 218253; June 20, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA affirming the Decision of the RTC finding
Evelyn Seguiente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Secs. 5 (Illegal Sale of Shabu)
and 11 (Illegal Possession of Shabu), Art. II of R.A. No. 9165.

Seguiente was arrested during a buy-bust operation for selling illegal drugs. After the
arrest, PO1 Ismula searched appellant and recovered from her the marked money. When frisked,
PO1 Ismula found in appellant's possession another sachet of shabu. Thereafter, appellant was
brought to the Zamboanga City Mobile Office where SPO1 Jacinto marked the sachet of shabu
with his initials "STJ" while the sachet of shabu recovered from appellant's possession was marked
by PO1 Ismula with his initials "JHI." After an inventory of the seized items, the latter were turned
over to the case investigator PO2 Nedzfar M. Hassan (PO2 Hassan) who also placed his initials
on the two sachets.

On appeal to the SC, appellant alleged the prosecution’s failure to account for the chain of
custody of the seized drugs as the marking of the items seized was not done in her presence. The
physical inventory and taking of photographs were likewise not conducted in her presence and the
persons mentioned in the law.

ISSUE:
Will the charge for violation of R.A. No. 9165 prosper despite the failure of the
apprehending officer to comply with the requirements of inventory and photograph taking?

RULING:
No. The Court held that marking upon immediate confiscation does not exclude the
possibility that marking can be at the police station or office of the apprehending team. However,
while there was testimony about the marking of the seized substance at the police station, there
was no mention that the marking was done in the presence of appellant.

Another crucial deviation from the procedure required by law was the failure to take
photographs of the seized items. This fact was admitted by the prosecution during the request for
admission by the defense.

In this case, the prosecution offered no explanation on why the procedure was not followed
or whether there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so. The prosecution did not bother to
justify its lapses by conducting re-direct examination or through rebuttal evidence despite the
defense raising such matters during the trial. "These lapses effectively produced serious doubts
on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti especially in the face of allegation of frame-up."
As ruled in People v. Relato, "[i]t is settled that the State does not establish the corpus delicti when
the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is missing or when substantial gaps in the
chain of custody of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the
prohibited substance presented as evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State less
than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

GAPS IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY CANNOT BE FILLED IN BY THE MERE

INVOCATION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
THEIR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS

People of the Philippines vs. Tomawis

G.R. No. 228890; April 18, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by Basher Tomawis assailing the CA Decision, which affirmed the
RTC Decision finding him guilty of illegal sale of illegal drug under R.A. 9165.

A walk-in confidential informant appeared before PDEA and reported that a certain alias
Salim was engaged in illegal drug activities and operated in Muntinlupa, Alabang. PDEA Agent
IO1 Alejandro was assigned as the poseur-buyer and was given marked P500 bills. Thereafter,
they went to Metropolis, Alabang to meet with alias Salim, who was later identified as Tomawis.
Upon showing of money, Tomawis told Alejandro that he will get the shabu and will meet her in
the food court. Thereafter, they simultaneously exchanged the money for the shabu. Alejandro
signaled and immediate back up came to arrest Tomawis. A commotion occurred during the arrest.
Tomawis shouted "Tulungan niyo ako papatayin nila ako." They were not able to put markings on
the evidence in the vicinity due to the commotion. After Tomawis was arrested, he was brought
together with the evidence to Brgy. Pinyahan, Quezon City. Upon reaching Brgy. Pinyahan, they
immediately conducted the inventory which was done before the barangay officials of the said
barangay. Alejandro handed the seized item to Alfonso Romano who was the inventory officer, but
she (Alejandro) was present during the inventory process.

Tomawis argued that the prosecution failed to prove the identity and integrity of the alleged
seized drugs due to the irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operation.

ISSUE:
Does the presumption of regularity in performance of official duties apply in buy-bust
operations for dangerous drugs cases?

RULING:
No, the presumption of regularity cannot be applied due to the glaring disregard of the
established procedure under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 committed by the buy-bust team.

Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 outlines the procedure to be followed by a buy-bust team.
The procedure is a matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality. In drug cases, the presumption should arise only when there is a showing that the
apprehending officer/buy-bust team followed the requirements of Sec. 21, or when the saving
clause may be properly applied. Gaps in the chain of custody cannot be filled in by the mere
invocation of the presumption of regularity. Judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the
law is fundamentally unsound because the lapses themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity.

In the present case, there are gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs which create
reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity thereof. The conduct of the inventory in this case
was not conducted immediately at the place of arrest but at the barangay hall of Pinyahan, Quezon
City. There was no compliance with the three-witness rule as there were no witnesses from the
DOJ or the media. There were other breaches of procedure in the handling, marking, and
photographing of the seized drugs. Here, the presumption of regularity cannot be applied due to
the glaring disregard of the established procedure under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR,
committed by the buy-bust team.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WITHOUT CREDIBLE PROOF OF THE UNBROKEN AND UNASSAILABLE CHAIN OF

CUSTODY, THE EVIDENCE OF THE CORPUS DELICTI WAS NOT SATISFIED

People of the Philippines vs. Lumudag

G.R. No. 201478; August 23, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of RTC and CA finding accused-appellant Lumudag
guilty of violation of R.A. 9165.

The accused was charged and convicted for violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165 for the illegal
sale of shabu. He seeks the reversal of his conviction pointing out that the prosecution failed to
prove faithful compliance with the chain of custody rule. He specifically alleged the absence of
physical inventory and photographing of the illegal drug immediately upon seizure and in the
presence of the required representatives.

ISSUE:
Is the accused entitled to an acquittal on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable due to substantial lapses in the chain of custody?

RULING:
Yes. The saving mechanism for non-compliance with the chain of custody rule provided in
Sec. 21 (a) of the IRR of R.A. 9165 is conditioned upon a clear showing on the part of the agents
of the law not only that the non-compliance with the requirements was upon justifiable grounds,
but also that the evidentiary value of the seized items was properly observed by the apprehending
team.

Records bear out that the required justification for failure to perform physical inventory and
photographing in the presence of required persons was not given by the buy-bust team. Without
the credible proof of the unbroken and unassailable chain of custody, the evidence of the corpus
delicti was not adduced, hence accused must be acquitted.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 21 OF RA 9165 WILL NOT RENDER VOID AND INVALID
THE SEIZURE AND CUSTODY OF SEIZED ITEMS IF IT IS UNDER JUSTIFIABLE
GROUNDS AND THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS
ARE PROPERLY PRESERVED

People of the Philippines vs. Battung

G.R. No. 230717; June 20, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC finding
appellant Lulu Battung y Narmar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of
R.A. No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

Battung was charged with selling of illegal drugs punishable under R.A. No. 9165. She
claimed that her arrest was framed by the police officers who allegedly caught her selling illegal
drugs in a buy bust operation. On appeal to the Supreme Court, appellant argues that her guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant argues that presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties is inapplicable in this case on account of the police officers' failure to observe
the proper procedure in preserving the chain of custody as required under Sec. 21 of R.A. No.
9165 by failing to conduct an inventory at the scene of the crime, to take photographs of the alleged
illegal drug, nor obtaining the presence of the media or any elected public official after the arrest.

ISSUE:
Is the chain of custody rule properly followed where there was no inventory of the drugs
seized, photographs of the illegal drugs taken, or the presence of any media representative or
elected public official?

RULING:
No. Under the original provision of Sec. 21 and its IRR, which is applicable at the time the
appellant committed the crimes charged, the apprehending team was required to immediately
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the drugs after their seizure and confiscation in the
presence of no less than three (3) witnesses, namely: (a) a representative from the media, and (b)
the DOJ, and; (c) any elected public official who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory
and be given copy thereof. The presence of the three witnesses was intended as a guarantee
against planting of evidence and frame up, as they were "necessary to insulate the apprehension
and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity." Non-compliance with
the requirements of Sec. 21 will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody of the seized
items on justifiable grounds and where the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.

Here, the Court found nothing on record of any explanation proffered by the prosecution
for the procedural lapse. The prosecution never alleged and proved that the presence of the
required witnesses was not obtained for any of the following reasons, such as: (1) their attendance
was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area;(2) their safety during the inventory
and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the
accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were
involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the
presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required
under Art. 125 of the RPC prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat
of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug
operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE BREACHES OF THE PROCEDURE CONTAINED IN SEC. 21, ART. II OF R.A. 9165,
LEFT UNACKNOWLEDGED AND UNEXPLAINED BY THE STATE, MILITATE AGAINST
A FINDING OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AGAINST THE ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Ching

G.R. No. 223556; October 9, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC and the CA finding accused-appellant
Manuel Ching guilty of violating Secs. 11, 12, and 5 of R.A. 9165.

Ching was arrested after a buy-bust operation was conducted by the authorities. The items
seized from him were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination where eight (8) out of the
nine (9) sachets (marked as MLC-1 through MLC-6, MLC-8 and MLC-9) were positive for shabu.

Ching denied the charges and alleged that the police officers did not comply with Sec. 21,
Art. II of R.A. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). The taking of photographs
and the conduct of an inventory in the presence of a representative from the media and the DOJ
was not properly established by the prosecution. Moreover, the delivery of the seized items to the
PNP Crime Laboratory was made way beyond the prescribed twenty-four (24)-hour period from
seizure.

ISSUE:
May the accused be convicted despite lack of strict compliance with the chain of custody
rule?

RULING:
No. Jurisprudence states that it is essential that the identity of the seized
drug/paraphernalia be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary
doubts on such identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same.

Strict compliance with the requirements of Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. 9165 may not always be
possible. Its IRR provides that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure laid out in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and the IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid. However, the justifiable ground for non-compliance with
Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. 9165 must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what
these grounds are or that they even exist.

In the instant case, however, the lapses committed by the police officers were left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State. Thus, it militates against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary rule of the corpus delicti had
been compromised.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

STRICT COMPLIANCE TO PROCEDURAL RULES MAY NOT BE ALWAYS POSSIBLE,

NONETHELESS, THE PROSECUTION HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE JUSTIFIABLE
REASON FOR ITS NON-COMPLIANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Gajo

G.R. No. 217026; January 22, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal to the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC finding
accused-appellants Lawrence and Rico Gajo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Secs. 5
and 11, Art. II of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. 9165).

A buy-bust operation resulted to the arrest of accused-appellants, Lawrence and Rico

Gajo. Thereafter, the authorities took them and the seized items to the police station where PO3
Justo placed the markings on the three sachets he recovered. Then, PO2 Cruz who submitted
them to the Crime Laboratory Service of Rizal.

Lawrence and Rico contend that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because of non-observance of the chain of custody requirement under Sec. 21,
Art. II of R.A. 9165 in the case. Accused-appellants argue that the apprehending officer did not
immediately mark the sachets of shabu in their presence and that there was no proper physical
inventory and photograph taken as required by the chain of custody rule.

ISSUE:
Was the corpus delicti properly established despite procedural lapses?

RULING:
No. To convict the accused-appellants, it is primordial that the corpus delicti or the
confiscated illegal drugs had been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

As such, the required unbroken chain of custody under Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. 9165 comes
into play to ensure that no unnecessary doubt is created on the identity of the seized illegal drugs.
First, marking must be done immediately upon the seizure of the illegal drugs and in the presence
of the apprehended violator of law. In this case, however, the apprehending officer attested that
he did not immediately mark the sachets of shabu recovered from the scene. Moreover, it without
the presence of Lawrence and Rico.

Second, every person who touched the seized illegal drug must describe how and from
whom it was received. In this case, the prosecution did not present PC/Insp. Benzon to testify on
the matter. Likewise, the Court observes that no physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items were made in the presence of the accused or their counsel or representative, and in the
presence of a representative of the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public
official. While the Court agree that strict compliance to procedural rules may not be always
possible, nonetheless, the prosecution has the burden to prove justifiable reason for its non-
compliance. However, in the instant case, no justifiable reason was given anent the failure of the
police to observe the foregoing procedural requirements.

Certainly, the integrity of the corpus delicti was compromised; and the same became highly
questionable. Verily, the Court could not determine with moral certainty that the supposed shabu
seized from Lawrence and Rico were the same ones submitted to the Crime Laboratory, and
eventually, presented in court.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULES IS REQUIRED EXCEPT

WHEN JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE THEREOF EXIST

People of the Philippines vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 219953; April 23, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the CA Decision dismissing accused-appellants' appeal and affirming
the Decision of the RTC in convicting accused-appellants for illegal sale of shabu.

P/Insp. Gatus received a report from an informant about the activities of an alias "Babang"
at Quezon City. The chief of police dispatched policemen to confirm the veracity of this, and
conduct a surveillance and buy-bust operation. The informant identified that the person standing
in front of the house is "Babang," later known as appellant Reyes. The informant introduced PO2
Talosig to Reyes as a buyer of shabu. Appellant Josephine Santa Maria, who was standing beside
Reyes, asked for money. When PO2 Talosig gave appellant Santa Maria the marked money,
Reyes got a plastic sachet containing a crystalline substance from her right pocket. PO2 Talosig
signaled that the transaction was consummated. PO1 Lappay placed Santa Maria under arrest,
while PO2 Talosig arrested Reyes, keeping the seized plastic sachet in his possession. They were
brought to the police station with the seized evidence. Talosig placed the seized evidence in
another plastic sachet, sealed it and marked it "DT-AR-JS" at the police station. PO1 Bautista
prepared an inventory of seized items and request for laboratory examination, while Talosig took
the photo of appellants and the seized evidence.

Santa Maria claims that the trial court erred in finding the prosecution evidence to be
admissible despite being the result of an invalid warrantless search and arrest.

ISSUE:
Was the non-compliance with the chain of custody rule, in that there was no representative
from the media and the National Prosecution Service (NPS) during the inventory, justified by the
prosecution?

RULING:
No, there was no justifiable reason for the non-compliance of the prosecution.

The original provision of Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 states that the apprehending team is required
to immediately conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the same in the presence of (1) the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof
after seizure and confiscation of the drugs. Now, the amendatory law mandates that. the conduct
of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official and (3) a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

In the present case, the old provisions of Sec. 21 and its IRR shall apply since the alleged
crime was committed before the amendment. Here, there was no representative from the media
and the NPS present during the inventory and no justifiable ground was provided as to their
absence, hence the identity of the seized item has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 21, ART. II OF R.A. 9165 MAY NOT ALWAYS BE
POSSIBLE, BUT THE PROSECUTION MUST EXPLAIN THE REASONS BEHIND THE
PROCEDURAL LAPSES, AND THAT THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF
THE SEIZED EVIDENCE HAD BEEN PRESERVED

People of the Philippines vs. Crispo

G.R. No. 230065; March 14, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal to the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC of
Manila finding Marcelino Crispo and Enrico Herrera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sec. 5, Art. II of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. 9165); and Sec. 11, Art. II of
the same law.

A buy-bust operation resulted to the arrest of accused-appellants, Crispo and his runner,
Herrera. Thereafter, the authorities took them and the seized items to the barangay office where
the arresting officers conducted the inventory and photography in the presence of two (2) barangay
kagawads. After examination at the Crime Laboratory, it was confirmed that the sachets seized
from accused-appellants contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

Crispo averred that the absence of representatives from the DOJ and the media during the
conduct of the inventory is fatal to the prosecution of accused-appellants, hence his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Were the procedural lapses committed by the arresting officers justified?

RULING:
No. To obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same from the moment the drugs
are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

Under Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. 9165 the apprehending team shall immediately after seizure
and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official.
However, the Court clarified that under varied conditions, strict compliance with such requirements
may not always be possible, but the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved.

The Court finds that the arresting officers committed unjustified deviations from the
prescribed chain of custody rule. An examination of the records revealed that while the inventory
and photography of the seized items were made in the presence of two (2) elected public officials,
the same were not done in the presence of representatives from either the DOJ and the media.
Also, in this case, despite the non-observance of the witness requirement, no plausible explanation
was given by the prosecution.

Hence, the procedural lapses committed by the arresting officer, militate against a finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Crispo, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti had been compromised.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY REQUIREMENTS UNDER R.A.

9165 UNDER JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS SHALL NOT RENDER VOID AND INVALID
SEIZURES OF AND CUSTODY ITEMS, PROVIDED THAT THE INTEGRITY AND
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ARTICLES ARE PROPERLY PRESERVED

People of the Philippines vs. Lamama

G.R. No. 88313; August 27, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of RTC and CA finding accused-appellant Jalil Lamama
guilty of violation of R.A. 9165.

Accused was apprehended through a buy-bust operation, and thereafter charged with a
violation of R.A. 9165, for the sale of prohibited shabu. He protests that the buy-bust did not adhere
to the requirements because the photographing, marking, and inventorying were done at the POEA
station instead of the site of the arrest; and that the barangay officials in attendance were not from
the barangay where the arrest was made.

ISSUE:
Is the accused entitled to an acquittal on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt due to substantial lapses in the chain of custody?

RULING:
No, non-compliance with the requirements provided under R.A. 9165 under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.

The buy-bust team substantially complied with the requirements of the law on marking,
photographing and inventorying of the dangerous drugs seized. The photographs showed
Lamama standing beside the marked three sachets of shabu seized from him, and of the barangay
officials as well as the ABS-CBN News crew of Dagupan City signing the certificate of inventory in
the presence of one another and of the accused. The signed certificate of inventory of the drugs
and buy-bust money seized from Lamama was offered by the Prosecution to show compliance
with the requirements.

The protest of Lamama is unwarranted. The law does not expressly require that the
marking, photographing and inventorying be always made at the site of the buy-bust operation,
and that the elected officials be always from the place where the buy-bust arrest occurred. To
justify the procedural lapses, the apprehending officer explained during trial that the team had to
immediately leave the place of arrest to avoid a commotion or reprisal inasmuch as the accused,
who was a notorious person, could have cohorts around. That officials were not from the barangay
were arrest was made to avoid the buy-bust operation being leaked to Lamama’s cohorts.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE MUST BE JUSTIFIED;

FAILURE TO DO SO RENDERS VOID AND INVALID THE SEIZURE AND CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Sood

G.R. No. 227394; June 6, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an Appeal from the CA Decision affirming the RTC Decision which found Norjana
Sood guilty of illegal sale of shabu, violating Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165.

It was alleged that police operatives arranged a buy-bust and entrapment operation to
apprehend Norjana after being informed by the informant that she was the dealer of alleged drugs.
They successfully lured and apprehended her using the identity of “Florence” who they were also
able to arrest in an earlier operation. Before leaving the target area, SPO1 Regato placed the
markings on the plastic sachets. Norjana was taken to the barangay hall. The Inventory of Seized
Properties/Items was prepared and the inventory was conducted before Kgd. Salazar and Argana,
a media representative. Both of them signed the certificate of inventory for the (2) transparent
plastic sachets. Norjana was brought to the police station afterwards. The confiscated items were
turned over to the investigator, PO3 Cortes, who prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination
of the subject specimens.

As a defense, appellant denied the charges and testified that on the same day, she was
laying out her merchandise as a sidewalk vendor, when she was apprehended by 2 men and was
brought to the police station where the policemen demanded P35,000.00 for her release.

ISSUE:
Were there justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the chain custody rule in that there
was no inventory conducted in the place of seizure?

RULING:
No. Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 imports that the buy-bust team is to conduct the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized items immediately after seizure and confiscation in the
presence of the accused, his counsel, or representative, a representative of the DOJ, the media,
and an elected public official, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.

Only if this is not practicable can the inventory and photographing be done as soon as the
buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team. In cases of non-compliance with the procedure for inventory and photographing, twin
requirements are imposed: first, there should be justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and
second, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items should be properly preserved.
Failure to show these 2 conditions renders void and invalid the seizure of and custody of the seized
drugs.

The prosecution's reason for not conducting the inventory in the place of seizure was that
they supposedly wanted to avoid any commotion at the area because there would be vehicular
traffic. As buy-bust operations are planned, the team could have easily ensured that the conduct
of the inventory and photographing would cause minimal disruption to the area. Further, and more
importantly, the records fail to show any reason for the prosecution's failure to comply with the
presence of the three witnesses during the inventory and photographing of the seized drugs. The
prosecution failed to comply with Sec. 21 or justifiably explain the deviations from it

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

NON-COMPLIANCE MUST BE FOR JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS; INEXCUSABLE NON-

COMPLIANCE INVALIDATES SEIZURE AND CUSTODY OVER SEIZED ITEMS

People of the Philippines vs. Alvarado

G.R. No. 234048; April 23, 2018
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA Decision, which affirmed the RTC Decision finding accused-
appellant Alvarado guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of R.A. No.
9165, while Alvarez and Dal were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 5, Art. II
of the same.

The prosecution alleged that they formed a team and arranged a buy-bust operation based
on information reported to them, which resulted in the apprehension of the three accused-
appellants. The barangay authorities were contacted and thus, in the presence of Barangay
Kagawad Noel Azarcon and the suspects, markings were placed on the seized items at the scene
of the arrest. The plastic container of aluminum foils was also marked. Photographs of the arrested
suspects and the seized items were taken while the inventory of the seized item was being
prepared. The team brought the accused-appellants to the police station for documentation and to
submit the confiscated items to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The forensic chemist
found the sachets (in the possession of Alvarado) and the sachets subject of the sale positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

The RTC found the appellants guilty as charged. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The
appellants claim that no evidence was presented showing that the inventory and photographing of
the seized items were conducted in their presence and/or their representative, and representatives
from the media and the DOJ. The prosecution contends that there was substantial compliance with
Sec. 21 (a) of R.A. 9165, the chain of custody and the presentation of the corpus delicti in court.

ISSUE:
Was the integrity of the seized items maintained notwithstanding the non-compliance with
the chain of custody rule in that there was absence of DOJ and media representatives during the
inventory?

RULING:
No, the prosecution failed to establish that the plastic sachets containing shabu were
properly handled and sealed until their submission to the crime laboratory.

Sec. 1 (A.1.6) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations states that "[a]
representative of the [National Prosecution Service] is anyone from its employees, while the media
representative is any media practitioner. The elected public official is any incumbent public official
regardless of the place where he/she is elected." The presence of these three (3) persons required
by law can be ensured in a planned operation such as a buy-bust operation.

Here, the buy-bust operation was arranged and scheduled in advance. The police officers
formed an apprehending team, coordinated with the PDEA, prepared the buy-bust money, and
held a briefing. Yet, they failed to ensure that a DOJ representative and a media practitioner, would
witness the inventory and photographing of the seized drugs. Non-compliance with the
requirements shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over the seized items as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. It must
be stressed, however, that the non-compliance must be for "justifiable grounds." In this case, there
was no justifiable ground given by the arresting officers for the absence of DOJ and media
representatives.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNJUSTIFIED DEVIATIONS WITH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE PUT INTO

QUESTION THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS

People of the Philippines vs. Delociembre

G.R. No. 226485; June 6, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by accused Bernie Delociembre and Dhats
assailing the Court’s Resolution, which affirmed the CA Decision finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165.

It was alleged that a buy-bust team was organized to conduct an entrapment operation
against Bernie, alias “Axe,” who was reportedly “operating” within Quezon City. The team
proceeded to the target area in NIA Road and were able to apprehend him and Dhats. They
proceeded next to the PDEA office where the requisite marking and inventory were done in the
presence of Brgy. Kagawad Ruiz, Jr. and the two accused while SOII Macairap took pictures of
the same. IO1 Avenido then delivered the seized drugs to the PDEA laboratory where Forensic
Chemical Officer Santiago who confirmed that they tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride and meferonex, a dangerous drug. Consequently, Santiago turned over the items to
the custody of the trial court.

The two accused argues that the officers failed to comply with the mandatory procedures
in the handling and disposition of the seized drugs.

ISSUE:
Was the integrity of the seized drugs maintained notwithstanding the fact the inventory was
not done in the presence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ?

RULING:
No, the unjustified deviations put into question the evidentiary value of the seized items.
Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when
handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.

The failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Sec.
21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the
items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved.

The records reveal that while the requisite inventory of the seized drugs was conducted in
the presence of the two accused and an elected public official, the same was not done in the
presence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ. More significantly, the apprehending
officers failed to proffer a plausible explanation therefor. There was also no showing that the
apprehending officers attempted to contact and secure the presence of representatives from the
media and the DOJ apart from the unsubstantiated allegations of the prosecution witnesses. No
plausible reasons were given as to why their presence could not be easily secured.

Procedural lapses committed by the police officers, which were unfortunately

unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
had been compromised. The procedure in Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of
substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored
as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.

202 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

INEXCUSABLE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SEC. 21 OF R.A.

9165 EFFECTIVELY INVALIDATES THEIR SEIZURE AND CUSTODY OVER THE SEIZED
DRUGS, THUS, COMPROMISING THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE SAME

People of the Philippines vs. Macud

G.R. No. 219175; December 14, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC and CA finding accused-appellant Amroding
Macud holding him guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drug under Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165.

The prosecution rests its case from the legitimacy of a buy-bust operation where Macud
was caught in flagrante selling shabu. Among the witnesses it presented are PO2 Catarata who
testified on the acts constituting the offense charged and leading to the apprehension of Macud,
and PCI Cejes who testified on the delivery and report of the plastic sachet and the examination
of its contents.

The accused denied the charges against him and raised as defense the failure of the police
officers to comply with the procedural requirements under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. There were
no representatives of the media, the DOJ, and any elected public official to witness the marking
and physical inventory of the seized drugs; and, although the marking and physical inventory of
the seized drugs were done immediately after the arrest, the photograph was done after the
operation and in the police station by PO2 Francisco, also without the requisite persons who should
have witnessed the act.

ISSUE:
May the accused be convicted despite lack of strict compliance with the chain of custody
rule?

RULING:
No, the integrity and relevance of the prosecution's evidence have been compromised by
the failure of the police to preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drug subject of the crime
charged.

The preservation of the chain of custody is essential in a successful prosecution for the
illegal sale of dangerous drug. Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 provides a special rule on the handling of
items seized and confiscated in dangerous drugs cases. It establishes a chain of custody rule
which aims to preserve the integrity of the items to be used in prosecutions under the law.

In the instant case, there was a break in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drug
which the prosecution failed to explain. When asked to explain why there was failure to comply
with the procedural requirements, PO2 Catarata simply said that doing so could compromise the
buy-bust operation. Even if the claim were true, there is no requirement under the law that the
elected public official who should witness the operation must be one of those elected in the same
locality where the operation is conducted so as not to compromise the police operation in the area.
This is clear from the wordings of the law itself which says " any elected public official."

Considering that the prosecution failed to present the required quantum of evidence,
appellants acquittal is in order.

| 203
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

PROHIBITED OBJECT OR ITEM TAKEN FROM AN ACCUSED DURING A LAWFUL

WARRANTLESS ARREST IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE

Dacanay vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 199018; September 27, 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Rolando Dacanay assailing the
decision of CA, finding him guilty of violation of R.A. 9165.

The accused was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of plastic sachet of shabu and
thereafter charged with and convicted for violation of R.A. 9165 for illegal possession of prohibited
drugs. He argues that his arrest was illegal for not falling under the exceptions in Sec. 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court for a warrantless arrest; that he was not committing or attempting to commit
a crime when arrested, and that the apprehending officer had no personal knowledge that a crime
has been committed, and that the accused committed it.

ISSUE:
Is the evidence against petitioner inadmissible because his arrest was allegedly unlawful?

RULING:
No, the evidence is admissible. In the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, it must be shown that petitioner was in possession of an object or item that is identified to
be a prohibited drug and that his possession was not authorized by law.

These elements have been satisfactorily established in this case. Petitioner was caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs; the arresting officer had reasonable ground to be
believe the plastic sachet accused as holding contained shabu, judging from the past record, and
suspicion was heightened when accused was seen running after seeing the office. In the course
of a lawful warrantless arrest, the person of the accused may be searched for dangerous or illegal
objects. It follows that the prohibited object or item taken from him on the occasion is admissible
in evidence.

204 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

THE CORPUS DELICTI IN THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IS THE

LACK OF LICENSE OR PERMIT TO POSSESS OR CARRY THE FIREARM

Peralta vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 221991; August 30, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the decision of the RTC and CA finding
petitioner Joselito Peralta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition under Sec. 1 of PD 1866.

Peralta was apprehended by the police officers who responded to a telephone call received
by their desk officer-on-duty that there was a man firing a gun at the back of the PLDT Building in
Pantal District, Dagupan City. The officers charged them after recovering a pistol, with Serial No.
4517488, containing a magazine with 5 live ammunitions from Peralta and his companion, without
authority to possess the same. These men were then sent to the community precinct for paraffin
and gun powder residue test.

Petitioner vigorously denied having a firearm with him, much less illegally discharging the
same.

ISSUE:
Did the prosecution satisfactorily establish all the elements of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition?

RULING:
Yes. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack
of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law.

To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that: (a) the
firearm exists; and (b) the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess or carry the same.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish the aforesaid elements,
considering that the police officers positively identified Peralta as the one holding the pistol and
live ammunition, which were not registered under his name.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

STRANGULATING, SEVERELY PINCHING, AND BEATING AN EIGHT (8)-YEAR-OLD

CHILD TO CAUSE HER TO LIMP DEBASES, DEGRADES, AND DEMEANS THE
INTRINSIC WORTH AND DIGNITY OF SAID CHILD AND CONSTITUTES THE OFFENSE
PENALIZED UNDER R.A. NO. 7610

Lucido vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 217764; August 17, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This assails the decision of the CA affirming with modification the decision of the RTC
finding petitioner Antonieta Lucido guilty of child abuse under Sec. 10 (a) of R.A. 7610.

Lucido was the neighbor of the victim AAA’s family. The latter’s parents left her in the
custody of the former. The arrangement was made upon the request of Lucido that AAA, who was
eight years old at the time, stay with her since she was living alone. During AAA's stay with Lucido,
the child suffered repeated physical abuse in the latter's hands, which included strangulation,
beating, pinching, and touching of her sex organ by Lucido. AAA was also threatened by Lucido
that she would be stabbed if she tells anyone about what was being done to her.

Petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that the acts alleged in the information
— beating using a belt, pinching, and strangulating AAA — were intended to "debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being." Citing Bongalon v. People,
petitioner contends that she could not be convicted of child abuse but only of slight physical injuries
defined and punished under the RPC.

ISSUE:
Do the acts of petitioner against AAA constitute child abuse?

RULING:
Yes, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether it is habitual or not.

Sec. 10(a) of R.A. 7610 punishes four (4) distinct offenses, i.e. (a) child abuse, (b) child
cruelty, (c) child exploitation, and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's
development. As correctly ruled by the CA, the element that the acts must be prejudicial to the
child's development pertains only to the fourth offense. Any act of punishment that debases,
degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child constitutes the offense.

Strangulating, severely pinching, and beating an eight (8)-year-old child to cause her to
limp are intrinsically cruel and excessive. These acts of abuse impair the child's dignity and worth
as a human being and infringe upon her right to grow up in a safe, wholesome, and harmonious
place. It is not difficult to perceive that this experience of repeated physical abuse from petitioner
would prejudice the child's social, moral, and emotional development.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

ALL THREE ELEMENTS OF SEXUAL ABUSE MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY PROOF

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR SEC. 5 (b) OF R.A. 7610 TO APPLY

People of the Philippines vs. Villacampa

G.R. No. 216057; January 8, 2018
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC and the CA finding accused-appellant
Ceferino Villacampa guilty of nine counts of rape through sexual assault, one count of simple rape,
and one count of acts of lasciviousness in relation to R.A. 7610 committed upon the persons of
four minor siblings — AAA, BBB, CCC, and DDD then 11, 6, 14, and 13 years old.

Villacampa was the common-law husband of the mother of the four minor siblings with
whom accused-appellant had (sexual) incidents on several occasions. Villacampa had carnal
knowledge of CCC, who bore his child as a result thereof. Villacampa also inserted his finger into
the vagina of his victims and threatened to kill their father if they reported what happened.
Villacampa repeated these acts numerous times.

Accused-appellant argues that the victims' testimonies were not credible and thus not
enough to warrant his conviction. He posits that the victims were instructed by their father and Aunt
to file the cases against him. For CCC, he claims that he courted her and had a daughter with her.
In this appeal, Villacampa argues that the lower courts erred in finding him guilty of the crimes
charged as the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Did the trial and appellate courts err in convicting Villacampa for (1) nine counts of rape
through sexual assault in relation to Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, (2) one count of simple rape under
the RPC, and (3) one count of sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610?

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court affirmed all of the trial and appellate court’s findings with
modification only as to the penalty.

Rape through sexual assault as defined under the second paragraph of Art. 266-A was
committed by Villacampa when he inserted his finger into the vagina of his victims. It has long been
established that the insertion of the finger into another person's genital or anal orifice constitutes
rape through sexual assault. Simple rape as defined in the first paragraph of Art. 266-A was
committed by Villacampa when he had carnal knowledge of CCC, who bore his child as a result
thereof.

It is important to note that the victims in these cases were all minors at the time of the
commission of the crimes. Thus, the provisions of R.A. No. 7610 are relevant, specifically those
on sexual abuse. Under Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610, sexual abuse has the following
elements: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said
act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; (3) the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

All the elements of sexual abuse were proven beyond reasonable doubt. Villacampa
inserted his finger into the vagina of his minor victims. In this case, Villacampa, the common-law
husband of their mother, repeated the lascivious conduct against his victims, who were all under
his coercion and inuence. Clearly, the second element is present and all the child victims are
considered to be subjected to other sexual abuse. The minority of the victims was all proven during
the course of the trial and also admitted by Villacampa.

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COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

CHILDREN WHO ARE LIKEWISE COERCED IN LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT ARE "DEEMED

TO BE CHILDREN EXPLOITED IN PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSE”;
INSERTION OF FINGER INSIDE THE VAGINA OF A MINOR WITH THE USE OF THREAT
AND COERCION IS ALSO CONSIDERED CHILD ABUSE

Perez vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 201414; April 18, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure praying that the two CA Decision affirming Judgment of the RTC, which found Pedro
Perez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, be reversed and
set aside.

AAA, a 12-year old girl, testified that she first met Perez when she attended her cousin
BBB's birthday party. She saw him again when she visited her friend CCC at her house. She
narrated that Perez followed her when she went to the kitchen to drink water. He "kissed her on
the nape and simultaneously told her to keep silent." He then slid his finger in her vagina while
mashing her breasts. She wasn’t able to fight back due to fear. His sexual advances lasted for
around ten seconds. He then told her not to tell anybody about what happened. AAA told the
incident to her cousin FFF who disclosed it to her parents. Her parents reported the incident to the
Barangay who referred the matter to the police for investigation. the medico-legal report and Dr.
Tan’s testimony corroborate AAA’s allegation of sexual assault.

Perez argued that assuming there was a crime, his acts should only constitute acts of
lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC since the prosecution failed to prove that AAA was
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse".

ISSUE:
Is the insertion of a finger inside a 12-year old girl’s vagina and mashing her breasts only
constitute acts of lasciviousness?

RULING:
No, all the elements of sexual abuse as are also present.

Under Sec. 5 (b), the elements of sexual abuse are: (1) The accused commits the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and; (3) The child, whether male or female, is below
18 years of age. The Court in People v. Villacampa explained: To meet this (second) element, the
child victim must either be exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. In Quimvel
v. People, the Court held that the fact that a child is under the coercion and influence of an adult
is sufficient to satisfy this second element and will classify the child victim as one subjected to other
sexual abuse. Further, the Court clarified in Ricalde v. People, that the first paragraph of Art. III,
Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 7610 clearly provides that "children . . . who . . . due to the coercion . . . of any
adult . . . indulge in sexual intercourse . . . are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse." The label "children exploited in . . . other sexual abuse" inheres in a child who
has been the subject of coercion and sexual intercourse.

By analogy with the ruling in Ricalde, children who are likewise coerced in lascivious
conduct are "deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." When
petitioner inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA, a minor, with the use of threat and coercion,
he is already liable for sexual abuse.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

OFFENSE DESIGNATED AS ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS UNDER ART. 336 OF THE RPC,

IN RELATION TO SEC. 5 OF R.A. NO. 7610, SHOULD BE USED WHEN THE VICTIM IS
UNDER 12 YEARS OF AGE AT THE TIME LASCIVIOUS ACT WAS COMMITTED

People of the Philippines vs. Molejon

G.R. No. 208091; April 23, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal challenging the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of RTC
finding the accused, Benito Molejon guilty of five counts of Qualified Rape; and eleven counts of
acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC without applying the provisions of R.A. No. No.
7610 in connection with the crime committed against BBB, who was under twelve years old and
AAA who was twelve years old at the time the crime was committed.

The case stemmed from the allegations against accused, Benito Molejon, for allegedly
raping and sexually abusing his stepdaughters— AAA and BBB who were 12 and 11 years old
respectively. The abuse had been repeatedly committed over a number of years and was
discovered by the mother of the victims, AAA and BBB when she found the accused, standing
behind BBB with his hands inside the latter’s shorts. She immediately brought AAA and BBB to a
doctor who found healed lacerations consistent with the claims of the victims.

ISSUE:
Did the lower courts err in convicting accused, Benito Molejon guilty of 11 counts of acts
of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC without applying the provisions of R.A. No. 7610?

RULING:
Yes. The accused in criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness involving BBB, should be
convicted of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
No. 7610. With respect, however to criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness involving AAA, the
proper nomenclature of the offense should be lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
No. 7610, for the reason that the victim AAA was already 12 years of age when the offense was
committed.

On the one hand, conviction under Art. 336 of the RPC requires that the prosecution
establish the following elements: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness
upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed
either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of age. On the other
hand, sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements: (1) the accused
commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years
old.

Here, first, it has been established that accused-appellant committed lewd designs with his
step-daughter. The records show that accused-appellant on different occasions, fingered, fondled
and inserted his finger into BBB's vagina. These acts undoubtedly constitute lascivious conduct
under Sec. 2(h) of the IRR of R.A. No. 7610. Second, accused-appellant, as a step-father having
moral ascendancy over his step-daughter, coerced BBB to engage in lascivious conduct, which is
within the purview of sexual abuse. Third, BBB, who was then 11 years old, was clearly below 18
years old at the time of the commission of the offense, based on her testimony which was
corroborated by her Birth Certificate presented.

| 209
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHEN THE VICTIMS OF ABUSE, EXPLOITATION OR DISCRIMINATION ARE MINORS

OR INCOMPETENTS, SEC. 5(B) OF R.A. NO. 7610 IS APPLICABLE, NOT ART. 336 OF RPC

Orsos vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 214673; November 20, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This assails the resolution of the CA affirming with modification the decision of the RTC
finding Rizaldo Orsos guilty of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC.

The minor victim (AAA) was only fourteen years old when petitioner, a teacher and CAT
Commandant of AAA’s school, allegedly molested her. In the guise of an initiation to become an
officer, petitioner made her come to his house to which the former took advantage of AAA.

Orsos denied the charges against him and insisted that force and intimidation as an
element of acts of lasciviousness was not established in this case

ISSUE:
Was Orsos’ lascivious conduct towards the victim is punishable under Art. 336 of the RPC?

RULING:
No. There must be a confluence of the following elements before conviction can be had for
acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC: (1) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) through
force, threat, or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) when
the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present; and (3) that the offended party is another person of
either sex.

On the other hand, the requisites for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 are as
follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said
act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3)
that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

The court found that all the elements of both acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the
RPC and lascivious conduct under Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 have been sufficiently established in
this case. However, petitioner's conviction is upheld not for the crime of acts of lasciviousness
under Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, but for "lascivious conduct'' under
Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, considering that she was 14 years of age at the time of the commission of
the crime.

With regard to the element of force and intimidation, it has been established that petitioner,
who was then a teacher and CAT Commandant in AAA's school, and therefore, a person who
exercised moral ascendancy and influence upon her, committed lascivious or lewd conduct against
her.

210 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

WHEN THE VICTIM IS A MINOR IN THE CRIME OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED THROUGH INSERTING HIS FINGER INSIDE THE
FORMER’S VAGINA, R.A. NO. 7610 SHOULD PREVAIL AND NOT ART. 266-A OF THE
RPC

People of the Philippines vs. Macapagal

G.R. No. 218574; November 22, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming and modifying the decision of the
RTC of Naga City convicting the accused of two counts of rape through sexual intercourse, and
one count of rape through sexual assault.

When BBB, his daughter, was 11 years old, the accused, through lewd design and by
means of force and intimidation, inserted his finger inside the former’s vagina, against her will.
When BBB was 13 years old, accused successfully had sexual intercourse with the former. Finally,
when BBB was 16 years old, the accused again succeeded in having sexual intercourse with BBB.
When BBB’s mother learned of what the accused did to their daughter, the mother went to the NBI
Naga City to file charges.

Petitioner denied all the allegations. Appellant argued that while the last rape incident as
testified to by BBB happened on March 30, 2003, the hymenal lacerations diagnosed by Medico-
Legal Officer Dr. Jane Fajardo on April 3, 2003 are old and healed lacerations which were inflicted
more than a month or a year before. Faulting BBB's credibility, appellant contended that not only
did she tell anyone about the rape incident, she also tolerated similar incidences for the past five
(5) years from April 1998 to April 3, 2004, which is rather odd because there were times when she
was only with her mother at the clinic. Assuming that she was raped by her father, appellant
claimed that BBB could have found solace in a safe house or in government institutions rendering
social services for rape victims.

ISSUE:
Is the accused properly convicted of one count of rape through sexual intercourse under
Art. 266-A Paragraph 2 of the RPC?

RULING:
No. The proper crime should be Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336, RPC in relation to
Sec. 5(b) Art. III of R.A. No. 7610

Where the lascivious act covers both Art. 226-A and R.A. No. 7610, Art. 266-A, as
amended by RA8353, applies only if the victim is at least 18 years old, while R.A. No. 7610 is
applicable when the victim is below 18 years old, or if more than 18 years old but cannot fully take
care or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition. Where the lascivious act falls under R.A. No. 7610, the
proper nomenclature of the crime should be ‘Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC in
relation to Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610.’ In this case, the accused committed acts of
lasciviousness against BBB when she was 11 years old.

Hence, the accused should be convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of RPC
in relation to Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610

| 211
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

IT SHOULD BE R.A. No. 7610, NOT ART. 336 OF THE RPC, WHICH SHOULD BE USED
IN FIXING THE PENALTY FOR ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS COMMITTED AGAINST A
CHILD VICTIM

People of the Philippines vs. Padlan

G.R. No. 214880; September 6, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the appeal led by the accused-appellant Amante L. Padlan assailing decision
of the CA which affirmed with modifications the joint decision of the RTC finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC in relation to R.A. No. 7610
and one count of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to R.A. No. 7610
committed upon the person of AAA, a 9-year old girl.

On two separate occasions, accused-appellant, with lewd designs and by means of force
and intimidation, had carnal knowledge with AAA. He threatened AAA that he will kill her mother if
she reports such incident to BBB, her mother. In another day, accused-appellant roused AAA
awake by touching and rubbing her vagina. AAA quickly ran towards BBB to prevent him from
doing his advances. The next day, AAA complained to BBB about the pain she felt in her vagina.

For his defense, accused-appellant denied the charges against him and presented an alibi.
The trial court found him guilty as charged and imposed the penalty of imprisonment pursuant to
the provisions of Art. 336 of the RPC. The trial court did not apply the penalty prescribed by Sec.
5 (b); Art. III of R.A. No. 7610 since the Information did not allege what particular section of R.A.
No. 7610 was violated.

ISSUE:
In a criminal case for violation of R.A. No. 7610, in relation to Art. 336, should the court
impose the penalty provided for by Art. 336?

RULING:
No. The Court cannot apply the penalty provided under Art. 336 of the RPC because the
information specifically provided, and were able to prove, the elements of lascivious conduct under
Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610.

The Court ruled that AAA need not be a child exploited in prostitution for money or profit in
order for the provisions of R.A. No. 7610 to apply. As long as the child is subjected to sexual abuse,
either by engaging in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, the penalty under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III
of R.A. No. 7610 shall be the proper imposable penalty. As such, the penalty imposable on Padlan
is reclusion temporal in its medium period which ranges from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months,
and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.

The Court had already held in People v. Simon that when an offense is defined in a special
law but the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC, the legal effects
under the system of penalties native to the Code would necessarily apply to the special law.

Thus, in People v. Santos which also involved a case of acts of lasciviousness under Sec.
5 (b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610, the Court held that in the absence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the minimum term shall be taken from the penalty one degree lower to the
prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal medium, that is reclusion temporal minimum, while the
maximum shall be taken from the medium period of the imposable penalty, that is reclusion
temporal medium.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

CHARGING AN ACCUSED WITH RAPE UNDER THE RPC, AND WITH SEXUAL ABUSE
UNDER R.A. 7610, IN CASE THE OFFENDED PARTY IS A CHILD OF 12 YEARS OLD AND
ABOVE, WILL NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY

People of the Philippines vs. Udang, Sr.

G.R. No. 210161; January 10, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA, affirming the conviction of accused-appellant
Bienvenido Udang for two counts of rape under the RPC, and with sexual abuse under R.A. 7610.

The accused was charged with violation of Art. 266-A of RPC in relation to Sec. 5 (b) of
R.A. 7610, for allegedly raping AAA twice, the first instance the latter being only 12 years old then.
The RTC ruled that Udang cannot be convicted for both crimes, ratiocinating that an accused
cannot be prosecuted twice for a single criminal act. This was upheld by the CA, holding Udang
guilty of violation of R.A. 7610 and not Art. 266-A of RPC.

ISSUE:
Did charging the accused with both rape under RPC and sexual abuse under R.A. 7610
violate his right against double jeopardy?

RULING:
No. Charging an accused with rape under the RPC, and with sexual abuse under R.A.
7610, in case the offended party is a child of 12 years old and above, will not violate the right of
the accused against double jeopardy.

The offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special law, while rape is a felony
under the RPC. They have different elements. The "force, threat, or intimidation" or deprivation of
reason or unconsciousness required in Art. 266-A(1) of the RPC for rape is not the same as the
"coercion or influence" required in Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Consent is immaterial in the crime
of sexual abuse because "the mere act of having sexual intercourse with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse” is already punishable by law. However, consent
exonerates an accused from a rape charge. Hence, the two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus,
petitioner can be held liable for violation of Sec. 5(b) of Art. III of R.A. 7610.

| 213
COVERED CASES (1 JULY 2017 TO 30 JUNE 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

A RIVER IS CONSIDERED PART OF PHILIPPINE WATERS

People of the Philippines vs. Dela Peña

G.R. No. 219581; January 31, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
Maximo De La Peña (appellant) filed this appeal assailing the Decision of the CA finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of piracy punishable under P.D. No. 532,
otherwise known as Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.

Julita Nacoboan (Julita), her husband, Jose Nacoboan (Jose), and their son, Marvin
Nacoboan (Marwin) were about to board their pump boat loaded with 13 sacks of copra in
their barangay where it is situated along a river which opens to the sea. As the Nacoboan's pump
boat was about to depart, a smaller boat suddenly blocked its path. Three armed men then
immediately boarded the pump boat. One of the armed men pointed a firearm at Jose and ordered
him to proceed to the aft or the rear side of the boat. Another armed person grabbed Julita's bag
and took the following items, P1,000.00 cash, earrings, cellular phone and necklace.

The appellant and his armed companions then brought the pump boat to another island
where its engine, propeller tube, and tools were taken and loaded on appellant's boat.

Appellant's were charged with piracy and interposed denial and alibi as a defense and that
the elements of piracy were not established. Appellant maintains that the Information did not state
that the vessel in question was in Philippine waters and that its cargo, equipment, or personal
belongings of the passengers or complement were seized.

ISSUE:
Is the appellant guilty of piracy under P.D. No. 532?

RULING:
Yes, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the victims' pump boat
was in Philippine waters when appellant and his armed companions boarded the same and seized
its cargo, equipment, and the personal belongings of the passengers.

Sec. 2 (d) of P.D. No. 532 defines piracy as follows: Any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. x x x

The Supreme Court found that the Information categorically alleged that the incident
happened along the river bank of Brgy. San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar.

Under Sec. 2(a) of P.D. No. 532, "Philippine waters" is defined as follows: All bodies of
water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the
Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and
all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial sea, the
sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has

214 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON CRIMINAL LAW

sovereignty or jurisdiction. From this definition, it is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine
water.

PROHIBITION ON FIREARMS AND OTHER DEADLY WEAPONS; IT IS ESSENTIAL

THAT POSSESSION OF THE DEADLY WEAPON IN A PUBLIC PLACE BE ESTABLISHED

Gonzalez vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 225709; February 14, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA affirming the
conviction of petitioner Jasper Gonzalez for violation of Sec. 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC), as amended by Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166.

Gonzalez was charged with violating Sec. 261(p)(q) of the OEC, as amended by Sec. 32
of R.A. No. 7166, and Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 9165 for possession of a kitchen knife despite the ban
issued by the COMELEC on the carrying of deadly weapons at that time. PO1 Congson recovered
the knife from Gonzalez, frisked the latter, and ordered him to bring out the contents of his pocket,
which revealed one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing what PO1 Congson believed
to be shabu. He was then brought to the police station where the seized items were inventoried
and turned over.

In his defense, Gonzalez denied the charges and claimed that he was just at their house
and was about to go to sleep when four (4) male persons arrived and arrested him. The men tied
his hands, took the knife that was on top of the table and Gonzalez was photographed with the knife
placed on the top of a small table. Gonzalez alleged to have been brought to the barangay hall
where he just signed a paper about the seized evidence.

ISSUE:
Was the accused guilty of violating Sec. 261(p)(q) of the Omnibus Election Code, as
amended by Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166?

RULING:
No. Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166 provides that “During the election period, no person shall
bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building,
street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same,
unless authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearms licenses shall be
suspended during the election period”.

In order to secure a conviction of an accused based on these provisions, the prosecution

must prove that: (a) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly
weapons; (b) such possession occurs during the election period; and (c) the weapon is carried in
a public place. It is essential that possession of a deadly weapon in a public place be established
beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution failed to establish its allegation that, immediately before and at the time
of his arrest, Gonzalez was holding a knife in a public place - the critical elements of the crime of
violation of Sec. 261 (p) (q) of the OEC, as amended by Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166. Records show
that aside from the testimony of PO1 Congson, the prosecution did not present any other evidence
that would corroborate his version leading to Gonzalez' arrest. Gonzalez, on the other hand,
presented three (3) witnesses - neighbors who lived below and across his house where he was
arrested and who were there at the time of his arrest. All these witnesses corroborated Gonzalez'
version. Thus, acquittal from the crime charged is proper.

| 215
 ABOUTTHEBOOK

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